Family Cases 1-33

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CASES PAGE
1. Republic v Albios 2
2. Mallion v Alcantara 6
3. Abbas v Abbas 9
4. Capili v People 15
5. Jarillo v People 18
6. People v Odtuhan 21
7. OCA v Necessario 25
8. De Loria v Felix 36
9. Silverio v Republic 39
10. Republic v Cagandahan 44
11. Araes v Occiano 49
12. Manzano v Sanchez 51
13. Nial v Bayadog 53
14. Corpuz v Tirol 58
15. Fujiki v Marinay 63
16. Republic v Molina 72

CASES PAGE
17. Ferraris v Ferraris 82
18. Ngo-Te v Yu-Te 86
19. Camacho-Reyes v Reyes 102
20. Chi Ming Tsoi v CA 114
21. Halili v Halili 118
22. Antonio v Reyes 120
23. Republic v Obreccido III 131
24. de Castro v de Castro 134
25. Republic v Dayot 137
26. Carlos v Sandoval 145
27. Valdez v RTC 153
28. Cario v Cario 158
29. Mercado v Tan 163
30. Abunado v People 170
31. Salvador v Spouses Serafico 174
32. Antone v Beronilla 180
33. Tenebro v CA 186

2

Case No. 1

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LIBERTY D.
ALBIOS, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which
affirmed the April 25, 2008 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC), declaring
the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios(Albios) as void from
the beginning.
The Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios
filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a
collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could
not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits
ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void
from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent
as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent. ESDcIA
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage
to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from
its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying
the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not
understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a
marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for
Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
WHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE
PURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE IN
JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
CONSENT. 8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of
being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.

The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were
otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review
on certiorari.
3

Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud
for the purposes of immigration. SACTIH
Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development
of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States,
marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. 11 A common limited purpose
marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the
subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned
with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it attempts to filter out those
who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. 14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a
"marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married." This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that
the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early cases on limited
purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case
of United States v. Rubenstein 17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in
the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce
within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert
temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no
consent, to wit:
. . . But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual
consent is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or
ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do
not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved.
. . . Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a
marriage at all. . . . It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only
for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its
purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all.
They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily
understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which
declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United
States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration case ofMatter of McKee, 21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting
one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is
first necessary. 22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving
"limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid. 23 ACIDTE
The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent's marriage not void
In declaring the respondent's marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce
and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG's motion for
reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the
parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally
bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering
that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in
exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CA's assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties' supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the
same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab
initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties
willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the
Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also
be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
4

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to
do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly
and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There
was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios' marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered
into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any
conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not
intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence
of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent
because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent's marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had
an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow
them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was,
therefore, clearly present. cEaSHC

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real
intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered
into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and
incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus,
only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle
would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. 29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love
one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they
comply with all the legal requisites, 31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a
marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent's attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent's marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may
constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude;
(2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually
transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No
other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not
qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of
fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court
cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration
benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These
unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience;
she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be
safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and
just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06
isDISMISSED for utter lack of merit. SCIcTD
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, * Brion ** and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino of
the Fifth Division, Manila.
2.Id. at 38-39.
3.Id. at 37.
4.Id. at 33-35.
5.Id. at 38-39.
6.Id. at 39.
7.Id. at 48-49.
8.Id. at 13.
9.Id. at 61-71.
10.Id. at 89-95.
5

11.Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1
(2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).
(2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi
v. Schibi, 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only
to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup.
Ct. 1970); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly
to Schibi); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment
where purpose of marriage was to protect the girl's name and there was an
understanding that the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v.
Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v. Moore, 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939)
(refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for the purpose of
legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va.
Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to get his
pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband knew that
was the purpose of the marriage).
13.Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 237 (a) (1) (G), 8 U.S.C. 1227 (a) (1) (G) (2000).
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG. REC. 27,012, 27,015
(1986) (statement of Rep McCollum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986).
15.511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
17.151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18.United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
19.Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd,440 F.2d 1163 (5th
Cir. 1971).
(2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris
v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th
Cir. 1971).
21.Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
22.Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands: Kluwer
Law International, 2011) p. 86.
(2012); http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.
24.Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City,
Philippines: Joer Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.
25.Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City, Philippines:
Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
26.Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
(Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.
27.Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
(Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231;
citingMcClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.
28.Article 4, Family Code.
29.Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d
336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
32.Const. (1987), Article XV, Section 2.
*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, per
Special Order No. 1570 dated October 14, 2013.
**Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order
No. 1554 dated September 19, 2013.
||| (Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013)

6

Case No. 2

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141528. October 31, 2006.]
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, vs. EDITHA
ALCANTARA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a question of
law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack
of marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition 1 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, as amended,
otherwise known as the Family Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the
petition in a decision 2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." 3 The appeal
filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution 4 dated June 11, 1998 for
failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period. HDICSa
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999
another petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time
alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a
motion to dismiss 6 dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
In an order 7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to dismiss, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion
to Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order 9 dated January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A.IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION
OF HIS MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR
LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE
OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON
THE GROUND OF HIS WIFE'S PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE
BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY BY
THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW. IHCSET
B.IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE
REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES
JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND
FORUM SHOPPING. 10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same, that is, the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of action in the earlier case was
distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts
upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different.
Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there was no violation
of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters that while the
present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage, and prays for the
same remedy, that is, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that
petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that petitioner
violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this petition could have been
raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a
marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code
be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is being impugned on the ground of a
party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code? aIAHcE
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not
fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the
principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
7

Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit." 11
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is
founded upon the following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity,
which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the
hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine
would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquility and happiness. 12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47.Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment
or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a)In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will
or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the person;
however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate; DcAaSI
(b)In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the
commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the
same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and,
(c)In any other litigation between the same parties or their
successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged
in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata. 13 Section 47 (b) pertains to it in its
concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict," which is the effect of a judgment as
a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.
On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of
judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different cause of action. 14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar
by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former
judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and
the second actions identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the
presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the
same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a
judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. 16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence
necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological
incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition
which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license. CScTDE

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of
action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another. 17 In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated.
These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that
holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and
respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void
because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage
license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage
had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this
admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have
been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only
as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as
to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other
matters that could have been adjudged in that case. 18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by
simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. 19 As
this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals: 20
. . . the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of
action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks
redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have
been open under the pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the
right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having
circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in
the first. prcd
8

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A
plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues
existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal.
The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for
relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot
be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to
recover for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present
to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the
grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at
liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or
present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is
sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the
first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal
presentation is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in order to obtain
judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed in court, the parties must
ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The losing party who files another action
regarding the same controversy will be needlessly squandering time, effort and financial
resources because he is barred by law from litigating the same controversy all over again. 21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds
that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage
license is barred by the decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo
City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. EDSHcT
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 39-42.
2.Id. at 43-53.
3.Id. at 53.
4.Records, p. 33.
5.Id. at 3-10.
6.Id. at 15-33.
7.Id. at 74-77.
8.Rollo, p. 28.
9.Records, p. 90.
10.Rollo, pp. 7-8.
11.Gutierrez v. CA, G.R. No. 82475, January 28, 1991, 193 SCRA 437.
12.Cruz v. CA, G.R. No. 164797, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 379, quoting Heirs of the
Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, May 26, 2005, 459
SCRA 27.
13.NHA v. Baello, G.R. No. 143230, August 30, 2004, 437 SCRA 86.
14.Spouses Rasdas v. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 538.
15.Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, G.R. No. 163338, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA
533.
16.Sangalang v. Caparas, G.R. No. L-49749, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 53.
17.RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Section 2.
18.Carlet v. CA, G.R. No. 114275, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 97.
19.Linzag v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122181, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 304.
20.G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89.
21.Carlet v. CA, supra note 18.
||| (Mallion v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006)

9

Case No. 3
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.]
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO
ABBAS, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760, which reversed the Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated
July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order
No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment
of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract 3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967,
issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is
this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in
Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He
arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-law's residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told
him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The
Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to
the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads as follows: DcSACE

11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in
this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever
legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and
2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get
certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No.
9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993. 9 Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically. 10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003,
was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the
same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty.
Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified
that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the
bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty.
Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since
1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty.
Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the
marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it
was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage
contract and copy of the marriage license with that office. 17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he requested a certain
Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license
and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further testified that he did not know where
the marriage license was obtained. 20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by
the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21
10

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law,
and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her
house. 22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in
securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male
person went to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days later, the
same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to
Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She further testified
that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case had
been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. 26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola's testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one
of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was
seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and
(c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez. cTCaEA
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof. 27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to
their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days
returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January
9, 1993 at their residence. 28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that
she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who
celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been
issued for Gloria and Syed. 32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident
of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of
Article 9 of the Family Code. 33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner,
and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1.The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is
hereby annulled;
2.Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property
was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of
the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3.The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office, are hereby
ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries
the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January
9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED. 34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the
same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors: aEcDTC
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE
WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE
THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION
THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Gloria's arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for
11

the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. 37 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had
admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after
Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy. 38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between
Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January
1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008. 41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURT'S OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE. 42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious. EHCaDS
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No.
209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that
would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3), which read as follows:
Art. 3.The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1)Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2)A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3)A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4.The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35.The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3)Those solemnized without a license, except those covered
by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the
formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage
ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage
license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on
whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no
valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on
the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said
license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he
requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals 43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, which reads:
SEC. 28.Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided,
is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held: SDAcaT
12

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office
or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty,inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. 44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License
No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not
comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification,
and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no
diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth
noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig,
which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not
appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for
Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official
duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We
held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been
conducted, as Marriage License No. 9969967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the
best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other
witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied
for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the
contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of
the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and
thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar still enjoys probative value. STcAIa
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the
marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court.
However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid
marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, 47 following the case of Republic, 48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was
adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the
burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and
the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot
be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the
validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license
was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed
were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and
there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was
even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties
herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature
above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing
officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant's family, taken
during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the
lunch was held after the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit
"5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and
has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15
June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on
01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
13

Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. 50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a
marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2)." Article 35
(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from
the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. 51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among
the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage
license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The
law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage
of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. aESHDA
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1.Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.
2.Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling.
3.Rollo, p. 13.
4.Id. at 47.
5.Id.
6.Id. at 12.
7.Id. at 10.
8.Id. at 48.
9.Id. at 49, "January 19, 1993" in some parts of the records.
10.Id.
11.Id. at 49-50.
12.Id. at 50.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 51.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19.Id.
20.Id. at 52.
21.Id.
22.Id. at 53.
23.Id. at 54.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27.Id. at 55.
28.Id.
29.Id. at 56.
30.Id. at 57.
31.Id.
32.Id. at 58.
33.Article 9. A Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages
where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title.
34.Rollo, pp. 58-59.
35.Id. at 122.
14

36.Id. at 128.
37.Id. at 129.
38.Id. at 130.
39.Id. at 131.
40.Id. at 135-146.
41.Id. at 173-174.
42.Id. at 31.
43.G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257.
44.Id. at 262.
45.Supra note 43.
46.Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456.
47.403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001).
48.Supra note 43.
49.Supra note 47, at 870.
50.Rollo, pp. 129-130.
51.Art. 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the
marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall
remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
Art. 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to
enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage
may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall
state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person
legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo
mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrioor barangay, is so
located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear
personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary
steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the
absence of legal impediment to the marriage.
Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with a
legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the
marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within
the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Art. 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be
solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea
or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone
of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may
be performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they are
solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
||| (Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No. 183896, January 30, 2013)

15

Case No. 4

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183805. July 3, 2013.]
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision 1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused being previously united in lawful
marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having
been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law. 3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending
civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by
Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the
filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the
RTC. EHaASD
In an Order 4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner's Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be
dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had already been
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil
Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage)
nullifying the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and
Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was
stated, among others, that the issues raised in the civil case are not
similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and
that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of
the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the
Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second
marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had
already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo
City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity"
of the said second marriage. As such, this Court submits that there is no
more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision 5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's
decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution 7 dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
1.THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO
DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED
BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO
REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH
152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING
THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST
16

PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF
THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE
PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT,
AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND
THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES . . ., THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY
NULL AND VOID. CSaHDT
2.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P.
CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT
IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED
IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A
GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE
SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
3.THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR
ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF
FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO
LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4
OF THE FAMILY CODE.
4.THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF
THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043
DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE
DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND
DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE. 8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings. SaHIEA
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts
a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. 9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when
the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People, 10 the Court affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy ruling that the
crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering
that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
17

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage
to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled. 11 DEICTS
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that
what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law. 13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the
time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner's second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1,
2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1.Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Regalado E.
Maambong and Sixto C. Marella, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 44-54.
2.Id. at 56-57.
3.Records, p. 1.
4.Rollo, p. 58.
5.Id. at 44-54.
6.Id. at 52. (Emphasis in the original)
7.Id. at 56-57.
8.Id. at 20.
9.Mercado v. Tan, 391 Phil. 809, 818-819 (2000).
10.G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236.
11.Id. at 245-246. (Emphasis in the original.)
12.Merlinda Cipriano Montaez v. Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, October 22;
2012.
13.Teves v. People, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307, 314.
||| (Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013)

18

Case No. 5

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164435. September 29, 2009.]

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J p:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution 2 dated
July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S.
JARILLO of the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in
lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy
which marriage was only discovered on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter, trial
proceeded. ESacHC
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a
civil wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then
Municipal Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp.
20-21, TSN dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated
marriage in a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in
San Carlos City, Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17,
2000). Out of the marital union, appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J.
Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R, R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage
with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch
1, before then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D,
J, J-1, Q, Q-1, pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows
anew in a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-
93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5,
2000, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217,
for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby
finds accused Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS ofprision
mayor, as maximum. TcHDIA
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this
case, such as the nullity of accused's bigamous marriage to Uy
and its effect on their children and their property. This aspect is
being determined by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil
Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in
that assailed Order dated 2 August 2001. 3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null
and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of
the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for
lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner's conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision dated July 21,
2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted marriage with
Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been
declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to
Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of
19

sufficient evidence, petitioner's contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated March 28,
2003, declaring petitioner's 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null and void ab initio on the
ground of Alocillo's psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory on July
9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a
ground for the reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA,
citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he subsequent
declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, while it
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, the said marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy". 5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where
petitioner alleges that:
V.1.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A
CASE WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS
CASE. AaSHED
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST
TWO MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN
DECLARED BY FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38
BETWEEN EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO
AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN
ERRONEOUS PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed jointly. It is true
that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence, petitioner moved for suspension of
the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioner's marriages to Alocillo, which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her
appeal, she also asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated
by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her motion for
suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 6 the Court
categorically stated that:
. . . as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal
case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. . . .cDEICH
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the
first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar,
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married
man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity
would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. . . . 7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People, 8 where it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity,
the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner's
assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering
that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage
to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of
petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioner's conviction of
the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioner's two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of
bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner's
marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the
20

nullity of petitioner's marriage to Uy make any difference. 10 As held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. . . . A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code],
therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage". 11 ECISAD

Petitioner's defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision mayor, which is
classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty. Article 90 thereof provides that
"[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years", while Article
91 states that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the
crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ."
Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978; hence,
prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a fact as a matter of
defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused is obliged to produce evidence
in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to establish the same, it remains self-
serving. 12 Thus, for petitioner's defense of prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to
adduce evidence that as early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous
marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed to present
sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioner's testimony that her own mother told Uy
in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo does not inspire belief, as it is totally
unsupported by any corroborating evidence. The trial court correctly observed that:
. . . She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who
allegedly actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must
be obvious that without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the
attribution of the latter of any act which she allegedly did is hearsay. 13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals, 14 "the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to being counted from the date of
registration of the bigamous marriage. 15 Since petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the
period of prescription began to run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual. TCDHIc
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of
which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the
offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound discretion of the court
to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying
circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence. 16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is proper. Under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for bigamy isprision mayor. The
penalty next lower is prision correccional, which ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The
minimum penalty of six years imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within
the duration of prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
proven in this case, the prescribed penalty ofprision mayor should be imposed in its medium
period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial court correctly imposed a
maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioner's marriage to Alocillo has
after all been declared by final judgment 17 to be void ab initio on account of the latter's
psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to manipulative abuse,
the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years,
Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional,as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 8, 2004 are herebyMODIFIED as
to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED. aSEHDA
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio,
Jr. and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 8-21.
2.Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Mariano C. del
Castillo and Jose C. Mendoza, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-23.
3.Rollo, pp. 9-10.
4.467 Phil. 723 (2004).
5.CA rollo, p. 404.
6.391 Phil. 648 (2000).
7.Id. at 655-657. (Emphasis supplied.)
8.G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 562.
9.Id. at 567-568. (Emphasis supplied.)
10.Abunado v. People, supra note 8; Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4, at 752.
21

11.Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 742.
12.Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc., G.R. No.
151890, June 20, 2006, 491 SCRA 411, 433.
13.Records, p. 383.
14.G.R. No. 109454, June 14, 1994, 233 SCRA 155.
15.Id. at 161.
16.Abunado v. People, supra note 8, at 568.
17.See Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 00-1217,
CA rollo, pp. 343-347.
||| (Jarillo v. People, G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009)

Case No. 6

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 191566. July 17, 2013.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDGARDO V.
ODTUHAN, respondent.
DECISION

PERALTA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner
People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent
Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution 2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision granted the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 27, to give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and
resolve the case with dispatch, while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. TaCIDS
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina). 3 On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). 4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Modina. 5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 70 granted respondent's petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for
lack of a valid marriage license. 6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in
June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent's previous
marriage with Modina. 7 She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit 8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information 9 for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused being then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without
such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law. 10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion 11 praying that he be allowed to
present evidence to support his motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case
be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1)
that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished. 12
22

On September 4, 2008, the RTC 13 issued an Order 14 denying respondent's Omnibus
Motion. The RTC held that the facts alleged in the information that there was a valid
marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon constitute the crime of
bigamy. The trial court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the
ground that criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the
first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability. Respondent's
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order 15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court 16 before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the
fact that his first marriage with Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of
the bigamy case. 17 TADIHE
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is hereby ordered to
give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioner's motion to
quash and resolve the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED. 18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People, 19 and held that there is
cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would
establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of
bigamy would be lacking. 20 The appellate court further held that respondent is even better off
than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent
contracted the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed
against him. 21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondent's motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the
information do not charge an offense. 22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before
the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the
following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009
GRANTING RESPONDENT'S PETITION FORCERTIORARI AND THE
RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT
OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT
DECLARING RESPONDENT'S FIRST
MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT
EXTINGUISH RESPONDENT'S CRIMINAL
LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR
TO SAID JUDGMENT. 23 aHATDI
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montaez v.
Cipriano, 24 Teves v. People, 25 and Antone v. Beronilla. 26
In Montaez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of
their marriage on January 24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a
petition for the annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of psychological
incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for
bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and
dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared
void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their
marriage on December 10, 2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a
declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void on the ground that the latter is physically
incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an Information for Bigamy
was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage,
respondent contracted a second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a
declaration of nullity of her first marriage which decision became final and executory on May 15,
2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy against respondent
which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above
cases. As in Antone and Montaez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds
that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy and that his criminal liability has been
extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to
quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails
the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime
defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to be
considered. 27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information
which is evident on its fact. 28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the
court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. 29 If the motion to quash is sustained,
the court may order that another complaint or information be filed 30 except when the
23

information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy. 31 DcSACE
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of
the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the
crime as provided for in Article 349 32 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1)That the offender has been legally married;
(2)That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3)That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4)That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. 33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to
Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the
second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondent's evidence showing the
court's declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of
the absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to
that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted
the second marriage. This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense cannot
be raised in a motion to quash. 34 It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very
outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would
be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the
information on the basis of the document presented by respondent. 35 With the presentation of
the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed theprima facie truth accorded
to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.
Respondent's motion to quash was founded on the trial court's declaration that his marriage with
Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the
crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or
at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both respondent and the
CA heavily relied on the Court's pronouncement in Morigo v. People 36 where the accused
therein was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said
case, the first marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage
contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer. Considering, therefore, that the
declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there was no
marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused
was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. 37 It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. 38 IDScTE
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. 39 Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 40 If we allow respondent's line
of defense and the CA's ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. 41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him,
because he obtained the declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for
bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion
above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission
of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law
and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining
prescription. 42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way
of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations in
the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during
the presentation of evidence. 43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent.
The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow
him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
December 17, 2009 and Resolution dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 areSET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED. HcACST
Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1.Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices
Isaias P. Dicdican and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 37A-47.
2.Id. at 48-49.
24

3.Records, p. 8.
4.Id. at 7.
5.Rollo, p. 144.
6.Records, pp. 15-19.
7.Id. at 5.
8.Id. at 4-6.
9.Id. at 1-2.
10.Id. at 1.
11.Id. at 66-71.
12.Id. at 66.
13.Branch 27, Manila.
14.Penned by Judge Teresa P. Soriaso; records, pp. 104-105.
15.Records, pp. 121-122.
16.CA rollo, pp. 2-26.
17.Id. at 9.
18.Rollo, p. 46. (Emphasis in the original)
19.466 Phil. 1013 (2004).
20.Rollo, p. 44.
21.Id. at 44-45.
22Id. at 46.
23.Id. at 16-17.
24.G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012, 684 SCRA 315.
25.G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011, 656 SCRA 307.
26.G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615.
27.People v. Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 565, 573; Go v. The Fifth
Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783, 805 (2007).
28.Santos v. People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 341, 368.
29.The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 117, Section 4.
32.Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
33.Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 330, 342; Teves v.
People, supra note 25, at 312; Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at 627-628.
34.Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at 628.
35.Id. at 627.
36.Supra note 19.
37.Teves v. People, supra note 25, at 313.
38.Id. at 313-314.
39.Montaez v. Cipriano, supra note 24, at 325.
40.Id. at 325-326.
41.Teves v. People, supra note 25, at 314.
42.Id.
43.Antone v. Beronilla, supra note 26, at 632. (Italics in the original)
||| (People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013)

25

Case No. 7

EN BANC
[A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013.]
[Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner, vs. JUDGE
ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA,
Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE
EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu City;
CELESTE P. RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City;
CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu
City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ, Administrative Officer I, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court (RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D.
VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu
City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3,
Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1,
Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC,
Branch 4, Cebu City, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed with a heavy
burden of responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its dispensation from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk live up to the strictest standards of competence, honesty,
and integrity in the public service." 1
THE CASE
This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). 2 The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged
irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. 3Certain package fees were offered
to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. 4
THE FACTS
On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and
headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in
Cebu City. 5 A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to
get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to
Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be recognized by
other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school
classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire
about the marriage application process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached
and assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be
rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the
marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen
also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000)
only. 6 HSCATc
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of the
judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio S.
Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales
to submit their respective comments. 7 The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution
of the cases against them. 8
On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao
submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007 9 and Supplemental Report. 10Six hundred
forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. 11 The team
reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized
under Article 34 12 of the Family Code. 13 The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a
higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts'
custody. 14 There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil
registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. 15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9
a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day. 16 The town of Barili, Cebu is more than
sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2)
hours. 17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu
City. 18
The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and government
personnel, also reported the following:
1)Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to
get married by checking whether their documents were
complete and referred them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and
Rosales afterwards; 19
2)Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to
Judge Necessario. There were also "assistants" who would go
over the couples' documents before these couples would be
referred to Judge Necessario. Retuya also narrated several
anomalies involving foreign nationals and their acquisition of
marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu
despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those
anomalous marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis; 20
3)Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the
available judges. She admitted that after the payment of the
solemnization fee of three hundred pesos (P300), a different
amount, as agreed upon by the parties and the judge, was paid
to the latter. 21 She admitted that she accepted four thousand
pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil
Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the
payment to a certain "Mang Boy"; 22 THAECc
26

4)Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get
married and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained
from the local civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because
the registrars in those towns were not strict about couples'
attendance in the family planning seminar. She also admitted
that couples gave her food while the judge received five
hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside
the chambers. Foreigners were said to have given twice the
said amount. The judge accepted one thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses if the marriage was
celebrated outside the chambers; 23
5)Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them
to Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales. However, she
denied receiving any amount from these couples. She told the
audit team that during the 8th, 18th, and 28th of the month,
seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to Judge
Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage
solemnization; 24
6)Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003.
He told the investigating team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk
to couples wishing to get married without a license. He would
produce a joint affidavit of cohabitation form on which he or the
clerk of court would type the entries. The judge would then
receive an envelope containing money from the couple. Aranas
also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage
certificates; 25
7)Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the
investigating team that couples looked for Judge Geraldine
Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
9, Cebu City, "para menos ang bayad." 26 The excess of three
hundred pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge Econg as
solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch
9; 27
8)Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to
Judges Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get
married under Article 34 of the Family Code were advised to
buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint cohabitation for ten pesos
(P10); 28 IaAEHD
9)Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City,
admitted that he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of Court,
Harrish Co. Oca declared that on 28 June 2007, he
accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge
Necessario. 29 He informed the judge that the couple only had
birth certificates. 30The respondent judge then inquired about
their ages and asked them if they had been previously married
then proceeded to solemnize the marriage; 31and
10)Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that
she does not scrutinize marriage applications. 32 Couples who
are non-Barili residents are able to obtain marriage licenses
from her Barili office because these couples have relatives
residing in Barili, Cebu. 33 She also added that while couples
still need to submit a certificate of attendance in the family
planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of
the application for marriage license. 34
Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera was a
resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May 2007, she and her then fianc wanted to
set a marriage date. 35 Her younger sister who was married in a civil wedding last year gave her
the number of a certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the wedding was
scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their birth certificates.
No marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked for a fee of one thousand five
hundred pesos (P1,500). According to Baguio-Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as
"No marriage license was necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive
Order No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M. Tormis.
Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that statement meant at that time.
However, in her affidavit, she declared that the situation premised under Article 34 did not apply
to her and her fianc.
Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July 2007 affidavit,
she recounted how she and her boyfriend went to the Provincial Capitol to get married in
February 2006. While logging in at the entrance, they were offered assistance by the guards for
a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to become "Ninong"
or a witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push through with the
civil wedding at that time. acTDCI
On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring Judges Anatalio S.
Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC,
Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August
2007 Supplemental Report of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the
Process Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c) requiring
the court personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15) days from notice why no
disciplinary action should be taken against them for their alleged grave misconduct and
dishonesty and impleading them in this administrative matter:
1)Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
2)Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;
3)Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC, Cebu City;
4)Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;
5)Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;
27

6)Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;
7)Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;
8)Helen Mongaya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.
The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on the administrative matter involving the
violation of the law on marriage by Ms. Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu,
and one Ms. Veronica S. Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b) directed the
Process Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas with a copy
of the Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC,
Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment within fifteen (15) days from notice on the statement of staff
member Antonio Flores saying that Branch 9's court personnel received an amount in excess of
the P300 solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were solemnized by her. This
amount goes to the court's "sinking fund". 36 CacEID
In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of the OCA and its
Supplemental Report, 37 the respondent judges argued the following:
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents
presented to him by contracting parties. 38 He claims that marriages he solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code had the required affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro
forma affidavits of cohabitation have been used by other judges even before he became a
judge. 39 He avers that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the
existence of an impediment to marry. 40 He also asks the parties searching questions and
clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and the legal consequences of its
execution. 41 The judge also denies knowledge of the payment of solemnization fees in
batches. 42 In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording
marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of
marriages monthly. 43
Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not
required to inquire whether the license was obtained from a location where one of the parties is
an actual resident. 44 The judge believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the
marriage license to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity
of public documents. 45 The judge also outlines his own procedure in solemnizing marriages
which involves: first, the determination whether the solemnization fee was paid; second, the
presentation of the affidavit of cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of
the parties; third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal
capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when the party is
divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses questions regarding cohabitation
and interviews the children of the parties, if any. 46 ITHADC
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the
judicial audit team during the investigation an "entrapment". 47 She also claims that there is
nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license
and with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the
parties resided. 48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues that she cannot be
faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other judges are not handwriting
experts. 49 The affidavits also enjoy the presumption of regularity. 50 Judge Tormis also
discredits the affidavit of Baguio-Manera as hearsay. 51 The respondent said that when Baguio-
Manera and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they affirmed the
veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that they have been living together for five
years. 52 The judge also attributes the irregularity in the number of marriages solemnized in her
sala to the filing clerks. 53
Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. 54 He maintains that it is the
local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, and he presumes the
regularity of the license issued. 55 It is only when there is no marriage license given that he
ascertains the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to marry. 56 As to
the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing wrong with the fact that these
are pro forma. He states that marriage certificates are required with the marriage license
attached or the affidavit of cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility
of the local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come with the
marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document might have been
inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the proper local civil registrar. As to the
payment of the docket fee, he contends that it should be paid after the solemnization of the
marriage and not before because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications
of the couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of Court. 57 The judge
also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty. 58
On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of Law with Plea for
Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of Case. 59 This Court in a Resolution
dated 11 December 2007 lifted the suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them
from solemnizing marriages until further ordered. 60 SCHTac
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early Resolution with
Waiver of Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to Dismiss. 61 In a Resolution dated
15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and
Rosales for the payment of their unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits
from 9 July 2007. 62
THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA
In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010, 63 the OCA recommended the dismissal of the
respondent judges and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others. The
OCA summarized the liabilities of the respondents, to wit:
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents
and wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a
mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate
from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one
or both of the contracting parties were minors during the cohabitation.
xxx xxx xxx
JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty
for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid. He is
also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
28

Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting
parties were minors during the cohabitation.
JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents,
for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of
the required certificate from his embassy. He is also guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license.
JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents,
for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for
solemnizing marriages wherein one of the contracting parties is a
foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of
the required certificate from the embassy and for solemnizing a marriage
with an expired license. aSACED
xxx xxx xxx
HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel [that] prohibits court
personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on
any or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit
shall influence their official actions and for giving false information for the
purpose of perpetrating an irregular marriage.
RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section
2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing
Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing
her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.
DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for providing couples who are
to be married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required
affidavit of cohabitation.
CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are
guilty of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other
remuneration for assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions
or involved in actions or proceedings with the Judiciary. 64
The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against Judge Geraldine
Faith A. Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabaez, for lack of merit.
THE ISSUE
The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the MTCC and RTC in
Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and
gross misconduct, and in turn, warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from
service. cTEICD
THE COURT'S RULING
The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator are supported by
the evidence on record and applicable law and jurisprudence.
This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a heavy burden and
responsibility of keeping the faith of the public. 65 In Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:
Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance
of official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance
any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary. 66
The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages.
The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of
the parties and the proper administration of justice.
The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized
marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code
of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization
process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the individual
liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis- -vis the evidence presented by the
OCA against them.
Liability of J udge Anatalio S. Necessario
The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand one hundred
twenty-three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007. 67 However, only one hundred eighty-four
(184) marriage certificates were actually examined by the judicial audit team. 68 Out of the 184
marriages, only seventy-nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred
five (105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79 marriages with
license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Liloan,
Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming
from Liloan for over a period of years. 69There were also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized
by the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license, certificate of legal
capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation. 70 SIEHcA
Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable supporting documents
such as marriage licenses. 71 The OCA found that the place of residence of the contracting
parties appearing in the supporting documents differ from the place where they obtained their
marriage license. 72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence. 73 Likewise, in lieu of the required certificate of
legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the parties. 74 Variations in the
signatures of the contracting parties were also apparent in the documents. 75
The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34 of the Family
Code. These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit of cohabitation of the parties
29

show minority of one or both of them during cohabitation. 76 For example, he solemnized on 14
May 2004 the marriage of 22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who
are residents of Lapu-Lapu City. 77
There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of the solemnization
fee but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be found. 78 The presence of the receipts
implies that these marriages were solemnized.
Liability of J udge Gil R. Acosta
Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to
2007. 79 However, the logbook showed that he solemnized two hundred seventy-two (272)
marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that he solemnized five hundred twelve
(512) marriages over the same period. Out of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75)
under Article 34 of the Family Code. 80This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages solemnized
under Article 34 in a four-year period. 81
There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or Judge Necessario as
solemnizing officers found in his custody. 82 There were also ten (10) marriages under Article 34
of the Family Code where one or both of the contracting parties were minors during
cohabitation. 83 To illustrate, respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the marriage of
Julieto W. Baga, 22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old. 84
There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the contracting parties
were residents of Cebu City. 85 The judge solemnized three (3) marriages without the foreign
party's required certificate of legal capacity to marry. 86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment of
the solemnization fee in almost all of the marriages the judge officiated. 87 STaIHc
Liability of J udge Rosabella M. Tormis
Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages from 2003 to 2007
based on the marriage certificates actually examined. 88 However, the monthly report of cases
showed that she solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to
2007. 89 The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court started to use a
logbook to keep track of marriages. 90
Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or missing
documents such as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint
affidavit of cohabitation. 91 In several instances, only affidavits were submitted by the foreign
parties in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to marry. 92
Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable character of the
validity of the required documents particularly the marriage license. 93 The judicial audit team
found numerous erasures and superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties' place of
residence. 94 In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo and
Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license containing a
rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a handwritten note saying
"12/28/06" under it. 95
The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code
wherein the marriage requirements' authenticity was doubtful due to the circumstances of the
cohabitation of the parties and the given address of the parties. 96 These irregularities were
evident in the case of 22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married
on 25 May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is "Sitio
Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an application for marriage license attached
to the marriage certificate showing that Secuya's address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu
City." 97 DEcTCa
Liability of J udge Edgemelo C. Rosales
Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages from 2006 to
2007 based on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial audit team. 98However, only
three (3) marriages were reported for the same period. 99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge
solemnized, fifty-two (52) or 42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code. 100 Thirty-eight
(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from the local civil
registrar of Barili, Cebu. 101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from the local civil registrar of Liloan,
Cebu. 102 Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other local civil registrars. 103
There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses, applications for
marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to contract marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate
of legal capacity to contract marriage, joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents
referring to the solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no corresponding
marriage certificates. 104 He solemnized two marriages of Buddy Gayland Weaver, an
American citizen, to two different persons within nine (9) months. 105 No copy of the required
certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented. 106
The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete supporting
documents such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and the joint affidavit of
cohabitation. 107 He solemnized nine (9) marriages under questionable circumstances such as
the submission of an affidavit or affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal
capacity to marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as appearing in
the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage on the same day the marriage
license was issued. 108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that the solemnization
fee of P300 was paid. 109 On the other hand, there were twenty-six (26) marriages whose
solemnization fees were paid late. 110
To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:
First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements
submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these
documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of
entries related to the parties' place of residence. 111 These included indistinguishable features
such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and
marriage license. 112 These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross inefficiency.
In Vega v. Asdala, 113 the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence,
ignorance, and carelessness. cETDIA
Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of
solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, 114 defined neglect of duty as the
failure to give one's attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of
the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to
endanger or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit team show
30

that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing 115 or payment by
batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. 116 The OCA emphasizes that
the payment of the solemnization fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even
puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.
Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting
party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her
embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The
irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family
Code 117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in
scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would
have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage. 118
Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law
under Article 34 of the Family Code 119 with respect to the marriages they solemnized where
legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one party. 120 The
audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from
eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by there submission of a pro
forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. 121 These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing
judge himself or herself. 122
Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some
couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to
fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized. 123
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the
validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially
when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the
OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the moment the
marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen, 124 this Court held that:
. . . the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or
not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local
civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the
license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be
presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled
the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law. HEDaTA
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, 125 that "the presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."
The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing
judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the
certificate from the embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a marriage
license, the judges should have been more diligent in reviewing the parties' documents and
qualifications. As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the
presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the marriage
license issuance.
The judges' gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the existence of legal
impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made
under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. 126 Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions as a
general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. 127 The affidavits of cohabitation
should not be issued and accepted pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the
Court on this matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. 128 The
parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only
at the time of the marriage. 129
To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the respondents, the Family
Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage:
Art. 3.The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1)Authority of the solemnizing officer; DCaEAS
(2)A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter
2 of this Title; and
(3)A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4.The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of
the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)
The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. 130 The actions
of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the marriages they
solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure or check the required documents and
qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, 131 the Court said that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license
cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing
the marriage without a license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at
least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
ordinary layman. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
31

conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the
instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the
law intelligently. 132 cHAaCE
It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M. Tormis ordered
Celerina Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for couples outside the Hall of Justice
and offer services. 133 Crisanto Dela Cerna also stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis
instructed him to get all marriage certificates and bring them to her house when she found out
about the judicial audit. 134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the
solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business. 135 The respondent judge was
suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for repeatedly disregarding the directives
of this Court to furnish the complainant a copy of her comment. She was also fined the amount
of five thousand pesos (P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC. 136 She was
reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-001337. 137 Finally, in the
very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr.
Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817, promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was
found guilty of gross inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and
gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all
benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2 138 and 6 139 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of their duties. This Court previously
said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is
elementary, ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity." 140 In
connection with this, the administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon
assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible
representation of the law and more importantly of justice. 141
The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright shameful.
Liability of Other Court Personnel
The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the following
employees: SacTCA
Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City, is
guilty of grave misconduct when she informed the female lawyer of the judicial audit team that
she can facilitate the marriage and the requirements on the same day of the lawyer's
visit. 142 What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a fee of
P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel prohibits court personnel
from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding
that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions.
Mongaya's claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she knew from other
offices as the usual practice 143 is inexcusable. As found by the OCA in its Memorandum,
"Monggaya deliberately gave false information for the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme.
This, in itself, constitutes grave misconduct." 144 Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave offense that
carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on a first offense.
In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the
dispensation of justice; parties seeking redress from the courts for
grievances look upon court personnel, irrespective of rank or position,
as part of the Judiciary. In performing their duties and responsibilities,
these court personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of
impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of
the Judiciary and the people's trust and confidence in this institution.
Therefore, they are expected to act and behave in a manner that
should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only to maintain
the people's confidence in the Judiciary. 145
Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of court
personnel. Her actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts. ECTSDa
Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Cebu
City, is guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple, Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater,
and demanded and accepted P4,000 from them. 146 The act was a violation of Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by this
Court, Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her
to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu. 147 The claim that she gave the amount to a certain
Borces who was allegedly the real facilitator belies her participation in facilitating the marriage.
According to the OCA, when the couple went back for their marriage certificate, they approached
Rodriguez and not Borces. 148 When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage certificate had
been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill up another marriage
certificate. 149
This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon I of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty. 150 Such penalty can be dismissal from
service.
Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca Alesna are guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service. Aranas provided couples who were to be
married under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation. 151 On
the other hand, Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit which
according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount involved in the
transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives the public the wrong impression that
court personnel are making money out of judicial transactions. 152
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo 153 that acts of court personnel outside their official
functions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because these acts
violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of
the Court and free court personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.
Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia, Stenographer
III of Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC,
Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they received food from couples they
assisted. 154 This is in violation of Section 2 (b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting
or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with the
32

Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are admonished considering that this is their first
offense and the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that
commission of an administrative offense for the first time is an extenuating
circumstance. 155 DaEcTC
The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya. The OCA reports
that Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya
and Mary Grace Gabiana to secure necessary documents. 156 The information was volunteered
by Corazon Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple. However, she denies
this fact later on in her Comment. 157 Finding the earlier statement of Corazon Retuya as
unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court adopts the findings of the OCA and
decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.
The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against Marilou Cabaez.
Cabaez was only implicated in this case through the sworn statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-
Manera who attested that they paid a certain "Meloy" P1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of
the Family through the assistance of Cabaez. 158 Cabaez denies that she was the one who
assisted the couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal assistant
of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname "Meloy" not from Cabaez
herself but from Baguio-Manera's younger sister. 159 When Baguio-Manera met the said
"Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she did not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabaez.
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of Cabaez
and finds merit in her denial. 160
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the case against
Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated through the statement of
Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged sinking fund". No evidence was presented as
to the collection of an excess of the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg
or her staff had knowledge of such fund.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:
1.Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he
be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of his
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
2.Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of
duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he
office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation; EAHDac
3.Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that she
would have been DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any,
and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or -controlled
corporation, had she not been previously dismissed from
service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M. No. 09-2-
30-MTCC);
4.Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or
neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that he
5.Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of violating Section 2, Canon I of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she
be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her
retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be
6.Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross
misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the
application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except
leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation; EcAHDT
7.Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED without pay
for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;
8.Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 1, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and of violating Section 2 (b), Canon III
of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she
be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with
a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely;
9.Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6,
Cebu City, and Emma Valencia, Stenographer III, Regional
33

Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating
Section 2 (b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that
a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;
The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza
and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the
purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.
The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished copies of the
Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to conduct an investigation with
respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez, Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I.
Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage licenses and to
take the necessary action as the findings of the investigation may warrant. HCSDca
Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents' files that are with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes

1.Re: Anonymous letter-complaint against Hon. Marilou Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge,
MeTC Pateros, Metro Manila and Presiding Judge, MeTC San Juan, Metro Manila,
A.M. MTJ-04-1558 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1594-MTJ), 617 SCRA 428, April 7,
2010, citing Re: Withholding of Other Emoluments of the Following Clerks of Court:
Elsie C. Remoroza, et al., A.M. No. 01-4-133-MTC, August 26, 2003, 409 SCRA
574, 581-582.
2.Rollo, pp. 1-2.
3.Id.
4.Id. at 3.
5.Id. at 2.
6.Office of the Court Administrator Memorandum dated 15 June 2010.
7.Rollo, pp. 24-25.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 106.
10.Id. at 107.
11.Id. at 5.
12.Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)
13.Rollo, p. 9.
14.Id. at 2.
15.Id. at 109.
16.Id. at 5.
17.Supra note 15.
18.Id.
19.Rollo, p. 179.
20.Id. at 180-182.
21.Id. at 183-184.
22.Id. at 197.
23.Supra note 6 at 12.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Rollo, p. 188.
27.Supra note 6.
28.Id. at 13.
29.Rollo, p. 189.
30.Id.
31.Id.
32.Id. at 192.
33.Id.
34.Id.
34

35.Affidavit dated 5 July 2007.
36.Resolution dated 27 November 2007.
37.Rollo, pp. 106-202.
38.Id. at 77.
39.Id.
40.Id. at 78.
41.Id.
42.Id. at 79.
43.Id.
44.Id. at 47.
45.Id. at 48.
46.Rollo, pp. 46-47 and 226-231.
47.Id. at 53.
48.Id. at 55.
49.Id. at 56.
50.Id.
51.Id. at 60-61.
52.Id.
53.Id. at 816.
54.Id. at 34.
55.Id.
56.Id.
57.Rollo, pp. 36-39.
58.Id. at 625.
59.Id. at 238.
60.Id. at 258.
61.Id. at 265.
62.Id. at 273.
63.Supra note 6.
64.Id. at 33-34.
65.Alejandro v. Martin, A.M. No. P-07-2349, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 698, 704.
66.A.M. No. MTJ-04-1545, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 223, p. 228, citing Angeles v. Eduarte,
457 Phil. 49 (2003).
67.OCA 2010 Memorandum supra note 6 at 8.
68.Id.
69.Rollo, p. 109.
70.Id. at 114-119.
71.Id. at 119-123.
72.Supra note 67.
73.Rollo, pp. 119-123.
74.Supra note 67.
75.Id. at 9.
76.Id.
77.Rollo, p. 124.
79.Id.
80.Id.
81.Rollo, p. 129.
82.Supra note 78.
83.Rollo, pp. 130-131.
84.Id. at 130.
85.Id. at 131-133.
86.Id. at 133-134.
87.Supra note 78.
88.Rollo, p. 134.
89.Id.
90.Supra note 78.
91.Rollo, pp. 135-144.
35

92.Id.
93.Id. at 144-149.
94.Id.
95.Id. at 148.
96.Id. at 149-160.
97.Id. at 157.
99.Id.
100.Rollo, p. 161.
101.Id.
102.Id.
103.Id.
104.Id.
105.Id. at 162.
106.Id.
107.Id. at 163-172.
108.Id. at 172-176.
109.Id. at 176-177.
110.Id. at 177-178.
111.Supra note 6, at 24-25.
112.Rollo, p. 111.
113.A.M. No. RTJ-06-1997, October 23, 2006, 535 SCRA 729.
114.A.M. No. P-06-2231, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 286.
116.Supra note 112.
117.Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it
shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a
certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective
diplomatic or consular officials.
118.Supra note 6 at 26-27.
119.Supra note 12.
121.Rollo, p. 111.
122.Id.
124.54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929) as cited in Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28,
2007, 531 SCRA 446.
125.G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.
126.Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 435.
127.Id.
128.Ninal v. Badayog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000).
129.Id.
130.Cario v. Cario, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
131.430 Phil. 197 (2002).
132.328 Phil. 435 (1996), p. 444.
133.Supra note 6 at 34-35. See also Rollo, pp. 887-889.
134.Rollo, pp. 894-895.
136.Id.
137.Id.
138.INTEGRITY. Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.
139.COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Competence and diligence are pre-requisites to the
due performance of judicial office.
140.Macalintal v. Teh, 345 Phil. 871 (1997).
141.Office of the Court Administrator v. Gines, A.M. No. RTJ-92-802, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA
261.
143.Rollo, p. 874.
36

145.A.M. No. MTJ-08-1727, (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 03-1465-MTJ), March 22, 2011.
See also Angeles v. Eduarte, supra note 66.
146.Id.
147.Id.
148.Id.
149.Id.
150.In Re: Improper Solicitation of Court Employees Rolando Hernandez, A.M. No. 2008-
12-SC, and Office of the Court Administrator v. Sheela Nobleza, A.M. No. P-08-
2510, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 325, 332-334.
152.Id.
153.A.M. No. P-95-1148, July 30, 1996, 260 SCRA 1.
155.A.M. No. P-99-1285, October 4, 2000, 342 SCRA 6, 18.
156.Id.
157.Rollo, pp. 577-578.
159.Rollo, pp. 876-879.
160.Supra note 158.
||| (OCA v. Necessario, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 02, 2013)

Case No. 8

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9005. June 20, 1958.]
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioner, vs. FELIPE
APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.MARRIAGE IN ARTICULO MORTIS; LACK OF AFFIDAVIT AND NON-
REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGE. In the celebration of the marriage in articulo mortis,
where all the requisites for its validity were present, the marriage is not voided by the of the
failure priest to make and file the affidavit required in sections 20 and 21 of the Marriage
Law and to register said marriage in the local civil registry.
2.ID.; FAILURE TO SIGN MARRIAGE CONTRACT; EFFECT OF. Signing of
the marriage contract is a formal requirement of evidentiary value, the omission of which
does not render the marriage a nullity.

D E C I S I O N

BENGZON, J p:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the
validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan
Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons
lived together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties
but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory,
Matea became seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age
dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vicarra

1 visited and
persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish
priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe
Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according
to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the
bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme
Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo
mortis,

2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then
January 29 or 30, 1945.
37

After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be
denied, and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing
the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to
compel defendant to render an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the
deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be
the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting
up his rights as widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance,
but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the
legal question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief - whether the
events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and
binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
"There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr.
Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of
Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30,
1945, under the circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in
court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no
reason to side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive
evidence on the celebration or performance of the marriage in question,
Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo mortis,
because Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr.
Bautista clearly testified, however, that her condition at the time was bad;
she was bed-ridden; and according to his observation, she might die at
any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive was he about her condition that
he decided in administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction,
after hearing her confession. . . .. The greatest objection of the Appellees
and the trial court against the validity of the marriage under consideration,
is the admitted fact that it was not registered.'
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act
No. 3613) as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3,
20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage.
There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that
both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took
each other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a)There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses
and the priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
(b)The priest filed no affidavit nor recorded the marriage with local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition no signing may seriously be
doubted. The Court of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision
impliedly held such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in
articulo mortis was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr,
Bautista to send copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar
and to register the said marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church .
. . renders the said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue tendered in the court of
first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the
"marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the
Marriage Law which provides:
"Sec. 3.Mutual Consent. No particular form for the ceremony
of marriage is required but the parties with legal capacity to contract
marriage must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife. This declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in
triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said
two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage . . .
(Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates
the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of
them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage
are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter
being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife" - which in this case actually occurred.3 We think the signing of the
marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of
evidencing the act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an
essential requisite not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is.
The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.
"Certificate and Record. Statutes relating to the
solemnization of marriage usually provide for the issuance of a certificate
of marriage . . . and for the registration or recording of marriage . . .
Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not
essential to its validity, the statute being addressed to the officials issuing
the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and
registration or recording." (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p.
197-198.)
"Formal Requisites. . . . The general rule, however, is that
statutes which direct that a license must be issued and procured, that
only certain persons shall perform the ceremony, that a certain number of
witnesses shall be present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be
signed, returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the conditions
shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority
to secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage
contract. Such statutes do not void common-law marriages unless they
do so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into without
38

obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of these
statutes to discourage deception, prevent illicit intercourse under the
guise of matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties who live
together as man and wife, by providing competent evidence of the
marriage. . . ." (Section 15 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-
189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec.
33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence
of one or several formal requirements of this Act . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties
copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section
41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it
would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father
Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder
during the liberation of Manila and its environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit
required by sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should
bring no serious consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it was
caused by the emergency.
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's
natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to
send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does
not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the
celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the
requisites." (Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs.
De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.

The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it
requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually
required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practically substitutes the latter.
Now then, if a marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act
3613),

5 this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and
women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage

6 , section 22), we must hold this
marriage to be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased
than the plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of
brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . .
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased." (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Now a nun at Sta. Escolastica College.
2.In his presence, Matea and Felipe expressed mutual consent to be thenceforward
husband and wife.
3.p. 49 Record on Appeal.
4.And to prevent fraud, as petitioners contend. p. 30 brief. See Corpuz Juris Secundum,
Vol. 55 p. 899.
5.Because it is a formal requisite" (Section 7 as amended. See American Jurisprudence,
supra. However, the New Civil Code seemingly rules otherwise. (Art. 80 (3)).
6.Section 22 Act 3613; Article 76 New Civil Code.
||| (De Loria v. Felix, G.R. No. L-9005, June 20, 1958)

39

Case No. 9

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 174689. October 19, 2007.]

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J p:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind!
Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then
twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two
human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan
named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda"
(Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the
changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person's
sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth
certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8.
The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as
respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio
Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as
"Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was
registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. 1 Feeling
trapped in a man's body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent
psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to
transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical
certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People's Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to
the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions
read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose
of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief
asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative. SCEHaD
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be
more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his
sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted
like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner's
misfortune to be trapped in a man's body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness
on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their
dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny
the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the
State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in
the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner's first name
from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner's gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision 8 in favor of the Republic. It
ruled that the trial court's decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
40

Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic's petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. 9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed
under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048. 10
The petition lacks merit. AEScHa
A PERSON'S FIRST NAME
CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and
sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or
any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the
purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present
sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. 11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name
are controlled by statutes. 13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376.No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1
of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the
law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name)
and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until
and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, 16 form 17 and procedure. In sum,
the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial. AcDaEH
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4.Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of
the following cases:
(1)The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(2)The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the
community; or
(3)The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil
status. 18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner's first name for his declared purpose may
only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he will
be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show, or even
allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner's first name
was not within that court's primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy
because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila
where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed petitioner's petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. EACTSH
NO LAW ALLOWS THE
CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO
SEX ON THE GROUND OF SEX
REASSIGNMENT
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. 21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412.No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
41

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far
as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can
now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In
effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register. 23
Section 2 (c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following
terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3)"Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the
civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the
like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed
only by reference to other existing record or
records: Provided, however, That no correction
must involve the change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical
or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. AIDcTE
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: 24
ART. 407.Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408.The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1)Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments
of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. 25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from while to
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something
that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries
therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction
is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as
legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events(such as
births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations,
annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or
recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name).
These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws.
In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership. 27 DHaEAS
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable
at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status . . . include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession. 28 (emphasis supplied)
A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's
legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413.All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
This is fatal to petitioner's cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5.Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be
exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil
registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the
following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father
is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place
where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in
the regulations to be issued. AScHCD
42

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed
at the time of birth. 29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made
at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is immutable. 31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as
used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)
should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32or "the distinction between male and
female." 33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young" 34 and male is "the sex that
has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova." 35 Thus, the words "male" and "female"
in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the
contrary." 36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early
1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is
something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female." DCTHaS
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in
the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or
change of the entries in his birth certificate.
NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR
SEX BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF
EQUITY
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice
and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to
anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner's first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most
sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent unionbetween a man and a
woman. 37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female. 38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code 40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, 41among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if petitioner's petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret
the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines
in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be
recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to
fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law
exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and
[the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are
people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. AaCTID
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in
Statistics and Master of Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took up
Population Studies Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and Doctor of Philosophy
in Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
2.This consisted of "penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or
orchiectomy which is the surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion
vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood reconstruction and
augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the
breasts]." Id.
43

3.On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
4.Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
5.Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
6.Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
7.Special Sixth Division.
8.Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina
L. Buzon and Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
9.Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
10.An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a
Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or
Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for the
Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
11.Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
12.Id.
13.K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070
(1977).
14.Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, "first name" refers to a name or nickname given to a
person which may consist of one or more names in addition to the middle names
and last names. Thus, the term "first name" will be used here to refer both to first
name and nickname.
15.The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. . . .
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the
petitioner may either appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the
appropriate petition with the proper court.
16.SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. Any person having direct and
personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry
and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a
verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the
record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.
In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be
practical for such party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to
appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping the documents to be
corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil
registrar of the place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled.
The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will then communicate to facilitate the
processing of the petition.
Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file
their petition, in person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.
The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be
processed in accordance with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames
may be availed of only once.
17.SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an
affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to
administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits
of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify
to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or
entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1)A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing
the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed;
(2)At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon
which the correction or change shall be based; and
(3)Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul
general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.
In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the
documents mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the
petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a
certification from the appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no pending
case or no criminal record.
18.Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.
19.Supra note 11.
20.Id.
21.In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
22.Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
23.Id.
24.Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27.Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
44

28.Salonga, JOVITO, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p.
238.
29.This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code
which authorizes the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction
or change of errors including those that occur after birth. Nonetheless, in such
cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The
decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of
birth and shall form part of the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar.
(Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)
30.The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes "male" or "female" but the
genitals of the child are that of the opposite sex.
31.Moreover, petitioner's female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a
male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied.
32.Black's Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
33.Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
34.In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip
op., Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December
31, 2003), citing Webster's II New College Dictionary (1999).
35.Id.
36.Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
38.Article 2 (1), Id.
39.These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition,
facilities for women, prohibition on discrimination and stipulation against marriage,
among others.
40.These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple
seduction and acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and
Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and consented abduction, among others.
41.Section 3 (jj) (4).
||| (Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007)

Case No. 10

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 166676. September 12, 2008.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JENNIFER B.
CAGANDAHAN, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J p:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law
and seeking a reversal of the Decision 1 dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahan's birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff
Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male".
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate 2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a
female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further
alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen,
tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as
well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. cHaCAS
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks
and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered
his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr.
Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He
testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent's uterus is not fully developed because
of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondent's condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because
respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
45

The RTC granted respondent's petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is
entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented to
the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition.
It was medically proven that petitioner's body produces male hormones,
and first his body as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He
has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male. DHSEcI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna
is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the birth
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF
CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioner's school records, voter's registry,
baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED. 3
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF "SEX" OR "GENDER" IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE,
WHILE RESPONDENT'S MEDICAL CONDITION,i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A "MALE". 4
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the
birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground
of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff", under Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court. DHECac
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
respondent's petition before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar. 5 The OSG
further contends respondent's petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is
a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior
to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2 (b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 6 The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male. 7
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna
was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the
Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16,
2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings, 8 respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender, 9 change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108, 10 and respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court. 11 ICTacD
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SEC. 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides,
[or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
Sec. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall
fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of
the order be published before the hearing at least once a week for three
(3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation published
in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing
shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city
fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
46

SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date
fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that
the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition. AcISTE
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL
REGISTRY
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss
or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name. TcHEaI
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto. AaHTIE
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also
grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil
registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondent's petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise,
the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name
in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the case
can be had. 12 Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings,
the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. 13 The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby. 14 Respondent, however, invokes Section 6, 15 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that
there is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition
to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the
court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 16 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No.
9048 17 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register. 18 DAEIHT
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 19
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
47

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments
of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children;
(10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil
interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. 20
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate"
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive
tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. DcIHSa
CAH is one of many conditions 21 that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century,
medicine adopted the term "intersexuality" to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female. 22 The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia,
intersexuality "is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes,
genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female
sexes."
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. 23 Since the
rise of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous
external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female
genitals. 24 More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a "disorder"
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male
or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a 'no-man's land' for those individuals who
are neither truly 'male' nor truly 'female'." 25 The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a
change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony
and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in
the subject's birth certificate entry is in order. IaSAHC
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondent's body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, 26 to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose
not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal
more fully his male characteristics. TCacIE
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" 27 and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an
individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary
person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with hisunordinary state and thus help
make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. 28 The trial court's grant of respondent's change
of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform
with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
48

WHEREFORE, the Republic's petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs. TcSHaD
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.
2.Id. at 33-37.
3.Id. at 31-32.
4.Id. at 97.
5.Id. at 99.
6.Id. at 103.
7.Id. at 104.
8.Id. at 136.
9.Id. at 127.
10.Id. at 134.
11.Id. at 136.
12.Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 99,
106. HATICc
13.Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 134, 147.
14.Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.
15.SEC. 6. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
16.Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
17.AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR
IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
APPROVED, MARCH 22, 2001.
18.Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA
373, 388. acHITE
19.Id. at 389.
20.Id. at 389.
21.(1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome; (3) aphallia; (4)
clitoromegaly; (5) congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal dysgenesis (partial &
complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) Kallmann syndrome; (9) Klinefelter syndrome; (10)
micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex chromosomes; (12) MRKH (mullerian
agenesis; vaginal agenesis; congenital absence of vagina); (13) ovo-testes
(formerly called "true hermaphroditism"); (14) partial androgen insensitivity
syndrome; (15) progestin induced virilization; (16) Swyer syndrome; (17) Turner
syndrome. [Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August
15, 2008).]
22.Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).
23.Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008), citing
Gagnon and Simon 1973.
24.Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).
25.M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.
26.The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is done by taking a form
of cortisol (dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or hydrocortisone) every day.
Additional doses of medicine are needed during times of stress, such as severe
illness or surgery. HTAIcD
xxx xxx xxx
Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware of the side effects of
steroid therapy. They should report signs of infection and stress to their health care
provider because increases in medication may be required. In additional, steroid
medications cannot be stopped suddenly, or adrenal insufficiency will result.
xxx xxx xxx
The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature may result even with
treatment. Males have normal fertility. Females may have a smaller opening of the
vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat this disorder must be continued for life.
(Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/encyclopedia.html>.)
27.The word "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who
are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons
not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other
similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. (See Sec.
2 of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court) DETcAH
28.Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110 (1966).
||| (Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008)

49

Case No. 11

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.]
(formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.
OCCIANO, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner charged respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law. Petitioner
alleged that the respondent judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur,
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at the place outside of his jurisdiction. The Office of the Court
Administrator, in its report and recommendation, found the respondent judge guilty of the
charges made. He was recommended to be fined in the amount of P5,000.00.
According to the Supreme Court, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge
was limited to Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur was contrary to law and should subject him to
administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot
avoid liability for violating the law on marriage. Respondent should also be faulted for
solemnizing marriage without the requisite marriage license. The respondent judge was
fined by the Supreme Court in the amount of P5,000.00, with stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980; JUDGES, AS
SOLEMNIZING OFFICERS; CONFINED TO THEIR TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION;
VIOLATION IN CASE AT BAR. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129,
the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case
at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act
may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage. aTAEHc
2.CIVIL LAW; MARRIAGE; VALIDITY; MARRIAGE WHICH PRECEDED THE ISSUANCE OF
THE MARRIAGE LICENSE IS VOID; RATIONALE. In People vs. Lara, we held that a
marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage.
Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the
authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance
of the law.
3.JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT CANNOT EXONERATE
THEM FROM DISCIPLINARY ACTION; CASE AT BAR. Respondent judge cannot be
exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held
in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal
effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair
administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not
be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter
which involves the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may
be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J p:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the "vast
properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and
unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court
Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court
Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000.
Having been assured that all the documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and
50

could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded.ETDaIC
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess
the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would
render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the
marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is
valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with
the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued marriage license and that it was
because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same. She
confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by
her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for
Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage
license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no
record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May
2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no
record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could
communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the
issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia
to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November
2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued
marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was
recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy, 1 respondent judge held
office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos. We held that: HCacDE

"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to
marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or
place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of
this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability." 2 (Italics supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of
solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further
held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and
applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
principles like the ones involved in the instant case. . . . While magistrates
may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons." 3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act
may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of
human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite
marriage license. In People vs. Lara, 4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of
the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render
valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
51

marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of
petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner.
This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does
not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court
personnel, would be undermined. 5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely
private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant
who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Court's constitutional power to
discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of
a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. 6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED. ESCcaT
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.259 SCRA 129 (1996).
2.Id., pp. 135-136.
3.Id., p. 136.
4.C.A. O.G. 4079.
5.Farrales vs. Camarista, 327 SCRA 84 (2000).
6.Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 (1996).
||| (Ara, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390, April 11, 2002)

Case No. 12

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001.]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R
SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C .J p:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a
prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent
Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant
Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn
Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999. ICcDaA
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married
to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. 1 Four
children were born out of that marriage. 2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted
another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. 3 When respondent
Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the
marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married.
What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years
already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. 4 According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended
that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in
the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to
two separate affidavits 5 of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a
member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos,
respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels,
52

they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses
anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage. HACaSc
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur:
1.The man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2.The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3.The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;
4.The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal
impediment to marry each other]; and
5.The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage. 6
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their
separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a dirimant
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his
Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have
discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzano's and Payao's subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie,
much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar. HIaTCc
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void
and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special
application to judges, 8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. 9 And when the law transgressed is simple
and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez
is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Annex "A" of Complaint.
2.Annexes "B" to "E" of Complaint.
3.Annex "F" of Complaint.
4.Attached to the Marriage Contract (Annex "F" of Complaint).
5.Annexes "B" and "C" of Respondent Judge's Manifestation.
6.DISIDERIO P. JURADO, CIVIL LAW REVIEWER 63 (1989).
8.Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579, 589 [1997]; Vercide v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-
1265, 6 April 2000.
9.Macasasa v. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385, 395 [1999].
10.Madredijo v. Loyao, 316 SCRA 544, 568 [1999]; Agunday v. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134,
146 [1999]; Villanueva v. Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221, 16 March 2000.
||| (Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March 08, 2001)

53

Case No. 13

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the
minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO
NIAL, JR.,petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners.
Daryll A. Amante for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging
that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no
cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of
marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death,
applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. Hence, this petition. AcTDaH
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the trial court. The Court
ruled that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, therefore, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element. According to the Court, it can not be said that Pepito and respondent have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about
twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact,
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife." The Court also ruled that petitioners have the
personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage void because a void marriage can
be attacked collaterally and can be questioned even after the death of either party.

SYLLABUS
1.CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER; THE
5-YEAR COHABITATION PERIOD CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 76 OF THE CIVIL CODE
SHOULD BE THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE DAY OF THE MARRIAGE AND IT
SHOULD BE A PERIOD OF COHABITATION CHARACTERIZED BY EXCLUSIVITY MEANING
NO THIRD PARTY WAS INVOLVED AT ANY TIME WITHIN THE 5 YEARS AND CONTINUITY
THAT IS UNBROKEN. Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together
as husband and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should
be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor
is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period
should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time
within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be
respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground
to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless
the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license
is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; THE FIVE-YEAR COHABITATION OF PETITIONERS'
FATHER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THE COHABITATION CONTEMPLATED
BY LAW; THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE EVEN WHERE THERE WAS ACTUAL
SEVERANCE OF THE FILIAL COMPANIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPOUSES CANNOT MAKE
ANY COHABITATION BY EITHER SPOUSE WITH ANY THIRD PARTY AS BEING ONE AS
"HUSBAND AND WIFE." In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito
and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started
living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year
period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a
perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation
by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife."
54

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO FILE A PETITION TO
DECLARE THEIR FATHER'S MARRIAGE VOID EVEN AFTER HIS DEATH; VOID
MARRIAGES CAN BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY AND CAN BE QUESTIONED EVEN
AFTER THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY. Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of
the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party"
is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A
marriage that is annullable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that
is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of
rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while
the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution, and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On
the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24,
1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On
February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that
the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code. LibLex

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to
resolve the following issues:
(1)Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2)Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3)Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an action
for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded on a
pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's
averment that the allegations in the petition are 'true and correct.'" It was thus treated as an
unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and
reinstated the petition for review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under
Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant
to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is
the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording
protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of
family life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it not just an
adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is
dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a
continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no
license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity
attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To
preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
55

contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise
to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. cda
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have
attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each other." 16 The only issue that needs to
be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil
Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from
securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation
wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to
their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened
sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other
during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who
lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is
required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: ". . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. .
. . ."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. . . ."
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: ". . . . This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. . . . ."
Article 18 reads in part: ". . . . In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . . ." cdrep
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting
of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e.,
bigamy and concubinage and adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that
when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as "husband and wife."
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of
such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare
their father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even
by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of
marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit
"at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds,
periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annullable is valid until
otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be
ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
56

void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned
even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for
nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties
to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article
50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well asArticle 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the
contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership
and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital
bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong
premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted
that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all and the death of either
extinguished nothing. cdasia
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of
avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the
peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights
upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for
no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage
may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere
proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent
by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law makes either the
action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry.
The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40
of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
said case is ordered REINSTATED. cdtai
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., is on official business abroad.
Footnotes
1.The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J.
Marcos of Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby
granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p.
6; Rollo, p. 21).
2.Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
3.Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
4.Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
5.Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
6.Now Article 3. Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the
requisites are complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;
(2)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(3)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
7.Now Article 4. Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3)Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character
xxx xxx xxx
8.Art 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but
not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.
9.Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
10.Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G.R. No. 126010, December 8,
1999; See also Tuazon v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
57

11.Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
12.Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal or family life. . . . .
13.Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
14.Now Article 34. Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
15.Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
16.Rollo, p. 29.
17.Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Articles 17 and 18, Family Code.
18.Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1)the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2)the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years . . . . "
Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years . . ."
19.Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
20.Art. 17. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and
within the periods indicated herein:
(1)For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did
not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or
by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time
before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2)For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having
legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the
insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3)For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after
the discovery of the fraud;
(4)For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from
the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years
after the marriage.
21.Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill.
App. 59 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
22.In re Conza's Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac 394 cited in I
Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 271.
23.Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
24.Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499
(1986); People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People
v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
25.35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
26.18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am. Jur. 221.
27.Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes,
Jr., 60 SCAD 119; 312 Phil. 939 (1995).
28.Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
29.Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended by
R.A. No. 8533 dated February 23, 1998.

||| (Ni, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000)

58

Case No. 14

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.]

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J p:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship
through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married
respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his
wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerbert's petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
later, on January 8, 2006. 5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6 IHDCcT
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn
did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the
trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a
similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert's.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for
him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the
Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTC's ruling, 12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the
benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to
institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries
his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on
file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments, 14 both support Gerbert's position. SAcaDE
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT'S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right
under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in
favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void 15 and
voidable 16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens. 18
59

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code
to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse's
assertion of marital rights after a foreign court's divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillothat:
To maintain . . . that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a
wife's obligations . . . cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of
her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served. 22 aCHDST
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the
Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. 26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words,
the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the
alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states: aTEScI
SEC. 48.Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a)In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of
the thing; and
(b)In case of a judgment or final order against a person,
the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country." 28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity
60

must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. 29 The recognition
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be
(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as
the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
law on divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to
the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law. DCASIT
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests
that will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A
remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as
the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between the
parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides.
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate based
on the mere presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the recording to be legally improper;
hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person's legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal
capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil
Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1.Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the
civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a)births;
(b)deaths;
(c)marriages;
(d)annulments of marriages;
(e)divorces; EHDCAI
(f)legitimations;
(g)adoptions;
(h)acknowledgment of natural children;
(i)naturalization; and
(j)changes of name.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4.Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:
(1)Birth and death register.
(2)Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the
marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
(3)Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name
and naturalization register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree's registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context
of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree.
Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
61

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion
No. 181, series of 1982 37 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine
court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but
it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil
registry. STHDAc
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code
by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert
filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for
recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30,
2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.
2.Id. at 3-20.
3.Id. at 27.
4.Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.
5.Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.
6.Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:
It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of
Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of execution of such
foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.
7.Supra note 1.
8.Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.
9.Rollo, p. 31.
10.G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.
11.Id. at 121.
12.Gerbert's motion for reconsideration of the RTC's October 30, 2008 decision was denied in
an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo, p. 32.
13.Supra note 2.
14.Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.
15.The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53
in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.
16.The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.
17.Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.
18.Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004 ed.), p.
262.
19.Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.
20.G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
21.G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
22.Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.
23.Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.
24.The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign
divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.
25.See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:
62

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 17. . . . Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
26.Parenthetically, we add that an alien's legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a
certificate issued by his or her respective diplomatic and consular officials, which he
or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The
Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still resort to a judicial action
for a declaration of authority to remarry.
27.Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.
28.Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.
29.Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448;
see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November 7, 2008, 570
SCRA 472.
30.Rollo, pp. 38-41.
31.The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn
was dissolved by the Canadian court. The full text of the court's judgment was not
included.
32.Literally means "a thing adjudged," Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes
a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits,
on points and matters determined in the former. Supra note 28 at 462.
33.See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997,
274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it
was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to
repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to
initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment.
What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this
jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of
the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
34.On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold
letters; rollo, p. 37.
35.Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390,
citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
36.Rollo, pp. 47-50.
37.Id. at 51.
38.Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.
41.When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a
Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil Register of
Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.
*Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
||| (Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010)

63

Case No. 15

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.]

MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,
SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon
City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually,
they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. 4 On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be
recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment
on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
(NSO). 6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2.Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a)Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4.Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case
of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. . . .
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5 (4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be
a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition
to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a
special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a
civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong." 10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of
the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as
void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35 (4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts. 12
In any case, it was also Fujiki's view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages
under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. 13Thus, Section
2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2 (a) in bigamy
would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of
Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki
had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register
Law (Act No. 3753) 15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. 16 The Civil Register Law
imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy
of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil
registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in
64

the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. CaAIES
Fujiki's motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred"
when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC
may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court 19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
case." 20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately
dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially
complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect,
prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage. 21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e., lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding because
he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he
now seeks to be judicially recognized, . . . ." 23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its
ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) . . . as
a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by
the Court . . . which is Sec. 2 (a) . . . ." 24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages . . .
." 26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] . . . ." 27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition. 28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
not authenticated as required under Section 5 29 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and
the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review. 30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion. 31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC's "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with . . . A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC . . . be set aside" and that the case
be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. 32 The Solicitor General argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-
Llave v. Republic 33 which held that Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained: SCHATc
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or
she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage
was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party
as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and
the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution. 34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, 36 this Court
held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact." 37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a
Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record
"[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person's legal capacity and
status . . . ." 38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked." 41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
to comment on the petition. 42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she
was previously married to Fujiki. 43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence
on Marinay. 44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition. 45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46 ScTaEA
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1)Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
65

(2)Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
(3)Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, 47 this Court held that the rule inA.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office. 50 EaISTD
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and
contents of the petition, 51 the service of summons, 52 the investigation of the public
prosecutor, 53 the setting of pre-trial, 54 the trial 55 and the judgment of the trial court. 56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, 58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation." 59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State
may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine
courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence. ECcTaS
Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states
that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts
exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states. 62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules
of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure underA.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy.
While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules
of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such
as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact." 67 AIaHES
66

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because
the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has
the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) 68 his most
intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage. 71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse's
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot
"diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by
law. DHSCTI
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife" 75 it refers to the husband or the wife of the
subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife
under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning,
is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy
is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does
not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llaveruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that
a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] . . .
can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara. EAcTDH
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, 83 support pendente
lite of the spouses and children, 84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, 85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing
his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
67

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of
the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido, 88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because
the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that
results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign
citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which
is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is based on this Court's decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo 90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served." 91 IDETCA
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy.
The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because
the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35 (4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48
(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of
entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected
in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of
criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." CcHDSA
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1.Penned by Judge Jose L. Bautista Jr.
2.In Pasay City, Metro Manila.
3.See rollo, p. 88; Trial Family Court Decree No. 15 of 2009, Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage between Maria Paz Galela Marinay and Shinichi Maekara dated 18
August 2010. Translated by Yoshiaki Kurisu, Kurisu Gyoseishoshi Lawyer's Office
(see rollo, p. 89).
68

4.Id.
5.FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (E.O. No. 209 as amended):
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall
be sufficient.
6.Rollo, pp. 79-80.
7.The dispositive portion stated:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED and WITHDRAWN from the
active civil docket of this Court. The RTC-OCC, Quezon City is directed to refund to
the petitioner the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to be taken from the
Sheriff's Trust Fund.
8.Rollo, pp. 44-45. Section 5 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) provides:
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. (1) The petition shall allege the complete facts
constituting the cause of action.
(2) It shall state the names and ages of the common children of the parties and specify the
regime governing their property relations, as well as the properties involved.
If there is no adequate provision in a written agreement between the parties, the petitioner
may apply for a provisional order for spousal support, custody and support of
common children, visitation rights, administration of community or conjugal
property, and other matters similarly requiring urgent action.
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition
may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping
shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within
five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service
within the same period.
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.
9.RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3 (c). See rollo, pp. 55-56 (Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration).
10.RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3 (a).
11.FAMILY CODE (E.O. No. 209 as amended), Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void
from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
xxx xxx xxx
12.Rollo, p. 56.
13.FAMILY CODE, Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
14.Rollo, p. 68.
15.Enacted 26 November 1930.
16.CIVIL CODE, Art. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
17.Act No. 3753, Sec. 7. Registration of marriage. All civil officers and priests or ministers
authorized to solemnize marriages shall send a copy of each marriage contract
solemnized by them to the local civil registrar within the time limit specified in the
existing Marriage Law.
In cases of divorce and annulment of marriage, it shall be the duty of the successful petitioner
for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court
to the local civil registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled
marriage was solemnized.
In the marriage register there shall be entered the full name and address of each of the
contracting parties, their ages, the place and date of the solemnization of the
marriage, the names and addresses of the witnesses, the full name, address, and
relationship of the minor contracting party or parties or the person or persons who
gave their consent to the marriage, and the full name, title, and address of the
person who solemnized the marriage.
In cases of divorce or annulment of marriages, there shall be recorded the names of the
parties divorced or whose marriage was annulled, the date of the decree of the
court, and such other details as the regulations to be issued may require.
69

18.RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
19.273 Phil. 1 (1991).
20.Id. at 7. See rollo, pp. 65 and 67.
21.Rollo, p. 47.
22.Id. at 46.
23.Id. at 48.
24.Id.
25.G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638.
26.Id. at 641.
27.Id. at 643.
28.See rollo, p. 49.
29.Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC states in part:
Contents and form of petition. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(3) It must be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. The
verification and certification must be signed personally by the petitioner. No petition
may be filed solely by counsel or through an attorney-in-fact.
If the petitioner is in a foreign country, the verification and certification against forum shopping
shall be authenticated by the duly authorized officer of the Philippine embassy or
legation, consul general, consul or vice-consul or consular agent in said country.
xxx xxx xxx
Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition.
30.Resolution dated 30 May 2011. Rollo, p. 105.
31.Under Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz.
32.Rollo, p. 137. The "Conclusion and Prayer" of the "Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of
Comment)" of the Solicitor General stated:
In fine, the court a quo's pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements provided in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should accordingly be set aside. It
is, thus, respectfully prayed that Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 be reinstated for further
proceedings.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
33.G.R. No. 169766, 30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637.
34.Id. at 656. Quoted in the Manifestation and Motion of the Solicitor General, pp. 8-9. See
rollo, pp. 132-133.
35.Rollo, p. 133.
36.G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266.
37.Id. at 287.
38.Rollo, p. 133.
39.G.R. No. 160172, 13 February 2008, 545 SCRA 162.
40.384 Phil. 661 (2000).
41.De Castro v. De Castro, supra note 39 at 169.
42.Supra note 30.
44.Id.
46.Id.
47.Supra note 33.
49.RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
70

be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be
any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Rule 39, Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order, is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
50.See RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Secs. 24-25. See also Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,
supranote 36 at 282.
51.A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 5.
52.Id., Sec. 6.
53.Id., Sec. 9.
54.Id., Secs. 11-15.
55.Id., Secs. 17-18.
56.Id., Secs. 19 and 22-23.
57.Mijares v. Raada, 495 Phil. 372, 386 (2005) citing EUGENE SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 916 (2nd ed., 1982).
58.Id.
59.Id. at 386.
60.CIVIL CODE, Art. 17. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
61.Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at 386. "Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it
seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard
against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense
to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all
law: 'rest and quietness."' (Citations omitted)
62.Mijares v. Raada, supra note 57 at 382. "The rules of comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments
of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries." (Citations
omitted)
63.43 Phil. 43 (1922).
64.Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266, 280; Garcia v.
Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001); Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, supra.
65.FAMILY CODE, Art. 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
66.Act No. 3753, Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil
status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d)
annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h)
acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations;
(e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
67.Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, supra note 36 at 287.
68.FAMILY CODE, Arts. 35-67.
70.FAMILY CODE, Art. 195 in relation to Art. 194.
71.See supra note 69.
72.CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law . . . ."
74.CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
71

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. . . .
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
75.Emphasis supplied.
76.REVISED PENAL CODE (Act No. 3815, as amended), Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty
of prisin mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
77.See III RAMON AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE (1997), 518.
78.RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxx xxx xxx
79.Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.
80.Juliano-Llave v. Republic, supra note 33.
81.Supra note 25.
82.Supra note 25.
83.See supra note 68.
84.FAMILY CODE, Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate
provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for
the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children.
The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of
said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as
provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the
other parent.
Cf. RULES OF COURT, Rule 61.
85.FAMILY CODE, Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which
are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and
the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a decision granting the
petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of
annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
xxx xxx xxx
86.FAMILY CODE, Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor. (1) Within one
month after receipt of the court order mentioned in paragraph (3) of Section 8
above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective
counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his
report. The parties shall file their respective comments on the finding of collusion
within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-
trial. It shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-
trial.
87.RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.
88.509 Phil. 108 (2005).
89.Id. at 114.
72

90.223 Phil. 357 (1985).
91.Id. at 363.
92.See RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Sec. 3 (c).
93.See RULES OF COURT, Rule 72, Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Rule 111, Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. . . .
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action,
the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to
present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be
tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil
action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.
||| (Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)

Case No. 16

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Juanito A. Orallo for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY; CONFINED TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDER.
InLeouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A MERE OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT IN PERFORMANCE OF
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR INCOMPATIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. On the other hand, in the
present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapableof doing so, due to some psychological (not
physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 36. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden
of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness must
be graveenough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
73

marriage (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The
trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with
the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from
the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
PADILLA, J., Separate Statement:
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
EXISTENCE OF GROUND DEPEND ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE; TRIAL JUDGE MUST
TAKE PAINS IN EXAMINING FACTUAL MILLIEU AND APPELLATE COURT MUST AVOID
SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT. I concur in the result
of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the
case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In
the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion:
1.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; OPPOSING AND CONFLICTING
PERSONALITIES IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. The majority
opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling,
upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to
the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if
not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF MENTAL ILLNESS. I
would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
VITUG, J., Concurring Opinion:
1.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY; OTHER GROUNDS SHOULD BE READ ALONG WITH IT IN DETERMINING ITS
IMPORT. In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must
also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the
Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55
that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, 'psychological
incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse
to have sexual relations with the other.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. In fine, the term psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following
tests; viz: First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental not physical, in nature; Second,
the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand assume
and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity
and rendering mutual help and support; Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is contracted although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J p:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to
declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and
lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and
in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family Code.

74

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage
of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina
of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin
Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage,
Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money;
that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in
regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February
1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be
served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and
void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer
live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent
quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such
as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
"1.That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the
Church of St. Augustine, Manila;
2.That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina
was born on July 29, 1986;
3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4.That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5.That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6.That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner
wife."
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and
of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any
evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence,
the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws
on personal and family rights . . .." It concluded that:
"As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological
incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part
of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his
or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to
cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made."
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
75

Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
"COURT
QIt is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
AYes, Your Honor.
QThere is no hope for the marriage?
AThere is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
QIs it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other
parties?
AYes, Your Honor.
QNeither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
AYes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions."
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive
of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and
gentleness" on Reynaldo's part and of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at
all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. lexlib
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative
and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed
up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
76

words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization,
great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally
subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the
State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing
marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres,
Jr., JJ ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the result.
Padilla, Romero, Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the
facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R.
No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was
psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid
marriage. The facts of the present case, after an in-depth study, do not support a similar
conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial
Court ruling, upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so
much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7)Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
77

The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
"(7)That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting
in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and
to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital
obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . .
Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage." 1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or
mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person
may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of
how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest
after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1.lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2.reasons of public policy;
3.special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages
are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of
the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." liblex
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage
ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying
civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo freed from the
marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new
marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into
the Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or
totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination
of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be 'capable according to law' in order to
give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major
elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that
internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of
interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due
discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means that the person did not
have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid.
78

Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of
the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach
to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned
for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the
marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what
came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems
that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
"Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after
the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely
challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract
to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment
cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could
necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent." 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both
spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is
not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts,
but is, in its totality community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in
a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining
of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal
sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation
but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital
commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional
maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary
stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the
failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal
communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice;
(3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall
short of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A
situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often
fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a
shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties'
inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of
due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties'
incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of
lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the
time the marriage was entered into." 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well as in Santos v. Court of Appealscited in
the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to
communicate with her husband for more than five years is not proof of her psychological
incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping
with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to
the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference
and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate
79

children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1) on psychological incapacity,
concluded:
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity."
We declared:
"This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the
parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court."
I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both spouses.
VITUG, J ., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia,
and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the
proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the
Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the
Family Code. Thus
"Art. 36.A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which drafted
the Code explained:
"(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law " 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law
"Canon 1095.(The following persons) are incapable of contracting
marriage; (those)
"1.who lack sufficient use of reason;
"2.who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted
mutually;
"3.who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage"
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code
must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from,
the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise,
but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the
marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care
must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if
the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 3 viz:
"(T)he use of the phrase psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities,
extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances . . . Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity' should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render
help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be legitimate.'
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
80

renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of
the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity." 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz.:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand,
assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect
and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its
overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it,
to be an alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has
failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the
better; if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the
measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal
command on how the State should regard marriage and the family, thus

Section 2, Article XV:
"Sec. 2.Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State."
Section 12, Article II:
"Sec. 12.The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . ."
Section 1, Article XV:
"Section 1.The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of
the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively
promote its total development." (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm
than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency
or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 25-33.
2.Sixteenth Division composed of J. Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman; JJ., Serafin
V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3.Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.
4.Solemnized by Fr. Jesus G. Encinas.
5.The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC Decision
as follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible, dependent,
disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of
respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that the former failed to be gainfully
employed after he was relieved from the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel sometime in February, 1986, leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of
the family. Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically
abandoned both petitioner-mother and son except during the first few months of
separation when respondent regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly
allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months. Respondent is likewise
dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as he has no savings,
preferring to spend his money with his friends and peers. A year after their
marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a house and lot at BF
Homes, Paraaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred there only for
the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually renting the
house with the respondent's parents responsible for the payment of the rentals.
Aside from this, respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at
present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child, which fact he does not
deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned sour if we look at
the background of their relationship. During their college days, when they were still
going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative, homely, and
intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife and
mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his
thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their
relationship because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years
later, while they were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their
love affair. They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more
mature respondent. Believing that they know each other much better after two
years of going steady, they decided to settle down and get married. It would seem,
therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other well and were then
prepared for married life.
81

During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-up and
dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner and
respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their
frequent arguments and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and help of
their parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not
come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalties (sic). Neither of them can accept and
understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each
other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine,
respondent cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage.
Rather, this resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband
and wife which is unique and requisite in marriage.
5a.Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman with the
basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family Code).
The unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and
lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully
understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently)
united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the
parties, among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as
heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus,
the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform
these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-
up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in this case." (Decision, pp. 5-
8; Original Records, pp. 70-73)
6.240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7.Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
8.TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9.The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the marriage tribunals
of each archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside from heading the Appellate
Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the
degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also
Secretary-General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines PCP II
held from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of
a parliament or a constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and where the
ponente, who was a Council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by
his keen mind and prayerful discernments.
10.Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of Justice,
author, noted civil law professor and law practitioner.
11."Article XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1.The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2.Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the state.
Section 3.The State shall defend:
(1)The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the
demands of responsible parenthood;
(2)The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3)The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4)The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them.
Section 4.The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state may also do so
through just programs of social security.
12."Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code."
13.Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14.This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand, the text
used in Santos vs. CA reads:
"Canon 1095.They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
3.Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage."
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum is due to the
fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are differently-
worded English translations.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
1.Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil Code Revision
Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
2.Zwack, Joseph P., Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
82

3.The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society of America,
Paulist Press, New York, 1985.
4.Zwack, ibid., p. 47
5.G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
6.G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
VITUG, J., concurring:
1.Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, in Salita vs. Hon.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.
2.In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
3.Supra.
4.At pages 34-35.

||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997)

Case No. 17

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162368. July 17, 2006.]

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs. BRIX
FERRARIS, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible
error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision 1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris.
The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order 2 dated April 20, 2001 where the
trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed 3 in toto the judgment of the trial
court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was
suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present
at the inception of the marriage. 4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony
failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to
explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder;
that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an
adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from
accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied 6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for
failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. 7 The Court required respondent Brix
Ferraris to file comment 8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the
opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. 9 Such
83

factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the
Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination. 10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, 11 save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case,
run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a
misappreciation of facts, 12 which are unavailing in the instant case. CHcESa
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume. 13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics
associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. 14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, 15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital
annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends
that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on
record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that
those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed
that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital
obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave,
permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's
relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well
about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of
time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of
respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a
responsible and loving husband. . . . . Their problems began when
petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they
started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to
withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called
marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of
trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy.
. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis
that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and
why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's
statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is
dependent on others for decision . . . lacks specificity; it seems to belong
to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that
respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself.
Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family
upbringing" . . . . She stated that there was a history of respondent's
parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the
supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a
natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an
"adverse integral element" in respondent's character that effectively
incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the
essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove
that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even
before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against
petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing
nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum. 16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude
whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates
than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with
his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the
psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married
persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage
void based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
84

marriage. 19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of
the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. 20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 21 37, 22 38,23 and
41 24 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article
45 25 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. 26 Article 36 should not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. 28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated
June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently
show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH
FINALITY. cESDCa
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 96-99. Penned by Judge Franchito N. Diamante.
2.Id. at 101.
3.Id. at 9-19. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Danilo B. Pine.
4.Id. at 17.
5.Id. at 18.
6.Id. at 7.
7.Id. at 208-227.
8.Id. at 228.
9.Concurring Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil.
664, 680 (1997).
10.Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
11.Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812, 817.
12.Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February 11, 2005, 451
SCRA 63, 69.
13.Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
14.Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40 (1995).
15.Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 677.
16.Rollo, pp. 111-113.
17.Supra note 9 at 669 & 674.
18.377 Phil. 919, 931 (1999).
19.Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.
20.Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 522.
21.Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1)Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;
(2)Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3)Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter;
(4)Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5)Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
and
(6)Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
22.Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1)Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2)Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
23.Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy:
(1)Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2)Between step-parents and step-children;
(3)Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4)Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
85

(5)Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6)Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7)Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8)Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse or his or her own spouse.
24.Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.
25.Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
(1)That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen
years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife;
(2)That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3)That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with
full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(4)That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5)That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other,
and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6)That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable.
26.Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9
at 690.
27.Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra note 19 at 439.
28.Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 13.

||| (Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006)

86

Case No. 18

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.]

EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner, vs. ROWENA ONG
GUTIERREZ YU-TE, respondent.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J p:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its
incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The
Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential
doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be
viewed, totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated free in form and devoid
of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867. The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution 2 denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-
Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was
then initially attracted to Rowena's close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a
sophomore student and respondent, a freshman. 3
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after
their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he
was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and
sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat
ticket. 4
However, Edward's P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation
and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided
to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncle's house and Edward to his parents' home.
As his family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would
commit suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle's place. 5 CaTSEA
On April 23, 1996, Rowena's uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25
years old, and she, 20. 6 The two then continued to stay at her uncle's place where Edward was
treated like a prisoner he was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed
Edward his guns and warned the latter not to leave Rowena. 7 At one point, Edward was able to
call home and talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents' home and
live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his
inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the
patriarch got mad, told Edward that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go
home. 8
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena's uncle, and stayed with his parents.
His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him. 9
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should
live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted
ways. 10
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the
basis of the latter's psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-
39720. 11
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties. 12 In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled
hearings. 13
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not
determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the
merits. 14
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically
incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born
and baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in
college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed.
He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to
his petition for Nullification of Marriage against the latter by the grounds
of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street,
Quezon City. TDaAHS
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one
deceased sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom
he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are
said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers
himself to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid
of meeting people. After 1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales
Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in
the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by
being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself from his friends
87

even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and
hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy
father and a disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her
collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend
prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and
this became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of
dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems
with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her
family and that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that
[time on], respondent had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and
live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared as they are
both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow
manage because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996,
respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping and she already bought
tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to the
idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the
house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so
petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look
for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that
they should go back and seek help from petitioner's parents. When the
parties arrived at the house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all
out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her home for the
meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days
of separation, respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted
to talk to him. Petitioner responded immediately and when he arrived at
their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he appeared to
be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit
suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home again. Respondent would
call by phone every now and then and became angry as petitioner does
not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening to file
a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper.
Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at this
point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out
of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23,
1996, respondent's uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that
very same day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract
before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage
License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after
arrival of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner
arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was
threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they
will commission their military friends to harm his family. Respondent even
made petitioner sign a declaration that if he should perish, the authorities
should look for him at his parents['] and relatives['] houses. Sometime in
June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told
his parents about his predicament and they forgave him and supported
him by giving him military escort. Petitioner, however, did not inform them
that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew
about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the
counseling[,] tried to contact respondent. Petitioner offered her to live
instead to [sic] the home of petitioner's parents while they are still
studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only
live with him if they will have a separate home of their own and be away
from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should already
get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can
start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the
petitioner already settled his differences with his own family. When
respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for them to
stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his
parents. He told her already that he was disinherited and since he also
does not have a job, he would not be able to support her. After knowing
that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped
tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live
separate lives. CacEID

The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be
undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused
by both parties['] unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He
was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she
was still egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sach's Sentence Completion Test
M M P I
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature
and recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of
them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still
unsure and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still
88

founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is absconded as
an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in
social interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin
to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it boring and uninteresting to commit
himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent, as aggravated
by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and
timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a
solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the
aggressive-rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat
exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to
take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner
will bring her good fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to
have her dreams realized, she used force and threats knowing that [her]
husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really
no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the
relationship. AcDHCS
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and
marry himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be
taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by
religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,]
(sic) it is evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage
for granted as they are still unaware of their own selves. He is extremely
introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by his weak
behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative
and aggressive so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring
in her strides toward convenience. It is apparent that she is suffering the
grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested
during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities that
made marriage a big mistake for them to take. 15
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision 16 declaring the marriage of the parties
null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. 17 The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice
of appeal. 18
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision 19 in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867, reversed and set aside the trial court's ruling. 20 It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In
sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina 21 needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. 22 The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required
certification of the OSG briefly stating therein the OSG's reasons for its agreement with or
opposition to, as the case may be, the petition. 23 The CA later denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution. 24
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June
15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. 25
In his memorandum, 26 petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of
respondent's psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties' psychological incapacity.
Petitioner also points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the
latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial
court orders and notices. 27
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum, 28 that the annulment petition filed before
the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to
comply with. The root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the
petition; neither was it medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties
was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist
did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements
in Molina 29 were not satisfied. 30
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
the marriage between the parties is null and void. 31 IEHaSc
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin, and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code 32 provides:
Article 36.A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth
P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 33
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision
Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The
letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in
behalf of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then
Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro traced the background
of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had
thought of including a chapter on absolute divorce in the draft
89

of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had
been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In
fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-
fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of
separation, legal or de facto. Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then
requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or
without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever
a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for
absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the
proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision
Committee and Family Law Committee started holding joint
meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family
Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
aITDAE
'a special contract of permanent partnership between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by law.'
With the above definition, and considering the Christian
traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino people as a
permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which
the family and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of
our citizenry to whom the great majority of our people
belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not
pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an
action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on
grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such
an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to
divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil
law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again
prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of
invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of
provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of
invalidity of marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the
two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the
preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the
present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional
kind of void marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in
the present Civil Code, to wit: cSICHD

'(7)those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
'Art. 32.The absolute nullity of a marriage may be
invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without
prejudice to the provision of Article 34.'
'Art. 33.The action or defense for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.'
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today
may already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the
Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of
marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact,
during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University,
as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since
Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and
void on the ground of "lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other
jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-age or
premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person;
marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that
they have found out in tribunal work that a lot of machismo among
husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic personality anomaly,
like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence
or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual
anomaly. 34
90

In her separate opinion in Molina, 35 she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7)Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or
mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced
the following revised provision even before the session was over:
"(7)That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the
celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped
any reference to "wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" and to "mentally
incapacitated". It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent,
"it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the
insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage."aTEHIC
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that
psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or
mental impotence", Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February
9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention of some churchmen who
are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak
phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent
with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion
of the phrase "and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented
that this would give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic.
Yet, the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested
that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry. ATEHDc
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void
marriages, viz.:
1.lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2.reasons of public policy;
3.special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special
cases and special situations," hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the
Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for
avoiding or annulling marriages that even comes close to being
psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential
requisites, some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with
the more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the
relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are
incapable of contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of
a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two
types of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law,
however, recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable
marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e.,it never really existed in
the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two
living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment
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process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and
a formal hearing.AHCaED
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as
severing the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully
into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being
congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but
yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of
civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into
live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous
situations that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the
Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Code
and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab
initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while
it did not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect,
recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old canons:
"Canon #1081 required persons to be 'capable according to law' in order
to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087
(the force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom
be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation
produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment called 'lack of
due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion
means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the
time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and
1960s involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and
nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to the kind of
proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid
consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who
had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of
this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had
demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to
accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony. 36

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. The Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 37 The law is
then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its application. 38 acHDTA
Yet, as held in Santos, 39 the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 40 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the
most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 41 This interpretation is, in fact,
consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1.The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual
distinction must be made between the second and third paragraphs of
C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and
the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a
rotal judge, explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal,
example. Jose wishes to sell a house to Carmela, and on the assumption
that they are capable according to positive law to enter such contract,
there remains the object of the contract, viz., the house. The house is
located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract,
the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of them. This is
the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The
third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving
consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their
consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the
object of the consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid
because it lacks its formal object. The consent as a psychological act is
both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is directed
towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes
this distinction: the third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent
but with positing the object of consent. The person may be capable of
positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941
regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from
pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand
as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises
from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical
jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
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The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies
always and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition
which affects the higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom;
or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and
they affect the sexual condition, leaving intact the higher faculties
however, so that these persons are still capable of free human acts. The
evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain
anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual
activities which are not normal, either with respect to its frequency
[nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding,
it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact such that a
person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of what
marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can
assume those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be
able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to
assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity
to posit the object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent
itself. SHAcID
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in
this regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear
whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit
the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the
conclusion that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is
prevented from properly deliberating and its judgment lacks freedom.
This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of
consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the
inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible
that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse,
would not be a free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter
of fact, true that the intellect is always and continuously under such an
irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and certainly
more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who
is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite
maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his consent would be
juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object of
consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and
with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the consent
may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling
was gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2.Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to
have seen his way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as
he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent
on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the
other. It is his opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the
meaning of marriage, and they are usually able to evaluate its
implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and
intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they are of
eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge,
had likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the
act of positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person
afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually
leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact.
What it affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From
the selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain
progress towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of
consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free
decision, an intelligent judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing
of things. The decision coram Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac
affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to the
moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the
matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes that a person in such
a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal obligation of fidelity,
although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations
of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same
obligations. SCHIac
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not
unusual to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence,
or similar expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some
anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact
the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic,
obviously to distinguish it from the impotence that constitutes the
impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the
subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the
extent that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the
essential obligations. According to the principle affirmed by the long
tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxx xxx xxx
3.5.3.5Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both
of the contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this
consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where one of the
parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does
not even know how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to
maintain and sustain such a relationship. A second incapacity could be
due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or maintaining
a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of
matrimony. Another incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to
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concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon speaks,
not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is
capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua
persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of
contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be
quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security
of the other, but not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the
other. These are general strokes and this is not the place for detained
and individual description.

A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete
circumstances of the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering
from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may
have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of
marriage, he was not capable of assuming them because of his
"constitutional immorality".
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as
regards the fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the
moment of decision but also and especially during the moment of
execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the
marital consent, it means that the actual fulfillment of the essential
obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration that must be factored
into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the
obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability
of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking
at matrimonium in fieri,but also and especially at matrimonium in facto
esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the
incapacity of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of
marriage in the psychic constitution of the person, precisely on the basis
of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the
rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are
invariably disturbed in the presence of this personality disorder. A lack of
empathy (inability to recognize and experience how others feel) is
common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially
favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal
exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage of in order to
achieve one's ends. ADaECI
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential
matrimonial obligations. One of them is the right to the communio
vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically centered
around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic
anomalies, which do not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise
to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or even all of these rights.
There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible.
Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in
marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what
rubric homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage
that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to
evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to
fulfill its obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to
understand it as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that
by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an
autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is
said to be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this
same rotal decision, the object of matrimonial consent is understood to
refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius vitae. The
third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure
to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality is. The
homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual
relations with the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so
afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion
because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive,
and intellectual faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to
assume the responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this
object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not
so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of
consent. AEIHaS
3.5.3.6Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is
the source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a
psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a
reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must
be a reference to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is
something in the psyche or in the psychic constitution of the person which
impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is incapable
according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is
judged incapable in this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found
to have something rooted in his psychic constitution which impedes the
assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in one's
consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this
invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to be some
freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one
accepts as given one's psychic constitution. It would seem then that the
law insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the
fruit of some degree of freedom. 42
Conscious of the law's intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining
the lower court's judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 43 ruled that the findings
of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts. 44
Again, upholding the trial court's findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on
the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 45 explained that when private respondent
94

testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel
decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of
the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, 46 thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family
Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation". It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable", thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state. TAEDcS
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them,
was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
(4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision. DICSaH
(7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of
psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject
to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of
the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to
be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk
together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
95

(8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. 47
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court's membership concurred in
the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three
justices concurred "in the result" and another three including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero
took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even
emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on 'all fours'
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court." 48 SEAHID
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, 49 the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals".
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the
one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world". 50 The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has
allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to
continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals. 51
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. 52 The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage,
because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply
with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic
personality anomaly. 53 Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the
first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. 54 To indulge in imagery, the declaration
of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a
concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second,
because the judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson
learned. On one hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a
person with a personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically
incapacitated runs the risk of the latter's disorder recurring in their marriage. HIAEcT
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,55 there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more
the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties' whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist
who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner's
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and
respondent's, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder. 56
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert
opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. 57
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a
psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data
about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional
opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did
not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was
an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology
during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
96

important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from
that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it
could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could
intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent. TaSEHD
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality
disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not
merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the
whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or
psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an
adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person;
that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of
marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have
the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than
just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious
incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in
isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other
spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to
the mature marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the
marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment
to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner;
(3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility;
(6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions
that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the
parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or
her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the
individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently
fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on
any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the
more traditional categories often fits very easily into the
psychological category. DSCIEa
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis
was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume
or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the
marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the
family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out
marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage
was entered into." 58
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 59 emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos 60 asserts, there is no requirement that
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician,
if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. 61 Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or
expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. 62 Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, 63 an option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed
psychologist/expert for an independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of
the parties. This will assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at
an intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with
the parties' prerogative to present their own expert witnesses. cSDHEC
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as
adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders to
repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality
97

disorder for respondent. We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Healthdiscusses personality
disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of
a person's recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and
thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply
ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the
individual mental stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal
relationships and normal functioning. Personality disorders are often
recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and
become less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more
than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders,
despite a variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads
to pervasive problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some
individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as
overdramatic, paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an
awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may lead to trouble getting
along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and
often a tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals
with personality disorders are not unpleasant or difficult to work with but
tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead to
interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints
propose a variety of causes of personality disorders. These include
Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of
development led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as
described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic
character types. Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and
passive-aggressive) was thought to derive from fixation at the oral stage.
Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness were
thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic
stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in
intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic
factor involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality
disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other personality
disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that
schizotypal personality may be related to genetic factors.AaSTIH
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic
acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a
past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been
associated with low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and
impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have
been reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the
most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported
that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with
19 percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are
categorized into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders.
Individuals who have these disorders often appear to have odd or
eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly
emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-
aggressive personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders
often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not
otherwise specified", that can be used for other specific personality
disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific
personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. 64
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt
by others' comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by
others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to
make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned. 65 TaISDA
98

and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant
of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an
inability to sustain a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of
others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without
remorse and a tendency to blame others. There is often a faade of
charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of remorse for
mistreatment of others and the need to control others.

Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may
befit some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose
habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be
hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to
as moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that
was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social
personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality disorders,
the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic. 66
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules
that the marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties' psychological
incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses'
deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering
help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows
others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with
people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers
to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable
or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. 67 As clearly
shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He
is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to
speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted
with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society. 68 Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in
manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide. SCaIcA
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the
precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001,
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-36.
2.Id. at 38-39.
3.TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
4.Id.
5.Id. at 2-3.
6.Records, p. 8.
7.TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 4.
11.Records, p. 1.
12.Id. at 24.
13.Id. at 36-37.
14.Id. at 39.
15.Id. at 48-55.
16.Id. at 61-66.
17.The dispositive portion of the RTC's July 30, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE and defendant ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ UY-
TE, officiated by Honorable Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 23, 1996, NULL AND
VOID, ab initio, on the ground of the couple's psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code; and dissolving their property regime in accordance with law,
if there is any.
99

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela City where the
marriage took place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City where this decision
originated for proper recording.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 66.)
19.Supra note 1. IASTDE
20.The dispositive portion of the CA's August 5, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed decision dated July 30, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 106, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-00-39720, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one is entered declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee Edward Kenneth
Ngo Te and respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te VALID and SUBSISTING.
The petition is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35.)
21.335 Phil. 664 (1997).
22.Executive Order No. 209, entitled "The Family Code of the Philippines", enacted on July 6,
1987.
23.Rollo, pp. 28-35.
24.Supra note 2.
25.Rollo, p. 79.
26.Id. at 95-104.
27.Id. at 100-102.
28.Id. at 82-93.
29.Supra note 21.
30.Rollo, pp. 86-92.
31.Supra note 22.
32.Id.
33.G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
34.Id. at 38-41. (Italics supplied.)
35.Supra note 21.
36.Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 681-685.
37.Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108,
quoting Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1998, p. 37.
38.Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 31.
39.Id.
40.Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:
Art. 68.The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
41.Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 34.
42.Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments, 2000 ed., pp. 110-
119.
43.326 Phil. 169 (1996).
44.Id. at 182.
45.334 Phil. 294, 300-304 (1997).
46.Supra note 21.
48.Id. at 680.
49.See Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30,
2008; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27,
2008; Lester Benjamin S. Halili v. Chona M. Santos-Halili, et al., G.R. No. 165424,
April 16, 2008; Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA
123; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81; Navarro, Jr.
v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121; Republic v.
Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123; Zamora v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007, 515 SCRA 19; Perez-
Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396;Republic v.
Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177; Antonio v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R.
No. 167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No.
152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No.
158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No.
149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735; Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900
(2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626 (2003); Choa v. Choa, 441
Phil. 175 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001); Republic v. Dagdag, G.R.
No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840
(2000); Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320
SCRA 76. HEcaIC
50.See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 668.
51.Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, 2006 ed.,
pp. 14-16, cites the following:
100

"Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological incapacity pointed out cases of various
psychological disorders from the Roman Rota as enumerated below (Fr. Bacareza,
1999).
"6.1.From the 1917 Code of the Second Vatican Council
1.Coram Teodori in Italy on January 19, 1940 on Nymphomania.
2.Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.
3.Coram Heard in Quebec on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic Encephalitis.
4.Coram Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General Paralysis.
5.Coram Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on Nymphomania.
6.Coram Mattioli in Rome on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia.
7.Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.
8.Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.
"6.2From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of the 1983 Code
9.Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the following:
a.Homosexuality,
b.Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,
c.Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and
d.Affective Immaturity and Passive Dependent Personality.
10.Coram Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.
11.Coram De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.
12.Coram Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the following:
a.Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November 26, 1969),
b.Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),
c.Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)
d.Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)
e.Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)
13.Coram Bruno on the following:
a.Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15, 1972)
b.Sexual Neurosis (March 27, 1981)
c.Psychoneurosis (December 17, 1982)
14.Coram Jose Maria Serrano Ruiz on the following:
a.Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5, 1973)
b.Lack of Interpersonal Integration (April 15, 1973)
c.Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)
d.Psychic Immaturity (November 18, 1977)
e.Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)
f.Obsessive-Compulsive Personality (May 23, 1980)
g.Frigidity (July 28, 1981)

h.Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
15.Coram Ewers on the following:
a.Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
b.Sexual Neurosis (April 4, 1981)
16.Coram Pariscella on the following:
a.Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis (February 23, 1978)
b.Homosexuality (June 11, 1978) EHSTDA
17.Coram Fiore (May 27, 1981)
18.Coram Agustoni (March 23, 1982)
"6.3.After the Promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law
19.Rotal Case No. 41:c. Colagiovanni on March 3, 1983 on Homosexuality
20.Rotal Case No. 42 c. Huot on July 18, 1983 on Alcoholism and Immature Personality.
21.Rotal Case No. 43: c. Giannechini on July 19, 1983 on Homosexuality.
22.Rotal Case No. 45: c. Colagiovanni on November 22, 1983 about an ex-priest who was
a "liar, cheat and swindler" (Anti-Social Personality)
23.Rotal Case No. 46: c. Stankiewiez on November 24, 1983 on Homosexuality.
24.Rotal Case No. 47: c. Egan on March 29, 1984 on Hysterical Personality.
25.Rotal Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on June 9, 1984 on Psychic Immaturity.
26.Rotal Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May 30, 1986 on Alcoholism and Gambling.
27.Rotal Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini on December 20, 1988 on Hypersexuality-
Nymphomania.
101

52.Justice Padilla's Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 36-
37; Ancheta v. Ancheta, supra note 49, at 917.
53.Supra note 34.
54.See Article 36 of the Family Code; see also Justice Carpio's Dissenting Opinion, Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 299.
56.Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.
57.Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-Dagupan, explains
in Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that "[s]tandard practice shows the marked
advisability of Expert intervention in Marriage Cases accused of nullity on the
ground of defective matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason
of any factor causative of lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due
discretion and inability to assume essential obligations although the law
categorically mandates said intervention only in the case of impotence and
downright mental disorder . . . ." (p. 106).
59.Supra note 49, at 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, supra note 49, at 743.
60.Supra note 49, at 850; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, supra note 49, at
742; Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 49, at 526; Zamora v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 49, at 27;Paras v. Paras, supra note 49, at 96-97.
61.The Court, however, by saying
[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions
communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any
psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact,
his Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said
about his wife Leni is true, . . ."
xxx xxx xxx
Obviously, Dr. Guanzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had
merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on pure
suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his
testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable. AISHcD
Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioner's
character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also through
the former's at least fifteen hours of study of the voluminous transcript of records of
this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine
the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioner's psychological
state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
In Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at 190-191), in effect, required the personal examination of
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
62.Psychologists of the Psychological Extension Evaluation Research Services (PEERS)
enumerate the segments of the psychological evaluation report for psychological
incapacity as follows:
Identifying Data: Personal Information
Referral Question: Data coming from informants and significant others (psychologists,
psychiatrists, physicians, parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, friends, etc.).
Test Administered (Dates): List by name
Background Information:
Current Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict), history of problem,
and consequences in client's life.
Life History Information: Childhood development, educational history, vocational history,
medical history, sexual and marital history, personal goals.
Behavior Observations: Description of client, relationship with examiner, and test related
behaviors.
Interpretation of Test Results:
Intellectual Functioning: Wechsler tests, Stanford-Binet, etc. Obtained IQ scores and specific
strengths and deficits.
Cognitive Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality or perceptual
efficiency, conceptual organization, psychological needs, conflicts, preoccupations,
suspiciousness, hallucinations, or delusions.
Emotional Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.): Liability of emotions, impulse control,
predominant concerns like aggression, anxiety, depression, guilt, dependency, and
hostility.
Relationship Patterns (MMPI, Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work or school,
friendships, intimate relationships, difficulties such as immaturity, irresponsibility,
cooperativeness, sociability, introversion, impulsivity, aggression, dangerousness to
self or others.
Defenses and compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping mechanisms, or any
useful compensation that might be helping the client maintain himself/herself.
Integration of Test Results with Life History: Presenting a clinical picture of the client as a
total person against the background of his marital discords and life circumstances.
Hypotheses posed through the referral question and generated and integrated via
test results and other reliable information.
Summary, Conclusion, Diagnosis, Prognosis:
Summary: Emphasis should be on conciseness and accuracy so that the reader can quickly
find the essential information and overall impression.
102

Conclusion: Integrating the material (data) into a more smoothly stated conceptualization of
the client's personality and problem areas as regards root causes and
characteristics as ground for nullity of marriage. cHCIDE
Diagnosis: Diagnostic impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed impression of
personality disorders, and classified mental disorders based on the criteria and
multi axial system of the DSM IV.
Prognosis: Predicting the behavior based on the data obtained that are relevant to the current
functioning of the client, albeit under ideal conditions.
Recommendation: Providing a careful specific recommendation is based on the referral
sources and obtained data in dealing with a particular client that may be
ameliorative, remedial, or unique treatment/intervention approaches. As to
psychological incapacity, specific recommendation on the nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code and expertise and clinical judgment of the Clinical
Psychologist should be given emphasis. (Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical
Bases of Psychological Incapacity, supra note 51, at 179-181.)
63.A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.
64.Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See
Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7th ed., 2006, pp. 613-614,
defining personality disorders as "long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are
not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These
disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence,
create problems for those who display them and for others. Some psychologists
view personality disorders as interpersonal strategies or as extreme, rigid, and
maladaptive expressions of personality traits." (Citations omitted.)
65.Id. at 131.
66.Id. at 50-51.
67.Supra note 65.
68.Supra note 66.
||| (Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009)

Case No. 19

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185286. August 18, 2010.]

MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, petitioner, vs. RAMON REYES-
REYES, respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J p:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding of
psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where there
are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution 1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social institution, and validating a
marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on
the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted
upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 89761 2 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854. 3
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were
simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP
Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was free spirited
and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. 4 Since both resided in
Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the
university. TCaSAH
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondent's style of courtship which included dining out,
unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university student's budget. At that time,
respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner's good
impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter's habit of cutting classes, not even
by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB Sociology
from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year, and just
continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner's graduation and her father's death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
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Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent's family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondent's parents, and the couple's respective salaries were
spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of
P1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child
entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from
respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When
petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he
had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent's game plan was
to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the
Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family
for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that
the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial
difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the
household, respondent's business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a
fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner
sporadically. Compounding the family's financial woes and further straining the parties'
relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took
him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to
remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro. ECDaTI
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with
petitioner's mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties
became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just
financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At
that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the
petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while
playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent's fishpond business stopped operations. Although
without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family
business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and
carton trading. As with all of respondent's business ventures, this did not succeed and added to
the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly,
the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She
overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the
latter liked respondent's gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable
to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to
remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties' marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent
remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when
petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After
the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent's lack of concern, and asked
her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage.
Petitioner approached respondent's siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she
was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondent's siblings waved the white flag on
respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondent's elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple
scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the
parties' relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to
"determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other attempts to help
him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist's recommendation to
undergo psychotherapy. DHITCc
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent's siblings, told respondent to
move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent's
relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001, 5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter's psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner's allegations that he was psychologically
incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his
family both as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno,
and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC granted the
petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the
petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA.
SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES
contracted on December 4, 1976 at the Archbishop's Chapel Villa San
Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the
Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is
dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH
MICHAEL CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full
civil capacity and legal rights to decide for themselves having finished
their studies, are free to decide for themselves.
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The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from
notice to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for
Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the
Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the
corresponding Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the
Court shall observe the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-
10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec.
22 AM 02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance
with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules
on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21,
AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their respective
office addresses.
SO ORDERED. 6
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for reconsideration
of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage.CHIEDS
Taking exception to the trial court's rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties' marriage as valid and subsisting.
Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and
voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-
44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs. 7
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
II
PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY
PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V
TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO
VI
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY
WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE WERE
ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. CTDacA
VII
PARTIES' MARRIAGE, WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB
INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, DOES NOT
FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE
MANTLE OF THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF
MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE AMENDED PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM
TO EVIDENCE. 8
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties is
void ab initio on the ground of both parties' psychological incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of
the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary
evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The RTC
ratiocinated, thus:
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After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court
finds merit in the petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
solemnization."
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital
partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family
Code express the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the
determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case
basis. IHDCcT
xxx xxx xxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of
psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence
presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the
respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert
witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the
psychological condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the
marriage between the parties from its inception has a congenital infirmity
termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the inability of the
parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially
towards each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe
love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help and support,
(Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in the
psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the
truthfulness of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their
findings that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which
psychologically incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage.
Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the
Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of
an honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This
psychological incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said
three (3) expert witnesses, is serious, incurable and exists before his
marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his structural constellation.
It is beyond the respondent's impulse control. In short, he is weaponless
or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply
because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly
manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with
the petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact,
with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to
them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he
was blind and too insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He
totally disregarded the feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been
saturated already that she finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-
in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage.
However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to
ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the
respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to the
seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand
of his siblings.
xxx xxx xxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take
relationship and not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the
fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage which must naturally be
observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties
did not create a monument of marital integrity, simply because the
personality disorder of the respondent which renders him psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply entombed
in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that
there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the
respondent. Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that
she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity as her personality
cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are
poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while
respondent is a free spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of
the respondent cannot be catered by the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the
thunder bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward
their marital life with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a
pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty
kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable
and has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years. cEHSTC
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings,
they are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive
to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to
any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is
already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the
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words of Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at
the funeral parlor. Stated differently, there was no life at all in their
marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds that with this reality,
both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that
exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties
whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors
beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social ability of the
parties to sustain. 9
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the appellate
court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina] vis--vis the totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner],
we find that the latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is
thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent]
is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed
[respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder
(Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further,
clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an
Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features,
while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality
Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely
advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon
such testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are
inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In
the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr.
Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr.
Villegas are hearsay. They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have
no personal knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent]
as they never personally examined the [respondent] himself.
xxx xxx xxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported
psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the
[petitioner] would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that
[respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to
determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The
undeniable fact is that based on Dayan's personal examination of the
[respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral observations
made, background information gathered and interpretation of
psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help
the [respondent] through individual therapy and counseling
sessions. TAScID
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on
[respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance
abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are true, the totality of the
evidence presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo's findings regarding the
[respondent's] alleged mixed personality disorder, his "come and go"
attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to
his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner's] feelings,
irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed
business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some
debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent's] "defects" were not
present at the inception of marriage. They were even able to live in
harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two
children . . . . In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that
initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in
keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation
changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat
Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It
appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by
the [petitioner].
xxx xxx xxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr.
Villegas' Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] "manifested
inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive
to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it,
rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the
duties and responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to
specifically allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its celebration . . . . In fact, what
was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be
rendered "declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the
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ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the
time of the celebration of marriage . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in
their marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect"
in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. TaISDA
While [petitioner's] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be
without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to
have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the
unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article
36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct
from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different
reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make
the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for
legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were
indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. . . .
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of
marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. 10
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court's
ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established. We
disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and subsisting.
Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the
factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations are:
(1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 12
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a
personality disorder, to wit: STDEcA
1.Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents.
Belonging to an average social status, intellectual achievement is quite
important to the family values(sic). All children were equipped with high
intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them.
Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume
his financial and emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited
extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has been described as
the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the
home. Doing volunteer and community services, she was not the
demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and
concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing
touches of an emotional reaction (sic). Psychological home environment
did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or depression, but one has to
stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to
subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for
any undertakings (sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable,
dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong
sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical
resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial
adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and
less of how she feels (sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader,
but less effective in a heterosexual relationship, especially to her
husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy, insecurity, low self
esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this,
[petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to
reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her
husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended
upon. But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondent's]
shortcomings, the bigger was the discrepancy in their coping
mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated,
uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).
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On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to
the second set of brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and
limitations during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was
acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have a
close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical
behavior of conduct disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his
apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he felt that he needed a "push"
to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted [petitioner], who
adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered
by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other
people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for
whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of
a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his
apparent high intellectual resources (sic). cCSHET
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his
worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own.
With no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This
became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of
relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic
attitudes (sic) and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her
face which impliedly meant "you are nothing as compared to me" were in
reality, his defenses for a strong sense of inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides.
However, this seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as
perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and
confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the
support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But
when he failed, the more he became negativistic and closed to
suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too careful not to let go
or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence, doubts,
lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of
rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to his
plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as
stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of
insight and primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being
untraditional and different from others. Preoccupation is centered on
himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification
of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this
stems his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as
pressures, stresses, (sic) demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up
in their marital relationship. Strong masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to
be able to assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband and
father, but because of a severe psychological deficit, he was unable
to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner,
that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that
made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who
needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically
incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong
clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a Personality
Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that
renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage. This is characterized by his inability to
conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many aspects of
adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated
with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of
this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and
maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his
underlying defense mechanisms, or the unconscious mental
processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged and
closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and
developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine
strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making,
aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His
narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not
resolved (sic). HDTSCc
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the
celebration, due to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as
permanent in nature because it started early in his psychological
development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it
hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal functioning related
to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied) 13
2.Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]'s brothers, referred [respondent] to the
clinic. According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife
and children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to
be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to
accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now
[respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that
[respondent] is not himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the
day at home doing nothing. They wish that he'd be more responsible and
try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife[,] is the breadwinner
of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]'s brothers
learned from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She
109

has discussed things with him but he always refused to listen. She does
not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that
he stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the
truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been
hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked
what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely
and distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and
his wife [have] drifted apart. He wants to be close to somebody and
discuss things with this person but he is not given the chance. He also
mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant of
people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants
to avoid conflict so he'd rather be submissive and compliant. He does not
want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other
people happy.
xxx xxx xxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A.Intellectual/Cognitive Functioning
xxx xxx xxx
B.Vocational Preference
xxx xxx xxx
C.Socio Emotional Functioning
xxx xxx xxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved,
aloof and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns.
He has deep feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends
to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association with others. He
feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections.
Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid
personal and social involvement, which increases his preoccupation with
himself and accentuates his tendency to withdraw from interpersonal
contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant partner. He
feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A
self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with others in
order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of
companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels
uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being
hurt. Likewise, he maybe very angry within but he may choose to repress
this feeling. [Respondent's] strong need for social approval, which could
have stemmed from some deep seated insecurities makes him
submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra effort to please
people. Although at times[, he] already feels victimized and taken
advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal
conflicts. Despite his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize
dangers of indifference and disapproval [of] others. Resentments are
suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which is
likewise apt to be repressed. EaHcDS
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing
considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and
nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness
and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air
but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he
will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has
difficulty concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to
prioritize. He has many plans but he can't accomplish anything because
he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of hopelessness is
further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I:Drug Dependence
Axis II:Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial
Personality Disorder]
Axis III:None
Axis IV:Psychosocial and Environmental Problems: Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting
things but is unable to accomplish anything;
unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in
social relationships.
Axis V:Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis
supplied) 14
3.Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioner's] case history and
from her psychological assessment, and despite the non-
cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with certainty
the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about
the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder
with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him too
immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a
marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children.
Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally
immature and her comprehension of human situations is very shallow for
a woman of her academic and professional competence. And this
explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead,
110

then despite the abuse, took so long to do something about her
situation. AScHCD
Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Axis IPartner Relational Problem
Axis IIObsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features
Axis IIINo diagnosis
Axis IVPsychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouse's immaturity,
drug abuse, and infidelity)
Severity:4-severe
Diagnosis for [respondent]
Axis IPartner Relational Problem
Axis IIAntisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive
sadistic and dependent features
Axis IIINo diagnosis
Axis IVPsychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity:4 (severe)
xxx xxx xxx
One has to go back to [respondent's] early childhood in order to
understand the root cause of his antisocial personality disorder.
[Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings
were taken cared of by his grandmother. [Respondent's] father was kind,
quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother.
Unfortunately, [respondent's] mother grew up believing that she was not
her mother's favorite child, so she felt "api, treated like poor relations."
[Respondent's] mother's reaction to her perceived rejection was to act out
with poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like
water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became
[respondent's] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living,
he learned to use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up
the weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people
wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and
attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the
process, his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so
that he cannot sustain a relationship with one person for a long time,
which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondent's] narcissistic personality features were manifested by
his self-centeredness (e.g., moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10
years, leaving his family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-
importance (e.g., he would just "come and go," without telling his wife his
whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g., felt entitled to a
mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.);
interpersonally exploitative (e.g., let his wife spend for all the
maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g., when
asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would
think about it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were
manifested whom he has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of]
his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent personality features were
manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most major
areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder
with marked narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and
dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render
support for his spouse and children. A personality disorder is not
curable as it is permanent and stable over time. EcTDCI
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the
marriage of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the
very beginning.(emphasis supplied) 15
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, 16 necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of
the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely
witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment
of the present state of the parties' marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein
petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondent's pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical
psychologists and the psychiatrist.
For another, the clinical psychologists' and psychiatrist's assessment were not based solely on
the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent's own
son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
observations of respondent's behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time
they knew him. 17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors' assessments.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV), 19 instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria for
personality disorders:
111

A.An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates
markedly from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is
manifested in two (2) or more of the following areas:
(1)cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other
people, and events)
(2)affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and
appropriateness of emotional response)
(3)interpersonal functioning
(4)impulse control
B.The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range
of personal and social situations. DEcTIS
C.The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D.The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced
back at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E.The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a
consequence of another mental disorder.
F.The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a
substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical
condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A.There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights
of others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of
the following:
(1)failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts
that are grounds for arrest
(2)deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases,
or conning others for personal profit or pleasure
(3)impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4)irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated
physical fights or assaults
(5)reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6)consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to
sustain consistent work behavior or honor financial
obligations
(7)lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or
rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another
B.The individual is at least 18 years.
C.There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D.The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the
course of schizophrenia or a manic episode. 20 HESIcT
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of
a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by
the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors' separate diagnoses, does not
necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayan's findings and recommendation, the psychological
incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock's textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry, 21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan's recommendation that
respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent's
psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. 22 As aptly stated by
Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals & Molina: 23
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were
asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the
time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended
to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
. . . [Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades.
There was now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link
between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems;
and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards
providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail
of unpaid money obligations. EaCDAT
112

It is true that a clinical psychologist's or psychiatrist's diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages.
Indeed, a clinical psychologist's or psychiatrist's finding of a personality disorder does not
exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties' or
both parties' psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an expert's opinion concerning the supposed
psychological incapacity of a party. 24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, 25 we ruled that, even without
delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina, 26 the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals 27 must be independently met by the
party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Villegas with nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the
case" and the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr.
Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that
the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr.
Villegas' testimony did not illuminate on the parties' alleged personality
disorders and their incapacitating effect on their marriage . . . .
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality
disorders was not supported by psychological tests properly administered
by clinical psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and
interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties,
considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully
established by psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to
measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.
xxx xxx xxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven
(7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests,
cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own
factual finding on what happened in this case. The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts' conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable
conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides: AcSIDE
Art. 68.The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit the
following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal
and even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal
many areas of disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away
from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are
typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. . . .
Their own explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem
mindless, but their mental content reveals the complete absence of
delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they frequently
have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers
as having good verbal intelligence.
. . . Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to
carry out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. . . .
A notable finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they
appear to lack a conscience. 28
In the instant case, respondent's pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial
support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid
money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses;
and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioner's purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CA's ruling
thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically
allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of
marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
became manifest only after its celebration . . . . In fact, what was merely
prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered
"declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the
celebration of the marriage . . .
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioner's] Amended Petition
was indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas' finding that
[petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate Personality
[Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of
[petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological condition that incapacitates
her from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage. In
fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical psychologist
Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to
be a "good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best
to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard
113

are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas' psychiatric report, it was stated
that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20
years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding
and relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than
[petitioner's] own expert witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is
psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of Article 36 of the
Family Code. 29 cCAIDS
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in his
separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina: 30
". . . Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we
find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Article XV, Section 2 of the Constitution.
2.Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justices Mario L.
Guarina III and Pampio A. Abarintos concurring, and Associate Justices Vicente Q.
Roxas and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores dissenting, rollo, pp. 9-45.
3.Penned by Judge Elsa I. De Guzman, id. at 237-261.
4.Psychiatric Report of Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas, id. at 404.
5.The original petition was filed in July of 2001; RTC records, pp. 1-18; the amended petition,
in December of the same year, id. at 87-88.
6.Rollo, pp. 260-261.
7.Id. at 231.
8.Id. at 102-103.
9.Id. at 257-260.
10.Id. at 38-44.
11.G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
12.Rollo, pp. 33-34.
13.Id. at 413-416.
14.Id. at 390-397.
15.Id. at 372-375.
16.Article 1 of the Family Code.
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
. . .
17.Rollo, pp. 243, 248-249.
18.G.R. No. 176464, February 4, 2010.
19.Quick Reference to the Diagnostic Criteria from DSM IV-TR, American Psychiatric
Association, 2000.
20.See Kaplan and Saddock's Synopsis of Psychiatry and Psychology Behavioral
Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry (8th ed.), p. 785.
21.See Kaplan and Saddock's Synopsis of Psychiatry and Psychology Behavioral
Sciences/Clinical Psychiatry (8th ed.), 1998.
22.Rollo, pp. 243-247.
23.G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 219.
24.Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157; Paz v.
Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010.
25.Supra note 18.
26.Supra.
27.Supra note 11.
28.Supra note 20.
29.Rollo, p. 43.
||| (Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, August 18, 2010)

114

Case No. 20
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.]

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.

Arturo S. Santos for petitioner.
Prisciliano I. Casis for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; ASSAILED DECISION ON
ANNULMENT NOT BASED THEREON WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED AFTER TRIAL;
CASE AT BAR. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court pertains to a judgment on the
pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The
assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent
testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a
testimony. After such evidence was presented. it became incumbent upon petitioner to present
his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them. To prevent collusion between the
parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial
(Sec. 1, Rule 19). The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When
petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the truth.
2.ID.; ID.; EITHER SPOUSE MAY PETITION COURT FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE. Neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action
to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
3.ID.; EVIDENCE; SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL OF ONE OF THE PARTIES
TO FULFILL MARITAL OBLIGATION, EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
Assuming it to be so, petitioner would have discussed with private respondent or asked her what
is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse
with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out
or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.
Since it is petitioner' s claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder
on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim. "If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity." Evidently,
one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR., J p:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over
troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in
the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court
of Appeals 1 in its decision are as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established:
"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant
at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South
Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house defendant's mother.
"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first
night of their married life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her
expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making
love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to
sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where
they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they
went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle,
115

his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join
them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the
defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together
in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March
15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to
Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on
January 20, 1989.
"The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept
confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was
asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual
as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the
defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream
of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a
Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile-with her husband.
"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage
shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with
his wife.
"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife
annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that
he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically
capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is
any differences between the two of them, it can, still be reconciled and
that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there
is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is
any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or
science.
"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private
parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he
forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why
the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is
afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother,
and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid
because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome
their differences.
"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination.
His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that
there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of
erection. (Exh. "2-C")
"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to
find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the
original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the
defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza
said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is
not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his
soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a
woman.

"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the
marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988
at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception,
Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without
costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
116

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as
proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed
by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion
between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has
the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent
evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for
the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their
pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of
collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
"Section 1.Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct
judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court
and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse
party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit
such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19). cda
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he
and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have
been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes,viz.:
"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not
based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant
is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation
was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial
evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual
relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it
appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such
abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of
this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No.
112019, January 4, 1995)." 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both
the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical
finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for
such refusal which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might
have been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts,
why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to
March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The
fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties
is suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner would have discussed with private respondent
or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have
sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he
had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner' s claim that the reason is not psychological but
117

perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to
prove such a claim.
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform
his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the
prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity." 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea
that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire
belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989)
that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his rights
even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I
Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who
was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court
and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty
of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her
private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband
if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence
proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act
which is not psychological incapacity, and which can be achieved
"through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the
admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not
posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder
that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code." 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate of court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with
another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could
not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has
nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness
and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. cda
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is
a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-
way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other
can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but
for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect,
sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is herebyDENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo G. Montenegro and
Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
2.Rollo, pp. 20-24.
3.Ibid.
4.Rollo, p. 34.
5.Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C".
6.Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.
7.Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

||| (Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997)

118

Case No. 21
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 165424. June 9, 2009.]

LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, petitioner, vs. CHONA M. SANTOS-
HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J p:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying
petitioner's petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition
sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision 1 and September 24, 2004 resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a "joke". After the
ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop
seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank
calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon
making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake".
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder,
particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert
witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioner's personality disorder was
serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. 3 cDICaS
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the
totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the
CA's decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to
respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He
stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was
more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, 4 this Court reiterated that
courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration
of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 5
In this case, the testimony 6 of petitioner's expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering
from dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q.Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you
conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and]
conclusions?
A.Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a
mixed personality disorder from self-defeating personality
disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this is
brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He
also suffered from partner relational problem during his
marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not
truly a marriage, sir.
Q.Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from
psychological incapacity to handle the essential obligations of
marriage?
A.Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very
questionable. It was a very impulsive decision. I don't think he
understood what it meant to really be married and after the
marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual
intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three
months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and
afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and
he never thought it was a really serious matter at all. EHSAaD
xxx xxx xxx
Q.Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and
respondent suffered from a grave lack of discretionary
judgment. Can you expound on this?
A.. . . I don't think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had
undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that
they should get married . . . I don't think they truly considered
themselves married.
xxx xxx xxx
Q.Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to
conclude . . . that petitioner and respondent are suffering from
psychological incapacity?
119

A.. . . they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they
never consummated the marriage. During the very short
relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and so
there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other
and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder 7 as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt
by others' comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by
others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood.
Individuals who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday
decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to
make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to
agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty
starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that
are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with
fears of being abandoned.
In her psychological report, 8 Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner's dependent personality disorder
was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on
them for decisions. 9 Petitioner's mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help
when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was
for real. 10
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality
disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating
attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him. 11 This
could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who
treated his family like robots 12 and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his
father. 13 When petitioner could no longer take respondent's domineering ways, he preferred to
hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their
marriage. 14 HScCEa
Dr. Dayan traced petitioner's personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit: 15
Q.And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A.Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lester's family is dysfunctional. The
father was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has
been very unhappy and the children never had affirmation.
They might [have been] . . . given financial support because the
father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact
family. . . . The wife and the children were practically robots.
And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence,
very immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it]
meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real family
life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioner's personality disorder was grave and incurable
and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. 16
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave
and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that
individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term. 17 Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing, inflexible
ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of
living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others". 18
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008
resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. cHDAIS

Puno, C.J., Velasco, Jr. * , Leonardo-de Castro and Peralta ** , JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto (deceased) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed from the service) and Lucas P. Bersamin
of the Former Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 10-20.
2.Id., pp. 22-24.
3.Decision penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez. Id., pp. 106-109.
4.G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, p. 25. See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, citing Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988, p. 37. Although the case pertained mainly to a petition to declare
the parties' marriage as null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of
one of them, this Court, however, did not rule on the issue as the assigned error in
the petition for review filed in this Court dealt with rules of procedure.
See also Santos v. CA, et al., 310 Phil. 21, 36, (1995), which reiterated the above cited
principle.
5.Id., pp. 28-29, citing Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D. of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-
Dagupan, who explained in the Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that
"[s]tandard practice shows the marked advisability of [e]xpert intervention in
120

[m]arriage [c]ases accused of nullity on the ground of defective matrimonial consent
on account of natural incapacity by reason of any factor causative of lack of
sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due discretion and inability to assume
essential obligations although the law categorically mandates said intervention
only in the case of impotence and downright mental disorder".
6.TSN, 11 December 1997, pp. 3-10.
7.Te v. Yu-Te, supra note 4, p. 35, citing Kahn and Fawcett, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MENTAL HEALTH, 1993 ed., p. 131.
8.Exhibit C. RTC records, pp. 42-57.
9.Id., p. 44.
10.See RTC Decision, rollo, p. 107.
11.Exhibit C, supra at 51.
12.TSN, supra note 6, p. 7.
13.Id., p. 8. Respondent was described as domineering, demanding and short-tempered.
14.Exhibit C, supra at 44.
15.TSN, supra note 6, p. 7.
16.Id., see pp. 9-10:
Q.Now, would you say that this psychological incapacity which you identified and described
earlier, is it beyond treatment?
A.Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q.Now, based on your findings and what you said, would you say then that the psychological
incapacity of the petitioner was already apparent even before he got married?
A.Yes, sir.
17.Te v. Yu-Te, supra note 4, p. 34, citing Kahn and Fawcett, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MENTAL HEALTH, 1993 ed., p. 292.
18.Id., p. 35, citing Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart and Roy, PSYCHOLOGY, 7th ed.,
2006, pp. 613-614.
*Additional member per raffle dated May 27, 2009.
**Additional member in lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 653
dated June 1, 2009.
||| (Halili v. Santos-Halili, G.R. No. 165424, June 09, 2009)

Case No. 22

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.]

LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F.
REYES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J p:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is
always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and
irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability
to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N.
Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful
consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent
was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of
the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta.
Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990. 6 Out of their
union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null
and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was
celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1)She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy's parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their
marriage. 11
(2)She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her
when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12
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(3)She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and
told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was
neither. 13
(4)She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect 14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion
had taken place. 15
(5)She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. 16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the
truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold. 18
(6)She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make
it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts. 20
(7)She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates
to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated
from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not
change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on
the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and
constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22They further asserted that respondent's
extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They
concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by
attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation
that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version,
thus: ASHaDT
(1)She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband. 25
(2)She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such
intent from David's act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3)She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at
the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4)She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and
she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola,
Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold
office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the
Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979. 28
(5)She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof
were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29
(6)She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely
asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner,
and not to monitor her husband's whereabouts. 30
(7)She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00. 31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage,
the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance
was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological
incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute
the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests
conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive
Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that
respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor
control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were
not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr.
Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent's psychological
evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable
because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's
propensity to lying about almost anything her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and
her income, among others had been duly established. According to the trial court,
respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live
in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion
on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
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Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due
discretion. 38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was
upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have
been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of
the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It
declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 40 governing the
application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological
incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded
by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure
that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack
thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the
veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such
evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still,
the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner
sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling
in Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as the Molina case 45 ), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47In fact, even
before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, 48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded
by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. 49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while
undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a
decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree
of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of
marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in
the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51Marriages with such
persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and
persons already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce
under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at
the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of
1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce
law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950,
a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse
was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio. 57 Similarly, among the
marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a
party of unsound mind. 58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The
initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was
that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both
members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given
free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights
and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the
Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
does not affect the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family
Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code . . . [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations,
because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though
were answered, beginning withSantos v. Court of Appeals, 64 wherein the Court, through
Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina 66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban
observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that
the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity
"is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68
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It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design
the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would
limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not
binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each
case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the
auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed
the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven
indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in
stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to
disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that
precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the
considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is
but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the
concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law, 73 and as one member
admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic
Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of
Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the
Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. 75Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole
source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been
derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial
interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on
psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court
interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts. 76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court
and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article
XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as
the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the
family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to
define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the
qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through
the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may
appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the
constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory
definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation
of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage
and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will,
are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. SECHIA
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently
appliedMolina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general
rules. They warrant citation in full:
1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
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continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes
an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it
from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them
but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well
as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the
New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage
due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject
to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should
also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however
was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still,
Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in
this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for
declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is
extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to
the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court
of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent
had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The
question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological
incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of
his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his
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allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.
He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the
aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both
courts below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the
action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed
with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the
prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the
petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant
evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the
trial court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had
exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous
stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious
names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family
background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry
of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I
can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that
seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.
One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of
the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of
normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. . .
.
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q-Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of
the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of her marriage?
A-Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the
person, and it is also something that endangers human
relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication
between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and
expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth.
And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going
to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it
undermines that basic relationship that should be based on
love, trust and respect.
Q-Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is
then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the
marriage?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q-Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the
third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has
been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on
the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of
the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of
the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about
this, Mr. witness?
A-If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which
means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that
her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and
then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal
or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she
persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with
different women, then that is pathological and we call that
paranoid jealousy.
Q-Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations
of the marriage?
A-Yes, Ma'am. 83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is
[a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already
held in Marcos v. Marcos 85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the
methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
126

Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological
incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts.
However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's
expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent
has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She
has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities.
She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not
in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to
petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent
undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is
based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological
and amounts to psychological incapacity. 87
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports
the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in
extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in
order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of
respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses
and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's
inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person
unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to
effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We
are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in
the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are
is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to
adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much
credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to
draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations
under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse
who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses
to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to
commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently
deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the
assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention. 88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. DTISaH
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of
the marriage in question in a Conclusion 89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due
discretion" on the part of respondent. 90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In fact, respondent's
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause 93 was appended to
the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the
Tribunal's consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent
is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective
when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a
discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly
inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or
serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
and implications of the marriage vows.
127

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by
law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised
on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the
Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse
personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the
substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and
that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent
in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with
a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment
formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the
Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding
matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the
part of the Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but
also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling
the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the
trial court, of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated
respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of
the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the
factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded
significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological
incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that
the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did
not appear certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify
to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof
a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses
characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its
decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in
1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in
Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the opinion of
canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the deliberations
that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must
be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in
formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any
reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. 101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with
its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was
incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological
incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no
jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the
trial court's decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only
with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of
evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation
or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the
statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations.
The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly
in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity
yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to
him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases
tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably
the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court
level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies
heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an
expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling
cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the
incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any
lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which
indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were
sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree
that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.
128

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment
to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of
the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices Renato
C. Dacudao and Mariano C. Del Castillo; See rollo, pp. 67-84.
2.Rollo, p. 86.
3.Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina Guevara-
Salonga.
4.Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
5.Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.
6.Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
7.Records, pp. 1-5.
8.Id. at 1-2.
9.Id. at 2-3. See also rollo, pp. 69, 91.
10.Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.
11.Supra note 8.
12.Rollo, pp. 69, 92.
13.Id. at 70, 92.
14.Id. at 95.
15.Supra note 13.
16.Id. at 70, 92.
17.TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12.
18.Id. at 12-13. See also records, p. 91.
19.Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
20.Id.; records, p. 3.
21.Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
22.Id. at 71-72, 92-93.
23.Id.
24.Id. at 93.
25.Id. at 74, 94.
26.Id.
27.Id. at 73, 93.
28.Id.
29.Id.
30.Id. at 74, 94.
31.Id. at 73, 94.
32.Id. at 77-78.
33.Miss Francianina Sanches.
34.Rollo, p. 94.
35.Id. at 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17.
36.Rollo, pp. 95-96.
37.Id. at 97-98.
38.Id. at pp. 99-100.
39.Id. at 101-103.
40.335 Phil. 664 (1997).
41.Rollo, p. 95.
42.Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995), citing Serrano
v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
43.Rollo, p. 82.
44.Supra note 40.
45.The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina. Id.
46.Rollo, p. 78.
129

47.There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court order
declaring as a nullity a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are Sy v.
Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 760 (2000), and Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 127358 & 127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However, in Sy, the
Court found that the marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of a marriage
license at the time the marriage was solemnized, and thus declined to pass upon
the question of psychological incapacity. In Buenaventura, since the parties chose
not to challenge the trial court's conclusion of psychological incapacity and instead
raised questions on the award of damages and support, the Court did not review
the finding of psychological incapacity.
48.334 Phil. 294 (1997).
49.It does not escape this Court's attention that many lower courts do grant petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that these decisions are not elevated for
review to the Supreme Court.
50.See FAMILY CODE, Art. 36.
51.Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. SEE F.C. FISHER, THE CIVIL
CODE OF SPAIN WITH PHILIPPINE NOTES AND REFERENCES 45 (Fifth Ed.,
1947). The original text of Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code reads: "No
pueden contraer matrimonio: . . . (2) Los que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du
su razon al tiempo de contraer matrimonio."
52.See SPANISH CIVIL CODE. (1889) Art. 101.
53.Act No. 2710 (1917).
54.See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c)
55.See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).
56.Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other
as husband or wife. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 85 (3).
57.See CIVIL CODE, Art. 80.
58.Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See note 56.
59.See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
60.See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33 (1995). See also A. SEMPIO DIY,
HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 37 (1988). A contrary
view though was expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a member of the Family
Code commission. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, ibid.
61.I A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND
JURISPRUDENCE 274-275 (1990 ed.).
62.Id.
63.Id. at 274.
64.Supra note 60.
65.Id. at 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, "[t]here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity'
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage." Id.
66.Supra note 40.
67.Id. at 677.
68.Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
69.It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently rejected by the
Family Code Commission, stated that among those void ab initio marriages are
those "contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration." SeeSantos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30.
70.Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108; citing A.
SEMPIO-DIY, supra note 60, at 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v. Court of
Appeals, supra note 60, at 36; Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 677.
72.Id. at 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J.,
Separate Statement.
73.See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 32-39.
74.See SEMPIO-DIY, supra note 60, at 36.
75.Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 678.
76.Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the psychological
incapacity of the petitioner was recognized by the Court from the fact that he did not
engage in sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10) month marital
cohabitation, remains a binding precedent, even though it was decided shortly
before the Molinacase.
77.Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 676-680.
78.Id. at 680.
79.See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422,
435.
80.Rollo, p. 82.
130

82.University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr. Abcede
likewise was the past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association. TSN,
February 23, 1994, p. 6.
83.TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.
84.TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.
85.397 Phil. 840 (2000).
86.Id. at 850.
87.Rollo, pp. 95-96.
88.As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner with the
canonical declarations attached as annexes.
89.Id. at 97-98.
90.The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of invalidity on
the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of both parties. On appeal, however,
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal modified the judgment by holding that
lack of due discretion applied to respondent but there was no sufficient evidence to
prove lack of due discretion on the part of petitioner. See also note 38.
91.Rollo, pp. 99-100.
92.Id. at 101-103.
93."A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect that the
respondent may not enter into another marriage without the express consent of this
Tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as
well as for the protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
94.Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.
95.Rollo, p. 82.
96.Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30-36.
97.Id. at 37-39.
98.Id. at 39-40.
99.Id. at 33.
100.Id. at 39.
101."It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the
use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of
the void marriage to be "legitimate."

"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party
being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that
may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that
incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." Santos v. Court of Appeals, id. at
39-41.
102.G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
103.Id. at 593.
||| (Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006)

131

Case No. 23

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO
ORBECIDO III, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J p:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this
apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision 1 dated May 15, 2002, of
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution 2 dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art.
26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to
remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church
of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at
5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph
2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court
granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE
26 OF THE FAMILY CODE 4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
petition for annulment or for legal separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
that governs respondent's situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of
judicial determination. 6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. 7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually
constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1.Who may file petition Any person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
xxx xxx xxx
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party
seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial
determination. 8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief,
has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of
his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply
to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in
the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

132

Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26.All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the
time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife
was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are
divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of
foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for
Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly
divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly
divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse. AETcSa
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. 11 In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no
longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the
time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent. 12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the
contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. AHDTIE
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows:
1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
133

In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid
marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly,
the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a
long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence. 13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there
would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried,
also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence
submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that
his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could
only be made properly upon respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his
favor. CcAHEI
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 20-22.
2.Id. at 27-29.
3.Id. at 21-22.
4.Id. at 105.
5.Id. at 106-110.
6.Id. at 110.
7.Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
8.Office of the Ombudsman v. Ibay, G.R. No. 137538, 3 September 2001, 364 SCRA 281,
286, citing Galarosa v. Valencia, G.R. No. 109455, 11 November 1993, 227 SCRA
729, 737.
9.Held on January 27 and 28, 1988 and February 3, 1988.
10.No. L-68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
12.Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-9274, 1 February 1957, 100 Phil. 850,
855.
13.Cortes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121772, 13 January 2003, 395 SCRA 33, 38.
14.Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
15.Id. at 451.

||| (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 05, 2005)

134

Case No. 24

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160172. February 13, 2008.]

REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE
ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J p:
This is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No.
69166, 2 declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. de Castro is the legitimate child of the petitioner;
and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a
competent court in a proceeding instituted for that purpose.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married,
thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in
September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had
regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil
Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the
plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that
they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married
on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and
respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. de Castro.
Since the child's birth, respondent has been the one supporting her out of her income as a
government dentist and from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court. 3 In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to
petitioner and that the latter has "reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support
her "as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child." 4
Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab
initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed
upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental
advice from his parents before he got married. He also averred that they never lived together as
husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.
In its Decision dated 16 October 2000, 5 the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it
declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her support.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to
provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own
child. TSEHcA
The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be
subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that
the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties' marriage. In addition, the
Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioner's refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity
and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge
with respondent, saying that petitioner's "forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve
him of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible." 6 Moreover, the Court of
Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily
admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for
the trial court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very
same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to
see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions
for declaration of nullity of a marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void
rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity,
and not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been
limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and his wife on the basis of the marriage
apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. 7 The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October
2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna Tricia A. de Castro, as the
legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the
marriage on 13 March 1995 between the appellant and the appellee valid
until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for
that purpose. Costs against the appellant. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of
Appeals. 9 Hence this petition.
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent
because as shown by the evidence and admissions of the parties, the marriage was celebrated
without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage
license, contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived
together as husband and wife. The false affidavit should never be allowed or admitted as a
substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. 10 Petitioner additionally argues that there
was no need for the appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an
ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the
invalidity of their marriage since it was validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant
action for support. Citing several authorities, 11 petitioner claims that a void marriage can be the
subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent
proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between the parties. The refiling of
another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented
135

would entail enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and
would increase the burden of the courts. 12 Finally, petitioner claims that in view of the nullity of
his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the child's paternity and filiation, the
Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.
In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective comments on the petition. 13 SDECAI
In her Comment, 14 respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart
the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the
appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally,
but can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With
regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that compared to her candid and
straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about
their sexual encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the
trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA testing to prove paternity and
filiation. 15
For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the
trial court to declare null and void the marriage of petitioner and respondent in the action for
support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog, 16 it states that courts may pass upon the validity
of a marriage in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the
existence of a valid marriage. Moreover, the evidence presented during the proceedings in the
trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without
a marriage license, and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was false. Thus, it
concludes the trial court correctly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is
not valid. 17 In addition, the OSG agrees with the findings of the trial court that the child is an
illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. 18
Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent in an action for support
and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.
Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the marriage between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked. 19 Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of
remarriage. 20

Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, 21 the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient
authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite the main case being a claim for
death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as
it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be adduced, testimonial
or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute
nullity. 22 cDHCAE
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the
marriage voidable. 23 In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner
and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead,
they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five
years. 24 However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was
asked during cross-examination, thus
ATTY. CARPIO:
QBut despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as
husband and wife for the last five years on or before March 13,
1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?
AYes, sir. 25
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man
and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of
this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. 26 In the instant case,
there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.
The false affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through
with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not
exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a
marriage license renders their marriage voidab initio.
Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioner's illegitimate daughter, and therefore
entitled to support.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. 27 Thus, one can prove illegitimate filiation through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.28
The Certificate of Live Birth 29 of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in
an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor of respondent, admitted that he is the father
of the child, thus stating:
136

1.I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who
was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living, Paraaque,
Metro Manila; 30
We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:
That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is
supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by respondent's
own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that
petitioner was his former girlfriend. While they were sweethearts, he used
to visit petitioner at the latter's house or clinic. At times, they would go to
a motel to have sex. As a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner
became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid,
as earlier ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to
undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion
reveal otherwise (Exhs. "B," "B-1," to "B-3," "C," "C-1" and "C-2," "D," "D-
1" and "D-2," "E," "E-1" and "E-2," "F," "F-1" and "F-2," "G," "G-1" and "G-
2" and "H," "H-1" to "H-3"). In one of the pictures (Exhs. "D," "D-1" and
"D-2"), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioner's finger
and in another picture (Exhs. "E," "E-1" and "E-2") respondent is seen in
the act of kissing the petitioner. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Velasco, Jr. and Nachura, JJ., * concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 31-41.
2.Captioned Annabelle Assidao-de Castro v. Reinel Anthony B. de Castro.
3.The case was eventually raffled to Branch 70 of the Pasig RTC, presided by Judge Pablito
M. Rojas.
4.Records, p. 3, Complaint.
5.Rollo, pp. 92-94.
6.Id. at 37.
7.Id. at 40.
8.Rollo, p. 41.
9.Id. at 43-44; Resolution dated 1 October 2003.
10.Id. at 15-20.
11.Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000). TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, 1990 Ed. and SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY
CODE, 1991 Ed. CcaASE
12.Rollo, pp. 25-26.
13.Id. at 135.
14.Id. at 119-126.
15.Id. at 139-144.
16.384 Phil. 661, 673 (2000).
17.Rollo, pp. 174-182.
18.Id. at 183-185.
19.Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 704 (1999), citing TOLENTINO, CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I,
1987 ed., p. 265.
20.Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 675 (2000).
21.Cario v. Cario, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).
22.Id. at 132.
23.FAMILY CODE, Art. 4.
24.Purportedly complying with Art. 34 of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 34.No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. caADIC
25.TSN, 18 February 2000, p. 20.
26.Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 669 (2000), citing THE REPORT OF THE CODE
COMMISSION, p. 80.
In the book Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines by Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, p. 246
(1988), the following were given as examples of "other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws:" (a) the baptismal certificate of the child; (b) a judicial
admission; (c) the family bible wherein the name of the child is entered; (d) common
reputation respecting pedigree; (e) admission by silence; (f) testimonies of
witnesses; and (g) other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130.
137

29.Records, p. 6.
30.Id. at 160.
31.Rollo, pp. 93-94
*As replacement of Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales who inhibited herself per Administrative
Circular No. 84-2007. SIEHcA
||| (de Castro v. Assidao-de Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13, 2008)

Case No. 25

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A.
DAYOT, respondent.

[G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.]
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions
for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and
Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the
marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio. CacHES
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay
City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. 2 In lieu of a marriage
license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, 3 also dated 24 November 1986, attesting
that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint 4 for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he
did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.
According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisa's house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa
requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-
arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They
were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.
He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get
both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he
signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February
1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a
piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa's house. When he perused the same,
he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa,
the latter feigned ignorance. EAIaHD
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Jose's allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the
138

legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with
him on account of their age difference. 5 In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
(Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board. 6 The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
without emolument. 7
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence
presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the
above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against
[Jose]. 9 caIETS
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Jose's version of the
story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City
Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign
the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect
suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own
admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not
sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to
"discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly
the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.]
[Jose's] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the
fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote
[Felisa's] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he
filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage
contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his
company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in
case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing
there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers
her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name
of his sister.
When [Jose's] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she
testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage
in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she
further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot
was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the
marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and
when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was
procured through fraud. 10
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Jose's action had prescribed. It cited Article
87 11 of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus: AECIaD
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was
obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could
have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest
possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and
false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the
marriage at the earliest instance. . . . . 12
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. 13
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 14 of
the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action
for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Jose's appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed
on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the
annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the
Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the
ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after
the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force
or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered
by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within
which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on
July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa. 15 TaEIcS
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose's assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under
Article 76 16 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an
affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect
that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76
did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the
statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-
139

faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further
noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the
solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Jose's argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to
which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 17 of the
Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong
to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7 18 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties' marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a
marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In
particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he
maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Jose's Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005
is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the
marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab
initio. AICHaS
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City. 19
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v.
Bayadog, 20 and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that
they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had
lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry
each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
". . . In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for
the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that
continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have
common law relationships and placing them on the same
footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later
use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption
from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone
who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union
of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.
Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of
a marriage license. 21 AaHTIE
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution 22 dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisa's motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of
Appeals' Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit,
and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a
separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate
court's Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two
Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
resolution. 23
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF
THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS
AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
140

III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E. 24
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial. 25 She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an
existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.
Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal
case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.
Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any
liability. cSIADH
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic
of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Court's ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. 26 To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the
affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage
license. It is the Republic's position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not
affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and
the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally
obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact
that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband
and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties' marriage contract
states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Jose's
notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisa's
name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192,
Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife in said barangay; and (3) Jose's company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating
Felisa's name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article
53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract: cTIESa
ART. 53.No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58 27 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those
under Article 75. 28 Article 80 (3) 29 of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed
without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate
consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage
contract. 30 This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, 31 whereby the absence of a
marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage. 32
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at
the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular
marriages, 33 (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. 34
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

ART. 76.No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts
in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage. CHDAEc
The reason for the law, 35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending
a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status. 36
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." 37 One of the central
issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively
renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
141

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly 38 but reasonably
construed. 39 They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. 40 Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by
implication. 41 For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man
and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read
the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only
to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry
each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five
years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the
language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one
that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes
that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts 42 in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage. TaISDA
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose
and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration
of their marriage. 43 The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was
introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after
the EDSA Revolution. 44 The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in
June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. 45
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year
requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. 46 Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Court's review. 47 It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative
body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not
apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the
record or based on substantial evidence. 48
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties'
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they
should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from
the requirement of a marriage license. AIDTHC
Anent petitioners' reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 49 Restated more explicitly,
persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. 50 The present case does not
involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no
question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code 51 that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties' marriage, and extricate them from
the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the
requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under
exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent
by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. 52 The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of
an invalid one as well. 53 To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of
marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least
five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period
of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to
the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties
under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of
paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. caTIDE
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit
from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law. 54 There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation,
which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are
142

consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability. 55
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and
Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose's subsequent marriage to
Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. 56 Jose and Felisa's
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except
that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and
may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage. 57 It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized
by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and
continuity that is unbroken. 58
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to
Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if
any. No costs. aAEIHC
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Tinga, * Velasco, Jr. ** and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III
and Santiago Javier Ranada, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-
70; rollo, (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.
2.Records, p. 170.
3.Id.
4.Id. at 1-8.
5.The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties' marriage,
Jose was 27 years old, while Felisa was 37.
6.The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of
the Ombudsman was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.
7.Id. at 257.
8.Id. at 313-323.
9.Id. at 323.
10.Id. at 321-322.
11.ART. 87. The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and
within the periods as follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or guardian
did not give his or her consent, within four years after attaining the age of twenty or
eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or guardian or person having
legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of twenty or
eighteen years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent,
during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the
lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had no
knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of
unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after the
discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years after the
marriage.
12.Records, p. 322. THCASc
13.Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
14.ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4
of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by
a man other than her husband;
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
15.Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
16.ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
143

qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
17.ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly
registered, as provided in Article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in
special cases provided in Articles 74 and 75.
18.ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his
church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within
the limits of the written authority granted him by his church or religious sect and
provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing
officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the
latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32;
or HTDAac
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.
19.CA rollo, p. 279.
20.384 Phil. 661 (2000).
21.CA rollo, pp. 278-279.
22.Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.
23.Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.
24.Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.
25.Erroneously cited as Nio v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.
26.377 Phil. 919 (1999).
27.ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
28.ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and
vice-consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar
and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor with regard to the celebration of
marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
29.ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.
30.People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.
31.The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following essential
requisites:
(1) legal capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.
32.Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code
Annotated, 1956 Edition, Vol. I, p. 195.
33.Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but
not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first
being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides.
34.Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-
310.
35.In Nial v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit behind
Article 76 of the Civil Code, thus:
"However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is
to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage
due to the publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement." cIADaC
144

36.The Report of the Code Commission states that "No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years desire to
marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons from legalizing their status", Report of the Code
Commission, p. 80.
37.Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an "Affidavit on (sic)
Marriage Between Man and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband
and Wife for at Least Five Years".
38.Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).
39.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999).
40.Id.
41.Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA
654, 659.
42.The first part of Article 76 states, "No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and
a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other . . . ."

43.Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.
44.Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.
45.Id. at 159.
46.First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Pearanda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006,
480 SCRA 504, 508.
47.Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA
589, 605.
48.Id.
49.Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).
50.Id.
51.ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of
the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for
any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
52.People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.
53.Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).
54.Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000).
55.Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines (1995 Ed., p. 38) wrote that "If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to
have an instant marriage, although the truth is that they have not been cohabiting
for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will
also be criminally liable". Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family
Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage. EHSTDA
56.Nial v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.
57.Id. at 130-131.
58.Id.
*Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
designating Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the Court's Wellness
Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting
Chairperson.
**Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September 2007. CSIHDA
||| (Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, 179474, March 28, 2008)

145

Case No. 26

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 179922. December 16, 2008.]

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD
SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS,
and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J p:
ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity
and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.
The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows: TAECSD
Parcel No. 1
Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.
6137 of the Court of Land Registration.
Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is
specifically reserved.
Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Parcel No. 2
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, . . .
containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
(13,441) square meters. TEDHaA
Parcel No. 3
A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,
approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC]
Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the
SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on
the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan,
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS,
more or less.
PARCEL No. 4
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a
portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the
NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE, along
lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-1, by Lot
28-B of the subd. plan . . . containing an area of ONE THOUSAND AND
SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS. IATHaS
PARCEL No. 5
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela
36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos Castillas.
Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla a S. gds.
01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las
Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial
de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.
PARCEL No. 6
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela
37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas.
Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se halla at S. 43
gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un
mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que
forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una
extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150) METROS
CUADRADOS. 3
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement
was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan de Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
146

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their
son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are
covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged
their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This
includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land. cEAIHa
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos, 4 2,331 square meters of the second
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter
portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August
17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts,
the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity
of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of
money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him. TAECaD
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments
of petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the
requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents
declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another
woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized
the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II. In
the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo. 5
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its
report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion
for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as follows: ETaSDc
1.Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and
Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced
by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null and void ab
initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;

2.Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the
natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;
3.Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum of
P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from
date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4.Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land,
less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered
by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering
said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein;
5.Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of
147

Makati City to cancel TCT No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and
to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
6.Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and
defendant Sandoval null and void;
7.Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant
Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the exclusive name of
plaintiff herein;
8.Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant
Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on
his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock
in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED. 6
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling
the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of
Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as
follows: cSaADC
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the
case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 7
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the
court a quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the
aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants who first sought
summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify the grant thereof in
favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a claim" or "to
obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to
an action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was
presented and the desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot
justify a misinterpretation of the rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and
101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary
judgment practically amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the
law.
We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing
safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of
spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that the death of
Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved the marriage
herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty
years and that the annulment of their marriage is the very means by
which the latter is sought to be deprived of her participation in the estate
left by the former call for a closer and more thorough inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary nature by
which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the
effect that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of
marriage should always be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides: aEDCAH
"Section 1.Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
(Underscoring supplied)
Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows
that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be
warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid marriage license
is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58
of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage
license on the marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo
Carlos and appellant Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as
fatal as appellee represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to
the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's affirmation of the existence
of said marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the
affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
"That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license
issued at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said
marriage contract executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad
Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason
that it was the Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the
Marriage Contract who in turn, may have overlooked the
same."
148

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the
considered view that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing
statement as well as the motivations underlying the same should be
properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary evidence
of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither
should appellants' non-presentation of the subject marriage license be
taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage. aETASc
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes
the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial
court's rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo Carlos II
and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in appellant
Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively disavowed
appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo
Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of
appellee's brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility
of the said appellant's illegitimate filiation, his right to prove the same or,
for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find
appellee's bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely
purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on
the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a minor's total
forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent
though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad
Sandoval's declaration regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos
II is more credible when considered in the light of the fact that, during the
last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of
his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial court
could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in
order to be able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation
of appellant Teofilo Carlos II. 8
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1.That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the
Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for
reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F hereof, with respect to the
nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner respectfully submits that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in applying Articles
88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of
this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has
otherwise decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; AEHCDa
2.That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed a serious reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule
19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of Court providing for judgment
on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary Judgments;
3.That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu
thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of
Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion, disregarded judicial
admissions, made findings on ground of speculations, surmises, and
conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts. 9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in
bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I.The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of
judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 10 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides: aIAEcD
SEC. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender
an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse
party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment
on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule on
judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on
summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows
149

that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still not be warranted
. . . . 11
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct
in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on
the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages", the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on March 15, 2003 12 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17.Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial
of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the spouses.
(2)The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied) cHCSDa
Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan. 13 In that
case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of
marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal separation, summary
judgment is applicable to all kinds of actions. 14 (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration
of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have
been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was
rendered. 15
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of
evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13.Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) . . .
(b). . . If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor
to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent
suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity
of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence. 16
II.A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by
any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating: SDEHIa
SEC. 2.Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a)Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring
supplied)
Section 2 (a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of
voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs
of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they
do not have a legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or intestate heirs
have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and,
hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the
concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution. 17 (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone
can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by
law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on August 3, 1988. 18
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning
of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case
against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate
heirs of their successional rights. THEcAS
150

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. 19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 20 is prospective in its
application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under
the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its
application. 22 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place. 23
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. 24But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that
any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed
as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. 25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic
in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest. 26

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. 27
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 28 where the Court held: HcTDSA
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no
specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper
interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage,
like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus,
in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality
to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of the case to
the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts
remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and
the same did not allow respondent Orlando's remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondent's marriage as bigamous and void ab
initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to
P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00.
On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained
which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner
Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same. 29 (Underscoring supplied)
III.The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and
the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. 30
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad
and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1)Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
(2)In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3)The widow or widower; SCETHa
(4)Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5)Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code. 31
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right
to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:
151

ART. 1001.Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1003.If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire
estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
(Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate,
or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives. 32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent. 33
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of
his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives,
like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without
issue and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first
half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab
initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then
petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may
be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate, 34 or even an adopted child 35 excludes the collateral
relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo
II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased
brother of petitioner. DSIaAE
IV.Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper
and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other
causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the
case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave
the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 36
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We
are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the
appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We
remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of
legitimacy of a child, to wit:
ART. 167.The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act
that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable.
An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within a valid marriage. 37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as
said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null
and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1.The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the
action on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II
and the validity or nullity of marriage between respondent
Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos; TcDAHS
2.If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or
legally adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly
INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for
lack of cause of action;

3.The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is
VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give
this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
152

Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 47-63. Dated October 15, 2002. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-
Salvador, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Bernardo P. Abesamis,
concurring.
2.Civil Case No. 95-135. STEacI
3.Rollo, pp. 49-51.
4.Docketed as Civil Case No. 11975, CA decision, p. 6.
5.Rollo, p. 55.
7.Id. at 63.
8.Id. at 60-63.
9.Rollo, pp. 24-25.
10.Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 34, Sec. 1.
SEC. 1.Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
11.CA rollo, p. 61.
12.Sec. 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
13.G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133, citing Family Code, Arts. 48 & 60,
and Roque v. Encarnacion, 96 Phil. 643 (1954).
14.Republic v. Sandiganbayan, id. at 143. cHAIES
15.Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177,
citing Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, G.R. No. 137590, March 26, 2001, 355 SCRA 285, 289,
and Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425, 435.
16.Id. at 187-188, citing Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA
508, 529, and Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA
725, 740.
17.Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418,
429, citing Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional
Orders.
18.Id. at 427-428, citing Modequillo v. Brava, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990, 185 SCRA 766,
772. (Note in the citation omitted.)
19.Id. at 429-430.
20.A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on March 15, 2003 following its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation not later than March 7, 2003.
21.Supra note 17.
22.Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli, id. at 428.
23.Malang v. Moson, G.R. No. 119064, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 393.
24.See Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581, and Tecson-Dayot v. Dayot, G.R. No. 179474,
March 28, 2008; Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007, 531
SCRA 446.
25.Republic v. Agunoy, Sr., G.R. No. 155394, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 735, 746.
26.Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348.
27.Id. at 358, citing Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17,
2004, 442 SCRA 507, 521; Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115925, August
15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105, 117; and Bank of America NT & SA v. Court of
Appeals, 448 Phil. 181, 194-195 (2003); Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224
(2000); Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 466, 482 (1999); Ralla v. Ralla, G.R.
No. 78646, July 23, 1991, 199 SCRA 495, 499; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 81123, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 800, 806; Chua v. Torres, G.R. No.
151900, August 30, 2005, 468 SCRA 358, citing Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127210, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 470, 475-76; citing in turnUniversity of the
Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993,
227 SCRA 342, 355; Ralla v. Ralla, supra; Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, supra;
Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA
334, 346, in turn citing Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 84197 & 84157, July 18, 1989, 175 SCRA 668.
28.G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607, citing RULES OF COURT, Rule 3,
Sec. 2, Rule 2, Sec. 1; Nial v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328
SCRA 122. THCSEA
29.Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, id. at 614-615.
30.Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 522.
31.Paragraphs 4 & 5 are no longer controlling. The distinctions among different classes of
illegitimate children under the Civil Code have been removed. All of them fall in the
category of illegitimate children, as provided under Article 165 of the Family Code:
153

Article 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless
otherwise provided in this Code.
32.See Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998, 298 SCRA 322;
see also Reyes v. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA
520; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA
620; Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21,
1998, 300 SCRA 345.
33.Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, supra.
34.Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
35.Reyes v. Sotero, supra note 32; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32.
36.Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Brion, G.R. Nos. 157696-97, February 9, 2006, 482
SCRA 87, citing Sociedad Europea de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 75787, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA 105, 114, citing in turn Saura Import &
Export Co., Inc. v. Philippine International Co., Inc., 118 Phil. 150, 156 (1963);
and Miguel v. Court of Appeals, 140 Phil. 304, 312 (1969).
37.Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA
438. cCaATD
||| (Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008)

Case No. 27

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.]

ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDES, respondents.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for petitioner.
Roco, Buag, Kapunan & Migallos for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; VOID MARRIAGES; PROPERTY RELATIONS GOVERNED BY
PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE. In a void marriage,regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, as the case may be, of the Family Code.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 147, ELABORATED. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the
Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases. This peculiar kind of co-ownership
applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of
marriage. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of Art. 147 refers to the legal capacity of
a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the
conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership. Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified
Article 144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that (a) Neither party
can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property, without
the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and (b) In the case of a void
marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in favor of their
common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or
declaration of nullity of the marriage.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 148, ELABORATED. When the common-law spouses suffer
from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as
husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid
154

marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
4.ID.; ID.; VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES; ARTICLE 50, APPLICABILITY. The first
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43,
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted
by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a
special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In
now requiring forpurposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the
previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing
uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of
Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination
of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable
marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject
to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on
the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses.
5.REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; COURT IN NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CAN ALSO SETTLE
PARTIES' COMMON PROPERTY. On the settlement of the parties' common property, a
court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed
with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Here, petitioner and private
respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code should aptly prevail.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J p:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the courta quo has
failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological incapacity on the part of
either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the
marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-
12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After hearing the parties following the
joinder of issues, the trial court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1)The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo
Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations;
"(2)The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and
Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their
mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the
children who are in the custody of the other.
"(3)The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the
Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Register of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in the registry of
marriages." 2 (Emphasis ours.)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them
in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all
their other properties for that matter in equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply." 3 (Emphasis supplied.)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court
said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147,
the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
155

"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no
application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure
for the liquidation of the absolute community of property." 4
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.

In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties
are psychological incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declares
void ab initio on the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse,
the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the
children wish to stay." 5
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions
of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a
remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases; 6 it
provides:
"ART. 147.When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the
share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in
favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" 7 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household." 8 Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of
the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a)Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her
share in co-ownership property, without the consent of the
other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b)In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or
her share in the co-ownership in favor of their common
children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the
common children, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to
the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon the
termination of the cohabitation 9 or declaration of nullity of the
marriage. 10
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to
156

another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if
so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. 11
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction
to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner
and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as
well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by
them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation
to Articles 102 and 129, 12 12a of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to
govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract
is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-
law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3),
(4) and (5) of Article 43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms, tovoidable marriages and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of
a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and
an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree
is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the
declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present
law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is
not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 15 and 42, 16 of the
Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other case, it is not
to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one
hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other,
between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter
case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of
the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious,
that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime of
the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial
court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Bellosillo, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1.Hon. Perlita Tria Tirona, presiding.
2.Rollo, p. 22.
3.Rollo, p. 42.
4.Rollo, pp. 38-39.
5.Rollo, pp. 24-25.
6.See Margaret Maxey vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 187; Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al.,
102 Phil. 1055.
7.Art. 5.Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
Art. 37.Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether
the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(2)Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Art. 38.The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1)Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2)Between step-parents and stepchildren;
(5)Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(8)Between adopted children of the same adopter; and

(9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's
spouse or his or her own spouse.
8Article 147, Family Code.
10.Articles 43, 50 and 51, Family Code.
12.Art. 50.The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab
initioor annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such case shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and
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the delivery of their presumptive legitimates, unless such matters had been
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51.In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimates of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in
cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement
judicially approved, had already for such matters.
The children or their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of
the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both
of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of
annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
Art. 52.The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons.
Art. 102.Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
(1)An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2)The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 94.
(3)Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.
(4)The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver of such share as provided in this Code. For purposes
of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No.
(2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the
market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5)The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
(6)Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking
into consideration the best interests of said children.
Art. 129.Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply;
(1)An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal
partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2)Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and
obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an
asset thereof.
(3)Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition
of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which
has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
(4)The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable
for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
(5)Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered
to each of them.
(6)Unless the owner has been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of
movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to
fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
(7)The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which
shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
(8)The presumptive legitimates of the common children shall be delivered upon partition in
accordance with Article 51.
(9)In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below
the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court
has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
13.Art. 43.The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall produce the following effects:
158

(1)The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be
considered legitimate, and their custody and support in case of dispute shall be
decided by the court in a proper proceeding;
(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3)Donations by reason or marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation
of law;
(4)The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad
faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated
as irrevocable; and
(5)The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to
inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
14.Art. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.
15.Art. 41.A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case
of disappearance where there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.
16.Art. 42.The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse,
unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed.
||| (Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996)

Case No. 28

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001.]

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE
CARIO, respondent.

Gancayco Balasbas & Associates for petitioner.
Atty. Agapito P. Oquindo, Jr. for respondent.

SYNOPSIS
SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two marriages. The first was with petitioner with whom he
begot two (2) children, while the second, during the subsistence of the first, was with respondent
with whom he had no issue. When he died in 1988 petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies. Petitioner
collected P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig, while
respondent collected P21,000 from GSIS and SSS. Respondent, in an action for collection,
sought to recover half the amount collected by petitioner. She claimed that she had no
knowledge of the previous marriage with petitioner and presented evidence that the same was
contracted without the necessary marriage license. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in
favor of respondent which was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
recourse.
The absence of a marriage license, as a general rule, renders the marriage void ab initio.
However, for purposes of remarriage, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage must be obtained. For other purposes no such judicial action is required. Otherwise,
the second marriage would also be void.
Article 148 of the Civil Code governs the property regime of bigamous marriages. Only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. While
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage is governed by co-ownership under Article 147 of the Civil Code. Thus, the P146,000
from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig earned by the deceased, in the
absence of evidence that respondent contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition
of these monetary benefits, is owned by the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. However, petitioner is entitled to one-half of the subject "death
benefits" as her share in the property regime and the other half shall pass by to petitioner's
children as the decedent's legal heirs.
SYLLABUS
1.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE VOID, NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE. Under Article
159

40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
2.ID.; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; LICENSE, REQUIRED; CASE AT
BAR. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio. In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license,
therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license
number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has
no record of such marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
3.ID.; FAMILY CODE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID,
NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE; WITHOUT SUCH DECLARATION,
SECOND MARRIAGE IS ALSO VOID. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of
nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate
the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. SCaITA
4.ID.; ID.; BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; WAGES AND SALARIES EARNED BY EACH PARTY
BELONG TO HIM OR HER EXCLUSIVELY. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which
refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a
state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
multiple alliances of the same married man, the properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the
home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
remunerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as
a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said
that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits.
Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the
deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate
succession, the said "death benefits" of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And,
respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
6.ID.; ID.; VOID MARRIAGES OF PARTIES LEGALLY CAPACITATED AND NOT BARRED BY
ANY IMPEDIMENT; PROPERTY RELATIONSHIP GOVERNED BY CO-OWNERSHIP; CASE
AT BAR. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147
of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void
for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, under the
foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the
disputed "death benefits" were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee,
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject "death benefits" under
scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children with Susan Nicdao.

D E C I S I O N

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted
by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose "death benefits" is now the subject of the
controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first
was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second
was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan
Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in
1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee,
who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
160

monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from "MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig," 3 while respondent Susan Yee received a
total of P21,000.00 from "GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS)." 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as "death benefits" which she (petitioner) received from "MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig." Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file
her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the
previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage
license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a certification dated March
9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the
spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are
married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as
requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from
the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form
of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus
attorney 's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR
AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. 11 aDCIHE
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of
the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully
entitled to the subject "death benefits" of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage
void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as
certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage
161

is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the "death benefits" under scrutiny would now be
awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are
void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on "Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage."
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where
both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married
man, 17
". . . [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions . . ."
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and
household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed
to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in
order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan
Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said "death benefits" of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased
is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for
other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads
ARTICLE 147.When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by
both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition
by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxx xxx xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants,
such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute
thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed "death benefits" were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling
the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case,
both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject
"death benefits" under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and
the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of
162

the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife,
holding that:
". . . [S]ince the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has
not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as
putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in
his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether
as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir
she has an interest in the husband's share in the property here in
dispute . . ." And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void
ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as
the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved
before judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only just and equitable
solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to
her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband,
and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage." 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which
requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in
the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing
property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because
the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage.
However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money
anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is
necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that
would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the
applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may
arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration
of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void " in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of
P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 43-47.
2.Rollo, pp. 49-55.
3.Exhibit "F", Records, p. 38.
4.Ibid.
5.Exhibit "D-1", Records, p. 36.
6.Exhibit "E", Records, p. 37.
7.Rollo, p. 55.
8.Rollo, p. 18.
9.Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993].
10.Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.
11.Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra.
12.ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
13.ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title,
but not those under article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license
first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides.
14.ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
(3)Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
163

xxx xxx xxx
15.236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29.
16.Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in
Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab
initioor annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of
the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and
the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 43.The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall
produce the following effects:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad
faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 44.If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be
void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions
made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
17.Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995).
18.Id., p. 234.
19.Id., p. 230.
20.37 SCRA 316 [1971].
21.Id., p. 326.
22.Supra.
23.Supra.
||| (Cari, G.R. No. 132529, February 02, 2001)

Case No. 29

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000.]

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G.
MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.

Tan Acut & Madrid for petitioner.
Julius C. Baldeo for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

On April 10, 1976, petitioner Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado contracted his first marriage with Ma.
Thelma G. Oliva in Cebu City. On June 27, 1991, the petitioner contracted his second marriage
with herein respondent Ma. Consuela Tan in Bacolod City without his first marriage having been
legally dissolved. On October 5, 1992, herein respondent filed a complaint for bigamy against
the petitioner before the City Prosecutor's Office in Bacolod City which eventually resulted in the
filing of an information on March 1, 1993, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22 of Cebu
City. On the other hand, on November 13, 1992, the petitioner instituted an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 22, Cebu City. In a Decision dated May 6, 1993, the marriage between petitioner and
Thelma Oliva was declared null and void. After trial of the bigamy case, the Regional Trial Court
of Bacolod City convicted the petitioner of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. In this petition, the petitioner questioned the presence of
previous legal marriage as element of the crime of bigamy. EcIaTA
The Court ruled that petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. The crime had already been
consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of
bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. This cannot be
allowed. Under the circumstances of the present case, petitioner is guilty of the charge against
him.
Petition was DENIED.
SYLLABUS

1.CRIMINAL LAW; BIGAMY; ELEMENTS. The elements of this crime are as follows: "1. That
the offender has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; 4. That the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity."
164

2.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
PREVIOUS MARRIAGE IS NECESSARY BEFORE A SECOND MARRIAGE CAN BE
CONTRACTED. The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of
the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code,
a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as
follows: "ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void." . . . Thus, a
Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Committee has observed: "[Article
40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person
may be null and void but there is need of judicial declaration of such fact before that person can
marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug.
19/86, 143 SCRA 499,Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the
old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033).". . . Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage.
Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSISTENT WITH THE PRONOUNCEMENT IN TERRE VS. TERRE.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, which involved an
administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In injecting the lawyer's argument
that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the
Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family
Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."
4.CRIMINAL LAW; BIGAMY; THAT THE FIRST MARRIAGE IS VOID FROM THE BEGINNING
IS NOT A VALID DEFENSE WITHOUT A JUDICIAL DECLARATION. Moreover, Justice
Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view
on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a person must first
obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a subsequent
marriage: "It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code
states that . . . . The Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should be allowed
to assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. . . . ."
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second
marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was
still subsisting, he committed that acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF FIRST MARRIAGE DURING
PENDENCY OF BIGAMY CASE IS IMMATERIAL. That he subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution
of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void
and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot
allow that.
7.REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; APPELLEE COULD NOT OBTAIN AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF FROM
THE APPELLATE COURT; CASE AT BAR. [R]espondent prays that the Court set aside the
ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorney's fees. Her
prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot
obtain affirmative relief from this Court.
8.CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; CANNOT BE CLAIMED BY AN OFFENDED PARTY IN A BIGAMY
CASE IF SHE WAS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HER ACT. In any
event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point,
which we quote hereunder: "We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this
case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of
the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The
testimonies of the defense witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said
testimonies. . . . "Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2)
children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the
first wife would no longer return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another
man. "Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully
conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer
humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her
personal instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own
willful making."
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting opinion:
1.CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; FOR PURPOSES OF REMARRIAGE, NO
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY SHALL BE DEEMED ESSENTIAL WHEN THE
PREVIOUS MARRIAGE IS BETWEEN PERSONS OF SAME SEX OR WHEN EITHER OR
BOTH PARTIES HAD NOT GIVEN CONSENT THERETO. Article 40 of the Family Code
reads: "ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." The
phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts,
are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family Code
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent marriage is
contracted; without such declaration, the validity and the full legal consequence of the
subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article 52,
of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases
where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial
declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for
instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given
consent to the "marriage." Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant
and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37,
38 and 53 thereof.

165

2.CRIMINAL LAW; BIGAMY; "FORMER MARRIAGE" CONTEMPLATES AN EXISTING, NOT
VOID, PRIOR MARRIAGE. In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the
effect of overturning the rule in criminal law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code
expresses: "Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Surely, the foregoing provision
contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by Article 349 would thus be, for
instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and subsisting until set aside by a
competent court. TcIHDa
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; HAD JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF AB INITIO VOID MARRIAGE
BEEN WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LEGISLATURE, AN EXPRESS PROVISION
TO THAT EFFECT SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSERTED IN THE LAW. As early as People vs.
Aragon, this Court has underscored: ". . . Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment
and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab
initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to
that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said
rule of strict interpretation." Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially
annulled (and therefore not a defense is bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to
the decree ofannulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage,
being a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a
defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law
and that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within the respective spheres of
governance.
D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J p:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even
if the earlier union is characterized by statute as "void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) 1 in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999
Resolution denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein
petitioner of bigamy as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G.
Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy
punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment
imposing upon him a prison term of three (3) years, four (4) months and
fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor,
as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Cost against accused." 2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial court's judgment, as
follows:
"From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that
accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got
married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly
executed and signed by the parties, As entered in said document, the
status of accused was 'single.' There is no dispute either that at the time
of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually
a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a
marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B.
Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in
connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev.
Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred
Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between
accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June
29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of
Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first
consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child,
Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo
Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by
complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City,
which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before
this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1,
1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case
was lodged in the Prosecutor's Office, accused filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br.
22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage
between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null
and void.
"Accused is charged with bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant
Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously
united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at
Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As
shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential
elements of the crime are present, namely: (1) that the offender has been
previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he
166

contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. . . .
"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused
posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially
declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of
the first marriage of accused.
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into
with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accused's prior marriage with
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been
initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of
his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage,
it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such
second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the
time validly married to his first wife." 3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, 'the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.' But here, the
final judgment declaring null and void accused's previous marriage came
not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the
case for bigamy against accused was already tried in court. And what
constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall,
contract a second subsequent marriage 'before' the former marriage has
been legally dissolved." 4
Hence, this Petition. 5
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order
to convict petitioner.
"B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36
and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
"C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of
reasonable doubt." 6
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:
Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1.That the offender has been legally married;
2.That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3.That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4.That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity." 7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It
is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma.
Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages
which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage
is deemed never to have taken place at all. 8 Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage
to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries 9 of former Justice Luis Reyes that "it is
now settled that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy
charge. But if the first marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."

Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the
Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She
argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a
person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage has been characterized as "conflicting." 10 In People vs. Mendoza, 11 a bigamy case
167

involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such
declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of
the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged
him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab
initio because it had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second
marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial
declaration of its nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the
third time. This ruling was affirmed by the Court in People vs. Aragon, 12 which involved
substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity.
In Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, 13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first
marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his
retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children,
notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right
of the second wife, this Court observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to
be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is
need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras, 14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his
second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the
said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that "the
second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse
is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl
Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on
the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be
allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been
married to another woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled:
". . . There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs, according to this Court, a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; . . . ."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA, 16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding
that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA, 17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still
necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the
affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy." 18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into
effect several years after the promulgation of Mendoza andAragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which
provided:
"Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from
its performance, unless:
(a)The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b)The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annullable marriages." 19
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code
and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision,
expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
"ARTICLE 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void
was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling inWiegel. Thus, a
Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Committee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
that the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a
judicial declaration of such fact before that person can marry again;
otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,
Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499; Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA
315). This provision changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal
and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon,
100 Phil. 1033)." 20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage has been cast aside by Article 40 of the
168

Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage.
Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre, 21 which involved an
administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyer's argument
that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the
Court ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family
Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by
petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in
1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before
contracting a subsequent marriage: 22
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable
marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code
states that . . . . The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void,
even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of
nullity of their marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. . . .
."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first
marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a
prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of
Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorney's fees. 23
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot
obtain affirmative relief from this Court. 24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set
aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case
that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she
was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she
contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense
witnesses prove this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr.
Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took
the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer
return to Dr. Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she
was fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have
known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would]
come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal
instigation. If there are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they
are of her own willful making." 25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.,concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage in an
indictment for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr. Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed prior void marriage which
can constitute a defense against the criminal charge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong reservations
on its application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the instant
petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and the ponencia affirms the conviction of
petitioner Vincent Paul G. Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code reads:
"ARTICLE 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
169

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like void
contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that the Family
Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent
marriage is contracted; without such declaration, the validity and the full legal consequence of
the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in relation to Article
52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held to refer
merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No
such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be deemed essential when the
"marriage," for instance, is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had
not at all given consent to the marriage." Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has
been meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of
Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning the rule in
criminal law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
"ARTICLE 349.Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior marriage. Covered by
Article 349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and
subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as People vs. Aragon, 1 this Court has
underscored:
". . . Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule
enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity
of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the
legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been
inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict
interpretation."
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore not a
defense in bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree ofannulment), the
complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity
and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of a defense in a
criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of the
Family Code, and each may be applied within the respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
Footnotes
1.Penned by J. Salome A. Montoya, Division chairman; with the concurrence of JJ. Conchita
Carpio Morales and Bernardo P. Abesamis, members.
2.RTC Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 136-137. This was written by Judge Edgar G. Garvilles.
3.CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 45-47.
4.Ibid., p. 6; rollo, p. 13.
5.The case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 26, 2000, upon receipt by this Court
of the OSG Memorandum signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen.
Mariano M. Martinez and Sol. Jesus P. Castelo. Respondent's Memorandum, which
was signed by Atty. Julius C. Baldado, was received on November 11, 1999; while
petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Attys. Bernard B. Lopez and Maritoni Z.
Liwanag, had been filed earlier on September 30, 1999.
6.Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 215.
7.Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 828.
8.Citing Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p.
265.
9.Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 12th ed. (1981), p. 907.
10.Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J.
11.95 Phil. 845, September 28, 1954.
12.100 Phil. 1033, February 28, 1957.
13.37 SCRA 315, 326, January 30, 1971, per Zaldivar, J. Italics supplied. See also Gomez v.
Lipana, 33 SCRA 615, June 30, 1970.
14.122 SCRA 525, 529, May 30, 1983; per Melencio-Herrera, J. Italics supplied.
15.143 SCRA 499, August 19, 1986, per Paras, J. Italics supplied.
16.145 SCRA 229, October 28, 1986.
17.226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J., citing Sempio-Diy, Handbook of the
Family Code of the Philippines, 1988, p. 46.
18.Supra, p. 579.
19.People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845, 847, September 28, 1954, per Paras, C.J. See
also People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033, 1034-1035, February 28, 1957, per
Labrador, J.
20.Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1995 ed., p. 56.
21.211 SCRA 6, 11, July 3, 1992, per curiam.
22.Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 829. Italics supplied. Petitioner
had cited the statement of Justice Reyes that "if the first marriage is void from the
beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge." This statement, however, appeared
in the 1981 edition of Reyes' book, before the enactment of the Family Code.
23.Respondent's Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 259.
24.Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330, May 21, 1998; Dio v. Concepcion, 296
SCRA 579, September 25, 1998.
170

25.CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 50-52.
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
1.100 Phil. 1033.
||| (Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 01, 2000)

Case No. 30

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 159218. March 30, 2004.]

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS
ABUNADO, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803 convicting petitioner
Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo at the Manila
City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. 2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the
Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an extra-marital affair and
has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato.
She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with a
certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal. 3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. 4 On May 18,
1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida. 5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a municipal trial
court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to their separation in 1966.
It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955 marriage so he and Zenaida
remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son for the purpose of complying with
the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Bias was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. 6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to
the penalty imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating
the mitigating circumstance that accused is 76 years of age and applying
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.
171

SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage was
contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.
Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. 8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be alleged in the Information. 9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and
not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the Information. It is
fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the
Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in the Information must
be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements of the specific crimes. 10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent marriage with
another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the
Municipality of San Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been legally married
to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16, 1967 which has not
been legally dissolved, did then and therewillfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on
January 10, 1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid
marriage. cSIACD
CONTRARY TO LAW. 11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and sometime in the
month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the same information clearly
states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January
10, 1989. Petitioner's submission, therefore, that the information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless
the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have been
raised. 12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its
elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which
possesses all the requisites for validity. 13 All of these have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to object to the alleged defect in the
Information during the trial and only raised the same for the first time on appeal before the Court
of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the
effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
. . ., while he claims that there was condonation on the part of
complainant when he entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was
likewise not established by clear and convincing evidence. But then, a
pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action
considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of
Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the
person affected thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may
come to know the same. 14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a
prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended
during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999. 15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in
the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal
case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. 17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to Narcisa had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted. 18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. 19 In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained
a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The
penalty next lower would be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense,
without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime.
The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it
can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in the
imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. 20
172

In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age, 21 which is a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum term of
the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum period which
ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum term should be
taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which ranges from six (6) months and one
(1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, is proper.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED. HCTAEc
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., see concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding appellant
Salvador S. Abunado guilty of bigamy.
The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married Narcisa Arceno.
While his marriage with Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida Bias on 10
January 1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999, Abunado obtained from the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage with Arceno. On 18 May 2001,
the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a decision convicting Abunado of bigamy.
The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Bias on 10 January 1989
constitutes the crime of bigamy under Article 349 1 of the Revised Penal Code. More precisely,
the issue turns on whether Abunado's first marriage to Arceno was still subsisting at the time
Abunado married Bias.
Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of nullity of
the first marriage, one must first secure a final judgment declaring the first marriage void. Article
40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of Abunado on
10 January 1989.
Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of nullity of
the previous marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the previous marriage. If
subsequently the previous marriage were judicially declared void, the subsequent marriage
would not be deemed bigamous. The nullity of the previous marriage could even be judicially
declared in the criminal case for bigamy, 2 although the person remarrying "assume(d) the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy" 3 should the court uphold the validity of the first marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code has changed this.
Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before
he is freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails to secure a
judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the second marriage
becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of Appeals 4 in explaining Article
40 of the Family Code:
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage
is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy.
Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of his
previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous marriage to subsist
for purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared void by final
judgment. Thus, if the marital vinculum of the previous marriage subsists because of the
absence of judicial declaration of its nullity, the second marriage is contracted during the
existence of the first marriage resulting in the crime of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is void ab
initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other thanremarriage, marriages
that are void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code, are void
even without a judicial declaration of nullity. As the Court held in Cario v. Cario: 5
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning,
where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
173

Cario, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the statement in her
present ponencia that "under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding." I believe the ruling in Cario is
correct and should not be disturbed. As Justice Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook on
Civil Law (Volume I):
The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void
marriages, like void contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is
only by way of exception that the Family Code requires a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent
marriage is contracted; . . .. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need of
any judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception 7 under existing law is
Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for purposes
of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one can contract a
subsequent marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage suffers
from nullity while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial
declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage. Article 40 does not
apply to a situation where the first marriage does not suffer from any defect while the second is
void.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals finding
appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate
Justices Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine.
2.Exhibit "C", Records, p. 68.
3.Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.
4.Records, p. 202.
5.Records, p. 1.
6.Penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez; Rollo, pp. 33-42.
7.Rollo, p. 53.
8.Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).
9.Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Sec. 6.
10.Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144785, 11 September 2003.
11.Rollo, p. 30; emphasis ours.
12.People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 124441, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 262, 270.
13.Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
14.Rollo, p. 51.
15.Annex "1", Records, p. 208
16.Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 327, 335.
17.Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122, 133.
18.Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
19.Supra.
20.Garcia v. People, supra.
21.Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.
CARPIO, J., concurring:
1.Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: "Bigamy The penalty
of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."
2.People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
3.Landicho v. Relova, et al., 130 Phil. 745 (1968).
4.G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
6.Civil Law, Persons and Family Relations, Vol. I, (2003 Ed.)
7.See also note 4.

||| (Abunado v. People, G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004)

174

Case No. 31

EN BANC
[A.M. No. 2008-20-SC. March 15, 2010.]

RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. CORAZON S. SALVADOR AGAINST
SPOUSES NOEL and AMELIA SERAFICO

DECISION

PER CURIAM p:
The subject matter of the instant administrative proceeding is the formal letter-complaint 1 dated
August 20, 2008 filed by Corazon S. Salvador against Noel L. Serafico and Amelia G. Serafico
for Bigamy, Immorality, Falsification, Grave Abuse of Authority, Deceit, Fraud, Conduct
Unbecoming a Public Officer, and Violations of the Civil Service Code.TcEDHa
Corazon and Amelia met each other in January 2006, through an officemate of the latter in this
Court. Corazon became very close to Amelia and her husband Noel, who was also working in
the Court, because of business deals they got involved in.
On June 11, 2008, Corazon sent a letter, 2 addressed to the Chief Justice and received by the
Office of the Clerk of Court on June 18, 2008, requesting a certified copy of the pages of the
parking logbook of the Court's Old Building for the period covering May 2006 to May 2007. She
wanted to use the data on the dates and times when a red Pajero (Plate No. TAC 232) and a
silver Nissan X-Trail (Plate No. ZFE 835) were parked there as evidence to bolster her Counter-
Affidavit 3 against the Complaint-Affidavit 4 filed in March 2008 by Amelia against her for Estafa
and BP 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City, docketed as I.S. Nos. 08-
D-0832/08-D-0834. In her letter, Corazon also requested the Court to investigate and conduct a
lifestyle check on Noel and Amelia for alleged ill-gotten wealth and immorality. Without going into
specifics as her lawyers were still collating evidence against the couple Corazon made
general allegations of immorality, fraud/falsification, grave abuse of authority, conduct
unbecoming, and deceit.
On July 7, 2008, the Court, through the Office of Administrative Services-Supreme Court (OAS-
SC), informed Corazon of the approval of her request 5 and sent her certified copies 6 of the
pertinent pages of the parking logbook that she requested, with a summary 7 of the dates the
two vehicles were parked in the Old Building parking lot.
On July 9, 2008, the OAS-SC sent Amelia a Memorandum, 8 informing her of the formal
initiation of an investigation and for her to comment on the allegations contained in Corazon's
letter. In compliance, Amelia gave her letter-comment, 9 which was received by the OAS-SC on
July 14, 2008. She denied the accusations of Corazon, alleging that these were pure
harassment and a means of getting back at her for the criminal complaint she filed against
Corazon.
In the investigation that it conducted, the OAS-SC found an inconsistency between Amelia's
1994 Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN) 10 and her Complaint-Affidavit
against Corazon relative to the Nissan X-Trail. In the former, Amelia declared the vehicle as an
asset, but in the latter, she alleged that Corazon was its real owner. Consequently, on August
27, 2008, the OAS-SC, through a Memorandum, 11 directed Amelia to explain said
discrepancy. EHaDIC
On September 1, 2008, Amelia gave her undated letter-comment 12 on the OAS-SC
Memorandum. She said that she declared with utmost good faith the Nissan X-Trail as her own
after Corazon gave it to her in exchange for her family's Toyota Lite Ace van. She added that
Corazon used the Nissan X-Trail as collateral for her financial obligations; Corazon had earlier
used the title to the Brookside property of Amelia's family as security for her debts without their
knowledge. Thus, Amelia concluded that, for all practical purposes, the said vehicle was hers.
She also averred that an officemate, Leilani Recosar, had introduced Corazon to her sometime
in January 2006.
Subsequently, Corazon sent another letter, dated August 20, 2008 and received by the Office of
the Chief Justice (OCJ) on September 30, 2008, as her formal complaint against Amelia and her
husband Noel, which became the subject of the instant case. In her letter-complaint, Corazon
alleged that:
1.She helped Amelia obtain a red Pajero by accommodating the latter
through the use of her check to comply with the car financing requirement
of the bank, and a silver Nissan X-Trail by again accommodating Amelia
with a friend at the Nissan Corporation. In both cases, Amelia failed to
pay the monthly amortizations resulting in civil cases filed against
Corazon on account of her accommodation.
2.Amelia tried to sell to her real properties located at Canonigo, Paco,
Manila (Canonigo property) and at Brookside, Cainta, Rizal (Brookside
property), both of which do not legally belong to Amelia but to the wife
and family of her father, Virgilio M. Gopilan (Virgilio), whom she
defrauded by hiding the titles thereof and selling them for her (Amelia)
own benefit, by falsifying the record of sale and relevant documents
required for the sale. Corazon paid advances for the Canonigo property
to Amelia and her father but the sale did not materialize as it was sold by
Amelia to her brother-in-law, Menandro F. Valerio, Jr. (Menandro).
Worse, Amelia and her father Virgilio did not return all the money she
(Corazon) advanced to them. EICDSA
3.Amelia and Noel committed immorality and bigamy by marrying each
other in a civil ceremony on February 3, 1994 even if Noel had a prior
marriage to Rosemarie Jimeno on February 17, 1987. From this
subsequent bigamous marriage, Noel and Amelia begot three children.
4.Amelia violated RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
On November 3, 2008, Amelia submitted her letter-comment 13 on Corazon's formal complaint.
Amelia explained that the Canonigo property was originally owned by her father, Virgilio Gopilan,
who decided to sell it, on installment basis, to Menandro, who was then entrusted with its title.
Upon learning of the intended sale of said property, Corazon offered to buy it in cash. Amelia
then convinced her father to sell it to Corazon instead; whereupon Virgilio retrieved the title from
Menandro. Upon receipt of the title, Corazon issued Amelia a check for PhP50,000 which, when
encashed, bounced. Virgilio then demanded from Corazon the full payment for the property, but
175

the latter could not comply. Thereafter, Virgilio died, and after the burial, Corazon informed
Amelia that she had used the title of the Canonigo property as security for a loan, compelling
Amelia to redeem it by paying her PhP65,000. The title was then returned to Menandro.
On the allegation of immorality and bigamy, Amelia contended that she did not know that Noel
was previously married and that she came to know of it only when Corazon raised it. She further
stated that Noel had a valid legal justification for the matter.
For his part, Noel asserted in his letter-comment 14 dated November 3, 2008 that his first
marriage to Rosemarie Jimeno on February 17, 1987 was null and void ab initio. He then asked
to be excused from divulging details about it for fear that whatever he might say could be used
against him later.
In her letter-reply, 15 received by the OCJ on November 11, 2008, Corazon countered that Noel
had no authority to declare his previous marriage void ab initio, since only competent courts
have the authority to do so, citing a line of jurisprudence on the matter. Moreover, she argued
that Amelia's defense of lack of knowledge about Noel's previous marriage was a lie and, to
substantiate that claim, she attached a reproduction of an application, 16 in Amelia's own
handwriting, for a copy of the marriage certificate of Noel and Rosemarie Jimeno from the
National Statistics Office (NSO). The application was allegedly given by Amelia to Corazon's
sister sometime in 2006 for filing with the NSO.
In her letter, 17 dated December 6, 2008 and received by the OAS-SC on December 9, 2008,
Corazon requested a copy of Amelia's letter-comment regarding the discrepancy between her
1994 SALN and her Complaint-Affidavit against Corazon. Consequently, the OAS-SC granted
Corazon's request and directed her to submit the required supplemental reply, but Corazon
failed to submit any. DaIAcC
Parenthetically, Leilani, Records Officer II of the Records Division in the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), was invited to appear before the OAS-SC for clarificatory questions relative
to Amelia's assertion that Corazon was introduced to her by Leilani. Leilani testified on March
12 18 and April 4, 19 2009 that Amelia's statement was true and that Corazon became very
close to Noel and Amelia with whom she had business dealings.
In the ensuing investigation, Corazon gave sworn statements on April 17 20 and 29, 21 2009. In
gist, Corazon testified that, indeed, she became close to Noel and Amelia; that she was
interested in buying two properties offered to her by Amelia, but this fell through because one of
them, the Brookside property, was subjected to an adverse claim 22by Adelina, the first wife of
Virgilio, and the other, the Canonigo property, was sold 23 to Menandro after Virgilio's death.
Corazon further testified that, as a good friend, she helped Noel and Amelia purchase a red
Pajero via a trade-in of their Toyota Lite Ace van through an accommodation by her issuance of
checks to cover the price difference, with the understanding that the checks will be funded by
Noel and Amelia. When the red Pajero was repossessed for nonpayment by Noel and Amelia
from which a civil suit arose, Corazon helped them in acquiring the silver Nissan X-Trail, with
Noel and Amelia providing for the PhP200,000 down payment. The vehicle, however, was in
Corazon's name because Noel and Amelia's credit rating was low.
Corazon explained that she was supposed to shoulder the amortizations for the Nissan X-Trail
as commission payment to Noel and Amelia who represented that they could help her land a
contract with the Court for food/canteen concession. Eventually, Corazon was disqualified from
the bidding for the concession, and thus could not pay the amortizations. With the nonpayment
of the outstanding monthly amortizations, Noel and Amelia, with the consent of Corazon, sold
the vehicle to a buyer who was supposed to assume payment of the monthly amortizations. The
buyer, however, did not continue the monthly amortization payments, and since the Deed of
Sale of the vehicle was not registered, the financing bank (Union Bank) was compelled to run
after Corazon in a civil case. 24 CEcaTH
Corazon also testified that she introduced Amelia and Noel to one Rosa Caram who had an
interest in some cases, such as G.R. No. 158805 (Valley Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Vda. de
Caram), 25 where Rosa was the respondent, and another involving Genbank. She narrated that
a meeting took place in Makati in the office of a certain Alderito 26Yujuico where Noel and
Amelia represented that they could help set the Genbank case for agenda by the Court En
Banc at the price of PhP1.2 million. Rosa and Alderito were former stockholders of Genbank.
Corazon, however, was not included in the deal.
Finally, Corazon admitted that she filed the instant administrative case, as well as the criminal
complaint for bigamy against Noel and Amelia, to get back at them for filing harassment and
unsubstantiated cases against her.
Subsequently, Noel and Amelia were directed 27 on June 9, 2009 to give their comment on the
misrepresentations allegedly made by them: (1) that they could set a case for agenda by the
Court En Banc for which they allegedly received PhP1.2 million as consideration; and (2) that
they could help Corazon obtain a contract with the Court for food concession in exchange for
commissions. They were furnished a copy of the transcript of Corazon's sworn statements taken
in April 2009.
In her letter-comment, 28 dated June 10, 2009 and wholly adopted by Noel, Amelia admitted
knowing Corazon's interest in joining the bidding for the Court's canteen/food concession, but
denied assisting her in any way. She likewise denied their receiving PhP1.2 million in
consideration for a promise to set a case for agenda by the Court En Banc,asserting that they
were not in a position to do so. Anent the bigamous marriage, she pointed to a Regional Trial
Court (RTC) decision rendered on March 17, 2009 declaring the marriage of Noel with
Rosemarie Jimeno null and void ab initio. On the Brookside property, they claimed no
involvement in the transaction, and that Adelina filed an adverse claim only due to the many
failed promises of Corazon who, they later found out, used the title to the property as security for
some loans. HcSCED
Subsequently, to bolster her defense of not interfering with Court processes relative to some
cases, Amelia submitted copies of the September 6, 2006 Resolution 29 in G.R. No. 158805 and
the January 29, 2007 Decision 30 in G.R. No. 168639.
On the other hand, Corazon submitted, as additional evidence, photocopies of two checks
issued by Rosa to Noel and Amelia as payment for the promise to set a case for agenda or for a
favorable outcome of some cases.
Meanwhile, on August 3, 2009, Amelia resigned from the Court through a letter dated July 29,
2009. Her resignation was accepted by the Court subject to the outcome of the instant
administrative case.
On August 17, 2009, the OAS-SC inquired from the Judicial Records Office (JRO) if, at any
point, the records of these cases were borrowed by any employee of the OCA. 31 The JRO,
176

through its head of office, Atty. Ma. Lourdes G. Perfecto, Deputy Clerk of Court, gave its
response 32 dated August 19, 2009, stating that the rollos of both cases were not borrowed by
any employee or officer of the OCA but only circulated within the JRO, the Divisions of the Court,
and the Court En Banc, as evidenced by the entries in their logbooks and monitoring index card
records. 33
Terminating its investigation on November 23, 2009, the OAS-SC submitted its
Memorandum 34 with the findings, to wit: (1) Noel and Amelia committed immorality because,
when they got married in 1994, both had existing marriages which had not yet been judicially
annulled or nullified; and (2) the spouses violated Republic Act No. 3019 and the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel by misrepresenting that they could help set a case for agenda by
the Court En Banc, which amounted to grave misconduct. Consequently, citing applicable
penalties under the Civil Service Rules, it recommended the dismissal from the service of Noel
and the forfeiture of all the benefits of Amelia, including accrued leave credits, both with
prejudice to reemployment in the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCCs). TaCSAD
Anent the ownership of the silver Nissan X-Trail, the OAS-SC found no substantial evidence to
prove that the monthly amortizations were to be paid by Corazon as commissions to Noel and
Amelia from a food/canteen concession with the Court. The mere testimony of Corazon is not
enough, although her testimony bears out the fact that she was, indeed, introduced to Tribiana,
who was then a member of the Bids and Awards Committee, which tends to show that Amelia
did misrepresent that she could influence the bidding process.
As regards the transactions involving real estate properties, the OAS-SC said that the Canonigo
property transaction is the subject of a pending case before the trial court and must be ventilated
in that court, while the issues with the Brookside property are best threshed out in a proper
adversarial court proceeding. Finally, it stated that administrative liability for alleged fraud and
falsification may only prosper after conviction in a proper forum.
This Court finds the recommendation of the OAS-SC to fault respondents well taken, except as
to the penalties.
We agree with the assessment of the OAS-SC that the issues raised on the botched deals in the
purchase of the two properties by Corazon from Amelia, and the acquisitive transactions relative
to the red Pajero and the silver Nissan X-Trail are best ventilated in full-blown adversarial
proceedings before the trial courts.
The investigation established that both Noel and Amelia had subsisting marriages when they got
married on February 3, 1994 35 before the Rev. Jaime R. Quirabu in Tondo, Manila. It is, thus,
apparent that both had legal impediments to marrying when they married each other. It is clear
from the records that Noel married Rosemarie Jimeno on February 17, 1987 36 before the Rev.
Mario J. Dauz at the YMCA Youth Center in Ermita, Manila. Although in their June 10, 2009
letter-comment on Corazon's testimony/sworn statements they pointed to a purported RTC
Decision declaring the marriage of Noel with Rosemarie Jimeno null and void ab initio, they
failed to submit a copy of said decision. Even granting that Noel's first marriage was indeed
nullified in early 2009, Noel was still not capacitated to marry when he married Amelia in
1994. CcSTHI
Also, as aptly noted by the OAS-SC, the lack of knowledge by Amelia of the fact that Noel had a
subsisting marriage is not a valid defense, because she herself had a subsisting marriage with
Marc Michael A. Nacianceno on February 20, 1991, 37 which was not yet dissolved when she
married Noel in 1994. She was, thus, likewise incapacitated to marry when she married Noel.
The eventual dissolution of this marriage on December 20, 1996 by virtue of a judicial
declaration of nullity through a Decision 38 by the RTC, Branch 260 in Paraaque City, Metro
Manila in Civil Case No. 96-0426 does not militate against the fact that Amelia was still
married to Marc Michael A. Nacianceno when she contracted her second marriage to Noel. In
fact, tending to show that both were indeed aware of the bigamous nature of their February 3,
1994 marriage, Noel and Amelia contracted marriage anew on March 6, 1997 39 before
Presiding Judge Roberto L. Makalintal of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 77 in Paraaque
City.
Moreover, both Noel and Amelia admitted their subsequent marriage. In his 1995 Personal Data
Sheet 40 submitted to the Court and his 1995 SALN, 41 Noel indicated Amelia as his wife.
Likewise, in her 1994 SALN, 42 Amelia indicated Noel as her husband.
In a catena of cases, 43 the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires
a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage, thus:
Art. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
such previous marriage void. SaETCI
While the trial court is the proper forum to rule their subsequent marriage as bigamous, from a
criminal point of view, Noel and Amelia are nonetheless liable for immorality by the mere fact of
living together and contracting a subsequent marriage before their respective first marriages
were judicially dissolved. In effect, Noel, who was still married to Rosemarie Jimeno, and
Amelia, who was still married to Marc Michael A. Nacianceno, not only contracted an apparently
bigamous marriage, but also cohabited as man and wife in violation of their prior marital status
and obligations solemnly assumed before God and man. Indeed, we find that Noel and Amelia
made a mockery of marriage, which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. Their
act of contracting a second marriage while their respective first marriages were still in place is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality. 44
Immoral conduct is conduct that is "willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." 45 What is
grossly immoral must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree. 46 Absent a finding of criminal liability for bigamy, we,
however, cannot rule that their subsequent marriage and co-habitation is grossly immoral.
In Marquez v. Clores-Ramos, 47 we found a court stenographer guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct in maintaining relations with a married man with whom she begot a child, for
which she was suspended for a year. In Castillo-Casiquin v. Cansino, 48 aptly quoted by the
OAS-SC, we again found a court stenographer guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct in
marrying and cohabiting with a married man, for which she was suspended for six months.
In Samaniego v. Ferrer, 49 we found a married lawyer guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct
in having an extramarital affair by co-habiting with another woman who was not his wife and
begetting a child from it, for which he was suspended from the practice of law for six months.
177

For marrying each other despite their subsisting prior marriages, Noel and Amelia acted
reprehensibly and are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct. They are, thus, liable to
suspension for at least six months under Section 52 (A) (15) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which pertinently provides: caAICE
Section 52.Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with
corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light,
depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government
service.
A.The following are grave offenses with their corresponding
penalties:
xxx xxx xxx
15.Disgraceful and immoral conduct
1st offense Suspension (6 mos., 1 day to 1 year)
2nd offense Dismissal
Noel and Amelia are also liable for violation of Sec. 1, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel, which pertinently provides:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official position to
secure unwarranted benefits, privileges, or exemption for
themselves or for others. (Emphasis supplied.)
Corazon provided other pieces of evidence substantially proving her allegations that Noel and
Amelia misrepresented that they could help set a case for agenda by the CourtEn
Banc. Corroborating her testimony, Corazon presented two checks issued by Rosa to Noel and
Amelia, and photographs showing the connection between them and Alderito. This constitutes
grave misconduct. IDSETA
It must be noted that Noel and Amelia were furnished copies of the transcript of the
testimony/sworn statements of Corazon and directed to comment on it. Aside from their mere
denials, Noel and Amelia did not deny or dispute being introduced to Rosa and Alderito, nor did
they comment on or give any explanation for the two checks Rosa issued to them as payment
for her pending cases with the Court, which Corazon categorically mentioned in her testimony.
Rosa is the respondent in G.R. No. 158805 entitled Valley Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Vda. de
Caram, 50 which, incidentally, was decided in her favor by the Second Division of this Court on
April 16, 2009. What Rosa and Alderito worked for was the setting for agenda by the Court En
Banc of the Genbank case.
The two checks presented by Corazon indubitably show that:
(1)the first check, 51 Citibank Check No. 100176 dated May 31, 2007, in
the account of Rosa with Current Account No. 000203022105 in the
amount of PhP5,000 and made payable to Cash, was deposited to a
Land Bank of the Philippines account; and
(2)the second check, 52 Citibank Check No. 100197 dated August 8,
2007, also issued by Rosa from the same current account, in the amount
of PhP40,000 was made payable to Noel and encashed by him on the
same date as shown by his signature at the dorsal side of the check
above his written address of "14 Britain St., Better Living, Paraaque."
The checks evidently show and substantially prove payment by Rosa to Noel and Amelia for
either setting a case for agenda by the Court En Banc or for a favorable outcome of a case.
Aside from the general denials of Noel and Amelia, they did not explain the receipt of the checks
and the payments totaling PhP45,000 from Rosa. They likewise did not deny being introduced to
Rosa by Corazon. Thus, it is substantially evident that, absent any proof to the contrary, Noel
and Amelia indeed misrepresented to Rosa that they could either influence the outcome of her
case or help set a case for agenda by the Court En Banc. CASaEc
Moreover, G.R. No. 168639, entitled Yujuico v. Quiambao, 53 which was decided on January
29, 2007, directly involved Alderito as one of the petitioners. That case, however, does not seem
to be the subject of the representation for the setting for agenda by the Court En Banc, for it
neither involved Genbank nor was it adverse to Alderito, for the First Division granted the
petition, reversed the assailed Court of Appeals decision and resolution, and set aside the
assailed RTC order.
Nonetheless, the investigation showed that Alderito was likewise introduced to Noel and Amelia
by Corazon under the behest of Rosa for the Genbank case. This was also not denied by Noel
and Amelia. Aside from their mere denial of not being in a position to interfere with court
processes, they failed to rebut their connection with Alderito. As shown by the photographs
submitted by Corazon, Noel and Amelia came to know Alderito through Rosa and Corazon. The
photographs marked as "Annex C," "Annex C-1," and "Annex C-2" 54 show Alderito second from
the left, either seated or standing, ostensibly during the birthday party of Amelia's mother.
Amelia is shown in all the photos with Alderito. Allegedly, the expenses for the birthday bash of
Amelia's mother came from the PhP1.2 million that Noel and Amelia received from Alderito. No
substantial evidence was, however, shown for the alleged payment. But the fact that Alderito
had ties with Noel and Amelia bolsters the testimony of Corazon on the misrepresentations by
the couple that they could help set for agenda by the Court En Banc the Genbank case, in which
Alderito and Rosa had an interest and for which Rosa paid PhP45,000.
The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant. 55 Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise. 56 In sum, we find Noel and
Amelia guilty of grave misconduct for misrepresenting that they could help in the favorable
outcome of a case or for setting a case for agenda by the Court En Banc.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. 57 Corruption,
as an element of grave misconduct, includes the act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully
uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the rights of
others. 58
In the instant case, it is clear that by misrepresenting they could help influence either the
outcome of a case or set a case for agenda by the Court En Banc for which they demanded and
178

received payment, Noel and Amelia committed grave misconduct. It shows the corruption of
Noel and Amelia, who used their station or character as Court employees in misrepresenting
they could set a case for agenda by the Court En Banc and procuring financial benefits for that
vicious act. IaAScD
Grave misconduct is punishable with dismissal from the service for the first offense under Sec.
52 (A) (3) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Moreover,
under Sec. 55 59 of said Rules, if the respondent is guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts,
the penalty to be imposed should be the penalty for the most serious charge, and the rest
considered as aggravating. It is also worthy to note that the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel provides that "all provisions of law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the
Supreme Court or regulating the conduct of public officers and employees applicable to
the Judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code." Conformably, in the instant case, the
penalty for grave misconduct, which is the more serious charge, must be applied, and the
charge of disgraceful and immoral conduct considered as merely an aggravating circumstance.
Thus, Noel must be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued
leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government,
including GOCCs. 60 For Amelia, for whom dismissal is no longer possible, the Court having
approved her resignation on August 3, 2009 subject to the outcome of the instant administrative
case, the forfeiture of all her benefits, except accrued leave credits, is in order with prejudice to
reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including GOCCs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby resolve to:
(1)DISMISS from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits except
accrued leave credits, Noel L. Serafico, for Grave
Misconduct, Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct, and violation of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; and
(2)FORFEIT all the benefits, except accrued leave credits, of Amelia
G. Serafico, for Grave Misconduct, Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct, and violation of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel. IcTaAH
Both Noel L. Serafico and Amelia G. Serafico are BARRED from reemployment in any branch
or instrumentality of government, including GOCCs.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 218-221.
2.Id. at 276-278.
3.Id. at 233-237.
4.Id. at 230.
5.Id. at 322.
6.Id. at 326-408.
7.Id. at 323-325.
8.Id. at 275.
9.Id. at 272-273.
10.Id. at 26.
11.Id. at 271.
12.Id. at 269-270.
13.Id. at 211-214.
14.Id. at 210.
15.Id. at 198-201.
16.Id. at 203.
17.Id. at 194-195.
18.Id. at 181-186.
19.Id. at 162-180.
20.Id. at 147-161.
21.Id. at 123-146.
22.Id. at 115-116, Affidavit of Loss and Cancellation of Sale dated July 17, 2006.
23.Id. at 108-109, Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 20, 2006.
24.Union Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Corazon Salvador and Gaudencio Salvador, Jr. and
John Doe, Civil Case No. 07-0150-CFM; rollo, p. 5.
25.April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 218.
26.Indicated also as "Adelito" in the transcript of stenographic notes.
27.Rollo, p. 122, OAS-SC Memorandum.
28.Id. at 117-121.
29.Id. at 43.
30.Id. at 44-69.
31.Id. at 42.
32.Id. at 32-33.
179

33.Id. at 34-41, Annexes "A" to "G."
34.Id. at 1-14.
35.Id. at 16.
36.Id. at 15.
37.Id. at 22.
38.Id. at 22-24. Penned by Judge Helen Bautista Ricafort.
39.Id. at 25.
40.Id. at 27.
41.Id. at 28.
42.Supra note 10.
43.Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 376; Domingo v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572; Terre v.
Terre, A.C. No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 7; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, No. L-
53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499; Vda. de Consuegra v. Government
Service Insurance System, No. L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SC RA 315; Gomez
v. Lipana, No. L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 614.
44.Villasanta v. Peralta, 101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).
45.Elape v. Elape, A.M. No. P-08-2431, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 403, 407;
citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA
306, 314.
46.Reyes v. Wong, A.C. No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, 673.
47.A.M. No. P-96-1182, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 122.
48.A.M. No. P-06-2240, April 12, 2007, 520 SCRA 725.
49.A.C. No. 7022, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 1.
50.Supra note 25.
51.Rollo, p. 19.
52.Id. at 20-21.
53.513 SCRA 243.
54.Rollo, pp. 17-18.
55.Marcelo v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 589.
56.Bughaw, Jr. v. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 173151, March 28, 2008,
550 SCRA 307.
57.In Re: Partial Report on the Results of the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch
1, Cebu City, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1572, January 30, 2008, 543 SCRA 105, 128;
citing Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, September 30,
2005, 471 SCRA 589.
58.Marohomsalic v. Cole, G.R. No. 169918, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 98, 110;
citing Salazar v. Barriga, A.M. No. P-05-2016, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 449
and Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004, 440
SCRA 578.
59.Sec. 55. If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to
be imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and
the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances.
60.REVISED UNIFORM RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE,
Sec. 58 (a) provides: The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it that of cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the
decision.
||| (Re: Complaint Against Spouses Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, March 15, 2010)

180

Case No. 32

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183824. December 8, 2010.]

MYRNA P. ANTONE, petitioner, vs. LEO R. BERONILLA, respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
nullify and set aside the issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102834, to wit: (a)
the Resolution 1 dated 29 April 2008 dismissing the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which
assailed the trial court's Orders 2 dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 in Criminal
Case No. 07-0907-CFM for Bigamy; and (b) the Resolution 3 dated 18 July 2008 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the first resolution.
The trial court quashed the Information on the ground that the elements of Bigamy were
rendered incomplete after herein respondent presented documents to prove a fact, which the
court believed would negate the allegation in the Information that there was a first valid
marriage. The evidence presented showed that respondent later obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first union following the celebration of a subsequent marriage.
The Antecedents
On 12 March 2007, herein petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint 4 for
Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. She
alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the
latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
On 21 June 2007, the prosecution filed the corresponding Information 5 before the Regional
Trial Court, Pasay City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM and raffled
to Branch 115.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the
Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. 6 He informed the
court that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007; 7 that the decision became final and executory on 15
May 200[7]; 8 and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil
Registrar on 12 June 2007. 9 He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and
void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid
marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. 10
In its comment/opposition to the motion, 11 the prosecution, through herein petitioner,
maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites of
bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18
November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16
February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared
the first marriage null and void on 27 April 2007. 12 The prosecution also invoked the rulings of
the Supreme Court holding that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts
alleged in the information, and that facts contrary thereto are matters of defense which may be
raised only during the presentation of evidence. 13 SECIcT
After a hearing on the motion, 14 the court quashed the Information. 15 Applying Morigo v.
People, 16 it ruled:
Hence, contrary to what was stated in the Information, accused Beronilla
was actually never legally married to Myrna Antone. On this score alone,
the first element appears to be missing. Furthermore, the statement in the
definition of Bigamy which reads "before the first marriage has been
legally dissolved" clearly contemplates that the first marriage must at
least be annullable or voidable but definitely not void, as in this case. . . .
[I]n a similar case, [the Supreme Court] had the occasion to state:
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." . . . The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is
no first marriage to speak of. . . . 17
The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order 18 on
the ground, among others, that the facts and the attending circumstances inMorigo are not on all
fours with the case at bar. It likewise pointed out that, in Mercado v. Tan, 19 this Court has
already settled that "(a) declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense." 20
In its Order of 6 December 2007, 21 the court denied the motion for reconsideration stating
that Mercado has already been superseded by Morigo.
In the interim, in a Petition for Relief from Judgment 22 before the Regional Trial Court of Naval,
Biliran, petitioner questioned the validity of the proceedings in the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. B-1290 on 5 October 2007. On 24 March 2008, the court set
aside its Decision of 26 April 2007 declaring the marriage of petitioner with respondent null and
void, and required herein petitioner (respondent in Civil Case No. B-1290) to file her "answer to
the complaint." 23 On 21 July 2008, the court DISMISSED the petition for nullity of marriage for
failure of herein respondent (plaintiff in Civil Case No. B-1290) to submit his pre-trial
brief. 24 Respondent, however, challenged the orders issued by the court before the Court of
Appeals. 25 The matter is still pending resolution thereat. 26
Meanwhile, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 26 March 2008
before the Court of Appeals, 27 herein petitioner alleged that the Pasay City trial court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case of bigamy and denied her motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition stating that:
181

The present petition . . . is fatally infirm in form and substance for the
following reasons: aHSTID
1.The verification is defective as it does not include the assurance that
the allegations in the petition are based on authentic records.
2.Since the petition assails the trial court's dismissal of the criminal
information for bigamy filed against private respondent Leo Beronilla, the
petition, if at all warranted, should be filed in behalf of the People of the
Philippines by the Office of the Solicitor General, being its statutory
counsel in all appealed criminal cases.
3.There is a violation of the rule on double jeopardy as the dismissal of
the subject criminal case is tantamount to an acquittal based on the trial
court's finding that the first essential element of bigamy, which is a first
valid marriage contracted by private respondent is wanting. There is no
clear showing in the petition that the dismissal was tainted with
arbitrariness which violated petitioner's right to due process. Notably,
petitioner filed her comment/opposition to private respondent's motion to
quash before the trial court issued its Order dated September 20, 2007
dismissing the information. Hence, if there is no denial of due process,
there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application
of the exception to the double jeopardy rule. 28
On 18 July 2008, the Court of Appeals denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforequoted Resolution for lack of merit. 29
Hence, this petition. 30
Our Ruling
I
We are convinced that this petition should be given due course despite the defect in the
pleading and the question of legal standing to bring the action.
The Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which lacks a proper
verification shall be treated as unsigned pleading. 31
This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases, opted to relax the rule in order that the
ends of justice may be served. 32 The defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled
that the court may nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading
"if the attending circumstances are such that . . . strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice . . . may be served." 33 At any rate, a pleading is
required to be verified only to ensure that it was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations
were true and correct and not based on mere speculations. 34
There is likewise no dispute that it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which has the
authority to represent the government in a judicial proceeding before the Court of Appeals. The
Administrative Code specifically defined its powers and functions to read, among others:
Sec. 35.Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
(1)Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the
Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer
thereof in his official capacity is a party. 35 aDcHIC
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to:
(8)Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the
Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the
courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with
respect to such cases. 36
Thus, in Republic v. Partisala, 37 we held that the summary dismissal of an action in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines, when not initiated by the Solicitor General, is in order. 38 Not
even the appearance of the conformity of the public prosecutor in a petition for certiorari would
suffice because the authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to represent the People of
the Philippines is limited to the proceedings in the trial court. 39
We took exceptions, however, and gave due course to a number of actions even when the
respective interests of the government were not properly represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General.
In Labaro v. Panay, 40 this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved
by any order or ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and
not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before
us. 41 . . .
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the
State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to
dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the
OSG to comment on the petition, as we had done before in some
cases. 42 In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and
adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative,
Inc., 43 without requiring the Office of the Solicitor General to file a comment on the petition, this
Court determined the merits of the case involving a novel issue on the nature and scope of
jurisdiction of the Cooperative Development Authority to settle cooperative disputes as well as
the battle between two (2) factions concerning the management of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc. (DARBCI) "that inevitably threatens the very existence of one of
the country's major cooperatives." 44
182

And, lest we defeat the ends of justice, we opt to look into the merit of the instant petition even
absent the imprimatur of the Solicitor General. After all, "for justice to prevail, the scales must
balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone." 45 To borrow the words of
then Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario in another case where the dismissal of a criminal case
pending with the trial court was sought:
[T]he task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our
democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who
[come or are brought to court] are afforded a fair opportunity to present
their side[s]. . . . The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in
court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. 46
II
We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the filing of this petition is in violation of the
respondent's right against double jeopardy on the theory that he has already been practically
acquitted when the trial court quashed the Information. TaDAIS
Well settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites must concur:
(1)there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a
court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to
the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 47
The third and fourth requisites are clearly wanting in the instant case as (a) respondent has
not yet entered his plea to the charge when he filed the Motion to Quash the Information,
and (2) the case was dismissed not merely with his consent but, in fact, at his instance. 48
We reiterate, time and again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of
an order sustaining a motion to quash. 49 More specifically, the granting of a motion to quash
anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is "not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense." 50 Thus:
It will be noted that the order sustaining the motion to quash the
complaint against petitioner was based on Subsection (a) of Section 2 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that the facts charged in the complaint
do not constitute an offense. If this is so then the dismissal of said
complaint will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense,
for it is provided in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court [now
Section 6 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure] that an order
sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in
Section 2, Subsection[s] (f) and (h) of this rule [now substantially
reproduced in Section 3, Subsections (g) and (i) of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure] . . . . 51
III
We now determine the merit of the petition did the trial court act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondent's motion to quash on the
basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information?
Petitioner maintains that the trial court did so because the motion was a hypothetical admission
of the facts alleged in the information and any evidence contrary thereto can only be presented
as a matter of defense during trial.
Consistent with existing jurisprudence, we agree with the petitioner.
We define a motion to quash an Information as
the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. 52
This motion is "a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information," 53 for
which reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on the face
of the information. 54
As further elucidated in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals: 55
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to
dismiss/quash on the ground that it charges no offense may be properly
sustained. The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash on this
ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will
establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the
law. aIcDCH
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, a reading of the information will
disclose that the essential elements of the offense charged are
sufficiently alleged. It is not proper therefore to resolve the charges at the
very outset, in a preliminary hearing only and without the benefit of a full-
blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination. Given the
circumstances of this case, we feel it would be unfair to shut off the
prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the
informations on the basis only of the petitioner's evidence, such as
[this]. 56
As in the recent case of Los Baos v. Pedro, 57 where we found no merit in respondent's
allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because "the Information duly
charged a specific offense and provide[d] the details on how the offense was committed," 58 we
see no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at bar. Clearly, the facts
alleged in its accusatory portion, which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1991, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, LEO R. BERONILLA, having been united in a
lawful marriage with one MYRNA A. BERONILLA, which marriage is still
in force and subsisting and without having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with one Cecile Maguillo, which subsequent marriage of the
accused has all the essential requisites for validity. 59
183

sufficiently constitute an offense. It contained all the elements of the crime of Bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code hereunder enumerated:
(1)that the offender has been legally married;
(2)that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3)that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4)that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. 60
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is null and void from the beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final
and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval, Biliran are pieces
of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first
valid marriage was subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage.
This should not have been considered at all because matters of defense cannot be raised in a
motion to quash.
Neither do we find a justifiable reason for sustaining the motion to quash even after taking into
consideration the established exceptions to the rule earlier recognized by this Court, among
others: (1) when the new allegations are admitted by the prosecution; 61 (2) when the Rules so
permit, such as upon the grounds of extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy; 62 and
(3) when facts have been established by evidence presented by both parties which destroyed
the prima facie truth of the allegations in the information during the hearing on a motion to quash
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and "it would be pure
technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give due course to the
prosecution of the case already shown to be weak even to support possible conviction . . .
." 63 CASTDI
For of what significance would the document showing the belated dissolution of the first
marriage offer? Would it serve to prevent the impracticability of proceeding with the trial in
accordance with People v. dela Rosa thereby warranting the non-observance of the settled rule
that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information? We
quote:
[W]here in the hearing on a motion to quash predicated on the ground
that the allegations of the information do not charge an offense, facts
have been brought out by evidence presented by both parties which
destroy the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the
information on the hypothetical admission thereof, as is implicit in the
nature of the ground of the motion to quash, it would be pure
technicality for the court to close its eyes to said facts and still give
due course to the prosecution of the case already shown to be weak
even to support possible conviction, and hold the accused to what
would clearly appear to be a merely vexatious and expensive trial,
on her part, and a wasteful expense of precious time on the part of
the court, as well as of the prosecution. 64(Emphasis supplied.)
We find that there is none.
With the submission of the documents showing that the court has declared the first marriage
void ab initio, respondent heavily relied on the rulings 65 in People v.
Mendozaand Morigo declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will
not prosper because there is no need for a judicial decree to establish that a void ab
initiomarriage is invalid; 66 and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect
such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements
of bigamy incomplete. 67
Both principles, however, run contrary to the new provision of the Family Code, which was
promulgated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino in 1987, a few years before respondent's
subsequent marriage was celebrated in 1991.
The specific provision, which reads:
ART. 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
such marriage void.
was exhaustively discussed in Mercado, 68 where this Court settled the "conflicting"
jurisprudence on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage."
After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration
of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of cases, 69 this Court, concluded, in
essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a
subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty
of bigamy. 70
Notably, Morigo, was indeed promulgated years after Mercado. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold
the Order dated 6 December 2007 of the trial court, which maintained thatMorigo has already
superseded Mercado. In fact, in Morigo, this Court clearly distinguished the two (2) cases from
one another, and explained: cSaADC
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was
already celebrated. . . .
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized . . . . Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed
by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete
merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of
signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and
thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
184

judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage. 71
The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this
Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled
in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals: 72
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, . . .
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the
marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. . . .
. 73 (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico, 74 this Court pronounced:
In a catena of cases, 75 the Court has consistently held that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can
be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral. . . .
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for
the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by
the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts
contrary to the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only
during the presentation of evidence.
All considered, we find that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so
quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an evidence
introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to
quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts stated in the information; and that facts not
alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is
obtaining in the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated 20 September 2007 and 6 December 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City as well as the Resolutions dated 29 April 2008 and 18 July
2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. ISTECA
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, * Del Castillo and Abad, ** JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Edgardo P.
Cruz and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 29-31.
2.Both issued by Judge Francisco G. Mendiola. Records, pp. 50-52 and 63.
3.Rollo, pp. 32-33.
5.Id. at 1-2.
6.Id. at 31-36.
7.Id. at 32.
8.Id. at 32-33.
9.Id. at 34.
10.CA rollo, p. 34.
11.Id. at 33-41.
12.Id. at 37-38.
13.Id. at 35.
14.Records, p. 48.
15.Id. at 52.
17.Records, pp. 51-52 citing Morigo v. People, id.
19.G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
20.Records, p. 59 citing Mercado v. Tan, id.
21.Records, p. 63.
22.Rollo, p. 21.
23.Id. at 64.
24.Id. at 109.
25.Id. at 126.
26.Id. at 123-126.
28.Id. at 55-56.
185

29.Id. at 116.
30.Rollo, pp. 9-64.
31.Sec. 4, Rule 7, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10 dated 1 May 2000.
32.Hon. Eduardo Nonato Joson, in his capacity as the Governor of the Province of Nueva
Ecija v. Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 131255, 20 May
1998 citing, among others, Oshita v. Republic, L-21180, 31 March 1967, 19 SCRA
700,703.
33.Id.
34.Id.; Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, 23
September 1999, 373 SCRA 773, 786.
35.Sec. 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
36.Sec. 35 (8), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987.
37.No. L-61997, 15 November 1982, 370 SCRA 370.
38.Id. at 373.
39.Galangco v. Fung, G.R. No. 157952, 8 September 2009, 598 SCRA 637, 643.
41.Id. at 720 citing Tan v. Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306, 313 [1976].
42.Id. at 721 citing the following cases: People v. Montesa, Jr., 248 SCRA 641, 644-645
[1993], further citing Republic v. Partisala, 118 SCRA 370 [1982]; City Fiscal of
Tacloban v. Espina, 166 SCRA 614 [1988]; People v. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489
[1989]; People v. Calo, 186 SCRA 620 [1990]; and People v. Nano, 205 SCRA 155
[1992].
43.G.R. No. 137489, 29 May 2002, 382 SCRA 552.
44.Id. at 568.
45.Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 139, 162 citing the following
cases: Dimatulac v. Villon, 358 Phil. 328, 366; 297 SCRA 679, 714 (1998); People
v. Subida, G.R. No. 145945, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 125, 137.
46.Tan v. People, id. at 162-163.
47.Javier v. Sandiganbayan, First Division, G.R. Nos. 147026-27, 11 September 2009, 599
SCRA 324, 343-344 citing Cabo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169509, 16 June
2006, 491 SCRA 264.
48.Milo v. Salanga, No. L-37007, 20 July 1987, 152 SCRA 113, 122.
49.Id. at 121-122 citing the following: Section 8, Rule 117, Rules of Court; now Section 7,
Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; Andres v. Cacdac, Jr., 113 SCRA
216.
50.People v. Consulta, No. L-41251, 31 March 1976, 70 SCRA 277, 280-281.
51.Id. quoting Secs. 2 (f) and 2 (h), now substantially reproduced in Secs. 3 (g) and 3 (i) of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: (g) That the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; and (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
52.Javier v. Sandiganbayan, First Division, supra note 47 citing Ariel Los Baos, et al. v. Joel
Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, 22 April 2009, 586 SCRA 303.
53.Milo v. Salanga, supra note 48 at 121 citing People v. Lim Hoa, 103 Phil. 1169 and
Regalado, Remedial Law Compen[dium], 1085 ed., Vol. 2, p. 684.
54.Milo v. Salanga, supra note 48 at 121.
56.Id. at 150 citing U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245 and People v. de la Rosa, No. L-34112, 25
June 1980, 98 SCRA 190.
57.G.R. No. 173588, 22 April 2009, 586 SCRA 303.
58.Id. at 321.
59.Records, p. 1.
60.Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 279
citing Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p.
907.
61.People v. Navarro, Nos. L-1 and L-2, 75 Phil. 516, 518-519 [1945].
62.Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119063, 27 January 1997, 266 SCRA 678, 691.
63.People v. de la Rosa, supra note 56 at 199-200.
64.Id.
65.Rollo, p. 145 citing Morigo v. People, supra note 16 and People v. Mendoza, L-5877, 95
Phil. 845.
66.Rollo, p. 145 citing People v. Mendoza, id.
67.Morigo v. People, supra note 16 at 383-384.
68.Supra note 19.
69.Supra note 19 at 128-133 citing, among others, the following: Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143
SCRA 499, 19 August 1986, per Paras, J.; Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226
SCRA 572, 17 September 1993, per Romero, J., citing Sempio-Diy, Handbook of
the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988, p. 46; and Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6, 3
July 1992, per curiam.
186

72.G.R. 150758, 18 February 2004, 423 SCRA 272.
73.Id. at 284.
74.A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010.
75.Id. citing Morigo v. People, G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 376; Domingo
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572; Terre
v. Terre, A.C. No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 7; Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, No. L-
53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499; Vda. de Consuegra v. Government
Service Insurance System, No. L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315; Gomez
v. Lipana, No. L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 614.
*Per Special Order No. 916 dated 24 November 2010, Associate Justice Teresita J.
Leonardo-De Castro is designated as Acting Working Chairperson.
**Per Special Order No. 917 dated 24 November 2010, Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad is
designated as Additional Member.
||| (Antone v. Beronilla, G.R. No. 183824, December 08, 2010)

Case No. 33

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.]

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an
individual's criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the
second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia
Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. 1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15. 2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, 3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner,
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The Information, 5 which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed
accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda
Villareyes, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage
of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity were it not for
the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
187

During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom
he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each
other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. 7 He alleged that
he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman. 8 He further testified that he requested his brother to
verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and
Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. 9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor, as
maximum. 10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND
THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
QUO CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II.THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL
FORCE AND EFFECT. 11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1)that the offender has been legally married;
(2)that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3)that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4)that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 12
Petitioner's assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the
existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that
his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of
the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. 14
Petitioner's defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the
existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence
presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes,
dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City
Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila; 15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12,
1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. 16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by
the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and (2) a certification issued by the City
Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3, 1997. 18 Both these documents attest that the
respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro
and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage
contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court
provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract,
Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7.Evidence admissible when original document is a public record.
When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in
custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract
plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public
documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics
Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3,
1997 would plainly show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was no
marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10,
1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of
such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to theabsence of a record is quite different from
documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as
to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the
existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present. 19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that
would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against this
188

testimony are Villareyes' letter, Ancajas' testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence
of the valid first marriage, and petitioner's own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the
first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first
marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is
significant to note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both
documents, therefore, are dated after the accused's marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner's defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial
declaration 20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration
of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was
subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed. 21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails
to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State's penal laws are
concerned. HEScID
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner's valid
marriage to Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner's psychological capacity or incapacity. 22 Since a
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity
of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To
our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is
null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability
for bigamy is concerned. The State's penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individual's deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner's marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites
for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into
essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer) 23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license,
and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). 24 Under Article 5 of the
Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 38 26 may contract marriage. 27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted
the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
thevinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment
of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory,
and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this
case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage
a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although
this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused's guilt for purposes of this particular case,
the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State
does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the
foundation of the State's basic social institution, the State's criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy
isprision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There
being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term,
to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a duration
of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed
the decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years, and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
189

of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., joins the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, , Carpio-Morales, J. and Tinga, JJ., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being married to
Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues
that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the
ground of the latter's psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". 1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage,
contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it not
for its being bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial
declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or
both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained),
the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning,
and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. 2 As early as the case of People vs.
Aragon, 3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not,
unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void
marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law
contemplated otherwise, said the Court, "an express provision to that effect would or should
have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of
strict interpretation" of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until
judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were
contracted prior to the decree of annulment), 4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously
contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be a defense in an
indictment for bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of
bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second
marriage is contracted, there has as yet been no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
marriage. 5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads:

"Article 40.The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purposes of remarriage" that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of
the previous marriage may be invoked "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil
Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy, 6has held that a
subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior void marriage is itself (the
subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of
the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 7 the Family Code, however, has seen it fit to adopt
the Wiegel rule but only for purposes of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent
marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the
Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised Penal Code or to abandon
the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. 8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been
taken from Canon Law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law
with those of church laws. 9 The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential marital
obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined
to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or
disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the
like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto
may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be
valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers
children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be
legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to
assume, that the spouses' rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would
continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially
declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground
for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal
requisites of a valid marriage; 10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage
(i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties)
which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a
mental state, may not so readily be as evident. 11 It would have been logical for the Family
Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for an
apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
190

Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable
marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It
might be recalled that prior to Republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an
action or defense of absolute nullity of marriages falling under Article 36, celebrated before the
effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code.
The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness
by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a "void" marriage due to
psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until
judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or
otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case
questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same
way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until annulled) would not
be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first
marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. 12 The
Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only,
be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were
it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has
been contracted without the necessary license and thus void, 13 or that the accused is merely
forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage, 14 no criminal liability for the crime of
bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapse refers to the elements
required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the
contract of marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal
liability for bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the
elements, either essential or formal, in contracting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity
subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage
but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part
of the offender who has entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the decision of the majority, as expressed in the ponencia of Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago. The majority opinion reverses a well-settled doctrine, established in a long line
of decisions, applying Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The reversal finds no support in
the plain and ordinary meaning of Article 349. The reversal also violates the constitutional
guarantees of the accused and the separation of powers.
The majority opinion makes the following ruling:
We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of
celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines' penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The issue may be stated thus: if the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the
existence of the first marriage, such as psychological incapacity, is there a crime of bigamy?
In the present case, the prosecution filed the information for bigamy against the accused
Veronico Tenebro before the judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage. However,
before his conviction for bigamy by the trial court, another court judicially declared his second
marriage void ab initio because of psychological incapacity.
The majority opinion is premised on two basic assertions. First, the mere act of entering into a
second marriage contract while the first marriage subsists consummates the crime of bigamy,
even if the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the mere existence of the first
marriage. Second, a marriage declared by law void ab initio, and judicially confirmed void from
the beginning, is deemed valid for the purpose of a criminal prosecution for bigamy. I shall
examine the correctness of these assertions.
The majority opinion holds that the validity of the second marriage is immaterial and the mere
act of entering into a second marriage, even if void ab initio on grounds other than the existence
of the first marriage, consummates the crime of bigamy. Thus, the majority opinion states:
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence
of petitioner's valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner's marriage to
Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner's psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
isautomatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate
that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is
no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that
is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage,
and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is
concerned. . . .. (Underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
191

The majority opinion concedes that the second marriage in the present case is void ab initio,
even without, need of judicial declaration. The majority expressly admits that the second
marriage does not legally exist, and thus in legal contemplation never took place at all.
Nevertheless, the majority holds that the second marriage is a marriage that exists in law
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime of bigamy.
The majority opinion holds that a judicial declaration of nullity of Tenebro's second marriage is
immaterial in a prosecution for the crime of bigamy. Such judicial declaration that the second
marriage is void from the beginning is absolutely of no moment.
Prior to appellant Tenebro's conviction by the trial court of the crime of bigamy, his second
marriage was in fact judicially declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Tenebro could count in his favor not only an express provision of law declaring his second
marriage void ab initio, he also had a judicial confirmation of such nullity even prior to his
conviction of bigamy by the trial court. The majority opinion, however, simply brushes aside the
law and the judicial confirmation. The majority opinion holds that the fact that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity, and judicially declared as
void from the very beginning, is immaterial in a bigamy charge.
For more than 75 years now, this Court has consistently ruled that if the second marriage is void
on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of bigamy. The Court
first enunciated this doctrine in the 1935 case of People v. Mora Dumpo, 1 where the Court held:
Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally married according to
the rites and practices of the Mohammedan religion. Without this
marriage being dissolved, it is alleged that Dumpo contracted another
marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which the two lived together as
husband and wife. Dumpo was prosecuted for and convicted of the crime
of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty with a maximum of eight years and one day of
prision mayor and a minimum of two years, four months and twenty-one
days of prision correccional, with costs. From this judgment the accused
interposed an appeal. The records of the case disclose that it has been
established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented any
objection nor evidence to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage
of the accused is null and void according to Mohammedan rites on the
ground that her father had not given his consent thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second
marriage, having all the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for
the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage
alleged to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her
former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, cannot be considered as
such, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged in the
information. (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Mendoza, 2 decided in 1954, the Court acquitted the accused of bigamy on the
ground that the first marriage was void having been contracted during the subsistence of a still
earlier marriage. The Court held:
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and
Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14, 1941, during
the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga
Lema in the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On
August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with
Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to
his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14,
1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent, having been contracted
while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in
effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19,
1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place
after the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues
that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to Olga Lema is
void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous
judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs.
Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with
Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of his first marriage with
Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the
time the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person, with any person other than such first spouse shall be
illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a)The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b)The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted
by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from
its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. There is here
no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
192

contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been
absent for seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so
as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio so ordered.
In People v. Lara, 3 decided in 1955, the Court acquitted the accused of bigamy on the ground
that his second marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. Declared the Court in Lara:
It is not disputed that the [accused] and Anacoreta Dalanida were married
on July 1, 1947 . . .. Neither is it denied that on August 18, 1951, while
the marriage just referred to was subsisting, appellant entered into a
second marriage, this time with Josefa A. Rosales . . ..
In connection with the contract [for the second marriage], undisputed
documentary evidence show that . . . it was only on August 19, 1951, that
the marriage license . . . was issued . . .. AECDHS
We are . . . of the opinion that the evidence in this case virtually beyond
reasonable doubt that the marriage license . . . was issued . . . on the
date appearing thereon . . . namely, August 19, 1951.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 53 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, . . . which "no marriage
shall be solemnized," one of them being a marriage license duly issued at
the time of the celebration of the marriage . . .. Related to this point,
Article 80(3) of the new Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that
the license is the essence of the marriage contract.
Under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code there can be possible
conviction for bigamy without proof that the accused had voluntarily
contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage
with another person. Such was the interpretation given by the Court
in People v. Mora Dumpo that: "It is an essential element of the crime of
bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage."
xxx xxx xxx
As to its validity, the marriage should be examined as of the time it was
entered into. On that precise date all the essential requisites must be
present . . .. In the case before us, the evidence discloses that the
marriage preceded the issuance of the marriage license by one day. The
subsequent issuance of the license cannot in law, to our mind, render
valid what in the eyes of the law itself was void from the beginning . . ..
(Emphasis supplied)
In the 1960 case of Merced v. Diez, 4 the Court held that a prior case for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground of vitiated consent constitutes a prejudicial question warranting
the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy. 5 The Court declared:
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul
the second marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
xxx xxx xxx
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the
second and subsequent marriage must have all the essential elements of
a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. This
was the ruling of this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, . . ..
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent
thereto of the contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given.
Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void.
(Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But
the question of invalidity cannot ordinarily be decided in the criminal
action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of
the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be
determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does
not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is
necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second
marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the
second marriage, which must be determined before hand in the civil
action, before the criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where
the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined or
must first be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for
bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second
marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because determination of
the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and
must precede the criminal action for bigamy. (Emphasis supplied)
In Zapanta v. Montesa, 6 decided in 1962, the Court likewise suspended the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy because of a subsequent civil action filed by the accused to annul his
second marriage on the ground of vitiated consent. The Court ruled:
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in
a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
(People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial
question we further said must be determinative of the case before
the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court
(People vs. Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at
bar. Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that,
193

according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by
means of duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was
involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Thus the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the
second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the
crime of bigamy. On the other hand, there can be no question that the
annulment of petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds
relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said court.
In De la Cruz v. Ejercito, 7 decided in 1975, the Court, speaking through Justice Ramon C.
Aquino, dismissed a bigamy case against the accused in view of a final judgment the accused
obtained annulling her second marriage on the ground of vitiated consent. The Court, ruling that
the annulment of the second marriage rendered the criminal case "moot and untenable,"
explained:
The issue is whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after
the second marriage on which the prosecution for bigamy is based, was
annulled.
The City Fiscal of Angeles City contends that the lower court acted
correctly in denying the motion to dismiss the bigamy charge. He argues
that the decision in the annulment case should be set up as a defense by
Milagros de la Cruz during the trial and that it would not justify the outright
dismissal of the criminal case.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General manifested that the stand of
Milagros de la Cruz should be sustained because one element of bigamy
is that the alleged second marriage, having all the requisites, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage (People vs. Mora
Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246, 248; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta
vs. Montesa, 114 Phil. 1227).
We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage
contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is
determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict
that she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such a
finding would be unwarranted. (Emphasis supplied)
These decisions of the Court declaring there is no crime of bigamy if the second marriage is void
on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage merely apply the clear language and
intent of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This Article provides as follows:
Article 349.Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1.The offender is legally married;
2.The marriage is not legally dissolved;
3.The offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4.The second or subsequent marriage is valid except for the existence of the first marriage.
The first three elements reiterate the language of the law. The last element, the validity of the
second marriage except for the existence of the first marriage, necessarily follows from the
language of the law that the offender contracts a "second or subsequent marriage."
If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage,
then legally there exists no second marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates the
marriages that are "void from the beginning." The succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a
marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated "shall likewise be void." Article 1409 of
the Civil Code declares "inexistent and void from the beginning" contracts "expressly . . .
declared void by law." Thus, a marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the marriage is legally inexistent and void from the beginning. Such void marriage cannot
constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
If the second marriage is void solely because of the existence of the first marriage, the nullity of
the second marriage proceeds from its illegality or bigamous nature. However, if the second
marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, the nullity does not
proceed from its illegality or bigamous nature. The first situation results in the crime of bigamy
while the second does not. This is clear from Article 1411 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 1411.When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or
object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal act, both parties
being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and
both shall be prosecuted. . . .
The rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty; . . . .
Thus, if the second marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, the nullity does
not proceed from an illegal or criminal cause, and no prosecution could ensue. However, if
the second marriage is void solely because of the existence of the first marriage, the nullity
proceeds from an illegal or criminal cause, and thus prosecution should follow.
The plain and ordinary meaning of Article 349 could only be that the second marriage must be
valid were it not for the existence of the first marriage. This has been the consistent
interpretation of the Court for more than seven decades since the enactment of the Revised
Penal Code. Text writers in criminal law have never entertained or advanced any other
interpretation. There is no cogent reason to depart from the well-established jurisprudence on
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, there is doubt on the interpretation of Article 349,
substantive due process of law requires a strict interpretation of Article 349 against the State and
a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused. The majority opinion reverses this principle and
interprets Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code strictly against the accused and liberally in
favor of the State.
194

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code does not state that it is immaterial whether the second
marriage is valid or void ab initio. This Article does not also state that the mere act of celebration
of the second marriage, while the first marriage subsists, constitutes the crime of bigamy. Article
349 speaks of a "second or subsequent marriage" which, as commonly understood and applied
consistently by the Court, means a valid second marriage were it not for the existence of the first
marriage.
To hold that the validity of the second marriage is immaterial, as the majority opinion so holds,
would interpret Article 349 too liberally in favor of the State and too strictly against the accused.
This violates the well-settled principle of statutory construction that the Court declared in People
v. Garcia: 8
Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they
cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or by any
equitable considerations. In other words, the language cannot be
enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into
effect the general purpose for which the statute was enacted. Only those
persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any
reasonable doubt, will be considered within the statute's operation. They
must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute, and
where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the
person accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will
be resolved in favor of those from whom the penalty is sought. (Statutory
Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.)
The principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the
accused and strictly against the State is deeply rooted in the need to protect constitutional
guarantees. 9 This principle serves notice to the public that only those acts clearly and plainly
prohibited in penal laws are subject to criminal sanctions. To expand penal laws beyond their
clear and plain meaning is no longer fair notice to the public. Thus, the principle insures
observance of due process of law. The principle also prevents discriminatory application of penal
laws. State prosecutors have no power to broaden arbitrarily the application of penal laws
beyond the plain and common understanding of the people who are subject to their penalties.
Hence, the principle insures equal protection of the law.

The principle is also rooted in the need to maintain the separation of powers by insuring that the
legislature, and not the judiciary, defines crimes and prescribes their penalties. 10 As aptly
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, in United.
States v. Wiltberger: 11
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much
less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law
for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of
punishment is vested in the legislature, not in the judicial department. It is
the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court has specifically applied the rule on strict interpretation of a criminal statute to the
crime of bigamy. In People v. Aragon, 12 decided in 1957,. the Court ruled:
Appellant in this Court relies on the case, of People vs. Mendoza, (95
Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the majority of this Court
declared:
"The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act
No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by
any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable
marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second
marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief that the
first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to
render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
subsequent court."
We are aware of the very weighty reasons expressed by Justice Alex
Reyes in his dissent in the case above-quoted. But these weighty
reasons notwithstanding, thevery fundamental principle of strict
construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which principle we
may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of
People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment
and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the
contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would
or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by
said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to. (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion interprets Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to mean that a second
marriage, even if void ab initio on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, gives
rise to the crime of bigamy. This dissent interprets Article 349 to mean that for the crime of
bigamy to exist, the second marriage must be a valid marriage except for the existence of the
first marriage. Otherwise, the language of the law would mean nothing when it expressly
declares certain marriages void ab initio or void from the very beginning.
These opposing interpretations of a criminal statute call for the application of another well-
established rule that as between two reasonable interpretations, the more lenient one should be
applied to penal statutes. A leading English decision puts it in this wise:
If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any
particular case, we must adopt that construction. If there are two
reasonable constructions, we must give the more lenient one. That is the
settled rule for construction of penal sections. 13
In summary, the majority opinion reverses the well-settled doctrine that there is no bigamy if the
second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage. The Court has
consistently applied this doctrine in several cases since 1935. The majority opinion reverses this
doctrine by disregarding the plain and ordinary meaning of the clear language of a criminal
statute Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The majority opinion then proceeds to interpret
the criminal statute strictly against the accused and liberally in favor of the State. The majority
opinion makes this new interpretation even as Article 349 has remained unchanged since its
195

enactment into law on 1 January 1932. The majority opinion effectively amends the language of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code in violation of the separation of powers.
A final word. Even before appellant Tenebro's conviction of the crime of bigamy, he had already
secured a judicial declaration of nullity of his second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. This judicial declaration merely confirmed what the law already explicitly provides
that a marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated to marry is void from the very
beginning and thus legally inexistent. Inexplicably, the majority opinion still holds that the second
marriage exists to warrant Tenebro's conviction of the crime of bigamy.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion and vote to grant the petition.
CALLEJO, SR., J., dissenting:
I vote to grant pro hac vice the petition.
The prosecution was burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt the corpus delicti, namely, all
the elements of the crime. 1 In this case, the prosecution adduced evidence that the petitioner
contracted marriage with Hilda and during the subsistence of said marriage, he contracted a
second marriage with the private respondent. However, the petitioner adduced in evidence the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. AU-885 before the court a quo rendered
judgment convicting the petitioner of bigamy declaring null and void ab initio the petitioner's
marriage with the private respondent on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity. Since
the second marriage is null and void ab initio, such marriage in contemplation of criminal law
never existed and for that reason, one of the essential elements of bigamy has disappeared. To
quote Groizard:
. . . El matrimonio entonces, en realidad, no existe, pierde toda fuerza en
virtud del vicio intrinseco que lleva, y, por tanto, uno de los elementos del
delito desaparece y la declaracion de inculpabilidad procede. Esto que es
logico y llano en el terreno de los principios, no puede, sin embargo,
admitirse sin ciertas restricciones en la practica. . . . 2
Whether or not the decision of the RTC declaring the second marriage null and void ab initio, is
erroneous is beside the point. Neither the private respondent nor the State, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, appealed the decision of the court. Entry of judgment was made of record
before the court a quo rendered its decision. Hence, both the State and the private respondent
are bound by said decision.
Footnotes
1.TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 4-11.
2.Record, p. 78.
3.Record, p. 84.
4.TSN, 24 July 1995, pp. 11-12; TSN, 13 September 1995, pp. 6-9.
5.Record, pp. 1-2.
6.Id., p. 66.
7.TSN, 11 December 1996, p. 6.
8.Id., pp. 6-7.
9.Id., pp. 7-8.
10.Penned by Judge Rumoldo F. Fernandez, Rollo, pp. 156-162.
11.Rollo, p. 7.
12.Reyes, L.B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE. Book Two, 14th ed., 1998, p. 907.
13.Rollo, pp. 7-16.
14.Id., pp. 16-18.
15.Record, p. 85.
16.Record, p. 84.
17.Record, p. 148.
18.Record, p. 149.
19.Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992, 205 SCRA 337, 343,
citing People v. Borromeo, 218 Phil. 122, 126.
20.Decision dated November 20, 1995, penned by Judge Epifanio C. Llano of the Regional
Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. AV-885 (Annex "C", Rollo,
p. 43).
21.Record, pp. 16-18.
22.Family Code, Art. 41.
24.Family Code, Art. 3; Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, pp. 119-120, citing
the Family Code, Articles 2 and 3.
25.Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(2)Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
26.Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy:
(1)Between collateral blood relatives; whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
(2)Between step-parents and stepchildren;
196

(5).Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(8)Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9)Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that
other person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
27.Valdez v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996.
VITUG, J.:
1.Article 349, Revised Penal Code.
2.Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033.
3.100 Phil 1033.
4.See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.
5.Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327.
6.143 SCRA 499.
7.145 SCRA 229.
8.I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage even for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can
be said that the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no
such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when either or both parties
have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a "no" marriage situation
or when the prior "marriage" is between persons of the same sex.
9.Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996.
10.Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female;
and

(2)Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a)
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1)Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2)A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3)A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)
11.One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity,
merely renders a marriage voidable, not void.
12.De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs.
Hon. Diez, et al., 109 Phil. 155; Zapanta vs. Hon. Montesa, et al., 114 Phil.
1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246; People vs. Lara, 51 O.G. 4079.
13.People vs. Lara, supra.
14.De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra.; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
1.62 Phil. 246 (1935).
2.95 Phil. 845 (1954).
3.51 O.G. 4079, 14 February 1955.
4.109 Phil. 155 (1960).
5.In the 1954 case of People v. Aragon (94 Phil. 357), the Court refused to consider as a
prejudicial question the action to annul the second marriage because the accused
was the one who employed force and intimidation on the woman in the second
marriage. The Court said that the accused "may not use his own malfeasance to
defeat the action based on his criminal act." The Court also said that if the woman
in the second marriage "were she the one charged with bigamy, [she] could
perhaps raise said force or intimidation as a defense, because she may not be
considered as having freely and voluntarily committed the act if she was forced to
the marriage by intimidation."
6.No. L-14534, 28 February 1962, 4 SCRA 510.
7.No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1.
8.85 Phil. 651 (1950).
9.ESKRIDGE, JR., FRICKLEY AND GARRET, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 362 (2000).
197

10.Ibid., p. 363.
11.18 U.S. 76 (1820).
12.100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
13.Tuck & Sons v. Priester, 19 QBD 629 (1887), cited in Cross on Statutory Construction, p.
172, 3rd Edition (1995).
CALLEJO, SR., J., dissenting:
1.Fuquay v. State of Alabama, 56 American Law Reports, 1264 (1927).
2.Groizard, El Codigo Penal, 5th ed., Vol. 5, p. 599.
||| (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)

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