4841-1639-6060, v.

1
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH
J EFFREY L. SHIELDS (2947) jlshields@cnmlaw.com
MARK L. CALLISTER (6709) mcallister@cnmlaw.com
ZACHARY T. SHIELDS (6031) zachshields@cnmlaw.com
MICHAEL D. STANGER (10406) mdstanger@cnmlaw.com
Zions Bank Building
10 East South Temple, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300; Facsimile: (801) 364-9127

SCALLEY READING BATES HANSEN & RASMUSSEN, P.C.
J ohn Edward Hansen (4590) hansen@scalleyreading.net
David S. Bridge (9077) dbridge@scalleyreading.net
Dustin D. Gibb (13220) dgibb@scalleyreading.net
15 West South Temple, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0429
Telephone: (801) 531-7870; Facsimile: (801) 531-7968

WILLIAM G. WALKER, P.C.
William G. Walker (pro hac vice) wgwpc@aol.com
177 North Church Avenue, Suite 700
Tucson, AZ 85701
Telephone: (520) 622-3300

Attorneys for Defendant United Effort Plan Trust, by and
through Bruce R. Wisan, Court-Appointed Special Fiduciary

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
M. J . aka ELISSA WALL,

Plaintiff,
v.

WARREN J EFFS, THE FUNDAMENTALIST
CHURCH OF J ESUS CHRIST OF LATTER
DAY SAINTS, formerly known in part as The
Work or The Priesthood Work and also known as
the CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF
THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
J ESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS,

UNITED EFFORT PLAN TRUSTS
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO REQUIRE
$15,000,000 BOND




Civil No. 070916524

J udge Keith A. Kelly

4841-1639-6060, v. 1
THE CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDING
BISHOP OF THE FUNDAMENTALIST
CHURCH OF J ESUS CHRIST OF LATTER
DAY SAINTS, THE UNITED EFFORT PLAN
TRUST, and DOES 1 THROUGH 20,

Defendants.

and

ALLEN STEED,

Third Party Defendant.


The United Effort Plan Trust (the Trust) through Bruce R. Wisan, as Court-Appointed
Special Fiduciary, submits the following Memorandum in response to Plaintiffs Petition for
Court to Issue a $15,000,000 Property Bond on UEP Non-Residential, Non-Water Rights,
Property Pending Interlocutory Appeal (the Petition) and the Memorandum filed in support of
the Petition (the Memorandum). The Trust respectfully submits that this Court is without
authority to order the bond requested by Plaintiff.
INTRODUCTION
As was persuasively demonstrated by the discovery responses the Trust provided to
Plaintiff, the Trusts net assets are more than adequate to preserve Plaintiffs ability to recover in
the event she prevails at trial, especially when taking into account the contractual cap she has
placed on her recovery in this case. Rather than focus her Petition on the relevant question of
this Courts authority to order a bond against Trusts assets, Plaintiff has instead collaterally

4841-1639-6060, v. 1
attacked J udge Lindbergs oversight of the Trust,
1
asking this Court to grant relief that J udge
Lindberg has already denied.
2
In doing so, Plaintiff has revealed the hypocrisy of her complaints
that the Trust was attempting to bias the jury pool,
3
contravened this Courts December 3, 2013
Stipulated Protective Order,
4
filled the record with material that would never be admissible at
trial, accused the Trusts counsel of dishonesty,
5
put words in the Fiduciarys mouth he has never

1
It is not this Courts decision whether the Trusts settlement with Willie J essop should
be approved. It is not this Courts place to second guess whether the attorneys fees incurred by
the Trust and approved by J udge Lindberg are appropriate. It is not this Courts place to review
the Fiduciarys decisions to sell or not sell certain Trust properties. It is not this Courts decision
whether or for how long the Fiduciary continues to serve. Despite the clear desire of Plaintiff
that this Court make these decisions, they belong to J udge Lindberg.

2
Despite the fact that Plaintiff has twice asked her to reconsider that decision, J udge
Lindberg has twice approved the Trusts settlement with Willie J essop, including once in a
hearing where counsel for Plaintiff were present. It is unclear why Plaintiff believes this Court
has jurisdiction to second guess that decision or is in a better position than J udge Lindberg with
respect to the merits of that decision.

3
Plaintiffs most recent unauthorized second reply memorandum requesting that J udge
Lindberg not approve the Trusts settlement with Willie J essop attached the entire transcript of
the Fiduciarys J uly 30, 2014 deposition taken by Plaintiffs counsel. Less than two hours after
that pleading was filed with J udge Lindberg, the entire deposition transcript was posted to the
Salt Lake Tribunes website. Are the Tribunes reporters monitoring Trust litigation that closely,
or did Plaintiff leak the deposition to the press?

4
Per Paragraph 1, that Stipulated Protective Order applies to all deposition testimony
taken in this case after November 26, 2013. Paragraph 3 of the Stipulated Protective Order
makes clear that any information provided by the Trust in this case is Confidential. Yet, Plaintiff
attached a copy of the Fiduciarys J uly 30, 2014 deposition transcript to a public pleading filed
with J udge Lindberg and appears to have provided a copy of the same to the Salt Lake Tribune.

5
For example, Plaintiff suggests that Mr. Shields has misled the court by stating that the
Trust would have $10 million of non-residential property at the end of August 2014. See,
Memorandum at 5-6; see also, Memorandum at 14 (discussing the misrepresentations about the
true value of the UEP Trust by Mr. Wisan and his attorneys). The Trust does have $10 million
of non-residential property (particular when taking in to account all real estate in Utah and

4841-1639-6060, v. 1
uttered,
6
and accused J udge Lindberg of allowing the reformed Trust to turn[] into what appears
to be the pre-reformed UEP Trust.
7
This Court should reject Plaintiffs attempts to divert
attention from the simple legal questions now facing this Court: (1) whether this Court has
authority to condition its stay on a bond; and, (2) assuming the Court may condition its stay on a
bond, the appropriate amount of such bond.
ARGUMENT
I. The Court Lacks Authority to Enter the Relief Requested by Plaintiff.
A. Under the Facts of this Case Only an Appellate Court may Order a Bond
Pending Interlocutory Appeal.
Plaintiff cites two rules she contends entitle her to a bond, UTAH R. APP. P. 5 and UTAH
R. APP. P. 8. Neither rule gives this court authority to order a bond in the present context of a
stay pending resolution of an interlocutory appeal which has already been granted by the Utah
Supreme Court.
Rule 5, which governs interlocutory appeals, makes clear that any bond associated with
an interlocutory appeal will be set by the appellate court in the order permitting the appeal: The

Arizona and the Trusts water shares), and the few sales of property that have been approved by
J udge Lindberg will not change that fact.

6
For example, Plaintiff suggests that the Fiduciary has claimed that a religious belief in
underage sexual acts with minors does not constitute pedophilia. Memorandum at 11. Given
the efforts to which J udge Lindberg, the Trust and its counsel have gone to ensure that the
reformed Trust is not used as an instrument for child sexual abuse, this accusation is
disappointing and finds no support in the record.

7
Memorandum at 3.


4841-1639-6060, v. 1
order permitting the appeal may set forth the particular issue or point of law which will be
considered and may be on such terms, including the filing of a bond for costs and damages, as
the appellate court may determine.
8
The Supreme Court did not order a bond when it granted
the Trusts Rule 5 Petition. Quoting this same subpart of Rule 5, the Utah Court of Appeals has
noted We are naturally protective of our prerogative to exercise the discretion granted by rule
5.
9
This Court should not entertain a petition to issue a bond which it has no jurisdiction to
enter.
Rule 8(a) enumerates the situations in which a trial court may entertain a motion for a
stay/bond, none of which are in play here:
A motion for stay of the trial courts judgment pending appeal;
A motion for stay pending disposition of a Rule 5 petition;
A motion for approval of a supersedeas bond; or
A motion for an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction
during the pendency of an appeal.
This Court has not entered a judgment or order that needs to be stayed during the pending appeal,
so there is no need for a supersedeas bond (Plaintiff is not and may never become a judgment
creditor). The Court was never asked to stay this case during the pendency of the Trusts Rule 5

8
UTAH R. APP. P. 5(f)(emphasis added). Through the use of ellipsis, Plaintiff omitted the
critical bolded phrase in her quote of Rule 5 in the Memorandum. See, Memorandum at 2.

9
Gunn Hill Dairy Properties, LLC v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 2012 UT
App 20, 22, 269 P.3d 980, 987.


4841-1639-6060, v. 1
petition (discovery proceeded while the Supreme Court considered that petition). There is no
injunction in place. Thus, none of the circumstances set forth in Rule 8 are in play.
The bond which Plaintiff seeks is clearly governed by Rule 5 and thus committed to the
jurisdiction of only the appellate court. Plaintiffs petition to set a $15,000,000 bond should be
denied on this basis alone.
B. This Court has no Jurisdiction Over Specific Trust Property.
This Court cannot grant Plaintiffs request that any bond or security it orders include only
prime commercial property and not any residential property or water shares.
10
This is because
the Probate Court (J udge Lindberg) which is supervising Trust administration has ordered that
she has exclusive jurisdiction over Trust property pursuant to the doctrines of in custodia legis
and the Barton Doctrine.
11
This very same argument was raised by the Trust in opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment (a motion which Plaintiff lost but is
apparently now trying to revisit),
12
but not expressly adopted by the Court in denying that
motion. The Court must contend with these doctrines before ordering that any specific Trust
property be pledged as security for a stay.

10
Given the value of water in a desert climate it is unclear why Plaintiff believes that the
Trusts water rights are an inappropriate means for providing security.

11
See, e.g., Ruling and Order, dated February 10, 2011 (attached hereto as Exhibit A) at
p. 7 (ruling that the property of the Trust is in custodia legis, i.e. in the custody of the [Probate]
Court.); Transcript of Hearing, dated February 14, 2014, at p. 50 (attached hereto as Exhibit B)
(holding that the Probate Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the property of the Trust.)

12
The Trust adopts and incorporates herein by this reference all related arguments made
in its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment at 16-19.

4841-1639-6060, v. 1
Allowing Plaintiff (a contingent creditor with a disputed and unliquidated claim) to
cherry pick the prime properties of the Trust would clearly interfere with Trust administration in
the very manner the Barton Doctrine and in custodia legis are designed to prevent. Placing any
lien on the Trusts most marketable commercial parcels could jeopardize the Trusts ability to
raise capital to pay its debts and fund ongoing expenses necessary to administer the Trust for the
benefit of thousands of beneficiaries. Granting the Plaintiffs Motion could cripple the Trust. If
such a decision is to be made, it is surely a decision for J udge Lindberg (who is overseeing
administration of the Trust as a whole, and not just one tort case) to make.
Should the Court order a bond in any specific amount, it must allow the Trust to post that
bond in the manner it deems appropriate, whether through purchasing a bond, or pledging water
shares or residential properties as collateral. The Court does not have authority to order the Trust
to pledge its prime commercial property (whether located in Utah or Arizona).
II. The Trusts Property is more than Adequate to Protect Plaintiffs Potential
Recovery.

A. The Trust has Significant Assets and Very Little Debt.

Before this Court orders that any security be posted, it should first address whether
Plaintiff faces the likelihood of losing her remedy without any bond. Faced with this similar
question mere months ago, the Court found to the contrary.
The Fiduciary recently provided discovery responses to Plaintiff demonstrating that the
Trust is currently worth approximately $124,000,000 (less those properties recently sold at
auction where the sales have not yet closed, which may reduce the value of the Trust by less than

4841-1639-6060, v. 1
$2,000,000).
13
The Trust now has very little debt, approximately $2 million in court approved
professional fees.
As a result of a favorable ruling from the Utah Supreme Court on the subdivision of Trust
property in Hildale, Utah, the Trust has begun the process of identifying potential recipients of
deeds to a small number of Hildale homes. However, many beneficiaries have not yet filed a
Petition for Benefits with the Trust seeking the deed to their homes. Beneficiaries in Colorado
City, Arizona who want a deed do not yet have that option because the Trusts real property in
Arizona is not subdivided (and likely will not be without litigation against Colorado City). The
reality is that the Trust is not in a position to transfer the majority of its residential property even
if it wanted to do so.
Any suggestion that all Trust assets could be gone by the time a trial can be held in this
case is simply inaccurate. This Court should deny Plaintiffs Petition in recognition of the
substantial assets of the Trust, which are more than adequate to protect any potential recovery in
the event she succeeds at trial.
B. Plaintiff Previously Contractually Capped her Recovery at $308,375
One of the chief reasons Plaintiffs potential remedy is not at risk is another and separate
secret Agreement that caps her recovery in this case at $308,375.
14
In exchange for certain
payments by Diversity Foundation to Plaintiff and her then-husband, Lamont Barlow, Plaintiff
agreed as follows with respect to this case: From the damages recovered, if any, from the trust,

13
The Trusts discovery responses are attached hereto as Exhibit C.
14
A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit D. Per Paragraph 14, the parties
to the Agreement agreed to keep both the terms and existence of such agreement confidential.


4841-1639-6060, v. 1
Elissa has agreed to receive personal monetary compensation in an amount not more than
$308,375.
15
Plaintiff asks this Court to order a bond almost 50 times her highest possible
recovery! Any bond in this case should be capped at the $308,375, the amount which Plaintiff
capped her own recovery.
CONCLUSION
This Court is without authority to condition an order staying this case on the Trust
providing security. Should the Court conclude to the contrary, the security should be capped at
$308,375, with the Trust retaining the discretion as to how that security is provided.
DATED this 13
th
day of August, 2014.

CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH


/s/ J effrey L. Shields
J effrey L. Shields
Attorneys for Defendant UEP Trust

15
Agreement at 3.

4841-1639-6060, v. 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on this 13
th
day of August, 2014, that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing UNITED EFFORT PLAN TRUSTS MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO REQUIRE $15,000,000 BOND was served via the Courts
Electronic Notification System:



/s/ J effrey L. Shields

484116396060