By 'archeology', Foucault generally refers to a study of the methodological assumptions at least tacit in

the thinking of different cultures and ages. On the surface, it seems reasonable enough to suppose that
people, in each place and period of history will display some particular emphases in their ways of
thought, which can be identified as an epistemological framework, underlying their whole cultural
context. But such patterns are of course only discernible ex-post-facto, they are not predictable.
For a start, Foucault does not clearly distinguish between the epistemological practises common to all
the people of a defined group, and their own theories concerning these practises, and our own estimates
of what these practises and theories might be; there is always a agueness and ambialence in that
issue, which is rhetorically useful !as already indicated".
But, as it turns out, the method he explicitly proposes allows for such lapses. #e is not appealing to
ordinary scientific methods, to common logic, but to the so-called $ritical%&ranscendental method,
which was inaugurated by 'mmanuel (ant !)russia, *+,--*./-". Foucault frankly admits use of this
form of argument, though he also claims to be using it with other contents, other terms. 0ccording to
this method, the 'critical philosopher' can somehow 'transcend' the mind's structural limitations, and
make unassailable 1udgments from aboe, 'as it were'.
#ere, let me say that such argument is an 'imposture' from the point of iew of pure logic. 't is an
attempt to introduce a deus ex machina into epistemological discussions. &he philosopher becomes a
priileged human being, capable in some untold way to become a 'superman', to use a 2iet3schean
phrase dear to Foucault. &his is not logic 4 it is non-logic, een anti-logic. 't has neer been alidated
by the norms of logic, as a form of reasoning.
5ou cannot at once claim that a 6ub1ect is locked into his specificity and finitude, and at the same time
capable of acts of consciousness which rise aboe and oercome these gien limits. &he two theses are
strictly contradictory; there is formally no room for doubts and speculations about a paradoxical
credibility in between them !7aw of the 8xcluded 9iddle". :e do not hae here a dialectic of 'thesis
implies antithesis, therefore the latter is their synthesis', which is the definition of alid 'self-eidence'
arguments in logic. &he proposed argument is in no way proed necessary by dialectic; on the contrary,
dialectic proes it impossible.
'f the 6ub1ect says '' see !from aboe, allegedly" that my consciousness is limited in distortie ways', as
do Foucault and (ant, he is automatically de-legitimi3ing his ery own statement !an assertoric cannot
imply its own negation, nor, een, imply its own negation to be possible". &his means, in formal logic,
that the proposition in ;uestion is false; a conceptual claim which is logically self-incapacitating is
simply incapacitated, it is alethically impossible and not worthy of any further consideration. 5et these
people continue to try to eade this absolute law for the resolution of paradox.
Foucault claims that the (antian 'method' marked a radically new stage in epistemological history. '
agree that arguments of this sort hae since (ant receied considerable 'prestige and importance'; but '
do not agree that they are indubitable, ;uite the contrary, they are entirely spurious. &heir credibility is
due to the paradox which negates them, rather than to the existence of a paradox which posits them;
they are not self-eident, or een possible, they are self-re1ecting, logically impossible.
&his is not a 'radically different' 'configuration of science' as he suggests !nor are the findings and
theories of <icardo, $uier and Bopp, formal examples of such an 'other' science"; it is illogical and it
is therefore not knowledge !=>>". Foucault's alleged transcendence of language, is not a sort of mystical
state of silent meditation on the noumenal, but an alienation from een ordinary reality. )erhaps he is
describing his own peculiar relation to words and things, but it is not a relation ' personally recogni3e
in me, and so it cannot be uniersal.
&his peculiar method is contrasted to the $lassical%6cientific method, which Foucault re1ects as naie,
half-witted and tiny-minded. #e claims the change 'irreersible'; but, ' say, surely, criticism, too, can be
critici3ed, it is not itself alone aboe criticism, the exclusie domain of those who are for it. ' agree,
howeer, that the (antian method was a radical break from the $lassical 4 in my iew, an unfortunate
break. &he 'second degree' of language, the language of science, is simply a clarification of ordinary
language, a selection and re-affirmation of its most intelligent potentials; it is not something essentially
different than ordinary language, and !a-fortiori" nor can the critical method be so construed.
'n any case, it would be untrue, historically, to say, as Foucault does, that either the $lassical method or
the (antian is exclusiely representatie of the episteme of its cultural era. 6urely, that is hyperbole. 's
he referring to uniersity professors, to the scientific community, to intellectuals or to the whole
population, of all ages and intelligence, socio-economic milieu, educational leel, ethnicity? &he
indefinition in the sub1ect of his propositions allows him to turn particular ones into uniersal ones.
But what is clear throughout, is that Foucault does not properly understand the scientific episteme !any
more than (ant did, incidentally". #is knowledge of logic is limited to actual-categorical propositions
and processes, which are used to construct simple classification 'tables' 4 drawings which display the
similarities and differences of things. &his is only one of the tools of scientific logic, and not its whole
method !thinkers may use a techni;ue long before they become aware that they were using it".
Foucault does not know modal logic, conditional logic of arious de re modal bases, causality, or the
inductie and deductie capacities of logical conditioning. $lass-logic clearly brings out the
perpendicularity between the space of ob1ects !subsumed by classes" and that of ideas !classes or
classes of classes". :hen ealuating the content of a thesis, we are duty bound to consider the methods
used in formulating it. #e borrows terms like 'alidation' from logic !which are meaningful to us, only
because of their alue within logic", and reerses their meanings. #e says that certain '@laws of
fluctuation and change@ cannot be fitted oer natural laws', as if formal logic cannot handle transitie
relations.
Our moements of thought always display certain patterns, whether philosophers and historians are yet
aware of them or not; changes in logical science may effect changes in the fre;uency and concentration
of our use of these thought processes, but not inent them 4 their discoery implies that they were
there already, because it is only possible by an act of self-consciousness. Foucault's use of phrases like
'partial totalities' !he means 'contexts thought to be total, then found partial', to be exact" or 'thoughts
that we cannot think' !when he should say 'things we cannot think of' 4 which is less dramatic, but
more accurate", preents him from deeloping a healthy outlook.
Because he lacks this logical training, he imagines that 6cience consists only of simple tables, and he is
always ery surprised to discoer, in history, eents or ideas which do not fit this narrow model. For
this reason, he sees the logic of science as flawed, and tries to find some alternatie 'logic' which will
somehow !he neer asks or says 1ust how" resole the difficulties of epistemology. But it is a red
herring, this $lassical science of his imagination; it is not a correct image of real science, at any point
in time or place.
#is arguments do not therefore concern the human mind as it in fact functions; they are irreleant. #is
so-called 'archeology' is neither omniscient nor infallible. 't is of course conceiable that different
people effectiely, if not self-consciously, use different epistemological frameworks; but ' ery much
doubt that Foucault has correctly identified the uniformities characteristic of the historical cultures
under consideration. #e tries to gie the impression that his historical thinking is noel and profound,
concerning an additional dimension of time; but none of the eidence he adduces for such an in-depth,
into-man line of aseity inductiely implies such a conclusion.
:hile Aescartes was predominantly a rationalist, #ume was more of an empiricist, and other people
were other things. 'n eery period, there is perhaps a bell-shaped cure, with a multitude of tendencies,
though some are more probable for a gien time and place. &here are shifts in emphasis, perhaps some
;uick moements or ;uantum leaps from cure to cure, but there are no 'reolutions' in a strict sense
of profound discontinuities. Foucault keeps insisting on them, but he fails to conince !me, at least".
0 distinction cannot be transformed at will into a radical difference. 7ogic, scientific epistemology,
hae always, since 0ristotle at least, sought for timeless generalities about the human means of
knowledge. 6uch a uniersal science acknowledges freely that different people, at different times in
their lies, as well as in different societies and epochs, may use an arsenal of logical techni;ues which
are incomplete or een fallacious.
&he logical philosopher has two tasksB to obsere the human thought potential and to alidate it. &hat
alid potentials are not in all cases actuali3ed, or that inalid potentials are all too often actuali3ed, in
no way affects the uniersality of the logician's findings, for they exist in a modal framework. 't is
modality which allows the reconciliation between the finitude and specificity of the thinker, and his
ability to formulate apodictic statements which are both empirical and rational.
6ince logic is able to alidate itself ery well, thank you, there is no need for a 'transcendental' non-
logic; the 'criti;ue' is a redundancy, it has no problem to sole !let alone whether it is capable of
offering a credible solution". &he (antian method, and Foucault's applications, are not exempt from the
inductie and deductie conditions set by logic; and it does not matter how we characteri3e the
meaningfulness of words.
't must be admitted, howeer !and this is the faint shining of credibility that the transcendental method
has behind it", that there is in fact a 'moement of thought', which consists in 'going aboe or under' or
'taking a step back or aside' from the situation at hand. 0nd this ability of the 6ub1ect to withdraw from
a context and conceie of a wider context, is of course perfectly possible and legitimate as a logical act.
:hat (ant achieed, is to remind philosophers to take this distance repeatedly, so as to ensure an
oerall consistency at all leels. &he trouble is, (ant wrongly defined the formal aspect of this
moement of thought, as a sort of paradox. 't is this interpretation of the eent by (ant, which is at
issue.
#egel and 9arx were of course among those who adopted this interpretation, misunderstanding the
psychology of synthesis. One of the more interesting statements in Foucault's book !which shows that
good insight can sometimes come out of a bad method, though ' do not agree with it all", is the
following; ' see it as an attempt at poetic description of the consciousness relation between 6ub1ect and
Ob1ect, which is of course so uni;ue as a uniersal that it is undefinableB
't is no longer their identity that beings manifest in representation, but the external relation they
establish with the human being. &he latter, with his own being, with his power to present himself with
representations, arises in a space hollowed out by liing beings, ob1ects of exchange, and words, when,
abandoning representation, which had been their natural site hitherto, they withdraw into the depths of
things and roll up upon themseles in accordance with the laws of life, production and language !=*=".
0t a couple of points, to his credit, Foucault waxes romantic !whether sincerely or as a pose, ' cannot
tell" about the 6ame, thus suggesting that the ultimate goal of this sophistic self-contradiction dialectic
is a Cnity. 0t this point, he returns right back to 2icholas de $usa's more theistic idea of the ultimate
One. 'ndeed, this sort of <eturn, of which Foucault is conscious enough, and which makes him human,
is also found in his theory of philology. 0t first, words were understood as being deeply related to the
uniersals in ob1ects at some leel; then they were conentionali3ed; but at the end, they return to a
richer content and relation.