No.

14A196
3 J i i t b e
upreme (Court of tbe utteb tatc"
Mich l e B. McQuigg, in her official capacity as Prince Wil l iam
County Cl erk of Circuit Court,
zicant,
V.
Timothy B. Bostic, et al .,
espondents
Repl y in Support of Appl ication to
Stay Mandate Pending Appeal
DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND CIRCUIT
JUSTICE FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
David A. Cortman
Byron J. Babione
Counsel of Record
David Austin R. Nimocks
James A. Campbel l
Kenneth J. Connel l y
Kel l ie M. Fiedorek
J. Cal eb Dal ton
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
15100 North 90th Street
Scottsdal e, AZ 85260
(480) 444-0020; (480) 444-0028 (Fax)
bbabione@al l iancedefendingfreedom.org
A ttorneys for Appl ican
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . j i
ARGUMENT
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. There Is a Fai r Prospect That thi s Court Wi ll Reverse the Judgment Below. . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Irreparable Harm Wi ll Result from Denyi ng the Stay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
III. The Balance of the Equi ti es Wei ghs i n Clerk McQui gg's Favor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CONCLUSION
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Barefoot y. Estel l e,
459 U.S. 1169 (1983)
Conkright y.rommert,
556 U.S . 1401 (2009)
.....................................8
.................................4,7
erbertv.Evans
No. 14A65, 2014 WL 35571 12 (U.S. July 18 , 2014).....................................................7
erbert y. Kitchen
134 5. Ct. 8 93 (2014)
.................................................................................................1, 6
Hollingsworth y.
558 U.S. 18 3(2010)
1,4, 5, 7
In re MarriageCases,
18 3 P.3d 38 4 (Cal.
Maryland y. King,
133 5. Ct. 1(2012)
2008
)................................................................................................7
~ ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,4
New V ehicle Bd. of Cal. y. Orrin FoxC ,
434 U.S. 1345 (1977)
.....................................................................................................3

Nken y. Hol der,
556 U.S. 418 (2009)
Pl anned Parenthood of Se. Pa. y. Casey,
510 U.S. 1309 (1994)
.....................................................................................................4
United States y. Windsor,
133 5. Ct. 2675 (2013)
2,3,4
Scuette y.
134 S
BA MN,
Ct. 1623 (2014)
...................................................................................................4
Other Authorities
Eugene Gressman C t al. , Supreme C ourt P rac tic e (9th ed. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
P eter Dujardin, Al l iesDiverge on Whether Supreme C ourt Shoul dDel ay Same-Sex
Marriage Rul ing, Dail yP ress, Aug. 19, 2014, http://www. dail ypress. c om/news/dp-
nws-nn-request-f or-stay-20 1408 18 , 0, 137631 0. story. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
il l
To the Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Ju stic e of the United S tates and
Circ u it Ju stic e for the United S tates Cou rt of Appeals for the Fou rth Circ u it:
Mic h l e B. McQuigg, in he r official capacity as Prince Wil l iam County Cl e rk of
Circuit Court, re spe ctful l y submits this re pl y in support of he r appl ication to stay the
Fourth Circuit's mandate pe nding the final disposition of al l time l y fil e d pe titions for a
writ of ce rtiorari.
ARGUMENT
Re sponde nts agre e that the standard this Court outl ine d in Hol l ingsworth y. Pe rry,
558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (pe r curiam), gove rns he re , se e Bostic Re sponse at 4, and do
not dispute that four Justice s wil l conside r the que stion pre se nte d worthy of this Court's
re vie w. The ir argume nts on the re maining factors are unpe rsuasive .
I. The re Is a Fair Prospe ct That this Court Wil l Re ve rse the Judgme nt Be l ow.
By issuing the stay in He rbe rt y. Kitche n, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014), this Court al re ady
indicate d that the re is 'a fair prospe ct that a majority of the Court wil l vote to re ve rse the
judgme nt be l ow" and uphol d the man-woman marriage l aws e nacte d throughout the
various State s. Se e Hol l ingsworth, 558 U.S. at 190. The l owe r-court de cisions that have
issue d since He rbe rt y. Kitche n, a point e mphasize d by Re sponde nts (se e Bostic
Re sponse at 10-11;Harris Re sponse at 10), do not e l iminate this Court's own prior
asse ssme nt that l itigants de fe nding man-woman marriage l aws have a fair prospe ct of
succe e ding
on appe al .
In arguing that gove rnme nt official s de fe nding man-woman marriage l aws have no
chance of succe ss on appe al , Re sponde nts re l y he avil y on l owe r-court rul ings de cide d
a f t e r Unit e d St a t e s y. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) . Se e Bost ic Re sponse a t 7; Ha r r is
Re sponse a t 2, 9. But Windsor doe s not unde r mine t he St a t e s 'ma n-woma n ma r r ia ge
la ws. Inde e d, Windsor e xpr e ssly conf ine d it s "holding" a nd "opinion" t o t he pe culia r
sit ua t ion whe r e t he f e de r a l gove r nme nt r e f use d t o r e cognize "sa me-se x ma r r ia ge s ma de
la wf ul by t he St a t e." 133 5. Ct. a t 2695-96; se e a lso id. a t 2696 (Robe r t s, C.J., disse nt ing)
("The Cour t doe s not ha ve be f or e it, a nd t he logic of it s opinion doe s not de cide, t he
dist inct que st ion whe t he r t he St a t e s . . . ma y cont inue t o ut ilize t he t r a dit iona l de f init ion
of
ma r r ia ge.") .
The Cour t t he r e e mpha size d t ha t "[t]he St a t e's powe r in de f ining t he ma r it a l
r e la t ion [wa]s of ce nt r a l r e le va nce in t h[a t] ca se," id. a t 2692 (e mpha sis a dde d) , be ca use
t he f e de r a l gove r nme nt unusua lly "de pa r t[e d] f r om [it s] hist or y a nd t r a dit ion of r e lia nce
on st a t e la w t o de f ine ma r r ia ge," id. He r e, in cont r a st, St a t e s t ha t ha ve r e t a ine d t he ma n-
woma n ma r r ia ge de f init ion ha ve not de pa r t e d f r om, but ha ve simply r e a f f ir me d, t he ir
hist or y a nd t r a dit ion on ma r r ia ge. The r e f or e, in t his ca se, t he St a t e's a ut hor it y ove r
ma r r ia ge "come[s] int o pla y on t he ot he r side of t he boa r d," id. a t 2697 (Robe r t s, C.J .,
disse nt ing) , a nd bolst e r s t he const it ut iona lit y of t he cha lle nge d ma r r ia ge la ws
Accor dingly, t he lowe r cour t s t ha t ha ve r e a d Windsor t o conde mn St a t e s 'ma n-woma n
ma r r ia ge la ws ha ve done so in e r r or, a nd t hus t hose de cisions do not unde r cut t he f a ir
pr ospe ct t ha t a ma jor it y of t his Cour t will vot e t o r e ve r se t he judgme nt be low.
Te llingly, e ve n t hough Re gist r a r Ra ine y be lie ve s "t ha t t he Four t h Cir cuit's r uling
wa s cor r e ct," she a dmit s t ha t "suf f icie nt unce r t a int y" sur r ounding t ha t de cision
2
" s a t i s f i j e s] t he ' f a i r pr os pe ct ' s t a nda r d." Ra i ne y Re s pons e a t 2.1 " Tha t t he Cour t vi e ws
t he cont r ove r s i a l que s t i on pos e d he r e a s a n ope n one," Re gi s t r a r Ra i ne y e xpla i ns, i s
" but t r e s s e d by r e a s ona ble i nf e r e nce s dr a wn f r om t he f a ct t ha t t he Cour t ha s t wi ce s t a ye d
lowe r cour t r uli ngs t ha t would ha ve a llowe d s a me-s e x ma r r i a ge s t o pr oce e d i n Ut a h
be f or e t hi s Cour t could ha ve t he f i na l s a y." Id. a t 5. The r e i s t hus a f a i r pr os pe ct t ha t t hi s
Cour t wi ll r e ve r s e t he j udgme nt be low.
II. Ir r e pa r a ble Ha r m Wi ll Re s ult f r om De nyi ng t he St a y.
Re s ponde nt s do not de ny t ha t e nj oi ni ng t he e nf or ce me nt of Vi r gi ni a' s ma n-woma n
ma r r i a ge la ws wi ll i nf li ct " a f or m of i r r e pa r a ble i nj ur y." Ma r yla nd y. Ki ng, 1 33 S. Ct. 1 , 3
(201 2) (Robe r t s, C.J., i n cha mbe r s) (quot i ng Ne w Mot or Ve hi cle Bd.Cal. y. Orrin W
Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)). Standing alone, that
(implicitly conceded) harm satisfies the "irreparable harm" prong of this Court's stay
analysis.
Unable to dispute this irreparable injury, the Bostic and Harris Respondents
mischaracterize the gravity of the harm by reducing it to a prohibition on public officials
"enforc[ing] democratically enacted laws, " Bostic Response at 8, or "seeing the state's
When attempting to justify the Fourth Circuit's decision, Registrar Rainey incorrectly
asserts that this Court in Windsor already rejected "the same justifications offered by
Judge Niemeyer and Clerk McQuigg" in support of Virginia's man-woman marriage
laws. See Rainey Response at 3-4. As Windsor itself recognized, the federal government
has "no authority . . . on the subject of marriage." 133 5. Ct. at 2691 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, when Congress raised various marriage-related interests, those
interests were not legitimate because they fell outside Congress's authority. In contrast,
the States, which have "essential authority to define the marital relation, " id. at 2692,
advance various legitimate and compelling interests through their regulation of man-
woman marriage.
3
law enforced," Harris Response at 13. But t he decision below, by erasing Virginia's
enduring marriage definit ion, would silence t he voice of count less Virginiansincluding
the more than 1.3 million who approved the Commonwealth's marriage definition and
sought to "shap[e] the destiny of their own times" on marriage. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
2692. It would eradicate their "fundamental right" "to speak and debate and learn and
then, as a matter of political will, to act through a lawful electoral process" on this
profoundly important question of public policy. See Schuette y. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623 ,
1637 (2014). This concrete harm to citizens throughout the Commonwealth will
unquestionably occur in the absence of the requested stay.
Because this irreparable injury is irrefutable, the Bostic and Harris Respondents
shift the focus to themselves, claiming that they will experience irreparable harm if the
stay is granted and f they ultimately prevail in this lawsuit. See Bostic Response at 9-10;
Harris Response at 14. Yet the "irreparable harm" analysis considers the "likelihood that
irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay"not the granting of one.
Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 190 (emphasis added);accord King, 133 S. Ct. at 2 (Roberts,
C.J ., in chambers) (quoting Conkright y. Frommert, 556 U.S. 1401, 1402 (2009)
(Ginsburg, J ., in chambers));Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. y. Casey, 510U.S. 1309,
1310 (1994) (Souter, J ., in chambers) ("a likelihood of irreparable injury that, assuming
the correctness of the applicants' position, would result were a stay not issued").
III. The Balance of the Equities Weighs in Clerk McQuigg's Favor.
Because the primary three factors of the stay analysis weigh decidedly in Clerk
McQuigg's favor, her stay application does not present a "close case[]," and the Court
4
need not "balance the eq u i ti es [or] wei gh the relati v e harms to the ap p li cant and to the
res p ondent[s l."See Holli ngs worth, 558 U.S. at 190.
Nev ertheles s, the balance of the eq u i ti es warrants a s tay. Whi le the Bos ti c
Res p ondents argu e that confu s i on and "u ncertai nty" wou ld "fall[]" only "on thos e s ame-
s ex cou p les who choos e to marry before thi s Cou rt has ru led," Bos ti c Res p ons e at 9, the
u ncertai nty wou ld, as Regi s trar Rai ney exp lai ns, affect cou ntles s "thi rd p arti es," s u ch as
"[e]mp loyers and i ns u rers," and gov ernment agenci es and offi ci als, li k e "the Vi rgi ni a
Dep artment of Taxati on," Rai ney Res p ons e at 10- 11. Shou ld thi s Cou rt u p hold the
v ali di ty of man- woman marri age laws, u ndoi ng all that follows as a cons eq u ence of the
Fou rth Ci rcu i t's mandate wou ld, i n the words of Regi s trar Rai ney, "p os e a wrenchi ng and
i ns u rmou ntable tas k." Id. at li.
Unable to di mi ni s h the harm i denti fi ed by Clerk McQu i gg, the Bos ti c Res p ondents
argu e that they wou ld exp eri ence i rrep arable harm i f a s tay i s i s s u ed. See Bos ti c
Res p ons e at 9- 10. Bu t Mr. Bos ti c hi ms elf has p u bli cly s tated that "wai ti ng another s i x
months . . . i s not that bi g of an i s s u e." Rai ney Res p ons e at 9 ( i nternal q u otati on mark s
omi tted) ; s ee als o Peter Du jardi n, A lli es Di v erge on Whether Su p reme Cou rt Shou ld
Delay Same- Sex Marri age Ru li ng, Dai lyPres s, A u g. 19, 2014, http://www.dai lyp res s.
com!news/dp- nws- nn- req u es t- for- s tay- 20 140818,0,137631 0.s tory ( "No matter [whether
the Cou rt grants a s tay], Ti m Bos ti c and Tony London . . . s ay they wi ll wai t u nti l the
Su p reme Cou rt hands down i ts fi nal ru li ng.") . "By contras t," Regi s trar Rai ney affi rms,
decli ni ng to s tay the mandate "wou ld be a v ery 'bi g i s s u e' for the Commonwealth and
thi rd p arti es" throu ghou t Vi rgi ni a. Rai ney Res p ons e at 9.
5
The balance of the harms thus reduces to thi s: the Bosti c and Harri s Respondents
have i denti fi ed potenti al harms (e.g., a delay i n obtai ni ng state recogni ti on of thei r
relati onshi ps) that w i ll result only i f they ulti mately prevai l i n thi s case, w hereas Clerk
McQui gg and Regi strar Rai ney have i denti fi ed certai n harms (e.g., enjoi ni ng a duly
enacted state consti tuti onal provi si on) that w i ll result as soon as the Fourth Ci rcui t i ssues
i ts mandate. That balance ti ps sharply i n favor of stayi ng the Fourth Ci rcui t's mandate.
The Bosti c Respondents argue that balanci ng the eq ui ti es i n thi s case di ffers from
Herbert y. Ki tchen, clai mi ng that "the Commonw ealth has no legi ti mate i nterest i n"
enforci ng i ts law s because the Vi rgi ni a Attorney General here, unli ke the Utah Attorney
General i n Herbert, beli eves that the challenged law s are unconsti tuti onal. See Bosti c
Response at 11. For purposes of thi s stay i nq ui ry, how ever, the proper q uesti on i s
w hether Regi strar Rai ney i ntends to enforce the Commonw ealth's man-w oman marri age
law s pendi ng appeal (not the Attorney General's vi ew s about those law s'
consti tuti onali ty). In that respect, Herbert y. Ki tchen i s i ndi sti ngui shable from thi s case.
Indeed, Regi strar Rai ney, li ke the Utah state offi ci als i n Herbert y. Ki tchen, has made i t
clear that she "w i ll conti nue to enforce [the challenged marri age law s] unti l a defi ni ti ve
judi ci al ruli ng can be obtai ned" from thi s Court. See Rai ney Response to Stay Moti on at
6, Bosti c y. Schaefer, Nos. 14-1167, 14-i 169, 14-1173 (4th Ci r. Aug. 5, 2014). Therefore,
the cases are not di sti ngui shable for purposes of granti ng a stay, and thi s Court should
follow w hat i t di d i n Herbert.
The Harri s Respondents, for thei r part, argue that although confusi on and
uncertai nty occurred i n Utah because the state offi ci als conti nued enforci ng thei r man-
6
woman marriage laws af t er t h is Court st ayed t h e dist ric t c ourt's injunc t ion, "t h ere is [no]
reason t o believe [t h at] would rec ur h ere." Harris Response at 12. On t h e c ont rary, t h ere
is every reason t o t h ink t h at would h appen h ere bec ause, as st at ed above, t h e Virginia
At t orney General h as indic at ed t h at Regist rar Rainey will c ont inue t o enf orc e t h e
c h allenged marriage laws unt il t h is Court f inally resolves t h is c ase.2
Th e Harris Respondent s addit ionally argue t h at t h is Court's st ay orders in Herbert
and Herbert y. Evans
"dist inguish able bec ause
No. 14A65, 2014 WL 3557112 (U.S. July 18, 2014), are
t h ey st ayed dist ric t c ourt judgment s t h at h ad not yet been
reviewed by t h e c ourt of appeals." Harris Response at 11. But t h e same analysis applies
wh et h er t h e applic ant asks t h is Court t o st ay a dist ric t c ourt's order or a c ourt of appeals'
mandat e. Compare Conkrigh t, 556 U.S. at 1402 (Ginsburg, J., in c h ambers) (out lining t h e
st andard f or analyzing an applic at ion f or a st ay of a c ourt of appeals' mandat e), wit h
Hollingswort h, 558 U.S. at 189-90 (out lining t h e same st andard f or analyzing "an
applic at ion f or a st ay of t h e D ist ric t Court's order"). And t h e same reasons wh y t h is
Court h as st ayed a dist ric t-c ourt judgment t h at enjoins a St at e's man-woman marriage
lawse.g., providing for the orderly administration of justice, maintaining the status quo
until the case is finally decided, and avoiding the irreparable harm, confusion, and
2 The Harris Respondents also argue that California's experience with a temporary
redefinition of marriage in 2008 shows that confusion and uncertainty will not result in
Virginia. See Harris Response at 12 n.3 . But those circumstances were very different
from the facts at hand. California issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples pursuant
to a final decision of the California Supreme Court construing state law. See In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). Here, however, absent the requested
stay, public officials in the Commonwealth would issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples pursuant to a district-court decision that is still subject to this Court's review.
7
u n c e r t a i n t y t h a t w i l l l i k e l y r e s u l t fr om pr e ma t u r e l y u pe n di n g t h e s t a t u s qu oequally
compel this Court to stay a court of appeals' mandate affirming such a judgment.
Moreover, this Court granted the stay in Herbert y. Evans even after the Tenth Circuit
had already declared Utah's man-woman marriage laws unconstitutional in Kitchen y
Herbert. Therefore, that stay order, as Registrar Rainey notes, "makes sense only if this
Court is reserving to itself the final decision on whether the Constitution prohibits States
from" defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. Rainey Response at 7.3
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Clerk McQuigg respectfully requests an order staying
the issuance of the Fourth Circuit's mandate.
3 The Court converts stay applications to petitions for a writ of certiorari "only where an
obvious emergency calls for expedition by the Court." Eugene Gressman et al., Supreme
Court Practice 4 18-19 (9th cd. 2007); see, e.g., Nken y. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423 (2009)
(converting stay application to petition for a writ of certiorari where the applicant was to
be deported and where he "asked in the alternative that [the Court] grant certiorari");
Barefoot y. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1169 (1983 ) (converting stay application to petition for a
writ of certiorari where the applicant was to be executed one day later). Should the Court
determine that such an emergency exists here, Clerk McQuigg does not oppose treating
her application as a petition for a writ of certiorari.
8
Dated: August 19, 2014
Respectfully Submitted,
Davi
Counfel of Record
David Austin R. Nimocks
James A. Campbell
Kenneth J. Connelly
Kellie M. Fiedorek
J. Caleb Dalton
ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM
15100 North 90th Street
Scottsdale, AZ 85260
(480)444-0020; (480)444-0028 (Fax)
bbabione@alliancedefendingfreedom.org
Counselr Applicant
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby c ert i f y t ha t on t he 19t h da y of August, 2014, I c a used t he f oregoi ng Reply
i n Support of Appli c a t i on t o St a y Ma nda t e Pendi ng Appea l t o be served on t he f ollowi ng
c ounsel vi a elec t roni c ma i l a nd Fi rst- c la ss Uni t ed St a t es ma i l (post a ge prepa i d) :
Da vi d B. Oa kley
J ef f rey F. Brooke
Poole Ma honey PC
860 Greenbri er Ci rc le, Sui t e 401
Chesa pea ke, VA 23320
doa kley@poolema honey.c om
jbrooke@poolema honey.c om
At t orneys f or Respondent George E. Sc ha ef er, III
St ua rt Ra pha el
Trevor St ephen Cox
Of f i c e of t he At t orney Genera l
900 Ea st Ma i n St reet
Ri c hmond, VA 23219
sra pha el@oa g.st a t e.va.us
t c ox@oa g.st a t e.va.us
At t orneys f or Respondent J a net M. Ra i ney
Theodore B. Olson
Gi bson Dunn & Crut c her LLP
1050 Connec t i c ut Avenue, NW
Wa shi ngt on, DC 20036
t olson@gi bsondunn.c om
Da vi d Bojes
Boi es, Sc hi ller & Flexner LLP
333 Ma i n St reet
Armonk, NY 10504
dboi es@bsf llp.c om
At t orneys f or Respondent s Ti mot hy Bost i c et a l.
10
Paul M. Smith
Jenner & Block LLP
1099 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
psmith@jenner.com
Rebecca K. Glenberg
ACLU of Virginia
701 East Franklin Street, Suite 1412
Richmond, VA 23219
rglenberg@acluva.org
Attorney. for Respondent Harris Class
~~~~~~

11