Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD,
HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for
petitioner.

PARAS, J .:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions.
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in
this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C
of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application
of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with
his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of
pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected
with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in
legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the
law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner,
referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated,
one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava,
(105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure
of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr.
p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of
work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation
to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business
and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects
a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves
appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of
the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the
practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment
in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is
of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment
such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of
the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR
23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show
that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I
am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this
provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be
considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even
chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on
the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever
this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the
Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer
is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in
the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it
is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among
others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission
on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many
ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many
lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986],
p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged
in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers
are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In
most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of
law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice
of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d
623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition
would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once
the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon
role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney
is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of
the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also
know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time
doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in
trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be]
stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided
where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-
giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client
before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer
is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this
work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the
lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.
And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation
work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically,
so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both
by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of
these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those members participating in
various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of
the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating
rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such
improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-
making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed,
the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the
appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory,
operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional
structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment
thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in
terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early
introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with
either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or
management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making
now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar
types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems
would require the services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could
not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the
number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with
the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems
in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws
research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other
capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other
than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually
fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged
by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one
of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working
in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an
area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm
of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce
Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent
lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the
arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law
teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation
Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3)
types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances
which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate
counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles,
with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate
counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning
that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other often with those who are competitors in
other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within
the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has
gained a new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in
the organization and operations of governance through participation
on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived
as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize
for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental
policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New
collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms
of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and
Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial
structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term
and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be
related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as
the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate
lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged.
Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable
users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and
effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in
these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They
differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned
with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights
for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts
are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences
attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay
competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships
needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most
vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships
with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with
public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or
by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate
law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor
to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand
all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if
only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or
makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate
Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have
more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect
of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his
stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work
of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment
bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-
Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as
the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately
the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial
body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system
for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team,
and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies
that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official
involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of
the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of
the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it
lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus,
the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five
(5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan
agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted
and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction
with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction
is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the
contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities
of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the
ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where
they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine
Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p.
265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission,
143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case,
and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has
no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at
bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of
its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that
his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped
notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of
the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would
outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional
areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In
that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks
one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And
even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus
in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the
U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would
be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that
giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan,
C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.











































SECOND DIVISION

ROLLY PENTECOSTES, Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
MARASIGAN, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Kabacan, North Cotabato,
Respondent.

D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J .:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court
VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabacan, North Cotabato, stands administratively charged with grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a
motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was placed under his
care and custody.

The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a
sworn affidavit-complaint[1] filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly
Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was
recovered by members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Mlang,
North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for
carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at Branch 22, RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato.

On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of Mlang,
North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged
receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.

After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of
the motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order[2] of November 15, 2000 for
its release to Pentecostes.

Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the
motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and come back
repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.

In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent
gave the following explanation:

After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the Mlang
chief of police on August 1, 1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a utility
worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he issued an
acknowledgement receipt thereof.

He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to
the Kabacan police station for which he (respondent) prepared a receipt.

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every
time a hearing on the criminal case was conducted. When the court finally
ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes on November 15, 2000,
the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was already cannibalized
and unserviceable.

From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him,
demanding that he be responsible for reconditioning the vehicle. During the
latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he accompanied
Pentecostes to the Kabacan police station only to discover that the
motorcycle was missing.

As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police
chief Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he prepared a letter-complaint
requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for the
conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the letter, however.

He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the
record of the criminal case and the page of the blotter where the turnover was
recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn statements of
Pedroso[4] and SPO4 Alex Ocampo[5] who confirmed the transfer of the
vehicle from his custody to that of the Kabacan chief of police.

Belying respondents averments, Pentecostes, in his Rejoinder,[6]
contended as follows:

The vehicle was in good running condition when it was
delivered to respondent by police operatives[7] of Mlang.
Respondents act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan
was a clear case of hand washing as the records showed that respondent was
responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for this reason that
he (Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan
protesting the loss. Moreover, the police blotter of PNP Kabacan has no
entry or record of the alleged turn over.

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the
case to the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for
investigation, report and recommendation.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his findings and
recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative complaint against
respondent.[9]

In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any
knowledge about the turnover of the motorcycle to the PNP of Kabacan.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found
that the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP of Mlang, North Cotabato to
respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual
physical condition of the motorcycle when it was turned over to the PNP of
Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof of Pentecostes claim that
the vehicle was cannibalized from the time it was under respondents
custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.
In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late
1990s and in the early part of 2000 and the absence of a suitable courthouse
then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made a wise decision in
turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabangs report and recommendation, Pentecostes
filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] in which he assailed the conclusion
that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and was already
cannibalized when it was delivered to the office of the clerk of court from
the Mlang police station.

Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of
the motorcycle to the police station of Kabacan was irrelevant because the
proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who should be held
responsible for its eventual loss.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the
investigating judges recommendation to be sufficiently supported by the
evidence.[11]

The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabangs
recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against respondent,
subject to certain qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the
vehicle upon its delivery to respondent and the latters lack of authority for
the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the
actual condition of the motorcycle at the time it was turned over to
respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during the
investigation supported a finding that the vehicle had missing parts when it
was delivered to respondent.

From the testimony of Pentecostes witness SPO2 Servando
Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle was loaded into a service vehicle
for delivery to respondent. This fact, according to the OCA, could only
mean that the vehicle could not run by itself.

Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that
the evidence sufficiently proved that the vehicle was turned over to the PNP
of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to ask prior
authority from the trial court to transfer its custody. Only when respondent
was having problems with Pentecostes did he bring the matter to the
attention of the executive judge, the OCA added.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be
reminded to secure prior authority from the court before evidence is turned
over to any authorized government office or agency and that he be warned to
be more careful to prevent any similar incident from arising in the future.

The finding of the OCA insofar as respondents lack of
authority to transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on account of which
respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct.

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records,
papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his
charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of
Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:

All exhibits used as evidence
and turned over to the court and before the
case/s involving such evidence shall have been
terminated shall be under the custody and
safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.


Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court,
provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of
property. The clerk shall safely keep all
record, papers, files, exhibits and public
property committed to his charge, including
the library of the court, and the seals and
furniture belonging to his office.


From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of
the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody and
safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination
of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping
elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for
turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was
mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment
receipt evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to the
Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal Case No.
1010,[13] with nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. This
circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping
of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.

With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery
to respondent, the evidence indicates that it was still serviceable when it was
delivered by the Mlang police to respondent and at the time it was turned
over by respondent to the Kabacan police station. The Joint Affidavit[14] of
SPO2 Guadalupe and Police Inspector Romeo Banaybanay categorically
stated that the motorcycle was in good running condition when they
delivered it to respondent. Later during his testimony, Guadalupe narrated
that he was the the driver of the service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was
on board the motorcycle when the vehicle was turned over to respondent on
August 1, 1995.[15]

Even respondents following testimony that:

x x x when x x x [he] received the
motorcycle for safekeeping, he immediately
delivered together with Alex Pedroso [sic]
because it could be noted that respondent
do[es] not know how to drive a motorcycle, I
requested x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me
and deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of
Kabacan[16] (Italics supplied)


suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and
subsequently transferred its custody to the Kabacan police.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential
and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform delicate functions
vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice.[17] Their duties
include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and,
as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property
committed to their charge.

Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court
and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one pretext or
another.[18] They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court or
the efficient administration of justice.[19]

The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in
view of their exalted positions as keepers of public faith.[20] The exacting
standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees are reflective
of the premium placed on the image of the court of justice, and that image is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of court
personnel.[21] It becomes the imperative and sacred duty of everyone
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk,
to maintain the courts good name and standing as true temples of
justice.[22]

By transferring Pentecostes motorcycle without authority,
respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty of keeping it under his
care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the consequences of his act
or omission, which is akin to misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite
rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public
officer.[23] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise,
the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999) classifies
simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension of One
Month and One Day to Six Months. Considering that this is respondents
first offense and no taint of bad faith has been shown by his actuations, a 15-
day suspension without pay is deemed appropriate.


WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo
Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple Misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for
15 days without pay, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.


CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice




























EN BANC


Father RANHILIO C.
AQUINO,
Complainants,

- versus -


Atty. EDWIN PASCUA,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 5095





November 28, 2007

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:


For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3,
1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named
complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty.
Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he
had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of
one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as
Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III,
Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
(2) He also made it appear that
he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of
one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as
Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of
1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26,
1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial
Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200
executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have
notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4,
1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on
December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to
the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was
attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized
documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service
Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the
other above-named complainants. They filed with this Court a Motion to
Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondents Comment. They maintain
that Atty. Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.[1] On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.[2]
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its
Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. For this reason, notaries public must
observe the utmost care to comply with the
formalities and the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties (Realino v.
Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, the
notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person
executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to
each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and
shall also state on the instrument the page or
pages of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter
II of the Revised Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make
the proper entry or entries in his notarial
register touching his notarial acts in the
manner required by law is a ground for
revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article
VI).
In the instant case, there is no
question that the subject documents allegedly
notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in
his notarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the
omission was not intentional but due to
oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case,
Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His
failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a
dereliction of duty on his part as a notary
public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it
was simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial
register shows that the last entry which he
notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document
No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the
two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on
December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213
and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243,
Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are, therefore, correct in
maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-
complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not
only as a Notary Public, but also as a member
of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the
only supporting evidence of the claim of
inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of
his own secretary which is hardly credible
since the latter cannot be considered a
disinterested witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that
the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No.
1213) was submitted only when Domingos
affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in
the administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua
against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This
circumstance lends credence to the submission
of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-
dated another affidavit-complaint making it
appear as notarized on December 10, 1998 and
entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be
sheer coincidence then that both documents are
dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as
1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity
should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust
reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the legal profession (Maligsa
v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to
be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to
subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to
his office, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest.
A member of the Bar may be
disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct
in his professional or private capacity. The
Court has invariably imposed a penalty for
notaries public who were found guilty of
dishonesty or misconduct in the performance
of their duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325
SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended
from his Commission as Notary Public for a
period of one year for notarizing a document
without affiants appearing before him, and for
notarizing the same instrument of which he
was one of the signatories. The Court held
that respondent lawyer failed to exercise due
diligence in upholding his duties as a notary
public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA
248), respondent lawyer who certified under
oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that
some of the vendors were dead was suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that another infraction
would be dealt with more severely. In said
case, the Court did not impose the supreme
penalty of disbarment, it being the
respondents first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272
SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred
from the practice of law, after being found
guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious
document. The Court considered the
seriousness of the offense and his previous
misconduct for which he was suspended for six
months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first
offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months
may be considered enough penalty for him as a
lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a
ground for revocation of notarial commission,
the same should also be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it
is most respectfully recommended that the
notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V.
PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and
that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months.[3]

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to
adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar
Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of
his duties for failing to register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-
complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.[4] The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or
criminal intent.[5]
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct
committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In
Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of
Absolute Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this
Court held that such wrongful act constitutes misconduct and thus imposed
upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months,
this being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v.
Ramos,[7] we revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and
suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating the
Notarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute
Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however, a lesser penalty of
one month suspension from the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian
G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first
offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the
practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground
for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon
him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still
existing, is ordered REVOKED.
SO ORDERED.






Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE
EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint
for Disbarment
1
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's)
then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her
friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann")
Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed
that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read
"I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at
night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did
not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or
she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her
family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the
conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of
furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social
card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down
the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what
you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting
happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true
love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for
the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have
done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you
make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I
laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in
my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS
AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS
I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"
2

Eternally yours, NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly
parked at No. 71-B 11
th
Street, New Manila where, as he was to later
learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January
18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
pregnant.
In his ANSWER,
3
respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU
card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001,
the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion
of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at
Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the
Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the
report is attached as Annex C.
4
(Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous
relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their
respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general
public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.
5
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and
his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate
his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his
membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his
writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her
wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together
again," as now they are.
6
(Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of
the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts
demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep
his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's
relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances
and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally
meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.
x x x x
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere
piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and
Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of
the marriage contract.
7
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted
8
paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution
and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable
social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec.
2).
9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to
uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own
family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with
his wife, and degrades the legal profession.
10
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of
the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the
acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile
special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as
would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.
11
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,
12
alleging that
Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to
the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth
13
bearing
Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her
daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS
14
dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he
denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainant's Reply."
15
Respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant
for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint
for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before
the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's
Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his
testimony on direct examination.
16
Respondent's counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.
17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
18
dated
October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended
19
that respondent be disbarred
for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28,
2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936 Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-
entitled case for lack of merit.
20
(Italics and emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition
21
of complainant before this Court, filed
pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139
22
of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing
the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-
quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment
23
on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him.
24
The contention
fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh.
"C") and the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"),
even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there
are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation
of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to
wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was
low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct
. . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission
that there is indeed a "special" relationship between him and
complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex
"H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the
birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene
supplied the information that respondent was the father of the
child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special
relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene
would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity
of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise
Irene Moje.
25
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an
adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art.
333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing
her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void."
26
(Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted
such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known
only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect
an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.
27
(Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal
knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's
Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent
a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT
MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to
Irene in the certificate
28
with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate
29
shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical
Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit
30
which he identified at the
witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.
31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and
Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant
evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore,
has greater weight than the other
32
which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all
that is required.
33
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because
his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of
the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.
34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral
conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse
under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in
the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has
sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."
35
The
case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair
was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of
this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:
36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had
an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and
which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
x x x x
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law,
sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.
37
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:
38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the
records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors,
i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.
39
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before
admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law
in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The
Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the
wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support."
40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation
41
on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to
Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant
filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts
alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been,
on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the
appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand
as though no appeal has been taken."
42
(Emphasis supplied by
complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently
declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and void.
43
As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
44
In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and
despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for
an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to
be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the
DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant
filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on
September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon
Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish
all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,
and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's
frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje
to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married
to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11
th
Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited.
Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen
there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after
her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest,
to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of
St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the
respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the
girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This
speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of
the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed
illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the
point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any
categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha
Irene Louise Moje.
45
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the
Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have
been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,
46
viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not
a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal case
47
(Italics in the
original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.
Naldoza,
48
held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-
06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for
grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made
part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.



























































































































EN BANC

RODOLFO M. BERNARDO,
C
o
m

- versus -

ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA,
t
.



Adm. Case No. 2984


Promulgated:

August 31, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J .:


Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No.
2984 with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F.
Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the
practice of law for fifteen years.


The antecedent facts that led to Mejias disbarment are as follows.

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained
attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

a) part of the sum of P27,710.00
entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on
property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and

b) part of another sum of P40,000.00
entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses
in connection with the registration of title of
Bernardo to another property in a subdivision known
as Valle Verde V;

2) falsification of certain documents, to
wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated
March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor
by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainants
affidavit dates October 4, 1989);

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982
(Annex O, par. 48, id.); and

c) a deed of assignment purportedly
executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios
Pastor, in Bernardos favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was
without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained
from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and
thereafter, replacing said check with others known also
to be insufficiently funded.[1]


On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc
rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES
the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,
guilty of all the charges against him and
hereby imposes on him the penalty of
DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this
judgment, and effective immediately, Atty.
Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision
be spread in his record in the Bar Confidants
Office, and notice thereof furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as
the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to
inform all the Courts concerned of this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.


On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to
reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En
Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of
Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of
law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.[2]

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests
to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend
on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and
impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with
the applicants reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a
candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will
take into consideration the applicants character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has
elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.[3]

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law
profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejias name was
dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging
for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has
long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he
wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they
have suffered due to his disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication
containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a religious
organization and named it El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of
Heart and Mind.

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has
passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment.
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it
also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years.
While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has
endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a
petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his
lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long
enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its
erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is
a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing
requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.[4]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for
reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby
GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.







Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila


THIRD DIVISION

JESSIE R. DE LEON,
Complainant,

-versus -


ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 8620


Promulgated:

January 12, 2011

D E C I S I O N


BERSAMIN, J .:

This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April
29, 2010, concerns respondent attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification
committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in the civil
action in which De Leon intervened.

Antecedents

On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the
purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two
parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the names of
defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a
public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to
the extent, respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600
square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and the
Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No.
4674MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, in Malabon City.[1]

De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a
voluntary intervenor two years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the
respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case No.
4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and
falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The
respondents sin was allegedly committed by his filing for defendants
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer
to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite
said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.[2]

De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and
falsification as follows:

xxx in causing it (to) appear that
persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu)
have participated in an act or proceeding (the
making and filing of the Answers) when they
did not in fact so participate; in fact, they could
not have so participated because they were
already dead as of that time, which is
punishable under Article 172, in relation to
Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code.

Respondent also committed the
crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by
submitting the said falsified Answers in the
judicial proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN;

Respondent also made a mockery
of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by
representing dead persons therein who, he
falsely made to appear, as contesting the
complaints, counter-suing and cross-suing the
adverse parties.

12. That, as a consequence of the
above criminal acts, complainant respectfully
submits that respondent likewise violated:


(a) His Lawyers Oath:
xxx
(b) The Code of Professional
Responsibility:[3]
xxx

On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to
comment on De Leons administrative complaint.[4]

In due course, or on August 2, 2010,[5] the respondent
rendered the following explanations in his comment, to wit:

1. The persons who had engaged him as
attorney to represent the Lim family in
Civil Case No. 4674MN were William
and Leonardo Lim, the children of
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;

2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries
relevant to the material allegations of
the Governments complaint in Civil
Case No. 4674MN, William Lim, the
representative of the Lim Family,
informed him:

a. That the Lim family had
acquired the properties
from Georgina Flores;

b. That William and
Leonardo Lim were
already actively
managing the family
business, and now co-
owned the properties by
virtue of the deed of
absolute sale their
parents, Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu,
had executed in their
favor; and

c. That because of the
execution of the deed of
absolute sale, William
and Leonardo Lim had
since honestly assumed
that their parents had
already caused the
transfer of the TCTs to
their names.

3. Considering that William and Leonardo
Lim themselves were the ones who had
engaged his services, he (Atty. Castelo)
consequently truthfully stated in the
motion seeking an extension to file
responsive pleading dated February 3,
2006 the fact that it was the family of
the defendants that had engaged him,
and that he had then advised the
children of the defendants to seek the
assistance as well of a licensed geodetic
surveyor and engineer;

4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial
pleadings based on his honest belief
that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were then still living. Had he known
that they were already deceased, he
would have most welcomed the
information and would have moved to
substitute Leonardo and William Lim
as defendants for that reason;

5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to
commit either a falsehood or a
falsification, for he in fact submitted
the death certificates of Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu in order to
apprise the trial court of that fact; and

6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon
City even dismissed the criminal
complaint for falsification brought
against him (Atty. Castelo) through the
resolution dated February 11, 2010.
The same office denied the
complainants motion for
reconsideration on May 17, 2010.

On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a
reply,[6] whereby he asserted that the respondents claim in his comment
that he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because the subject
of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of the answers in
behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already
deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the
justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in
dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his
motion for reconsideration.

The Court usually first refers administrative complaints
against members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate recommendations. For
the present case, however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to the
IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in
Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits.
Ruling

We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any
falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN.
Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint.

I
Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth

All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent,
have sworn to the vows embodied in following Lawyers Oath,[7] viz:

I, ___________________, do
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.


The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers
Oath, providing:[8]

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.

The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as
officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty, integrity,
and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of
the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys are
expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves
exemplars worthy of emulation by others.[9] The least they can do in that
regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or manner of unlawful
conduct (which broadly includes any act or omission contrary to law, but
does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad
enough to include such element).[10]

To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest
value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:[11]

A lawyer must be a disciple of
truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar
that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court and he shall conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to his clients. He
should bear in mind that as an officer of the
court his high vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion. The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. While a lawyer has the solemn
duty to defend his clients rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense
of his clients cause, his conduct must never be
at the expense of truth.


Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only
the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the
immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance of their
obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servants of
the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the statements they make
in behalf of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject
of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor.
Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered
service to their clients causes and in protecting the clients confidences.
With the cloak of privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their
clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or
actions for damages.[12]

Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by
reason of their office and in recognition of the vital role they play in the
administration of justice, attorneys hold the privilege and right to practice
law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals or offices only
during good behavior.[13]

II
Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility


On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu, the persons whom the Government as plaintiff named as defendants in
Civil Case No. 4674MN.[14] He alleged therein that:

2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the
complaint are ADMITTED. Moreover, it is
hereby made known that defendants
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had
already sold the two (2) parcels of land,
together with the building and
improvements thereon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (148805) 139876
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to
Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, of
Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del
Conde, Binondo, Manila. Hence, Leonardo
Lim and William Lim are their successors-
in-interest and are the present lawful
owners thereof.

In order to properly and fully protect
their rights, ownership and interests,
Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall
hereby represent the defendants-spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as
substitute/representative parties in this
action. In this manner, a complete and
expeditious resolution of the issues raised in
this case can be reached without undue
delay. A photo copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property, executed by
herein defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu in favor of said Leonardo C. Lim
and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as
Annex 1 hereof.
xxx
21. There is improper joinder of parties
in the complaint. Consequently, answering
defendants are thus unduly compelled to
litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as
to which they have no knowledge of nor any
involvement or participation in.

22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of
estoppel in bringing this suit, as it was the one
who, by its governmental authority, issued the
titles to the subject property.

This action is barred by the
principles of prescription and laches for
plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining this
suit, particularly against defendant Flores,
from whom herein answering defendants
acquired the subject property in good faith and
for value. If truly plaintiff has a clear and
valid cause of action on the subject property, it
should not have waited thirty (30) years to
bring suit.


Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his
complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN.[15] He expressly
named therein as defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but also their sons
Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William Lim, married to Sally
Lee, the same persons whom the respondent had already alleged in the
answer, supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the parcels of
land.[16]

The following portions of De Leons complaint in
intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN are relevant, viz:



2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu, are Filipino citizens with addresses at
504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and at 46 C.
Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City,
where they may be served with summons
and other court processes;

3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and
Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William
Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age and
with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores
Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila,
alleged purchasers of the property in
question from defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu;

4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon
City holds office in Malabon City, where he
may be served with summons and other court
processes. He is charged with the duty, among
others, of registering decrees of Land
Registration in Malabon City under the Land
Registration Act;
xxx
7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner
of a parcel of land located in Malabon City
described in TCT no. M-15183 of the Register
of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which
is attached to this Complaint as Annex G,
and copy of the location plan of the
aforementioned property is attached to this
complaint as Annex H and is made an
integral part hereof;

8. That there are now more or less at least 40
squatters on intervenors property, most of
them employees of defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lee who had
gained access to intervenors property and built
their houses without benefit of any building
permits from the government who had made
their access to intervenors property thru a two
panel metal gate more or less 10 meters wide
and with an armed guard by the gate and with
permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu and/or and defendant
spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee
illegally entered intervenors property thru a
wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall now
separating intervenors property from the
former esquinita which is now part of
defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chus
and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally
Khoos and defendant spouses William Lim
and Sally Lees property and this illegally
allowed his employees as well as their relatives
and friends thereof to illegally enter
intervenors property through the ladders
defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
installed in their wall and also allowed said
employees and relatives as well as friends to
build houses and shacks without the benefit of
any building permit as well as permit to
occupy said illegal buildings;

9. That the enlargement of the properties of
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had resulted
in the closure of street lot no. 3 as described in
TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu having titled the street lot no. 3
and placed a wall at its opening on C. Arellano
street, thus closing any exit or egress or
entrance to intervenors property as could be
seen from Annex H hereof and thus
preventing intervenor from entering into his
property resulted in preventing intervenor from
fully enjoying all the beneficial benefits from
his property;


10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu and later on defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally
Lee are the only people who could give
permission to allow third parties to enter
intervenors property and their control
over intervenors property is enforced
through his armed guard thus exercising
illegal beneficial rights over intervenors
property at intervenors loss and expense,
thus depriving intervenor of legitimate
income from rents as well as legitimate
access to intervenors property and the
worst is preventing the Filipino people from
enjoying the Malabon Navotas River
and enjoying the right of access to the
natural fruits and products of the Malabon
Navotas River and instead it is defendant
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and
defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally
Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim
and Sally Lee using the public property
exclusively to enrich their pockets;
xxx
13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu and defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally
Lee were confederating, working and
helping one another in their actions to
inhibit intervenor Jessie de Leon to gain
access and beneficial benefit from his
property;

On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the
defendants named in De Leons complaint in intervention, responded in an
answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-
claim,[17] stating that spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu xxx are now both
deceased, to wit:

xxx
2. The allegations in paragraphs 2
and 3 of the Complaint are ADMITTED, with
the qualification that defendants-spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William
Lim and Sally Lee Lim are the registered
and lawful owners of the subject property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
M-35929, issued by the Register of Deeds for
Malabon City, having long ago acquired the
same from the defendants-spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu, who are now both
deceased. Copy of the TCT No. M-35929 is
attached hereto as Annexes 1 and 1-
A. The same title has already been previously
submitted to this Honorable Court on
December 13, 2006.
xxx

The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-
called clarification and submission,[18] in which he again adverted to the
deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:

1. On March 19, 2009, herein
movants-defendants Lim filed before this
Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint of the
plaintiff Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the DENR;

2. The Motion for Substitution is
grounded on the fact that the two (2) parcels
of land, with the improvements thereon,
which are the subject matter of the instant
case, had long been sold and transferred by
the principal defendants-spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-
intervention defendants Leonardo C. Lim
and William C. Lim, by way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, a copy of which is attached to
said Motion as Annex 1 thereof.

3. Quite plainly, the original
principal defendants Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject
property, have totally lost any title, claim or
legal interest on the property. It is on this
factual ground that this Motion for
Substitution is based and certainly not on
the wrong position of Intervenor de Leon
that the same is based on the death of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu.

4. Under the foregoing
circumstances and facts, the demise of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no
longer has any significant relevance to the
instant Motion. To, however, show the fact
of their death, photo copy of their respective
death certificates are attached hereto as
Annexes 1 and 2 hereof.

5. The Motion for substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint dated
March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is
the clear, legal and imperative need to now
substitute herein movants-defendants Lim for
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in the
said principal complaint.

6. Simply put, movants-defendants
Lim have become the indispensable defendants
in the principal complaint of plaintiff DENR,
being now the registered and lawful owners of
the subject property and the real parties-in-
interest in this case. Without them, no final
determination can be had in the Principal
complaint.

7. Significantly, the property of
intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the subject
of his complaint-in-intervention, is identically,
if not similarly, situated as that of herein
movants-defendants Lim, and likewise, may as
well be a proper subject of the Principal
Complaint of plaintiff DENR.

8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself,
concedes the fact that herein movants-
defendants Lim should be substituted as
defendants in the principal complaint as
contained in their Manifestation dated June 3,
2009, which has been filed in this case.

WHEREFORE, herein movants-
defendants Lim most respectfully submit their
Motion for substitution of Defendants in the
Principal Complaint and pray that the same be
granted.
xxx

Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in
the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants?

A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the
contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in
intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the
clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu were already deceased.

Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the
respondents pleadings might have created any impression that the Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still cannot hold the
respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent
was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed
the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such,
his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him
as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected
properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the
action, and that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed
to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the
pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim
knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living.
His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of
all the other persons interested in the litigation. He also had an actual
awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, supra,
bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim,
and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the
respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to
any other party.

III
Good faith must always motivate any complaint
against a Member of the Bar


According to Justice Cardozo,[19] xxx the fair fame of a
lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of
ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth,
and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.

A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The
Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from
mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly,
by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer;
and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation
of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and
harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.

The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake
of harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his
clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an
imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the pending action, or to
accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation
apparent from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint
sooner than later.


WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or
suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.


































































































Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila


THIRD DIVISION

JESSIE R. DE LEON,
Complainant,

-versus -

ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 8620


Promulgated:

January 12, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N


BERSAMIN, J .:

This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April
29, 2010, concerns respondent attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification
committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in the civil
action in which De Leon intervened.

Antecedents

On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the
purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two
parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the names of
defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a
public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to
the extent, respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600
square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and the
Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No.
4674MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, in Malabon City.[1]

De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a
voluntary intervenor two years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the
respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case No.
4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and
falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The
respondents sin was allegedly committed by his filing for defendants
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer
to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite
said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.[2]

De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and
falsification as follows:

xxx in causing it (to) appear that
persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu)
have participated in an act or proceeding (the
making and filing of the Answers) when they
did not in fact so participate; in fact, they could
not have so participated because they were
already dead as of that time, which is
punishable under Article 172, in relation to
Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code.

Respondent also committed the
crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by
submitting the said falsified Answers in the
judicial proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN;

Respondent also made a mockery
of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by
representing dead persons therein who, he
falsely made to appear, as contesting the
complaints, counter-suing and cross-suing the
adverse parties.

12. That, as a consequence of the
above criminal acts, complainant respectfully
submits that respondent likewise violated:


(a) His Lawyers Oath:
xxx
(b) The Code of Professional
Responsibility:[3]
xxx

On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to
comment on De Leons administrative complaint.[4]

In due course, or on August 2, 2010,[5] the respondent
rendered the following explanations in his comment, to wit:

1. The persons who had engaged him as
attorney to represent the Lim family in
Civil Case No. 4674MN were William
and Leonardo Lim, the children of
Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu;

2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries
relevant to the material allegations of
the Governments complaint in Civil
Case No. 4674MN, William Lim, the
representative of the Lim Family,
informed him:

a. That the Lim family had
acquired the properties
from Georgina Flores;

b. That William and
Leonardo Lim were
already actively
managing the family
business, and now co-
owned the properties by
virtue of the deed of
absolute sale their
parents, Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu,
had executed in their
favor; and

c. That because of the
execution of the deed of
absolute sale, William
and Leonardo Lim had
since honestly assumed
that their parents had
already caused the
transfer of the TCTs to
their names.

3. Considering that William and Leonardo
Lim themselves were the ones who had
engaged his services, he (Atty. Castelo)
consequently truthfully stated in the
motion seeking an extension to file
responsive pleading dated February 3,
2006 the fact that it was the family of
the defendants that had engaged him,
and that he had then advised the
children of the defendants to seek the
assistance as well of a licensed geodetic
surveyor and engineer;

4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial
pleadings based on his honest belief
that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
were then still living. Had he known
that they were already deceased, he
would have most welcomed the
information and would have moved to
substitute Leonardo and William Lim
as defendants for that reason;

5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to
commit either a falsehood or a
falsification, for he in fact submitted
the death certificates of Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu in order to
apprise the trial court of that fact; and

6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon
City even dismissed the criminal
complaint for falsification brought
against him (Atty. Castelo) through the
resolution dated February 11, 2010.
The same office denied the
complainants motion for
reconsideration on May 17, 2010.

On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a
reply,[6] whereby he asserted that the respondents claim in his comment
that he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because the subject
of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of the answers in
behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already
deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the
justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in
dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his
motion for reconsideration.

The Court usually first refers administrative complaints
against members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate recommendations. For
the present case, however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to the
IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in
Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits.
Ruling

We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any
falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN.
Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint.

I
Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth

All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent,
have sworn to the vows embodied in following Lawyers Oath,[7] viz:

I, ___________________, do
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid
nor consent to the same. I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.


The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers
Oath, providing:[8]

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.

The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as
officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty, integrity,
and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of
the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys are
expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves
exemplars worthy of emulation by others.[9] The least they can do in that
regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or manner of unlawful
conduct (which broadly includes any act or omission contrary to law, but
does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad
enough to include such element).[10]

To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest
value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:[11]

A lawyer must be a disciple of
truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar
that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court and he shall conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to his clients. He
should bear in mind that as an officer of the
court his high vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case
and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusion. The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only complete
honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. While a lawyer has the solemn
duty to defend his clients rights and is
expected to display the utmost zeal in defense
of his clients cause, his conduct must never be
at the expense of truth.


Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only
the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the
immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance of their
obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servants of
the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the statements they make
in behalf of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject
of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor.
Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered
service to their clients causes and in protecting the clients confidences.
With the cloak of privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their
clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial
proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or
actions for damages.[12]

Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by
reason of their office and in recognition of the vital role they play in the
administration of justice, attorneys hold the privilege and right to practice
law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals or offices only
during good behavior.[13]

II
Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility


On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with
counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu, the persons whom the Government as plaintiff named as defendants in
Civil Case No. 4674MN.[14] He alleged therein that:

2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the
complaint are ADMITTED. Moreover, it is
hereby made known that defendants
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had
already sold the two (2) parcels of land,
together with the building and
improvements thereon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (148805) 139876
issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to
Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, of
Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del
Conde, Binondo, Manila. Hence, Leonardo
Lim and William Lim are their successors-
in-interest and are the present lawful
owners thereof.

In order to properly and fully protect
their rights, ownership and interests,
Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall
hereby represent the defendants-spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as
substitute/representative parties in this
action. In this manner, a complete and
expeditious resolution of the issues raised in
this case can be reached without undue
delay. A photo copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property, executed by
herein defendants-spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu in favor of said Leonardo C. Lim
and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as
Annex 1 hereof.
xxx
21. There is improper joinder of parties
in the complaint. Consequently, answering
defendants are thus unduly compelled to
litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as
to which they have no knowledge of nor any
involvement or participation in.

22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of
estoppel in bringing this suit, as it was the one
who, by its governmental authority, issued the
titles to the subject property.

This action is barred by the
principles of prescription and laches for
plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining this
suit, particularly against defendant Flores,
from whom herein answering defendants
acquired the subject property in good faith and
for value. If truly plaintiff has a clear and
valid cause of action on the subject property, it
should not have waited thirty (30) years to
bring suit.


Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his
complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN.[15] He expressly
named therein as defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but also their sons
Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William Lim, married to Sally
Lee, the same persons whom the respondent had already alleged in the
answer, supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the parcels of
land.[16]

The following portions of De Leons complaint in
intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN are relevant, viz:



2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu, are Filipino citizens with addresses at
504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and at 46 C.
Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City,
where they may be served with summons
and other court processes;

3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and
Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William
Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age and
with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores
Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila,
alleged purchasers of the property in
question from defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu;

4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon
City holds office in Malabon City, where he
may be served with summons and other court
processes. He is charged with the duty, among
others, of registering decrees of Land
Registration in Malabon City under the Land
Registration Act;
xxx
7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner
of a parcel of land located in Malabon City
described in TCT no. M-15183 of the Register
of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which
is attached to this Complaint as Annex G,
and copy of the location plan of the
aforementioned property is attached to this
complaint as Annex H and is made an
integral part hereof;

8. That there are now more or less at least 40
squatters on intervenors property, most of
them employees of defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant
spouses William Lim and Sally Lee who had
gained access to intervenors property and built
their houses without benefit of any building
permits from the government who had made
their access to intervenors property thru a two
panel metal gate more or less 10 meters wide
and with an armed guard by the gate and with
permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu and/or and defendant
spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee
illegally entered intervenors property thru a
wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall now
separating intervenors property from the
former esquinita which is now part of
defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chus
and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally
Khoos and defendant spouses William Lim
and Sally Lees property and this illegally
allowed his employees as well as their relatives
and friends thereof to illegally enter
intervenors property through the ladders
defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu
installed in their wall and also allowed said
employees and relatives as well as friends to
build houses and shacks without the benefit of
any building permit as well as permit to
occupy said illegal buildings;

9. That the enlargement of the properties of
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had resulted
in the closure of street lot no. 3 as described in
TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu having titled the street lot no. 3
and placed a wall at its opening on C. Arellano
street, thus closing any exit or egress or
entrance to intervenors property as could be
seen from Annex H hereof and thus
preventing intervenor from entering into his
property resulted in preventing intervenor from
fully enjoying all the beneficial benefits from
his property;


10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu and later on defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally
Lee are the only people who could give
permission to allow third parties to enter
intervenors property and their control
over intervenors property is enforced
through his armed guard thus exercising
illegal beneficial rights over intervenors
property at intervenors loss and expense,
thus depriving intervenor of legitimate
income from rents as well as legitimate
access to intervenors property and the
worst is preventing the Filipino people from
enjoying the Malabon Navotas River
and enjoying the right of access to the
natural fruits and products of the Malabon
Navotas River and instead it is defendant
spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and
defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally
Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim
and Sally Lee using the public property
exclusively to enrich their pockets;
xxx
13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu and defendant spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and
defendant spouses William Lim and Sally
Lee were confederating, working and
helping one another in their actions to
inhibit intervenor Jessie de Leon to gain
access and beneficial benefit from his
property;

On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the
defendants named in De Leons complaint in intervention, responded in an
answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-
claim,[17] stating that spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu xxx are now both
deceased, to wit:

xxx
2. The allegations in paragraphs 2
and 3 of the Complaint are ADMITTED, with
the qualification that defendants-spouses
Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William
Lim and Sally Lee Lim are the registered
and lawful owners of the subject property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
M-35929, issued by the Register of Deeds for
Malabon City, having long ago acquired the
same from the defendants-spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu, who are now both
deceased. Copy of the TCT No. M-35929 is
attached hereto as Annexes 1 and 1-
A. The same title has already been previously
submitted to this Honorable Court on
December 13, 2006.
xxx

The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-
called clarification and submission,[18] in which he again adverted to the
deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:

1. On March 19, 2009, herein
movants-defendants Lim filed before this
Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint of the
plaintiff Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the DENR;

2. The Motion for Substitution is
grounded on the fact that the two (2) parcels
of land, with the improvements thereon,
which are the subject matter of the instant
case, had long been sold and transferred by
the principal defendants-spouses Lim Hio
and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-
intervention defendants Leonardo C. Lim
and William C. Lim, by way of a Deed of
Absolute Sale, a copy of which is attached to
said Motion as Annex 1 thereof.

3. Quite plainly, the original
principal defendants Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject
property, have totally lost any title, claim or
legal interest on the property. It is on this
factual ground that this Motion for
Substitution is based and certainly not on
the wrong position of Intervenor de Leon
that the same is based on the death of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu.

4. Under the foregoing
circumstances and facts, the demise of
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no
longer has any significant relevance to the
instant Motion. To, however, show the fact
of their death, photo copy of their respective
death certificates are attached hereto as
Annexes 1 and 2 hereof.

5. The Motion for substitution of
Defendants in the Principal Complaint dated
March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is
the clear, legal and imperative need to now
substitute herein movants-defendants Lim for
defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in the
said principal complaint.

6. Simply put, movants-defendants
Lim have become the indispensable defendants
in the principal complaint of plaintiff DENR,
being now the registered and lawful owners of
the subject property and the real parties-in-
interest in this case. Without them, no final
determination can be had in the Principal
complaint.

7. Significantly, the property of
intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the subject
of his complaint-in-intervention, is identically,
if not similarly, situated as that of herein
movants-defendants Lim, and likewise, may as
well be a proper subject of the Principal
Complaint of plaintiff DENR.

8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself,
concedes the fact that herein movants-
defendants Lim should be substituted as
defendants in the principal complaint as
contained in their Manifestation dated June 3,
2009, which has been filed in this case.

WHEREFORE, herein movants-
defendants Lim most respectfully submit their
Motion for substitution of Defendants in the
Principal Complaint and pray that the same be
granted.
xxx

Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in
the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants?

A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not
misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the
contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in
intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the
clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores
Chu were already deceased.

Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the
respondents pleadings might have created any impression that the Spouses
Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still cannot hold the
respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent
was acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed
the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such,
his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him
as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim
Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected
properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the
action, and that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed
to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and
Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the
pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim
knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living.
His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of
all the other persons interested in the litigation. He also had an actual
awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, supra,
bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim,
and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the
respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to
any other party.

III
Good faith must always motivate any complaint
against a Member of the Bar


According to Justice Cardozo,[19] xxx the fair fame of a
lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of
ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth,
and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored.

A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The
Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from
mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly,
by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer;
and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation
of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and
harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.

The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake
of harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his
clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an
imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the pending action, or to
accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation
apparent from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint
sooner than later.


WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or
suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.




































































































Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M.
MACABATA, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Before Us is a complaint
1
for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula
against respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter
with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia
Advincula] seek the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata],
regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As
promised, he sent Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy
attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas
Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint
against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle
their accounts as demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent
complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car,
respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and
embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met
respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to
finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the
meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every
time they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why
she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours
ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe
St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost
restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face
and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast.
Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting
his criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of
the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent
informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer
and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The
communications transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and
read as follows:
Sent by complainant
At 5:33:46 pm
- forget the case. I decided to refer it with other lawyer
replied by respondent
at 6:16:11 pm
- "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
(Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant
at 6:17:59 pm
- I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage of the situation.
Follow-up message
Sent by complainant
At 6:29:30 pm
- wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you dont have relationship with her.
Replied by respondent
At 6:32:43 pm
- "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the situation, 2 put it rightly it s an expression of
feeling. S sri" (Im very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situation, to put it rightly it is an
expression of feeling)
Follow up message
by respondent
at 6:42:25 pm
- Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can show u my sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do
it again. Will you still see me so I can show you my sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another
message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I dont know wat 2 do
s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know what
to do so you may forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another
message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. Im
really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry.
Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of
admission of guilt.
2

In his answer,
3
respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal
services to the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10
February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters
relative to the case which complainant was intending to file against
the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of
money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car
where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the former
offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and
Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a
busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible
to commit the acts imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a
criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against
respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in
Quezon City; 2) the legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula
Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana because
the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived
pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was
living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never
bothered to discuss respondents fees and it was respondent who
always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B.
Funa submitted his Report and Recommendation,
4
recommending the
imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent
for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20
March 2006, approving and adopting, with modification, the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of
Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer
when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.
5

The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent
committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute serious
moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal
with respondents actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the
standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be.
This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public
faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and,
hence, must handle their personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
x x x x
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of
good moral character is a continuing condition to preserve their
membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of
good moral character is a requisite condition for remaining in the
practice of law.
6
In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,
7
we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good
moral character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a
privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not
only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of
its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to
withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
no less than the highest degree of morality.
8
We explained in
Barrientos v. Daarol
9
that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only
upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in
order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor.
10

In Bar Matter No. 1154,
11
good moral character was defined as what a
person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has
four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients;
and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
12

In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the
lips.
In his Answer,
13
respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you
goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left
hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently
on the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
x x x x
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left
cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her
right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There
was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed.
No breast holding was done. Everything happened very
spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual
harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building,
Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled
the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say,
somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was
then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car
somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning and I was there
about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said she
opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that
we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought
her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there,
we discussed about her case, we ordered food and then a little while I
told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes
so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing
matters about her case, so I said its about 9:00 or beyond that
time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I
stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she
followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told
me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping
me for the last meetings that we had and that was at the corner of
Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her
can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it
and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted her
face towards me and when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her
on the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, thats
it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
x x x x
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an
appointment. So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where
to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she
went down , before she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered
her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and
then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then
kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x x.
14
(Emphases
supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not
be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
15

In Zaguirre v. Castillo,
16
we reiterated the definition of immoral
conduct, as such conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as
to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members
of the community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant
disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral, but grossly
immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of
grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,
17
a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law,
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,
18
a lawyer was disbarred after complainant
proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,
19
respondents act of engaging in illicit
relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his
marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct
warranting the imposition of appropriate sanctions. Complainants
testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,
20
it was ruled that it was highly immoral of
respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of
his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking
complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where
he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flank
in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,
21
respondent lawyer was disbarred when
he abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent
woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor"
so he could contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,
22
respondent entered into multiple
marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There,
we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines
the institutions of marriage and family, institutions that this society
looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values
essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for
the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such, "there can be no
other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,
23
respondent contracted marriage with another
married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married
for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral
conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the
fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting respondents
disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,
24
respondent married complainant while his
first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We
held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the
good moral character required by the Rules of Court, respondent was
disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,
25
respondent lured an innocent woman into a
simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that
respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity
which, at all times, is expected of members of the bar. He is,
therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes
conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption,
indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or
shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of
respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude
toward good order and public welfare.
26

Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-
beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and
camaraderie,
27
forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of
respondent, though, in turning the head of complainant towards him
and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if
considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly
immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took
advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have
sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof
rests on the complainant, and she must establish the case against the
respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,
28
disclosing a
case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of
its disciplinary power.
29
Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he
who denies, must prove."
30
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of
proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit
probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum
negantis probation nulla sit.
31
In the case at bar, complainant
miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A
mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation
is not synonymous with guilt.
32

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on
the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. We come to this
conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her
annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular
phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to
complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of
text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there
were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue
is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had
malicious designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a
private place or a more remote place where he could freely
accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are
not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or
suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed
against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of
a number of factors.
33
When deciding upon the appropriate sanction,
the Court must consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public confidence in
the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other
lawyers from similar misconduct.
34
Disciplinary proceedings are
means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those
who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
35

While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction
that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be
arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to
scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to
exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to
his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and
only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those
acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral
character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless
they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the
lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious
character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced
the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before
suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should
also be considered.
36

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of
misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor
infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client.
37
In the Matter
of Darell Adams,
38
a lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a
female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which constituted
illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely
reflected on his fitness to practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and
considering that this is respondents first offense, reprimand would
suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly
believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and
agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer
of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the
incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be
corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent
and cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING
that a more severe sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.





































































































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

REBECCA B. ARNOBIT, A.C. No. 1481
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. PONCIANO P.
ARNOBIT Respondent.

Promulgated:

October 17, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PER CURI AM:


Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint[1] dated May 11, 1975,
prays that the Court exercise its disciplinary power over her husband,
respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the grounds of Immorality and
Abandonment.

In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were
married on August 20, 1942. Twelve children were born out of this
union. Rebecca further alleged seeing respondent through law school,
continuously supporting him until he passed the bar examinations and
became a member of the Philippine bar. Several years after, however, or in
1968, respondent left the conjugal home and started cohabiting with one
Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children.
Respondents infidelity, according to Rebecca, impelled her to file a
complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case for adultery
against Benita and respondent later followed.

In his Answer[2] dated July 31, 1975, respondent admitted that
Rebecca is his wedded wife and the mother of their 12 children. He denied,
however, having cohabited with Benita. And he pointed to his complaining
wife as the cause of their separation, stating the observation that she was
always traveling all over the country, ostensibly for business purposes,
without his knowledge and consent, x x x thereby neglecting her obligations
toward her family.[3]

Issues having been joined, hearings were conducted before the Office
of the Solicitor General and, subsequently, before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission). At the
hearings, Rebecca presented both oral and documentary evidence to support
her allegations of abandonment and immorality.

Aside from her testimony, Rebecca presented two other witnesses, viz:
Venancia M. Barrientos, her sister, who identified a letter dated August 28,
1970 written by respondent to her, addressing her as Vending (Exhibit B-
1), therein asking for forgiveness for the unhappiness he caused his family;
and Melecio Navarro, husband of Benita, who testified about how
respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress, knowing fully well of their
lawful marriage.


Rebecca also presented the affidavits of National Bureau of
Investigation agents Eladio C. Velasco and Jose C. Vicente (Exhibits H-1
and H-2) to show the existence of a prima facie case for adultery. The
pictures and baptismal and birth certificates of Mary Ann, Ma. Luisa,
Caridad, and Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, were submitted to prove the
fact that respondent sired four illegitimate children out of his illicit
cohabitation with Benita.[4]

According to the investigating commissioner, respondent, despite due
notice, repeatedly absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence,
adding that scheduled hearings had to be postponed just to afford respondent
ample opportunity to present his side of the controversy. The investigating
commissioner also stated that, in most cases, respondent would seek
postponement, pleading illness, on the very date of the hearing. And
according to the Commission, its several directives for respondent to send by
mail his affidavits and documentary exhibits in lieu of personal appearance
so that the commission could finish with the investigation proved futile.

In its Report dated June 21, 1995, the Commission found
respondent liable for abandonment and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) months. The recommendation portion of the
report reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended to the Board of Governors that
the respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three (3) months as a
lesson for him to change his ways. An
indefinite suspension is not recommended
because it has been gathered from complainant
herself that respondent supports himself
through the practice of law which would be
cruel for us to curtail at this time when he is
already advanced in age the penalty of three
(3) months suspension and recording of such
penalty in his record being sufficient to berate
him as to his lack of responsibility as
evidenced by his abandonment of the children.
[Report and Recommendation rendered by
Commissioner Vicente Q. Roxas]

On January 27, 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XII-96-43 adopting and approving the Commission report
aforementioned.

While the Court concurs with the inculpatory findings of the IBP on
the charge of abandonment, it cannot bring itself to agree that respondent is
liable only for that offense. As it were, the charge for gross immoral conduct
has sufficiently been proven. Following established jurisprudence,
respondent deserves to be disbarred.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct:

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.


As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of
good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public
is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is
not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it
is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his
clients property, reputation, his life, his all.[5]

Immoral conduct has been described as that conduct which is so
willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good
and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary
action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is,
it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.[6]

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.[7] A member of the bar and an officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the impression that he is flouting those moral standards.

A review of the records readily reveals that despite the protracted
delay in the hearings mainly caused by respondents failure to appear,
complainant relentlessly pursued this administrative case against her
husband. She was, to be sure, able to establish by clear, convincing, and
preponderant evidence his commission of marital infidelity and abandonment
of his family.

Although respondent in his answer denied abandoning complainant
and their children and offered an explanation as to the cause of his and his
wifes separation, he opted not to take the witness stand and be cross-
examined on his sworn answer. Neither did he bother to call and present his
alleged paramour, Benita, who could have had disproved an existing
adulterous relationship between them, or, at least, confirm his protestation
about the paternity of her four children. Significantly, Benitas husband, no
less, risked personal ridicule by testifying on the illicit liaison between his
wife and respondent.

The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the
exercise of his profession would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may
be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest
him.[8] To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza, [t]he grounds expressed in Section
27, Rule 138,[9] of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad
enough to cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity.[10] To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar.

While the onus rests on the complainant proffering the charges to
prove the same, respondent owes himself and the Court the duty to show that
he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial of wrongdoing
would not suffice in the face of clear evidence demonstrating unfitness.

When ones moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue
practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves the individual
concerned to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to
keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys.[11] Respondent has not discharged
the burden in this regard. Although duly notified, he never attended the
hearings to rebut the serious charges brought against him, irresistibly
suggesting that the charges are true.


Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to
cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral
conduct. And to add insult to injury, there seems to be little attempt on the
part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman.

As we have already ruled, disbarment is warranted against a lawyer
who abandons his lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another
woman who had borne him a child.[12] In the instant case, respondents
grossly immoral conduct compels the Court to wield its power to disbar. The
penalty is most appropriate under the premises.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit is hereby DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished the IBP and
circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.



















































































SECOND DIVISION


HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES A.C. No. 6270
LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA,
Complainants, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.


ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 22, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


CARPIO, J .:

The Case

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent),
filed by the heirs of the late spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva
(spouses Villanueva), namely: Ardenio M. Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier,
Alano M. Fonacier, Eusebio M. Fonacier, Jr., Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro
V. Nazarro, Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado, and Herminigildo Ylhi
(complainants).




The Facts

During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels
of land in Pangasinan, one of which was covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in 1974. Their five
children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia, survived
them.

On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication[1]
(affidavit of adjudication) stating that as the only surviving son and sole
heirs (sic) of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the
parcel of land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale[2] (deed of sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to
Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary public on both the
affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale.

Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was
still alive at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of
sale, as were descendants of the other children of the spouses Villanueva.
Complainants claimed that respondent was aware of this fact, as respondent
had been their neighbor in Balungao, Pangasinan, from the time of their
birth, and respondent constantly mingled with their family. Complainants
accused respondent of knowing the true facts and surrounding
circumstances regarding the properties of the spouses Villanueva, yet
conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of their rightful shares in the
property.


In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent
to comment on the complaint.

In her Comment,[3] respondent admitted that she notarized the
affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984.
However, respondent denied that she conspired with Alfonso to dispose of
fraudulently the property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed the two
documents under the following circumstances:

That the properties of the late spouses
[Villanueva] have been divided equally among
their compulsory heirs, but said old couple left
for themselves one titled lot, the subject now
of the complaint x x x That said titled property
was the only property left by the old couple, to
answer for their needs while they are still alive
until their deaths x x x. Alfonso [and his wife]
were tasked to take care of the old couple, as
they were the ones living in the same
compound with their late parents. This fact
was and is known by the other compulsory
heirs, and they never questioned the said act
of their parents, as they already had their
own share on the estate of the late [spouses
Villanueva]. This fact was also known to me
because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across
the street from our house and I was
requested to the house of the old man when
he gave said title to [Alfonso and Tomasa,
his wife]. The other compulsory heirs who
were still alive at the time just made visits to
their parents and never stayed in their old
house to help in the care of their parents. Even
[when] the parents died, it was [Alfonso and
his wife] who took charge of the funeral and
all other acts relative thereto.

x x x x

That said title remain[ed] in the custody
of [Alfonso] and after the death of the old man,
when the spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa]
needed money to finance the schooling of their
children, it was then that they thought of
disposing the land x x x and said land was
sold by them to one Adriano Villanueva of
which in both documents, I notarized the
same (sic).

x x x x




I can say with all clean and good
intentions, that if ever I notarized said
documents, it was done in good faith, to do my
job as expected of me, to help, assist and to
guide people who come to me for legal
assistance, as contained in my oath as a lawyer
when I passed the bar. x x x[4] (Emphasis
supplied)


According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonsos co-heirs filed
their objections at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication proved
that most of the properties of the spouses Villanueva had earlier been
distributed to the other heirs. It also proved that the heirs had agreed to abide
by the intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the property to Alfonso.
Respondent asserted that the personal appearances and acknowledgment by
the party to the document are the core of the ritual that effectively convert a
private document into a public document x x x.

On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which designated Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. (IBP Commissioner Villadolid) to investigate, and submit his
report and recommendation on, the complaint.

The IBPs Findings

In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid
found that respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the spirit and intent of the notarial law when she notarized
the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory heir of the
spouses Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of fraudulent intent on
respondents part, IBP Commissioner Villadolid held that respondent
engaged in conduct that lessened confidence in the legal system. Thus, he
recommended suspension of respondents notarial commission for one year.
He further recommended that respondent be reprimanded or suspended from
the practice of law for up to six months.

The Courts Ruling

We sustain partly the IBPs findings and recommendations.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial
acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of a
document or instrument. In the performance of such notarial acts, the notary
public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a
document. The notarial seal converts the document from private to public,
after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its
genuineness and due execution.[5] Thus, notarization should not be treated
as an empty, meaningless, or routinary act.[6] As early as Panganiban v.
Borromeo,[7] we held that notaries public must inform themselves of the
facts to which they intend to certify and to take no part in illegal transactions.
They must guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements.[8]

On its face, Alfonsos affidavit does not appear to contain any illegal
or immoral declaration. However, respondent herself admitted that she
knew of the falsity of Alfonsos statement that he was the sole heir of the
spouses Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a document while fully
aware that it contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonsos assertion of
status as sole heir. The affidavit of adjudication is premised on this very
assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his parents estate
all to himself, to the exclusion of his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent
notarized the deed of sale, knowing that the deed took basis from the
unlawful affidavit of adjudication.

Respondent never disputed complainants allegation of her close
relationship with the Villanueva family spanning several decades.
Respondent even underscored this closeness by claiming that Lucas himself
requested her to come to his house the day Lucas handed to Alfonso a copy
of OCT No. 2522, allegedly so she could hear the conversation between
them.

Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the
time Alfonso executed the affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their
respective shares from the estate of the spouses Villanueva. However, we are
not concerned here with the proper distribution of the spouses Villanuevas
estates. Rather, respondents liability springs from her failure to discharge
properly her duties as a notary public and as a member of the bar.

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet
proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may
be undermined and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. In
this case, respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent
also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.



We also view with disfavor respondents lack of candor before the IBP
proceedings. The transcript of hearings shows that respondent denied
preparing or notarizing the deed of sale,[9] when she already admitted
having done so in her Comment.

WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, we REVOKE the commission of respondent
Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY
her from being commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We further
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
upon finality of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as
attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

















































Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION


ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,


- versus -


ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 7241
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]

Present:

Promulgated:

October 17, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J .:

The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6,
2005 filed by Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary
action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public, which resulted in
the violation of their rights over their property.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco
(Atty. Linco), the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements,
consisting of 126 square meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B,
C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary
public for Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly
executed by her husband in favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The
notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P.
Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before
respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainants husband
died on July 29, 2003.3

Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of
Deeds of Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 20054 and
issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.

Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that
respondent's reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only
violative of her and her children's rights but also in violation of the law.
Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar.

In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a
deed of donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son,
Alexander David T. Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.
Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco,
through an emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see
him at his residence located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street,
Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was sick
and wanted to discuss something with him.

Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and
sickly, but was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco
showed him a deed of donation and the TCT of the property subject of the
donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a favor of
notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses.

However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be
notarizing a document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him.
Thus, he instead told Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed
deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that he could formally
notarize and acknowledge the same.

On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his
law office and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29,
2003. Respondent was then asked to notarize the deed of donation.
Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his commitment
to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which
was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.

During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was
established that indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on
July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, likewise, admitted that while he was not the one
who prepared the deed of donation, he, however, performed the notarization
of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died.8

On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of
violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the
donor appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003,
it was just ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on
July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that
respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed of donation on
July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet a
public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only
on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement portion
of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty.
Linco personally came and appeared before me is false. This act of
respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath to obey the laws and
do no falsehood.

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission
be revoked and he be disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a
period of two (2) years.

On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of
the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11

On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19,
2009 of IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated December 11, 2008, denying
complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed
resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment.12

In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated
anything new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the
reversal of the recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent
violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being commissioned as
notary public; thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions.

On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's
motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court,
recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for judicial adjudication.

RULING

The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently
established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the
deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he
knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation.
We take note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more
than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the
deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty.
Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with
the notarization of the deed of donation.

However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in
order to accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that
respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify his act
of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the
very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the
deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and
appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not
have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July
29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14
Respondent should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.15

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the
importance attached to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document;
thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be
able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.16

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.17 Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein.
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A
graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to
obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is
mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties, being
dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's
failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging
complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held
liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties
as a notary public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and
suspension from the practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it
proper to impose the same penalty.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional
Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D.
LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this
Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of the
respondent.

SO ORDERED.


































































































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila


SECOND DIVISION


SPS. AMADOR and ROSITA A.C. No. 7434
TEJADA,
Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA,
Respondent. August 23, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J .:

Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint
Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to initiate
disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa for his
continued refusal to settle his long overdue loan obligation to the
complainants, in violation of his sworn duty as a lawyer to do justice to
every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

More specifically, the complaint alleges that:

3. Sometime on January, 2001,
respondent lawyer Antoniutti K. Palana taking
advantage of his special knowledge as a lawyer
represented to the petitioners that he has an
alleged parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (73196) 16789 and that
he needs an amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00) so that he could
reconstitute the torrens title on the same;

4. Respondent then induced by sweet
promises and assurances petitioners spouses to
finance such undertaking with a solemn
commitment on his part that after he has
already reconstituted such torrens title, he will
deliver the same to the petitioners spouses as
security for the amount they had financed;

Thereafter, petitioner spouses shall earn
an amount of P70,000.00 from the
P100,000.00 they had financed or all and [sic]
all, respondent lawyer shall pay petitioner
spouses a total amount of P170,000.00;

5. The agreement between the
petitioner spouses and respondent lawyer,
Antoniutti K. Palana in this regard is being
partly evidenced by their written agreement
thereon dated January 12, 2001, a xerox copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex A.
Likewise, the receipt by the respondent of the
P100,000.00 is being evidenced in the bottom
part of page 1 of the agreement;

6. Under the clear terms of their
agreement, respondent lawyer Antoniutti K.
Palana solemnly assured petitioner spouses
that he will reconstitute, deliver the
reconstituted title and give the P170,000.00 to
the petitioners spouses all within a period of
three months reckoned from their execution of
their written agreement dated January 12,
2001;

7. However, after respondent lawyer,
Antoniutti K. Palana had gotten the
P100,000.00 amount from the petitioner
spouses, respondent from that time on up to the
present had intentionally evaded the
performance of his due, just, legal and
demandable obligations to petitioner spouses.

It turned out that all his assurances that
he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute the
same and deliver an amount of P170,000.00 to
petitioner spouses were all fraudulent
representations on his part or else were only
fictitious in character to defraud petitioner
spouses of their hard owned monies;

x x x x

9. Legal demands had already been
made to respondent lawyer to fulfill all his
moral and legal responsibilities to petitioner
spouses but all of said demands simply went
unheeded. A xerox copy of the two legal
demand letters to respondent lawyer in this
regard is hereto attached as Annex B and
C.[1]


Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the
complaint as required by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
Respondent likewise failed to appear on the scheduled date of the mandatory
conference despite due notice.

Thus, on March 10, 2005, the IBP declared respondent to have waived
his right to submit evidence and to participate further in the proceedings of
the case.

After a careful consideration of the pleadings and evidence submitted
by the complainants ex parte, Investigating Commissioner Elpidio G.
Soriano III submitted his February 1, 2006 Report to the IBP Board of
Governors, recommending respondent's suspension from the practice of law
for three (3) months.

Based on said Report, petitioners were able to satisfactorily prove the
following: that Rosita Tejada and respondent and his companion executed a
written agreement (Annex A); that respondent received the amount of one
hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000) from Rosita Tejada pursuant to said
agreement; and that petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent (Annex
C), but, until now, respondent has failed to settle his
obligation. Petitioners, however, failed to present evidence to show that
respondent fraudulently represented himself to be the owner of the aforesaid
lot. Noting respondents indifference to the proceedings of the case, the
Investigating Commissioner cited Ngayan v. Tugade,[2] where the Supreme
Court considered respondents failure to answer the complaint and his failure
to appear in four hearings below as evidence of his flouting resistance to a
lawful order of the court, and illustrate his despiciency to his oath of office in
violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, for respondents misconduct, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended respondents suspension for a period of three (3) months,
guided by Supreme Court rulings in analogous cases, viz: Sanchez v.
Somoso,[3] where the lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for having
issued personal checks from a closed bank account and subsequently refused
to pay for his medical expenses despite demand after the checks were
dishonored; Constantino v. Saludares,[4] where the lawyer was suspended
for three (3) months for his unwarranted refusal to pay a personal loan
despite demand; and Lizaso v. Amante,[5] where the lawyer was suspended
indefinitely for his failure to return and account for the money delivered to
him for investment purposes.[6]

In its November 18, 2006 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved said report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, considering Respondent's continued refusal to settle his
obligation to the complainants and for his failure to participate in the
proceedings before the Commission of Bar Discipline.[7]

After a review of the records and especially sans the submittal of any
response or evidence from respondent, we find no reason to disturb the
findings of Commissioner Soriano.

Respondent, like all other members of the bar, is expected to always
live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly the following Canons, viz:

CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal
processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high
sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires that s/he
shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the profession.[8]

Indeed, the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and
integrity of its members. As previously explained in Sipin-Nabor v.
Baterina:


A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession. The trust
and confidence necessarily reposed by clients
requires in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar
must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do
honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. To this end,
members of the legal fraternity can do nothing
that might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the profession.[9]

In the instant case, respondents unjustified withholding of petitioners
money years after it became due and demandable demonstrates his lack of
integrity and fairness, and this is further highlighted by his lack of regard for
the charges brought against him. Instead of meeting the charges head on,
respondent did not bother to file an answer nor did he participate in the
proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.
The Court has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member
of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that s/he denies the charges against
him; s/he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him/her.
S/he must show proof that s/he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him/her.[10]

Finally, respondents acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath to delay
no man for money or malice as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against him.

With respect to the recommendation to suspend respondent Palaa for
three (3) months, we find that the sanction is not commensurate to the breach
committed and disrespect to the Court exhibited by the erring member of the
bar. We increase the suspension to six (6) months in view of our ruling in
Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro.[11]

We find that the complainants could not have been defrauded without
the representations of respondent that he can easily have the torrens title of
his lot reconstituted with his special knowledge as a legal practitioner as long
as he is provided PhP 100,000 to finance the reconstitution. Respondent
knew that his representations were false since the filing fee for a petition for
reconstitution in 2001 was only PhP 3,145, and other expenses including the
publication of the filing of the petition could not have cost more than PhP
20,000. It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to
part with their hard earned money and the latter could not have been easily
swayed to lend the money were it not for his misrepresentations and failed
promises as a member of the bar. Moreover, when he failed to pay his just
and legal obligation, he disobeyed the provisions of the Civil Code which is
one of the substantive laws he vowed to uphold when he took his oath as a
lawyer. Lastly, to aggravate his misconduct, he totally ignored the directives
of the IBP to answer the complaint when he fully knew as a lawyer that the
compulsory bar organization was merely deputized by this Court to
undertake the investigation of complaints against lawyers, among which is
the instant complaint. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a
gross and blatant disrespect to the Court. Lawyers fully know, as respondent
is aware or at least is assumed to know, that lawyers like him cannot disobey
the orders and resolutions of the Court. Failing in this duty as a member of
the bar which is being supervised by the Court under the Constitution, we
find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and is
ordered to settle his loan obligation to petitioners-spouses Amador and
Rosita Tejada within two (2) months from the date of this Decisions
promulgation.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.






























Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7747 July 14, 2008
CATHERINE & HENRY YU, Complainants, vs. ATTY.
ANTONIUTTI K. PALAA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
On November 16, 2006, complainants Henry and Catherine Yu filed a
complaint
1
for disbarment against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K.
Palaa for alleged acts of defraudation, before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
2

Complainants attached therewith their Consolidated Complaint-
Affidavit
3
which they earlier filed before the City Prosecutors Office of
Makati, charging the respondent and his co-accused (in the criminal
case), with syndicated estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (BP 22).
The facts, as found by the CBD, are as follows:
Sometime in 2004, complainants met a certain Mr. Mark Anthony U.
Uy (Mr. Uy) who introduced himself as the Division Manager of
Wealth Marketing and General Services Corporation (Wealth
Marketing), a corporation engaged in spot currency trading.
4
Mr. Uy
persuaded the complainants, together with other investors, to invest a
minimum amount of P100,000.00 or its dollar equivalent with said
company. They were made to believe that the said company had the
so-called "stop-loss mechanism" that enabled it to stop trading once
the maximum allowable loss fixed at 3%-9% of the total contributions,
would be reached. If, on the other hand, the company would suffer
loss, Wealth Marketing would return to the investors the principal
amount including the monthly guaranteed interests. Further, Wealth
Marketing promised to issue, as it had in fact issued, postdated
checks covering the principal investments.
5

It turned out, however, that Wealth Marketings promises were false
and fraudulent, and that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for
the reason "account closed." The investors, including the
complainants, thus went to Wealth Marketings office. There, they
discovered that Wealth Marketing had already ceased its operation
and a new corporation was formed named Ur-Link Corporation (Ur-
Link) which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the
former. Complainants proceeded to Ur-Link office where they met the
respondent. As Wealth Marketings Chairman of the Board of
Directors, respondent assured the complainants that Ur-Link would
assume the obligations of the former company.
6
To put a semblance
of validity to such representation, respondent signed an Agreement
7

to that effect which, again, turned out to be another ploy to further
deceive the investors.
8
This prompted the complainants to send
demand letters to Wealth Marketings officers and directors which
remained unheeded. They likewise lodged a criminal complaint for
syndicated estafa against the respondent and his co-accused.
9

Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into
hiding and has been successful in defying the law, to this date.
In an Order
10
dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline
Rogelio B. Vinluan required respondent to submit his Answer to the
complaint but the latter failed to comply. Hence, the motion to declare
him in default filed by the complainants.
11
The case was thereafter
referred to Commissioner Jose I. De la Rama, Jr. (the Commissioner)
for investigation. In his continued defiance of the lawful orders of the
Commission, respondent failed to attend the mandatory conference
and to file his position paper. Respondent was thereafter declared in
default and the case was heard ex parte.
In his report,
12
the Commissioner concluded that Wealth Marketings
executives (which included respondent herein) conspired with one
another in defrauding the complainants by engaging in an unlawful
network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign currency
trading business where, in fact, no such business existed, as Wealth
Marketing was not duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to engage in such undertaking. This was
bolstered by the fact that Wealth Marketings financial status could not
support the investors demands involving millions of pesos. It also
appears, said the Commissioner, that Ur-Link was created only to
perpetuate fraud and to avoid obligations. The Commissioner likewise
found that respondent had been previously suspended by this Court
for committing similar acts of defraudation.
13
Considering the gravity
of the acts committed, as well as his previous administrative case and
defiance of lawful orders, the Commissioner recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, after a careful evaluation of
the documents presented, including the jurisprudence laid down by
the complainants involving the same respondent, and said decision of
the Supreme Court forms part of the law of the land, the undersigned
commissioner is recommending that respondent Atty. Antoniutti K.
Palaa be disbarred and his name be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys upon the approval of the Board of Governors and the
Honorable Supreme Court.
14

In its Resolution dated August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Commissioners report and
recommendation.
15

This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors.
Lawyers are instruments in the administration of justice. As
vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Lawyers may be
disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity
for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good
demeanor.
16

In the present case, two corporations were created where the
respondent played a vital role, being Wealth Marketings Chairman of
the Board and Ur-Links representative. We quote with approval the
Commissioners findings, thus:
As correctly pointed out by the City Prosecutors Office of Makati, it
appears that the executive officers of Wealth Marketing Corporation
conspired with each (sic) other to defraud the investors by engaging
in unlawful network of recruiting innocent investors to invest in foreign
currency trading business. The truth of the matter is that there was no
actual foreign currency trading since said corporation is not duly
licensed or authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission
to perform such task.
In the General Information Sheet (Annex "I") of Wealth Marketing and
General Services Corporation, the authorized capital stock is only
P9,680,000.00 and the paid up capital, at the time of [in]corporation is
(sic) only P605,000.00. Said corporation, as the records will show,
has been dealing with investors with millions of pesos on hand, with
the hope that their money would earn interests as promised.
However, their company resources and financial status will show that
they are not in the position to meet these demands if a situation such
as this would arise.
x x x x
Furthermore, in order to evade the investors who were then asking for
the return of their investments, said respondent even formed and
made him part of a new company, Ur-Link Corporation, which
according to the complainants, when they met the respondent, would
assume the obligations of the defunct Wealth Marketing Corporation.
It is also evident that respondent is frolicking with the Securities and
Exchange Commission for the purpose of employing fraud.
17

To be sure, respondents conduct falls short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
The fact that the criminal case against the respondent involving the
same set of facts is still pending in court is of no moment.
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that
administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
criminal cases. A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in
the administrative proceedings.
18
Besides, it is not sound judicial
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court
will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on admission to, and
continuing membership in, the legal profession during the whole
period that the criminal case is pending final disposition, when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.
19
Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare and for preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law.
20
The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
21

As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, we find the same to
be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
Time and again, we have stated that disbarment is the most severe
form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar.
22

The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing
an administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from
the practice of law in Samala v. Palaa
23
and Sps. Amador and Rosita
Tejada v. Palaa.
24
In Samala, respondent also played an important
role in a corporation known as First Imperial Resources Incorporated
(FIRI), being its legal officer. As in this case, respondent committed
the same offense by making himself part of the money trading
business when, in fact, said business was not among the purposes
for which FIRI was created. Respondent was thus meted the penalty
of suspension for three (3) years with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
25

Likewise, in Tejada, he was suspended for six (6) months for his
continued refusal to settle his loan obligations.
26
1avvphi1
The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service
upon him of the warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his
criminal case is pending) exacerbates his offense.
27

Finally, we note that respondents case is further highlighted by his
lack of regard for the charges brought against him. As in Tejada,
instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to
file an answer and verified position paper, nor did he participate in the
proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his conduct.
28
The Court
has emphatically stated that when the integrity of a member of the bar
is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He
must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him.
29
Verily, respondents
failure to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason
manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.
30
As a lawyer, he ought
to know that the compulsory bar organization was merely deputized
by this Court to undertake the investigation of complaints against
lawyers. In short, his disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross and
blatant disrespect of the Court.
31
By his repeated cavalier conduct, the
respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the
authority of the Court.
32

Considering the serious nature of the instant offense and in light of his
prior misconduct herein-before mentioned for which he was penalized
with a three-year suspension with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely; and another
six-month suspension thereafter, the contumacious behavior of
respondent in the instant case which grossly degrades the legal
profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver penalty --
- disbarment.
33
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bonds of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office, and sets a pernicious
example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.
34

WHEREFORE, respondent Antoniutti K. Palaa is hereby
DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a
member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.







































SECOND DIVISION
NEMESIO FLORAN and CARIDAD FLORAN,
Complainants,
- versus -
ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA,
Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This administrative case arose from an Affidavit/Complaint filed by spouses
Nemesio (Nemesio) and Caridad (Caridad) Floran against Atty. Roy Prule
Ediza (Atty. Ediza) for unethical conduct.
The Facts
Spouses Floran own an unregistered 3.5525 hectare parcel of land,
particularly described as Cad. Lot No. 422-A, Pls-923 and situated in San
Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. The land is covered by a tax
declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal (Epal), a relative, who gave the
property to the Spouses Floran.
On 9 August 1996, a certain Esteban Valera filed an action
1
for judicial
foreclosure of mortgage on the house situated on the land owned by the
Spouses Floran with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 41. The action for foreclosure involved an amount of P7,500.
Spouses Floran sought the assistance of Atty. Ediza. On 24 September 1996,
Atty. Ediza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
and cause of action. On 23 October 1996, the RTC granted the motion to
dismiss the case without prejudice based on non-compliance with barangay
conciliation procedures under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Sometime in 1997, the Spouses Floran sold a hectare or 10,910 square
meters of their 3.5525 hectare land to Phividec Industrial Authority
(Phividec) for P25 per square meter totaling to the amount of P272,750,
payable in three installments (1) P55,132; (2) P120,000, and (3) P97,618.
The installments were paid and released within the months of June to July
1997. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Undertaking of Lot Owner
executed by Nemesio and Phividecs representative and notarized by Atty.
Ediza on 31 March 1997.
Phividec then required the couple to execute a waiver in Phividecs favor.
The Spouses Floran again sought the help of Atty. Ediza for the preparation
and notarization of the waiver. Atty. Ediza informed the Spouses Floran to
have the original owner of the land, Epal, sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in
their favor. Atty. Ediza gave the Spouses Floran several documents for Epal
to sign. Caridad visited Epal in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur and acquired her
approval and expressed assent to the conveyance, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale made by Epal in favor of Nemesio for P2,000.
On 11 June 1998, Nemesio and Phividec executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land. Out of the total amount of P272,750, which
Phividec paid and released to the Spouses Floran, Atty. Ediza received the
amount of P125,463.38 for the titling of the remaining portion of the land,
other expenses and attorneys fees.
Spouses Floran went back to Atty. Ediza several times to follow-up on the
title. However, Atty. Ediza failed to fulfill his promises. After the lapse of
two years, with the land still unregistered, the Spouses Floran asked Atty.
Ediza for the return of their money. Atty. Ediza refused. Thus, Spouses
Floran presented their complaint before the chapter president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Misamis Oriental.
The IBP called the Spouses Floran and Atty. Ediza to a conference. During
the dialogue, Atty. Ediza refused to return the money but promised to tear a
document evidencing sale by the Spouses Floran to him of one hectare land
of their property for P50,000. The Spouses Floran claimed that they had no
knowledge that they executed such document in favor of Atty. Ediza and
suspected that they might have signed a document earlier which Atty. Ediza
told them not to read. Afterwards, the Spouses Floran filed their formal
complaint before the Supreme Court.
In the Complaint/Affidavit dated 8 September 2000, Caridad alleged that
Atty. Ediza gave them certain documents, including a Deed of Absolute Sale,
for Epal to sign in order to transfer the land in their name. However, the
Spouses Floran later discovered that one of the documents given by Atty.
Ediza is a deed of sale for a one hectare land in the same property executed
by Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza for a consideration of P2,000. When the
Spouses Floran confronted Atty. Ediza, he initially denied the document but
then later promised to tear and destroy it.
In his Comment dated 23 January 2001, Atty. Ediza claimed that the Spouses
Floran voluntarily gave him one hectare of the 3.5525 hectare land as
payment for handling and winning the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage.
Atty. Ediza explained that the Spouses Floran did not find the lot interesting,
lacking in good topography. He also stated that the property only had an
assessed value of P23,700 at the time it was presented to him.
Thereafter, towards the end of 1996, when Atty. Ediza learned that Phividec
was interested to buy a hectare of the Spouses Florans land, and considering
that he has a hectare of undivided portion in the property, he suggested to the
Spouses Floran that both of them sell half a hectare each and equally share in
the proceeds of the sale. After Phividec made its full payment, Atty. Ediza
gave fifty percent of the proceeds to the Spouses Floran and he kept the other
half. Thereafter, Atty. Ediza wanted his remaining share in the land
consisting of 4,545 square meters be titled in his name. Atty. Ediza conveyed
this to the Spouses Floran and volunteered to take care of titling the land,
including the Spouses Florans remaining share, with no cost to them.
Atty. Ediza stated that since Phividec had not yet applied for a separate tax
declaration which would segregate its portion from the remainder of the
property, he thought of holding in abeyance the separate survey on the
remainder of the land. Also, Atty. Ediza was in a hurry to have the land titled
with the intention of selling it so he informed the Spouses Floran to just
follow up with Phividec.
At the IBP conference, Atty. Ediza stated that he only agreed to return the
4,545 square meter portion of the land to amicably settle the case with the
Spouses Floran. He asserted that the Deed of Sale signed by the Spouses
Floran in his favor served as payment for the dismissal of the case he
handled for the Spouses Floran. Atty. Ediza denied that the money he
received was intended for the titling of the remaining portion of the land.
Atty. Ediza claimed that the complaint against him stemmed from a case
where he represented a certain Robert Sabuclalao for recovery of land. The
land was being occupied by the Church of the Assembly of God where
Nemesio Floran serves as pastor.
In a Resolution dated 7 March 2001, the Court resolved to refer the case to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On 14 August 2008, the investigating commissioner of the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP submitted his Report and found that Atty. Ediza (1)
failed to meet the standards prescribed by Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon
15, and (2) violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP recommended that Atty. Ediza be imposed the
penalty of six months suspension from the practice of law.
In finding Atty. Ediza guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
After careful evaluation of the claims of the parties vis-a-vis
the documents available, the version of the complainants
appear to be credible while that of the respondent is shot
through with inconsistencies.
x x x
b. The foreclosure case of complainants involved only
P7,500.00 and respondent Ediza filed only a single motion
and attended only two hearings. Thus, it is highly incredible
[that] complainants whom respondent Ediza claims were
destitute will voluntarily and generously donate to him 1
hectare of their land valued at P50,000.00. As it turned out,
the 1 hectare portion is worth not only P50,000.00 [but] more
than P200,000.00.
c. The deed of sale of a portion of complainants land to
respondent Ediza is admittedly simulated because while it
states that the consideration for the sale is P50,000.00, neither
party claims that any money was paid by respondent Ediza to
complainants.
d. As a lawyer, Atty. Ediza must be aware that a deed of sale
involving real property must be notarized to be enforceable.
The document was unexplainably never notarized.
Thus, this Commission finds that respondent Ediza must have
caused the complainants to unknowingly sign the deed of sale
of a portion of their property in his favor. It may further be
noted that in their complaint, complainants allege that they
saw in the files of respondent Ediza a copy of deed of sale of
a property executed by Sartiga Epal in favor of Atty. Ediza
which he promised to destroy when confronted about it by
complainants. This was never denied by Atty. Ediza.
Such conduct fails to come up to the standard prescribed by
Canon 1.01 that A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct and Canon 15 that
A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transaction with his client.
On the second issue, x x x the claim of the complainants that
they agreed to give P125,000.00 of the proceeds of the sale of
their property to respondent Ediza to register the remaining
portion also appears to be more credible for the following
reasons:
1. There is no credible reason for complainants to expect and
demand that respondent Ediza undertake the registration of
their property except that they have paid for it. If they were
aware that they gave 1 hectare of their property to respondent
Ediza for handling their civil case and that they are not paying
respondent Ediza to register their property, it is not likely that
simple folks like them would be so bold to demand for such
valuable service from him for free.
2. There is no credible reason for respondent to willingly
undertake for free for complainants the not so simple task of
registering an untitled property.
3. As previously stated, the P125,000.00 given to respondent
Ediza by complainants is obviously too generous for simply
having handled the civil case involving only P7,500.00. There
must have been another reason for complainants to willingly
pay the said amount to respondent and the registration for
their remaining property appears to be a credible reason.
It should also be noted that respondent Atty. Ediza does not
even allege that he has taken any step towards accomplishing
the registration of the property of the complainants prior to
the filing of this complaint. Whether or not he agreed to do it
for free or for a fee, respondent Ediza should have complied
with his promise to register the property of complainants
unless he has valid reasons not to do so. He has not also given
any credible explanation why he failed to do so.
Such conduct of respondent Ediza violates Canon 18.03 that
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 26 June 2011, in
Resolution No. XIX-2011-433, the Board of Governors of the IBP affirmed
the findings of the investigating commissioner. The resolution states:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial ground or reason
to disturb it, the Board of Governors Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-401 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Courts Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings
of the IBP and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Ediza
administratively liable.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
2

Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. x x x
CANON 15
A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY
IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
CANON 18
A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
In the present case, the Spouses Floran assert that they had no knowledge
that they signed a deed of sale to transfer a portion of their land in favor of
Atty. Ediza. They also insist that Atty. Ediza failed to comply with his
promise to register their property despite receiving the amount of
P125,463.38. On the other hand, Atty. Ediza maintains that he acquired the
land from the Spouses Floran because of their deep gratitude to him in the
dismissal of the civil case for foreclosure of mortgage. Atty. Ediza further
claims that the amount of P125,463.38 which he received was his rightful
share from the sale of the land.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Ediza deceived the Spouses Floran
when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a
portion of their land to Atty. Ediza. Atty. Ediza also did the same to Epal
when he gave Caridad several documents for Epal to sign. Atty. Ediza made
it appear that Epal conveyed her rights to the land to him and not to the
Spouses Floran. Moreover, when the sale of the Spouses Florans land
pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount from the proceeds
given by the buyer and falsely misled the Spouses Floran into thinking that
he will register the remaining portion of the land.
Lamentably, Atty. Ediza played on the navet of the Spouses Floran to
deprive them of their valued property. This is an unsavory behavior from a
member of the legal profession. Aside from giving adequate attention, care
and time to his clients case, a lawyer is also expected to be truthful, fair and
honest in protecting his clients rights. Once a lawyer fails in this duty, he is
not true to his oath as a lawyer.
In Santos v. Lazaro
3
and Dalisay v. Mauricio,
4
we held that Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics.
Indeed, when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting the latters rights. Failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes
the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him
answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts
and society.
The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is
not only a right, but a moral and legal obligation as well. The Court will not
tolerate such action from a member of the legal profession who deliberately
and maliciously did not protect his clients interests.
In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for
six months is warranted. Atty. Ediza is directed to return to the Spouses
Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he misled the spouses and Epal to
sign. Atty. Ediza is also directed to return the amount of P125,463.38,
representing the amount he received from the proceeds of the sale of the land
belonging to the Spouses Floran, with legal interest from the time of the
filing of the administrative complaint until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza administratively
liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months, effective upon
receipt of this Decision. He is DIRECTED to return to the Spouses Nemesio
and Caridad Floran the two (2) sets of documents that he misled the spouses
and Sartiga Epal to sign. He is further ORDERED to pay Spouses Nemesio
and Caridad Floran, within 30 days from receipt of this Decision, the amount
of P125,463.38, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully paid.
He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.



Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as
attorney. Further, let other copies be served on the IBP and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

































































Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC


MARITES E. FREEMAN,
Complainant,


- versus -


ATTY. ZENAIDA P. REYES,
Respondent.


A.C. No. 6246
[Formerly CBD No. 00-730]

Promulgated:

November 15, 2011
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N


PER CURI AM:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint, filed by complainant
Marites E. Freeman, seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Zenaida P.
Reyes, for gross dishonesty in obtaining money from her, without rendering
proper legal services, and appropriating the proceeds of the insurance
policies of her deceased husband. Complainant also seeks recovery of all the
amounts she had given to respondent and the insurance proceeds, which was
remitted to the latter, with prayer for payment of moral and exemplary
damages.

In her sworn Complaint-Affidavit[1]

dated April 7, 2000, filed on May
10, 2000, complainant alleged that her husband Robert Keith Freeman, a
British national, died in London on October 18, 1998. She and her
son, Frank Lawrence applied for visas, to enable them to attend the wake
and funeral, but their visa applications were denied. Complainant engaged
the services of respondent who, in turn, assured her that she would help her
secure the visas and obtain the death benefits and other insurance claims due
her. Respondent told complainant that she had to personally go to London to
facilitate the processing of the claims, and demanded that the latter bear all
expenses for the trip. On December 4, 1998, she gave respondent the
amount of P50,000.00. As acknowledgment for the receipt of P47,500.00 for
service charge, tax, and one round trip ticket to London, respondent gave her
a Cash/Check Voucher,[2] issued by Broadway Travel, Inc., but on the right
margin thereof, the notations in the amount of P50,000.00 and the date
12-5-98 were written and duly initialled. On December 9, 1998, she
acceded into giving respondent the amount of P20,000.00 for legal costs in
securing the visas, as shown by the Temporary Receipt[3]

bearing said date,
issued by Z.P. Reyes Law Office (respondent's law firm). On December 18,
1998, she went to see respondent to follow-up the visa applications, but the
latter asked for the additional amount of P10,000.00 for travel expenses, per
Temporary Receipt[4]

bearing said date, issued by respondents law
firm. After several phone calls inquiring about the status of the visa
applications, respondent told her, Mahirap gapangin ang pagkuha ng visa,
kasi blacklisted at banned ka sa Embassy. (It is difficult to railroad the
process of securing visa, because you are blacklisted and banned by the
Embassy). Sometime in February 1999, respondent told her that to lift the
travel ban on her, she should shell out P18,000.00 as panlagay or grease
money to bribe some staff of the British Embassy. After a week,
respondent informed her that the ban was lifted, but the visas would be
issued on a later date, as she had convinced the British Embassy to issue
resident visas instead of tourist visas. Respondent told her that to expedite
the release of the resident visas, she should again give P20,000.00 and a
bottle of wine, worth P5,000.00, as grease money to bribe the British
Embassy personnel. After several weeks, respondent told her that the period
for visa applications had lapsed, and that another amount of P18,000.00 was
needed to reinstate the same. Later, respondent asked for P30,000.00 as
legal costs, per Temporary Receipt,[5]

dated April 19, 1999, to be used for
booking the former's flight to London, and P39,000.00 for legal costs, per
Temporary Receipt[6]

dated May 13, 1999, to cover the expenses for the
plane tickets. Both temporary receipts were issued by respondents law
firm.

Complainant said that despite repeated follow-ups with respondent,
nothing came out. Instead, she received a picture of her husband's burial,
sent by one Stanley Grist, a friend of the deceased. She later learned that
respondent left for London alone, without informing her about
it. Respondent explained that she needed to go to London to follow-up the
insurance claims, and warned her not to communicate with Grist who
allegedly pocketed the proceeds of her husband's insurance policy. She told
respondent that she received a letter[7]

dated March 9, 1999 from one Martin
Leigh, an Officer of H.M. Coroner's Court, London, informing her about the
arrangements for the funeral and that her late husband was covered by three
insurance policies, to wit: Nationwide Building Society (Account Number
0231/471 833 630), Lincoln Assurance Company (British National Life
Policy No. PP/85/00137851), and Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No.
2779512).[8] Respondent offered to help and assured her that representations
with the insurance companies had earlier been made, so that the latter would
be receiving the insurance proceeds soon.

According to the complainant, respondent required her to affix her
signature in a Special Power of Attorney (SPA),[9] dated November 6, 1998
[first SPA], which would authorize the respondent to follow-up the insurance
claims. However, she found out that the SPA [first SPA] she signed was not
notarized, but another SPA,[10] dated April 6, 1999, was notarized on April
30, 1999 [second SPA], and that her signature therein was forged. Later, she
came across a similar copy of the SPA,[11] dated April 6, 1999, also
notarized on April 30, 1999 [third SPA], but this time, additionally bearing
the signatures of two witnesses. She said that without her knowledge and
consent, respondent used the third SPA, notarized on April 30, 1999, in her
correspondence with the insurance companies in London.

Complainant discovered that in an undated letter,[12] addressed to one
Lynn O. Wilson of Scottish Equitable PLC (Policy No. 2779512),
respondent made representations that her husband left no will and that she
had no verified information as to the total value of her husband's estate and
the existence of any property in London that would be subjected to Grant of
Representation. Said letter requested that complainant be advised on the
value for probate in the amount of 5231.35 and the procedure for its
entitlement. Respondent added therein that As to the matter of the
installments due, as guaranteed by Mr. Freeman's policy, Mrs. Freeman
requests that the remittance be sent directly to Account No. 0148-27377-7
Far East Bank, Diliman Branch, with business address at Malakas St.
Barangay Central District, Quezon City, Philippines under the account
name: Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further
notice.

Subsequently, in a letter[13] dated July 29, 1999, addressed to one
Andrea Ransom of Lincoln Financial Group (PP/8500137851), respondent,
declaring that she is the Counsel/Authorized Representative [of the
complainant], per SPA dated April 20, 1999 [should be April 30, 1999],
replied that she had appended the documents required (i.e., marriage
certificate and birth certificate), in her previous letter,[14] dated April 20,
1999, to the said insurance company; that pursuant to an SPA[15] executed
in her favor, all communications pertaining to complainant should be
forwarded to her law firm; that she sought clarification on whether
complainant is entitled to death benefits under the policy and, if so, the
amount due and the requirements to be complied with; and that in the
absence of a Grant of Probate (i.e., the deceased having left no will), she
enclosed an alternative document [referring to the Extrajudicial
Settlement[16] dated June 1, 1999, notarized by respondent] in support of the
claim of the surviving spouse (Mrs. Freeman) and their sole child (Frank
Lawrence Freeman). In the same letter, respondent reiterated that
complainant requests that any amount of monies due or benefits accruing,
be directly deposited to Account No. 0148-27377-7 at Far East Bank,
Diliman Branch, Malakas St., Quezon City, Philippines under
Reyes/Mendiola, which serves as her temporary account until further
notice.

Complainant declared that in November 1999, she made a demand
upon the respondent to return her passport and the total amount of
P200,000.00 which she gave for the processing of the visa applications. Not
heeding her demand, respondent asked her to attend a meeting with the
Consul of the British Embassy, purportedly to discuss about the visa
applications, but she purposely did not show up as she got disgusted with the
turn of events. On the supposed rescheduled appointment with the British
Consul, respondent, instead, brought her to Airtech Travel and Tours, and
introduced her to one Dr. Sonny Marquez, the travel agency's owner, who
assured her that he would help her secure the visas within a week. Marquez
made her sign an application for visa and demanded the amount of
P3,000.00. After a week, she talked to one Marinez Patao, the office
secretary of respondent's law firm, who advised her to ask respondent to
return the total amount of P200,000.00.

In her Counter-Affidavit/Answer[17] dated June 20, 2000, respondent
countered that in 1998, complainant, accompanied by former Philippine
Sports Commission (PSC) Commissioner Josefina Bauzon and another
woman whose identity was not ascertained, sought legal advice regarding the
inheritance of her deceased husband, a British national.[18] She told
complainant to submit proof of her marriage to the deceased, birth certificate
of their son, and other documents to support her claim for the insurance
proceeds. She averred that before she accepted the case, she explained to
complainant that she would be charging the following amounts: acceptance
fee of P50,000.00, P20,000.00 for initial expenses, and additional amount of
P50,000.00 on a contingent basis. She said complainant agreed to these rates
and, in fact, readily paid her the said amounts. With an SPA,[19] dated April
6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA], having been executed
in her favor, she made preliminary communications with the insurance
companies in London regarding complainant's claims. Having received
communications from said insurance companies, she stated that complainant
offered, which she accepted, to shoulder her plane ticket and the hotel
accommodation, so that she can personally attend to the matter. She left for
London in May 1999 and, upon her return, she updated the complainant
about the status of her claims.

As to the visa arrangements, respondent said that when she met with
complainant, she asked her why she had not left for London, and the latter
replied that her contacts with the embassy had duped her. She explained to
complainant that she could refer her to a travel consultant who would handle
the visa arrangements for a fee, to which the latter agreed. She stated that
when complainant acceded to such arrangement, she accompanied her, in
December 1999, to a travel consultant of Airtech Travel and Tours, who
found out that complainant's previous visa applications had been denied four
times, on the ground of falsity of information. Thereafter, complainant was
able to secure a visa through the help of the travel consultant, who charged
her a professional fee of P50,000.00. She added that she had no
participation in the foregoing transactions, other than referring complainant
to the said travel consultant.

With regard to the alleged falsified documents, respondent denied
knowledge about the existence of the same, and declared that the SPA,[20]
dated April 6, 1999, which was notarized on April 30, 1999 [second SPA],
was her basis for communications with the insurance companies in
London. She stated that in her absence, complainant, through wily
representations, was able to obtain the case folder from Leah Buama, her
office secretary, and never returned the same, despite repeated demands. She
said that she was unaware of the loss of the case folder as she then had no
immediate need of it. She also said that her secretary failed to immediately
report about the missing case folder prior to taking a leave of absence, so as
to attend to the financial obligations brought about by her mother's lingering
ailment and consequent death.[21] Despite repeated requests, complainant
failed to return the case folder and, thus, the law firm was prevented from
pursuing the complainant's insurance claims. She maintained that through
complainant's own criminal acts and machinations, her law office was
prevented from effectively pursuing her claims. Between January to
February 2000, she sent complainant a billing statement which indicated the
expenses incurred[22] by the law firm, as of July 1999; however, instead of
settling the amount, the latter filed a malicious suit against her to evade
payment of her obligations.



On January 19, 2001, complainant filed a Motion Submitting the
Instant Case for Immediate Resolution with Comments on Respondent's
Answer, alleging, among others, that upon seeing the letter[23] dated March
9, 1999 of the Coroner's Court, respondent began to show interest and
volunteered to arrange for the insurance claims; that no acceptance fee was
agreed upon between the parties, as the amounts earlier mentioned
represented the legal fees and expenses to be incurred attendant to the
London trip; that the parties verbally agreed to a 20% contingent fee out of
the total amount to be recovered; that she obtained the visas with the
assistance of a travel consultant recommended by respondent; that upon
return from abroad, respondent never informed her about the arrangements
with the insurance companies in London that remittances would be made
directly to the respondent's personal account at Far East Bank; that the reason
why respondent went to London was primarily to attend the International
Law Conference, not solely for her insurance claims, which explained why
the receipt for the P50,000.00, which she gave, bore the letterhead of
Broadway Travel, Inc. (in the amount of P47,500.00) and that she merely
made a handwritten marginal note regarding the receipt of the amount of
P50,000.00; that with the use of an SPA [referring to the second SPA] in
favor of the respondent, bearing her forged signature, the amount of
10,546.7 [should be 10,960.63],[24] or approximately equivalent to
P700,000.00, was remitted to the personal bank account of respondent, but
the same was never turned over to her, nor was she ever informed about it;
and that she clarified that she never executed any SPA that would authorize
respondent to receive any money or check due her, but that the only SPA
[first SPA] she executed was for the purpose of representing her in court
proceedings.

Meanwhile, respondent filed a criminal complaint[25] for malicious
mischief, under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code, against complainant
and one Pacita Mamaril (a former client of respondent), for allegedly barging
into the law office of the former and, with the use of a pair of scissors, cut-
off the cords of two office computer keyboards and the line connections for
the refrigerator, air conditioning unit, and electric fan, resulting in damage to
office equipment in an estimated amount of P200,000.00. In the
Resolution,[26] dated July 31, 2000, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon
City recommended that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. The case was subsequently dismissed due to lack of evidence and
for failure of respondent to appear during the preliminary investigation of the
case.[27]

Thereafter, complainant filed a criminal case for estafa, under Article
315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, against respondent,
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-108181, before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 83. On Motion for Reinvestigation by
respondent, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, in the Resolution[28] dated
October 21, 2002, recommended that the information, dated February 8,
2002, for estafa be withdrawn, and that the case be dismissed, for
insufficiency of evidence. On November 6, 2002, the Assistant City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information.[29] Consequently, in
the Order[30] dated November 27, 2002, the trial court granted the
withdrawal of the information, and dismissed the case.

In the Report and Recommendation[31] dated August 28, 2003,
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent to
have betrayed the trust of complainant as her client, for being dishonest in
her dealings and appropriating for herself the insurance proceeds intended
for complainant. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that despite
receipt of the approximate amount of P200,000.00, respondent failed to
secure the visas for complainant and her son, and that through deceitful
means, she was able to appropriate for herself the proceeds of the insurance
policies of complainant's husband. Accordingly, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for the maximum period allowed under the law, and that she be
ordered to turn over to complainant the amounts she received from the
London insurance companies.

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution
No. XVI-2003-166,[32] adopted and approved the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with modification that respondent be disbarred.

The Court agrees with the observation of the Investigating
Commissioner that complainant had sufficiently substantiated the charge of
gross dishonesty against respondent, for having appropriated the insurance
proceeds of the complainant's deceased husband, and the recommendation of
the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be disbarred.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the
individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the administration of justice by
protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the
court, and to remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for
their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust
reposed in them as members of the bar.[33]

A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, it does not involve a trial of an action or a
suit, but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still fit to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice, by purging the profession of members who,
by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.[34]

Being a sui generis proceeding, the main disposition of this Court is the
determination of the respondent's administrative liability. This does not
include the grant of affirmative reliefs, such as moral and exemplary
damages as prayed for by the complainant, which may very well be the
subject of a separate civil suit for damages arising from the respondent's
wrongful acts, to be filed in the regular courts.

In the absence of a formal contract, complainant engaged the legal
services of respondent to assist her in securing visa applications and claiming
the insurance proceeds of her deceased husband. There are conflicting
allegations as to the scope of authority of respondent to represent the
complainant. A perusal of the [first] SPA,[35] dated November 6, 1998,
which was not notarized, showed that complainant merely authorized
respondent to represent her and her son, in order to protect their rights and
interests, in the extrajudicial and/or judicial proceeding and the possibility of
any amicable settlement, relating to the estate of her deceased husband, both
in the Philippines and United Kingdom. The [second] SPA,[36] dated April
6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999, allegedly bearing the forged
signature of complainant, in addition to the foregoing representations,
authorized respondent to appear and represent the complainant, in connection
with her insurance claims, and to receive monies and/or encash treasury
warrants, checks arising from said claims, deposit the same, and dispose of
such funds as may be necessary for the successful pursuit of the claims. The
[third] SPA,[37] also dated April 6, 1999 and notarized on April 30, 1999,
allegedly bearing the forged signature of complainant, but additionally
bearing the signatures of two witnesses, was a faithful reproduction of the
second SPA, with exactly the same stipulations. The three SPAs, attached to
the pleadings of the parties and made integral parts of the records of the case,
were not certified true copies and no proof was adduced to verify their
genuineness and authenticity. Complainant repudiates the representation of
respondent in her behalf with regard to the insurance claims; however, the
admission of respondent herself, as lawyer, that she received payment from
complainant, her client, constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-
client relationship.[38]

Be that as it may, assuming that respondent acted within the scope of
her authority to represent the complainant in pursuing the insurance claims,
she should never deviate from the benchmarks set by Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates that a lawyer shall hold in
trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Specifically, Rule 16.01 states that a lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client, and Rule
16.03 thereof requires that a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of a
client when due or upon demand.

When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose,
the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money
for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to
his client.[39] In the present case, the cash/check voucher and the temporary
receipts issued by respondent, with the letterhead of her law firm, Z.P. Reyes
Law Office, indubitably showed that she received the total amount of
P167,000.00[40] from the complainant, in connection with the handling of
the latter's case. Respondent admitted having received money from the
complainant, but claimed that the total amount of P120,000.00[41]

she
received was in accordance with their agreement. Nowhere was it shown
that respondent rendered an accounting or, at least, apprised the complainant
of the actual expenses incurred. This leaves a quandary as to the discrepancy
in the actual amount that respondent should receive, supposedly pursuant to
an agreement of engaging respondent to be her counsel, as there was absence
of a formal contract of legal services.

Further, on December 4, 1998, complainant gave P50,000.00 to the
respondent for the purpose of assisting her in claiming the insurance
proceeds; however, per Application for United Kingdom Entry
Clearance,[42] dated December 8, 1998, it showed that respondent's primary
purpose in traveling to London was to attend the International Law
Conference in Russell Square, London. It is appalling that respondent had
the gall to take advantage of the benevolence of the complainant, then
grieving for the loss of her husband, and mislead her into believing that she
needed to go to London to assist in recovering the proceeds of the insurance
policies. Worse, respondent even inculcated in the mind of the complainant
that she had to adhere to the nefarious culture of giving grease money or
lagay, in the total amount of P43,000.00,[43] to the British Embassy
personnel, as if it was an ordinary occurrence in the normal course of
conducting official business transactions, as a means to expedite the visa
applications. This runs afoul the dictum in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

More importantly, apart from her bare denials that no remittance was
made to her personal bank account, as shown by the monthly transaction
report (covering January to December for the years 2000-2001),[44]
respondent never attempted to reconcile the discrepancy, or give a
satisfactory explanation, as to why she failed to render an accounting, on the
proceeds of the insurance policies that should rightfully belong to the
complainant vis--vis the correspondence by the insurance companies based
in London, pertaining to the remittance of the following amounts to the
respondent's personal bank account, to wit: Per letter[45] dated November
23, 2000, from one Rupesh Majithia, Administrator, Customer Services
Department of Lincoln Financial Group, addressed to complainant, stating,
among others, that An amount of 10,489.57 was paid out under the Power
of Attorney on 27
th
September 2000), and per letter,[46] dated April 28,
2000, from one Jeff Hawkes, Customer Services Claims (CLD), of the Eagle
Star Life Assurance Company Limited, addressed to one Andrea Ransom of
the Lincoln Financial Group, The Quays, stating, among others, that I can
confirm that a death claim was made on the policy on 13 October 1999 when
an amount of 471.06 was sent by International Moneymover to the client's
legal representative, ZP Reyes Law Office of Quezon City,
Philippines. Clearly, there is no doubt that the amounts of 10,489.57 and
471.06 were remitted to respondent through other means of international
transactions, such as the International Moneymover, which explains why no
direct remittance from the insurance companies in London could be traced to
the personal bank account of respondent, per monthly transaction report,
covering January to December for the years 2000-2001.



A criminal case is different from an administrative case, and each must
be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each
case.[47] Section 5, in relation to Sections 1[48] and 2,[49] Rule 133, Rules
of Court states that in administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. Applying the rule to the present case, the
dismissal of a criminal case does not preclude the continuance of a separate
and independent action for administrative liability, as the weight of evidence
necessary to establish the culpability is merely substantial
evidence. Respondent's defense that the criminal complaint for estafa
against her was already dismissed is of no consequence. An administrative
case can proceed independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein,
based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial court eventually
rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the ground either that the prosecution
failed to prove the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no
crime was committed. More so, in the present administrative case, wherein
the ground for the dismissal of the criminal case was because the trial court
granted the prosecution's motion to withdraw the information and, a fortiori,
dismissed the case for insufficiency of
evidence.

In Velez v. De Vera,[50] the Court ruled that the relation between
attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires
utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity, and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client. The
Canon of Professional Ethics provides that the lawyer should refrain from
any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the
client or collected for the client, or other trust property coming into the
possession of the lawyer, should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not, under any circumstances, be commingled with his own or be
used by him. Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the
funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics; it
impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves
punishment. Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in
gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction
may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of
law.[51] Indeed, lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.[52]

In some cases, the Court stripped lawyers of the privilege to practice
their profession for breach of trust and confidence pertaining to their clients'
moneys and properties. In Manzano v. Soriano,[53] therein respondent,
found guilty of grave misconduct (misappropriating the funds belonging to
his client) and malpractice, represented therein complainant in a collection
suit, but failed to turn over the amount of P50,000.00 as stipulated in their
agreement and, to conceal the misdeed, executed a simulated deed of sale,
with himself as the vendor and, at the same time, the notary public. In
Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.,[54] therein respondent, found guilty of malpractice,
deceit, and gross misconduct, received the check corresponding to his client's
insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to himself, encashed
the same, and appropriated the proceeds.

Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields
profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater
deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with public
interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.[55] Respondent's
repeated reprehensible acts of employing chicanery and unbecoming conduct
to conceal her web of lies, to the extent of milking complainant's finances
dry, and deceitfully arrogating upon herself the insurance proceeds that
should rightfully belong to complainant, in the guise of rendering legitimate
legal services, clearly transgressed the norms of honesty and integrity
required in the practice of law. This being so, respondent should be purged
from the privilege of exercising the noble legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Zenaida P. Reyes is found guilty of
gross misconduct and DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let her name
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This Decision is immediately
executory.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be
notified of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of the
respondent.

Respondent is ORDERED to turn over to complainant Marites E.
Freeman the proceeds of the insurance policies remitted to her by Lincoln
Financial Group, in the amount of 10,489.57, and Eagle Star Life
Assurance Company Limited, 471.06, or in the total amount of 10,960.63,
which is approximately equivalent to P700,000.00, pursuant to the prevailing
exchange rate at the time of the subject transaction.

SO ORDERED.







































































































Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila


EN BANC


EUGENIA MENDOZA, A.C. No. 5338
Complainant,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,

ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 23, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


R E S O LU T I O N


PER CURIAM:


Any departure from the path which a
lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after
that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is
more imperative than that of law.[1]

Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated
September 19, 2000, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for his acts
of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks without her authority and using the same for
filing unfounded criminal suits against her.

Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On
October 13, 1998, she borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount of
P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers
47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully pay
her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's Metrobank
account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00.[2] Claiming
that the amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges,
respondent warned complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him
on March 30, 1999 in the amount of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court,
complainant made good said check and respondent was able to encash the same on March 30,
1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the Metrobank account of
respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999,[3] thereby paying respondent the total sum
of P35,690.00.[4]

Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal
checks she issued in blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00 each
and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims
was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received on November 15,
1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from respondent and
that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less
than P6,000.00, such amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other
employees of the Postal Office by filling up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as
condition for loans.[5]

In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings
with complainant were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only
vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was complainant who
deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999
transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason
account closed; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate and distinct transaction;
complainant filed the disbarment case against him to get even with him for filing the estafa and
B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim that respondent filled up the blank checks
issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks referred to were already filled
up when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would
issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain
several checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have
written a higher amount on the checks instead of only P50,000.00.[6]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines[7] (IBP), and the
parties were required to file their position papers.[8]

In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating her earlier claims,
alleged that respondent, after the hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on September 5,
2001, again filled up three of her blank checks, Check Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265, totaling
P100,000.00, to serve as basis for another criminal complaint, since the earlier estafa and B.P. Blg.
22 case filed by respondent against her before the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City was
dismissed on August 14, 2000.[9]

Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that complainant borrowed
P100,000.00 in exchange for two postdated checks, and that since he had known complainant for
quite some time, he accepted said checks on complainant's assurance that they were good as
cash.[10]

Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes submitted his Report dated
September 6, 2002, finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for one year.[11] The Report was adopted and approved by
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19, 2002.[12] Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, however, by the IBP Board of Governors on
January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was
already endorsed to the Supreme Court.[13]

On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding
the case to the IBP for the conduct of formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner Reyes
was based merely on the pleadings submitted.[14]

After hearings were conducted,[15] Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B.
Funa submitted his Report dated December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended
respondent's suspension for three years.[16]

Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first to determine who
between complainant and respondent was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with his
own contradicting allegations, showed that complainant's version should be given more
credence.[17]

Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's total obligation to
respondent was only P24,000.00, since the loan obtained by complainant on October 13, 1998
was P20,000.00 at 20% interest payable in six months, by April 13, 1999, however, complainant
had actually paid respondent the total amount of P30,240.00. Thus, even though the payment was
irregularly given, respondent actually earned more than the agreed upon 20% interest. Moreover,
the amounts of P50,000.00 as well as the name of the payee in the subject checks were all
typewritten[18]

Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's claim that it was
respondent's modus operandi to demand a certain amount as settlement for the dropping of
estafa complaints against his borrowers. As Commissioner Funa explains:

[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP
22 was filed against [complainant] before the Prosecutor's
Office in Pasig City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000,
the Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaint. On
October 2, 2000, Complainant filed this disbarment
case. About one year later, or on September 5, 2001,
Complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter
demanding payment once again for another P100,000.00
corresponding to another three checks, Check Nos.
0047263, 0047264 and 0047265.

Furthermore, Respondent filed another
criminal complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 dated
October 17, 2001, this time before the QC Prosecutor's
Office. The prosecutor's office recommended the filing of
the criminal case for one of the checks.

x x x x

Respondent's version, on the other hand,
is that Check Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were given to
him for loans (rediscounting) contacted on November 15,
1999 and not for a loan contracted on October 13, 1998. x x
x He claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an
earlier and different transaction. x x x On the very next day,
or on November 16, 1999, Complainant again allegedly
contracted another loan for another P100,000.00 for which
Complainant allegedly issued the following Postal Bank
checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001 for
P20,000.00; Check No. 0047264 dated May 30, 2001 for
P30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15, 2001
for P50,000.00].

x x x x

Oddly though, Respondent never
narrated that Complainant obtained a second loan on
November 16, 1999 in his Answer [dated January 18,
2000] and in his Position Paper [dated October 8, 2001]. He
did not even discuss it in his Motion for Reconsideration
dated December 20, 2002, although he attached the
Resolution of the QC Prosecutor's Office. Clearly, the
November 16, 1999 transaction was a mere concoction
that did not actually occur. It was a mere
afterthought. Respondent once again filled-up three of the
other checks in his possession (checks dated May 16, 2001,
May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001) so that he can again file
another estafa/BP 22 case against Complainant (October 17,
2001) AFTER the earlier complaint he had filed before the
Pasig City Prosecutor's Office had been dismissed (August
14, 2000) and AFTER herein Complainant had filed this
disbarment case (October 2, 2000).

More telling, and this is where
Respondent gets caught, are the circumstances attending
this second loan of November 16, 1999. In addition to not
mentioning it at all in his Answer, his Position Paper, and his
Motion for Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is
that fact that he alleges that the loan was contracted on
November 16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly
issued checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June
15, 2001. Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen (18 months),
or 1 year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999. This is
strangely a long period for loans of this nature. This loan
was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally. With no
collaterals and no guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-existent
transaction. It was merely concocted by Respondent.

More importantly, and this is where
Respondent commits his fatal blunder thus exposing his
illegal machinations, Complainant allegedly received
P100,000.00 in cash on November 16, 1999 for which
Complainant gave Respondent, in return, checks also
amounting to P100,000.00. The checks were supposedly
dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 x x
x.

Now then, would not Respondent suffer
a financial loss if he gave away P100,000.00 on November
16, 1999 and then also receive P100,000.00 on May 16,
2001 or 1 year and 6 months later? Aperson engaged in
lending business would want to earn interest. The same also
with a person re-discounting checks. In this instance, in his
haste to concoct a story, Respondent forgot to factor in the
interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per annum, for
1 years, Respondent should have collected from
Complainant at least P130,000.00. And yet the checks he
filled up totaled only P100,000.00. The same is true in re-
discounting a check. If Complainant gave Respondent
P100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be giving
Complainant an amount less than P100,000.00. This
exposes his story as a fabrication.

The same observations can be made of
the first loan of P100,000.00 secured by Check Nos.
0047261 and 0047262.

More strangely, during the course of the
entire investigation, Respondent never touched on what
transpired on the dates of November 15 and 16,
1999. Consider that Complainant's position is that no such
transaction took place on November 15 and 16. And yet,
Respondent never made any effort to establish that
Complainant borrowed P100,000.00 on November 15 and
then another P100,000.00 again on November
16. Respondent merely focused on establishing that
Complainant's checks bounced --- a fact already admitted
several times by the Complainant --- and the reasons for
which were already explained by Complainant. This only
shows the lack of candor of Respondent.[19]

x x x x

We take note further that Complainant is
a mere mail sorter earning less than P6,000.00 per
month. Who would lend P200,000.00 to an employee
earning such a salary, nowadays, and not even secure such a
loan with a written document or a collateral? It defies
realities of finance, economy and business. It even defies
common sense.[20]

Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case had practically the
same set of facts as in Olbes v. Deciembre[21] and Acosta v. Deciembre.[22] In Olbes,
complainants therein, who were also postal employees, averred that respondent without authority
filled up a total of four checks to represent a total of P200,000.00. In Acosta, the complainant
therein, another postal employee, averred that respondent filled up two blank checks for a total of
P100,000.00. Acosta, however, was dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground
that it did not involve any lawyer-client relationship, which ground, Commissioner Funa believes,
is erroneous.[23]

On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting
and approving Commissoner Funa's Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219
Adm. Case No. 5338
Eugenia Mendoza vs.
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found
guilty of committing the same set of facts alleged in AC
5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law to be served
successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite
Suspension.[24]

Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before the IBP Board of
Governors, nor a petition for review before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution merely recommendatory and therefore would
not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The IBP
elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action.

The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not
just indefinite suspension is in order.

The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State
upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege.[25] Ahigh sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is
expected and required of members of the bar.[26] They must conduct themselves with great
propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.[27]

The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the
transactions entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent,
as a lawyer, from liability.

Alawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for
acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of
the public.[28] Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a
lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[29]

In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the
standards required of members of the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON 1 Alawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01. - Alawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

x x x x

CANON 7 Alawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.

x x x x

Rule 7.03. Alawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent
failed to mention in his Comment dated January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8,
2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, the P100,000.00 loan
which complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, 1999. It is also questionable why the
checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were supposedly issued to
secure a loan contracted about 18 months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made without any
interest. The same is true with the checks dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of
P100,000.00, which were supposed to secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the
same amount. Considering these circumstances and the sequence of dates when respondent filed
his criminal cases against complainant, and complainant her disbarment case against respondent,
what truly appears more believable is complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing the
blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases for criminal cases in order to harass
complainant.

The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated
January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001[30] had its dates,
amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the blanks on the check for P16,000.00 dated
March 30, 1999 which complainant used to pay part of her original loan, were all filled up in her
handwriting.[31]

It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when
respondent committed his wrongful acts. In Olbes,[32] complainants therein contracted a loan
from respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1, 1999, for which they issued five blank
checks as collateral. Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four of
the blank checks with the amount of P50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and used the
same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases against complainants. The Court, in imposing the
penalty of indefinite suspension on respondent, found his propensity for employing deceit and
misrepresentation as reprehensible and his misuse of the filled up checks, loathsome.[33]

In Acosta,[34] complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she
borrowed P20,000.00 from respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months and
guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had already paid the total amount of
P33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to comply
therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using
two of her blank checks which respondent filled up with the total amount of
P100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner
Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction did not involve any lawyer-
client relationship.[35] As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such conclusion is
erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving any attorney-client
relationship.

As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he
demands excessive payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks
with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain; and then he uses
said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass
them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance from the
legal profession.

While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld
whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired,[36] the seriousness of respondent's
offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not
hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the
evidence calls for it.[37] This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney.[38]

As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession,
the severance of his privilege to practice law for life is in order.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of
GROSS MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of respondent; all the courts of the Philippines;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and
all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
































































EN BANC

DIANA RAMOS,
Complainant,


- v e r s u s -


ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG,
Respondent.


x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

R E S O L U T I O N


PER CURIAM:


This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose
R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

THE COMPLAINT

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance
of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent
P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3]

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases
against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the
courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after
several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and
rescheduled.[4] This happened six times and for each appearance in court,
respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became
suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial
courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that
respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in
fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).[5]


RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE

According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the
government service from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant
when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office
(predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the
complainant's daughter.[6]

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for
damages against the Jovellanoses.[7] Because he was with the PAO and
aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.[8]
Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a
relative who was a private practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not
accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the
acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the
complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the
Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, the
complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the
balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an
antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to account for the
P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.[12]
Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated
July 15, 1992.[13]

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few
months later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent
to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private
practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was
unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.[15]


RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed,
received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD
submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.[16]

The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when
respondent was still with the PAO.[18] It also noted that respondent
described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent
was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not
have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The
CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a
friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions
on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's
fees other than their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent
violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a
legal service which he knows or should know
that he is not qualified to render. However, he
may render such service if, with the consent of
his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the
matter.


Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
three years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the
amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21]

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the
CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's
recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest
at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to
return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months.[22]


THE COURT'S RULING


We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected
to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who
owe utmost fidelity to public service.[24]

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely
to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is
prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. --
In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of
any public official and employee and are
hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities
related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict
with their official function.[25]


Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective
offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and
issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the
complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed
that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government
lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of
profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's
fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance
to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of
the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil,
labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial
cases.[28]



As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from
the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.[29]
Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than
his salary.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.


Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes
the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's
fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's
acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of
profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private
cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived
the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the
Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent
also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the
Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and
asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never
took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath
not to do any falsehood.[31]

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good
moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public
office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act
or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times
and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government
lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of
social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.[32]

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of
violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent
did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as
his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant
(such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment
obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for a specific
purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond).[34] Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a
government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to
accept them.[35]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the
lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of
P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days
from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.





















































Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila



SECOND DIVISION

MARTIN LAHM III and JAMES P. CONCEPCION,
Complainants,



- versus -




LABOR ARBITER JOVENCIO Ll. MAYOR, JR.,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 7430

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
*

PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 15, 2012

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--x

RESOLUTION

REYES, J .:

Before us is a verified complaint[1] filed by Martin Lahm III
and James P. Concepcion (complainants) praying for the disbarment of
Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. (respondent) for alleged gross
misconduct and violation of lawyers oath.

On June 27, 2007, the respondent filed his Comment[2] to the
complaint.

In a Resolution[3] dated July 18, 2007, the Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.

The antecedent facts, as summarized in the Report and
Recommendation[4] dated September 19, 2008 of Commissioner Romualdo
A. Din, Jr. of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, are as follows:

On September 5, 2006 a certain
David Edward Toze filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board
of Trustees of the International School, Manila.
The same was docketed as NLRC-NCR Case
No. 00-07381-06 and raffled to the sala of the
respondent. Impleaded as among the party-
respondents are the complainants in the instant
case.

On September 7, 2006, David
Edward Toze filed a Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. The said Motion was set for
hearing on September 12, 2006 at 10:00 in the
morning. A day after, on September 8, 2006,
the counsel for the complainants herein entered
its appearance and asked for additional time to
oppose and make a comment to the Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents of David
Edward Toze.

Thereafter, the respondent
issued an Order dated September 14, 2006 that
directs the parties in the said case to maintain
the status quo ante. The complainants herein
sought the reconsideration of the Order dated
September 14, 200[6] x x x.

x x x x

On account of the Order dated
September 14, 2006, David Edward Toze was
immediately reinstated and assumed his former
position as superintendent of the International
School Manila.

The pending incidents with the
above-mentioned illegal dismissal case were
not resolved, however, the scheduled hearing
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction on
September 20, 2006 and September 27, 2006
was postponed.

On January 19, 2007, the co-
respondents of the complainants herein in the
said illegal dismissal case filed a motion for an
early resolution of their motion to dismiss the
said case, but the respondent instead issued an
Order dated February 6, 2007 requiring the
parties to appear in his Office on February 27,
2007 at 10:00 in the morning in order to thresh
out David Edward Toze claim of moral and
exemplary damages.

x x x x

The respondent on the other
maintains that the Order dated September 14,
2006 was issued by him on account of [the]
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents that was filed by David Edward
Toze, and of the Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Additional Time to File Comment
that was thereafter filed by the counsel for the
herein complainants in the illegal dismissal
case pending before the respondent.

The respondent maintains that
in order to prevent irreparable damage on the
person of David Edward Toze, and on account
of the urgency of [the] Verified Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents of David Edward Toze, and that
the counsel for respondents in the illegal
dismissal case have asked for a relatively long
period of fifteen days for a resetting, he
(respondent) found merit in issuing the Order
dated September 14, 2006 that requires the
parties to maintain the status quo ante.

x x x

The respondent argues that [the]
instant case should be dismissed for being
premature since the aforementioned illegal
dismissal case is still pending before the Labor
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission, that the instant case is
a subterfuge in order to compel the respondent
to inhibit himself in resolving the said illegal
dismissal case because the complainants did
not assail the Order dated September 14, 2006
before the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.[5]


Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that: (1) the grounds cited by the respondent to justify his issuance
of the status quo ante order lacks factual basis and is speculative; (2) the
respondent does not have the authority to issue a temporary restraining order
and/or a preliminary injunction; and (3) the inordinate delay in the resolution
of the motion for reconsideration directed against the September 14, 2006
Order showed an orchestrated effort to keep the status quo ante until the
expiration of David Edward Tozes employment contract.

Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that:

WHEREFORE, it is
respectfully recommended that the respondent
be SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar incident will be dealt with more severe
penalty.[6]


On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-644[7] which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The said resolution
further pointed out that the Board of Governors had previously
recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for three
years in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 7314 entitled Mary Ann T. Flores
v. Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr..

The respondent sought to reconsider the foregoing
disposition,[8] but it was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XIX-2011-476 dated June 26, 2011.

The case is now before us for confirmation. We agree with the
IBP Board of Governors that the respondent should be sanctioned.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a
lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
gross misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath. Thus:

Section 27. Attorneys removed
or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or wilful
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (emphasis
supplied)


A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.[9] Gross misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or
flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of a person concerned with the
administration of justice; i.e., conduct prejudicial to the rights of the parties
or to the right determination of the cause. The motive behind this conduct is
generally a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.[10]

Intrinsically, the instant petition wants this Court to impose
disciplinary sanction against the respondent as a member of the bar.
However, the grounds asserted by the complainants in support of the
administrative charges against the respondent are intrinsically connected
with the discharge of the respondents quasi-judicial functions.

Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted that the respondent, as a
labor arbiter, is a public officer entrusted to resolve labor controversies. It is
well settled that the Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on
his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize
the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the courts, or
showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to
render him unworthy of public confidence.[11]

Thus, the fact that the charges against the respondent were
based on his acts committed in the discharge of his functions as a labor
arbiter would not hinder this Court from imposing disciplinary sanctions
against him.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to
apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In
fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the
conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer
or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such grounds.[12]

In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[13] we stressed that:

Generally speaking, a lawyer
who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a
lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this
Court as a member of the Bar.

In this case, the record shows
that the respondent, on various occasions,
during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services,
CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C.
Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G.
Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their
pending applications or requests before her
office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given
the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to
comment on the charges. We find that
respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED is of such a character as to affect her
qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a
lawyer, she ought to have known that it was
patently unethical and illegal for her to demand
sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting
action by her office.

x x x

A member of the Bar who
assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on
June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the
conduct of private practitioners alone, but
of all lawyers including those in government
service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public
servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the
public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is
subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the
public.

For a lawyer in public office is expected not
only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of
the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty
and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public
faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than
her brethren in private practice.[14]
(emphasis supplied and citations omitted)


In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr.,[15] we ruled that an
administrative case against a lawyer for acts committed in his capacity as
provincial adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional
Arbitration Board may be likened to administrative cases against judges
considering that he is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government.

This Court made a similar pronouncement in Buehs v.
Bacatan[16] where the respondent-lawyer was suspended from the practice
of law for acts he committed in his capacity as an accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board.

Here, the respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system
of our government, performs official functions that are akin to those of
judges. Accordingly, the present controversy may be approximated to
administrative cases of judges whose decisions, including the manner of
rendering the same, were made subject of administrative cases.

As a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity do not always constitute misconduct although the same acts may be
erroneous. True, a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment absent
proof that such error was made with a conscious and deliberate intent to
cause an injustice.[17]

While a judge may not always be held liable for ignorance of
the law for every erroneous order that he renders, it is also axiomatic that
when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic, lack of conversance
with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge
may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order
or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent
or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.[18]

When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to know and to simply apply it. Anything less would be constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law.[19]

In the case at bench, we find the respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.

Acting on the motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the respondent issued
the September 14, 2006 Order requiring the parties to maintain the status quo
ante until the said motion had been resolved. It should be stressed, however,
that at the time the said motion was filed, the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is already in effect.

Admittedly, under the 1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC,
the labor arbiter has, in proper cases, the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining orders. Section 1, Rule XI of the
1990 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that:

Section 1. Injunction in
Ordinary Labor Disputes. A preliminary
injunction or restraining order may be granted
by the Commission through its Divisions
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of
Article 218 of the Labor Code, as amended,
when it is established on the basis of the sworn
allegations in the petition that the acts
complained of involving or arising from any
labor dispute before the Commission, which, if
not restrained or performed forthwith, may
cause grave or irreparable damage to any party
or render ineffectual any decision in favor of
such party.

If necessary, the Commission
may require the petitioner to post a bond and
writ of preliminary injunction or restraining
order shall become effective only upon the
approval of the bond which shall answer for
any damage that may be suffered by the party
enjoined, if it is finally determined that the
petitioner is not entitled thereto.

The foregoing ancillary power
may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters
only as an incident to the cases pending
before them in order to preserve the rights
of the parties during the pendency of the
case, but excluding labor disputes involving
strike or lockout. (emphasis supplied)


Nevertheless, under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer has the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. Under Section 1,
Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, only the NLRC,
through its Divisions, may issue writs of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining orders. Thus:

Section 1. Injunction in
Ordinary Labor Disputes. - A preliminary
injunction or restraining order may be
granted by the Commission through its
Divisions pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph (e) of Article 218 of the Labor
Code, as amended, when it is established on
the basis of the sworn allegations in the
petition that the acts complained of involving
or arising from any labor dispute before the
Commission, which, if not restrained or
performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party.
(emphasis supplied)


The role of the labor arbiters, with regard to the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunctions and/or writ of preliminary injunction, at present, is
limited to reception of evidence as may be delegated by the NLRC. Thus,
Section 4, Rule X of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides
that:

Section 4. Reception of
Evidence; Delegation. - The reception of
evidence for the application of a writ of
injunction may be delegated by the
Commission to any of its Labor Arbiters
who shall conduct such hearings in such places
as he may determine to be accessible to the
parties and their witnesses, and shall thereafter
submit his report and recommendation to the
Commission within fifteen (15) days from such
delegation. (emphasis supplied)


The foregoing rule is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.
However, the respondent, in violation of the said rule, vehemently insist that
he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order. On this point, the Investigating Commissioner aptly ruled
that:

The respondent should, in the
first place, not entertained Edward Tozes
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents. He should have denied it outright
on the basis of Section 1, Rule X of the 2005
Revised Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission.

x x x x

The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter
of the Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission, should have
been familiar with Sections 1 and 4 of the 2005
Revised Rules of procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission. The first, states
that it is the Commission of the [NLRC] that
may grant a preliminary injunction or
restraining order. While the second, states
[that] Labor Arbiters [may] conduct hearings
on the application of preliminary injunction or
restraining order only in a delegated
capacity.[20]


What made matters worse is the unnecessary delay on the part of the
respondent in resolving the motion for reconsideration of the September 14,
2006 Order. The unfounded insistence of the respondent on his supposed
authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, taken together with the delay in the resolution of the said
motion for reconsideration, would clearly show that the respondent
deliberately intended to cause prejudice to the complainants.

On this score, the Investigating Commissioner keenly observed that:

The Commission is very much
disturbed with the effect of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 and the delay in the
resolution of the pending incidents in the
illegal dismissal case before the respondent.

Conspicuously, Section 3 (Term of
Contract) of the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International
School Manila provides that David Edward
Toze will render work as a superintendent for
the school years August 2005-July 2006 and
August 2006-July 2007.

The Order dated September 14, 2006 in
effect reinstates David Edward Toze as
superintendent of International School of
Manila until the resolution of the formers
Verified Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction Against the
Respondents.

Since the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International
School Manila is about to expire or end on
August 2007, prudence dictates that the
respondent expediently resolved [sic] the
merits of David Edward Tozes Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction Against the Respondents because
any delay in the resolution thereof would result
to undue benefit in favor of David Edward
Toze and unwarranted prejudice to
International School Manila.

x x x x

At the time the respondent inhibited
himself from resolving the illegal dismissal
case before him, there are barely four (4)
months left with the Employment Contract
between David Edward Toze and International
School Manila.

From the foregoing, there is an
inordinate delay in the resolution of the
reconsideration of the Order dated September
14, 2006 that does not escape the attention of
this Commission. There appears an
orchestrated effort to delay the resolution of
the reconsideration of the Order dated
September 14, 2006 and keep status quo ante
until expiration of David Edward Tozes
Employment Contract with International
School Manila come August 2007, thereby
rendering the illegal dismissal case moot and
academic.

x x x x

Furthermore, the procrastination
exhibited by the respondent in the resolution of
[the] assailed Order x x x should not be
countenanced, specially, under the
circumstance that is attendant with the term of
the Employment Contract between David
Edward Toze and International School Manila.
The respondents lackadaisical attitude in
sitting over the pending incident before him for
more than five (5) months only to thereafter
inhibit himself therefrom, shows the
respondents disregard to settled rules and
jurisprudence. Failure to decide a case or
resolve a motion within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction against the erring magistrate x x x.
The respondent, being a Labor Arbiter, is akin
to judges, and enjoined to decide a case with
dispatch. Any delay, no matter how short, in
the disposition of cases undermine the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary x x x. [21]


Indubitably, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyers oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby occasioning sanction from this Court.

In stubbornly insisting that he has the authority to issue writs
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order contrary to the
clear import of the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the respondent
violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates
lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

All told, we find the respondent to have committed gross
ignorance of the law, his acts as a labor arbiter in the case below being
inexcusable thus unquestionably resulting into prejudice to the rights of the
parties therein.

Having established the foregoing, we now proceed to
determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.

Under Rule 140[22] of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge,[23]
punishable by a fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service.[24]

In Tadlip v. Atty. Borres, Jr., the respondent-lawyer and
provincial adjudicator, found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, was
suspended from the practice of law for six months. Additionally, in parallel
cases,[25] a judge found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was meted the
penalty of suspension for six months.

Here, the IBP Board of Governors recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar incident would be dealt with
more severe penalty. We adopt the foregoing recommendation.

This Court notes that the IBP Board of Governors had
previously recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of
law for three years in A.C. No. 7314, entitled Mary Ann T. Flores v. Atty.
Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr.. This case, however, is still pending.

It cannot be gainsaid that since public office is a public trust,
the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is
more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the
government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of
public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside
their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private
activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official
functions.[26]

At this point, the respondent should be reminded of our
exhortation in Republic of the Philippines v. Judge Caguioa,[27] thus:

Ignorance of the law is the
mainspring of injustice. Judges are called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. Basic rules should be at the palm of their
hands. Their inexcusable failure to observe
basic laws and rules will render them
administratively liable. Where the law
involved is simple and elementary, lack of
conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. Verily, for transgressing the
elementary jurisdictional limits of his court,
respondent should be administratively liable
for gross ignorance of the law.

When the inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the
discharge of his functions, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position
and title he holds or he is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority.[28] (citations omitted)


WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll.
Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of his lawyers
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the IBP, as well as
the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Court Administrator who shall
circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance and likewise be
entered in the record of the respondent as attorney.

SO ORDERED.











































































































Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7027 January 30, 2009
TANU REDDI, Complainant, vs. ATTY. DIOSDADO C. SEBRIO,
JR., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Tanu Reddi (complainant), an American citizen of Indian descent and
a practicing endodontist in New York, seeks the disbarment of Atty.
Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. (respondent) for allegedly deceiving her into
giving him a total of US$ 3,000,000 for the purpose of, among other
things, purchasing several real estate properties for resale.
From the records of the case, the following facts are gathered:
Taking after her parents who had been involved in various charitable
activities in India, complainant nurtured philanthropic desires of her
own consisting primarily in opening a hospital with modern facilities in
an underdeveloped part of Asia.
1

Together with Immaculada Luistro (Immaculada), a Filipino citizen,
2

who was her assistant of over 10 years, complainant visited the
Philippines for the first time in 2000. Noting the level of poverty in the
country and the lack of medical services for the poor,
3
she decided to
put up a hospital.
4

Immaculada suggested to complainant to consider engaging in the
real estate business in the Philippines in order to speed up the
generation of funds.
5
Heeding the suggestion, complainant returned
to the Philippines in 2003 to explore opportunities in the real estate
business.
6

Complainant was introduced to respondent who would help her
acquire real properties for development and/or resale. Since she
could not acquire ownership of lands in the Philippines, respondent
advised her to use corporate vehicles to effect the purchases. Three
corporations were thus formed Tagaytay Twins, Inc., Manila Chic
Twins, Inc., and Tanu, Inc.
7

By complainants account, respondent cajoled her into buying several
parcels of land located at Tagaytay City, Las Pias City, Makati City,
Quezon City, and Pasay City. She related the details surrounding the
intended acquisition of property as follows:
Re the Tagaytay City Property
Respondent represented to complainant that his client Teresita
Monzon (Teresita) owned an untitled 27-hectare property located at
Tagaytay City. Through the Tagaytay Twins, Inc., complainant and
Teresita executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated March 21,
2003 (Tagaytay MOA)
8
prepared by respondent under which she
agreed to finance the titling of the property in the total amount of
P20,000,000, and that once titled, the property would be offered for
sale, the proceeds of which would be divided equally between her
and Teresita. Complainant thereupon made staggered payments of
US$1,000, P2,000,000, and US$36,360 to Teresita.
9

Complainant was later to discover that 996 square meters of the 27-
hectare property had been purchased by Aldio Properties, Inc. in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, which sale Teresita challenged in an
action for annulment before the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City.
In said action, respondent was Teresitas counsel of record.
10

Re the Las Pias City Property
Respondent offered to complainant the option to purchase a house
and lot located at Las Pias City, which were encumbered by a
mortgage, and which respondent represented as owned and being
sold by one Francisca Parales (Francisca)
11
to finance an urgently
needed heart surgery of her daughter.
12

On respondents advice, complainant obtained a franchise to operate
a Jollibee food outlet, with the agreement that out of the profits that its
operation would generate, she would get 50% while respondent and
Immaculada would share the remaining 50%.
13
Complainant thus sent
respondent sums of money for the acquisition of both the Las Pias
property and a franchise to operate a Jollibee outlet.
14

Re the Makati City Property
Respondent introduced complainant to a certain Mario C. Mangco
(Mangco), alleged legal officer of the intestate estate of one Faustino
Ramos (Ramos), which estate was alleged to be the owner of a real
property located at the consular area adjacent to Forbes Park in
Makati City.
15
Complainant having been interested in acquiring the
property, respondent prepared a Memorandum of Agreement (Makati
MOA) which she, together with Mangco, forged on March 20, 2004.
16

Under the Makati MOA, complainant agreed to, as she did, release
P10,000,000 representing the cost of development and titling of the
property, and payment of back taxes; and an additional P2,000,000
for the execution of the Makati MOA.
Complainant was later to learn that the property was neither owned
by the intestate estate of Ramos nor for sale.
Re the Quezon City Property
Respondent broached to complainant the idea of buying the land on
which SM North Mall in Quezon City stands, he representing that it
belongs to his client, purportedly a retired US Navy employee who
resides in Mindanao.
17
Complainant assented and transmitted large
sums of money to respondent for the purpose of, among other things,
filing a petition for injunction against SM North Mall, paying back
taxes, and titling of the land.
18

Re the Pasay City Property
Complainant sent respondent hefty amounts of money for the
purchase of a vacant lot located along Roxas Boulevard in Pasay
City, alleged to belong to Florenda Estrada (Florenda) and Alma
Mallari (Alma), but which was mortgaged to one Atty. Go to secure a
loan of P5,000,000.
19
She also defrayed expenses, on the strength of
respondents representations, to secure title to the lot, settle the
mortgage obligation, relocate squatters on the lot, and bribe a judge
to "close the transaction."
20

Complainant subsequently discovered that there was no such vacant
lot along Roxas Boulevard in Pasay City; instead, she found out that
the "vacant lot" referred to was titled in the names of Philippine Bank
of Communications (PBC) and Banco De Oro Universal Bank
(BDO).
21

In light of the foregoing developments, complainants counsel, by
letter dated December 19, 2005,
22
demanded from respondent the
return of the amount of US$3,000,000, claimed to be part of the total
sum of money she had sent to him for all the transactions that did not
come about. No amount has been returned to complainant.
Hence, spawned the filing on January 27, 2006
23
of the present
complaint for disbarment against respondent.
By his Comment, respondent admits receiving a total of US$544,828
from complainant
24
which amount he claims was used not only for the
purchase of the Las Pias property and discharge of the mortgage
thereon, but also for the setting up of the earlier mentioned
corporations, as well as for the downpayment on the Makati property
and related expenses.
25

Respondent likewise admits having represented to complainant that
the Las Pias City property belonged to one Francisca,
26
certificate of
title to which and the corresponding deed of sale signed by Francisca,
by his claim, are in his possession; but the title has not been
transferred to Tanu, Inc., as agreed, in view of complainants failure to
provide the money needed therefor, he adding that he is also
exercising his retaining lien over the Las Pias documents.
27

Specifically with respect to the Makati property, respondent claims
having paid P500,000 to Mangco representing initial payment
28

thereof.
Regarding the Tagaytay City property, respondent admits that the
Tagaytay MOA exists, and avers that it is complainant who wants to
get out of a perfected sale in order to recover her partial payment
amounting to approximately P4,000,000.
29

With respect to the Quezon City property, respondent states that he is
willing to surrender all the documents pertaining thereto, but would do
so only if complainant is first ordered to pay him his professional
fees.
30

As for the Pasay City property, respondent denies complainants
claims thereon as mere "preposterous allegations."
Following the filing by complainant of her Reply, the Court referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation/decision by Resolution of
January 22, 2007.
31

At the mandatory conference scheduled by the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline on September 13, 2007 before Commissioner Lolita A.
Quisumbing (the Commissioner),
32
respondent failed to appear
despite notice. He instead sent a representative who sought a
resetting as, allegedly, respondent was in Ilocos attending to an
important family matter.
33
The Commissioner, finding respondents
absence inexcusable, given that he had ample time to file a motion for
resetting but he did not, considered respondent to have waived his
right to participate in the proceedings.
34
Complainant thereupon
presented evidence ex-parte and submitted her position paper.
35

In her Report and Recommendation
36
submitted to the IBP Board of
Governors on December 14, 2007, the Commissioner found
respondent to have committed fraudulent acts which constitute
violations of the lawyers oath and numerous provisions of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR), viz:
1. Respondent violated CANON 1 which states: "A lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and for legal processes."
Respondent committed estafa punishable under Art. 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. With unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, he
misappropriated millions of pesos which was [sic] given to him on his
misrepresentation that such were needed for the acquisition of the
aforementioned properties.
Respondent also committed an unlawful act (i.e., falsification as part
of his fraudulent scheme) when he tampered with the Articles of
Incorporation of Tanu, Inc.. A perusal of the Articles of Incorporation
given by respondent to complainant shows that the incorporators are
Tanu Reddi, Michael Lee, Prasuna Reddy, Ahalya Devi, and Robert
Juntilla. When complainant obtained a copy of the same in
September 2005, she discovered that other names were inserted.
The names of respondent, Clarito D. Cardozo, Brian Pellazar, and
Michael Angelo Lopez were intercalated. (Exhibit "W")
2. He likewise violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which provides: "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
He engaged in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
offered properties for sale to complainant on the misrepresentation
that complainant was dealing with the true owners thereof. This is
very clear from the documents he asked complainant to sign; namely,
the Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit "D") for the Tagaytay
property, Deed of Conditional Sale (Exhibit "U") for the Pasay City
property, and Memorandum of Agreement (Exhibit "M") for the Makati
City property. The certificates of title, tax declaration and other
documents obtained by complainant from the various government
agencies reveal that all these properties aforementioned were either
fictitious, not susceptible to sale, simulated, or inexistent.
3. Respondent violated Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the CPR which
state:
"CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of
his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client."
He failed to account for the sums of money he received from
complainant and failed to return the same upon demand. (Copy of
demand letter dated 19 December 2005, Exhibit "T")
4. Respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the CPR which provides:
"A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body."
He convinced complainant to pay bribe money to our judges since, he
claims, that it is a common practice in the Philippines.
37
(Underscoring
supplied)
The Commissioner thus recommended that respondent be disbarred;
that his name be ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys; and that
he be ordered to return the total amount of US$3,000,000 to
complainant.
By Resolution of January 17, 2008,
38
the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Commissioner, with the modification that respondent was ordered to
return only the admitted amount he received from complainant
(US$544,828), without prejudice to complainants recovery of the
other amounts claimed in the appropriate forum.
The Court sustains the IBP Board of Governors, except its
findings/conclusion that respondent committed estafa and
falsification. This is not the proper forum to determine whether he
committed these offenses.
The Court finds, however, that respondents dishonest and deceitful
conduct with respect to the intended transactions, real property
acquisitions which turned out to be bogus, is sufficiently established.
It bears emphasis that respondent admits having received from
complainant at least US$544,828. He claims, however, that the
amount was used for the purchase of the Las Pias property and the
discharge of the mortgage thereon, the setting up of the corporations
earlier mentioned, and the downpayment on the Makati property and
related representation expenses therefor. The Court finds that the
claim does not lie.
All that respondent presented to account for the money is a
handwritten acknowledgment of a supposed partial payment of
P500,000 for the Makati property, purportedly executed by one
Mangco.
39
By any standard, this document is a mere piece of paper,
Mangco not having been presented, if he exists at all, to confirm that
he indeed issued the receipt. Since respondent failed to credibly
account, upon demand, for the money held by him in trust an
element of misappropriation
40
complainants claim that respondent
employed deceit on her is established.
Respondents culpability is further highlighted by his utter lack of
regard for the seriousness of the charges against him. His defenses
raised in his Comment consist mainly in bare denials. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him.
41
He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.
42
This, respondent miserably failed to do.
Respondents justification for his non-presentation of any documents
to substantiate the so-called property acquisitions that he is
exercising his retaining lien over them as, allegedly, his professional
fees have not been paid is incredible.
If those documents actually exist, and considering that his license to
practice law is on the line, respondent could have readily attached
even photocopies thereof to his Comment in order to lend a
semblance of credibility to his claim. His "retaining lien" claim remains
just that. Worse, it only amounts to an admission that he acted as
counsel for complainant; yet, he completely failed to show that in his
dealings on her behalf, he put her interests before his.
As to the recommended penalty of disbarment, the Court finds the
same to be in order.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
To reiterate, by his own admission, respondent received a total of
US$544,828 from complainant, which he could not properly account
for. The orchestrated manner in which he carried out his fraudulent
scheme, in connivance with other persons, and by taking advantage
of complainants naivete in the workings of the real estate business in
the Philippines, depict a man whose character falls way, way short of
the exacting standards required of him as a member of the bar and an
officer of the court. Thus, respondent is no longer fit to remain as
such.
The Court is mindful that disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction and, as such, the power to disbar must always
be exercised with great caution, and only for the most imperative
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar.
43
If the practice of law, however, is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, those enrolled in its ranks
should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in
their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them.
44
The requirement of
good moral character is, in fact, of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
45

The Court also sustains the order of the IBP for respondent to return
only the amount of US$544,828. While complainant submitted
documents showing her bank remittances involving different sums of
money, some of these remittances were not made in the name of
respondent.
46
And as complainant herself declares, the amount of
US$3,000,000 is a mere estimate of her total claim.
47
Thus, only the
return of the admitted amount of US$544,828 is in order. As reflected
above, complainant is not precluded from litigating her claim for any
balance due her in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, respondent Diosdado C. Sebrio, Jr. is DISBARRED,
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
He is ORDERED TO RETURN to complainant the amount of
US$544,828. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a
member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.




























































EN BANC

KELD STEMMERIK, A.C. No. 8010
represented by ATTYS.
HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and
WINSTON P.L. ESGUERRA,
Complainant, Present
:

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ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS,
Respondent. Promu
lgated:

June 16, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


R E S O L U T I O N
Per Curiam:

Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In
one of his trips to the Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty.
Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.
In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the
beauty of the country and expressed his interest in acquiring real property in
the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised him that he could
legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even
suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic,
Zambales with the assurance that the property was alienable.

Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the
property through respondent as his representative or attorney-in-fact.
Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the preparation of
the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and
received a P400,000 fee.

Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task,
complainant returned to Denmark, entrusting the processing of the necessary
paperwork to respondent.

Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between
complainant, represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa,
the purported owner of the property.[1] Subsequently, respondent prepared
and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa sold and conveyed the
property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8 million.[2] Respondent also
drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and Gonzales
stating that it was complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of
the property.[3] Complainant then gave respondent the full amount of the
purchase price (P3.8 million) for which respondent issued an
acknowledgment receipt.[4]

After the various contracts and agreements were executed,
complainant tried to get in touch with respondent to inquire about when the
property could be registered in his name. However, respondent suddenly
became scarce and refused to answer complainants calls and e-mail
messages.

When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he
engaged the services of the Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya
& Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status of the property he supposedly
bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land under
Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in Olongapo City revealed that the property was
inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military Reservation.[5]
The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to disposition or
acquisition under Republic Act No. 141.[6]

Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,[7] exerted
diligent efforts to locate respondent for purposes of holding him accountable
for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was in arrears in his
annual dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo
City.[8] Search of court records of cases handled by respondent only yielded
his abandoned office address in Olongapo City.

Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent in the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.[9] He
deplored respondents acts of serious misconduct. In particular, he sought the
expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely
misrepresenting that a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines
and for maliciously absconding with complainants P3.8 million.[10]

Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service
of notice at his last known address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled
mandatory conference. In this connection, the CBD found that respondent
abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction with
complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against
him.[11]

The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to
mislead complainant on the matter of land ownership by a foreigner.[12] He
even went through the motion of preparing falsified and fictitious contracts,
deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he collected
P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and
absconded with it.[13]

The CBD found respondent to be nothing more than an
embezzler who misused his professional status as an attorney as a tool for
deceiving complainant and absconding with complainants money.[14]
Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence
reposed by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of
respondent.[15]

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and
recommendation of the CBD with the modification that respondent was
further required to return the amount of P4.2 million to respondent.[16]

We agree with the IBP.

SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE OF
THE DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS


We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given
notice of the disbarment proceedings against him? Yes.

The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor
did he appear during the scheduled mandatory conference. Respondent in
fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in Olongapo City, after
he committed the embezzlement.

Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his
disappearing act. He can neither defeat this Courts jurisdiction over him as a
member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the mere ruse of
concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders
and processes on respondents office was sufficient notice to him.

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him
impossible, the notice requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus
considered to have waived it. The law does not require that the impossible be
done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.[17] The law obliges no one to perform
an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in
accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.[18]

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by
informing the IBP National Office or their respective chapters[19] of any
change in office or residential address and other contact details.[20] In case
such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential
address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute
sufficient notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings
against him.


RESPONDENTS ADMINISTRATIVE INFRACTIONS
AND HIS LIABILITY THEREFOR

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to
promote respect for the law and uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and
women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that the law functions to
protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.

Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of
the legal profession and has been found wanting.

Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is
also guilty of culpable violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the code of ethics of the legal profession.

All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws
and to do no falsehood.[21] That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor
hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be upheld and kept inviolable at
all times.[22]

Lawyers are servants of the law[23] and the law is their
master. They should not simply obey the laws, they should also inspire
respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy of
emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.


Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947
case Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[24] to mean that under the Constitution,
aliens may not acquire private or agricultural lands, including residential
lands. The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional policy.[25]

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a
fundamental constitutional policy, showed disrespect for the Constitution
and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared spurious documents
that he knew were void and illegal.

By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the
property to complainant and that de Mesa thereafter sold the property to
Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of complainant, he
falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy
Law.[26]

Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising
complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in
the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable,
respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due
regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he
deceived complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for
services that were both illegal and unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing
and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for the purchase
of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in
nature.

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he
committed unethical act after unethical act, wantonly violating laws and
professional standards.

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath
and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed
the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL
OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD
IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES
FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis supplied)

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the
law and uses his legal knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great
prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to the rule of law and to
the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and degrade
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything
that the legal profession stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name
and make laymen support Dick the Butchers call, Kill all lawyers![27] A
disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged from the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby
DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to immediately strike out the
name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant
Keld Stemmerik the total amount of P4.2 million with interest at 12% per
annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution until full payment.
Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment
of the amount within ten days from payment.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to
locate Atty. Mas and file the appropriate criminal charges against him. The
NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report the progress of its action in
this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant
who shall forthwith record it in the personal file of respondent, the Court
Administrator who shall inform all courts of the Philippines, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its chapters and
members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic
of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.