Buddhism as a Supplementation for Care Ethics

Tayler Moosa
PHIL 8200












Care ethics is a proposed ethical system arising in feminist philosophy as a response to
typical justice-oriented models. Dr. Joan C. Tronto states the following descriptive analysis of
care ethics: Caring suggests an alternative moral attitude. From the perspective of caring, what
is important is not arriving at the fair decision, understood as how the abstract individual in this
situation would want to be treated, but at meeting the needs of the particular others or preserving
the relationships of care that exist.
1
In place of the autonomous and ontologically isolated
individual, care ethics places at the foundational level the relationships that exist between
particular individuals. Dr. Nel Noddings states that this care for the other is a natural impulse that
must then be consciously chosen in order to be actualized.
2
Arising from the focus on
relationships, there are two roles within care ethics, the carer and the cared-for, and this dyad
forms the core structure of this ethical system. In this paper, I am arguing that the critiques raised
against care ethics from both within and outside of feminism, while valid concerns, can be
resolved through a borrowing of basic Buddhist tenets that are both easily adoptable and
necessary to fill the conceptual holes in this still-developing ethical system.

Concerns

Even though care ethics introduces valid points of concern typically left unaddressed by
ethical systems focused solely on justice, care ethics as a proposed ethical system has been
criticized for its seeming inability to function as a comprehensive system from both outside

1
Joan C. Tronto, Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality from
Caring?, Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, ed. Virginia Held (1989,
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 105.
2
Nel Noddings, Caring, Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, ed. Virginia
Held (1984, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 13.
feminism as well as within. The criticisms range from claims that care ethics simply needs
further development to account for its shortcomings to claims that care ethics, instead of being a
stand-alone system, belongs within another ethical system.
34
A prominent concern facing care
ethics, addressed by Dr. Alison Jaggar, is that this ethical theory presupposes knowledge of the
good of the cared-for held by the carer. Jaggar illuminates this potential problem by referencing
instances of child molestation and feet binding. Jaggar states, Incestuous fathers often portray
themselves as caring for their daughters, even as nurturing or initiating them, and the Chinese
women who bound the feet of their daughters and granddaughters also equated the pain they
caused with care.
5
In each situation, the parents role as caregiver is used to justify the acts of
supposed care; the molesting of the child has the claimed goal of initiating the child and the
binding of the childs feet has the supposed benefit of creating a more aesthetically pleasing
physique, even though the harm that both practices cause is evident. As care ethics focuses on
those within a relationship taking care of one anothers needs, the aforementioned examples
point to a needed method of evaluating what is good for the cared-for.
This problem seems easily resolved through communication; one can simply ask the
other what the other needs before attempting to provide for them. Jaggar points to other care
ethicists who place communication as a potential corrective for this lack of prescriptive process
for understanding the good of the cared-for, but this is immediately insufficient when one
analyzes the relationship between the parent and child. The parent does not consult the child
when attempting to put together a meal, as the child does not know what is nutritionally

3
Alison Jaggar, Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason, Justice and Care: Essential
Readings in Feminist Ethics, (1995, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).
4
Alan Thomas, Virtue Ethics and An Ethics of Care: Complementary Or In Conflict?(Eidos
14 ,2011).
5
Jaggar, Justice and Care, 192.
adequate. The relationship between parent and child shows that communication is not sufficient
in that particular relationship to determine the needed good of the cared-for, but there are also
problems with assuming that communication is sufficient for various other relationships as well.
Communication with another conveys only what the other wants to present, not what is
necessarily true. Relying on communication to determine the needs of the other necessarily
presupposes that the cared-for both knows what is needed and is willing to convey those needs
over the conveyance of arbitrary wants.
A second problem is that of the possible self-abnegation found in Nell Noddingss
account of necessary engrossment within an ethic of care.
6
The foundation of care ethics resides
in the relationship between the individuals that constitute a relationship and the prescriptive
action is from the carer to the cared-for. Within this system, it is easy to see how critics of care
ethics point out that a focus on caring for others based on the needs of the other can easily lead to
a point of self-abnegation where the caring individual does not take into account ones own
wellbeing. Noddings attempts to address this concern by contrasting engrossment within care
ethics against agapism, stating that, If caring is to be maintained, clearly, the one-caring must be
maintained. She must be strong, courageous, and capable of joy.
7
Noddings makes this claim,
but she offers nothing structural within the framework of care ethics to solidify this idea
otherwise only intuitively accepted.
This concern interestingly points to a potential weakening in the progress for gender
equality as women socially relegated to care-oriented obligations are seemingly justified by such
a system of ethics. For example, the wife may tell herself that she is acting in accordance with an
ethic of care by tending consistently to the perceived needs of he husband and children, even to

6
Thomas, Virtue Ethics, 145.
7
Noddings, Justice and Care, 26.
the extent that she is denying herself opportunities to flourish as an individual. If confronted with
Noddingss statement that the carer must be strong, courageous, and capable of joy, the wife can
justifiably state that she is joyful, strong, and courageous through her self-sacrifice. In short,
Noddingss response to this criticism is not sufficient to dismiss concerns that those acting as the
carer in various relationships will become so engrossed within the relationship with the other that
the carers self is all but lost.
A third concern is that care ethics cannot effectively apply to large-scale concerns. A
necessary component of care ethics maintains that there must exist a personal relationship
between the carer and the cared-for. This relationship must exist as something more meaningful
than the superficial acknowledgement that we are all connected through causal rippling; I cannot
be a carer for someone I do not personally know. This is intuitively apparent as I have a better
chance of knowing what is good for those I personally know than what is good for a stranger,
and my finite resources cannot be dispersed to fulfill the needs of everyone, even if I were able
to know the needs of everyone. It thus seems that being ethically concerned and responsible for
others not within my realm of personal relationships is prohibited.
Dr. Alan Thomas criticizes the concern about the lack of predefined limits for
engrossment and states that the perceived shortcomings of care ethics show that it is insufficient
as a comprehensive ethical system and should thus be subsumed under virtue ethics.
8
His
proposed subsummation of care ethics into virtue ethics does not address the concerns
confronting care ethics, but he instead proposes to use care ethics as a corrective within the
virtue ethics system by drawing attention to the otherwise unaccounted for vulnerable individuals
in the community. While there are surely certain focuses presented by care ethics that would

8
Thomas, Virtue Ethics.
benefit the virtue ethics system, the general relegation of an ethical system to a simple corrective
function necessarily detracts from the value offered by care ethics.
Instead of faulting the ethical systems structure for the holes shown through various
critiques or promoting the subsummation of care ethics into another system, Jaggar states that
care ethics is not lacking the resources but is lacking the development needed to address these
concerns. Specifically with regard to the concern about the assumed good of the cared-for, she
sates, The care perspective is not necessarily without resources for addressing this issue, but so
far few care theorists have given it more than perfunctory attention, perhaps because they have
not yet clearly acknowledged it as a problem.
9
I remain hesitant to accept that the resources are
already available for care ethics to answer these criticisms, however, so long as it maintains its
general structure. As long as it is the responsibility for the carer to act in a way to increase the
good of the cared-for, a theory for how that knowledge is gained is necessary; however, as it has
already been shown, the method of assuming and the method of inferring from conversation are
both evidently insufficient and lead to actions that are detrimental to the cared-for.
Before it can be shown that Buddhism can provide the resources to respond to these
criticisms of care ethics, a preliminary description of the key components of Buddhism needed
for this project will be provided.

A Two-Pronged Introduction Into Buddhist Thought

The origin story of Buddhism, telling the tale of the prince who, reacting to the perceived
suffering in the world, founded a philosophical movement motivated by the goal to end

9
Jaggar, Justice and Care, 192.
suffering, places suffering as the primary concern for the entire tradition.
10
After recognizing the
suffering in the world, the prince left his home and eventually came to a tree, under which he
meditated for six days until he had achieved enlightenment. Directly following his
enlightenment, the Buddha gave his first sermon in which he outlined the Four Noble Truths and
the primary goal of Buddhism: the cessation of suffering.
11
The first of the Four Noble Truths
states that suffering exists, and the following three explain the origin of suffering and the method
of resolving it.
12
For the ways in which I propose Buddhism can benefit care ethics, a thorough
understanding of the philosophical tradition is not needed; however, there are two main concepts
within Buddhism that will benefit care ethics in ways that will respond to the criticisms
previously addressed, and the first is the acknowledgement of suffering and the desire to lessen
and eventually end suffering. With this goal in mind, the Buddhist does not strive to promote the
goods of the other as seen in care ethics but instead strives only to act when those actions will
not increase suffering.
The second main concept of Buddhism needed for this project is the understanding of
interconnectivity arising from the dependent origination.
13
Dependent origination is essentially
the claim that nothing in existence exists in isolation. Focusing on causal relations that bring all
things into existence, the Buddhist tradition recognizes that all things currently in existence come
from things that were and will cause the arising of the things that will be. This relationship is

10
!"amoli. The Life of the Buddha: According to the Pali Canon. (Seattle: BPS, 2001).
11
Charles F. Horne, The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East: With Historical Surveys
of the Chief Writings of Each Nation, vol. 10 (New York: Parke, Austin, and Lipscomb, 1917).
12
Bstan-#dzin-rgya-mtsho, The Four Noble Truths: Fundamentals of Buddhist Teachings
(London, England: Thorsons, 1997).
13
Th$pw$th% Phra and Bruce Evans, Dependent Origination: The Buddhist Law of
Conditionality (Bangkok, Thailand: Buddhadhamma Foundation, 1994).
understood horizontally as well; my actions affect those around me and those affected
individuals subsequently affect others in ways that can be partially contributed to my actions.
In Buddhism, the idea of dependent origination arises from impermanence, one of the
three marks of existence discussed in the Buddhas first sermon and the ontological claim that all
individuals consist of various, constantly changing parts.
14
The Buddha makes the claim that all
things are impermanent, and that the self is, instead of the standard conception of the atomistic
entity, comprised of five components, or aggregates, that collectively constitute the self. A prime
example of this ontological claim can be found in the discussion Buddhist sage Nagasena has
with King Milinda.
15
Nagasena parallels the self to a chariot and claims that the chariot is not any
of its parts or all of its parts sitting on the ground; the chariot only exists when all of the parts are
functioning and interacting in a certain way, and he states that the self is no different.
While Buddhism is diverse philosophical system with various branches and practices, the
aforementioned aspects are considered core tenets that exist from the Theravada tradition to the
Zen traditions found within the Mahayana tradition, and it is from these core concepts that care
ethics can benefit.

A Supplementation From Buddhism

Buddhist tradition provides a strong response to the concern of the good of the cared-for
through its core focus on the cessation of suffering. In the examples given by Jaggar, the parent
binding the daughters feet and the father molesting the daughter both are argued by the carers as
ethically sound under the notion that the parents are fulfilling certain needs had by their children.

14
Horne, The Sacred Books.
15
T. W. Rhys Davids, The Questions of King Milinda. (New York: Dover Publications, 1963).
This view is focused on actively benefiting the cared-for, and there is in each situation an
acknowledged, though perverse, reason; for example, there are those who find the small foot size
of women important and thus the daughter who has been bound as a child may have a better
chance of finding a husband. The problem with these examples is not that there is no benefit with
these actions but that there is a detrimental component that far outweighs whatever possible
expected benefit could arise from these actions. The core of the problem is thus that the carer is
committing these actions for one of two purposes. Either the parent is acting in a way that is
desired by the parent and is subsequently justified by a proposed benefit without an
acknowledgement of the ways in which that action is detrimental to the cared-for, or the parent is
acting with a good intention but is inadequately weighing the benefit against the harm caused by
the action. In either case, the end result of the carers action on behalf of the cared-for is that the
cared-for is caused suffering by the action of the carer.
As Buddhisms focus is not on promoting a benefit but on lessening suffering, a parent
acting in accordance with this goal, instead of justifying their acts of caring for their children by
particular potential benefits, contemplates ones actions and attempts to act only in ways that
would not further the suffering of their children. In general, this is a shift from an active
promotion of the good to a passive reduction of suffering. The example of the foot binding can
be used to show this subtle difference. The parent has the understanding, whether accurate or not,
that girls who develop small feet will be more likely able to find a suitable spouse, and thus the
childs feet are bound so as to stunt the development of the feet. By focusing on the singular
potential benefit, the parent, whether intentionally or otherwise, keeps the detrimental aspects of
feet binding in the background of the mind. If the parent, instead of attempting to grant a
particular benefit to the child, were focused on lessening the suffering of the child, the
problematic aspects of feet binding would necessarily stay at the forefront of the mind.
This is not to say that a focus on avoiding suffering over seeking to provide goods is a
foolproof way to avoid making mistakes about what is best for the cared-for; instead it only
forces the carer to consider the problematic aspects of any action on behalf of the other. For a
parent to bind a childs feet while maintaining a concern for suffering, the parent must
consciously sift through all of the potential problems associated with such an action before
committing to it. While pragmatically beneficial as a way to lessen the acts of care that are
detrimental for the cared-for, this does not specifically address the problem of knowing what is
good for the other. This therefore does not answer the question proposed by Jaggar, but it may
remove the need for the asking of that question; I do not need to know what is good for the other
if I am now concerned with the causation of suffering instead of the granting of benefits.
With regard to the criticism raised against Noddingss conception of engrossment,
specifically that there is no prescribed limitation on how far ones engrossment should be and
that it potentially leads to self-abnegation, we find a response again in the main goal of
Buddhism. The goal of a lessening of suffering has already been discussed and a maintaining of
that goal has been shown to be beneficial in addressing the question of the good of the other, but
here we are going to look at suffering not in the particular sense but rather in the general sense.
In Buddhism, the goal is to lessen suffering, but that goal is not specifically tied to a lessening of
suffering for the acting individual or for the other; the goal of Buddhism is simply the lessening
of suffering in general. From this, it is clear how a focus on a cessation of suffering will prohibit
the arising of a self-abnegating carer.
The problem of self-abnegation is specifically that the carer will sacrifice ones own good
in order to benefit the cared-for. Translating this into Buddhist terminology, the carer will cause
suffering for oneself in order to lessen the suffering for the other. In western culture, this self-
abnegation is sometimes seen as a form of altruism and this is seen in the stereotypical American
household; when the parents come home from work and the children are done with school, the
wife begins cooking dinner while the husband drinks a beer and relaxes with the children around
the television. When the wife is done cooking, she serves dinner and then cleans the table after
the meal is done, all the while smiling at the thought of how well she is taking care of her family.
This example is not specifically used to critique a family dynamic in which one parent is doing
more total work than the other; rather, it is the self-sacrificing of the mother that exemplifies the
concerns of engrossment within an ethic of care.
While such an attitude may be glorified in American culture, Buddhisms concern with
suffering is not one that allows the actor to take on additional suffering in every instance where
the actor doing so may benefit the other. Instead, it may help to think of suffering as quantifiable,
where the goal is to lessen the total amount of suffering in a given system. Taking the
relationship established in care ethics, that between the carer and the cared-for, the carer, keeping
in mind the goal of lessening suffering in general, is now only prepared to increase ones own
suffering if the total amount of suffering between the two is lowered. This may at first seem
problematic if one compares the benefits gained by the cared-for to the suffering taken on by the
carer, but it must be remembered that the lessening of suffering is not equivalent to the
increasing of the good. In instances like the aforementioned example of the mother who self-
sacrificingly takes care of her family, the benefits she provides the family are not necessarily acts
of lessening suffering; were the children given the task of cleaning the table after dinner, those
children would not be suffering but would instead simply have additional responsibility. In
switching the concern from promoting the good to an avoidance of suffering as mentioned in the
response to the first critique, the carer is no longer in the position to play the role of self-
abnegating carer.
The third critique, that care ethics cannot address concerns of large-scale ethical
concerns, finds a response in the Buddhist conception of interconnectivity. As the dyadic
relationship in care ethics consists of the carer and the cared-for, the question of how one
accounts for the moral considerations of others, for example, affected by natural disasters on the
other side of the planet, expresses a reasonable concern; I was not ethically responsible for those
who were devastated by the typhoon in Japan in 2011 as I do not have any personal relationships
with anyone who lives there. This ethic seems a bit callous toward the vast majority of people in
existence, as I only know a relatively insignificant amount of people alive on the planet, yet this
presupposes that my actions effects are limited to the impact they have on those for whom I
care. When I accept that my actions influence those with whom I personally relate and that those
people then go and interact with others, I cannot help but see that my influence reaches much
farther than the confines of my direct relationships.
Further, the way that Buddhism understands self, that each individual is actually a
collection of components that are constantly changing, can be extrapolated to apply to the
various nations of the world. The United States government, for example, is comprised of
people, corporations, legislation, and various other components. Comparatively, the complexity
is of a higher degree when comparing the parts of a nation to the aggregates of the individual, but
it is conceptually identical; a nation is to its parts as an individual is to its aggregates. In this
view, it is evident how those in Japan can be cared for by those in America while at the same
time not requiring a modification of the focal point in care ethics. It is not our ethical duty to care
about those we do not personally know, but it is a function of the individual within a nation to act
collectively with the other constitutive parts to allow the nation to act as the carer for another
nation as the cared-for. I am therefore not ethically responsible for those whom I do not know,
but the structures in which I participate have specific ethical responsibilities to the various
structures with which they interact.

Circumventing Potential Roadblocks

It seems to be a lot to ask for the acceptance of Buddhism in its entirety only to
supplement care ethics in order to provide the needed patchwork; however, a full embracing of
the Buddhist tradition is not needed to acquire the benefits it offers. Specifically, the focus on
lessening suffering and the focus on relationships along with the acceptance of interconnectivity
are the two necessary components that are needed to aid in addressing the aforementioned
concerns, but the question immediately becomes whether these two aspects can be readily
accepted by those not in the Buddhist communities. In order for Buddhism to benefit care ethics,
the aspects needed must therefore be adoptable for their own merits instead of simply being
accepted through an adoption of Buddhism. I will now argue how this is not only feasible but
easily done.
The first potential roadblock exists in promoting an acceptance of the core philosophical
tenet of Buddhism. On the surface, it seems unlikely that anyone concerned with ethics in
general would have a problem with the goal of lessening suffering. Granted, suffering is a broad
term and the Buddhist tradition establishes attachment as the core cause of suffering; however,
this is largely irrelevant as an intuitive understanding of suffering is sufficient for the goal of
addressing the concern for presumptions of the good of the other. The focus on suffering needed
to supplement care ethics is a causal concern, not a conceptual one; there is no essential need for
care ethics to adopt the underlying causes of suffering proposed by Buddhism in order to use the
general goal of Buddhism. Care ethics practitioners need only contemplate the potential effects
of their actions for the cared-for with regard to suffering, and this proposed methodological shift
is not founded on concerns of attachment and desire that are found in Buddhist doctrine. The
benefits of this shift in focus have already been described as pragmatically beneficial and the
origin for such a reconceptualization of focus is inconsequential.
With regard to the interconnectivity found in Buddhism, there is already a strong
congruence to be found in care ethics. Care ethics, focusing on the relationships existing between
individuals, is already in line with the Buddhist focus on relationships, with the only difference
being that Buddhism naturally expands the influences of actions through relationships beyond
where both care ethicists and critics of care ethics allow. The acceptance of the interconnectivity
found in Buddhism needed in care ethics is thus simply a matter of scope; both schools of
thought promote the focal primacy on relationships, though Buddhism takes this view and
applies it in a broader sense to show the effects of the carer as ripples in a pond arising from a
fallen stone instead of simply ending with the effects felt by the cared-for. Showing the extension
of a focus on relationships to the level of interconnectivity found in Buddhism does give rise to a
potential concern that only those steeped in Buddhist tradition can do this as they accept the
foundational ontological claims about impermanence that aid in the acceptance of
interconnectivity, but there is illuminating work that shows how this is not necessarily only an
accepted notion in Buddhism.
Psychologist Richard Nisbett, in The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners
Think Differently. And Why, discusses the focus on relationships previously attributed to
Buddhist tradition as a component of eastern cultures in general.
16
This focus on relationships in
eastern cultures is evident even in linguistic development. Nisbett notes that children raised in
eastern cultures learn verbs at a higher rate than children in western cultures; where western
languages are concerned with objects, eastern languages are focused on the relationships
between objects.
17
This shows that, while Buddhism represents this focus, a concern for
relationships is not uniquely held by a specific philosophy and is instead accepted by various
communities, though predominately on the side of the globe opposite of the origins of care
ethics. Philosopher Thomas Kasulis, in Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural
Difference, notes this cultural difference as a divide between the integrity orientation, found in
western cultures, and the intimacy orientation, found in eastern cultures.
18
The integrity
orientation is reduced to a conception of self that maintains the individual as an atomistic unit,
while the intimacy orientation is founded on the conception of self that places relationships as
necessary components of the self. This conception of self within the intimacy orientation shows
the value of relationships ingrained in eastern cultures as illuminated by Nisbetts following
claim: In Korean, the sentence Could you come to dinner? requires different words for you,
which is common in many languages, but also for dinner, depending on whether one was
inviting a student or a professor. Such practices reflect not mere politeness or self-effacement,

16
Richard E. Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think
Differently-- and Why (New York: Free Press, 2003).
17
Ibid., 149.
18
Thomas P. Kasulis, Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference (Honolulu:
University of Hawai'i Press, 2002).
but rather the Eastern conviction that one is a different person when interacting with different
people.
19

This point of cultural orientation illuminates two ways in which care ethics can be
developed to expand the value and understanding of the relationship between carer and cared-for.
The first is that the relational worldview founding the notion of interconnectivity is already more
broadly accepted than just within the Buddhist communities. While Buddhism has been used as
the exemplar for representing interconnectivity, the perceived ease of acceptance may increase
when it is shown that the majority of eastern cultures already subscribe to a value of relationships
over individuals; one does not have to be Buddhist to place a high level on relationships. The
second is that care ethics may find a home where a relationship-focused cultural orientation
exists but feminism is underrepresented. Were care ethicists to promote such a system in an
environment lacking feminist representation that may still be highly receptive to the ethic, it may
function as a method of introducing feminism into the East.
In summation, the aspects of Buddhism that strengthen care ethics are intuitively
acceptable by anyone already accepting care ethics as a viable ethical system. The desire to
remove suffering is obviously a concern for all concerned with ethics, and the conception of
interconnectivity is easily seen as an extension of the already accepted focus on relationships in
care ethics. Through slight modification of focus in care ethics, the criticisms mentioned in this
paper can be adequately responded to without sacrificing the autonomy of the care ethics system,
and through a recognition of the already present similarities between care ethics and both
Buddhism and the cultural orientation from which Buddhism developed, care ethics may have a

19
Nisbett, The Geography of Thought, 52-53.
definitive path of progression as it enters the realm of permanency as a contending ethical
system.





















Bibliography

Bstan-#dzin-rgya-mtsho. The Four Noble Truths: Fundamentals of Buddhist Teachings. London,
England: Thorsons, 1997.
Davids, T. W. Rhys. The Questions of King Milinda. New York: Dover Publications, 1963.
Horne, Charles F. The Sacred Books and Early Literature of the East: With Historical Surveys of
the Chief Writings of Each Nation ... Vol. 10. New York: Parke, Austin, and Lipscomb,
1917.
Jaggar, Alison, Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason, Justice and Care: Essential
Readings in Feminist Ethics, 179-202. Edited by Virginia Held, Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1995.
Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu:
University of Hawai'i Press, 2002.
!"amoli. The Life of the Buddha: According to the Pali Canon. Seattle: BPS Pariyatti Editions,
2001.
Nisbett, Richard E. The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently
and Why. New York: Free Press, 2003.
Noddings, Nel, Caring, Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, 7-30. Edited
by Virginia Held, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.
Phra, Th$pw$th%, and Bruce Evans. Dependent Origination: The Buddhist Law of Conditionality.
Bangkok, Thailand: Buddhadhamma Foundation, 1994.
Thomas, Alan. Virtue Ethics and An Ethics of Care: Complementary Or In Conflict? Eidos 14
(2011): 132-151. Print.

Tronto, Joan C., Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality from
Caring?, Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, 101-115. Edited by
Virginia Held, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995.