Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO B. GUEVARA, PIO
PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO M. SERRANO, and ROMAN
OZAETA, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano for themselves and for
other petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of Congress)." The suit was instituted by the Philippine
Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated under Philippine
laws, by way of a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines
and the disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from countersigning the
checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former Member of the House of Representatives
of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent
disbursing officers of the House and Senate, respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said retirement
and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the retirement of the
members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and void. The challenge to the
constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the
bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the
members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire
after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of
the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only
equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress
are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-
SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred eighty-six, as amended by
Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further amended to read as follows:
"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at least twenty years of service.
The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions plus interest and the payment of the
corresponding employer's premiums described in subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without interest, be only a
gratuity equivalent to one month's salary for every year of service, based on the highest rate received, but not to exceed
twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or employee has been in the service of the said employer or
office for at least four years immediately preceding his retirement.
"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and to an elective officer of either
House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case of a Senator or Member, he must have served at
least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a member of the House of Representatives, and, in the case of an elective
officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, not less than four years of which
must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided, That the gratuity payable to a retiring senator, member of
the House of Representatives, or elective officer, of either House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four
years of service in the government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable to
attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to provide the necessary
appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of appropriations or savings in its appropriations or saving in
its appropriations.
"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall be entitled to the commutation
of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate received, which they may have to their credit at the
time of retirement."
SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 22, 1963.
The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer on September 8, 1964, and contends,
by way of special and affirmative defenses that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner
does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21, Article VI, of the Constitution
that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill.
3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.
4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who are authorized to approve vouchers for
payments for funds under the law in question, and the claimants to the vouchers to be presented for payment under
said items, were not included in the petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for
computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by Congressmen Marcial R. Pimentel of
Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was
referred to the Committee on Civil Service. which on the following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129,
recommending approval of the bill with amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as filed
representing the number of years that a senator or member must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under
the bill must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE SAME
(referring to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT
OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF REINSTATEMENT OR REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the
bill with the proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on third reading on May 13, 1963,
and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it without amendment. The bill
was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As explained in the EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others
The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, as amended, will enable them to retire
voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a minimum of twenty years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure
the security of the family of the retiring member of Congress with the latter engaging in other activities which may
detract from his exalted position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is expected that with this assurance of security for his
loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men will be attracted to serve their people in Congress.
As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a Member of the
House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire regardless of age. To be eligible
for retirement, he must have served for at least twelve years as such Senator and/or as member of the House of
Representatives. For an elective officer of either House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years,
of which not less than four years must have been rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the
employer or office concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government. Said
gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case of reinstatement or
re-election of the retiree.
First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute this action. This Court has not
hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court has repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in
this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to
bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary, G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802
[1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders from all walks of life
whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among other things, that
"there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the taxpayers, laws providing the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of the
taxpayers."
1
This legislation (Republic Act 3836) involves the disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
ofMassachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
... the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different. His interest in the moneys
of the Treasury partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources is shared with millions of others; is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation of any payment out of the funds, so
remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of equity.
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American Jurisprudence, thus
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a
statute the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)
As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the Solicitor General is untenable.
Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in Art. VI, section 14 of
the Constitution.
The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which
reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an
annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or
allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the
House of Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of
the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation
of sixteen thousand pesos (emphasis supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations and prohibitions upon
the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their respective seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil office which may have been
created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while they were members of Congress; (Section 16,
Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the Government is accused.
(Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members of Congress to have
any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be favored by any law or resolution authored
by them during their term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these limitations and
prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or application of the principle of the and
balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our Constitution. In the light of this background, can We conclude
that Congress can validly enact Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without violating the
provisions in the aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the compensation act
including other emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral body) was fixed at
P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the enactment of the 1940 Constitutional
amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly, was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the salary for the
Members of Congress was raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation
for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum, but it embodies a special proviso
which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of
all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the
original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,
no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected
subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco,
Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)
This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding against the temptation
for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original strict prohibition was modified by the
subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were approved in 1940
2

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other
emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefits as provided
for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term "other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment;
that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees
and perquisites.
3

In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites;
advantage, gain, public or private." The gain, profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition or significance
of the word "emolument" as applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit, or advantage which
is pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897, 90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106
A.L.R. 767)
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed 234 N.Y. 548, 138
N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement allowances are part of compensation of public officials;
otherwise their payment would be unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in Article 4, section 9, of the
Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or Representative shall hold any office, the emoluments of which
have been increased during the session of the Legislature of which he was a member, until after the expiration of his
term of office in the Legislature, the word "emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but includes fees and
compensation as the incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive because he holds such office and performed
some service required of the occupant thereof."
From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument,
because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act 3836 are patently
discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. (Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the governors of provinces
and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective officials of the municipalities and chartered cities.
The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully explained by Us in the case ofPeople
v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to be reasonable must be based upon substantial
distinctions which make real differences and must be germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p. 1937, the principle of the
requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly situated. Why limit the application of the benefits
of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of Congress? We feel that the classification here is not reasonable. (See
also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed. [1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [1938-62], p. 789; The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after serving twelve years, not
necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and employees are given retirement benefits after serving
for at least twenty years. In fact, the original bill of Act 3836 provided for twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit irrespective of their
length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836, because of no age limitation, a Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24 years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or
equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been retired and reappointed is
suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended), this is not so under Republic Act
3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not members of the
Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under the various retirement laws have to
be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly salaries to the System.
4

The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as Members of Congress are
concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House, such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-
arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretaries and Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of
retirement without having served for twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government.
Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject matter expressed in the
act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the requirement of
paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill.
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional
provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice whatsoever to the
public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress. It
is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House,
testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and he revealed that
in 1963, Congress enacted the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1964-65,
Republic Act No. 4164, provides:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3836:
PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall
have been paid P210,000.00.
In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House of
Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P300,000.00
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act
No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.
1616 P1,300,000.00.
In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in the appropriations for the
Senate:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1616:
PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall
have been paid P100,000.00.
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to implement
Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and employees of the House Of
Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,200,000.00.
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as provided for under Republic Act
No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No.
1616 P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12, subsection (c) of
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the retirement benefits are granted to
members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of
age. This paragraph is related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In
other words, this portion of the amendment (re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers, such
as the Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth
Act 186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance
benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should be expressed in
its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise
the people, through such publication of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have the
opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied if all
parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a complete index of the
content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should be reasonably construed
so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than
technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject. (Sumulong v. The Commission on
Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and explained inCentral
Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the
Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the public domain or whether its provisions also extended to
agricultural lands held in private ownership. The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as
indicated in its title, and did not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the
Constitution expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to
Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any statute not conforming to this constitutional
provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164;
5
See also Agcaoili v.
Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said Republic Act 3836 is void
as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition regarding increase in
the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and third, the prohibition that the title of a
bill shall not embrace more than one subject.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null and void, in so far as it
refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials thereof, as being unconstitutional. The
restraining order issued in our resolution on December 6, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
=================================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections,
1
is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another
province Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's
answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The
body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan,
Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted
into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province
of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen hundred sixty-
seven general elections for local officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon,Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which
are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission
RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the
municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting
legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the
same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative
power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title
of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."
3
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact,
in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House of Representatives
4
where the bill, being of local application, originated.
5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve
the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill,
and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement, the
following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and
the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
xxx xxx xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of
the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.
7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"
8
projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao
del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has
a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-
one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two
municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the
members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of
Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of
territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not
be expressed in the title of the law." This posture we must say but emphasizes the error of constitutional
dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another
of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of
the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in
focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads: "An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions
of the law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in
the title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must
be expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" which is "manifestly germane to the subject"
of the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping
together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of
the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without
necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649.
There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of
Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following
described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted
a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of
Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands.
Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace
more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well
apply to this case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and that the
words, "in the county of Muskegon" were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted
may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of saving
the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to "challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its
provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the restriction.
As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: "The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleading."
9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the
title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."
10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took
away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning
advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is
rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld.
Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and
that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,
11

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the
valid portion if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be
so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if
they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. . . Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the invalid part of the
statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will
independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, . . . .
12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns
of Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in
the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.
13

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was
apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking
of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient
to maintain an independent municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of
municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios not nine
barrios was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of
Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the
inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the
consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the
income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations?
This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems,
or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an
undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive
community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create
Dianaton with only nine of the original twenty-one barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured.
For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to
pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional
separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the
originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of
Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.
14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal
interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that
petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the subject
of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or
interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has
been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the
law so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this
jurisdiction.
15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual
residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are fanned into the new
town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and
benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of desire to
vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before dismemberment.
Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the
community affected thereby,
16
it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to vote on the part of any
citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality of the Act as passed by
Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from
implementing the same for electoral purposes.
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent.
Hence these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of
Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body
of such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of another province were included does not of itself suffice for
a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the
insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of
Butig and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
1
This provision is similar to those found in the Constitution of many American
States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or
unconsidered enactments.
2
Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature as
well as the people should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus
precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The construction must be
reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of
the act a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its
subject find expression in its title.
3

The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a
provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank,
4
held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No.
4007, the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may
be reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner
was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously
dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal
with reorganization but with taxation. While the case ofGovernment vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a
bare majority of four justices against three, the present trend seems to be that the constitutional requirement is to be
given the liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as
desired by the majority headed by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,
5
up to and
including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,
6
the opinion coming from Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,
7
one of the grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was
predicated was the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives
was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we noted, the
paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective officers
thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits, therefore,
for these officials, would relate to a subject matter which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words,
this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the
Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No.
186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement and insurance
benefits to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note that there was no abandonment of the principle
of liberality. Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe
the constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that
the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one subject which should be expressed in his title was not
met. The subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That was embodied in the title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists
illustrious for their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the
citation from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem
controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del
Sur were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself would not have given rise to a
constitutional question considering the broad, well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial and
municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios
in two municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the newly created municipality of Dianaton,
Lanao del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios
mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can
meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new
municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur. This construction assures precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic principles underlying precedents, which if not
precisely controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v. Agregado,
8
certain provisions of the Administrative Code
were interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law."
In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,
9
this Court had a similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied
in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above principle gained acceptance at a much
earlier period in our constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re Guaria:
10
"In construing a statute enacted by
the Philippine Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an Act of
Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In
doing so, we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the apparent intention of the legislator
which would lead to the conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of Congress.
However specious the argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on
examination it is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to transcend the rightful limits
of his authority, and that his apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes
"with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid doubts as to [their] validity."
11
From the pen of the
articulate jurist, Frankfurter:
12
"Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning
that may fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle of constitutional adjudication which makes it
decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise serious constitutional questions avoided by
another." His opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief
Justices: "In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach
conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US
331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194, 198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, "if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L. ed. 598, and cases cited." The
prevailing doctrine then as set forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision,
13
is that courts "have consistently sought an
interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice Douglas, the judiciary
favors "that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of constitutionality."
14

It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the
language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open
to construction free from such peril."
15
Republic Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the
peril of nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the practical considerations clearly brought to light in the
opinion of the Court.
==========================================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO,
ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B.
PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO M.
MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y
AQUINO, ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y
NUNEZ, SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial
Fiscal of Samar for petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.

MUOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office
of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are
consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by
Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo,
presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon"
in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above
issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or
dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This is the central issue which
we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A The Information filed by the People
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree No. 9 of
Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) carving
knife with a blade of 6- inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11- inches, which the said
accused carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement necessary to earn his
livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the commission
of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in
relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an
overall length of about 8 inches, the same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor
being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and place of the
commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao, Province
of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument
which from its very nature is no such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act
committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. The Orders of dismissal
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential
element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence
of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion,
insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be
prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege that the possession of bladed weapon
charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor.
Devoid of this specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does not allege
sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in these cases under consideration
suffer from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought
to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of
course not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what
with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had
to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now
anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the
same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be assailed. But
it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the Court, and
hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves. (pp.
55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and order
throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed,
pointed or blunt weapons outside of one's residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is
one thatabets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is intended
to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that
also made the carrying of similar weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is
noteworthy that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if not carried
in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui,
contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now made unlawful and punishable, particularly by
paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it "mala
prohibita". If the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home
by law enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in order that the same
may be used by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with such a
severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going
to be used by him to earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the manner that
that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the President in promulgating this decree may thus be
perverted by some unscrupulous law enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of
extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President intended to make unlawful
and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder. (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-
32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the Information filed before him,
thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or there should be
an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence and public disorder. Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country
was issued because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to
restore the tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest
possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall
under the exception is prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable,
which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would mean the imposition of
the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying
deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for self-
preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case
before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the
Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release
unless held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of deadly weapon in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972,
RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed under a state
of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and General Order
No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly
weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in older to
attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and
decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission may
direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in
authority or their agents in the performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or
their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons, property or chastity
causing the death of the victim used in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated
under said Proclamation No. 1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/commission
may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, members
of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public or private firms, companies, corporations or entities
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned
to be used in violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, including, but
not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device consisting of any
chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents containing combustible units or other ingredients in such
proportion, quantity, packing, or bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of
all or part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or
death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years
as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," "dagger,"
"bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements
to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission of or for the
purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its maximum extent, in
addition to the penalty provided for the particular offenses committed or intended to be committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
D. The arguments of the People
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the
Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced
on the issue now under consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not
be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of
public policy.
1

The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the accused who commits the
act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not
only the carrying of said weapon in connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of
criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued
that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.
2

E. Our Ruling on the matter
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
3

Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a complaint or information to
be sufficient it must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to
prepare his defense accordingly.
4

To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative
for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists
why a specification of the statute violated is essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren
the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus,
Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or
other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent
jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in
turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months, or both, at the
discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly
character any kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public place.Consequently, it is necessary
that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city
ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and
the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9
(3).
5
P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored.
6
This
principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against
the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
7
In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a
prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being the case, the right
becomes more compelling for an accused to be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the
offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature of their judicial
functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in the body of the
Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in the presidential
decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed
weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon
was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the
statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in
the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree
is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute
when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his
residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose,
converts these cases into one of "statutory construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest
from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to
construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are
to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a presidential decree in these cases the primary rule
is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words
of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within
the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions.
8

There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in
the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos.
6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by
the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an
essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-
42050-66); that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the
decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which
prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble
or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff
sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be remedied, and
objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635,
639, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous and difficult
of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du
Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent
must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision
alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those
with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if read together with
other provisions.
9

Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to
attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and
decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to
P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for
its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted government and against our
people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed
raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and
private buildings, and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities have
seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder, turmoil
and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the forces of our duly constituted government and
the New People's Army and their satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults,
violence, murders, assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations,
arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged
to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and scheme until and unless they have fully attained
their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our
present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines
by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to the
afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v.
American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731;
emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed
with reference to its intended scope and purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the measure if a strict
adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences
were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored,
which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
9
-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a
hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to
impose hardship on another, and so on.
10

At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons brought
to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen - of
course not all can be so heartless now have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what
with the terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-minded peace officer had
to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the coercive message of one year in jail, now
anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the
same purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his
example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house
remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the
street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books
him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable,
and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited."
11
The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a
precise definition of forbidden acts.
12

Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within
them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36
Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning
of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged
therein.
13
Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is
in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the complaint or information
when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment was rendered knowing
it to be unjust, is fatal.
14

In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of the Court
affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not constitute a public
offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145.
15

G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of other available remedies
below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. If the motion to quash is sustained the court may order
that another information be filed. If such order is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be
admitted to bail. If such order is not made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be
specified in the order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if in
custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without
leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information to include the second
element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in
the Information do not constitute a punishable offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be
given an opportunity to amend the Information.
16

Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted
earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the
cases, the dismissal was made prior to arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was
based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the criminal action or liability
had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all these cases should new
complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the government true to the
oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating the particular
circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the
prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe
penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on
October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed weapons,
specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the
serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9.
17

Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task
and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of
an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the
fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which
renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or
quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this
Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential
Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.


Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring.
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending the
information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.


Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring.
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible, without the need of amending the
information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:
I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the
Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
===========================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as
complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II, ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO
OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S SUELLO,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to
agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975) provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine
of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information
against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteen informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon,
province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and
claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease
Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating
has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied
for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes and Modesto Suello
were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833
and 1839, respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dated December 9, 1977
dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through
"stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or
threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem
generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy" the expression "with
threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal
asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decree does not include
agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the
affluent class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble
shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in
squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972,
directing the Secretaries of National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of
Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors,
City and Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on
and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and private
property." squatting is still a major problem in urban communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the
affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this illegal and nefarious practice.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and private property. It is
complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for the relocation of squatters in the interest of public
health, safety and peace and order.
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this
case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly
enter or occupy public agricultural lands. That law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals
under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the
Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title
thereto still remains in the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to
commit such acts.
Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the
intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-50).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Abad Santos, J., concur.
=========================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
June 30, 1947
G.R. No. L-239
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLONIO CARLOS, defendant-appellant.
Vicente J. Francisco, Felicisimo Ocampo and Alberto V. Francisco for appellant.
Office of the First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Tomacruz for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced toreclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of
P7,000, and costs.
The findings of the People's Court are not assigned as errors or disputed.
The lower court found that one day in July or August, 1944, about two or three o'clock in the morning, a truck pulled up
to the curb in front of a house on Constancia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, where one Martin Mateo lived. From the truck
the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese military police and pointed Martin
Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into
Martin Mateo's dwelling first and Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo
and Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck. Along with other persons who had been rounded up in
the other places and who had been kept in the truck while it was parked, they were taken to Fort Santiago where the
two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were released six days later. The reason for the arrest
and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother,
Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and
tortured because he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected.
The defendant in this instance invokes only questions of law. He assigns four alleged errors, viz.:
I. The lower court erred in not holding that the accused cannot be convicted of the offense of treason committed against
the government of the United States and of the Philippines, because it is a settled principle in international law that in a
territory actually under the authority of the enemy, all laws of political complexion of the previous government are
suspended, and are without force and inasmuch as the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines defining and penalyzing the crime of treason are all of political complexion, they were suspended and had no
binding effect whatsoever upon the inhabitants in the said occupied territories.
II. The People's Court erred in not declaring the accused could not have violated the Philippine law on treason, because
it is also a settled principle in international law that in such occupied territories all laws inconsistent with the occupation
are being likewise suspended and without force and effect over the inhabitants, and since the laws of the United States
and the Commonwealth of the Philippines defining and penalyzing treason against the said government are by their very
nature evidently inconsistent with the said occupation of the Philippines by the Imperial Japanese forces, the said laws
must be deemed as having been suspended and without force and effect upon the Filipinos, during the said occupation.
III. The People's Court erred in not holding that the accused herein cannot be convicted of the crime of treason
committed against the government of the United States and of the Philippines, because it is settled principle in
international law that once the territory is so occupied by the enemy, the allegiance is as a legal obligation
distinguishable and distinguished from loyalty of the inhabitants therein to the former government or governments is
temporarily suspended, and it being necessary and essential for the commission of the offense of treason against the
United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines that the supposed offender should owe allegiance to said
government at the time of the alleged offense, it follows that the accused cannot possibly be chargeable with treason
against the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines for acts allegedly committed by him in the territory
of the Philippines actually occupied by the Japanese during said occupation.
IV. The decision rendered in this case should be reversed and, set aside, because the law creating the People's Court is
unconstitutional.
The questions propounded in the first, second and third assignments of error were squarely raised and decided in the
case of Laurel vs. Misa (77 Phil., 856). That decision controls this appeal so far as the pleas of suspended allegiance and
change of sovereignty are concerned. On the strength thereof, the first three assignments of error must be overruled.
The fourth assignment of error attacks the law creating the People's Court as unconstitutional. Numerous provisions of
the People's Court Act are singled out as contrary to the Organic Law. But in formulating many of his propositions the
appellant has not indicated the reasons or the authorities which sustain them. We shall dispose of them as briefly as
they are presented. For better understanding, we shall reproduce the appellant's propositions and will comment on
them separately.
The brief says:
(a) It (People's Court Act) contains provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed in
its title, such as:
(1) The first proviso of section 2 thereof, which retains the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to try and decide
cases of crimes against national security committed during the second world war not filed within six months,
notwithstanding the fact that according to its title, the People's Court is precisely created for that purpose, and
impliedly, the People's Court jurisdiction in regard to said crimes is exclusive;
(2) The second proviso of the same section which grants the People's Court jurisdiction to convict and sentence those
accused therein even of crimes other than those against national security, although its title does not in any way indicate
that such jurisdiction over other crimes would be granted to the said court;
(3) Section 14 thereof, which adds to the disqualifications of Justice of the Supreme Court and provides a procedure for
their substitution, a matter not indicated in any manner in its title;
(4) The first proviso of action 19 thereof, which changes the existing Rules of Court on the subject of bail although its
title speaks only of the creation of the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors; and
(5) The second proviso of the same section, which suspends the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, a
substantive law, which is not referred to in its title expressly or by implication.
The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own machinery for the indictment, trial and
judgment of treason case. The various provisos mentioned, in our opinion, are allied and germane to the subject matter
and purposes of the People's Court Act; they are subordinate to its end. The multitude of matters which the legislation,
by its nature, has to embrace would make mention of all of them in the title of the act cumbersome. It is not necessary,
and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a complete index of its contents. (Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil., 634.) The constitutional rule is satisfied if all parts of a law
relate to the subject expressed in its title.
The brief says:
(b) It deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws inasmuch as:
(1) Only those political offenders against whom cases are filed within six months from the passage of the law are to be
tried in the People's Court, while others are to be tried in the Courts of First Instance;
(2) Political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied preliminary examination and/or investigation whereas
the others who shall be entitled thereto;
(3) Political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to appeal, while those who may be accused of the
same crimes in the Courts of First Instance have absolute right of appeal inasmuch as under section 13 of the law, Rules
42 and 46 of the Rules of Court are made applicable to the latter;
(4) Appeals in the case involving persons who held any office or position under either or both the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality and/or agency thereof are to heard and decided
by a substantially different Supreme Court, thus causing lack of informity in rulings over the same subject;
(5) The first proviso of section 19 thereof prescribes a different rule as to the granting of release on bail only with
respect to the political offenders detained by the United States Army and released to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines but not as to others political offenders accused or accusable of the same crimes; and
(6) The second proviso of section 19 thereof suspends article 125 of the Revised Penal Code only as to those political
detainees released by the United States Army to the Commonwealth of the Philippines or, at most, only to those
accused or accusable of the crimes specified in the law and not as to all persons accused or accusable of crimes against
national security committed during the second world war, much less to all offenders, notwithstanding the fact that there
is no reasonable and real difference among said groups of offenders.
(1) The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency and
national security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic necessity and
other factors of public policy. Obviously, the main concerning the creation of a special court was the trial and and
disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were being held by the United States military authorities
and who were to be turned over to the Commonwealth Government. It was presumed that there were other cases of
treason not included in this number cases which might not be discovered until years afterward , and the possibility
was not overlooked that even some of the cases which the United States Army was on the eve of placing under the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Government could not be filed and submitted for trial within a foreseeable future owing to
lack of readily available evidence, absence of witnesses, or other causes. On the other hand, considerations of economy
and public interests forbade maintenance of the People's Court for an indefinite period. Under the circumstances, it was
necessary that a provision be made requiring that only cases which could be brought to court within six months and
which were deemed enough to occupy the attention of the People's Court within the limited time of its life, should be
cognizable by it, and the rest should be instituted in the proper Courts of First Instance. Such provision is not an arbitrary
and international discrimination, and does not work as a deprivation of the right to equal protection of the laws. Both in
privileges or advantages conferred, if any, and in liabilities imposed, if any, person under equal circumstances are
treated alike. It does not deprive appellant of the protection enjoyed by others failing within his class. The equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution "does not prevent a state or municipality from adjusting its
legislation to differences in situations and making a discrimination or distinction in its legislation in respect of things that
are different, provided that the discrimination or distinction has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense, that is, outside of the wide discretion which the legislative
body may exercise." (16 C.J.S., 997.) Moreover, with its associate feature the People's Court is designed to extend
greater protection to persons charged with collaboration with the enemy. If others are prosecuted before a Court of
First Instance, they and not the appellant should have cause to complain of discrimination.
(2) Section 22 in denying preliminary investigation to persons accused before the People's Court is justified by the
conditions prevailing when the law was enacted. In view of the great number of prisoners then under detention and the
length of time and amount of labor that would be consumed if so many prisoners were allowed the right to have
preliminary investigation, considered with the necessity of disposing of these cases at the earliest possible dates in the
interest of the public and of the accused themselves, it was not an unwise measure which dispensed with such
investigation in such cases. Preliminary investigation, it must be remembered, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution. For the rest, the constitutional prohibition against discrimination among defendants placed in the
same situation and condition is not infringed.
(3) For the same reasons stated before, this contention cannot be upheld. There is a rational basis for the distinction.
The employment of two modes of appellate procedure in the two classes of cases involved are, in our opinion, suitably
adapted to the differences, in their composition, between the courts from which the appeals are taken. The People's
Court is a collegiate court whereas the Court of First Instance is presided over by a single judge. Appeal is not a
constitutional but statutory right. The admitted fact that there is no discrimination among appeals from the same court
or class of court saves the provision objected to from being unconstitutional.
(4) This objection does not seem to fall within the subject of constitutional guarantee against deprivation of equal
protection of the laws. Be that as it may, we find no merit in the appellant's contention. The disqualification under the
People's Court Act of some or a majority of the members of this Court and their substitution by justices of the Court of
Appeals or judges of the Courts of First Instance do not make the Supreme Court, as thus constituted, a new court in the
eyes of the law. A court is an entity possessing a personality separate and distinct from the men who compose or sit on
it. This objection is no more valid than that of a party in an ordinary action who protests that his case is heard by a
Supreme Court which, by reason of disability of a majority of its regular members, is made up mostly of judges from
outside. As to the "lack of uniformity in rulings over the same subject," it need only be said that the Constitution does
not insure uniformity of judicial decisions; neither does it assure immunity from judicial error.
(5) and (6) The two provisos in section 19 do no constitute denial of equal protection of the laws. The distinction made
by these provisos between two sets of accused in the "granting or release on bail" and in the application of article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code are not arbitrary or fanciful calculated to favor or prejudice one or the other class. This point was
discussed at length and made clear in Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372), in which this Court explained the reasons which
necessitated the extension to six months of the authorized detention of persons charged with treason before filing of
information. The provisos rest "on some real and substantial difference or distinction bearing a just and fair relation to
the legislation." (16 C.J.S., 998.)
The brief says:
"(c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known and identified individuals or group of
individual, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any form of judicial
trial or procedure."
"The bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial." (Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall.,
232, etc.) Detention of a prisoner for a period not exceeding six months pending investigation or trial is not a
punishment but a necessary extension of the well-recognized power to hold the criminal suspected for investigation.
This proviso was held by this Court to be justified and reasonable under existing circumstances in Laurel vs. Misa, supra.
The brief says:
"(d) Section 2 thereof which purports to define the jurisdiction of the People's Court constitutes an invalid and void
delegation of legislative power which is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines by the Constitution, in so far
as said section virtually leaves unqualifiedly in the discretion of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of Special
Prosecutors the power to determine the actual cases over which the People's Court shall have jurisdiction."
Granting the correctness of the premise of this proposition, it does not follow that the authority vested in the Solicitor
General amounts to a delegation of legislative power. We do not think that the power to institute certain cases in one
court or another in the discretion of the prosecuting attorney is an exercise of legislative power. "The true distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
(Cincinnati, V. & Z. R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comr's [1852], 1 Ohio St., 77, cited in Taada on the constitution of the
Philippines, p. 291.)
The brief says:
"(e) Sections 1, 4 and 18 thereof abridge, limit and curtail the power of appointment of the President or the Chief
Executive in that
(1) Section 1 practically leaves the President with such a very small field of choice in the appointment of the members of
the court that he can hardly use his discretion in regard thereto; and
(4) Sections 4 and 18 actually designate and appoint the persons who will occupy the positions left vacant by those
appointed to the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors respectively.
The power to create offices and courts is vested in the legislative department. Subject to constitutional restrictions, the
Congress may determine on the eligibility and qualification of officers and provide the method for filing them. We find
no valid objection on constitutional ground to a law which directs that a special temporary court should be filled by
appointment by the Chief Executive himself from among judges already on the bench and/or other quasi-judicial
officers. As to outsiders who might have to be appointed by reason of insufficiency of qualified men already in the
service, the Chief Executive is left with a wide field of choice.
The theory that "sections 4 and 18 actually designate and appoint the persons who will occupy the positions left vacant
by those appointed to the People's Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors respectively" loses sight of the fact that
the positions referred to are, as a matter of fact, vacant only in theory, and for the duration of the People's Court, and
that the law does no more than say that after those judges and officers shall have accomplished their work, they shall go
back to their permanent posts.
The brief says:
"(f) The said law provides for the designation and/or transfer of judges appointed for particular districts to another place
outside of their respective districts without the consent of the Supreme Court."
Section 7 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that "no judge appointed for a particular district shall be designated
or transferred to another district without the approval of the Supreme Court. The Congress shall by law determine the
residence of judges of the inferior courts." This constitutional provision, as its language clearly states, refers to transfers
from one judicial district to another. It does not prohibit the appointment or designation of a judge from being
appointed temporarily or permanently with his consent to a court of different grade and make-up, such as the People's
Court.
The brief says:
"(g) Sections 13 and 19 thereof prescribed rules of procedure regarding appeal and bail which violate the rule of
uniformity of rules for all courts of the same grade established in the Constitution."
It is the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court which are required by section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution to
be uniform for all courts of the same grade. The People's Court is not a court of the same grade, considering many of its
special features, and its purposes, as the Court of First Instance or any other existing court in the Philippines, so that the
adoption of special rules of procedure for said court different from those applicable to Courts of First Instance is not
violative of this constitutional mandate. More than this, the last sentence of the section expressly authorizes the
Congress "to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines."
The brief says:
"(h) It is destructive of the independence of the judiciary and thereby violates the constitutional provision that the
Philippines is a republican state because:
(1) By creating a special court with jurisdiction over cases which were already within the jurisdiction of the existing
Courts of First Instance without any real necessity and urgent justification, considering that the persons involved in said
cases were more or less known and identified at the time of the creation of said special court, the law establishes a
precedent under which the legislature may at any time remove from the jurisdiction of existing courts cases involving
definite or specific individuals or groups of individuals to serve any purpose which said legislature or the legislators
composing the same may wish to accomplish, either to the benefit or damage of said individuals or groups of
individuals;
(2) By limiting the choice of the judges to compose the People's Court to those who did not hold any position in the
Philippine Executive Commission and/or the so-called Republic of the Philippines, the law makes a classification that has
absolutely no rational basis inasmuch as the reason for discriminating against those who served in said governments,
which is, that they might be prejudiced or influenced in favor of the accused exists in equal measure for those who did
not serve, in the sense that they may likewise be prejudiced or influenced against the accused; and
(3) In leaving practically in the hands of the Solicitor General the absolute right to choose, in which court he shall
prosecute the cases contemplated by the law, and in providing that the judges of the People's Court shall be chosen
from a limited group of the judges of the Court of First Instance, etc., the law does not leave a wide room for the play of
external factors in the administration of justice to those concerned but also destroys the confidence of the people in the
judiciary.
(1 and 2) These objections go to the wisdom of the law and to matters of policy. This being so, it is enough that the
Congress deemed it necessary to incorporate these provisions in Commonwealth Act No. 682. It is not the province of
the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and
exclusively a legislative concern. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 661.)
(3) This proposition is covered by and answered in our comment on paragraph (d) of the brief.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against appellant.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Hontiveros, and Padilla, JJ., concur in the result.
PARAS, J.:
I reserve my vote, the decision in the Laurel case is not as yet final.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
The appeal in this case raises only questions of law. Of the four assignments of error made in appellant's brief, the first
three are premised on the theory of suspended allegiance, and the last is premised on the theory that the law creating
the People's Court is unconstitutional.
The question of suspended allegiance was already rejected by a majority of this court in the case of Laurel vs. Misa, in a
resolution dated January 30, 1947 (77 Phil., 856), and our reasons for voting for the rejection are expressed in our
written opinion in said case.
We do not see in appellant's brief any argument which may justify the changing of our opinion in the Laurel case where,
by the way, the question of suspended allegiance appears to have been discussed, perhaps, thoroughly and exhaustibly.
Regarding the fourth assignment of error, appellant advances the following proposition: "The People's Court Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 682) is unconstitutional and void in many parts and as a whole because:
"(a) it contains provisions which deal on matters entirely foreign to the subject matter expressed on its title;
"(b) It deprives persons similarly situated of the equal protection of the laws;
"(c) It is a bill of attainder in that it virtually imposes upon specific, known, and identified individuals or group of
individuals, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months without any form or
judicial trial or procedure;
"(d) Section 2 thereof constitutes an invalid and void delegation of legislative power, in so far as it virtually leaves
unqualifiedly in the discretion of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of Special Prosecutors the power to determine
the actual case over which the People's Court shall have jurisdiction;
"(e) Section 1, 4, and 18 thereof abridge, limit and curtail the power of appointment of the President;
"(f) It provides for the designation and/or transfer of judges appointed for particular district to another place outside of
their respective district without the consent of the Supreme Court;
"(g) Section 13 and 19 thereof prescribed rules of procedure regarding appeal and bail which violate the rule of
uniformity of rules for all courts of the same grade established in the Constitution;
"(h) It is destructive of the independence of the judiciary and thereby violates the constitutional provision that the
Philippines is a republican state;
"(i) Section 14 providing for disqualification of some Justice of the Supreme Court is unreasonable in its operation."
Although it is regrettable that appellant failed to elaborate on the several grounds upon which he impugns the validity of
the law in question, upon which theory he seeks reversal of the decision of the People's Court and his acquittal from the
treason charge, such failure does not relieve us from the duty of passing upon the questions raised, much more because
they are not of passing importance. Our opinion on the several grounds relied upon by appellant to attack the validity
of Commonwealth Act No. 682 as is follows:
(a) MULTIPLICITY OF SUBJECT MATTER
On the first ground, appellant undoubtedly relies on the following provision of the Constitution:
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill. (Section 21 [1], Article VI.)
Five reasons are advanced by appellant to show that the acts violates the constitutional prohibition against multiplicity
of subject matter. We are going to deal with them separately.
(1) It is alleged that, although the People's Court has been created precisely to try crimes against national security with
jurisdiction impliedly exclusive, section 2 thereof retains the jurisdiction of courts of first instance to try and decide case
not filed within six months. We do not believe that the provision violates the constitutional inhibition. There should not
be any question that the creation of the People's Court was an answer to an unusual situation, created by the
extraordinary social upheaval provoked by the last war, demanding an uncommon solution, compatible with the tenets
of our democracy, with the provision of the Constitution, and with the noble aims of justice. The several thousands of
persons detained upon liberation charged with treason and other crimes against national security needed the creation
of a judicial machinery for the prompt disposal of their cases so as not to violate their constitutional right to a speedy
trial. It was admitted that the inferior courts then existing were not enough to cope with the situation. Those who are
guilty, should be sentenced as soon as possible, so they may expiate for the wrongs that they have committed, and
those who are innocent are entitled to be cleared without any delay. The People's Court was, therefore, created to
shoulder the burden that the courts of first instance could not bear. Congress estimate that six months was enough time
for the cases of the thousands of detainees to be filed with the People's Court, while the cases of those who have not
yet been detained, on the assumption that they will be few, there was no reason why these should not be disposed of
by the courts of first instance as is declared in the proviso of section 2. The proviso is germane with the subject matter of
the law and does not violate the prohibition against multiplicity of subject matter.
(2) The second objection is raised against the proviso authorizing the People's Court to convict and sentence those
accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence, although they are
not classified as among those committed against national security. The objection cannot be entertained. The proviso is
within the logical purview of the creation of the People's Court. The lawmaker must have had in mind the fact that
among the thousands of detainees which motivated the creation of the court there were persons who had committed
crimes other than those against national security.
Although these are the crimes preliminary in the minds of those who arrested said detainees, there is nothing unnatural
that those who committed said crimes may have also committed offenses of different nature either in connection with
the first ones or independently, and if said other offenses are included among the facts alleged in the information filed
with the People's Court and proved by the evidence, there is no reason why said court should not punish them as a court
of first instance would, it appearing that the People's Court is but a special court of first instance.
(3) The third objection points to the disqualification of certain Justice of the Supreme Court and the procedure of their
substitution as provided in section 14 ofCommonwealth Act No. 682. Although said section is, in effect, null and void as
unconstitutional, it is not enough ground to hold the whole act as unconstitutional, as said section can be eliminated
without affecting the remaining provisions of the act.
(4) The fourth objection points to the proviso of section 19, which provides for an exception concerning political
offenders in the existing rules of court on the subject of bail. Whether the proviso is valid or not, it cannot affect the
constitutionality of the whole act. If it is valid, it is within the purview of the creation of the People's Court. If it is invalid,
it can be discarded without affecting the other provisions of the law.
(5) The fifth objection points to the second proviso of section 19, suspending the provisions of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. The proviso is evidently unconstitutional. It is within the purview of the creation of the People's Court. It
creates a discrimination violative of the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. In effect, it
authorizes deprivation of liberty of the political prisoners for a period of six months, which is violated of the
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But the proviso may
be eliminated without affecting the remaining portions of the act and, therefore, is not enough ground for declaring the
whole act null and void.
Our conclusion is that the first ground attacking the validity of the law is without merit.
(b) EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
Appellant advances six reasons to show that the act violates the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the
laws.
(1) The first reason is that, under section 2, the People's Court is only to try the cases of political offenders against whom
the information has been filed within six months., while others shall be tried in a Court of First Instance. We believe that
there is no unjust discrimination in it, complain of any unjust discrimination. They will be tried by the regular tribunals
created to try all other offenses. Those who are to be tried by the People's Court cannot complain either, because said
court is but another court of first instance, although especially created for the prompt disposal of the cases of political
detainees. Congress made it collegiate as a guarantee against possible miscarriage of justice due to popular excitement
during the first months after the liberation. Congress believed that a three-person tribunal can defend itself better
against any outside pressure than a one-man tribunal.
(2) The second reason is that political offenders accused in the People's Court are denied the preliminary investigation
accorded to those who may be accused in the court of first instance. We are of opinion that the allegation is groundless.
There is nothing in the act in question depriving political offenders accused in the People's Court of the preliminary
investigation as provided by Rule 108.
(3) The third reason is that political offenders accused in the People's Court have limited right to appeal, while those
who may be accused of the same crime in court of first instance have absolute right to appeal. The allegation is partly
true. There appears a discrimination against those who may be convicted by the People's Court in banc, by providing
that they can only appeal in accordance with Rule 46, under which only questions of law may be raised. We are of
opinion that the discrimination is violative of the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, and should not be given
effect. But the unconstitutional provision may be eliminated, without annulling the whole act. In practice, the invalid
discriminating provision seems to have become obsolete as all cases in the People's Court are tried and decided in
division and not in banc.
(4) The fourth reason is that appeals in cases involving persons who held any office under the governments established
by the Japanese during the occupation are to be heard and decided by a substantially different Supreme Court. The
allegation is correct by virtue of the provisions of section 14 which is flagrantly unconstitutional because (a) the
disqualification of some members of the Supreme Court provided therein constitutes in effect partial removal form
office in open violation of the guarantees and procedure provided by Article IX of the Constitution, (b) it provides for
sitting in the Supreme Court of persons not appointed in accordance with section 5 of Article VIII of the constitution and
without the qualifications provided in section 6 of the same article, and (c) it provides for the existence of a second
Supreme Court in violation of section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution which provides for only "one Supreme Court."
But, as we have already stated, section 14 can be eliminated fromCommonwealth Act No. 682, without declaring the act
wholly unconstitutional.
(5) The fifth reason is that there is discrimination in the first proviso of section 19 as to the granting of release on bail.
We are opinion that there is no substantial discrimination.
(6) The sixth reason is the discrimination provided in the second proviso of section 19. The proviso is null and void, but it
can be eliminated without annulling the whole act. It is a denial of the equal protection of the laws and is violative of the
constitutional guarantee against deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The proviso should not be given
effect, without annulling the whole act.
(c) BILL OF ATTAINDER
Appellant alleges that Commonwealth Act No. 682 is a bill of attainder in that it virtually impose upon specific, known
and identified individuals or group of individuals, the penalty of detention and imprisonment for a period not exceeding
six months without any form of judicial trial or procedure.
The allegation is justified by the second proviso of section 19 of the act. But it cannot affect it in whole as said proviso
can be eliminated without impairing the remaining proviso of the law.
(d) DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Appellant alleges that section 2 constitutes an invalid and void delegation of legislative power in so far as it virtually
leaves unqualifiedly in the discretion of the Solicitor General and/or the Office of Special Prosecutors the power to
determine the actual cases over which the People's Court shall have jurisdiction. There is no such delegation. The
People's Court is substantially but one court of first instance, only with limited jurisdiction. Whether a case is to be tried
by the People's Court or by an ordinary court of first instance, there is no substantial difference for the purposes of the
administration of justice and the jurisdictions of both courts are specifically provided in the law.
(e) CURTAILMENT OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT OF THE PRESIDENT
Appellant's objection is directed against section 1, 4, and 18. The objection is untenable. Congress may validly provide
for the qualifications of the members of the People's Court. Section 8 of Article VIII of the constitution expressly grants
that authority.
(f) TRANSFER OF JUSTICE WITHOUT APPROVAL OF THE SUPREME COURT
Appellant alleges that Commonwealth Act No. 682 provides for the designation and/or transfer of judges to an other
place outside their respective districts without the consent of the Supreme Court, implying that section 7 of Article VIII
of the Constitution is violated. The allegation is untenable. The fact that the act authorizes the appointment of person
already holding positions in the judiciary to be members of the People's Court is no violation of the constitutional
mandate. What the authors of the Constitution contemplated were transfers from one district to another, but not
appointment of those already holding positions to other positions.
(g) UNIFORMITY OF LAWS
The objections of appellant in paragraph (g) is but a repetition of his objections in paragraph (b) already dealt with
above.
(h) INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
Appellant sets the following propositions:
1. By creating a special court with jurisdiction over cases which were already within the jurisdiction of the existing courts
of first instance, considering that the persons involved in said cases were more or less known and identified at the time
of the creation of said court, the law establishes a precedent under which Congress may at any time remove from the
jurisdiction of existing court cases involving definite or specific individuals or groups of individuals to serve any purpose
which the members of the Congress may wish to accomplish, either to the benefit or damage of said individuals.
2. By limiting the choice of the judges to compose the People's Court, the law makes a classification that has absolutely
no rational basis.
3. In leaving to the hands of the Solicitor General the absolute right to choose in which court he shall prosecute the
cases contemplated by the law and in providing that the judges of the People's Court shall be chosen from a limited
groups of individuals, etc., the law does not leave a wide room for the play of external factors in the administration of
justice to those concerned but also destroys the confidence of the people in the judiciary.
The question raised in the above three propositions are serious but none of them amounts to a violation of the
fundamental law that may nullify the law in question, as they involve a matter of public policy, although the first one
points to a situation bordering into a transgression of the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. If the provisions
of the law creating the special court should show a clear purpose of making a discrimination, pro or against those who
may be tried under it, then the law must be declared null and void in toto. Such is not the case of the law under
discussion. Matters of public policy not involving a violation of the fundamental law are within the province of Congress
to legislate, subject only to the control of the people through the electorate.
For all the foregoing, we vote to affirm the decision rendered by the lower court in this case.
===================================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 22, 1961
G.R. No. L-16950
SIMEON T. GARCIA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ARTURO B. PASCUAL, Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, EULOGIO STA. MARIA, Municipal Treasurer
of said municipality and the MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE, NUEVA ECIJA, respondents-appellants.
Cezar Francisco for petitioner-appellee.
Cirilo V. Soriano for respondents-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Hon. Felix B. Makasiar, presiding, declaring the
appointment of petitioner-appellee, Simeon T. Garcia as clerk of court of the justice of the peace court of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija valid, and, ordering the respondents Municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Arturo B. Pascual and Eulogio Sta.
Maria, Mayor and Treasurer, respectively of said Municipality, to approve the vouchers of petitioner-appellee covering
his period of service, as well as to pay petitioner's salary from July 1, 1958 and directing the respondent municipality to
provide for the necessary appropriations therefore.
Simeon T. Garcia filed a petition for mandamus on September 11, 1958, which was amended on June 15, 1959. The facts
involved in this case may be briefly stated as follows: the acting justice of the peace of the municipality of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija appointed petitioner Simeon T. Garcia, junior typist civil service eligible, as clerk of the justice of the peace
court of said municipality on July 1, 1958. This appointment was approved by the Department of Justice. On July 7, 1958,
the acting justice of the peace forwarded the appointment, duly approved by the department and the Civil Service
Commission, to the municipal treasurer. The petitioner submitted certain vouchers supporting his daily time record, duly
approved by the acting justice of the peace, for payment, but the treasurer returned the vouchers with the information
that they be first approved by the municipal mayor before payment could be made. The vouchers were submitted to the
mayor but the latter did not want to approve them. The reason of the mayor was an opinion of the provincial fiscal,
that Rep. Act No. 1551 has repealed Section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act.
Section 75 of the judiciary act provides that the justices of the peace of first class municipalities may have clerks of the
court and other necessary employees at the expense of said municipalities, which clerks of court and employees shall be
appointed by the respective justices of the peace. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 1551, which is claimed to have
repealed section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296, provides
Hereafter, all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall, subject to the civil
service law, be appointed by the municipal mayor upon the recommendation of the corresponding chief of office.
Provided, that in case of disagreement between the chief of office concerned and the municipal Mayor, the matter shall
be submitted for action to the proper provincial department head whose decision shall be final..
The judge below ruled that said Rep. Act No. 1551 did not expressly repeal section 75 of the Judiciary Act and that the
two laws, although apparently in conflict with each other, may be reconciled, following the principle of law that a prior
specific statute is not repealed by a subsequent general law. The judge further ruled that there being no specific grant of
authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the clerk of court of the justice of the peace the power to appoint should not
be considered lodged in said mayor. Lastly, the judge held that the intent of the law in placing the appointment of clerks
in the justice of the peace is to prevent the clerks from the importunities and pressure of prejudicial politics.
On this appeal appellants insist that the provisions of Rep. Act No. 1551 repealed the provisions of section 75 of the
Judiciary Act because section 1 of Rep. Act No. 1551provides that all employees whose salaries are paid by the general
funds of the municipality shall be appointed by the mayor upon recommendation of the chief of office, so that, as the
clerk of court of the justice of the peace is paid out of the general funds of the municipality the power to appoint the
said clerk should be lodged in the mayor as with all other subordinate officials of the municipality.
We find no merit on the above contention. In the first place, justices of the peace are appointed by the President of the
Philippines, in the same manner as judges of superior courts, in pursuance of the separation of powers among the three
departments of the government. The independence of the judiciary from the other departments of the government is
one of the fundamental principles established by the Constitution. This independence will be greatly hampered if
subordinate officials of the courts are subject to appointment by the head of the municipality province. A cursory
reading of the provisions of Rep. No. 1551 clearly shows that what it intended to be made subject to appointment by the
municipal mayor are subordinate officials in the municipality, like employees in the executive branch and employees in
the municipal council or board. There is no reason why said act, as a general law, may be considered as having repealed
the specific provisions of section 75 of Rep. Act No. 296.
A substantially similar rule prevails in cases where the two conflicting provisions are found in different statutes relating
to the same subject. It is an established rule in the construction of statutes that a subsequent act treating a subject in
general terms, and not expressly contradicting the provisions of a prior special statute, is not to be considered as
intended to affect the more particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to
construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all. Hence, where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is
special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone,
would include the same matter, and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special act must be taken as
intended to constitute an exception to general act, as the legislature is not presumed to have intended a conflict. Thus,
when the provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a previously
enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such general law does not operate to modify
or repeal the special law, either wholly or in part, unless such modification or repeal is provided for in express words, or
arises by necessary implication. (pp. 328-329. Black on Interpretation of Laws.)
Another ground for the legal conclusion arrived at by the court below is that the Secretary of Justice, in an opinion dated
June 7, 1957, Opinion No. 122, has already held that section 75 of the Judiciary Act has not been repealed by Rep. Act
No. 1551. The Secretary of Justice is the legal adviser of the government and his opinions override those of provincial
fiscals who are his subordinates. His opinions although not law, should be given great weight, which in this case is the
correct interpretation of the laws involved.
For the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from should be, as is it is hereby, affirmed with costs against the
appellants.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.

============================================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
April 29, 1966
G.R. No. L-21516
BUTUAN SAWMILL, INC., petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CITY OF BUTUAN, ET AL., respondents-appellants.
Ricardo S. Castillo, for respondents-appellants.
David G. Nitafan, for petitioner-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal on questions of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, in its Special Civil Case No.
152, declaring as unconstitutional and ultra viresOrdinances Nos. 7, 11, 131, and 148 of the herein respondent-appellant
City of Butuan "in so far as they impose a 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the business of electric light, heat and
power of the petitioner (appellee) Butuan Sawmill, Inc." and annulling Ordinance No. 104, also of the said city, as
unconstitutional, arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive. The decision was rendered on a petition for declaratory relief.
The petitioner-appellee, Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise,Republic Act No. 399, approved on 18
June 1949, for an electric light, heat and power system at Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan, subject to the terms and
conditions established in Act 3636, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 132 and the Constitution. It was also issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public Service Commission on 18 March 1954.
Ordinance No. 7, which took effect on 1 October 1950, imposes a tax of 2% on the gross sales or receipts of any business
operated in the city, payable monthly within the first 20 days of the following month, and provides penalties for
violation thereof. This ordinance was amended on 14 December 1950 by Ordinance No. 11, by enumerating the kinds of
businesses required to pay the tax, and further amended by Ordinance No. 131, enacted on 16 May 1961, by modifying
the penal provision, and still further amended by Ordinance No. 148, approved on 11 June 1962, by including within the
coverage of taxable businesses "Those engaged in the business of electric light, heat and power (sic) ... " (Rec. on Appeal,
pp. 116-131).
Ordinance No. 104, enacted on 13 April 1960, makes it unlawful, and provides a penalty of fine and imprisonment
for any person, firm or entity to cut or disconnect electric wire or wires connecting the electric power plant of any
franchise holder or electricity supplying current with any consumer in the City of Butuan without the consent of the said
consumer except in cases of fire and/or when there is a clear and positive danger to the lives and properties of the
residents of the community, or upon order by the proper authorities. (Rec. on App., pp. 133-134).
The stand of the respondents-appellants is that the franchise of the
petitioner-appellee is subject to "amendment, alteration or repeal by the National Assembly ...", as per Section 12 of Act
3636, as amended; that the city is empowered under its charter (Republic Act 523, approved on 15 June 1950) to
"provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and special purposes"; and that its taxing power was enlarged
and extended by the Local Autonomy Law, Republic Act 2264, which was approved on 19 June 1959; and that all said
statutory enactments gave the city the authority to impose the 2% tax on the gross sales or receipts of the business of
electric light, heat and power of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc.
The petitioner-appellee, Butuan Sawmill, Inc., on the other hand, disputes the constitutionality of the taxing ordinance,
as amended, as one that impairs the obligation of contract, its franchise being a contract, and deprives it of property
without due process of law; it maintains that the said ordinances are ultra vires and void.
Examination of the laws involved shows that the inclusion of the franchised business of the Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by the
City of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city
under its charter; nor can the power therein granted be taken as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the
franchise, since its charter did not expressly nor specifically provide any such power. Be it noted that the franchise was
granted by act of the legislature on 18 June 1949 while the city's charter was approved on 15 June 1950.
Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the general broad enough to
include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the
land, the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. [U.S.], 425) (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Rafferty, 40
Phil. 224)
The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City of Butuan to tax the franchised business of the petitioner-appellee.
Its pertinent provision states:
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all chartered cities ... shall have authority to impose municipal
license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business ... Provided, however, That no city,
municipality or municipal district may levy or impose any of the following:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) Taxes on persons operating waterworks, irrigation and other public utilitiesexcept electric light, heat and power.
x x x x x x x x x
(j) Taxes of any kind on banks, insurance companies, and persons paying franchise tax.
x x x x x x x x x
(Sec. 2, Republic Act 2264) (Emphasis supplied)
The argument of the appellant city is that, under subparagraph (d) of the above-quoted provision, the business of
electric light, heat and power, being an exception to those which it cannot tax (like waterworks and irrigation), is within
the city's taxing power. This argument is untenable, because (1) subparagraph (j) of the same section specifically
withholds the imposition of taxes on persons paying franchise tax (like appellee herein), and (2) the city's interpretation
of the provision would result in double taxation against the business of the appellee because the internal revenue code
already imposes a franchise tax. The logical construction of section 2(d) of Republic Act 2264, that would not nullify
section 2(j) of the same Act, is that the local government may only tax electric light and power utilities that are not
subject to franchise taxes, unless the franchise itself authorizes additional taxation by cities or municipalities.
The passage of ordinance No. 104, which prohibits the disconnection of any electrical wire connected to any consumer's
building with the power plant, without the consent of the consumer; except in case of fire, clear and positive danger to
the residents, or order of the authorities, is an unwarranted exercise of power for the general welfare. In effect, the
ordinance compels the electric company to keep supplying electric current to a customer even if the latter does not pay
the bills therefor, and to that extent deprives the company of its property without due process. It is no answer to the
objection that the company is not prevented from resorting to the courts for the collection of unpaid bills; for unless the
supply of electricity is stopped, the bills will keep mounting during the pendency of the case, and the company will be
unable to stop litigating. How the general welfare would be promoted under the ordinance has neither been explained
nor justified; in fact, the respondents spare no bones in asserting that the ordinance was directed against the petitioner
in protest against its allegedly inefficient service. But the general welfare clause was not intended to vent the ire of the
complaining consumers against the franchise holder, because the legislature has specifically lodged jurisdiction,
supervision and control over public services and their franchise in the Public Service Commission and not in the City of
Butuan.
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in the result. Costs against appellant City of Butuan.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., is on leave.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five
minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the
jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce
his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out
of the manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after
which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the
left thigh, the left upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella region.
These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital, required
further medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint
which was, subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health
officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the
Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University
of the East. He held responsible positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U.
Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated
with several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men
Club of Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his
customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work.
Because of the incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and friends. During the
period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was
their only support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section,
Office of the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P.
Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that
again the iron cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced
the next day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in
question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968; that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is
charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is
received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the matter is immediately attended to, either by
immediately replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting that because of the lucrative
scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer
has filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city
government has changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by constructing them under the sidewalks
with concrete cement covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by
the city from time to time whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the
theory of the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00.
1
Hence, this appeal by the City of
Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter
of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor,
the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by
reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial
application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the
liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to
enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of
the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for
the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers
to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due
to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him
took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City.
Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the
defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended
complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good
condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the
officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties
as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control
and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion
for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of fact, which
had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less after the
rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said
article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its
"control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
x x x x x x x x x
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and to regulate
the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for
lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of, fix the license fees for
and regulate the openings in the same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of
tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires
therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the
streets and other public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners
thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to
prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using the
streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor
and other vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and
locomotives; . . . to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such railroad
to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their
property, or any part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and to construct and
repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and
adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated
May 2, 1955, upon which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway funds and the
giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within their
respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917,
concerning the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the
construction, maintenance and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and city
roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic
of the Philippines in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of
Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said road, which were
decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject
to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so
ordered.1wph1.t
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

=====================================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
December 29, 1953
G.R. No. L-6359
CARMEN CASTRO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FRANCISCA SAGALES, defendant-appellee.
Roberto P. Ancok and Antonio S. Atienza for appellants.
Lorenzo G. Valentin for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
Appeal from an order of Hon. Jesus Y. Perez of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan dismissing plaintiff's complaint for
workmen's compensation on the ground that the matter properly falls within the jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission.
Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive
jurisdiction" to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to
this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act demands for compensation had to be submitted to the regular
courts.
The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and
action having been commenced in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952, the resultant issue is the
proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
For the appellants, it is contended that the date of the accident, and not the date of filing the complaint, should be
considered because the right to compensation of the laborer or employees or his dependents, like the obligation of the
employer to pay the same, begins from the very moment of the accident.
It is true that the right arises from the moment of the accident, but such right must be declared or confirmed by the
government agency empowered by law to make the declaration. If at the time the petition for such declaration is
addressed to the court, the latter has no longer authority to do so, obviously it has no power to entertain the petition.
Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on and after June 20, 1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided
exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having
been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction,
at that time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be interposed to the application of the law conferring
jurisdiction upon the Commission, because the statute does not thereby operate retroactively; it is made to operate
upon claims formulated after the law's approval. As attorney for appellee suggests, had the claim been filed before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 772 in a court of first instance, the question might be debatable whether such court
should now continue hearing the matter or not. "A retrospective law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new
disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already past. Hence, remedial statutes, or statutes relating to
remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance
of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law,
or the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes" (50 Am. Jur. p. 505).
A parallel situation is not far to seek. The right of the heirs to the decedent's estate begins from the moment of death.
And yet it undoubtedly could be within the power of the Legislature to establish by law probate courts to take charge
even of estates of persons who had died before its approval. The creation of the People's Court to try treason cases
arising from acts committed during the Japanese occupation is another example of recent times.
It is argued that Republic Act No. 772 should not be enforced as to accidents happening before its approval, because it
has introduced changes affecting vested rights of the parties. Without going into details, it might be admitted that
changes as to substantive rights will not govern such "previous" accidents. Yet here we are dealing with remedies and
jurisdiction which the Legislature has power to determine and apportion. And then it is hard to imagine how one litigant
could acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular court, even before he has submitted himself to that particular
court's jurisdiction.
In the United States actions pending in one court may be validly taken away by statute and transferred to another (See
21 C.J.S., p. 148).
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
============================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity
as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution,
1
as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325,
326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566,
573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192,
193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-
283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386,
396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-
1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-
1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-
2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532,
536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-
707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question
2
said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner,
and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General,
3
this Court
held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent
of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when
public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as
the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has
any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal
president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party
to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply
a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well
lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a
proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of
the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would
indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the
government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette
is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,
4
this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it
goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as
have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as
may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents
as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the
Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so
to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for
the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by
the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan
Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-
making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.
5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ."
The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The
law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC
7
:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository
promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to
obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall
have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only
during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank
8
to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is
quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of
its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban
9
sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
10
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none
of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles,
11
the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of
[penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as
a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect
immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.


Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect
of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow,
however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or
any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me,
raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to
past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception
as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that
the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
1
I am likewise
in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable
in some form if it is to be enforced at all.
3
It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by
Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.
4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of
what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that
parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential
decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes
evident.
5
In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be
that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity.
6
In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would
be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of
Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,
1
citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of
said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based
on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they
are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text
and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that
it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.
2
To sustain respondents' misreading that "most
laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity
3
would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or
an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published.
What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the
decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not
mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should
be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes
that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution
of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its
frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto.
It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to
be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its
own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability
ineffective, until due publication thereof.



Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am
unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply
adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect
of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow,
however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or
any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me,
raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such
requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to
past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception
as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth
what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the
publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that
the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such
notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.
1
I am likewise
in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice
before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable
in some form if it is to be enforced at all.
3
It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by
Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.
4
Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to
subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of
what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that
parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous
transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential
decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes
evident.
5
In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a
showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be
that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity.
6
In traditional
terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to
the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such
publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to
laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this
exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act
No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act
which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and
executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would
be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of
Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly
circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently
stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be
afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,
1
citing the settled
principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of
said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised
Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based
on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they
are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their
effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text
and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law
itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional
requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that
it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.
2
To sustain respondents' misreading that "most
laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary for their effectivity
3
would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential
requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or
an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published.
What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the
decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not
mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should
be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected
parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The
due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute
as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it
obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes
that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of
notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be
published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution
of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its
frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto.
It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to
be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not
provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all
statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its
own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person
should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that
such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the
Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability
ineffective, until due publication thereof.
==============================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
February 1, 1932
G.R. No. 36886
CLEMENTE LACESTE, petitioner,
vs.
PAULINO SANTOS, Director of Prisons, respondent.
Pastor L. de Guzman for petitioner.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for respondent.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The petitioner, Clemente Laceste, prays the court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading that
there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer.
Together with Nicolas Lachica, he had been prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to commitment for the crime of
rape.
Subsequently Nicola Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from the criminal
prosecution by virtue of section 2, Act No. 1773, and article 448 of the Penal Code then in force, which provided that
such a marriage extinguished penal liability, and hence, the penalty. But the petitioner herein continued serving his
sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his coaccused and the offended party.
However, he is not entitled to the benefits accruing from such marriage in accordance with the last paragraph of article
344 of the Revised Penal Code, in force since the first of this year, providing as follows:
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accesories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
En los casos de estupro, rapto, abusos deshonestos y violacion, el matrimonio del ofensor con la ofendida extinguira la
accion penal, a la pena que ya se le hubiere impuest. Lo dispuesto en este parrafo alcanza lo mismo a los coautores que
a los complices y encubridores de los delitos ya mencionados. (We have italicized the a).
We have quoted both the English and the spanish text, in order to show the real meaning of the provision; for the
Spanish version contains a clerical error: the preposition a is used instead of the disjunctive conjunction o in the third
line, so that it reads "a la pena que yase le hubiere impuesto," instead of "o la pena que ya se le hubiere impuesto."
The Attorney-General, answering the petition, is in favor of granting it, because, under the aforementioned last
paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Codenow in force, which has retroactive effect, the petitioner is entitled to
his liberty. We approve and adopt the following observation made by the former:
It is believed that the Revised Penal Code, Act No. 3815, article 344, last paragraph, applies to the case of the herein
petitioner, and that he should be discharged from prison. All penal laws have been declared retroactive by the
Honorable Supreme Court in the cases of People vs. Moran (44 Phil., 433); People vs. Parel (44 Phil., 437). And the
Legislature, under section 366 of the New Penal Code, has clearly intended to give retroactive effect to article 22,
because section 366 provides:
"Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior
to the date of effectiveness of this Code, shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of
their commission."
If it was not the intention of the Legislature to make the new Code retroactive, it would have used the
words "notwithstanding" or "in spite of", instead of "without prejudice."
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
That this article applies to crimes committed before the new Code took effect, cannot be doubted, for article 366 of said
Code unmistakably provides for such cases in the following words:
ART. 366. Application of laws enacted prior to this Code. Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of
this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness of this Code shall be punished in
accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of their commission.
It may be clearly seen that as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until the 31st
of December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the
general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried
over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22, quoted above. This is an
exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the following
maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex de futuro, judez de praeterito (the law
provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil
Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known
aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the exception was
inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science.
Article 22 of the new Penal Code is applicable to the petitioner, who comes within one of the cases especially provided
for in article 344 of the Code: this is a point upon which there neither is, nor can be, any discussion between the parties
to this case.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. Let the petitioner be immediately set at liberty, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
=====================================
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
May 12, 1948
G.R. No. L-1505
VALENTIN CAMACHO, BONIFACIO MACARANAS ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ANGELES CANSON and TERESA MELGAR DE CARRETERO, respondents.
Paguia and Villanueva for petitioners.
Emiliano C. Tabigne and Arsenio I. Martinez for respondents Court of Industrial Relations.
Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for respondents Canson and Melga de Carretero.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon, Solicitor Guillermo E. Torres and Onofre P. Guevarra as amici curiae.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations which reversed that of the Tenancy Law
Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice that ordered a 70 per cent and 30 per cent division in favor of the
petitioners herein, after deducting from the gross produce the expenses of harvesting and threshing, of the palay
planted in the haciendas of the now respondents located in the municipality of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, during the
agricultural year of 1946-1947.
The decision appealed from declares that the participations of the parties in this case should be governed, not by the
provisions of section 3 Act No. 34 which amended section 8 of Act No. 4054, as decided by the said Tenancy Division of
the Department of Justice, but by an oral contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the
parties, in accordance with section 8 Act No. 4054which according to the lower court's theory recognizes the validity of
an oral contract. The ground on which the Court of Industrial Relations bases its decision is that, although "the records
show that Act No. 4054 had been proclaimed effective in the Province of Pangasinan in January, 1937, Act. No. 53 seems
to recognize an oral contract inspite of section 4, of said Act No. 4054;" and there being an" oral contract embodying the
old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties prior to 1945-46 agricultural year," Republic Act 34, which
amended Act No. 4054 in force in Pangasinan since 1937, can not be applied to tenancy relation between the parties in
this case without impairing the obligations of contract and infringing the Constitution.
After a mature deliberation, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the decision of the lower court is contrary to law
and, therefore, must be reversed.
Section 4 of Act No. 4054 provides that "the contract on share tenancy in order to be valid and binding shall be in
writing, drawn in triplicate in the language known to all the parties there to be signed or thumbmarked both by the
landlord or his authorized representative and by the tenant before two witnesses, one to be chosen by each party." But,
in view of the provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act. No. 53, promulgated on October 17, 1936, which prescribes
that "where a covenant or contract made between the owner of land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof has not
been reduced to writing or has not been forth in a document written in a language known to the lessee or tenant, the
testimony of such lessee or tenant shall be accepted as prima facie evidence on the terms of a covenant are recognized
by law in spite of the provision of section 4 Act No. 4054 quoted in the preceding paragraph, and therefore, the oral
contract embodying the old customs of tenancy sharing observed by the parties in this case prior to 1945-1946
agricultural year, was valid in Santa Barbara, Pangasinan, in spite of the provisions of section 4 of Act No. 4054; and that
the effectivity in Pangasinan of Republic Act No. 34, which amended section 8 of said Act No. 4054 relating to share
basis, started from November 12, 1946, when the President issued Proclamation No. 14 declaring the provision of Act
No. 4054, as amended, to be in full force and effect through-out the Philippines, and not before.
It is obvious that the conclusion of the lower court that (1) the so called oral contract between the parties in this case
was valid and binding upon the parties during the agricultural year 1946-1947, and (2) that Republic Act No.
34 amendatory of section 8 and other sections of Act No. 4054 became effective in Pangasinan on November 12, 1946
the date of the Proclamation , No. 14, are erroneous because they are based on incorrect premises.
(1) The major premise of the first conclusion is not correct. It is elementary rule that a subsequent general law should
not be construed to repeal or modify a prior special law; and that repeal by implication is not favored, and therefore the
former and subsequent act must if possible, be construed as to give effect to both. Hence,Commonwealth Act No.
53 which refers to "covenant or contract made between the owner of land and a lessee or tenant on share thereof" in
general, and does not mention or make any reference to Act No. 4054, should be construed to apply to tenancy
contracts on all other agricultural products which may be oral, as well as to tenancy contract on rice in provinces
where Act No. 4054 had not yet then made effective by proclamation in which oral tenancy contracts were valid; but not
in those where said Act No. 4054 was proclaimed to be effective and, therefore, oral contracts were not valid and
binding. Because, if in the latter oral contract is not valid and binding, no amount of evidence of whatever kind can be
admitted to prove the legal existence and terms thereof; and besides it is unconceivable that the Legislature had
intended, for it would be retrogressive, to practically repeal section 4 Act No. 4054 enacted for the purpose of
preventing serious controversies that may arise as a result of the conflicting interpretation of verbal contracts and other
agreements affecting rice tenancy between landlords and tenants.
The provisions of Act No. 4054, which provides in its section 4 that an oral contract or share tenancy is not valid and
binding, having been in the force in the province of Pangasinan since January 20, 1937, there could not legally exist an
effective oral contract between the parties embodying the old customs of tenancy sharingobserved by the parties prior
to 1945-1946 agricultural year, and therefore the rice sharing tenancy between the parties must be governed since the
year 1937 by the provisions of section 8 of Act No. 4054 and its amendments.
(2) The major premises of the other conclusion is also incorrect. Proclamation No. 14 issued by the President of the
Philippines dated November 30, 1946, which declares the provisions of Act. No. 4054, as amended, to be in full force
and effect throughout the Philippines, was obviously intended for territories in the Philippines in which said Act had not
yet been declared in force by proclamation prior to said date, and not to provinces, like Pangasinan, where Act No.
4054 had already been put in force since January 30, l937, which proclamation was never set aside or suspended. It is
therefore clear that Act No. 34, amendatory of said Act No. 4054, became effective ipso facto in Pangasinan since the
date of its passage, September 30, 1946, on which, according to the express provision of section 4 therefore, it became
effective; because an amendment of a law being a part of the original which is already in force and effect in a certain
territory, must necessarily become effective therein as a part of the amended law at the time the amendment takes
effect. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 34 provides that the Act shall take effect immediately, that is, upon its passage or
approval by the President on September 30, 1946; and a statute which is to take immediate effect is operative from the
exact instance of its becoming law.
Taking into consideration that our Constitution, not only does not take place any limitation on the general legislative
power, but ordains Congress to "regulate the relations between landowner and tenant" (section 6, Article XIV), and
provides that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all people should be the
concern of the State" (section 5, Article II); that it is a well settled rule that the history of a legislation is also important in
interpreting the intention of the legislative body, and therefore courts may refer to messages of the executive to the
legislature (2 Sutherland's Statutory Construction 3rd ed., sections 5002, 5004, pp. 481-489); that the President in his
message to Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1946, in recommending the earliest approval of the proposed
amendments to the tenancy law embodied in Republic Act No. 34, which "establish the fairest possible contractual basis
between the tenant and landowner," according to the message, the President said that "In view of the fact that planting
season of rice is under way and that the harvest will take place before the next session of the Congress, I earnestly
request that this matter receives your early attention and that the proposed amendments be enacted at an early date";
and thatAct No. 34 was passed by Congress and approved by the President on September 30, 1946 to take effect
immediately; it is to be inferred that it was the intention of the Congress to make it applicable to the harvest of rice
during the agricultural year 1946-1947.
No retrospective effect would be given to said provision of section 8 of the Act No. 4054, as amended by section 3 of
the Republic Act No. 34 relating to share basis, if applied to the rice harvested during agricultural year 1946-1947;
because said Act No. 34 became effective on September 30, 1947, for "agricultural year shall mean the length of time
necessary for the preparation of the land sowing, planting and harvesting a crop" (section 6, Act No. 4054), and the crop
in question had been, according to the conclusion of fact of the lower court, planted during May and harvested during
the months from October to December, 1946, and even January, 1947. And it is a well established rule recognized by all
authorities without exception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but that statute is not made retrospective
because it drawns on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and
application is drawn from a time antedating its passage (See cases cited in 37 Words and Phrases, pp. 530-533).
But even if to apply Republic Act no. 34 to the tenancy relations in agricultural year 1946-1947 between the parties
would be tantamount to giving said Act retroactive or retrospective effect, our Constitution does not in terms prohibit
the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or deprive a person of property
without due process of law, that is, which do not divest rights of property and vested rights. It is evident that there being
no valid or binding oral tenancy contract, nor a written one for that matter, between parties prior to the sate Act No.
34 became effective, no obligations of contract could be impaired by the application of said Republic Act No. 34. And no
vested right having been acquired by the parties over the 1946-1947 rice crop under the provision of section 8 of Act No.
4054, applicable to the division of the crop in the absence of a contract in writing between the parties, before it was
amended by Republic Act No. 34, no vested right could be affected by the application of said Act No. 34 to the tenancy
share in 1946-1947 rice crop.
In view of all the foregoing, and the fact that the conditions set forth in section 8 ofAct No. 4054, as amended by section
3 of Republic Act No. 34, are complied within the present case as found by the lower court in its decision that is, that the
tenants owns the work animals and the necessary implements, that he defrayed the cost of plowing and cultivation, and
that the costs of harvest and threshing were deducted from the gross produce, the decision appealed from is reversed
or set aside, and the decision by the Tenancy Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Justice, in so far as it
applies the provisions of said Act No. 34 to the present case, be carried out, with cost against the respondent. So
ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
HILADO, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Among the facts stipulated by the parties, as narrated on pages 2-3 of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, is
that the rice planting season of 1946-1947 of the lands involved herein commenced in May and ended in July. It is
therefore obvious that the palay crops in question were planted during those months of the year 1946. In behooves us,
consequently, to inquire: What was the governing provision of the law at the time as to the respective shares that
should pertains to the tenants and to the landlords? For it goes without saying that both landlords and tenants must be
taken to have entered into their relation as to such, for the agricultural year, in view of, and pursuant to, those legal
provisions.
Section 8 of Act No. 4054 provides:
SEC. 8. Share basis. In the absence of any written agreement to the contrary and when the necessary implements and
the work animals are furnished by the tenant; and the expenses for planting, harvesting, threshing, irrigation and
fertilizer, if any, as well as other expenses incident to the proper cultivation of the land, are borne equally by both the
landlord and tenant, the crop shall be divided equally. The division shall; be made in the same place where the crop has
been threshed and each party shall transport his share to his warehouse, unless the contrary is stipulated by the
parties: Provided, however, That when the landlord furnishes the work animal gratuitously it shall be deemed as a
special consideration, and the tenant shall be obliged to transport the share of the landlord to his warehouse if it is
within the municipality where the land cultivated is situated.
The above quote provision, along with the other sections of said Act No. 4054, was proclaimed effective in the Province
of Pangasinan in January, 1937, as found by the Court of Industrial Relations in its decision appealed from. Hence, there
being no written contract of tenancy between the instant parties, their share in the crops under consideration must be
determined pursuant to said section 8, which was in force when they entered into their relation, when the landlord
agreed to let the tenants work their lands and the latter to work them for the planting and raising of palay. In effect, the
law, because they themselves did not in writing fix them, fixed their shares in the crop upon a 50-50 basis when the
necessary and the work animals were furnished by the tenants, and the expenses for planting, harvesting, threshing
irrigation and fertilizer, if, any, as well as other expenses incident to the proper cultivation of the land, were borne
equally by both the landlord and tenants. The Court of Industrial Relations decided that the crops in question shall be
divided pursuant to said section 8, with the requirement (in order to adjust matters exactly to the legal mandate) that
the landlord shall reimburse the tenants for one-half of the expense of planting and others incidental to the proper
cultivation of said lands, the said tenants being the owners of their work animals and implements, the landlords landlord
having supplied only the seeds. In my opinion this is a correct solution of the problem, with the sole modification that
the tenants should also be required to reimburse the landlords for one-half of the seeds thus supplied or their
reasonable value.
I believe that when enacting Republic Act No. 34, amendatory of Act No. 4054, the Congress, and in issuing his
Proclamation No. 14, of November 12, 1946, the President, did not intend that said amendatory act or said proclamation
should be applicable to crops already planted pursuant to the former legal provisions in force at the time of the
planting and before the amendment. Section 4 of Republic Act. No. 34 itself clearly evinces the intention to give it only
prospective effect, and neither said act nor said proclamation contain express of retroactivity.
Furthermore, for the law, as in the case of section 8 of Act No. 4054, to tell the landlord and the tenant that if they do
not stipulate to the contrary in writing their shares in the product shall be equal, as therein defined and specified, and
after both parties have accordingly acted, and when the planted crops are already bearing fruit and nearing harvest, or
being harvested, to change the sharing basis from 50-50 to 70-30 or the like would be to my mind nothing short of a
deception practised by the law upon the prejudiced party. I cannot support such an absurd construction. No
consideration of social justice can possibly justify such an injustice to the landlord or to the tenant, whoever comes out
prejudiced by the ex post facto change in the law. If the change, as happened through Republic Act No. 34, was against
the landlord, it might well have been that he would not have agreed to enter into that landlord-tenant relation if the law
had been changed before its creation. And we also suppose that if such change had been adverse to the tenant and had
been made before the initiation of the landlord-tenant relation, such tenant might not have entered into it and invested
labor or money thereunder.
The construction in favor of giving the amendment retroactive effectiveness, on the score of social justice, in the first
place would appear rather to tend toward socialism and in the second, might tend to the prejudice of the tenants
themselves. I say socialism because it subjects the landlord's property to use and enjoyment by the tenant upon terms
not voluntarily accepted by the former but arbitrarily imposed by the government after said landlord had agreed to let
his property be worked by the tenant under terms required or permitted by the law in force at the time. And I say to the
prejudice of the tenant himself, because it is not hard to see that under such regime no reasonably prudent landlord
would be inclined to allow his property to be worked by a tenant for fear that any time before the actual division of the
crop the government may arbitrarily change his share in the crop from that which was required or permitted when he
delivered his property to worked by his tenant, without such landlord being able to foresee or even guess how great the
change might come out to be. For instance, under such a theory the government might have changed the share from 50-
50 to 90-10 or any other proportion more onerous to the landlord than 70-30. In such state of affairs it is easily
comprehensible that tenants would likely be deprived of the very opportunity to work landlord's lands and find it hard
to find lands to work, with the result that what was thought to be a measure of social justice for the amelioration of
their lot may on the contrary tend to aggravate their situation.
BENGZON, J.:
I believe, like Mr. Justice Hilado, that the law should not apply to contracts a already existing at the time of its approval. I
join this dissent.
TUASON, J.:
I concur in Mr. Justice Hilado's dissenting opinion.