The Nicoll Highway Collapse The Nicoll Highway Collapse

D W Hi ht D. W. Hight
T.O. Henderson +A.R. Pickles
S. Marchand
Content Content
Background and construction sequence
Observations up to the point of collapse, including
monitoring monitoring
The collapse
Post-collapse investigations
Design errors
J et grout layers
Ground conditions and the buried valley Ground conditions and the buried valley
The need for a trigger
Back analyses of the collapse
Relative vertical displacement and forced sway
The bored piles
Collapse mechanismand its trigger Collapse mechanism and its trigger
Lessons to be learnt
C824
210m 2-cell cut &
cover tunnels
34m Diameter
Temporary Staging
Area (TSA) Shaft -
35m deep
3-level cut & cover
Station (BLV)
550m 2-cell cut &
cover tunnel and
siding (BLS)
C824
Collapse site
M3 area
3-level cut & cover
Station (NCH)
200m cut & cover
stacked 4-cell
scissors crossover
tunnel
25m - 30m deep
30m - 33m deep
35m 2-cell cut and
cover tunnel
C825
M3 area
370m stacked 2-cell
cut & cover tunnel
20m - 25m deep
800m twin bored
tunnel
C824 - 2km of cut and cover construction
mostly in soft clay - up to 35m deep
Ci l Li St 1 Ci l Li St 1 Circle Line Stage 1 Circle Line Stage 1
Reclamation dates
G ld Mil
The Concourse
Plaza Hotel
M d k
Beach Road
1930-1940s
Golden Mile
Tower
Golden Mile
Complex
Plaza Hotel
NCH station
Merdeka
Bridge
1930-1940 s
reclamation
Nicoll Highway
Cut and Cover
tunnels
1970s
reclamation
TSA
shaft
Kallang
reclamation
Kallang
Basin
Courtesy of Richard Davies
31700
54+900
ABH32
31650
R
T
H
I
N
G

(
m
)
M3
54+900
M2
54+812
M3010
MC3007
MC3008
ABH30
ABH34
ABH35
ABH83
ABH85
AC-1
AC-2
AC-3
AC-4
N
O
R
MC2026
ABH27
ABH28
ABH29
ABH31
ABH33
ABH81
ABH82
ABH84
31550 31600 31650 31700 31750 31800
EASTING (m)
31600
M2064 M2065
MC2025
ABH27
EASTING (m)
Pre- and post-tender site investigation
SOUTH NORTH
ABH 31 ABH 32
M304 M309
100
Fill
U
Fill
Upper estuarine
Upper estuarine
Upper
M304 M309
90
Upper
Marine
Clay
Marine
Clay
Upper F2
80
Upper F2
Upper F2
Lower
Marine
Lower
Marine
70
Clay
Clay
Base marine clay
Lower
Top of OA
o e
estuarine
Lower F2
Old
Old
Alluvium
Typical section in M3
Alluvium
Alluvium
0 0 4 0 8 1 2 1 6 2
Cone resistance, q
c
(MPa)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Undrained shear strength (kPa)
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
0
AC1
AC2
AC3
AC4
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
AC1
AC2
AC3
AC4
10
AC4
10
AC4
Nkt=12
20
D
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
20
D
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
30 30
40 40
Piezocone data for M3 area
Construction details and sequence Construction details and sequence
Fill
SOUTH
NORTH
Upper
Upper E
Fill
Formation level
approx 33m bgl
Marine Clay
Upper F2
Temporary diaphragm
walls,0.8m
Driven kingpost
Sacrificial JGP
Lower
Marine Clay
gp
Permanent bored piles
supporting
rail boxes
Sacrificial JGP
Permanent JGP
Lower E
10 levels of steel struts at
3m +3.5m vertical
centres
Lower F2
OA SW2 (N=35)
OA SW1 (N 72) OA SW1 (N=72)
OA (CZ)
General Excavation sequence for M3 up to level for
removal of sacrificial J GP and installation of 10
th
level strut
Tidal sea
TSA Shaft
Utility crossings M3
Curved walls
M2
Nicoll
Highway
24/3/04
Support beam
Shaft
Kingpost
M3
C channel stiffener
No waler
C channel stiffener
J acking point
M2
Walers
Non-splayed strut
Splayed strut
M2
Walers
Two Struts Bearing
Direct on Single panel
Single Strut with Splays
Struts on Walers - No Splays
g y
Bearing on Waler for Single
panel
Gaps in Diaphragm Wall for 66kV Crossing
South side 13 March 04 South side 13 March 04
Events and observations prior to collapse Events and observations prior to collapse Events and observations prior to collapse Events and observations prior to collapse
Plate stiffener
C channel
stiffener
Replacement of plate stiffeners at strut Replacement of plate stiffeners at strut- -waler connection waler connection
Strut bearing
C channel
Strut bearing
directly on Dwall
C channel
connection
Excavation for the 10
th
level of struts, including removal of the sacrificial J GP Excavation for the 10 level of struts, including removal of the sacrificial J GP
Observations on the morning of the collapse
North wall
1 4 2
6
7
3
M305
M304 M303 M302 M301
335 336
338 339
340
334
333
337
H H H
KP 182 KP 181 KP 183
1 5 5 5
7 7
M306 M307 M308 M309 M310
1 Order in which distortion to waler noted
Excavation to 10
th
complete
Excavation in progress
Location of walers, splays and Dwall gaps
S335 9 S335-9
Strut 335-9 south wall
S338 9 S338-9
Strut 338 Strut 338- -9 north wall 9 north wall
Instrumentation and results of monitoring Instrumentation and results of monitoring Instrumentation and results of monitoring Instrumentation and results of monitoring
M2/M3 plan at 9 M2/M3 plan at 9
th th
level level
M3
TSA Shaft
M2
TSA Shaft
I 65
All struts at S335
instrumented for load
measurements
GWV24
I 104 I 104
5000
Excavation Front
Beyond S335 at the
4000
4500
SG3358 Total Force
SG3359 Total Force
Excavation Front
Approaches S335 at
the end of Day Shift on
start of Day Shift on
18th April 2004
3000
3500
y
17th April 2004
Excavation Front for
10th Level Advancing
from S338
d

(
k
N
)
2000
2500
s
t
r
u
t

l
o
a
d
1000
1500
Excavation Front for
10th Level Between
e
a
s
u
r
e
d

0
500
20th April 19th April 18th April 17th April 16th April 15th April
S336 and S335
M
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Hours before collapse
Change in Measured Load at Strut 335
5000
4000
4500
5000
336(N) & 337(N)
Waler Buckling Observed
Support Bracket at 335(S) Drops Off
335(N)
Waler Buckling Observed
3000
3500
4000
(
k
N
)
2000
2500
3000
t
r
u
t

l
o
a
d

1500
2000
Strut Load 335-9
Strut Load 335-8
338(N) & 335(S)
e
a
s
u
r
e
d

s
500
1000
338(N) & 335(S)
Waler Buckling Observed
M
e
0
6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 16.00
Time on 20April 2004
Observed trends in 8
th
and 9
th
strut loads
Load
f
9
t
h
Observed
n
s
t
a
l
l
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

Observed
8th
9th
Excavation approaches
I
n
m
m
9th
+passes beyond S335
5
18 20
9
a
m
3
.
3
0
p
April 2004
The trends were consistent with there being g
yielding of the 9
th
level strut-waler connection
when the excavation passed beneath but with
f th i ifi t h i l d i ith no further significant changes in load in either
the 9
th
or 8
th
level struts until the collapse was
initiated initiated
0 200 400
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 104
400 200 0
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 65
10
I 104
10 April
10
I 65
10 April
10 10
Behind South Wall North Wall
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
30
D
e
30
D
e
40 40
50 50
0 200 400
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 104
400 200 0
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 65
10
I 104
10 April
15 April
10
I 65
10 April
16 April
10 10
Behind South Wall North Wall
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
30
D
e
30
D
e
40 40
50 50
0 200 400
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 104
400 200 0
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 65
10
I 104
10 April
15 April
17 April
10
I 65
10 April
16 April
17 April
10 10
Behind South Wall North Wall
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
30
D
e
30
D
e
40 40
50 50
0 200 400
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 104
400 200 0
Horizontal displacement (mm)
0
I 65
10
I 104
10 April
15 April
17 April
20 April
10
I 65
10 April
16 April
17 April
20 April
10 10
Behind South Wall North Wall
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
30
D
e
30
D
e
40 40
50 50
500
400
n
t
,

m
m
I104 max
I65 max
300
d
i
s
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
South wall
200
m

h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l

N th ll
100
M
a
x
i
m
u
North wall
5-J ul 9-Aug 13-Sep 18-Oct 22-Nov 27-Dec 31-J an 6-Mar 10-Apr
0
Comparison of inclinometer readings I65 and I104
2004 2003
S338-9 stood for 8 days under load and was 20m S338-9 stood for 8 days under load and was 20m
from excavation front
S335 9 stood for 2 5 days under load and was over S335-9 stood for 2.5 days under load and was over
8m from excavation front
B th S335 9S &S338 9N b kl d ithi 10 i t Both S335-9S & S338-9N buckled within 10 minutes
Load in S335-8 and S335-9 was almost constant
b t 18 A il d i iti ti f ll between 18 April and initiation of collapse
All C-channel connections failed downwards at both
ends
The south wall was pushing the north wall back
Key observations
The south wall was pushing the north wall back
The collapse The collapse
3.33pm
3.33pm
3.34pm
3.34pm
3.34pm
3.41pm
3.46pm
Post-collapse investigations Post collapse investigations
Design errors
Errors
Misinterpretation of BS5950 with regard to stiff
b i l h bearing length
Omission of splays
Effects
Design capacity of strut-waler connection was 50%of Design capacity of strut waler connection was 50% of
required design capacity where splays were omitted
Errors in structural design of strut Errors in structural design of strut--waler connection waler connection
Capacity based on BS5950:1990 =2550 kN Capacity based on BS5950:1990 = 2550 kN
Average ultimate capacity based on physical Average ultimate capacity based on physical
load tests = 4100 kN
9 % f Based on mill tests, 95% of connections had
capacity of 3800 kN- 4400kN
Predicted 9
th
level strut load in 2D analyses
which ignored bored piles was close to
ultimate capacity therefore collapse was ultimate capacity therefore collapse was
considered by the COI to be inevitable
Inevitability of collapse
Method A and Method B refer to two alternative ways of
modelling undrained soil behaviour in Plaxis (Pickles,
2002) 2002)
Method A is an effective stress analysis of an undrained
bl problem
Assumes isotropic elastic behaviour and a Mohr-
C f Coulomb failure criterion
As a result mean effective stress p is constant until yield p y
Method A was being applied to marine clays which were
of lowover-consolidation or even under-consolidated of low over consolidation or even under consolidated
because of recent reclamation
Method B is a total stress analysis
Methods A and B
Method B is a total stress analysis
t
Cu from Method A
Cu from Method B
p
The shortcomings of Method A
105
105
Method A Method B
90
95
100
90
95
100
75
80
85
R
L

(
m
)
75
80
85
R
L

(
m
)
60
65
70
60
65
70
55
-0.050 0.000 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250 0.300
Wall Disp. (m)
Exc to RL 100.9 for S1 Exc to RL 98.1 for S2 Exc to RL 94.6 for S3
Exc to RL 91.1 for S4 Exc to RL 87.6 for S5 Exc to RL 84.6 for S6
55
-0.050 0.000 0.050 0.100 0.150 0.200 0.250 0.300
Wall Disp. (m)
Exc to RL 100.9 for S1 Exc to RL 98.1 for S2 Exc to RL 94.6 for S3
Exc to RL 91.1 for S4 Exc to RL 87.6 for S5 Exc to RL 84.6 for S6
M3 S th W ll Di l t
Exc to RL 81.6 for S7 Exc to RL 78.3 for S8 Exc to RL 75.3 for S9
Exc to RL 72.3 for S10
Exc to RL 81.6 for S7 Exc to RL 78.3 for S8 Exc to RL 75.3 for S9
Exc to RL 72.3 for S10
M3 - South Wall Displacement
Method A versus Method B
95
100
105
100
105
Method A Method B
75
80
85
90
95
R
L

(
m
)
75
80
85
90
95
R
L

(
m
)
55
60
65
70
75
55
60
65
70
75
-
3
0
0
0
-
2
5
0
0
-
2
0
0
0
-
1
5
0
0
-
1
0
0
0
-
5
0
00
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
3
0
0
0
3
5
0
0
4
0
0
0
Bending Moment (kNm/m)
-
3
0
0
0
-
2
5
0
0
-
2
0
0
0
-
1
5
0
0
-
1
0
0
0
-
5
0
00
5
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
5
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
5
0
0
3
0
0
0
3
5
0
0
4
0
0
0
Bending Moment (kNm/m)
M3 - South Wall bending moments
Method A versus Method B Method A versus Method B
M th d A
Method B
g ( )
2206
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
_S1
2383
2000
2200
2400
2600
2800
3000
Method A
Method B
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2200
S
t
r
u
t

L
o
a
d

(
k
N
/
m
)
_S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
S
t
r
u
t

L
o
a
d

(
k
N
/
m
)
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
0
200
400
600
S8
S9
0
200
400
600
S7
S8
S9
M3 strut forces
Method A versus Method B
Method A over-estimates the undrained shear
strength of normally and lightly overconsolidated
l clays
Its use led to a 50% under-estimate of wall
displacements and of bending moments and an
under-estimate of the 9
th
level strut force of 10%
The larger than predicted displacements mobilised
the capacity of the J GP layers at an earlier stage p y y g
than predicted
Method A Method A
St t l d i Structural design errors
Removal of splays at some strut locations p y
Introduction of C-channel waler connection detail
Use of Method A in soil-structure interaction analysis
C ll i it bl f th Collapse was an inevitable consequence of the
design errors which led to the applied loads on the
struts increasing with time and equalling the capacity
of the strut-waler connection of the strut-waler connection
COI view on the principal causes of
the collapse
St t l d i Structural design errors
Removal of splays at some strut locations p y
Introduction of C-channel waler connection detail
Use of Method A in soil-structure interaction analysis
C ll i it bl f th Collapse was an inevitable consequence of the
design errors which led to the applied loads on the
struts increasing with time and equalling the capacity
of the strut-waler connection of the strut-waler connection
COI view on the principal causes of
the collapse
Post-collapse investigations Post collapse investigations
J et grout
Excavation of sacrificial JGP in Type H
JGP quality in 100mm cores from borehole M1 in Type K JGP quality in 100mm cores from borehole M1 in Type K
Shear wave velocity measurements in JGP at Type K
5
Shear wave section
4
Pressuremeter section
3
c
k
n
e
s
s

(
m
)
2
J
G
P

t
h
i
c
Design thickness
1
0 2 4 6 8
0
Thicknesses of JGP in Type K
Post-collapse investigations Post collapse investigations
Ground conditions and
soil properties soil properties
BN3
P33
P36
P40
P41/P47
P42/P48
31700
54+900 AN1
BN2E
CN3
DN2E
DN3
AN2
BN2W
CN2
TSAN2
P45
P52
P54
31650
R
T
H
I
N
G

(
m
)
M3
54+900
M2
54+812
66KVNI
AN1
BN1E
BN1Ea
BS1Ea
CL-1a
CL-2
CL-3g
CN1
DN1E
BN1W
DN1W
DN2W
EN1
EN2
FN1
FN2
N
O
R
66KVS
AS1
BS1Ea
BS1Eb
BS2E
CFVN
CL 3g
CS1
CTSN
DS1E
SPTSa
TSAS2b
AS2
BS1W
CPTN
CPTNa
CS2
DS1W
ES1
FS1
TSAS2
31550 31600 31650 31700 31750 31800
EASTING (m)
31600
BS3E
DS2E
DS3E
AS3
BS2W
BS3W
CS3
DS2W
DS3W
ES2
ES3
FS2
EASTING (m)
BS4E
BS4Ea
DS4E
BS4W
CS4
DS4W
Post Post- -collapse ground investigation collapse ground investigation
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
Cone resistance, q
t
(MPa)
0
0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
Cone resistance, q
t
(MPa)
0
10
BN1W
q
t
u2
f
s
10
BS2W
q
t
u2
f
s
North
South
20
D
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
20
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
30
D
30
D
e
40
0 0.4 0.8 1.2
40
0 0 4 0 8 1 2
Pore pressure, u
2
(MPa)
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Friction, f
s
(MPa)
0 0.4 0.8 1.2
Pore pressure, u
2
(MPa)
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Friction, f
s
(MPa)
CPT profiles north and south of collapse area
100
=28.5
o
50
K
o
=0.5
=34.2
o
0
P
a
)
0 50 100 150 200
s' (kPa)
0
t

(
k
P
-50
P-8
P-9
-100
P-24
P-26
=35
o
Kisojibans CAU tests on Kisojibans CAU tests on
Upper and Lower Marine Clay Upper and Lower Marine Clay
50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105
Tender SI borehol es
Tender SI CPTs
Detai led design SI
Detai led design SI CPTs
Post col lapse SI
Post col lapse SI CPTs
BN3
P33
P36
P40
P41/P47
P42/P48
31700
Post col lapse SI CPTs
Boreholes for bored pi les
Magnetic logging boreholes
BN2E
CN3
DN2E
DN3
AN2
BN2W
CN2
TSAN2
P45
P52
P54
31650
I
N
G

(
m
)
M3
54+900
M2
M3010
MC3007
ABH30
ABH32
ABH34
ABH35 ABH83
ABH85
AC 1
AC-2
AC 3
AC-4
66KVNI
AN1
BN1E
BN1Ea
CL-1a
CN1
DN1E
BN1W
DN1W
DN2W
EN1
EN2
FN2
WN1 WN10
WN11
WN12
WN13
WN14
WN15
WN16
WN17
WN18
WN19
WN2
WN20
WN21
WN22
WN23
WN24
WN25
WN26
WN28
WN3
WN30A
WN4
WN5
WN6
WN7A
WN8
WN9
31650
N
O
R
T
H
I
54+812
MC3008
ABH28
ABH29
ABH31
ABH33
ABH81
ABH82
ABH84
AC-1 AC-3
66KVS
AS1
BS1Ea
BS1Eb
CFVN
CL-2
CL-3g
CS1
CTSN
DS1E
SPTSa
TSAS2b
BS1W
CPTN
CPTNa
DS1W
ES1
FN1
TSAS2
WN27
WN29
WN30A
WN31
WN32
WN33
WN34
WN35
WN36
WN37
WN38
WN39
WN40
WS1
WS10 WS14
WS15
WS16
WS17
WS18
WS19
WS2
WS20
WS21
WS22
WS23
WS24
WS25
WS26
WS27
WS28
WS29
WS3
WS30
WS31
WS32
WS34
WS36
WS4A
WS5
WS6
WS7
WS8
WS9
WS11
WS11A
WS11B
WS11C
WS12
WS12A
WS12B
WS12C
WS13
WS13A
WS13B
WS13C
31550 31600 31650 31700 31750 31800
31600
M2064 M2065
MC2025
MC2026
ABH27
BS2E
BS3E
DS2E
AS2
AS3
BS2W
BS3W
CS2
DS2W
ES1
ES2
FS1
FS2
WS32
WS33
WS35A
WS37
WS38
31550 31600 31650 31700 31750 31800
EASTING (m)
BS4E
BS4Ea
DS3E
BS4W
CS3
CS4
DS3W
ES3
Evidence for a buried valley in the Old Alluvium
DS4E
DS4W
100
110
90
(
m
R
L
)
70
80
E
L
E
V
A
T
I
O
N

(
Bottom of F2 Clay in Marine Clay
Detailed design site investigation
50
60
Detailed design site investigation
Bottom of F2 Clay in Marine Clay
Post collapse site investigations
Top of OLD ALLUVIUM
Post collapse site investigations
Section along north wall
100
110
90
100
R
L
)
70
80
E
L
E
V
A
T
I
O
N

(
m
R
60
E
50
Section along south wall
Tender SI boreholes
Tender SI CPTs
Detailed design SI borehol es
Detailed design SI CPTs
BN3
77.02
P33
P36
P42/P48
86.07
86 90
31700
Detailed design SI CPTs
Post collapse SI boreholes
Post collapse SI CPTs
Boreholes for bored pi les
Magnetic l ogging boreholes
BN2E
CN3
DN2E
DN3
82.61
82.27
81.91
P40
P41/P47
P45
P52
P54
86.39
86.30
86.84
86.90
86.20
85.98
86.58
31650
H
I
N
G

(
m
)
M3
54+900
M2
KP181
KP182
KP183
WN1
WN10
WN11
WN12
WN13
WN14
WN15
WN16
WN17
WN18
WN19
WN2
WN20
WN21
WN22
WN23
WN24
WN25
WN26
WN27
WN29
WN3
WN30A
WN31
WN4
WN5 WN6 WN7A
WN8
WN9
82.16
81.21
80.95
80.66
80.37
80.72
79.86
81.86
80.81
80.31
80.88
82.31
80.94
79.93
79.91
80.15
80.95
80.36
79.57
79.72
81.25 81.38
81.43 81.42 81.38
81.05
81.25
66KVNI
AN1
BN1E
BN1Ea
CL 2
CL-3g
CN1
DN1E
DN2E
81.88
82.91
80.68
81.57
83.13
81.86
81.94
M3010
82.55
MC3007
80.65
ABH32
ABH35 ABH83
ABH85
83.41
81.69 83.39
81.69
AC-1
AC-2
AC-3
AC-4
81.73
79.98
3
3
8
M305
M304
M303
M302
M210 M209 31650
N
O
R
T
H
54+812
KP181
WN31
WN32
WN33
WN34
WN35
WN36
WN37
WN38
WN39
WN40
WS1
WS10
WS15 WS16
WS17
WS18
WS19
WS2
WS20
WS21
WS22
WS23
WS24
WS25
WS26
WS27
WS28
WS29
WS3
WS30
WS31
WS32
WS34
WS35A
WS37
WS38
WS4A WS7 WS8 WS9
78.34
77.51
77.71
78.02
80.58
80.53
80.66
81.43
78.35
80.83
81.06
83.19
78.20
72.28
81.39 81.39
81.45
81.28
81.38
75.20
80.84
81.48
79.93
80.03
79.99
81.59
79.76
78.25
78.52
79.57
76.59
78.78
79.10
79.25
79.23
79.69
80.65
81 26
76.77 73.84 72.61 72.70
66KVS
AS1
BS1Ea
BS1Eb
BS2E
CFVN
CL-2
CS1
CTSN
DS1E
SPTSa
TSAS2b
71.09
75.98
74.60
74.72
81.97
78.04
80.22
82.01
82.17
81.09
71.52
82.16
ABH29
ABH31
ABH33
ABH81
ABH82
ABH84
81.23
82.07
80.51
80.13
80.37
82.57
80.76 81.69 M301
M211
M210 M209
M310 M309 M308 M307
M213
M212 & M306
missing
31550 31600 31650 31700 31750 31800
EASTING (m)
31600
81.26
BS2E
BS3E
DS2E
82.28
81.29
80.68
M2064
79.00
MC2025
81.70
ABH27
80.69
-14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
BS4E
BS4Ea
DS4E
80.33
80.96
79.24
Distortion to upper F2 layer caused by the collapse
Buried valley in the Old Alluvium
Buried valley in the Old Alluvium
Coincidence between buried valley and
distortion to upper F2 layer
There was a buried valley crossing the site of the
collapse diagonally from south-west to north-east
The presence and setting of the buried valley explain
the asymmetric conditions and the different collapse
on the north and south sides on the north and south sides
The buried valley coincides with the major ground
distortion on the south side and was clearly influential
in the collapse
Below the Lower Marine Clay the buried valley was
infilled with estuarine organic clays on the south side infilled with estuarine organic clays on the south side
and fluvial clays on the north side
Gas exsolution almost certainly occurred in the deep y p
organic clays as a result of stress relief, reducing
their strength further
The buried valley The buried valley
CN3
DN3
G
A
ABH-32
ABH-34
ABH-85 EN2
CN2
AN2
TSAN2
WN1
BN2W
BN1W
DN2W
66KVN
BN2E
I-67
AN1
CN1
DN2E
A
S

M
A
I
N
94.9
MC3007
MC3008
M3010
ABH 31
ABH-30 AC-2
AC-4
AC-3
AC-1
ABH-83
FN2
EN1
FN1
WN1
WN10
WN20
WN30
WN36 WS1
66KVS
WN26
WN28
WN29
WN33
WN34
WN35
WN24 WN25
WN27
WN31
WN32
DN1W
BN1W
BS1W
I-65
I-102
BN1Ea
BN1E
66KVN
CL-1A
CL-2
CL-3G
KP181
KP182
KP183
I 67
DN1E
BS1Ea
BS1Eb
ABH-35
S
E
A
W
A
L
L
ABH-33
ABH-31
ABH-28
ABH-27
ABH-29
ABH-81
ABH-82
ABH-84
MC2026
FS1
ES1
DS1E
CS1
TSAS2
WS34
WS30
WS20
WS10
WN40
WS38
66KVS
CPTN
CFVN CPTNa
SPTSa
WS35
WS36
WS37
WN39
WN38
WN37
TSAS2B
WS32
WS31
WS29
WS28
WS26
WS27
WS33
DS1W
BS1W
AS2
AS1
I-104
I-103
I-66
BS2E
M2064
ABH-26
ABH 27
ABH-80
FS2
ES2
DS2E
CS2
DS3E
CS3
AS3
DS3W
BS2W
DS2W
BS3W
I-64 M2065
BS3E
ES3
BS4E
DS3W
Post-collapse geometry and sequence of excavation
superimposed on buried valley
G
A
S
WN1
BN1W
66KVN
I
CN1
A
S

M
A
I
N
ABH-30
AC
WN10
WN20
N1W
I-65
BN1Ea
BN1E
66KVN
DN1E
66kV Cable
MC3007
M3010
AC-3
ABH-83
WN20
WN24
5
CL-1A
CL 3G
KP181
KP182
KP183
ABH-31
ABH 84
WS1
66KVS
SPTSa
BS1W
I-104
CL-2
CL-3G
BS1Ea
BS1Eb
ABH-29
ABH-82
ABH-84
DS1E
CS1
WS20
WS10
SPTSa
DS1W
AS1
L
L
ABH 29
CS1
WS26
DS1W
Sequence of excavation in relation to buried valley
The buried valley was crossed without collapse
developing
Strut forces would have been a maximum in the
buried valley and would have varied across the valley
The collapse was not, therefore, inevitable
An external influence (trigger) is required to explain
the timing of the collapse and why it occurred after the timing of the collapse and why it occurred after
crossing the buried valley
Significance of crossing the buried valley without Significance of crossing the buried valley without
collapse collapse
S338-9 stood for 8 days under load and was 20m
fromexcavation front from excavation front
S335-9 stood for 2.5 days under load and was over
8mfromexcavation front 8m from excavation front
Both S335-9S & S338-9N buckled within 10 minutes
Load in S335-8 and S335-9 was almost constant
between 18 April and initiation of collapse
All C-channel connections failed downwards at both
ends
The south wall was pushing the north wall back
Key observations
3D effects cannot explain why the collapse was
initiated at 9am S338 was 20-24mfromthe initiated at 9am S338 was 20 24m from the
excavation face and had stood for 8 days without
distress, S335 was 8-12m from the excavation face
Time effects cannot explain why the collapse was
initiated at 9am there was no evidence of load initiated at 9am there was no evidence of load
increases in the monitoring
Potential triggers Potential triggers
Load
g

o
f

9
t
h
e
r
f
9
t
h
Y
i
e
l
d
i
n
Observed
T
r
i
g
g
n
s
t
a
l
l
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

Observed
Minor additional loading
<2mm yielding in 9th
8th
9th
Excavation approaches
I
n
m
m
9th
+passes beyond S335
5
18 20
9
a
m
3
.
3
0
p
April 2004
Post-collapse investigations Post collapse investigations
Back analyses of the collapse
Analyses by Dr Felix Schroeder and Dr Zeljko
Cabarkapa using Imperial College Finite Element p g p g
Program (ICFEP)
2Dsection through M307 (I104) and M302 (I65) 2D section through M307 (I104) and M302 (I65)
Bored piles are not modelled (enhanced J GP) p ( )
Upper and Lower Marine Clays, F2 and lower Estuarine
Clay modelled using Modified CamClay Clay modelled using Modified Cam Clay
Coupled consolidation p
Fill and OA sand modelled using Mohr Coulomb. OA-CZ
clay/silt modelled as Tresca
Geotechnical analyses
clay/silt modelled as Tresca
W ll EI d d t ll f ki b d Wall EI reduced to allow for cracking, based on
reinforcement layout
Bending moment capacities set according to
reinforcement layout and ultimate strengths of steel
and concrete as supplied a d co c ete as supp ed
J GP treated as brittle material
9
th
level strut capacity set and strut allowed to strain
soften 72 hours after excavation to 10
th
level.
Geotechnical analyses
North
South
F2
F2
Upper Marine Clay Upper Marine Clay
Estuarine Estuarine
Fill Fill
+102.9
+98.58
+96.58
+84.58
+81.58
+102.9
+98.58
+97.07
+85.57
+82.07
OA (Sand) - OA-CZ
OA (Sand) - OA-CZ
OA (Clay/Silt) - OA-SW-1
F2
Lower Marine Clay
Lower Marine Clay
+71.00
+67.00
+63.00
+63.57
+61.57
+57.57
OA (Clay/Silt) - OA-CZ
OA (Clay/Silt) - OA-CZ
Stratigraphy assumed for ICFEP analyses
North wall 9th South wall
95
100
95
100
85
90
85
90
measured
predicted
80
85
80
85
predicted
n

(
m

R
L
)
measured
predicted
70
75
70
75
E
l
e
v
a
t
i
o
60
65
65
55
60
50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
55
60
450 -400 -350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50
Horizontal displacement (mm)
Horizontal displacement (mm)
North wall 10th South wall
95
100
95
100
85
90
85
90
measured
predicted
80
85
80
85
n

(
m

R
L
)
measured
predicted
predicted
70
75
70
75
E
l
e
v
a
t
i
o
60
65
65
55
60
50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
55
60
450 -400 -350 -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50
Horizontal displacement (mm)
Horizontal displacement (mm)
Predicted trends in 7
th
, 8
th
and 9
th
strut loads ed cted t e ds , 8 a d 9 st ut oads
4000
4500
3000
3500
4000
m
)
1500
2000
2500
Strut 7
Strut 8
Strut 9
9
8
r
c
e

(
k
N
/
m
500
1000
1500
7
P
r
o
p

f
o
r
0
280.00 281.00 282.00 283.00 284.00 285.00 286.00
( )
6 hours
Time (days)
6 hours
Observed trends in 8
th
and 9
th
strut loads
Load
f
9
t
h
Observed
n
s
t
a
l
l
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

Observed
8th
9th
Excavation approaches
I
n
m
m
9th
+passes beyond S335
5
18 20
9
a
m
3
.
3
0
p
April 2004
The analyses matched reasonably well the build up in The analyses matched reasonably well the build up in
horizontal wall movements, and the trends in the forces
in the 7th, 8th and 9th level struts
To match movements and forces at all stages it was
necessary to model the jet grout as a brittle material
The upper J GP was predicted to pass its peak strength
during excavation to the 6th level and the lower J GP to during excavation to the 6th level and the lower J GP to
pass its peak strength during excavation to the 9th level
Th 9 h l l h d i i d i i The 9th level strut reached its capacity during excavation
to the 10th level
Key findings from geotechnical analyses
The collapse had to be initiated by allowing the 9th level
strut to strain soften a ductile failure of the connection
was not associated with a collapse
The bending moment capacity of the south wall was
reached on the first stage of excavation below the 9th
l l b t hi did t f i th ll til th level, but a hinge did not form in the wall until the
sacrificial J GP layer had been removed
Key findings from geotechnical analyses
Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse
Relative vertical displacement between
the kingposts and Dwall panels
)
100
Top of southern wall-nolimit
Top of southern wall-OA1
Top of southern wall-OA2
8th
w
a
l
l

(
m
m
)
Up
0
50
p
9th
10th
e
n
t

o
f

D
w
-50
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
i
s
p
l
a
c
e
m
-100
V
e
r
t
i
c
a
l

d
i
Down
Excavation depth (m)
V
Predicted settlement of south wall during excavation
500
300
400
Run 4apfnolimit
Run 4apfnolimit_OA1
Run 4apfnolimit_OA2
t
s

(
m
m
)
200
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
0
100
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
r
t
i
c
a
l

d
i
s
p
-200
-100
North Wall
South Wall
V
e
r
Distance (m) Distance (m)
Predicted vertical displacement of lower JGP layer
after excavation to 10
th
level
20
2
Strut 262
no backfill
10
(
m
m
)
N
o
r
t
h

w
a
l
l
t
h

w
a
l
l
n
g
p
o
s
t
Typical relative Typical relative
displacements of displacements of
strut between strut between
0

a
n
d


k
i
n
g
p
o
s
t

1
3
7A
S
o
u
t
k
i
n
strut between strut between
walls and kingpost walls and kingpost
l

b
e
t
w
e
e
n

w
a
l
l
2
3
3
7B
-10
f
e
r
e
n
c
e

i
n

l
e
v
e
4
6A
-20
D
i
f
f
1
5
6A
7A
-30
4 5
7B
Calibrated FE analyses predict downward Calibrated FE analyses predict downward
displacement of Dwall and upward displacement of
kingpost when sacrificial J GP layer excavated
Survey data supports upward vertical displacement of
centre of strut relative to ends
Relative vertical displacement Relative vertical displacement
KP184 KP183 KP182 KP181 KP180
339
340
335
336
337
338
Sacrificial J GP
9
th
level
Excavation front
Lower J GP
Kingposts in long section
Post-collapse investigations Post collapse investigations
Structural steel physical tests
and numerical analyses.
The effect of relative vertical The effect of relative vertical
displacement
5000
12mm stiffener
plates
Waler
4000
3000
(
k
N
)
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
o
a
d

(
1000
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
Axial displacement (mm)
Comparison of tests on connections with plate and C channel
stiffeners
5000
12mm stiffener
plates
Waler
4000
3000
(
k
N
)
C channel
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
o
a
d

(
Waler
stiffener
1000
C channel stiffener has similar capacity
to double plate stiffener but becomes
brittle after an initial ductile response
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
Unforced sway
Comparison of tests on connections with plate and C channel
stiffeners
Axial displacement (mm)
5000
Test result
4000
3000
a
d

(
k
N
)
C channel
stiffener
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
o
a
Waler
1000
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
Adjustedaxial displacement (mm)
Calibration of FE model of strut Calibration of FE model of strut--waler connection waler connection
5000
Test result
FE prediction
4000
FE prediction
3000
a
d

(
k
N
)
C channel
stiffener
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
o
a
Waler
1000
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
Adjustedaxial displacement (mm)
Calibration of FE model of strut Calibration of FE model of strut--waler connection waler connection
5000
Test result
FE prediction
Ductile plateau 10-15mm
4000
FE prediction
3000
a
d

(
k
N
)
C channel
stiffener
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
o
a
Waler
Yield
1000
Ductile plateau allows failure to
develop at both ends
0 10 20 30 40 50
0
Adjustedaxial displacement (mm)
Calibration of FE model of strut Calibration of FE model of strut--waler connection waler connection
5000
8m strut
4000
3000
o
a
d

(
k
N
)
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
Waler
C channel
stiffener
1000
0 10 20 30 40 50
Axial displacement (mm)
0
Effect of strut length (bending restraint) on brittleness of
connection
p ( )
5000
8m strut
18m strut
4000
3000
a
l

l
o
a
d

(
k
N
)
2000 A
x
i
a
Waler
C channel
stiffener
Reduced restraint increases brittleness
d d d til l t
1000
and reduces ductile plateau
8m strut effective kingpost
18m strut ineffective kingpost
0 10 20 30 40 50
Axial displacement (mm)
0
Effect of strut length (bending restraint) on brittleness of
connection
Test on C channel stiffened connection by Nishimatsu
Test on C channel stiffened connection by Nishimatsu
5000
axial load only
4000
3000
o
a
d

(
k
N
)
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
Waler
C channel
stiffener
1000
0 10 20 30 40 50
Axial displacement (mm)
0
Effect of relative vertical displacement
p ( )
5000
axial load only
axial load+RVD
4000
3000
o
a
d

(
k
N
)
2000 A
x
i
a
l

l
Waler
C channel
stiffener
1000
RVD reduces ductile plateau,
increases brittleness, makes
stable situation unstable
0 10 20 30 40 50
Axial displacement (mm)
0
Forced sway
Effect of relative vertical displacement
p ( )
P
Force, P
D til
P
Force, P
Ductile
strain
Effect of brittleness of strut to waler connection
2500
Ductile
2000
Run 4apf2100drop
Run 4apf2100drop4
Run 4apf2100drop3
Ductile
1000
1500
p
(
)
p p
Run 4apf2100drop2
Run 4apf2100
e

(
k
N
/
m
)
500
r
o
p

f
o
r
c
e
0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
P
Total axial strain (%) Total axial strain (%)
Effect of brittleness of strut to waler connection
2500
R 4 f2100
2000
500
Run 4apf2100
Run 4apf2100drop2
Run 4apf2100drop3
Run 4apf2100drop4
Run 4apf2100drop
Ductile no collapse
1500
e

(
k
N
/
m
)
500
1000
r
o
p

f
o
r
c
e
0
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25
6 hours
9 days
21 days
P
Time since reaching excavation level of 72.3m RL (days)
P
Force, P
D til
P
Force, P
No collapse
Ductile
hours to collapse
Several days to collapse
strain
hours to collapse
y
Th l ti ti l di l t b t th There was relative vertical displacement between the
diaphragm wall, which settled when the sacrificial
J GP was removed, and the kingpost, which rose, i.e. gp
relative vertical displacement between the ends and
centre of the strut (RVD)
The strut-waler connection was ductile-brittle. The
ductile plateau explains why both ends could fail p p y
The brittleness of the connection determines the time
taken for the collapse to develop
Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse
RVDreduces the length of the ductile plateau and RVD reduces the length of the ductile plateau and
increases the brittleness
RVD k t bl it ti t bl RVD can make a stable situation unstable
RVD can shorten the time to collapse
Why downward failure at both ends? Why downward failure at both ends?
Why collapse after crossing the buried valley?
Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse
Free
Fixed
Forced sway
Downward failure at both ends Downward failure at both ends
Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse Trigger required to initiate collapse
Post-collapse positions of the Dwall
panels
G
A
S
WN1
BN1W
66KVN
I
CN1
A
S

M
A
I
N
ABH-30
AC
WN10
WN20
N1W
I-65
BN1Ea
BN1E
66KVN
DN1E
66kV Cable
MC3007
M3010
AC-3
ABH-83
WN20
WN24
5
CL-1A
CL 3G
KP181
KP182
KP183
ABH-31
ABH 84
WS1
66KVS
SPTSa
BS1W
I-104
CL-2
CL-3G
BS1Ea
BS1Eb
ABH-29
ABH-82
ABH-84
DS1E
CS1
WS20
WS10
SPTSa
DS1W
AS1
L
L
ABH 29
CS1
WS26
DS1W
Post-collapse geometry superimposed on buried valley
31650
CL-2
31640
66KVS
BS1Ea
SPTSa
1
9
.
6
1
3
.
5
7
.
5
9
.
2
7
TUNNEL
SOUTH WALL
31640
T
H
I
N
G

(
m
)
WS10
WS14
WS15
WS16
WS8
WS9
W
S
1
1
W
S
1
1
A
W
S
1
1
B
S
1
1
C
W
S
1
2
W
S
1
2
A
W
S
1
2
B
1
2
C
W
S
1
3
W
S
1
3
A
W
S
1
3
B
3
C
1
1
1
4
.
7
1
2
1
9
1
5
.
2
.
5
1
6
2
6
1
3
.
2
.
5
31630
N
O
R
T
CS1
WS17
W
S
W
S
1
W
S
11
1
2
WS11E
WS12E
WS11D
WS12D
Post collapse SI boreholes
Magnetic logging boreholes
Unsuccessful magnetic logging boreholes
2005 boreholes
WS11F
WS13F
WS13E
31670 31680 31690 31700
EASTING (m)
31620
Coincidence between inability to advance boreholes and
missing Dwall panels
EASTING (m)
WS11E,11F,
12E,13F
WS11-13A-D
Obstruction created by missing Dwall panels
2
3
M306
1
Gap
1
M306
M212
1
M306 Gap M306
M212
1. Panels M306 and M212, each side of the
gap, and panel 213 fail by toe kick-in and
rotate back rotate back.
2. Soil flows through resulting gap between
M306 and M307, rotating panel 307.
3 S il fl th h lti b t 3. Soil flows through resulting gap between
M307 and M308, rotating panel 308, etc.
Sequence of south wall panel movements
304
4
5
305
r
a
g
r
a
g
d
r
a
g
303
3
4
d
r
a
g
d
r
a
g
d
r
d
r
d
301
302
2
1
2a
3a
4a
306
1
2a
3a
4a
Sequence of south and north wall panel movements
Fill
SOUTH
NORTH
Upper
Upper E
Fill
Marine Clay
Upper F2
Differing restraint Differing restraint
Lower
Marine Clay
Sacrificial JGP
Differing restraint Differing restraint
imposed by bored imposed by bored
piles at north piles at north
and south walls and south walls
Lower E
Sacrificial JGP
Permanent JGP
Lower F2
OA SW2 (N=35)
OA SW1 (N 72) OA SW1 (N=72)
OA (CZ)
The bored piles had a major influence on the
displacements of the Dwall panels during the
collapse and on their post-collapse positions
The bored piles restricted toe movements on the The bored piles restricted toe movements on the
south side and prevented failure as the buried valley
was crossed
Loads carried by the bored piles contributed to the
under reading of the strain gauges under-reading of the strain gauges
Significance of the bored piles Significance of the bored piles
North wall
1 4 2
6
7
3
M305
M304 M303 M302 M301
335 336
338 339
340
334
333
337
H H H
KP 182 KP 181 KP 183
1 5 5 5
7 7
M306 M307 M308 M309 M310
1 Order in which distortion to waler noted
Excavation to 10
th
complete
Excavation in progress
Location of walers, splays and Dwall gaps
G
A
S
WN1
BN1W
66KVN
I
CN1
A
S

M
A
I
N
ABH-30
AC
WN10
WN20
N1W
I-65
BN1Ea
BN1E
66KVN
DN1E
66kV Cable
MC3007
M3010
AC-3
ABH-83
WN20
WN24
5
CL-1A
CL 3G
KP181
KP182
KP183
ABH-31
ABH 84
WS1
66KVS
SPTSa
BS1W
I-104
CL-2
CL-3G
BS1Ea
BS1Eb
ABH-29
ABH-82
ABH-84
DS1E
CS1
WS20
WS10
SPTSa
DS1W
AS1
L
L
ABH 29
CS1
WS26
DS1W
Repositioned bored piles at 66kV crossing Repositioned bored piles at 66kV crossing
Upward displacement of KP 180 and 181 Upward displacement of KP 180 and 181
accentuated by toe displacement of M306 and M212,
where bored piles had been re-positioned and
dditi l t t ibl additional toe movement was possible
Resulting RVD fed back into buried valley Resulting RVD fed back into buried valley
Relative vertical displacement Relative vertical displacement
KP184 KP183 KP182 KP181 KP180
335
335
337
338
336
335
336
339
340
Upper J GP
9
th
level
Excavation front
Lower J GP
Kingposts in long section
C channel stiffened connection undergoes brittle
failure
Critical length of strut and of load in strut result in
minimal lateral restraint to connection
Restraint from rising kingpost results in downward
force on connection
RVDresults in reduction in ductility of connection and RVD results in reduction in ductility of connection and
increase in brittleness
RVD makes a stable situation with overstress
bl unstable
RVD results in downward failure of connection
RVD was the trigger for the failure
Failure mode of connection and RVD Failure mode of connection and RVD
Overall conclusions
The use of Method A in the numerical analyses to model
near normally consolidated soils is fundamentally
incorrect
Its use led to under prediction of wall displacements and Its use led to under-prediction of wall displacements and
bending moments and so to a reduction in the
redundancy in the system. The J GP was strained
beyond its peak and a plastic hinge formed in the wall as
excavation of the sacrificial J GP was underway
Overall conclusions
There were errors in the design of the strut-waler connection
resulting in a design capacity that was 50% of the required
capacity where splays were omitted capacity where splays were omitted
The collapse initiated some time after the excavation crossed
th b i d ll h f th d d i d t t the buried valley, where forces on the under-designed strut-
waler connections would have been a maximum
An additional perturbation or trigger was necessary to explain
the timing of the collapse, the downward failure of the walers at
both ends and the trends in the monitoring data
Overall conclusions
The permanent bored piles in combination with the J GP
played a significant role in preventing the collapse as the p y g p g p
valley was crossed
The collapse was triggered when working in the vicinity of The collapse was triggered when working in the vicinity of
the 66kV cable crossing
At this location, the permanent bored piles had been
repositioned and the J GP layout had been modified,
allowing the wall toe to kick-in and cause additional uplift of g p
the local kingposts
Overall conclusions
This additional upward displacement of the kingposts relative to
the wall fed back into the system, introducing forced sway
failure failure
Downward movement of the walls has been predicted by
analysis; the potential for relative upward movement of the analysis; the potential for relative upward movement of the
kingposts has been confirmed by surveys
Forced s a fail re red ced the strain o er hich the Forced sway failure reduced the strain over which the
connection remained ductile, increased the brittleness of the
connection and allowed a stable situation to become unstable
Forced sway failure can explain the timing of the collapse, the
form of the observed distortions, the trends in the monitoring
data and the speed at which the collapse developed data, and the speed at which the collapse developed
Overall conclusions
The collapse was not caused by hydraulic base
heave and was not related to poor workmanship heave and was not related to poor workmanship
Wall rotation, which had been linked with inadequate , q
penetration of the wall into the OA, was not the cause
of the collapse
Several factors had to act in combination to cause
the collapse the collapse
Unforgiving site
Deepest excavation in marine clay in Singapore shortcomings
in use of Method A not previously apparent because of depth
dependence
Ground conditions buried valley in OA infilled with soft fluvial
and organic clay, rapid variation in depth of marine clay along
d th ti lti i t i ti and across the excavation resulting in an asymmetric section
Curvature of walls in plan requiring more frequent use of p q g q
walings
Presence of 66kVA crossing Presence of 66kVA crossing
Need to adopt sacrificial J GP layer, removal of which caused p y ,
step increase in 9th level strut load and step increase in wall
settlement
Lessons learnt
J GP is a brittle material
The mass properties of J GP need to be more carefully
evaluated
Coring of J GP is not an adequate check
The use of numerical modelling of soils in design should be
carried out by specialists and its incompatibilities with
current codes needs to be removed current codes needs to be removed
The potential for brittle failure of C channel connections
t b i d must be recognised
Lessons learnt
Temporary and permanent works should be subject to
independent checks
The effects of relative displacement between kingposts
and walls should be considered in the design of strutted g
excavations
Forced sway failure and its consequences should be y q
recognised as a potential mechanism in design
Monitoring did not warn of the impending collapse Monitoring did not warn of the impending collapse