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The Eastern Muslims Journal of Asian and African Studies

Copyright © 2009
SAGE Publications

of Sri Lanka www.sagepublications.com


(Los Angeles, London, New Delhi,
J
Singapore and Washington DC)

A
Vol 44(4): 407–427
Special Problems and DOI: 10.1177/0021909609105092

Solutions A
A.R.M. Imtiyaz
Temple University, USA
S

Abstract
Conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamils and the Sinhalese brought the Eastern
Muslims into the crossfire. Muslim elites and politicians generally cooperate
with the Sinhalese ruling class. Such cohabitation irritated the Tamils. Since
1985, relations between the Tamils and the Muslims in the Eastern region have
become strained, and Muslims claimed that they have some problems to be
solved. This study attempts to identify some special problems of the Eastern
Muslims. A questionnaire on the special problems of the Eastern Muslims was
distributed to the Eastern youth, students, unemployed Muslims and farmers.
The population of the target group was selected randomly. More than 150
questionnaires were issued with a 75 percent response rate. Interviews were also
conducted on the phone with an educated section of the Eastern Muslims. This
study also suggests solutions to the protracted ethno-political conflict based on
power-sharing.

Keywords consociationalism • divided societies • ethnic relations • mobilization


• modernization • power-sharing

Introduction
Sri Lanka (known as Ceylon until 1972) gained global attention in recent
years, particularly for its deadly ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), commonly known as the Tamil Tigers and the state
security forces controlled by the Sinhalese, the majority ethnic group, and the
tsunami that swept the shores of Sri Lanka on 26 December 2004 killing over
30,000 people. Both events victimized the Muslims of Sri Lanka, particularly
the Eastern Muslims. Muslims, Sri Lanka’s second-largest minority after ethnic
Tamils, share close linguistic and cultural ties with Tamils and speak Tamil;
however, they prefer to be recognized by their religious and cultural identity.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438382


408 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

By and large, the Muslims of Sri Lanka oppose the Tamil Tigers and cooperate
with the Sri Lankan government dominated by the majority Sinhalese to win
their share in divided polity. Muslims believe that the Tamil Tigers, who claim
that the Tamils are discriminated against by the State and its institutions since the
island’s independence in favor of the majority Sinhalese (Balasingham, 2004),
carried out systematic killings of Muslims, including a massacre in August 1991
(Hasbullah, 2000; Mohideen, 2002; Nuhuman, 2002). Thus, Muslims claim
they have the special problems in term of security and existence in the Eastern
region. This article will review many of these factors that led to the special prob-
lems of the Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka who comprise only 25% of the 1.5
million Muslims in the country.
To understand the problems of the Eastern Muslims, this piece of study will
address the following questions: What are the special problems of the Muslims
of the Eastern Province? Could an arrangement of devolution of powers accept-
able to the Muslims of the Eastern province be arrived at in the present political
context? What are the negative consequences of the special problems of the
Eastern Muslims?

Theoretical Understanding
There are several theories to understand the causes of the group tension and
conflict. This article, however, employs constructive, modernization and polit-
ical mobilization theories to examine the special problems of the Eastern
Muslims.

Constructive Approach

Constructivists view ethnic identities as a product of human actions and


choices. They are constructed and transmitted, not genetically inherited, from
the past (Taras and Ganguly, 2002). Max Weber was one of the theorists who
stressed the social origin of ethnic identity. Weber viewed each ethnic group as
a ‘human group’ whose belief in a common ancestry leads to the formation of a
community (Stone, 1995). This led to the conclusion that ethnic identity is not
primarily a genetic phenomenon, but forms under the right circumstances by
appropriate political actions (Stone, 1995). Thus, political actors construct both
identity and problems in order to gain and hold power. Ismail (1997) shares
similar understanding in a study of the Muslims of Sri Lanka. According to him,
Muslim political elites well before independence had succeeded in constructing
identity based on Islamic faith to maintain a distinct group identity from the
Tamils.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438382


Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 409

Modernization

In this theory, greater political and economic interaction among people, coupled
with widespread education and mass communication networks, would collapse
parochial identities of ethnic and religious groups and replace them with loyalty
to larger communities. However, political developments of the 1980s and 1990s
in both the post-colonial and the western worlds have clashed with this pre-
diction. Ted Robert Gurr (1993) maintains that ethno-religious movements
throughout the world in recent decades provide strong networks that form the
basis for political mobilization.
Gurr, in his work on the mobilization of minorities, clearly identifies modern-
ization as a threatening source of ethno-political and religious mobilization. He
maintains that the global processes of economic development, state building
and the communication revolution have increased ethnic tensions everywhere
(Gurr, 1993). This comes from the fact that dominant groups want to build
nations on their own cultural values, triggering a minority reaction for increased
autonomy and separate development.
In Sri Lanka, modernization exerted enormous pressure on the different
ethnic groups. Politicians use such pressure for their quest for power by formu-
lating special policies in order to win the support of particular ethnic groups
(de Votta, 2004). Such, commonly considered as pro-Sinhalese, policies led to
the ethnic civil war between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. On the other hand,
Muslims, particularly the North and East Muslims complain about the Tamil
oppression and discrimination against them.

Mobilization
A sense of insecurity emerges among the members of a group when they feel that
they are deliberately and systematically beleaguered by the dominant group of
the society. The group that is methodically targeted by the dominant group due
to its ideas, beliefs, lifestyle and/or identity tends to mobilize against the oppres-
sors in all available ways, theoretically both in non-violence primarily by the
moderate democratic leadership and violently by radical groups, if it thinks the
former’s strategies make no sense to win its rights. This punch line theory on
mobilization facilitates the understanding of the process of group mobilization
either against the State or dominant group or both (Gurr, 1993).
In Sri Lanka, Muslim elites’ willingness to build ‘distinct’ identity from the
Tamils and the Tamil violence persuaded the North and East Muslims to be
identified as separate ethnic group based on the Islamic faith which has played a
significant role in shaping their ideas, values and lifestyle, and eventually led to
the emergence of Muslim religo-nationalism in a corner of the Eastern province.
410 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

One may consider the origin of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) led by
the late M.H.M. Ashraff in this theoretical light.

Special Problems of the Muslims of the Eastern Province


Ethnic Relations: Will Security and Existence Matter?

Despite the political confrontations among the elites, masses of Tamils and
Muslims lived peacefully since the independence. Sri Lanka Muslims, particularly
North and East Muslims in the 1960s and 1970s proudly identified themselves
as Tamil-speaking Muslims, and shared some of the genuine grievances of
the Tamil community. According to Ameerdeen (2006: 7), Eastern Muslims
‘offered refuge to the Tamils who were displaced by the onslaught of the security
forces. They protected the Tamils, their belongings and even the fighters in
times of danger.’ Further, studies on the Sri Lanka Muslims maintained that
Muslims even subscribed to the Tamil militant ideology and joined the Tamil
Tigers’ military wing. The Tamil Tigers enjoyed some good support from the
Muslim villages and opened branch offices and eventually won the popularity
among certain sections of the Muslims (Ali, 1997). During the mid-1980s a large
number of Muslims joined the ranks of the Tamil from Eravur to fight the Sri
Lanka state (Hoole, 2001), and continued to support the Tamil Tigers even
after Tamil Tigers ‘murdering over a hundred surrendered Muslim policemen’
(Hoole, 2001).
However, Tamil–Muslim riots broke out in April 1985, apparently over
an incident in the town of Mannar in the north where three Muslim worship-
pers were said to have been gunned down by Tamil militants inside a mosque,
which ruined the Tamil–Muslim cordiality. According to Ali (1986: 155), ‘the
UNP which was in power at that time exploited this incident to the maximum
and utilized every means at its disposal to create a permanent rift between the
LTTE and the Muslims.’
Following the 1985 riots, particularly in 1990, Ali (1986: 158) notes, the Tamil
Tigers:
lost its patience with the Muslims, changed its compromising approach towards
them and unleashed some of its most ferocious acts of savagery on the innocent
Muslims of Polonnaruwa, Kattankudy and Eravur in the Eastern provinces.
Tens and hundreds of Muslim men, women and children were massacred in
their homes, fields, markets, and mosques. The entire Muslim population of
Jaffna in the north were evicted from their homes at gun point and turned into
refugees overnight.

On the other hand, the Muslim cadre of the Tamil Tigers feared that they
would become a next target of the Tamil Tigers and most of them deserted and
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 411

surrendered to the Sri Lankan forces (Hoole, 2001). Continuous violence and
threat persuaded the Muslims of the East to approve the political appeals of
charismatic Mr Ashraff who founded the SLMC.
Tamil violence against the Eastern Muslims raises the key question: Why did
the Tamils target the Muslims? The majority of Sri Lanka Muslim scholars do
not present any logical answer to the question. The truth is that Muslim elites
since independence regularly cooperated with the ruling Sinhala political elites
regardless of who occupied the powers in Colombo to consolidate their com-
mercial interests. In addition to the commercial interests, according to Ismail
(1997), is a fear of physical security or protection on the island had persuaded
the Muslim elites to maintain good relations with the Sinhalese political class.
Muslim leaders are well aware that their community would face the risk of
unfriendly attitudes from the Sinhalese leaders by denying state support for
business activities and possibly would face violent opposition as the Tamils met
in the early independence period. Such concerns made the Muslim political
establishment dominated by the Southern Muslims seek an accommodative
approach and to support the unitary state structure. The Muslim decision to
accommodate the Sinhalese generated two immediate results: (1) ministerial
portfolios and concessions; and (2) the revival of Tamil animosity against the
Muslims, particularly the North and East Muslims. However, Muslim cooper-
ation with the Sinhala political class irritated the Tamil polity, particularly the
militants. Tamil militants targeted both Muslim masses and political class: they
intimidated the Eastern Muslims and outlawed the activities of the SLMC and
listed Mr Ashraff in its hit list (Ameerdeen, 2006). However, Mr Ashraff, an
adroit Muslim politician, tactfully utilized the threats of the Tamil Tigers with
religious rhetoric for electoral gains:
If the LTTE is killing us, if the LTTE is leaving us out of our homes, simply
because we happen to be Muslims, simply because we say ‘La ilaha illallahu,
Mammmdur-Rasoolullah’ because of our belief in Allah and Prophet
Muhammed (peace be upon him) … if that is the only reason, it is the
commandment of the Holy Quran that we should declare Jihad against them
and kill every LTTEr. We shall now intend to slaughter every LTTEr includ-
ing Mr. Prabhakaran. In a personal note, I will be the happiest if I can die in
battle at the time of slitting the neck of this bloody Prabhakaran. (Ameerdeen,
2006: 17)

Then again, Tamils share different perceptions on the worsening Tamil–


Muslim relations in the region. Tamils believe that problems started between
Muslims and Tamils, because various Muslims started being recruited into
the armed forces, intelligence and home guards to be used against the Tamil
militants. In the 1980s the Sri Lanka government created armed Muslim para-
military groups which it utilized to fuel communal violence and open a third
412 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

front in the bloody war. The Tamil Tigers responded violently to the Muslim
willingness to cooperate with the State (Nayagam, 2006).
Further, study on the Eastern situation maintains that Muslims in the East
are accused of confiscating Tamils’ land and are ‘perceived as taking advantage
of Tamil misfortune’. It further notes, ‘Muslim purchasing of paddy land from
Tamil absentee landlords, buying up Tamil owned shops, the creeping spread
of Muslim villages into Tamil villages is part of the contemporary reality of the
Eastern Province’ (Raheem and Haniffa, 2005: 4).
Ethnic and religious rhetoric generally helps to mobilize economically and
politically disadvantaged groups. However, such political rhetoric aimed at de-
stabilizing ethnic harmony in divided societies could seriously undermine the
security and stability of the region. In the Eastern region of Sri Lanka, it seems
both the Tamil and Muslim leaderships exploited the vulnerability and emotions
of the masses to gain the upper hand in politics. In sum, the employment of
ethnic and religious emotions, particularly since 1985, had radically exacerbated
ethnic dissonance, and thus led to a serious security crisis.

Special Issues: Question of Land and Permanent Merger of the North and East

Tensions between the groups in divided societies can occur as a result of growth
of the population and increased competition for land and jobs (Brubaker, 1996).
Land-attached communities often develop confrontations when both com-
munities expand their farming or grazing into the same land. This often leads
to sharp competition over land, which is likely to take on an ethnic coloration.
This theoretical understanding can be applied to examine the situation of the
Muslims of the Eastern province who claim that their lands were being force-
fully confiscated by the Tamil Tigers.
A peculiar phenomenon in the East is that Muslim and Tamil villages closely
intersperse with each other. The large share of Muslim lands squeeze in the
Tamil villages. To meet the population growth, they need farm land and/or
urban jobs, and these jobs and resources are in short supply. Unemployment
and despair become a serious challenge both for Muslims and Tamils. Economic
competition causes tension between the two communities, mainly because of
the fears of expansion. Communities fixed unwritten rules and regulations
strictly discouraged members of one ethnic group from selling the land to the
other ethnic community. Muslims in the Eastern Province often complain about
being harassed by Tamils when they pass through the adjacent Tamil villages,
waylaying of vehicles, robbing of paddy and cattle belonging to the Muslims.
By the 1980s, the Muslims and Tamils had developed different economic
interests. While the Eastern Muslims paid interest to buying the lands and
property and setting up businesses, the Tamils had concentrated on pursuing
education and trying to secure government jobs and professions. With the
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 413

ethnic civil war sharpened between the Tamils and the Sinhalese, Tamils in
the Eastern began to sell the lands to the Muslims. This contributed enough to
generate an economic gap between the Tamils and the Muslims and the violent
tensions in the region. Economically poor Tamils with the help of Tamil militants
confiscated the lands located in the adjacent Tamil villages but belonging to the
Muslims when the ethnic tensions disturbed the order and stability.
After the 1983 ethnic violence, North and East Tamils, according to
Mohideen (2002), ‘have started to forcibly occupy the lands belonging to the
Muslims in areas close to the Tamil villages’ and ‘there are about 490 locations
in the North-East where the Tamils are forcibly occupying about 100,000 acres
of agricultural lands belonging to 30,000 Muslim Families’. In fact, the question
of land largely decides the fate of the ethnic harmony and stability between
these conflicting groups.
To mitigate the Tamil and Muslim tensions, a high level meeting took place
between the SLMC delegation led by its leader Rauf Hakeem and the LTTE
delegation led by Mr V. Pirapakaran on 13 April 2002. The three-and-a-half
hours of discussion centered on several problems faced by Muslims in the North
and East including that of the land dispute. The delegations finally reached what
they called the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU), between the leader of
the LTTE, and the leader of the SLMC. The MoU maintained that cultivation
by Muslims in untended Muslim lands in the region would be enabled and the
practice of collecting funds from Muslims in the East would cease.
Moreover, the Tamil Tigers also made a similar offer at the second round of
peace talks in Thailand with the Sri Lanka Government from 31 October to 3
November 2000 that they were seriously considering returning the lands and
the properties to the Muslim owners at the end of the harvest.
According to Mohideen (2002), had the Tamil Tigers fulfilled their commit-
ments concerning the Eastern Muslim land question, ‘it would have benefited
more than 22,000 families – 103,000 men, women and children and will establish
the basis for conflict resolution and help peaceful co-existence between the
Tamils and Muslims’.
Another issue concerning the stability of the region is the permanent merger
of the North-East province. Tamils consider the recently de-linked North and
East provinces as the traditional homeland of the Tamils (Wilson, 2000), and
they would reject any solution beyond the permanent fixture of the provinces
(Vigneswaran, 2007). Eastern Muslims, however, express reservation about the
permanent merger of the provinces.
According to some opinions, Muslims opposed the permanent merger for
valid reasons: Muslims have reasonable fear over the permanent annex of the
regions (Siddeek, 2002). A permanent merger would marginalize the Muslims
and lose the unique identity of the Muslims.
414 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

Since Muslims of the East became victims of Tamil violence in the region,
they constantly develop fears over the Tamils who violently mobilize against the
State. The majority of the Eastern Muslims think that Muslims would further lose
their lands and political mobility, and Muslims would be placed at the receiving
end of the Tamil domination if the merger is done. This confirms that the Tamil
radical nationalist violence against the Muslims had persuaded many Muslims in
the region to oppose the permanent merger of North and East provinces.
The Sinhalese oppose the merger because they think it would lead to the
separation in the region (Rodrigo, 2006). Eastern Muslims believe that Muslims
for their part have similar concerns of living in a ‘unitary’ North and East
under the Tamil–Hindu chauvinism, given their own history of harassment and
oppression at the hands of the Tamil Tigers. Thus, they demand permanent de-
merger of the province for their better future.
In any divided societies, minorities tend to establish certain fears with a logic
or otherwise to challenge the real or perceived domination of the majority. Such
fears can be managed or minimized if there were some institutional safeguards
in the form of power-sharing.

Muslims’ Perceptions of the ISGA and P-TOMS Agreement: Will They


Accommodate Muslim Interests?

The Muslim perceptions of the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) and


the Post-Tsunami Operation & Management Structure (P-TOMS) represent
the Eastern Muslims’ concerns and frustration. In October 2003, the LTTE sub-
mitted its proposal for political power-sharing in the form of ISGA (Philipson
and Thangarajah, 2005). The Eastern Muslims consider that the ISGA would
not deliver any justice to them and, in fact, would lead to institutionalize the
Tamil domination over the Muslims in the region. Therefore, Muslim opinions
reflect that the implications of the ISGA rather than easing the concerns of the
Muslims, it would further aggregate the Muslim fears.
Muslims of the region also think that the ISGA fails to address the Muslim
concerns on the representation and authority. Further, the ISGA does not offer
institutional guarantee for the Muslims in the Tamil-dominated North and East
polity. As a matter of fact, in the Muslim psyche, the past history of Tamil dis-
crimination of Muslims is still fresh. Muslims believe that the Tamil forces did
noting to allay the Muslim fears.
Political communities often refuse to submit their sovereignties when they feel
that their interests would be marginalized in a new political environment. The
responses from the Eastern Muslims to the ISGA confirm this understanding.
The Sri Lanka government sealed the P-TOMS with the Tamil Tigers in June
2005 to distribute international aid equally to the North and East, implicitly
accepting administration of aid by the Tamil Tigers.
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 415

Muslims thought that the P-TOMS was unfair because it did not give any
weight to the concerns of the affected Muslims. The study on the tsunami and its
impact on the Eastern Muslims estimated that ‘approximately half of the close
to 30,000 people killed in the tsunami is Muslim. Kalmunai and Sainthamarudhu
stand out as some of the most severely affected areas in the country’ (Raheem
and Haniffa, 2005: 4). In other words, the Muslim community in the East
suffered a staggering 65% of the total damage caused there.
The Muslims believed that implications of the P-TOMS would strengthen the
Tamil domination over the Muslims because the regional committees, the key
part of the pact, grants the lion’s share (five members) to the Tamils, while allo-
cating three seats to the Muslims, the most affected group by the killer tsunami,
thus Muslims would be placed in a precarious position in this mechanism.
Muslims’ concerns were further provoked when the pact formally declared
Killinochichi, as a headquarters of the regional committee. Tamil Tigers con-
sider Killinochichi as their de-facto political capital of Tamil Eelam, and it
became a symbolic home of political and military decision making of the Tamil
Tigers. Many local and foreign dignitaries including Norwegian peace brokers
often visit Killinochichi for consultation with the Tamil Tigers. Thus, Muslims
consider a regional committee located in Killinochichi controlled by the Tamil
Tigers would not address the problems of the Muslim victims of the tsunami.
According to Moulavi M. Musawwir of Trincomalee, ‘Muslims will be at a
disadvantageous position of not getting their due share as their opinion will
not carry any weight against the powerful LTTE once P-TOMS would be in
their hands’ (telephone interview, 13 May 2006). Muslim opinions also rejected
government efforts to seal a pact with the Tamil Tigers. Muslims, according to
Moulavi M. Musawwir, think that the Government should not do any political
business in relation to the tsunami with the Tamil Tigers. If there is any agree-
ment for tsunami purpose by the Government, ‘it should have been done with
the Muslims’, Moulavi concluded. However, some Muslim respondents of the
survey rejected such opinions, and said the pact offers equal representation
to the Muslims in the high level committee which is more or less an equally
powerful role in the decision making.
Institutions such as P-TOMS could have cemented mistrust among the sub-
cultures at the level of the masses if the politicians and leaders keep the trust in
the institutions. But Muslim politicians shared reservations and thus, opposed
the P-TOMS: Rauff Hakeem, leader of the SLMC said that the lack of Muslim
input into the P-TOMS would seriously affect its credibility. He had accused
those at formulation level of cold-shouldering them and expressed concern that
the Muslim community in the East had a feeling that it was being ‘besieged’
by the Tamil Tigers. If the logic is that of tsunami relief, according to Muslims,
then surely the Muslims should have more, not less representation than the
Tamils (Hakeem, 2005).
416 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

By and large, the masses follow the rhetoric and actions of the political
leaders. When political leaders justify the decisions or when they appeal to
the masses with symbolic ethnic or religious slogans, it is highly likely that the
masses will follow the appeals of politicians. Such a tendency is particularly
common among the ethnically and religiously deeply oriented people. This is
the general pattern in Sri Lanka, including among the Muslims: the section of
the Muslim youth violently opposed the P-TOMS in the region, particularly in
Kattankudy, the area increasingly becoming a hotbed for Islamic extremism
(Lankamuslims, 2005). The unprecedented uprising across the region under-
scored the widespread Muslim rejection of the raw deal dished out to the
Muslim community in the processes of the joint pact with the Tamil Tigers.
Hence, when the Supreme Court issued an interim injunction (on 15 July 2005)
restraining the key operational clauses of the agreement made for the P-TOMS,
Eastern Muslims found they had reasons to breathe a sigh of relief.1

Muslim Political Autonomy: Will It Survive?

Political scientists such as Horowitz (1998) suggest that political power-sharing


can strengthen marginalized trust by offering opportunities to govern their
affairs. The key question is that could an arrangement of devolution of powers
acceptable to the Muslims of the Eastern province be arrived at in the present
political context? Muslims in the region think that the establishment of a political
unit for the Eastern Muslims could be arrived at in the present political context.
Though Muslims sharply differ about the form of devolution model, they think
such a politico-administrative unit is possible in the Eastern corner.
There are many options, which are being put forward. One is an exclusive
power-sharing arrangement, which can take care of the Muslim majority areas
of the region with the legislature and the executive political arena proportionate
to their demographic presence in that area, in other words, a kind of Muslim
unit that would ensure administration and security of the Muslims in the region.
Second, there is the need for some means of equitable sharing of resources
between the Muslims and the other communities with regard to issues like eco-
nomic development, land, financial resources, credit and educational oppor-
tunities. This is one type of approach, which is essentially an arrangement for
the Muslims to participate meaningfully in a devolved administration (Imtiyaz,
2004). Degrees of autonomy can be discussed, but Muslims think they should
be given an opportunity to have a greater say in how they are governed in the
areas where they live.
Then, another question that arises is how would the resources currently shared
between the Tamils and Muslims of the Eastern province, for instance water,
roads and other public infrastructure including government administration, be
affected by the proposed scheme of devolution in the form of a Muslim unit?
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 417

Though Muslim spokespersons succeeded in articulating the rationale for the


separate power-sharing, it seems many of them are not very knowledgeable about
the practical difficulties of such a power-sharing mechanism in the region. The
Eastern province, homeland of both Tamils and Muslims, is demographically
adjacent with Tamil and Muslim villages. The analogy of ‘pittu and coconut’ the
traditional Tamil delicacy explains how adjacent the Tamil and Muslim villages
are and how deeply linked their economic and social relations and affairs are in
Eastern Sri Lanka.
The purpose of the establishment of a power-sharing unit is to give oppor-
tunities to the local people to decide how they should be governed in the areas
where they live. Such opportunities need market, adequate resources, and
effective control for delivery. As Lijphart (1977) notes, socio-political conditions
are crucial for successful consociationalism.
It is true that Muslims in the region are economically rather well off. How-
ever, what is also true is that they do not have an exclusive market to decide
their own destiny. Farmers from Sammanthurai or Sainthamaruthu from the
Amparai district or Eravur or Kattankudy from Batticaloa willingly or unwil-
lingly need to cooperate with the Tamils in the region for their prosperity. It
is, thus, practically impossible for the Eastern Muslims to freeze the economic
cooperation with their Tamil counterparts.
It is very likely that Tamils would hold back their economic dealings with
the Muslims if the Tamil unit controlled by the Tamil nationalists chooses
hostility against the interests of the Muslim unit. Practically, greater Tamil
areas containing the North and East can survive without the active support of
Muslims of the East. The Tamil Tigers already proved such a politico-economic
infrastructure is possible in the chunk of North and East. And, in future a
greater Tamil power-sharing unit composing Tamil pockets in the East could
further strengthen the mobility of the Tamil market. However, Muslims in the
region would likely confront greater challenges if the Tamil unit declines to
build a healthy economic cooperation with the Muslims who become part of
the Muslim unit. Such a scenario would be disastrous both for the Muslims
and the Muslim unit. Thus, it remains unclear how the future Muslim power-
sharing unit would create a market for the Muslims in the region on its own to
meet the pressing challenges of the greater Tamil unit.
Besides the controversy of the market, uncertainties are prevailing in the areas
of water, roads and other public infrastructure including government admin-
istration. As a matter of fact, regional institutions such as Muslim schools, local
libraries and administrative bodies that come under the control of the Muslim
unit may function well because they do not necessarily require exclusive Tamil
cooperation. However, a crisis is likely when the Muslim unit begins businesses
with public resources, particularly public water and roads as well as government
infrastructure.
418 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

In July 2006, the Tamil Tigers cut off the water supply to over 30,000 acres
of paddy lands in Sinhalese-dominated Seruwila, a key village of Trincomalee,
threatening the livelihoods of a large farmer community. The situation has
assumed grave proportions since the local population are largely dependent
on this supply for drinking (Mallawarachi, 2006). A Muslim unit may face such
a fate since the areas of the Muslim unit do not possess independent natural
resources under the control of Muslims of the region.
Instability concerning sharing resources, however, can be minimized if there
is a political cooperation possible both at the elite and masses level among the
Tamil and Muslim community. According to Lijphart (1977), power-sharing is
prosperous when the cooperation dominates both at the masses and elites level,
particularly the latter level. However, it is not very clear that implementation
of power-sharing divisions in the Eastern province would promote ethnic co-
operation or ethnic disaster in the impulsive Eastern region. If cooperation
dominates, difficulties related to public infrastructure and resources can be
fixed in an amicable manner.

Muslim Political Representation: Are Muslims Satisfied with Them?

What history proves is that the Muslim political leaders of the South regularly
maintained cooperation with the Sinhalese political parties, which formed the
successive governments since independence to win and consolidate their inter-
ests and to prevent the fate of the Tamil community being subjected from the
Sinhala polity (Phadnis, 1979; Ismail, 1997). However, the Muslim politicians
from the North and East until the early 1980s contested under the Federal Party
ticket (FP), a party dominated by the Tamil nationalists, and won elections to
Parliament (Phadnis, 1979).
The studies argue that pressures of the ethnic conflict in the mid-1980s
compelled the section of the young Eastern Muslim politicians to rally behind
Mr Ashraf, a young Muslim lawyer from the Eastern Province (Ali, 1977; de
Silva, 1986). Mr Ashraf formed the SLMC in the early 1980s, which was formally
registered as a political party in 1986.
The SLMC largely employed the Islamic religious and ethnic symbols for the
electoral purposes and used mosques as its base. They participated for the first
time in the December 1988 Provincial Council elections. The Muslim Congress
highlighted the Tamil violence as well as atrocities perpetrated by the Indian
forces on Muslim women and the desecration of their places of worship. The
emotional appeal of the SLMC attracted the Muslims of the region and the party
won a reasonable portion of the North-East Muslim votes (de Silva, 1998). The
SLMC obtained 168,038 votes of the North-East Muslims, and thus, secured
29 seats (Dissanayake, 1994; Statistical Abstract, 2002). The SLMC, thanks to
the proportional representation system that gave more incentive to the smaller
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 419

parties to win the seats from various districts, effectively dominated Sri Lanka
politics until its leader Mr Ashraff died in the most tragic circumstances when
the helicopter that he was traveling in crashed into a hillside somewhere close
to Kegalle in 2000 (BBC, 2000).
Essentially, the death of Mr Ahraff undermined the unity of the SLMC.
Several factions emerged within the party ranks. Many believed that Muslim
political representations have lost the common program to win the security and
rights: they failed to win legitimate shares both in the process of ceasefire of
2002 and P-TOMS of 2005 as well as at the peace talks. Their inability to arti-
culate coercive policies to win Muslim interests largely frustrated the Eastern
Muslims who had put their trust in the delivery of moderate democratic Muslim
leadership.
Muslim opinions in the East held that the disunity and factionalism among
the Muslim politicians undermined the Muslim interests both at the peace talks
and beyond. Such frustrations could de-legitimize political alternatives and
weaken the trust of the Eastern Muslims in the Muslim political establishment
if the Muslim political representation continuously dissatisfies the Muslim
masses. Also, it may lead frustrated Muslims to seek violent means as their only
choice in conditions that are beyond their control when their moderate political
representation was weakened. Such a scenario had ensued in relation to the
Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka against the State and its institutions.

Radicalization of Eastern Muslims: Will It Lead to Violent Mobilization?

Academically speaking, social, political and/or economic grievances motivate


communities to rebel violently against the dominant actors (Gurr, 1993). This
understanding can be applied to read the trend of radicalization of the Eastern
Muslims. It is true, ‘there is discontent among Muslims, particularly among the
young in some areas’ (Luthra, 2004) and it could radicalize the section of the
Eastern Muslims (Imtiyaz, 2005). However, the key questions are what form
does radicalization take? Who is financing it? And is it likely to lead to violent
resistance by the Muslims of the Eastern province against the Tamil Tigers?
Radicalization among the Eastern Muslims is still confined to the basic
level and a remarkable amount of the Muslims of the region are active in
embracing the radical Islamic ideology to eradicate all ethnic identities and
make the religious identity paramount. Unemployment, frustration and Tamil
violence as well as the inability of the Muslim political representations to fix
the problems of the Muslims of the East motivated some Muslims to adopt
violence. Such groups are active though ‘they are small and not a major security
threat’ (International Crisis Group, 2007: 3) and ‘had been warning Muslims
not to indulge in un-Islamic activities like consuming alcohol, gambling, visiting
420 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

prostitutes and misbehaving with women … Women, even tiny tots in nursery
schools, now cover themselves from head to foot’ (Hindutantimes, 2005).
These elements, however, according to our respondents, do not run effective
financial networks to support their activities. They support their activities with
the limited local help and their salaries.
Also, these elements are trying to collect financial support from the local
business circle and threatening those if they refuse to contribute to them. The
report circulated in the Lanka Muslim e-Forum reflects their need:
Several Muslim youths were arrested by a special CID team in a mosque
premises (Sirajiyya Nagar mosque) on July 24, 2006 when they forced a Muslim
well wisher (who is in Mutur to do some charity works) for a ransom of 10
lakhs. It is learned that the well wisher has come to Mutur to build some toilets
for the Tsunami victims and was approached by these youths for money. In
his first visit, he has given some money to them. Later he was threatened to be
killed if he is not giving 10 lakhs. (Lankamuslims, 2006)

A solid financial network is the backbone of any successful political move-


ment for vigorous mobilization. Muslim youths seem to be aware of the fact.
Thus, it is likely that interested external forces can manipulate the fears and
financial needs of Eastern Muslims. The former Indian intelligence officer Col.
Hariharan, a top-ranking intelligence officer with the Indian Peace Keeping
Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s argued that Pakistan can mani-
pulate Eastern Muslims’ fears for its own agenda against the interests of India
(Hindutantimes, 2005). Further, B. Raman, a former Additional Secretary in
the Cabinet Secretariat revealed that some Pakistani diplomats in Colombo
had sent some Sri Lankan Muslims to the radical Binori madarsa in Karachi
for religious education with scholarships arranged by the Tablighi Jamat, an ISI
outfit (Hindutantimes, 2005).
In fact, Muslims of Sri Lanka tend to look East for all form of support from
the Arab states and from Iran and thus believe that Arabs and Persians would
extend financial and military support to energize the Muslim cause. This theory
does not draw enough attention, primarily due to the post-9/11 international
political climate. It is highly unlikely that international forces, particularly India
and the USA would tolerate any free flow of financial and moral support to
the violent Muslim mobilization under any pretext. In point of fact, there is
no substantial evidence to prove the existence of such a financial or political
collaboration between the Eastern Muslims and the external forces. However,
the key question in relation to the Muslim radicalization is that if there is the
tendency of radicalization among the Muslims of East, then, is it likely to lead
to violent resistance against the Tamil Tigers?
Given the fact that Muslim polity often cooperates with the Sinhalese leader-
ships, relationships both at the elite and masses level between the Muslims and
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 421

the Sinhalese often anger the Tamils. Also, the State or the Sinhalese majority
has not made a serious threat to the Muslims’ identity and security as the Tamil
leadership committed against the Muslims since well before independence.
The political motivations and actions of Tamil leaders from P. Ramanathan
(1888), who argued that the Muslims were Tamils in ethnic calculations but
Mohammedans in religious identify, to the Tamil Tiger leader V. Pirapakaran,
whose organization violently targeted the Muslims in the North and East from
the mid-1980s, significantly contributed to the early growth of the Muslim
radicalization against the Tamil minority.
However, there are no established reports to substantiate the claim about the
existence of the organized Muslim arm element in the region. On the other hand,
even if jihadi groups exist in the East as the Tamil Tigers claimed (Balasingam,
2006), they seem to be not well-organized. But it is very likely that continuous
Tamil discrimination and oppression packed with the brutal violence against the
Muslims can encourage the Muslims to make choices beyond the democratic
channel, in order to confront the violent threats of the Tamil Tigers.
The logic of mobilization is easy to understand: when the mainstream polity
denies fairness to a particular group or by taking a position of upholding exclu-
sive status to a particular group, there is likelihood that the section of the society
would lose the trust in the system. Such a situation more likely could legitimize
violent alternatives if the political forces exhaust correct actions.

Conclusion: Can Muslim Trust Be Restored?


There are numerous reasons why the nation-building process in Sri Lanka can
trigger tensions between groups. Domination of the majority group over the
minorities to win a larger share in the economic competition can lead to the
mobilization by the marginalized, because such competition creates special
problems.
This study attempted to identify some special problems of the Eastern
Muslims.
Regardless of their size in the demographic map, Eastern Muslims became
the key actor in the conflict. It is beyond the scope of this study to judge all of
their past political maneuvers and approaches. The key point is that Muslims
of the East have legitimate grievances, in other words, some well-established
special problems, which deserve both local and global attention.
In Sri Lanka, the process of modernization produced violence and chaos
rather than trust and stability. Sinhalese leaders formulated some anti-
Tamil policies to attract the sympathy of the Sinhalese. The result was
violent Tamil mobilization. On the other hand, Tamil polity controlled by
the violent Tamil movements denied justice to the Muslims. Thousands of
Muslims were expelled forcefully from Jaffna in October 1990; 300 Eastern
422 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

Muslims were killed at prayer time inside their mosque in 1991 and Muslim
wealth confiscated in the Jaffna, Baticolaoa and Amparai districts of the North-
Eastern Province. But a conflict resolution process supported by the global
community does not give due space to the Muslim representation.
Muslim elites and intellectuals might have constructed Muslim identity, but
such constructions could have made less impact if the Muslims had been treated
humanely by the Tamil polity. Therefore, un-making or re-constructing the
Muslim identity may not help build peace between the Tamils and Muslims as
long as Muslims patch the differences and problems with the Tamils.
On the other hand, the Muslim democratic representations need to play
‘genuine and responsible’ political roles in the national affairs concerning
Tamil and Muslim relations. In this regard, Muslim political forces should seek
policies both to calm the fears of Eastern Muslims concerning the Tamils and
to develop cooperation with the Tamils at the elite level to seek a political
solution. Also, Muslim politicians need to understand the consequences of
employing symbolic religious slogans to win the votes of the Muslims who value
religious identity over other traits. It is very likely too much dependency on
religion to just win elections could transform the society into the stage where
commitments to non-violence can be discouraged. It may be hard for political
parties to freeze some easy access to power, because they formulate policies,
in Downs’s (1957: 28) language, ‘to win elections’. But bad choices of Muslim
politicians more likely would trigger instability and chaos in the East among the
Muslims and Tamils at the masses level. Also, as suggested by the ICG (2007),
a democratic Muslim political establishment needs to monitor the activities and
behaviors of the Muslim armed groups in the East.
The Eastern Muslims already have spilled enough blood. So, the special
problems of the Eastern Muslims require political solutions as the Tamil
grievances deserve. Maybe help from the international community to pressure
the actors in the peace process could raise the trust of the embattled Muslims.
The global community needs to ‘make a greater commitment in any peace
process, including a separate delegation at peace negotiations’ (ICG, 2007: 5).
Then again, it is the responsibility of the Sri Lanka government to search for
a solution beyond the current unitary political system. Such a solution can be
found based on consociationalism, which proportionally allocates political
power among the communities – whether religious or ethnic – according to the
percentage of their population.

Note
1. JVP and JHU, the parties that opposed the P-TOMS right from the very beginning and went
to court on 15 July 2005 to deny the tsunami aid-sharing deal between the Government and
the LTTE signed in June 2005. Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court Blocks P-TOMS Deal. http://www.
dailymirror.lk/2005/07/16/front/2.asp (accessed 20 July 2006).
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 423

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Appendix: Questionnaire on the Special Problems of the Eastern Muslims in


Sri Lanka
Today’s date:
City where survey completed:
Confidentiality requested?

1. Biographical
Personal
Name:
Gender: [M/F]
Age:
Education (if any):
Full-time job or occupation:

2. Ethnic relations with Tamils


On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you identify with the Tamils (0 meaning no
identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you identify with the Sinhalese (0 meaning no
identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you identify with other members of your ethnic/
religious (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely strong identification)?
Circle the best answer.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
426 Journal of Asian and African Studies 44(4)

On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you believe that Tamils should be blamed for the
sufferings of the Eastern Muslims? (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning extremely
strong identification)? Circle the best answer.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you believe that the Tamil radical forces such as
EPRLF–Varadar, TELO, EPDP and Karuna Group should be blamed for the political
and social difficulties Muslims have been facing? (0 meaning no identification and 7
meaning extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

On a scale of 0–7, how strongly do you believe that the LTTE should be blamed for the
marginalization of the Eastern Muslims? (0 meaning no identification and 7 meaning
extremely strong identification)? Circle the best answer.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Main issues
Do you support the permanent merger of the NorthEast merger? [Yes/No]
What are the specific advantages and disadvantages accruing to the Muslims community
of the Eastern province from the merger?

What are your perceptions as to the implications of ISGA and P-TOMS?

If the merger of the Northern and Eastern is made permanent, could an arrangement of
devolution of powers acceptable to the Muslims of the Eastern province be arrived at in
the present political context? [Yes/No]
Do you think that the Sri Lanka government should offer a unit of devolution to the
Eastern Muslims? [Yes/No]
Why do you think Muslims should have a unit of political devolution?

Do you not think that the LTTE led political administration would fulfill the needs of
the Eastern Muslims? [Yes/No]. Please explain:

In your opinion, what would be a likely outcome if the Sri Lanka government controlled
by the Sinhalese rejects the Muslim devolution unit – the key demand of eastern
Muslims?

Do you think that Muslims’ decision to form a Muslim ethnic nationalist party in the
form of Sri Lanka Muslims Congress (SLMC) is the right choice? [Yes/No]
Are you a supporter of the SLMC? [Yes/No]
Has there ever been fighting or tension between the Tamils and Muslims in the past?
[Yes/No]
Imtiyaz: The Eastern Muslims of Sri Lanka 427

Do your religious beliefs justify the use of force and/or violence under certain
circumstances? Please explain:

Some sources speak of Eastern Muslim violence against the Tamils in the mid-1980s and
1990s? Are you aware of any such violence against the Eastern Tamils? [Yes/No]
Do you think that Sinhala-Buddhist extremists forces such as the JVP and the JHU
are intentionally making use of Muslim fears over the Tamils for their own electoral
benefits? [Yes/No]. Any comments:

Is there a trend towards the radicalization of the Muslims of the Eastern province?
[Yes/No]
The media claim that there are certain Muslim violent units existing in the corner of
Eastern. Any comment?

Thank you for your time and willingness to offer your perceptions on the special
problems of the Muslims of the Eastern province.
A.R.M. Imtiyaz, PhD
Department of Political Science
Temple University, USA

A.R.M. Imtiyaz is currently a visiting scholar at the Department of Political


Sciences, the College of Liberal Arts, Temple University, USA. His primary
research interest is in the study of ethnic conflict, both in Sri Lanka and in other
countries. His articles have been published in several journals and presented at
the international conferences on ethnicity. He served as a lecturer in Political
Science at the South Eastern University of Sri Lanka from 1995–2002.
Address: Department of Political Science, Gladfelter Hall, Room No. 414,
Temple University, 1115 West Berks St, Philadelphia, PA 19122–6089, USA.
(imtiyaz@temple.edu)

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