1

G.R. No. L-44428 September 30, 1977

AVELINO BALURAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I and ANTONIO OBEDENCIO, respondents.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
Spouses Domingo Paraiso and Fidela Q. Paraiso were the owners of a residential lot of around 480 square meters located in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. On or
about February 2, 1964, the Paraisos executed an agreement entitled "BARTER" whereby as party of the first part they agreed to "barter and exchange"
with spouses Avelino and Benilda Baluran their residential lot with the latter's unirrigated riceland situated in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, of approximately 223
square meters without any permanent improvements, under the following conditions:
1. That both the Party of the First Part and the Party of the Second Part shall enjoy the material possession of their respective
properties; the Party of the First Part shall reap the fruits of the unirrigated riceland and the Party of the Second Part shall have a
right to build his own house in the residential lot.
2. Nevertheless, in the event any of the children of Natividad P. Obencio, daughter of the First Part, shall choose to reside in this
municipality and build his own house in the residential lot, the Party of the Second Part shall be obliged to return the lot such
children with damages to be incurred.
3. That neither the Party of the First Part nor the Party of the Second Part shall encumber, alienate or dispose of in any manner their
respective properties as bartered without the consent of the other.
4. That inasmuch as the bartered properties are not yet accordance with Act No. 496 or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, they
finally agreed and covenant that this deed be registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte pursuant to the
provisions of Act No. 3344 as amended. (p. 28, rollo)
On May 6, 1975 Antonio Obendencio filed with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte the present complaint to recover the above-mentioned
residential lot from Avelino Baluran claiming that he is the rightful owner of said residential lot having acquired the same from his mother, Natividad
Paraiso Obedencio, and that he needed the property for Purposes Of constructing his house thereon inasmuch as he had taken residence in his native
town, Sarrat. Obedencio accordingly prayed that he be declared owner of the residential lot and that defendant Baluran be ordered to vacate the same
forfeiting his (Obedencio) favor the improvements defendant Baluran had built in bad faith.
1

Answering the complaint, Avelino Baluran alleged inter alia (1) that the "barter agreement" transferred to him the ownership of the residential lot in
exchange for the unirrigated riceland conveyed to plaintiff's Predecessor-in-interest, Natividad Obedencio, who in fact is still in On thereof, and (2) that the
plaintiff's cause of action if any had prescribed.
2

At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of their stipulation of facts. It was likewise admitted that the
aforementioned residential lot was donated on October 4, 1974 by Natividad Obedencio to her son Antonio Obedencio, and that since the execution of
the agreement of February 2, 1964 Avelino Baluran was in possession of the residential lot, paid the taxes of the property, and constructed a house
thereon with an value of P250.00.
3
On November 8, 1975, the trial Judge Ricardo Y. Navarro rendered a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
Consequently, the plaintiff is hereby declared owner of the question, the defendant is hereby ordered to vacate the same with costs
against defendant.
Avelino Baluran to whom We shall refer as petitioner, now seeks a review of that decision under the following assignment of errors:
I The lower Court erred in holding that the barter agreement did not transfer ownership of the lot in suit to the petitioner.
II The lower Court erred in not holding that the right to re-barter or re- exchange of respondent Antonio Obedencio had been
barred by the statute of limitation. (p. 14, Ibid.)
The resolution of this appeal revolves on the nature of the undertaking contract of February 2, 1964 which is entitled "Barter Agreement."
It is a settled rule that to determine the nature of a contract courts are not bound by the name or title given to it by the contracting parties.
4
This Court
has held that contracts are not what the parties may see fit to call them but what they really are as determined by the principles of law.
5
Thus, in the
instant case, the use of the, term "barter" in describing the agreement of February 2, 1964, is not controlling. The stipulations in said document are clear
2

enough to indicate that there was no intention at all on the part of the signatories thereto to convey the ownership of their respective properties; all that
was intended, and it was so provided in the agreement, was to transfer the material possession thereof. (condition No. 1, see page I of this Decision) In
fact, under condition No. 3 of the agreement, the parties retained the right to alienate their respective properties which right is an element of ownership.
With the material ion being the only one transferred, all that the parties acquired was the right of usufruct which in essence is the right to enjoy the
Property of another.
6
Under the document in question, spouses Paraiso would harvest the crop of the unirrigated riceland while the other party, Avelino
Baluran, could build a house on the residential lot, subject, however, to the condition, that when any of the children of Natividad Paraiso Obedencio,
daughter of spouses Paraiso, shall choose to reside in the municipality and build his house on the residential lot, Avelino Baluran shall be obliged to return
the lot to said children "With damages to be incurred." (Condition No. 2 of the Agreement) Thus, the mutual agreement each party enjoying "material
possession" of the other's property was subject to a resolutory condition the happening of which would terminate the right of possession and use.
A resolutory condition is one which extinguishes rights and obligations already existing.
7
The right of "material possession" granted in the agreement of
February 2, 1964, ends if and when any of the children of Natividad Paraiso, Obedencio (daughter of spouses Paraiso, Party of the First Part) would reside
in the municipality and build his house on the property. Inasmuch as the condition opposed is not dependent solely on the will of one of the parties to the
contract the spouses Paraiso but is Part dependent on the will of third persons Natividad Obedencio and any of her children the same is valid.
8

When there is nothing contrary to law, morals, and good customs Or Public Policy in the stipulations of a contract, the agreement constitutes the law
between the parties and the latter are bound by the terms thereof.
9

Art. 1306 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, Morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations,
if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no
matter what their form may be, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present. (Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22)
The trial court therefore correctly adjudged that Antonio Obedencio is entitled to recover the possession of the residential lot Pursuant to the agreement
of February 2, 1964.
Petitioner submits under the second assigned error that the causa, of action if any of respondent Obedencio had Prescribed after the lapse of four years
from the date of execution of the document of February 2, 1964. It is argued that the remedy of plaintiff, now respondent, Was to ask for re-barter or re-
exchange of the properties subject of the agreement which could be exercised only within four years from the date of the contract under Art. 1606 of the
Civil Code.
The submission of petitioner is untenable. Art. 1606 of the Civil Code refers to conventional redemption which petitioner would want to apply to the
present situation. However, as We stated above, the agreement of the parties of February 2, 1964, is not one of barter, exchange or even sale with right to
repurchase, but is one of or akin the other is the use or material ion or enjoyment of each other's real property.
Usufruct may be constituted by the parties for any period of time and under such conditions as they may deem convenient and beneficial subject to the
provisions of the Civil Code, Book II, Title VI on Usufruct. The manner of terminating or extinguishing the right of usufruct is primarily determined by the
stipulations of the parties which in this case now before Us is the happening of the event agreed upon. Necessarily, the plaintiff or respondent Obedencio
could not demand for the recovery of possession of the residential lot in question, not until he acquired that right from his mother, Natividad Obedencio,
and which he did acquire when his mother donated to him the residential lot on October 4, 1974. Even if We were to go along with petitioner in his
argument that the fulfillment of the condition cannot be left to an indefinite, uncertain period, nonetheless, in the case at bar, the respondent, in whose
favor the resolutory condition was constituted, took immediate steps to terminate the right of petitioner herein to the use of the lot. Obedencio's present
complaint was filed in May of 1975, barely several months after the property was donated to him.
One last point raised by petitioner is his alleged right to recover damages under the agreement of February 2, 1964. In the absence of evidence,
considering that the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on a stipulation of facts, We have no basis for awarding damages to petitioner.
However, We apply Art. 579 of the Civil Code and hold that petitioner will not forfeit the improvement he built on the lot but may remove the same
without causing damage to the property.
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as
he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He
may, however. He may, however, removed such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the
property.(Emphasis supplied)
3

Finally, We cannot close this case without touching on the unirrigated riceland which admittedly is in the possession of Natividad Obedencio.
In view of our ruling that the "barter agreement" of February 2, 1964, did not transfer the ownership of the respective properties mentioned therein, it
follows that petitioner Baluran remains the owner of the unirrigated riceland and is now entitled to its Possession. With the happening of the resolutory
condition provided for in the agreement, the right of usufruct of the parties is extinguished and each is entitled to a return of his property. it is true that
Natividad Obedencio who is now in possession of the property and who has been made a party to this case cannot be ordered in this proceeding to
surrender the riceland. But inasmuch as reciprocal rights and obligations have arisen between the parties to the so-called "barter agreement", We hold
that the parties and for their successors-in-interest are duty bound to effect a simultaneous transfer of the respective properties if substance at justice is
to be effected.
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring the petitioner Avelino Baluran and respondent Antonio Obedencio the respective owners the
unirrigated riceland and residential lot mentioned in the "Barter Agreement" of February 2, 1964; 2) ordering Avelino Baluran to vacate the residential lot
and removed improvements built by thereon, provided, however that he shall not be compelled to do so unless the unirrigated riceland shall five been
restored to his possession either on volition of the party concerned or through judicial proceedings which he may institute for the purpose.
Without pronouncement as to costs. So Ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Martin, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
-------------
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION,
INC., respondents.
The Case
This is a petition for review
[1]
seeking to set aside the Decision
[2]
dated 30 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No.
48382, as well as its Resolution dated 25 June 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court reversed the Decision
[3]
of Branch 87 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) dated 8 March 1994 in Civil Case No. Q-53464. The trial court dismissed the complaint for injunction
filed by Bulacan Garden Corporation (BGC) against the National Housing Authority (NHA). BGC wanted to enjoin the NHA from demolishing BGCs
facilities on a lot leased from Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. (MSBF). MSBF allegedly has usufructuary rights over the lot leased to BGC.
Antecedent Facts
On 24 October 1968, Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos set aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City
owned by the NHA
[4]
as reserved property for the site of the National Government Center (NGC). On 19 September 1977, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF usufructuary rights
over this segregated portion, as follows:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, 1968, which established the National Government Center
Site, certain parcels of land embraced therein and reserving the same for the Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., for use in its operation and
projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future survey, under the administration of the Foundation.
This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the future survey based on the technical descriptions found in Proclamation
No. 481, and most particularly on the original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the subdivision survey dated April 19-25, 1968.
(Emphasis added)
MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years, MSBFs occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its
usufructuary rights. By 1987, MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares. By then the land occupied by MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek to the north.
On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which
occupies 4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare area.
On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 (MO 127) which revoked the reserved status of the 50
hectares, more or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the National Government Center. MO 127 also
authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the public.
On 15 August 1988, acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind
after the expiration of the ten-day period will be demolished by NHA.
4

BGC then filed a complaint for injunction on 21 April 1988 before the trial court. On 26 May 1988, BGC amended its complaint to include MSBF as
its co-plaintiff.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court agreed with BGC and MSBF that Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF the right to conduct the survey, which would establish the seven-
hectare area covered by MSBFs usufructuary rights. However, the trial court held that MSBF failed to act seasonably on this right to conduct the survey.
The trial court ruled that the previous surveys conducted by MSBF covered 16 hectares, and were thus inappropriate to determine the seven-hectare area.
The trial court concluded that to allow MSBF to determine the seven-hectare area now would be grossly unfair to the grantor of the usufruct.
On 8 March 1994, the trial court dismissed BGCs complaint for injunction. Thus:
Premises considered, the complaint praying to enjoin the National Housing Authority from carrying out the demolition of the plaintiffs structure,
improvements and facilities in the premises in question is hereby DISMISSED, but the suggestion for the Court to rule that Memorandum Order 127 has
repealed Proclamation No. 1670 is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[5]

The NHA demolished BGCs facilities soon thereafter.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
Not content with the trial courts ruling, BGC appealed the trial courts Decision to the appellate court. Initially, the appellate court agreed with the
trial court that Proclamation No. 1670 granted MSBF the right to determine the location of the seven-hectare area covered by its usufructuary rights.
However, the appellate court ruled that MSBF did in fact assert this right by conducting two surveys and erecting its main structures in the area of its
choice.
On 30 March 2001, the appellate court reversed the trial courts ruling. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 8, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The National Housing Authority is enjoined from demolishing the structures, facilities and improvements of the plaintiff-appellant Bulacan Garden
Corporation at its leased premises located in Quezon City which premises were covered by Proclamation No. 1670, during the existence of the contract of
lease it (Bulacan Garden) had entered with the plaintiff-appellant Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[6]

The NHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court on 25 June 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The following issues are considered by this Court for resolution:
WHETHER THE PETITION IS NOW MOOT BECAUSE OF THE DEMOLITION OF THE STRUCTURES OF BGC; and
WHETHER THE PREMISES LEASED BY BGC FROM MSBF IS WITHIN THE SEVEN-HECTARE AREA THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 1670 GRANTED TO
MSBF BY WAY OF USUFRUCT.
The Ruling of the Court
We remand this petition to the trial court for a joint survey to determine finally the metes and bounds of the seven-hectare area subject to MSBFs
usufructuary rights.
Whether the Petition is Moot because of the
Demolition of BGCs Facilities
BGC claims that the issue is now moot due to NHAs demolition of BGCs facilities after the trial court dismissed BGCs complaint for injunction. BGC
argues that there is nothing more to enjoin and that there are no longer any rights left for adjudication.
We disagree.
BGC may have lost interest in this case due to the demolition of its premises, but itsco-plaintiff, MSBF, has not. The issue for resolution has a direct
effect on MSBFs usufructuary rights. There is yet the central question of the exact location of the seven-hectare area granted by Proclamation No. 1670
to MSBF. This issue is squarely raised in this petition. There is a need to settle this issue to forestall future disputes and to put this 20-year litigation to
rest.
On the Location of the Seven-Hectare Area Granted by
Proclamation No. 1670 to MSBF as Usufructuary
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the jurisdiction of this Court to the review of errors of law.
[7]
Absent any of the established
grounds for exception,
[8]
this Court will not disturb findings of fact of lower courts. Though the matter raised in this petition is factual, it deserves
resolution because the findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict on several points.
The entire area bounded by Agham Road to the east, EDSA to the west, Quezon Avenue to the south and by a creek to the north measures
approximately 16 hectares. Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF a usufruct over only a seven-hectare area. The BGCs leased portion is located along EDSA.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on
usufruct.
[9]
A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct.
[10]
Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590 square meter portion MSBF leased to BGC
is within the seven-hectare area held in usufruct by MSBF. The owner of the property must respect the lease entered into by the usufructuary so long as
the usufruct exists.
[11]
However, the NHA has the right to evict BGC if BGC occupied a portion outside of the seven-hectare area covered by MSBFs
usufructuary rights.
5

MSBFs survey shows that BGCs stall is within the seven-hectare area. On the other hand, NHAs survey shows otherwise. The entire controversy
revolves on the question of whose land survey should prevail.
MSBFs survey plots the location of the seven-hectare portion by starting its measurement from Quezon Avenue going northward along EDSA up
until the creek, which serves as the northern boundary of the land in question. Mr. Ben Malto (Malto), surveyor for MSBF, based his survey method on
the fact that MSBFs main facilities are located within this area.
On the other hand, NHAs survey determines the seven-hectare portion by starting its measurement from Quezon Avenue going towards Agham
Road. Mr. Rogelio Inobaya (Inobaya), surveyor for NHA, based his survey method on the fact that he saw MSBFs gate fronting Agham Road.
BGC presented the testimony of Mr. Lucito M. Bertol (Bertol), General Manager of MSBF. Bertol presented a map,
[12]
which detailed the area
presently occupied by MSBF. The map had a yellow-shaded portion, which was supposed to indicate the seven-hectare area. It was clear from both the
map and Bertols testimony that MSBF knew that it had occupied an area in excess of the seven-hectare area granted by Proclamation No. 1670.
[13]
Upon
cross-examination, Bertol admitted that he personally did not know the exact boundaries of the seven-hectare area.
[14]
Bertol also admitted that MSBF
prepared the map without consulting NHA, the owner of the property.
[15]

BGC also presented the testimony of Malto, a registered forester and the Assistant Vice-President of Planning, Research and Marketing of MSBF.
Malto testified that he conducted the land survey, which was used to construct the map presented by Bertol.
[16]
Bertol clarified that he authorized two
surveys, one in 1984 when he first joined MSBF, and the other in 1986.
[17]
In both instances, Mr. Malto testified that he was asked to survey a total of 16
hectares, not just seven hectares. Malto testified that he conducted the second survey in 1986 on the instruction of MSBFs general manager. According
to Malto, it was only in the second survey that he was told to determine the seven-hectare portion. Malto further clarified that he based the technical
descriptions of both surveys on a previously existing survey of the property.
[18]

The NHA presented the testimony of Inobaya, a geodetic engineer employed by the NHA. Inobaya testified that as part of the NHAs Survey
Division, his duties included conducting surveys of properties administered by the NHA.
[19]
Inobaya conducted his survey in May 1988 to determine
whether BGC was occupying an area outside the seven-hectare area MSBF held in usufruct.
[20]
Inobaya surveyed the area occupied by MSBF following the
same technical descriptions used by Malto. Inobaya also came to the same conclusion that the area occupied by MSBF, as indicated by the boundaries in
the technical descriptions, covered a total of 16 hectares. He further testified that the seven-hectare portion in the map presented by BGC,
[21]
which was
constructed by Malto, does not tally with the boundaries BGC and MSBF indicated in their complaint.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is
deficient, the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed.
In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the seven-hectare area
shall be determined by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if there be any. The appellate court and the
trial court agree that MSBF has the latitude to determine the location of its seven-hectare usufruct portion within the 16-hectare area. The appellate court
and the trial court disagree, however, whether MSBF seasonably exercised this right.
It is clear that MSBF conducted at least two surveys. Although both surveys covered a total of 16 hectares, the second survey specifically indicated a
seven-hectare area shaded in yellow. MSBF made the first survey in 1984 and the second in 1986, way before the present controversy started. MSBF
conducted the two surveys before the lease to BGC. The trial court ruled that MSBF did not act seasonably in exercising its right to conduct the survey.
Confronted with evidence that MSBF did in fact conduct two surveys, the trial court dismissed the two surveys as self-serving. This is clearly an error on the
part of the trial court. Proclamation No. 1670 authorized MSBF to determine the location of the seven-hectare area. This authority, coupled with the fact
that Proclamation No. 1670 did not state the location of the seven-hectare area, leaves no room for doubt that Proclamation No. 1670 left it to MSBF to
choose the location of the seven-hectare area under its usufruct.
More evidence supports MSBFs stand on the location of the seven-hectare area. The main structures of MSBF are found in the area indicated by
MSBFs survey. These structures are the main office, the three green houses, the warehouse and the composting area. On the other hand, the NHAs
delineation of the seven-hectare area would cover only the four hardening bays and the display area. It is easy to distinguish between these two groups of
structures. The first group covers buildings and facilities that MSBF needs for its operations. MSBF built these structures before the present controversy
started. The second group covers facilities less essential to MSBFs existence. This distinction is decisive as to which survey should prevail. It is clear that
the MSBF intended to use the yellow-shaded area primarily because it erected its main structures there.
Inobaya testified that his main consideration in using Agham Road as the starting point for his survey was the presence of a gate there. The location
of the gate is not a sufficient basis to determine the starting point. MSBFs right as a usufructuary as granted by Proclamation No. 1670 should rest on
something more substantial than where MSBF chose to place a gate.
To prefer the NHAs survey to MSBFs survey will strip MSBF of most of its main facilities. Only the main building of MSBF will remain with MSBF
since the main building is near the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue. The rest of MSBFs main facilities will be outside the seven-hectare area.
On the other hand, this Court cannot countenance MSBFs act of exceeding the seven-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670. A
usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owners interests. One such duty is found in Article 601 of
the Civil Code which states:
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to
the rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been caused through his own fault.
6

A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides.
[22]
This controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the limit of the beneficial use given to it. MSBFs encroachment of its
benefactors property gave birth to the confusion that attended this case. To put this matter entirely to rest, it is not enough to remind the NHA to respect
MSBFs choice of the location of its seven-hectare area. MSBF, for its part, must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. MSBFs rights begin and
end within the seven-hectare portion of its usufruct. This Court agrees with the trial court that MSBF has abused the privilege given it under Proclamation
No. 1670. The direct corollary of enforcing MSBFs rights within the seven-hectare area is the negation of any of MSBFs acts beyond it.
The seven-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer easily determinable considering the varied structures erected within and surrounding the area. Both
parties advance different reasons why their own surveys should be preferred. At this point, the determination of the seven-hectare portion cannot be
made to rely on a choice between the NHAs and MSBFs survey. There is a need for a new survey, one conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, to remove
all doubts on the exact location of the seven-hectare area and thus avoid future controversies. This new survey should consider existing structures of
MSBF. It should as much as possible include all of the facilities of MSBF within the seven-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.
A final point. Article 605 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before
the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof.
(Emphasis added)
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant.
Unlike a natural person, a corporation or associations lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would then be perpetual. This is especially
invidious in cases where the usufruct given to a corporation or association covers public land. Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or
28 years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22 years left.
MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved site for the National Government Center. However, MO 127 does not
affect MSBFs seven-hectare area since under Proclamation No. 1670, MSBFs seven-hectare area was already exclude*d+ from the operation of
Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, 1968, which established the National Government Center Site.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 2001 and its Resolution dated 25 June 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48382 are SET
ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which shall order a joint survey by the National Housing Authority
and Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. to determine the metes and bounds of the seven-hectare portion of Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc.
under Proclamation No. 1670. The seven-hectare portion shall be contiguous and shall include as much as possible all existing major improvements of
Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. The parties shall submit the joint survey to the Regional Trial Court for its approval within sixty days from the date
ordering the joint survey.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. L-42334 October 31, 1936
NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SERAFIN HIDALGO, defendant-appellee.
Hilado and Hilado for appellant.
Simeon Bitanga for appellee.
Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso and DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile as amici curi.

RECTO, J.:
On October 12, 1933, the plaintiff filed before the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros a complaint praying, upon the allegations contained therein,
that in an injunction be issued, restraining the defendant from entering or passing through the properties of the plaintiff, specially through the "mill site"
of plaintiff's sugar central.
It appears that the plaintiff is the owner of a site in which is located its sugar central, with its factory building and residence for its employees and laborers,
known as the "mill site." It also owns the adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda "Begoa." Across its properties the plaintiff constructed a road
connecting the "mill site" with the provincial highway. Through this road plaintiff allowed and still allows vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge of
P0.15 for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians are allowed free passage through it.
Immediately adjoining the above-mentioned "mill site" of the plaintiff is the hacienda of Luciano Aguirre, known as Hacienda "Sagay," where the
defendant has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon. Like other people in and about the place, defendant used to pass through the said road of the plaintiff,
7

because it was his only means of access to the Hacienda "Sagay" where he runs his billiard hall and tuba saloon. Later on, by order of the plaintiff, every
time that the defendant passed driving his automobile with a cargo of tuba plaintiff gatekeeper would stop him and prevent him from passing through said
road. Defendant in such cases merely deviated from said road and continued on his way to Hacienda "Sagay" across the fields of Hacienda "Begoa,"
likewise belonging to the plaintiff.
The alleged conveyance of tuba to plaintiff's "mill site" or the sale thereof within its property has not been established by the evidence adduced in this
case. This the plaintiff admits in its brief (p.15). Neither is there any evidence to show that the defendant actually created disturbance in plaintiff's
properties, including its "mill site."
Other pertinent facts will be stated in appropriate places in this decision.
A. First of all it may be stated that in the case at bar the injunction applied for, constitutes, unlike the auxiliary and subordinate remedy that it
ordinarily is, the principal remedy itself. The relief should only be granted, therefore, after it has been established not only that the right sought to be
protected exists, but also that the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
SEC. 164. Circumstances under which a preliminary injunction may be granted. A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established,
in the manner herein-after provided, to the satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work in justice to the
plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or in procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation
of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject to the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (Code of Civil
Procedure.)
In order that, at the final trial of a case, an injunction may issue perpetually prohibiting the repetition or continuation of an act complained of, it
is indispensable that it shall have been proven at trial that he who seeks such a remedy is entitled to ask for it; if he is not, his request must be
denied. (Tumacder vs. Nueva, 16 Phil., 513.)
The extraordinary remedy of injunction will not be granted to prevent or remove a nuisance unless there is a strong case of pressing necessity,
and not because of a trifling discomfort. (De Ayala vs. Barretto, 33 Phil., 538.)
The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. . . . A permanent injunction should not be awarded except in a
clear case and to prevent irreparable injury. (32 C. J., 34-36.)
A court of chancery will not entertain a bill enforce a mere valueless abstract right, and the court will, on its own motion, raise the point for its
own protection. (Dunnom vs. Thomsen, 58 Ill. App., 390.)
None of these requisites is present in the instant case. There has been a failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right of the plaintiff
specially calling for judicial protection through an extraordinary writ of the kind applied for, or that the defendant has committed or attempts to commit
any act which has endanger or tends to endanger the existence of said right, or has injured or threatens to injure the same.
In obtaining ex-parte a preliminary injunction in the lower court, the plaintiff made under oath in its complaint the following allegations, which later
turned out to be untrue, or, at least, beyond the capacity of plaintiff to prove:
3. That on sundry occasions heretofore, the defendant used to go to the said "mill site" of the plaintiff, passing over the latter's private roads,
and there caused trouble among the peaceful people of the place.
4. That the plaintiff, through its representatives, has prohibited the defendant from entering its private property, but this notwithstanding, the
defendant still persists in repeating his incursions into the said private roads and "mill site" of the plaintiff, disturbing public order and
molesting plaintiff's employees and their families.
The court, in its order granting the preliminary injunction said:
8

Considering the said injunction and the sworn statement of its correctness filed by plaintiff's attorneys
1
and it appearing satisfactorily that the
issuance of a preliminary injunction is in order because of the sufficiency of the grounds alleged, upon the filing of a bond, it is hereby, etc. . . . .
After obtaining the preliminary injunction, the plaintiff amended its complaint by eliminating therefrom those very allegations upon which the court
granted the temporary remedy, namely, the acts imputed to the defendant "of causing trouble among the peaceful people of plaintiff's "mill site," and of
disturbing public order and molesting plaintiff's employees and their families within the private roads and the "mill site" of the plaintiff." The plaintiff
doubtless overlooked the fact that the allegation it availed of to obtain a preliminary injunction was necessary to secure one of a permanent character. In
its new complaint, its only grievance is that the defendant insists in passing through its property to take tuba to the Hacienda "Sagay" (which does not
belong to the plaintiff but to Luciano Aguirre, and where the defendant has established a legitimate business). The amended complaint no longer alleges
that the defendant went to the "mill site" and to the private roads of the plaintiff "to cause trouble, disturb public order and molest plaintiff's employees
and their families."
It develops, however, that neither the original complaint nor the one amended states how and why the mere passage of the defendant over plaintiff's
estate to convey tuba to the Hacienda "Sagay" has caused damages to the plaintiff's property rights, requiring the unusual intervention and prohibition
thereof by the courts through injunctive relief. The plaintiff failed not only to make any allegation to this effect, but also to the state that the road on its
property where the defendant used to pass on his way to the Hacienda "Sagay" was open to the public in general, and that the plaintiff, exercising
without any permit a power exclusively lodged in the state by reason of its sovereign capacity, required the payment of passage fees for the use of said
road.
Now, there being no contention here that the defendant, in passing over plaintiff's estate to take tuba to the Hacienda "Sagay," occasioned damages to
such estate, or that he sold tuba within the confines thereof, what could have been the basis of the plaintiff's right for which the special protection of the
court is invoked, and of the illegal act laid at defendant's door? Defendant's passage over plaintiff's property does not, of itself, constitute an unlawful act
inasmuch as the plaintiff, of its own accord, opened the same to the public conditioned only upon the payment of transit fees by motor vehicles. Neither
does the mere transportation of tuba over plaintiff's estate amount to a violation of the latter's property rights, unless the goods' destination be at any
point within the confines thereof, or unless the said goods be sold in transit to the laborers and employees of the plaintiff, which, as plaintiff itself admits
in his brief. (p. 15), has not been shown.
The deduction from plaintiff's evidence is, that the real damage which it seeks to avoid does not consist in defendant's taking tuba with him while
traversing the former's property, as there is no causal relation between the act and any resultant damage, but in the fact that tuba is disposed of at the
Hacienda "Sagay" to which plaintiff's laborers have access. What should, therefore, be enjoined, if it were legally possible, is defendant's sale of tuba at
the Hacienda "Sagay," and not its conveyance across plaintiff's estate. But if, as plaintiff concedes (brief, p. 16), the former cannot legally enjoined, least
of all can the latter be restrained as long as the public in general is free to go about the said property and it has not been shown that the defendant, in
passing through, it has occasioned damage thereto or has committed any act infringing plaintiff's property rights or has refused to pay the required road
toll.
Defendant's sale of tuba at the Hacienda "Sagay" is nothing more than the exercise of a legitimate business, and no real damage to the third persons can
arise from it as a natural and logical consequence. The bare possibility that plaintiff's laborers, due to the contiguity of the Hacienda "Sagay" to its
property, might come to the defendant's store to imbibe tuba to drunkenness, does not warrant the conclusion that the defendant, in thus running this
business, impinges upon plaintiff's property rights and should thereby be judicially enjoined. The damage which plaintiff seeks to enjoin by this action does
not consist, as has been demonstrated, in defendant's maintaining a tuba store at the Hacienda "Sagay," or in defendant's crossing its property while
taking tuba to the Hacienda "Sagay," but in its laborers finding their way to the said hacienda in order to buy tuba and become drunk. In other words, the
act sought to be restrained as injurious or prejudicial to plaintiff's interests, is that committed, not by the defendant, but by plaintiff's own laborers. Rightly
and logically, the injunction should be directed against said laborers to the end that they should abstain from going to the Hacienda "Sagay" in order to
buy tuba and become drunk. As it would seem unusual for the plaintiff to do this, it should at least exercise stricter vigilance and impose rigorous discipline
on its laborers by, for instance, punishing drunkenness with expulsion. Plaintiff's remedy lies in its own hand and should not be looked for in the courts at
the sacrifice of other interests no less sacred and legitimate than the plaintiff's.
Where one has a right to do a thing equity has no power to restrain him from doing it. (Dammann vs. Hydraulic Clutch Co., 187 Pac., 1069.) Acts under the
authority of the law will not be enjoined (Bonaparte vs. Camden, etc. Railroad Co., 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1617, Baldw., 205). Lawful exercise of rights incidentally
injuring others may not be enjoined by injunction. (14 R. C. L., 369.) "It is . . . an established principle that one may not be enjoined from doing lawful acts
to protect and enforce his rights of property or of persons, . . . ." (14 R. C. L., pp. 365, 366.)
It is said that the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendant, not from selling tuba at his store in the Hacienda "Sagay," but from passing through its property
to introduce tuba to said hacienda (plaintiff's brief, p. 16.) The legal rule, however, is that what the law does not authorize to be done directly cannot be
hone indirectly. If the plaintiff cannot judicially enjoin the defendant from selling tuba at the Hacienda "Sagay," neither can it obtain said injunction to
prevent him from passing over its property to transport tuba to that place as long as the defendant is ready to pay the transit fees required by the plaintiff
and does not sell the said goods inside the said property.
Suppose that the defendant, instead of being a tuba vendor, is a social propagandist whose preachings, while not subversive of the established legal order,
are not acceptable to some capitalistic organizations, say the plaintiff. Suppose that the defendant, armed with the corresponding official permit, should
desire to go to Hacienda "Sagay" through plaintiff's estate for the purpose of explaining to the laborers the advantage of the latter organizing themselves
into unions, or joining existing ones, to better defend their interests. Plaintiff learns in time of the plan and determines to frustrate it in the belief that it
9

would be prejudicial to its interests for the laborers to be "unionized," while it is for its good that the laborers be contracted under the so-called "open
shop" system. Unable to stop the holding of the meeting because the same is not to take place on its property may he plaintiff secure an injunction from
the court to prevent the defendant to pass through the said property in order to reach the place of the meeting, by alleging that the defendant entertains
theories of social reform which might poison the minds of the laborers at the expense of the plaintiff's interests? May the latter, under the same
hypothesis, maintain that the defendant's act in passing through its property, which is open to public use, constitute trespass or usurpation restrainable by
injunction? If the answer to these questions is, as it must be, in the negative, the present case is not susceptible of a different solution. The only difference
between the two cases is that in the one supposed the dreaded damage to plaintiff's interests is of more moment and of more lasting effect than in the
case at bar.
When a private road has been thrown open to public use, no action for trespass is maintainable against any person who desires to make use thereof;
consequently, an injunction suit likewise does not lie.
Private roads, except where laid out under constitutional provisions authorizing the condemnation of private property for a private use, are
public roads in the sense that they are open to all who see fit to use them, and it is immaterial that the road is subject to gates and bars, or that
it is merely a cul de sac. Being thus considered as a public road, it necessarily follows that the owner of the land through which the road is laid
out cannot maintain an action of trespass against any person using it; . . . (50 C. J., pp. 397, 398.)
. . . Where it is clear that the complainant does not have the right that he claims, he is not entitled to an injunction, either temporary or
perpetual, to prevent a violation of such supposed right. . . . An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise
or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action, . . . . (32 C. J., pp. 34, 35.)
B. In its brief, plaintiff states:
In transporting the tuba which he sells in his saloon in Hacienda "Sagay" the defendant used to pass thru the private road of the plaintiff which
connects its sugar central with the provincial road. On this private road the plaintiff has put up a gate under the charge of a keeper, and every
time that the defendant passed with a cargo of tuba the gatekeeper would stop him and remind him that the tuba was not permitted entry into
the private properties of the company, but instead of heeding this prohibition the defendant would simply deviate from the road and continue
on his way to hacienda "Sagay" by way of the fields of Hacienda "Begoa." which is also the private property of the plaintiff.
It is deducible from the above statement that, whenever the gatekeeper of the plaintiff prevented the defendant from passing thru its so-called "private
road," on his way to the provincial road to Hacienda "Sagay," the defendant deviated from said road and carried the tuba across the lands of Hacienda
"Begoa" leading to the Hacienda "Sagay." The evidence discloses that the passageway across the Hacienda "Begoa," is the same one frequented by
carabaos (s. t., 32, 36). Plaintiff intends not only to prohibit the defendant from using the road in question, but also from crossing the lands of the
Hacienda "Begoa," also belonging to the plaintiff, where carabaos are allowed to roam. An act so shocking to the conscience, one is reminded, could only
have been perpetrated during the feudal period when human rights were unmercifully sacrificed to property rights. If an injunction should lie in the instant
case, it should be in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, to enjoin the latter from obstructing the former to pass over the road in question to
convey tuba to the Hacienda "Sagay." It is indeed strange that it is the plaintiff and not the defendant that should have applied for the remedy.
. . . An injunction will not be granted when good conscience does not require it, where it will operate oppressively or contrary to justice, where
it is not reasonable and equitable under the circumstances of the case, or where it will tend to promote, rather than to prevent, fraud and
injustice. . . . (32 C. J., p. 33.) . . . a court of equity may interfere by injunction to restrain a party from enforcing a legal right against all equity
and conscience. . . . (14 R. C. L., pp. 365, 366, par. 66.) . . . The comparative convenience or inconvenience of the parties from granting or
withholding the injunction should be considered, and none should be granted if it would operate oppressively or inequitably, or contrary to the
real justice of the case. This doctrine is well established. . . . (14 R. C. L., pp. 357, 358, par. 60.)
The power of the courts to issue injunctions should be exercised with great caution and only where the reason and necessity therefor are
clearly established; and while this rule has been applied more frequently in the case of preliminary and mandatory injunctions, it applies to
injunctions of all classes, and to restraining orders. . . . (32 C. J., pp. 33, 34.)
The writ of injunction will not be awarded in doubtful or new cases not coming within well-established principles of equity.
(Bonaparte vs. Camden, etc. Railroad Co., 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1617; Hardesty vs. Taft, 87 Am. Dec., 584.)
C. Plaintiff's action is frivolous and baseless.
Plaintiff states in the sixth paragraph of its amended complaint:
6. That, in addition, the plaintiff, in the exercise of it property rights, does not want to allow the entry of the defendant in any part of its estate
above mentioned in order to avert any friction or ill-feeling against him.
10

The plaintiff, in petitioning the courts for an injunction to avert "friction or ill-feeling" against the defendant, invoking its sacred property rights, attempts
to intrust to them a mission at once beyond those conferred upon them by the Constitution and the laws, and unbecoming of their dignity and decorum.
D. Plaintiff has not established the existence, real or probable of the alleged damage against which the injunction is invoked.
As has been seen, the allegations of the amended complaint do not justify the granting of an injunction. The said allegations only state, as the basis of
plaintiff's action, that the defendant insists in passing or "making incursions" on plaintiff's property to take tuba to the Hacienda "Sagay," and the plaintiff
wants to avoid "friction and ill-feeling against him." Such allegations do not imply the existence, of any real damage to plaintiff's rights which should be
enjoined, and do not, therefore, constitute a legal cause of action. On the other hand, what the plaintiff attempted to establish by its evidence differs from
the allegations of its amended complaint. What said evidence really discloses is not, that the plaintiff had forbidden the defendant to convey tuba to the
Hacienda "Sagay" through plaintiff's estate, but to introduce tuba into the central or to place tuba on its lands, or, according to Exhibit A, to trespass
illegally on plaintiff's estate. The testimony of the gatekeeper Santiago Plagata and the accountant Ankerson is as follows:
Q. Why did you detain him? A. Because the Central forbids the bringing of tuba to the Central.
Q. Why does the Central prohibit the entry of tuba? A. The Central prohibits the entry of tuba there because the laborers, generally,
buy tuba, drink it and become drunk, and are unable to work, and sometimes they fight because they are drunk. (S. t., p. 5.)
Q. Why did you kick them? A. Because the North Negros Sugar Co. prohibits the placing of tuba on those lands. (S. t., pp. 38, 39.)
Exhibit A, the alleged letter addressed by the plaintiff to the defendant, recites:
Mr. SERAFIN HIDALGO, Driver of Auto, License No. 1085-1935.
Present.
SIR: Effective this date, you are hereby forbidden to trespass upon any of the Company's properties under penalties of law prescribed for
trespass.
NORTH INTEGROS SUGAR CO., INC,.
By: (Sgd.) Y. E. GREENFIELD
Manager
It will be noted that according to this letter, the defendant was enjoined by the plaintiff from passing thru its properties, whether he carried tuba or not.
Plaintiff's admission in its brief (p. 15) that it has not been established that the defendant has brought tuba to the "mill site," or has sold it within its
property, is fatal to the present action charging the defendant with said acts.
E. The well-known principle of equity that "he who comes to equity must come with clean hands" bars the granting of the remedy applied for by the
plaintiff.
It has been already stated that the plaintiff, to obtain a preliminary injunction in this case, alleged under oath in its original complaint facts which it knew
to be false, or, at least, unprobable, because it did not only eliminate them from the amended complaint which it filed after the issuance of the preliminary
injunction, but it failed to substantiate them at the trial. We refer to the following allegations: "that the defendant used to go to the "mill site" of the
plaintiff passing through plaintiff's private roads and there cause trouble among peaceful people of the place," and "that notwithstanding the prohibition
of the plaintiff, the defendant insists in repeating his incursions into the said private roads and "mill site" of the plaintiff, disturbing public order and
molesting plaintiff's employees and their families."
If said allegations were true, it is evident that plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction at the commencement of the trial, and to a permanent
injunction after the was rendered. But such is not the case, as the subsequent theory of the plaintiff, announced in its amended complaint, is not that the
defendant "made incursions into the "mill site" and private roads of the plaintiff, causing trouble, disturbing public order, and molesting plaintiff's
employees and their families," but only that the defendant, to take tuba to the Hacienda "Sagay," belonging to Luciano Aguirre, insisted in passing
through plaintiff's estate. From all this it follows that the plaintiff in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, trifled with the good faith of the lower court
by knowingly making untrue allegations on matters important and essential to its cause of action. Consequently, it did not come to court with clean hands.
Coming into Equity with Clean Hands. The maxim that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands is, of course, applicable in suits
to obtain relief by injunction. Injunction will be denied even though complainant shows that he has a right and would otherwise be entitled to
the remedy in case it appears that he himself acted dishonestly, fraudulently or illegal in respect to the matter in which redress is sought, or
where he has encouraged, invited or contributed to the injury sought to be enjoined. However, the general principle that he who comes into
11

equity must come with clean hands applies only to plaintiff's conduct relation to the very matter in litigation. The want of equity that will bar a
right to equitable relief for coming into court with unclean hands must be so directly connected with the matter in litigation that it has affected
the equitable relations of the parties arising out of the transaction in question. (32 C. J. pp. 67, 68.)
At this point, attention should be directed to other facts of the case indicative of the censurable attitude which the plaintiff has taken in connection
therewith. On one occasion, the defendant drove his automobile along the road in question, accompanied by Antonio Dequia, headed for the Hacienda
"Sagay." As they had tuba with them, on reaching the gate they were halted by the gatekeeper. The defendant and his companion got off the car and
unloaded the tuba in order to follow the passageway across the lands of the Hacienda "Begoa," through which plaintiff's carabaos passed, until they
could reach "Sagay." Thereupon, one Ankerson, accountant and auditor of the plaintiff, arrived and no sooner he had laid eyes on the tuba containers
than he indignantly kicked them and uttered a blasphemy to both, spilling the contents thereof. The defendant protested and asked Ankerson to
indemnify him for the value of the tuba which had been wasted, to which Ankerson replied that he would make good what should be paid, and he then
and there wrote and handed over a note to the defendant for presentation to plaintiff's cashier. The defendant presented the note, but this claim was not
paid, and instead he was prosecuted for trespass in the justice of the peace court of Manapla under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code. So absurd and
malicious was the charge that the court, in acquitting the defendant, entered the following order (Exhibit 3):
A peaceful citizen who passes through a private road open to the public does not commit the crime of trespass. Although the prohibition to the
accused to be in a private property should be manifest, if the latter is not fenced or uninhabited, the mere fact that the accused is found on the
place in question, for a lawful purpose, does not constitute the crime of trespass defined and punished under article 281 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The plaintiff did not stop at this; it filed the present action for injunction which, as has been seen, is nothing more than the culmination of a series of
affronts which the plaintiff has perpetrated, privately and through the courts, against the defendant.
F. The exercise of discretion by trial courts in matters injunctive should not be interfered with by appellate courts except in cases of manifest abuse.
. . . The court which is to exercise the discretion is the trial court and not the appellate court. The action of the court may be reviewed on
appeal of error in case of a clear abuse of discretion, but not otherwise, and ordinarily mandamus will not lie to control such discretion. (32 C.
J., sec. 11, p. 33.)
True, the rule has particular application to preliminary injunctions, but the rule should not be otherwise with respect to permanent injunctions especially
where, as in this case, the trial court, after granting the preliminary injunction, set the same aside in its final decision on a careful review of the evidence.
II
It is undisputed the road in question was constructed by the plaintiff on its own land, and that it connects the central or the "mill site" with the provincial
road. We have also the admission that the plaintiff made this road accessible to the general public, regardless of class or group of persons or entities. Its
use has been extended to employees and laborers of the plaintiff; and so also to all those who have a mind to pass through it, except that, in cases of
motor vehicles, a passage fee of P0.15, each should be paid. There is no contention here that the defendant had refused to pay said tolls whenever he
wanted to drive his car along the road in question.
We, therefore, have the case of an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a community. Civil Code articles 531 and 594 read:
ART. 531. Easements may also be established for the benefit of one or more persons or of a community to whom the encumbered estate does
not belong.
x x x x x x x x x
ART. 594. The owner of an estate may burden it with such easements as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider
desirable, provided he does not violate the law or public order.
There is nothing in the constitution of this easement in violation of law or public order, except perhaps that the right to open roads and charge passage
fees therefor i the State's by right of sovereignty and may not be taken over by a private individual without the requisite permit. This, however, would
affect the right of the plaintiff to charge tolls, but not that of the defendant or of any other person to make use of the easement.
As may be seen from the language of article 594, in cases of voluntary easement, the owner is given ample liberty to establish them: "as he may deem fit,
and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable." The plaintiff "considered it desirable" to open this road to the public in general, without
imposing any condition save the payment of a fifteen-centavo toll by motor vehicles, and it may not now go back on this and deny the existence of an
easement. Voluntary easements under article 594 are not contractual in nature; they constitute the act of the owner. If he exacts any condition, like the
payment of a certain indemnity for the use of the easement, any person who is willing to pay it may make use of the easement. If the contention be made
12

that a contract is necessary, it may be stated that a contract exits from the time all those who desire to make use of the easement are disposed to pay the
required indemnity.
The plaintiff contends that the easement of way is intermittent in nature and can only be acquired by virtue of a title under article 539. The defendant,
however, does not lay claim to it by prescription. The title in this case consists in the fact that the plaintiff has offered the use of this road to the general
public upon payment of a certain sum as passage fee in case of motor vehicles.
The cases of Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Roxas (22 Phil., 450), and Cuaycong vs. Benedicto (37 Phil., 781), are not controlling, as there the
attempt was to establish that the right to an easement of way had been acquired by prescription. Here defendant's contention is, that while the road in
question remains open to the public, he has a right to its use upon paying the passage fees required by the plaintiff. Indeed the latter may close it at its
pleasure, as no period has been fixed when the easement was voluntarily constituted, but while the road is thrown open, the plaintiff may not capriciously
exclude the defendant from its use.
Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence discloses the existence of a forcible right of way in favor of the owner and occupants of the Hacienda "Sagay" under the
Civil Code, article 564, because, according to said evidence, those living in Hacienda "Sagay" have no access to the provincial road except thru the road in
question. Santiago Plagata, principal witness of the plaintiff, testified thus:
Emerging from the provincial road, the defendant has necessarily to pass through this private road where the gate of which I am the keeper is
situated, and then he gets to the Central. (S. t., p. 5.)
Q. To go to the Hacienda "Sagay," is there any need to cross the "mill site" of the Central? A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the property of the Central is passed in going to the Hacienda "Sagay"? A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is there any other road? A. I am not sure whether there is another road.
Q. For how long have you been a watchman there? A. Nine years to date.
Q. And during that period of nine years, can you not state if there is any road which gives access to the Hacienda "Sagay"? Or the
Central has necessarily to be passed? A. I cannot say because I do not go to those places.
COURT:
Q. But all the others, except the defendant, who go to the Hacienda "Sagay" necessarily pass thru the Central? A. They pass thru
that road of the Central. (S. t., pp. 16, 17.)
The evidence for the defendant confirms this:
Q. To go there, thru what road did you have to pass? A. Thru the road of the Central.
Q. And by this road of the Central you mean the Central "North Negros Sugar Co., Inc."? A. Yes, sir.
Q. By this road of the Central which you mentioned, you mean the road where there is a gate, beginning from the Central until the
provincial road, where the gate is for the purpose of preventing passage? A. Yes, sir, the very one.
Q. And because of that gate, the Central collects certain toll? A. Yes, sir. (S. t., pp. 20, 21.)
III
Having been devoted by the plaintiff to the use of the public in general, upon paying the passage fees required in the case of motor vehicles, the road in
question is charged with a public interest, and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions against any private person.
When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only; as if a man set out a street in new building on his own
land, it is now no longer bare private interest, but is affected by a public interest. (Lord Chief Justice Hale in his treatise "De Portibus Maris,
quoted with approval in Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113 [1876], and in Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U. S., 502 [1934].)
13

The above language was used in the seventeenth century, when exceptions to the individualistic regime of ownership were scarcely recognized, and when
the ideas on its social function may be said to be in their infancy.
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at
large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in
that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may
withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he must submit to the control. (Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U. S., 113;
24 Law. ed., 77.)
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; nor
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate in the common interest. . . . The court has repeatedly
sustained curtailment of enjoyment of private property, in the public interest. The owner's rights may be subordinated to the needs of other
private owners whose pursuits are vital to the paramount interests of the community. (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U. S., 502, 521, 525; 78 Law.
ed., 940, 948.)
Whenever any business or enterprise becomes so closely and intimately related to the public, or to any substantial part of a community, as to
make the welfare of the public, or a substantial part thereof, dependent upon the proper conduct of such business, it becomes the subject for
the exercise of the regulatory power of the state. (Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. vs. Public Service Commission, P. U. R. 1920A, 639; 84 W. Va.,
638; 100 S. E., 551.)
. . . If the service is dedicated to the public or some portion thereof, or to persons within a given area, then any member of the public or of the
given class, or any person within the given area, may demand such service without discrimination, and the public, or so much of it as has
occasion to be served, is entitled to the service of the utility as a matter of right, and not of grace. . . . A corporation becomes a public service
corporation, and therefore subject to regulation as a public utility, only when and to the extent that the business of such corporation becomes
devoted to a public use. . . . (Stoehr vs. Natatorium Co. 200 Pac. [Idaho], 132, quoted in 18 A. L. R., 766.)
Tested by the rule laid down in Munn vs. Illinois, it may be conceded that the state has the power to make reasonable regulation of the charges
for services rendered by the stockyards company. Its stock yards are situated in one of the gateways of commerce, and so located that they
furnish important facilities to all seeking transportation of cattle. While not a common carrier, nor engaged in any distinctively public
employment, it is doing a work in which the public has an interest, and therefore must be considered as subject to government regulation.
(Cotting vs. Godard, 183 U.S., 79; 46 Law. ed., 92.)
Business which, though not public at their inception, may be fairly said to have risen to be such, and have become subject in consequence to
some government regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is superimposed upon them. In the
language of the cases, the owner, by devoting his business to the public use, in effect, grants the public an interest in that use, and subjects
himself to public regulation to the extent of that interest, although the property continues to belong to its private owner, and to be entitled to
protection accordingly. (Munn vs. Illinois, supra; Spring Valley Waterworks vs. Schottler, 110 U. S., 347; 28 L. ed., 173; 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 48;
People vs. Budd, 117 N. Y., 1, 27; 5 L. R. A., 559; 15 Am. St. Rep., 460; 22 N. E., 670; s. c. 143 U. S., 517; 36 L. ed., 247; 4 Inters. Com. Rep., 45; 12
Sup. Ct. Rep., 468; Brass vs. North Dakota, 153 U. S., 391; 38 L. ed., 757; 4 Inters. Com. Rep., 670; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 857; Noble State
Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104; 55 L. ed., 112; 32 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1062; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 186; Ann. Cas., 1912A, 487; German Alliance Ins.
Co. vs. Lewis, 233 U.S., 389; 58 L. ed., 1011; L. R. A. 1915C, 1189; 34 Sup. Ct. Rep., 612; VanDyke vs. Geary, 244 U. S., 39, 47; 61 L. ed., 973, 981;
37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 483, Block vs. Hirsh, 256 U. S., 135; 65 L. ed., 865; 16 A. L. R., 165; 41 Sup. Ct. Rep., 458.) Wolff Packing Co. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522; 27 A. L. R., 1280, 1286.)
Under the facts of the instant case, the road in question is of the nature of the so-called "turnpike road" or "toll-road." The following authorities are,
therefore, in point:
""Toll" is the price of the privilege to travel over that particular highway, and it is a quid pro quo. It rests on the principle that he who, receives
the toll does or has done something as an equivalent to him who pays it. Every traveler has the right to use the turnpike as any other highway,
but he must pay the toll. (City of St. Louis vs. Creen, 7 Mo. App., 468, 476.)
A toll road is a public highway, differing from the ordinary public highways chiefly in this: that the cost of its construction in the first instance is
borne by individuals, or by a corporation, having authority from the state to build it, and, further, in the right of the public to use the road after
completion, subject only to the payment of toll. (Virginia Caon Toll Road Co. vs. People, 45 Pac., 396, 399; 22 Colo., 429; 37 L. R. A., 711.)
Toll roads are in a limited sense public roads, and are highways for travel, but we do not regard them as public roads in a just sense, since there
is in them a private proprietary right. . . . The private right which turnpike companies possess in their roads deprives these ways in many
essential particulars of the character of public roads. It seems to us that, strictly speaking, toll roads owned by private corporation, constructed
and maintained for the purpose of private gain, are not public roads, although the people have a right to freely travel them upon the payment
of the toll prescribed by law. They are, of course, public, in a limited sense, but not in such a sense as are the public ways under full control of
14

the state, for public ways, in the strict sense, are completely under legislative control. (Elliott, Roads & S., p. 5.) (Board of Shelby County
Com'rs vs. Castetter, 33 N. E., 986, 987; 7 Ind. App., 309.)
It has been suggested during the consideration of the case at bar that the only transportation companies with motor vehicles who can have an interest in
passing over the said road are those which carry laborers of the central and passengers who transact business with the plaintiff, and not all public service
motor vehicles with certificates of public convenience, and that the only persons who may have an interest in passing over the said road are the laborers
of the plaintiff and persons who do business with it and the occupants of the 21 houses situated in the Hacienda "Sagay," and not everyone for personal
convenience. But even if this were true, the plaintiff having subjected the road in question to public use, conditioned only upon the payment of a fifteen-
centavo passage fees by motor vehicles, such circumstance would not affect the case at all, because what stamps a public character on a private property,
like the road in question, is not the number of persons who may have an interest in its use, but the fact that all those who may desire to use it may do so
upon payment of the required indemnity.
. . . The public or private character of the enterprise does not depend, however, upon the number of persons by whom it is used, but upon
whether or not it is open to the use and service of all members of the public who may require it, to the extent of its capacity; and the fact that
only a limited number of persons may have occasion to use it does not make of it a private undertaking if the public generally has a right to
such use. . . . (51 C. J., sec. 2, p. 5.)
The test is, not simply how many do actually use them, but how many may have a free and unrestricted right in common to use them. If it is
free and common to all citizens, then no matter whether it is or is not of great length, for whether it leads to or from a city, village or hamlet, or
whether it is much or little used, it is a "public road." (Heninger vs. Peery, 47 S. E., 1013, 1014; 102 Va., 896, quoting Elliott, Roads & S., secs. 11,
192.)
The circumstance that the road in question does not properly fall within the definition of a public utility provided in Act No. 3108, does not divest it to this
character:
. . . Whether or not a given business, industry, or service is a public utility does not depend upon legislative definition, but upon the nature of
the business or service rendered, and an attempt to declare a company or enterprise to be a public utility, where it is inherently not such, is, by
virtue of the guaranties of the federal constitution, void wherever it interferes with private rights of property or contract. So a legislature
cannot by mere fiat or regulatory order convert a private business or enterprise into a public utility, and the question whether or not a
particular company or service is a public utility is a judicial one, and must be determined as such by a court of competent jurisdiction; . . . . (51
C. J., sec. 3, p. 5.)
The road in question being a public utility, or, to be more exact, a private property affected with a public interest, is not lawful to make arbitrary
exceptions with respect to its use and enjoyment.
Duty to Serve Without Discrimination. A public utility is obligated by the nature of its business to furnish its service or commodity to the
general public, or that part of the public which it has undertaken to serve, without arbitrary discrimination, and it must, to the extent of its
capacity, serve all who apply, on equal terms and without distinction, so far as they are in the same class and similarly situated. Accordingly, a
utility must act toward all members of the public impartially, and treat all alike; and it cannot arbitrarily select the persons for whom it will
perform its service or furnish its commodity, nor refuse to one a favor or privilege it has extended to another, since the term "public utility"
precludes the idea of service which is private in its nature and is not to be obtained by the public. Such duties arise from the public nature of a
utility, and statutes providing affirmatively therefor are merely declaratory of the common law. (51 C. J., sec. 16, p. 7.)
The circumstance that the plaintiff is not the holder of a franchise or certificate of public convenience, or that it is a company devoted principally to the
manufacturer of sugar and not to the business of public service or that the state has not as yet assumed control or jurisdiction over the operation of the
road in question by the plaintiff, does not preclude the idea that the said road is a public utility.
The touchstone of public interest in any business, its practices and charges, clearly is not the enjoyment of any franchise from the state.
(Munn vs. Illinois [94 U. S., 113; 24 L. ed., 77, supra.) (Nebbia vs. New York,supra.)
The fact that a corporation may not have been given power to engage in the business of a public utility is not conclusive that it is not in fact
acting as a public utility and to be treated as such. (51 C. J., p. 5.)
The question whether or not it is such does not necessarily depend upon whether it has submitted or refused submit to the regulatory
jurisdiction of the state, nor upon whether or not the state has as yet assumed control and jurisdiction, or has failed or refused so to do. (51 C.
J., p. 6.)
The fact that a corporation does other business in addition to rendering a public service does not prevent it from being a public utility, and
subject to regulation as such, as to its public business. (51 C. J., p. 6.)
15

The term "public utility" sometimes is used to mean the physical property or plant being used in the service of the public. (51 C. J., p. 6.)
There are . . . decisions in which the incidental service has been held to public regulation and control. (ReCommonwealth Min. & Mill. Co. [1915;
Ariz.], P. U. R., 1915B, 536; Nevada, C. & O. Teleg. & Teleph. Co. vs.Red River Lumber Co. [1920; Cal.], P. U. R., 1920E, 625; Sandpoint Water &
Light Co. vs. Humberd Lumber Co. [1918; Idaho], P. U. R., 1918B, 535; Public Service Commission vs. Valley Mercantile Co. [1921; Mont.], P. U.
R., 1921D, 803; Public Service Commission vs. J. J. Rogers Co. [1918], 184 App. Div., 705; P. U. R., 1919A, 876; 172 N. Y. Supp., 498;
Wingrove vs. Public Service Commission [1914], 74 W. Va., 190; L. R. A. 1918A, 210; 81 S. E., 734; Chambers vs. Spruce Lighting Co. [1918], 81
W. Va., 714; 95 S. E. 192. See also Hoff vs. Montgomery [1916; Cal.], P. U. R., 1916D, 880; Re Producers Warehouse [1919; Cal.], P. U. R., 1920A,
919; Ticer vs. Phillips [1920; Cal.], P. U. R., 1920E, 582; Re Ontario Invest. Co. [1921; Cal.], P. U. R., 1922A, 181; Bassett vs. Francestown Water
Co. [1916; N. H.], P. U. R., 1916B, 815; Re Northern New York Power Co. [1915; N. Y., 2d Dist.], P. U. R., 1915B, 70.) (Annotation in 18 A. L. R.,
766, 767.)
The point is made that, there being no contract between the plaintiff and the public interested in the use of the road in question it should be understood
that such use has been by the mere tolerance of the plaintiff, and that said property has not been constituted into a public utility. The contention is devoid
of merit.
When private property is devoted to public use in the business of a public utility, certain reciprocal rights and duties are raised by implication of law
between the utility and the public it undertakes to serve, and no contract between them is necessary to give rise thereto. . . . (51 C. J., sec. 12 p. 6.)
Wherefore the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.
Abad Santos, J., concurs.
G.R. No. L-10778 March 29, 1916
THE MUNICIPALITY OF DUMANGAS, ILOILO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF JARO, objector-appellant.
J. M. Arroyo for appellant.
The provincial fiscal of Iloilo, F. Enaje, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
This appeal by bill of exceptions was raised by counsel for the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro from the judgment of December 22, 1914, wherein the judge
of the Court of First Instance ordered the inscription in the registry of property in the name of the applicant municipal corporation, of lot 3 of parcel 3, of
lot 2 of parcel 5, and of lot 1 of parcel 4, and therefore disallowed the objector's adverse claim with respect to said lot 1 of parcel 4.
By a written application of November 1, 1913, counsel for the municipality of Dumangas, Province of Iloilo, petitioned the Court of First Instance of said
province, in conformity with the law, for the registration of six parcels of land of which said municipality claimed to be the absolute owner. These lands are
situated in the barrio of Balabag of the pueblo of Dumangas, Iloilo; their description and boundaries are given in detail in the plans and technical
descriptions which were made a part of the application, and they contain a total area of 41,815 square meters. The applicant alleged that it had acquired
said lands by possession dating from time immemorial; that it was occupying one of said parcels as a public market, the rest of them being unoccupied,
etc., etc.
The application for registration was opposed by the Director of Lands, several private parties, and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro who, in a writing of
December 8, 1914, set forth that he objected to the registration of lot 2, described in the technical plan Exhibit A, and to that of lot 1 of parcel 4, specified
in detail in the plan Exhibit B. He stated that his objections were based on the ground that said lots absolutely and exclusively belonged to the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church, which had been in quiet and peaceable possession of same since time immemorial, and therefore prayed that the petition for
registration be denied.
During the hearing of this case, the applicant municipality requested that there should be stricken out of its application for registration certain parcels of
land mentioned in its verbal petition, found on page 152 of the record. For this reason all the oppositions that had been filed with respect to those
portions were considered withdrawn, save that of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro with regard to lot 1 of parcel 4. After the close of the trial the court
rendered the judgment aforementioned, to which counsel for the objector excepted and from which after taking the proper legal steps, he duly appealed.
In this case the only issue raised and submitted for our decision is whether the applicant municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo, is or is not entitled to have
inscribed in its name in the registry of property lot 1 of parcel 4, which lot, according to the application and technical plan, Exhibit B, contains a total area
of 2,183 square meters and is adjoined on the northeast by lands of the Roman Catholic Church, on the southeast, by lands of the same Church and by
those of Crisostomo Divinagracia, and on the southwest and northwest, by streets without names.
16

The record shows it to have been duly proven that the disputed lot 1 of parcel 4, is adjacent to the same wall that forms the side of the church of the
pueblo of Dumangas; that in said wall or partition there is a side door through which the faithful pass in order to enter the church, and that in order to do
so they are compelled to cross the land in question. The applicant municipality claims to be the exclusive owner of the said lot 1, while the objector, the
Church, also alleges itself to be the owner, inasmuch as it has been exercising acts of ownership over the said property; that the applicant's contention is
unfounded, in that it maintains that said church of Dumangas was constructed on the very edge of the land belonging to the church, without leaving a
reasonable space for the use of the faithful, who are accustomed to enter the building by means of said door; and that, inasmuch as its own lands lie on
the other side of the church, the most logical thing would have been for it to have built the church in the middle of its own land.
However, reasonable may be the contention of the objecting corporation, the evidence does not justify its claim, inasmuch as the record shows it to have
been conclusively proven that the municipal government of the pueblo of Dumangas has been in possession of the lot in question for more than thirty
years, and during this period of time have performed thereon acts of indisputable ownership, such as that of erecting a flag-staff for the use of the
municipality and that of using said land as a corral for branding cattle; as a public square, it served as a place for posting the lists of persons called up as
military conscripts and also as a place for the recognition or identification of malefactors killed by the guardia civil, and it was here where on holidays small
mortars were placed for firing salutes. After the revolution, the applicant municipality constructed on said land a building that served first as a theatre,
then as a school, and finally as a cockpit. On none of these occasions did the Church object to or oppose such acts of the applicant municipality during the
former Spanish or the present American sovereignty. The record also shows that the disputed land is now occupied by a billiard hall and by several houses
belonging to private parties who pay a rental to the municipality of Dumangas; that the billiard hall was erected by a concessionary who obtained the
necessary permit from said municipality of Dumangas itself, in 1912, without opposition on the part of the objector to these acts of ownership. These facts
are proven by the testimony of Quintin Salas, 44 years of age, who says that since he was 7 years old, he has known that the land is litigation belonged to
the municipality of Dumangas, and by that of Celestino Dominado, 52 years of age, who stated that from the time of his earliest recollection he has known
that the applicant corporation was the owner of the disputed property. The weight of this testimony was not over-balanced by that of the witnesses
presented by the adverse claimant.
The circumstance that the priests in charge of the parish church of Dumangas consented to the performance by the municipal council of said pueblo of
acts of possession and ownership over the lot of land in dispute, without their having protested against and objected to the same, clearly shows that the
parish church did not then consider that it has a right to the portion of land it now claims, and for this reason we accept the conclusions of fact contained
in the judgment appealed from. Besides; it must be remembered that the trial judge had an opportunity to see the witnesses, to observe their manner of
testifying and to determine their relative credibility; and the weight of evidence does not always lie on the side of the party who presents the most
witnesses.
The record shows that the church of the pueblo of Dumangas was constructed in or about the year 1887; that its wall on the southeast side adjoins the
building lot in question; and that since the construction of the church there has been a side door in this wall through which the worshippers attending
divine service enter and leave, they having to pass over and cross the land in question. It is therefore to be presumed that the use of said side door also
carries with it the use by faithful Catholics of the municipal land over which they have had to pass in order to gain access to said place of worship, and, as
this use of the land has been continuous, it is evident that the Church has acquired a right to such use by prescription, in view of the time that has elapsed
since the church was built and dedicated to religious worship, during which period the municipality has not prohibited the passage over the land by the
persons who attend services customarily held in said church.
The record does not disclose the date when the Government ceded to the Church the land on which the church building was afterwards erected, nor the
date of the laying out of the adjacent square that is claimed by the municipality and on which the side door of the church, which is used as an entrance by
the people who frequent this building, gives. There are good grounds for presuming that in apportioning lands at the time of the establishment of the
pueblo of Dumangas and in designating the land adjacent to the church as a public square, this latter was impliedly encumbered with the easement of a
right of way to allow the public to enter and leave the church a case provided for by article 567 of the Civil Code for the municipality has never
erected any building or executed any work which would have obstructed the passage and access to the side door of the church, and the public has been
enjoying the right of way over the land in question for an almost immemorable length of time. Therefore an easement of right of way over said land has
been acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also by the public which, without objection or protest, has continually availed itself of the
easement in question.
For the foregoing reasons, by which the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been refuted, said judgment should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed. The land in litigation shall, however, be understood to be burdened with an easement of right of way to allow passage to and from the side door
of the church of Dumangas, to such extent as may be necessary for the transit of persons and four-wheeled vehicles. No special finding is made as to costs.
So ordered.
Johnson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-48384 October 11, 1943
SEVERO AMOR, petitioner,
vs.
GABRIEL FLORENTINO, ET AL., respondents.

17

BOCOBO, J.:
The petitioner asks for the setting aside of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
The trial court declared that an easement of light and view had been established in favor of the property of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) and ordered
the petitioner to remove within 30 days all obstruction to the windows of respondents' house, to abstain from constructing within three meters from the
boundary line, and to pay P200.00 damages.
It appears that over 50 years ago, Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin or warehouse in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. The house had and still has, on the
north side, three windows on the upper story, and a fourth one on the ground floor. Through these windows the house receives light and air from the lot
where the camarin stands. On September 6, 1885, Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on which it is situated to Gabriel
Florentino, one of the respondents herein, and to Jose Florentino, father of the other respondents. In said will, the testatrix also devised the warehouse
and the lot where it is situated to Maria Encarnancion Florentino. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1882, nothing was said or done by the devisees in
regard to the windows in question. On July 14, 1911, Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the warehouse thereon to the petitioner, Severo Amor,
the deed of sale stating that the vendor had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. In January, 1938, petitioner destroyed the old
warehouse and started to build instead a two-story house. On March 1st of that year, respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from
building higher than the original structure and from executing any work which would shut off the light and air that had for many years been received
through the four windows referred to. The Court of First Instance found on the 15th of the same month that the construction of the new house had almost
been completed, so the court denied the writ of preliminary injunction.
I.
Inasmuch as Maria Florentino died in 1892, according to the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, Articles 541 of the Civil Code governs this case. The
facts above recited created the very situation provided for in said article, which reads as follows:
Art. 541. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one
of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed.
When the original owner, Maria Florentino, died in 1892, the ownership of the house and its lot passed to respondents while the dominion over
the camarin and its lot was vested in Maria Encarnancion Florentino, from whom said property was later bought by petitioner. At the time the devisees
took possession of their respective portions of the inheritance, neither the respondents nor Maria Encarnacion Florentino said or did anything with respect
to the four windows of the respondents' house. The respondents did not renounce the use of the windows, either by stipulation or by actually closing
them permanently. On the contrary, they exercised the right of receiving light and air through those windows. Neither did the petitioner's predecessor in
interest, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, object to them or demand that they be close. The easement was therefore created from the time of the death of
the original owner of both estates, so when petitioner bought the land and the camarin thereon from Maria Encarnancion Florentino, the burden of this
easement continued on the real property so acquired because according to Article 534, "easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively
or passively pertain."
An incidental question that arises at this juncture is whether or not Article 541 applies to a division of property by succession. The affirmative has been
authoritatively declared. (Manresa, "Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espanol," vol. 4, p. 619; Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, November 17, 1911).
Petitioner assigns as an error of the Court of Appeals the supposed failure of that tribunal to pass upon his motion to consider certain allegedly new
evidence to prove that Maria Florentino, the original owner of the properties, died in 1885. Petitioner alleges that Maria Florentino died in 1885 and,
therefore, the Law of the Partidas should be followed in this case and not the Civil Code. However, the petitioner's contention cannot be upheld without
rejecting the finding of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as follows:
We cannot review the above finding of fact by the Court of Appeals that Maria Florentino die in 1892. The evidentiary fact from which the Court of
Appeals drew the above finding is that Gregorio Florentino during the trial in 1938 testified to facts of his own personal knowledge, and he was then 58
years old, having been born in 1880. If Maria Florentino, as claimed by petitioner, had died in 1885, Gregorio Florentino would have been only 5 years of
age at the time of Maria Florentino's death. The Court of Appeals therefore concluded that Maria Florentino died in 1892, when Gregorio Florentino was
ten 12 years of age. We do not believe we can disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals, because its deductions as to the date of Maria Florentino's death
may be right or wrong, according to one's own reasoning. In other words, its conclusion of fact from Gregorio Florentino's testimony is not necessarily and
unavoidably mistaken. On the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that a person 58 years old cannot remember facts of inheritance as far back as when he
was only 5 years of age.
Furthermore, the burial certificate and the gravestone, whose copy and photograph, respectively, were offered by petitioner in a motion for new trial filed
in the Court of Appeals, could have been discovered by petitioner before the trial in the Court of First Instance by the exercise of due diligence. There is no
reason why this evidence could be found when the case was already before the Court of Appeals, but could not be found before the trial in the Court of
First Instance. It was easy, before such trial, for the petitioner to inquire from the relatives of Maria Florentino as to when she died. And having
ascertained the date, it was also easy to secure the burial certificate and a photograph of the gravestone, supposing them to be really of Maria Florentino.
The fact is, petitioner never tried to find out such date and never tried to secure the additional evidence till his counsel raised this issue for the first time
before the Court of Appeals. That Court was therefore died in 1885. (Sec. 497, Act. 190). The petitioner's statement in his brief (p. 11) that the Court of
18

Appeals neither passed upon his motion nor took the burial certificate and the gravestone into account is not true, because the very words of the Court of
Appeals clearly show that the Court had in mind said motion and evidence when the decision was signed. The decision said: "a la muerte de Maria
Florentino ocurrida en 1892 (el demandado sostiene que fue con anteriodad a 1889)" (Emphasis supplied).
Lastly, the issue as to the date of Maria Florentino's death cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Petitioner did not in the trial court allege or prove
this point. He presented this issue for the first time in the Court of Appeals. (Sec. 497, Act. 190).
Let us now consider Article 541 more closely in its application to the easement of light and view and to the easement not to build higher (altius non
tollendi). These two easements necessarily go together because an easement of light and view requires that the owner of the servient estate shall not
build to a height that will obstruct the window. They are, as it were, the two sides of the same coin. While an easement of light and view is positive, that
of altius non tollendi is negative. Clemente de Diego states that when article 538 speaks of the time for the commencement of prescription for negative
easements, "it refers to those negative easements which are the result and consequence of others that are positive, such as the easement not to build
higher, or not to construct, which is indispensable to the easement of light." (Se refiere a aquellas servidumbres negativas que son sucuela y consecuencia
de otras positivaas, como la de no levantar mas alto, o de no edificar, que es imprescindible para la servidumbre de luces.") ("Curso Elemental de Derecho
Civil Espaos, Comun y Foral," vol. 3, p. 450). This relation of these two easements should be borned in mind in connection with the following discussion of
(1) the modes of establishing and acquiring easements; (2) the meaning of article 541; and (3) the doctrine in the case of Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo.
First, as to the modes of establishing and acquiring easements. According to Article 536, easements are established by law or by will of th owners.
Acquisition of easements is first by title or its equivalent and seconly by prescription. What acts take the place of title? They are mentioned in Articles 540
and 541, namely, (1) a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate; (2) a final judgment; and (3) an apparent sign between two estates,
established by the owner of both, which is the case of article 541. Sanchez Roman calls cuh apparent sign under article 541 "supletoria del titulo
constitutivo de la servidumbre (Derecho Civil, vol. 3, p. 656). The same jurist says in regard to the ways of constituting easements:
(Spanish word - page 410)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain dated November 7, 1911, it was held that under article 541 of the Civil Code, the visible and permanent
sign of an easement "is the title that characterizes its existence" ("es el titulo caracteristico de su existencia.")
It will thus be seen that under article 541 the existence of the apparent sign in the instance case, to wit, the four windows under consideration, had for all
legal purposes the same character and effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of light and view by the respondents upon the death of the original
owner, Maria Florentino. Upon the establishment of that easement of light and view, the con-comitant and concurrent easement of altius non tollendi was
also constituted, the heir of the camarin and its lot, Maria Encarnacion Florention, not having objected to the existence of the windows. The theory of
article 541, of making the existence of the apparent sign equivalent to a title, when nothing to the contrary is said or done by the two owners, is sound and
correct, because as it happens in this case, there is an implied contract between them that the easements in question should be constituted.
Analyzing article 541 further, it sees that its wording is not quite felicitous when it says that the easement should continue. Sound juridical thinking rejects
such an idea because, properly speaking, the easement is not created till the division of the property, inasmuch as a predial or real easement is one of the
rights in another's property, orjura in re aliena and nobdy can have an easement over his own property, nimini sua res servit. In the instant case, therefore,
when the original owner, Maria Florentino, opened the windows which received light and air from another lot belonging to her, she was merely exercising
her right of dominion. Consequently, the moment of the constitution of the easement of light and view, together with that of altius non tollendi, as the
time of the death of the original owner of both properties. At that point, the requisite that there must be two proprietors one of the dominant estate
and another of the servient estate was fulfilled. (Article 530, Civil Code.)
Upon the question of the time when the easement in article 541 is created, Manresa presents a highly interesting theory, whether one may agree with it
or not. He says:
The concealed easement, as it were by the oneness of the owner, becomes visible, and is revealed in all its importance when the ownership of
the estate or portions of the estate which respectively should play the role of servient and dominant estates is divided.
Such a view cannot be fully accepted because before the division of the estate there is only a service in fact but not an easement in the strictly juridical
sense between the two buildings or parcels of land.
We come now to the case of Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo, 2 Phil., 24 decided in 1903, Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Mapa speaking for the Court. Counsel for
petitioner contends that the doctrine in that case is controlling in the present one. If the essential facts of the two cases were the same, there is not doubt
but that the early opinion would be decisive inasmuch as it is by its cogent reasoning one of the landmarks in Philippine jurisprudence. However, the facts
and theories of both cases are fundamentally dissimilar. What is more, as will presently be explained, that every decision makes a distinction between that
case and the situation provided for in article 541. In that case, Cortes sought an injunction to restrain Yu-Tibo from continuing the construction of certain
buildings. Cortes' wife owned a house in Manila which had windows that had been in existence since 1843. The defendant, who occupied a house on the
adjoining lot, commenced to raise the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in the house owned by plaintiff's wife had been
covered. This Court, in affirming the judgment of the lower court which dissolved the preliminary injunction, held that the opening of windows through
one's own wall does not in itself create an easement, because it is merely tolerated by the owner of the adjoining lot, who may freely build upon his land
19

to the extent of covering the windows, under article 581, and that his kind of easement is negative which can be acquired through prescription by counting
the time from the date when the owner of the dominant estate in a formal manner forbids the owner of the servient estate from obstructing the light,
which had not been done by the plaintiff in this case.
It will thus be clear that one of the essential differences between that case and the present is that while the Yu-Tibo case involved acquisition of easement
by prescription, in the present action the question is the acquisition of easement by title, or its equivalent, under article 541. Therefore, while a formal
prohibition was necessary in the former case in order to start the period of prescription, no such act is necessary here because the existence of the
apparent sign when Maria Florentino died was sufficient title in itself to created the easement.
Another difference is that while in the Yu-Tibo case, there were tow different owners of two separate houses from the beginning, in the present case there
was only one original owner of the two structures. Each proprietor in the Yu-Tibo case was merely exercising his rights of dominion, while in the instant
case, the existence of the apparent sign upon the death of the original owner ipso facto burdened the land belonging to petitioner's predecessor in
interest, with the easements of light and view and altius non tollendi in virtue of article 541.
The very decision in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo distinguishes that case from the situation foreseen in article 541. Said this Court in that case:
It is true that the Supreme Court of Spain, in its decisions of February 7 and May 5, 1986, has classified as positive easements of light which
were the object of the suits in which these decisions were rendered in cassation, and from these it might be believed at first glance, that the
former holdings of the supreme court upon this subject had been overruled. But this is not so, as a matter of fact, inasmuch as there is no
conflict between these decisions and the former decisions above cited.
In the first of the suits referred to, the question turned upon two houses which had formerly belonged to the same owner, who established a
service of light on one of them for the benefit of the other. These properties were subsequently conveyed to two different persons, but at the
time of the separation of the property noting was said as to the discontinuance of the easement, nor were the windows which constituted the
visible sign thereof removed. The new owner of the house subject to the easement endeavored to free it from the incumbrance,
notwithstanding the fact that the easement had been in existence for thirty-five years, and alleged that the owner of the dominant estate had
not performed any act of opposition which might serve as a starting point for the acquisition of a prescriptive title. The supreme court, in
deciding this case, on the 7th of February, 1896, held that the easement in this particular case was positive, because it consisted in the active
enjoyment of the light. This doctrine is doubtless based upon article 541 of the Code, which is of the following tenor: "The existence of
apparent sign of an easement between two tenements, established by the owner of both of them, shall be considered, should one be sold, as a
title for the active and passive continuance of the easement, unless, at the time of the division of the ownership of both tenements, the
contrary should be expressed in the deed of conveyance of either of them, or such sign is taken away before the execution of such deed.'
The word "active" used in the decision quoted in classifying the particular enjoyment of light referred to therein, presuposes on the part of the
owner of the dominant estate a right to such enjoyment arising, in the particular cases passed upon by that decision, from the voluntary act of
the original owner of the two houses, by which he imposed upon one of them an easement for the benefit of the other. It is well known that
easements are established, among other cases, by the will of the owners. (Article 536 of the Code.) It was an act which was, in fact, respected
and acquiesced in by the new owner of the servient estate, since he purchased it without making any stipulation against the easement existing
thereon, but, on the contrary, acquiesced in the continuance of the apparent sign thereof. As is stated in the decision itself, "It is a principle of
law that upon a division of a tenement among various persons in the absence of any mention in the contract of a mode of enjoyment
different from that to which the former owner was accustomed such easements as may be necessary for the continuation of such enjoyment
are understood to subsist." It will be seen, then, that the phrase "active enjoyment" involves an idea directly opposed to the enjoyment which
is the result of a mere tolerance on the part of the adjacent owner, and which, as it is not based upon an absolute, enforceable right, may be
considered as of a merely passive character. (2 Phil., 29-31).
Finally, the Yu-Tibo case was decided upon the theory if the negative easement of altius non tollendi, while the instant case is predicated on the idea of the
positive easement of light and view under article 541. On this point, suffice it to quote from Manresa's work. He says:
That in easements whose positive aspect appears tied up with the negative aspect, just as for the purposes of prescription the negative aspect
has to be considered preferential, so for the purposes of Article 541 it is sufficient to view the positive aspect, and therefore the existence of
openings or windows between two estates which belonged to the same owner is sufficient to establish, when the ownership of these estates is
divided, the easement of light or view, and with them the easements of altius non tollendi because without the latter, the former cannot exists.
There are several decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain which have applied Article 541. Some of them are those of February 7, 1986; February 6, 1904;
May 29, 1911; and November 17, 1911.
The sentence of February 7, 1896, dealt with windows established in one house by the original of two houses. When he died, the two houses were
adjudicated to different heirs. The court held that there was an easement of light.
Considering that, according to what has been established by this Supreme Tribunal in repeated sentences, and principally declared in the
sentence promulgated on October 21, 1892, the provision of law 14, title 31 of Partida 3 in treating of the mode of constituting easements, is
20

not contrary to the principle that when an estate is divided between different persons, and in the contract nothing is said out a mode of
enjoyment different from that used by the original owner thereof, the necessary easements for said mode of enjoyment are understood to be
subsisting;
Considering that such principle and jurisprudence have obtained a new santion, for due to them is the clear and concrete concept of Article 541
applicable to the case . . . .
Therefore, considering that Maria Florentino died in 1892, according to a finding of fact by the Court of Appeals, there is an easement of light and view in
favor of the respondents' property under article 541 of the Civil Code.
But granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino died in 1885, as contended by petitioner, nevertheless the same principle enunciated in article 541 of the
Spanish Civil Code was already an integral part of the Spanish law prior to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have to be upheld. That the
law before the Civil Code was the same as at present is shown by the following:
1. Under Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3, this easement was constituted by an implied contract among the heirs of Maria Florentino.
2. Granting for the sake of argument that this easement was not created through an implied contract according to Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3,
yet that provision of the Partidas was not inconsistent with the principle in question, so that there was a gap in the Partidas which the Supreme
Court of Spain filled up from the Roman Law and modern civil codes, by recognizing the existence of this kind of easement.
3. Law 17, Title 31, Partida 3 regarding the extinguishment of an easement did not prohibit the easement in the instant case, Therefore, we
should adhere to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain which maintain this easement under the Spanish law prior to Civil Code.
4. Other considerations show that the principle of apparent sign as announced by the Supreme Tribunal of Spain is not incompatible with the
Partidas.
First, as to the implied contract. Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3 provided that easements were acquired by contract, by will and by prescription. Upon the death
of the original owner, Maria Florentino, the four windows under consideration already existed and were visible. One of the heirs, Maria Encarnacion
Florentino, to whom thecamarin and its lot had been devised, having failed to object to the same, knowingly consented to their continuance. Nor did
Gabriel and Jose Florentino (devisees of the house that had the four windows) permanently close the windows. There was consequently an implied
agreement between her and the devisees of the house with the four windows to the effect that the service of these windows would continue, thus
creating the easement of light and view and the concomitant easement of altius non tollendi. Hence, the easement in question was acquired by Gabriel
and Jose Florentino through contract under Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3.
Secondly, with respect to the doctrine of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain. In a series of decisions of that court, it was held that Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3
was not opposed to the easement under review. One of those decisions is that of November 7, 1883, which held:
(Spanish word - page 418)
Other decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain to the same effect are those of September 14, 1867 and June 7, 1883. (See Scaevola, "Codigo Civil
Comentado" vol. 10, pp. 272-274.)
So that, granting for the sake of argument, that the easement was not created through an implied contract according to Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3, yet
that provision of the Partidas, according to decisions of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, was not inconsistent with the principle in question. The problem in
this case not having been foreseen in Law 14, Title 31, Partida 3, there was a gap in the old legislation, which the Supreme Tribunal of Spain filled up from
the Roman Law and from modern Civil Codes.
The principle in question was deeply rooted in the Roman Law. It is from the Roman Law that the Supreme Tribunal of Spain obtained this principle, in
order to solve a question not provided for by the Partidas, whose main source was also the Roman law. In other words, the Partidas being silent on the
point under consideration, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain resorted to the authoritative voice of the Roman law from which the Law of the Partidas had
derived its inspiration.
The following quotations from the Spanish version the Roman Law Digest will prove the assertions just made:
(Spanish word - page 419)
Among the modern civil codes which contain the rule in question are those of France, Belgium, Holland, Portugal, Mexico and Chile. It is presumed that the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain had also in mind at least one of them when it decided cases involving this principle before the promulgation of the Spanish Civil
Code.
21

When, therefore, Maria Florentino died (supposing she died in 1885), the status of the Spanish law was in favor of the doctrine in question. We cannot
change it because it was in full force at the time of the alleged date of Maria Florentino's death. We cannot reject a doctrine established by the Spanish
Supreme Tribunal as an integral part of the Spanish law before the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1889. And we know that jurisprudence in the sense
of court decisions is one of the sources of the law.
Thirdly, concerning Law 17, Title 31, Partida 3. It is true that the eminent jurist, Manresa, is of the opinion that "el precepto del art. 541 no solo no existia
en nuestra antigua legislacion, sino que podia deducirse claramente lo contrario de la ley 17, tit. 31, Partida 3.a . . . ." However, a careful reading of this
provision of the Partidas reveals that the same did not militate against the creation of an easement by an apparent sign if nothing was said or done when
the property is divided. Law 17, Title 31, Partida 3, read as follows:
(spanish word - page 420-21)
This law regulates the extinguishment of an easement by merger of the dominant and the servient estates. Speaking of this law of the Partidas and of
article 546, par. 1, of the Civil Code, both of which refer to merger of the two estates, Acaevola says: (p. 319, vol. 10)
But there is a world of difference between extinguishment of an easement by merger of the two estates and theconstitution of an easement by an
apparent sign when nothing is done or said upon the division of the property. Law 17, title 31, Partida 3, having in mind only the modes of extinguishment,
the legislator did not intend to cover the question involved in the present case, which refers to the creation of an easement.
What, then, are the differences between the extinguishment of an easement by merger under Law 17, title 31, Partida 3, and the constitution of an
easement in this case, both before and after the Civil Code went into effect?
First, in merger under Law 17, Title 31, Partida 3, there were from the very beginning, already two separate estates, the dominant and the servient estates,
whereas in this case, there was only one estate.
Second, in merger under said Law 17, there were already two owners, whereas in this case, there was only one owner, Maria Florentino.
Third, in merger under Law 17, there was already an easement in the legal sense, whereas in the instant case, there was only a service between the two
lots, (while Maria Florentino was living) but there was as yet no easement from the juridical viewpoint.
4. Other considerations prove that the principle of apparent sign as enunciated by the Supreme Tribunal of Spain is not inconsistent with the Partidas.
These considerations are:
1. Article 537, Civil Code, provides that continuous and apparent easements are acquired by title, or by prescription. However, side by side with
that article is article 541 which contemplates an easement upon division of an estate, unless a stipulation to the contrary is agreed upon, or the
sign is destroyed. Bearing in mind that "title" includes a contract, our view is that if Article 537 and 541 of the Civil Code can stand together,
there is no reason why Law 14, title 31, Partida 3, whereby easements are acquired by contract, by will and by prescription should be
considered incompatible with the easement under review.
2. Article 546, par. 1 of the Civil Code ordains that by merger of the two estates in the same owner an easement is extinguished. Yet, coexistent
with such provision is that of article 541 regarding the apparent sign which is a title for the easement. If these two principles can and do stand
together under the Civil Code, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Tribunal of Spain before the Civil Code was in force about the effect
of an apparent sign can also stand together with Law 17, title 31, Partida 3 declaring the extinguishment of an easement by merger.
3. Under article 546, par. 1 of the Civil Code, merger extinguishes an easement. So in case the estate is again divided by purchase, etc., the
easement is not, under the Civil Code automatically revived. That is the same provision of law 17, title 31, Partida 3, which does not reject the
principle in question, just as article 546, par. 1 of the Civil Code does not reject article 541 about an apparent sign.
III.
Aside from the foregoing reasons that support the easement under consideration, the same has been acquired by respondents through prescriptions.
The easement involved in this case is of two aspects: light and view and altius non tollendi. These two aspects necessarily go together because an
easement of light and view prevents the owner of the sevient estate from building to a height that will obstruct the windows. This court in Cortes vs. Yu-
Tibo, supra, held that the easement concerned when there is an apparent sign established by the owner of two estates is positive. Manresa is of the same
opinion, supra. This being so, and inasmuch as the original heirs of Maria Florentino succeeded to these two estates either in 1885 or in 1892 and as
petitioner bought one of the lots in 1911, the prescriptive period under any legislation that may be applied the Partidas, Civil Code or Code of Civil
Procedure has elapsed without the necessity of formal prohibition on the owner of the servient estate. The respondent's action was brought in 1938.
22

The persons who were present, and 20 years between absentees. (4 Manresa, 605). According to article 537 of the Civil Code, continous and apparent
easements may be acquired by prescription for 20 years. Under sections 40 and 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the period is 10 years.
IV.
The petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the lot and camarin thereon, and that he was not bound to know the existence of
the easement because the mere opening of windows on one's own wall does not ipso facto create an easement of light. Such contention might perhaps be
in point if the estates had not originally belonged to the same owner, who opened the windows. But the petitioner was in duty bound to inquire into the
significance of the windows, particularly because in the deed of sale, it was stated that the seller had inherited the property from her aunt, Maria
Florentino. Referring to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain dated February 7, 1896, which applied Article 541, this Court in the case of Cortes vs.
Yu-Tibo already cited, said that the establishment of the easement "was an act which was in fact respected and acquiesced in by the new owner of the
servient estate, since he purchased it without making any stipulation against the easement existing thereon, but on the contrary acquiesced in the new
owner of the servient estate, since he purchased it without making any stipulation against the easement existing thereon, but on the contrary, acquiesced
in the continuance of the apparent sign thereof." (p. 31). Moreover, it has been held that purchasers of lands burdened with apparent easements do not
enjoy the rights of third persons who acquire property, though the burden it not recorded. (Sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, April 5, 1898).
V.
Let us now discuss the case from the standpoint of justice and public policy.
First. When Maria Encarnacion Florentino, as one of the devisees, accepted the camarin and the lot, she could not in fairness receive the benefit
without assuming the burden of the legacy. That burden consisted of the service in fact during the lifetime of the original owner, which service became a
true easement upon her death.
Second. According to Scaevola, the reason for the principle in question is that there is a tacit contract. He says in vol. 10, p. 277:
It is not just to allow Maria Encarnacion Florentino or her successor in interest to repudiate her own undertaking, implied, it is true, but binding
nevertheless. This easement is therefore a burden which Maria Encarnacion Florentino and her successor in interest willingly accepted. They cannot now
murmur against any inconvenience consequent upon their own agreement.
Third. During the construction of the new house by the petitioner, the respondents filed an action to stop the work. But petitioner continued the
construction, so that when the Court of First Instance was ready to pass upon the preliminary injunction, the work had almost been finished. Petitioner,
therefore, cannot complain if he is now ordered to tear down part of the new structure so as not to shut off the light from respondents' windows.
Fourth. When petitioner bought this lot from the original coheir, Maria Encarnacion Florentino, the windows on respondents' house were visible. It was
petitioner's duty to inquire into the significance of those windows. Having failed to do so, he cannot now question the easement against the property
which he purchased.
(spanish word - page 425)
This idea of easements can never become obsolete in the face of modern progress. On the contrary, its need is all the more pressing and evident,
considering that this mutual assistance and giving way among estates is demanded by the complexities of modern conditions, such as those which obtain
in large cities where buildings, large and small, are so close together.
VI.
Recapitulating, we believe the easement of light and view has been established in favor of the property of respondents, for these reasons:
1. Maria Florentino having died in 1892, according to a finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, which we cannot review, Article 541 of the Civil
Code is applicable to this case.
2. Granting, arguendo, that Maria Florentino died in 1885, nevertheless that same principle embodied in article 541 of the Civil Code was
already an integral part of the Spanish law before the promulgation of the Civil Code in 1889, and therefore, even if the instant case should be
governed by the Spanish law prior to the Civil Code, the easement in question would also have to be upheld.
3. The easement under review has been acquired by respondents through prescription.
4. The petitioner was not an innocent purchaser, as he was in duty bound to inquire into the significance of the windows.
23

5. Justice and public policy are on the side of the respondents.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Yulo, C. J., Moran Imperial,
1
and Havtiveras, 1 JJ., concu
G.R. No. L-10619 February 28, 1958
LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of VICENTE, ROCO Y. DOMINGUEZ ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Moises B. Cruz for appellants.
Vicente Roco, Jr. for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Involving as it does only a question of law, the present appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, dated March 6, 1955,
dismissing the amended and supplemental complaint of plaintiffs on motion of defendants that it did not state a cause of action, was taken directly to this
Court.
The facts and the issue involved in the appeal are well and correctly stated in the appealed order, the pertinent portion of which we are reproducing and
making our own:
The amended and supplemental complaint alleged that the plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road or passage
way which traversed the land of the defendants and their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga
City, from their residential land and back, for more than 20 years; that the defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors in
interest of the said defendants have long recognized and respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said plaintiffs; that on
May 12, 1953, the defendants Jose Roco thru his co-defendants, Raymundo Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and with a view
to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement over the property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a chapel in the middle of
the said right of way construction actually impeded, obstructed and disturbed the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said
right of way; that on July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio Miras, Jr. with the approval of the defendant, Jose Roco
and with the help of their men and laborers, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced
with barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and their right of way in question against their protests and opposition, thereby
preventing them from going to or coming from their homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.
It is very clear from the allegations of the plaintiffs in their amended and supplemental complaint, that they claim to have acquired the
easement of right of way over the land of the defendants and the latter's predecessors in interest, Vicente Roco, thru prescription by their
continuous and uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way or road in going to Igualdad Street and the public
market of Naga City, from their residential land or houses, and return.
The only question therefore to determine in this case, is whether an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription.
The dismissal was based on the ground that an easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and,
therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under old as well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous
discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent, discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man
(Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or prescription,
continuous non-apparent easements and discentinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and
620 and 622 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively).
Both Manresa and Sanchez Roman are of the opinion the easement of right of way is a discontinuous one:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, particularly the articles thereof aforecited, it would therefore appear that the easement of right of
way may not be acquired through prescription. Even Article 1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real
property, excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such as, easement of right of way.
(Bargayo vs. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857, 867).
In the case of Cuayong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781 where the point in issue was whether or not vested rights in a right of way can be acquired through user
from time immemorial, this Court said:
24

It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect.
Under that Code (Article 539) ino discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event.
However, in the case of Municipality of Dumangas is Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil., 545, this same Tribunal held that the continued use by the public of a path
over land adjoining the Catholic church in going to and from said church through its side door, has given the church the right to such use by prescription,
and that because of said use by the public, an easement of right of way over said land has been acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also
by the public, which without objection or protest on the part of the owner of said land, had continually availed itself of the easement.
The minority of which the writer of this opinion is a part, believes that the easement of right of way may now be acquired through prescription, at least
since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly,
Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to
the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere
tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.
The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof
every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use. (17 Am. Jur.
972)
Even under the case of Cuaycong vs. Benedicto (supra), this Tribunal insinuated the rule that no discontinuous easement, like an easement of right of way,
may, under Article 539 of the Old Civil Code, be acquired, might possibly have been changed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to
prescription.
. . . Assuming, without deciding, that this rule has been changed by the provisions of the present Code of Civil Procedure relating to
prescription, and that since its enactment discontinuous easement of acquired by prescription, it is clear that this would not by avail plaintiffs.
The Code of Civil Procedure went into effect on October 1, 1901. The term of prescription for the acquisition of right in real estate is fixed by
the Code (section 41) at ten years. The evidence shows that in February, 1911, before the expiration of the term of ten years since the time the
Code of Civil Procedure took effect, the defendants interrupted the use of the road by plaintiffs by constructing and maintaining a toll gate on,
it collecting toll from persons making use of it with carts and continued to do so until they were enjoin by the granting of the preliminary
injunction by the trial court in December 1912. . . (Cuayong vs. Benedicto, 37 Phil., 781, 796).
Professor Tolentino in his Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. I, p. 340, would appear to be of the opinion that under, the provision of
the Code of Civil Procedure relative to prescription, even discontinuous easements, like the easement right of way, may be acquired through prescription:
. . . "It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the
servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants'."
However, the opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new,
unless and until the same is changed or clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription.
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.
[G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996]
ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO,J.:
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where the way is shortest and will cause least prejudice shall be chosen. However, if the two
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way where damage will be least shall be used even if not the shortest route.
[1]
This is so
because least prejudice prevails over shortest distance. This means that the court is not bound to establish what is the shortest distance; a longer way may
be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round about way, or to secure
the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest distance would place the way on a dangerous decline.
Thus we conclude from the succeeding facts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina
inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of
Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B-
1. It is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 1448-B-2. Adjoining Soteros property on the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3
and 1448-B-4 originally owned by Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located directly behind the
lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now Lots
25

Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacias Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No.
1448-B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his
administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But
Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200.00 per square
meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia s
property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred
by Anastacia from passing through her property.
[2]

In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who
provided her a pathwaygratis et amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of
Sotero, and Anastacias perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide
and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be
reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the
road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia s property. An ocular inspection
upon instruction of the presiding judge was conducted by the branch clerk of court. The report was that the proposed right of way was at the extreme
right of Anastacias property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Soteros sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her
property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal road
[3]
and the way was unobstructed except
for an avocado tree standing in the middle.
[4]

But on 5 September 1991 the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way through Soteros
property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacias property would no longer make the path straight. Hence the trial court
concluded that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was
the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacias property.
[5]

On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners
property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
[6]
The appellate court however did not
award damages to private respondent as petitioner did not act in bad faith in resisting the claim.
Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent Court of Appeals: (a) in disregarding the agreement of the parties; (b) in considering
petitioners property as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent; and, (c) in holding that the
one-meter by five-meter passage way proposed by private respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest distance to the public road.
Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private respondent a right of way. She claims that her agreement with private respondent was to
provide the latter with a right of way on the other lot of Antonio Quimen under her administration when it was not yet sold to private
respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through the property of Yolandas parents is more accessible to the public road than to make a detour to her
property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
Petitioner further argues that when Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-B in 1986 the easement of right of way she provided her (petitioner)
was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any
compelling reason to provide private respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose. Petitioner strongly
maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the
most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an
average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.
[7]

But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right of way to private respondent through petitioners
property. In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the
determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the
court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law.
[8]

As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or
allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or tenement.
[9]
It is jus in re aliena, inseparable,
indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by
law
[10]
to a person or class of persons to pass over anothers property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an
adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies
the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.
[11]

The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables
without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of
the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.
[12]

A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a right of way
[13]
readily shows that
26

[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff was reluctant to purchase the same for they are enclosed with permanent
improvements like a concrete fence and store and have (sic) no egress leading to the road but because of the assurance of the defendant that plaintiff will
be provided one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per square meter to be taken from Anastacias lot at the side of
a concrete store until plaintiff reach(es) her fathers land, plaintiff was induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land x x x. That the aforesaid right of way is
the shortest, most convenient and the least onerous leading to the road and being used by the plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest from the very inception
x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that
she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate.
[14]
These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of
court, more so that the trial court itself declared that *t+he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros
were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway.
[15]

Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to
the parties. We cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter ofjudicial
appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing
the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In
other words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way
is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
[16]
This is the test.
In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted -
Q. You testified during your direct examination about this plan, kindly go over this and please point to us in what portion of this plan is the house or store
of the father of the (plaintiff)?
A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located near the proposed right of way).
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you will agree with me x x x that this portion is the front portion of the lot owned by the father of the plaintiff and which was (sic)
occupied by a store made up of strong materials?
A. It is not true, sir.
Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the plaintiff made of?
A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of the lot in question, what right of way does (sic) he use in reaching the public road,
kindly point to this sketch that he is (sic) using in reaching the public road?
A. In my property, sir.
Q. Now you will agree with me x x x the main reason why your brother is (sic) using this property is because there was a store located near
this portion?
A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no other way than this, sir.
[17]

The trial court found that Yolandas property was situated at the back of her fathers property and held that there existed an available space of
about nineteen (19) meters long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda s father; that the
vacant space ended at the left back of Soteros store which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of
Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway. But notwithstanding its
factual observations, the trial court concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled to a right of way on petitioners property since a
detour through it would not make the line straight and would not be the route shortest to the public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter
wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested
passage through the property of Yolanda s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that
these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As between
a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will
only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or
weigh the evidence presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence considering primarily the
27

credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of the
situation.
[18]
In sum, this Court finds that the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED and the decision subject of review
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 105294. February 26, 1997]
PACITA DAVID-CHAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In pleading for an easement of right of way, petitioner correctly cites the requirements of law but fails to provide factual support to show her
entitlement thereto. Since findings of facts by the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are binding on the Supreme Court, the petition must
thus fail. Even petitioners plea for equity becomes unavailing because resort to equity is possible only in the absence, and never in contravention, of
statutory law.
The petition assails the Decision
[1]
of respondent Court
[2]
promulgated on April 30, 1992. The Decision of respondent Court affirmed the decision
dated July 26, 1989, of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. 8049. The dispositive portion of the affirmed
decision of the trial court reads:
[3]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, and finding plaintiffs petition to be without merit, the same is, as it is hereby ordered dismissed with
costs against plaintiff.
On defendants (Singian) counterclaim, the same is, as it is hereby dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop
private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access to the highway. Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635
square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R, was delineated on its northern and western sides by
various business establishments. Adjoining her property along its southern boundary was the land of the Pineda family, while along the east-northeastern
boundary, and lying between her property and the MacArthur Highway, was another lot with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned by
private respondent. In short, petitioners lot was almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only access to
the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the aforementioned property of private respondent. Petitioner
believed she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way through the said property of private respondent. The prospective subservient
estate was a portion of a bigger lot consisting of 7,239 square meters and covered by TCT No. 163033-R, which was formerly owned by the Singian
Brothers Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Singian Brothers) and was sold to private respondent without the knowledge and consent of petitioner,
who was thereby allegedly prevented from exercising her right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Petitioner alleged that private respondent was
about to complete the construction of its concrete fence on the said lot which would result in depriving petitioner of the only available right of way, and
that therefore, she was constrained to petition the trial court to enjoin private respondent from fencing said lot. The petition likewise prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering private respondent to sell to petitioner the subject lot and to pay the damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The parents and relatives of petitioner were never tenants or lessees of the former owner,
Singian Brothers; rather, they were found to be illegally occupying the property as ruled by the MTC-San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1, in Civil Case No.
4865. The dispositive portion of the judgment of ejectment reads:
[4]

WHEREFORE, defendants Eduardo Mangune, Pacita David-Chan and Primo David including their agents/representatives and, any and all persons given
access by them to the disputed premises claiming any right under them, are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the area in question, remove all the
improvements that they have constructed thereon; to pay the plaintiff corporation jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00 pesos - as Attorneys fees
and the costs of this suit.
The case against defendants Loida Makabali and Helen Hermidia is hereby dismissed as the action has become moot.
The defendants counterclaim, Pacita David-Chan and Eduardo Mangune is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence the former owners were not obliged to inform petitioner of the sale. The land sold by the Singian Brothers was free from all liens and
encumbrances as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Private respondent was not selling the 161 square-meter lot because it needed the property. Also,
petitioner had another access to the highway without passing through the lot in question.
28

The Singian Brothers were impleaded in the trial court. In their answer, they alleged that they did not authorize anyone to receive rentals for the disputed
lot. As their affirmative and special defenses, Defendant Singian Brothers averred that the complaint of petitioner stated no cause of action because,
being apparent and discontinuous, the right of way cannot be acquired by prescription. Petitioner was not a tenant of the Singian Brothers; therefore she
was not entitled to a right of pre-emption or right of redemption. Finally, petitioner had another access to the National Highway which, however, she
closed during the pendency of the case at the trial court when she extended the construction of her fence.
[5]

The Issues
Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent courts, petitioner now submits the following issues for consideration of this Court:
I. In its reaffirmation of the lower courts decision, the Court of Appeals missed to temper with human compassion of the Art. 649
and 650 of the New Civil Code of the Phil. which requires the presence of four requisites for a compulsory easement of
way.
[6]

II. (The) Court (of Appeals) had used in its decision all technical and legal niceties to favor respondents, violating time-honored and
deeply-rooted Filipino values.
[7]

III. With due respect, the Court (of Appeals) erred in deciding this case in favor of the respondent despite the facts existing at the
background.
[8]

IV. The Court (of Appeals) erred in stating that petitioner had an outlet measuring two (2) feet and four (4) inches to the national
highway without passing through respondent's property as per the commissioners report.
[9]

In her Memorandum
[10]
dated February 26, 1993, petitioner alleges only one issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal easement of right of way over that portion of the property of respondent Rabbit?
On the other hand, private respondent raises two issues:
[11]

1. Is the petitioner entitled to an easement of right of way from the private respondents?
2. Should she be granted her desire for a right of way by way of `pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao?
After deliberating on the various submissions of the parties, the Court holds that the issues can be condensed into two, as follows:
(1) Is petitioner legally entitled to a right of way through private respondents property?
(2) In any event, is she entitled to such easement through the recognition and application of the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao?
The Courts Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Requisites of an Easement of Right of Way
Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code,
[12]
petitioner submits that the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he
(or she) has established the existence of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid; (3) the isolation is not due to the proprietors own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.
[13]

While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to
satisfy their requirements. Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not without adequate outlet to a public highway as
follows:
[14]

1. Let it be stressed that it was plaintiff who built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the
Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National Highway
29

without passing through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can always destroy a portion of the concrete fence which
she erected and pass through the property of the Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioners Report, has an open space
on the southern boundary of plaintiffs land.
2. Plaintiff maintains that once the Pineda family (fences) off their lot, plaintiff has no more way to the National Highway.
Plaintiffs apprehensions are without basis. The Pineda family could no longer fence off their property because plaintiff (had) already constructed a fence
to separate the two properties. And even granting that the Pineda family would eventually fence off their land, then plaintiff could ask for an easement of
right of way from the Pineda family.
The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement because she caused her own isolation by closing her access
through the Pineda property, thus:
[15]

1. Worthy of note is the fact that it was plaintiff who built a fence to separate her property from that of the Pineda family on the southern
boundary. And she even closed the small opening causing her property to be isolated and losing one access to the National Highway. Plaintiff thus failed
to meet the third requisite for the grant of an easement of right of way. As held by the Hon. Supreme Court in the case of Francisco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, 534-535:
The evidence is, therefore, persuasively to the effect that the private respondent had been granted an adequate access to the public highway (Parada
Road) through the adjacent estate of Epifania Dila even as he was trying to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with petitioner Francisco for another
passageway through the latters property. If at the time he filed suit against the petitioner, such access (through the property of Epifania Dila) could no
longer be used, it was because he himself had closed it off by erecting a stone wall on his lot at the point where the passageway began for no reason to
which the record can attest except to demonstrate the isolation of his property alleged in his complaint. But the law makes it amply clear that an owner
cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent
estate. The third of the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property had not been met-indeed
the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of
the passageway through Lot 860-B was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be traversable by even
a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar
easement in an alternative location. (Underscoring ours)
The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the proper indemnity, to wit:
[16]

2. The second requisite - that there was payment of the proper indemnity was likewise not met by the plaintiff. Plaintiffs complaint contained no
averment that demand for the easement of right of way had been made after payment of the proper indemnity. There was no showing that plaintiff ever
made a tender of payment of the proper indemnity for the right of way. As the lower court said, The fact that plaintiff prays that defendant Rabbit be
ordered to sell to her the disputed premises hardly satisfies the requisite regarding the payment of the proper indemnity.
The questions of whether (1) petitioner has another adequate outlet to the public highway, or (2) she caused her own isolation, or (3) she made, in
fact, a tender of the proper indemnity are all issues of facts which this Court has no authority to rule upon.
[17]
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
[18]

It is doctrinal that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court.
[19]
While there are
exceptions to this rule,
[20]
petitioner has not convinced us that this case falls under one of them.
Second Issue: Application of Traditional Filipino Values
Perhaps sensing the inadequacy of her legal arguments, petitioner who claims to be an ordinary housewife (with) x x x meager resources pleads
that those who have less in life should have more in law and that the Court should apply the Filipino values ofpakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao in
resolving the case.
Such appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been aptly described as justice outside legality. However, equity is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
[21]
As found by respondent Court, petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of
way on the property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable arguments cannot prevail over the legal findings.
There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners of the dominant estate before they may be granted with easement of right of
way. These standards must be strictly complied with because easement is a burden on the property of another. Before such inconvenience may be
imposed by the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their isolation is caused by
their own acts. In the latter case, they decide their detachment and must bear the consequences of such choice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision dated April 30, 1992, of the respondent Court is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
30

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 95252. September 5, 1997]
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO
TIMBOL, EMDEN ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIO, JR., DOMINGO REYES, PEDRO C. MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO, PORFIRIO
CABALU, JR. and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their behalf and in behalf of the residents of LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS, INC., PHASES I AND
II, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon City abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traversing the edges of La Vista
Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll (now Miriam) College on the south. Mangyan Road serves as the boundary
between LA VISTA on one side and ATENEO and MARYKNOLL on the other. It bends towards the east and ends at the gate of Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision. The road has been the subject of an endless dispute, the disagreements always stemming from this unresolved issue: Is there an easement of
right-of-way over Mangyan Road?
In resolving this controversy, the Court would wish to write finis to this seemingly interminable debate which has dragged on for more than twenty
years.
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and Marikina. On 1
July 1949 the Tuasons sold to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings amounting to 1,330,556 square meters by virtue of a Deed of
Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the deed provides that x x x the boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining property of
the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from
the portion adjoining belonging to the VENDORS.
On 7 December 1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which was then acting for and in behalf of Ateneo de Manila University (ATENEO) in
buying the properties from the Tuasons, sold, assigned and formally transferred in a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage, with the consent
of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land to ATENEO which assumed the mortgage. The deed of assignment states -
The ASSIGNEE hereby agrees and assumes to pay the mortgage obligation on the above-described land in favor of the MORTGAGOR and to perform any
and all terms and conditions as set forth in the Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated July 1, 1949, hereinabove referred to, which said document is
incorporated herein and made an integral part of this contract by reference x x x x
On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential village
known as La Vista Subdivision. Thus the boundary between LA VISTA and the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation was the 15-meter wide
roadway known as the Mangyan Road.
On 6 June 1952 ATENEO sold to MARYKNOLL the western portion of the land adjacent to Mangyan Road. MARYKNOLL then constructed a wall in
the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway making one-half of Mangyan Road part of its school campus. The Tuasons objected and later filed a complaint
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal for the demolition of the wall. Subsequently, in an amicable settlement, MARYKNOLL agreed to remove the
wall and restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters.
Meanwhile, the Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-meter wide boundary. ATENEO deferred improvement on its share and erected
instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide roadway.
On 30 January 1976 ATENEO informed LA VISTA of the formers intention to develop some 16 hectares of its property along Mangyan Road into a
subdivision. In response, LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales clarified certain aspects with regard to the use of Mangyan Road. Thus -
x x x The Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So
that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2
portion of the road in your favor (paragraph 3 of the Deed of Sale between the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation and Ateneo de Manila
dated 1 July 1949 x x x x
On 28 April 1976 LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S. J., offered to buy under specified
conditions the property ATENEO was intending to develop. One of the conditions stipulated by the LA VISTA President was that [i]t is the essence of the
offer that the mutual right of way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners Association will be extinguished. The offer of LA
VISTA to buy was not accepted by ATENEO. Instead, on 10 May 1976 ATENEO offered to sell the property to the public subject to the condition that the
right to use the 15-meter roadway will be transferred to the vendee who will negotiate with the legally involved parties regarding the use of such right as
well as the development costs for improving the access road.
LA VISTA became one of the bidders. However it lost to Solid Homes, Inc., in the bidding. Thus on 29 October 1976 ATENEO executed a Deed of
Sale in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., over parcels of land covering a total area of 124,424 square meters subject, among others, to the condition that -
7. The VENDOR hereby passes unto the VENDEE, its assigns and successors-in-interest the privileges of such right of way which the VENDOR acquired, and
still has, by virtue of the Deeds mentioned in the immediately preceeding paragraph hereof; provided, that the VENDOR shall nonetheless continue to
31

enjoy said right of way privileges with the VENDEE, which right of way in favor of the VENDOR shall be annotated on the pertinent road lot titles. However
it is hereby agreed that the implementation of such right of way shall be for the VENDEEs sole responsibility and liability, and likewise any development of
such right of way shall be for the full account of the VENDEE. In the future, if needed, the VENDOR is therefore free to make use of the aforesaid right of
way, and/or Mangyan Road access, but in such a case the VENDOR shall contribute a pro-rata share in the maintenance of the area.
Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc., developed a subdivision now known as Loyola Grand Villas and together they now claim to have an easement of
right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which they could have access to Katipunan Avenue.
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed Solid Homes, Inc., that LA VISTA could not recognize the right-of-way over Mangyan Road
because, first, Philippine Building Corporation and its assignee ATENEO never complied with their obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way
on their 7.5-meter portion of the road and, second, since the property was purchased for commercial purposes, Solid Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled
to the right-of-way as Mangyan Road was established exclusively for ATENEO in whose favor the right-of-way was originally constituted. LA VISTA, after
instructing its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan Road, then constructed one-meter high
cylindrical concrete posts chained together at the middle of and along the entire length of Mangyan Road thus preventing the residents of LOYOLA from
passing through.
Solid Homes, Inc., complained to LA VISTA but the concrete posts were not removed. To gain access to LOYOLA through Mangyan Road an opening
through the adobe wall of ATENEO was made and some six (6) cylindrical concrete posts of LA VISTA were destroyed. LA VISTA then stationed security
guards in the area to prevent entry to LOYOLA through Mangyan Road.
On 17 December 1976, to avert violence, Solid Homes, Inc., instituted the instant case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-22450, before the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal and prayed that LA VISTA be enjoined from preventing and obstructing the use and passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan
Road. LA VISTA in turn filed a third-party complaint against ATENEO. On 14 September 1983 the trial court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc. (affirming an earlier order of 22 November 1977), directing LA VISTA to desist from blocking and preventing the use of Mangyan Road. The
injunction order of 14 September 1983 was however nullified and set aside on 31 May 1985 by the then Intermediate Appellate Court
[1]
in AC-G.R. SP No.
02534. Thus in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 71150, Solid Homes, Inc., assailed the nullification and setting aside of the
preliminary injuntion issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, on 20 November 1987 the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a decision on the merits
[2]
in Civil Case No. Q-22450 affirming
and recognizing the easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and ordering LA VISTA to pay damages thus -
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that an easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the plaintiff over Mangyan Road, and,
consequently, the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff is granted, enjoining thereby the defendant, its successors-in-interest, its/their agents and all
persons acting for and on its/their behalf, from closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the plaintiff, its successors-in-interest, its/their
agents and all persons acting for and on its/their behalf, and to the public in general, the unobstructed ingress and egress on Mangyan Road, which is the
boundary road between the La Vista Subdivision on one hand, and the Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, and the Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision,
Marikina, Metro Manila, on the other; and, in addition the defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff reasonable attorneys fees in the amount
of P30,000.00. The defendant-third-party plaintiff is also ordered to pay the third-party defendant reasonable attorneys fees for another amount
of P15,000.00. The counter-claim of the defendant against the plaintiff is dismissed for lack of merit. With costs against the defendant.
Quite expectedly, LA VISTA appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19929. On 20 April 1988 this Court, taking into
consideration the 20 November 1987 Decision of the trial court, dismissed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 71150 wherein Solid Homes, Inc., sought
reversal of the 31 May 1985 Decision in AC-G.R. SP No. 02534 which nullified and set aside the 14 September 1983 injunction order of the trial
court. There we said -
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before
judgment when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling such reliefs (Section
3(a), Rule 58) and it appearing that the trial court had already granted the issuance of a final injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision rendered after
trial on the merits (Sections 7 & 10, Rule 58, Rules of Court), the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered moot and
academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it has already made a clear pronouncement as to the plaintiffs right thereto, that is, after the same
issue has been decided on the merits, the trial court having appreciated the evidence presented, is proper, notwithstanding the fact that the decision
rendered is not yet final (II Moran, pp. 81-82, 1980 ed.). Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or
proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merit of the main case for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already determined
in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect.
[3]

On the other hand, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, several incidents were presented for resolution: two (2) motions filed by Solid Homes, Inc., to cite
certain officers of LA VISTA for contempt for alleged violation of the injunction ordaining free access to and egress from Mangyan Road, to which LA VISTA
responded with its own motion to cite Solid Homes, Inc., for contempt; a motion for leave to intervene and to re-open Mangyan Road filed by residents of
LOYOLA; and, a petition praying for the issuance of a restraining order to enjoin the closing of Mangyan Road. On 21 September 1989 the incidents were
resolved by the Court of Appeals
[4]
thus -
1. Defendant-appellant La Vista Association, Inc., its Board of Directors and other officials and all persons acting under their orders and in their behalf are
ordered to allow all residents of Phase I and II of Loyola Grand Villas unobstructed right-of-way or passage through the Mangyan Road which is the
boundary between the La Vista Subdivision and the Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision;
32

2. The motion to intervene as plaintiffs filed by the residents of Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision is GRANTED; and
3. The motions for contempt filed by both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant are DENIED.
This resolution is immediately executory.
[5]

On 15 December 1989 both motions for reconsideration of Solid Homes, Inc., and LA VISTA were denied. In separate petitions, both elevated the 21
September 1989 and 15 December 1989 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals to this Court. The petition of Solid Homes, Inc., docketed as G.R. No. 91433,
prayed for an order directing the appellate court to take cognizance of and hear the motions for contempt, while that of LA VISTA in G.R. No. 91502 sought
the issuance of a preliminary injunction to order Solid Homes, Inc., ATENEO and LOYOLA residents to desist from intruding into Mangyan Road.
On 22 May 1990, pending resolution of G.R. Nos. 91433 and 91502, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals
[6]
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929
affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-22450. On 6 September 1990 the motions for reconsideration and/or re-raffle and to set
the case for oral argument were denied. In view of the affirmance of the Decision by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929 this Court dismissed
the petition in G.R. No. 91502 for being moot as its main concern was merely the validity of a provisional or preliminary injunction earlier issued. We also
denied the petition in G.R. No. 91433 in the absence of a discernible grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the appellate court that it could not
entertain the motions to cite the parties for contempt because a charge of contempt committed against a superior court may be filed only before the
court against whom the contempt has been committed (Sec. 4, Rule 71, Rules of Court).
[7]

Consequently we are left with the instant case where petitioner LA VISTA assails the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming in toto the
Decision of the trial court which rendered a judgment on the merits and recognized an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road, permanently
enjoining LA VISTA from closing to Solid Homes, Inc., and its successors-in-interest the ingress and egress on Mangyan Road.
In its first assigned error, petitioner LA VISTA argues that respondent appellate court erred in disregarding the decisions in (a) La Vista Association,
Inc., v. Hon. Ortiz,
[8]
affirmed by this Court in Tecson v. Court of Appeals;
[9]
(b) La Vista Association, Inc., v. Hon. Leviste,
[10]
affirmed by this Court in Rivera v.
Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court;
[11]
and, (c) La Vista v. Hon. Mendoza,
[12]
and in holding that an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road exists.
[13]

We do not agree with petitioner. The reliance of petitioner on the cited cases is out of place as they involve the issuance of a preliminary injunction
pending resolution of a case on the merits. In the instant case, however, the subject of inquiry is not merely the issuance of a preliminary injunction but
the final injunctive writ which was issued after trial on the merits. A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence. The opinion and findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made even before the
trial on the merits is terminated. Consequently there may be vital facts subsequently presented during the trial which were not obtaining when the writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. Hence, to equate the basis for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with that for the issuance of a final injunctive
writ is erroneous. And it does not necessarily mean that when a writ of preliminary injunction issues a final injunction follows. Accordingly, respondent
Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision rightly held that -
We are unswayed by appellants theory that the cases cited by them in their Brief (pages 17 and 32) and in their motion for early resolution (page 11,
Rollo) to buttress the first assigned error, are final judgments on the merits of, and therefore res judicata to the instant query. It is quite strange that
appellant was extremely cautious in not mentioning this doctrine but the vague disquisition nevertheless points to this same tenet, which upon closer
examination negates the very proposition. Generally, it is axiomatic that res judicata will attach in favor of La Vista if and when the case under review was
disposed of on the merits and with finality (Manila Electric Co., vs. Artiaga, 50 Phil. 144; 147; S. Diego vs. Carmona, 70 Phil. 281; 283; cited in Comments on
the Rules of Court, by Moran, Volume II, 1970 edition, page 365; Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 339; 350-351, cited in Remedial
Law Compendium, by Regalado, Volume I, 1986 Fourth revised Edition, page 40). Appellants suffer from the mistaken notion that the merits of
the certiorari petitions impugning the preliminary injunction in the cases cited by it are tantamount to the merits of the main case, subject of the instant
appeal. Quite the contrary, the so-called final judgments adverted to dealt only with the propriety of the issuance or non-issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, unlike the present recourse which is directed against a final injunctive writ under Section 10, Rule 58. Thus the invocation of the
disputed matter herein is misplaced.
[14]

We thus repeat what we said in Solid Homes, Inc., v. La Vista
[15]
which respondent Court of Appeals quoted in its assailed Decision
[16]
-
Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the
merits of the main case for injunction. The merits of the main case having been already determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary
determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect.
Petitioner LA VISTA in its lengthy Memorandum also quotes our ruling in Ramos, Sr.,v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,
[17]
no less than five (5) times
[18]
-
To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right-of-way provided by the petitioners subdivision for its
buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely
ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right-of-way, that mere convenience for the
dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity
for it (See Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1972, p. 371)
Again this is misplaced. Ramos, Sr., v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,
[19]
concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way -
33

Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case granting a right-of-way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a
voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is
whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a right-of-way -
which should be distinguished from a voluntary easement. A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private
interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after
he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietors own acts; and, (d) the right-of-way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest.
[20]
A voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons
and the Philippine Building Corporation in 1949 stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the boundary line between the property
herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein
sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to the vendors; (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to
the assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to contribute seven and one-half
meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for
breach of contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that MARYKNOLL set back its wall to restore
Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA President
Manuel J. Gonzales admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide,
one-half of which is taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m.
portion was created in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2 m. portion of the road in your favor; (e) LA VISTA, in
its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in 1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the
mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista Homeowners Association would be extinguished if it bought the adjacent
ATENEO property and would thus become the owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and, (f) LA VISTA President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter
addressed to the Chief Justice, received by this Court on 26 March 1997, acknowledged that one-half of the whole length of (Mangyan Road) belongs to
La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal portions;
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road
and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Thus
respondent Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error when it ruled that -
Concerning the pivotal question posed herein on the existence of an easement, we are of the belief, and thus hereby hold that a right-of-way was properly
appreciated along the entire route of Mangyan Road. Incidentally, the pretense that the court a quo erred in holding that Mangyan Road is the boundary
road between La Vista and Ateneo (page 31, Appellants Brief) does not raise any critical eyebrow since the same is wholly irrelevant to the existence of a
servitude thereon from their express admission to the contrary (paragraph 1, Answer).
Ones attention should rather be focused on the contractual stipulations in the deed of sale between the Tuason Family and the Philippine Building
Corporation (paragraph 3, thereof) which were incorporated in the deed of assignment with assumption of mortgage by the Philippine Building
Corporation in favor of Ateneo (first paragraph, page 4 of the deed) as well as in the deed of sale dated October 24, 1976 when the property was
ultimately transferred by Ateneo to plaintiff-appellee. Like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
rescission of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots (Chuanicovs. Ibaez, 7 CA Reports, 2nd Series, 1965
edition, pages 582; 589, cited in Civil Law Annotated, by Padilla, Volume II, 1972 Edition, pages602-603), more so when the easement was implicitly
recognized by the letters of the La Vista President to Ateneo dated February 11 and April 28, 1976 (page 22, Decision; 19 Ruling Case Law 745).
The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable
(Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same so much so that -
When the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or constructs works impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of the dominant tenement may
ask for the destruction of such works and the restoration of the things to their condition before the impairment was committed, with indemnity for
damages suffered (3 Sanchez Roman 609). An injunction may also be obtained in order to restrain the owner of the servient tenement from obstructing or
impairing in any manner the lawful use of the servitude (Resolme v. Lazo, 27 Phil. 416; 417; 418). (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of
the Philippines, by Tolentino, Volume 2, 1963 edition, page 320)
[21]

Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one. For, even an injunction cannot be used to create one as there is no
such thing as a judicial easement. As in the instant case, the court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the parties. Respondent court
could not have said it any better -
It must be emphasized, however, that We are not constituting an easement along Mangyan Road, but merely declaring the existence of one created by the
manifest will of the parties herein in recognition of autonomy of contracts (Articles 1306 and 619, New Civil Code; Tolentino, supra, page 308; Civil Code of
the Philippines, by Paras, Volume II, 1984 edition, page 549).
[22]

34

The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the least. The opening
of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an
easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity.
[23]

That there is no contract between LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., and thus the court could not have declared the existence of an easement created
by the manifest will of the parties, is devoid of merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the
Philippine Building Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. When the Philippine Building
Corporation transferred its rights and obligations to ATENEO the Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto. Meanwhile, the Tuasons themselves
developed their property into what is now known as LA VISTA. On the other hand, ATENEO sold the hillside portions of its property to Solid Homes, Inc.,
including the right over the easement of right-of-way. In sum, when the easement in this case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made
provisions for its observance by all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.
The contractual easement of right-of-way having been confirmed, we find no reason to delve on the issue concerning P.D. No. 957 which
supposedly grants free access to any subdivision street to government or public offices within the subdivision. In the instant case, the rights under the law
have already been superseded by the voluntary easement of right-of-way.
Finally, petitioner questions the intervention of some LOYOLA residents at a time when the case was already on appeal, and submits that
intervention is no longer permissible after trial has been concluded. Suffice it to say that in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,
[24]
we said -
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial has already been concluded,
a judgment thereon had been promulgated in favor of private respondent and on appeal by the losing party x x x the same was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and
manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court (now Sec. 2, Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make
the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged failure of, movants
to act seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in
good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors claims be proven to be true.
After all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay the proceedings. On the contrary, it seems to have expedited the resolution
of the case as the incidents brought forth by the intervention, which could have been raised in another case, were resolved together with the issues herein
resulting in a more thorough disposal of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 22 May 1990 and its Resolution dated 6 September 1990, which affirmed the
Decision of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, dated 20 November 1987, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106082 June 27, 1995
LORETO VDA. DE BALTAZAR and NESTOR BALTAZAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DANIEL PANGANIBAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, of Malolos and ordered petitioners
to grant the right of way claimed by private respondent.
The instant petition for review on certiorari presents two issues for resolution, namely: (1) whether or not an easement of right of way can be granted to a
person who has two other existing passageways adjacent to his property which he is using in going to and from his property; and, (2) whether or not an
easement of right of way can be established through the alleged continuous use thereof in light of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case
of Ronquillo v. Roco
1
which held that an easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature since the dominant estate cannot be continually crossing the
servient estate but can do so only at intervals.
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land consisting of 117 square meters denominated as Lot no. 1027 located at Sta. Ines, Bulacan.
Immediately to the front of said land is Lot 1026 of Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and her son Nestor Baltazar. Immediately behind is the Sta. Ana River. On
either side are Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and Jose Legaspi, respectively. Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of
Lots 1025, 1026 and 1028.
35

Sometime in 1989, Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars who are owners of Lot 1026 for the establishment of a permanent and
perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to the provincial road. In said complaint, he prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
In their answer, petitioners opposed the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction arguing that there exists two other rights of way
adjacent to private respondent's property. They likewise argue that private respondent had abandoned the alleged right of way.
The court a quo, after conducting an ocular inspection and hearings for the issuance of the writ prayed for, dismissed the complaint based on the following
findings:
Immediately in front of the plaintiff's aforedescribed property is Residential Lot 1026 with an area of 119 square meters belonging to
herein defendants. On this lot is constructed the residential house of the defendants, immediately in front of which is the provincial
road. Running along one side of this property is a 1.20-meter wide, 10.40 meter long passageway which the plaintiff claims to have
previously made use of as an ingress to and egress from his property in going to or coming from the provincial road, until some three
(3) years before he instituted the instant action when the defendants somehow prevented him from using the same.
It is significant to note that, aside from the passageway which the plaintiff seeks to be established as a permanent easement, the
property of the plaintiff is accessible to and from the provincial road via two (2) other passageways, viz:
1) a passageway running immediately alongside the concrete fence of the properties of plaintiff and the
defendants, over the properties of Loreto Bernardo and Jose Legaspi. This passageway ends in a gate which
serves as a point of entry into or exit from the property of the plaintiff; and
2) a passageway similarly running alongside the opposite concrete fence of the properties of the plaintiff and
the defendants, over the properties of Encarnacion Calimon and Ricardo Calimon. This passageway, which
ends in a gate leading into the plaintiff's property, is the right of way presently availed of by the plaintiff.
Daniel Panganiban appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that the court a quo erred in dismissing the complaint for reasons of pragmatic
considerations and in flagrant and clear violation of Articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed decision,
2
reversed the order of dismissal of the court a quo and granted respondent's right of way. The dispositive
portion of said decision states:
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to
grant the right of way of plaintiff-appellant, designated as Lot 1026-B, after payment of the proper indemnity, to be determined
after hearing in the Court below.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals found the following based on the evidence on record:
1) Plaintiff-appellant's Lot 1027 (Exh. D) is bounded on the south by Lot 1026-A, owned by defendants-appellees; on the north by
Sta. Ana River; on the east, by Lot 1025 (Legaspi's property); on the west, by Lot 1028 (Calimon's property) [Exh. 3-T.D. No. 10998];
2) The only accessible road from Lot 1027 is Braulio Street. This road runs across the frontage of Lot 1025, Lot 1026-A and Lot 1028;
3) The shortest, direct and convenient way to gain access as an egress and ingress to said Braulio Street from the appellant's
dominant Lot 1027 is to pass through the appellees' servient estate Lot 1026-A (Exhs. 4-G, A, B, B-1, and C);
4) That Lot 1026-B (Exh. 4-l) which is a strip of land and a portion of appellees' Lot 1026-A, with steel gates (Exhs. I-1 and F-2), has
been existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the
lifetime of appellees' grandfather, Fidel, and his father, Onisimo Baltazar;
5) That it was closed and obstructed by the appellees when it closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B, when
appellees constructed their present residence;
36

6) That appellant was compelled to request for a temporary pathway on the eastern side, Lot 1025, and when it was closed, on the
western side, Lot 1028, of his Lot 1027.
It is worth noting that there is a discrepancy in the findings between the court a quo and the Court of Appeals regarding the existence of two passageways
from respondent Panganiban's property to Braulio Street. The court a quo ruled that while the passageway through petitioner Baltazar's property is the
least prejudicial to the servient estate and the shortest distance between respondent Panganiban's property and the provincial road, the claimed
easement cannot be granted due to the strained relations between the parties.
3
The court a quo added that if the other two passageways will no longer
be available to respondent, then the claimed easement of right of way over petitioner's property would be granted.
4
It appears that the two passageways
are simultaneously existing as alternative pathways for respondent Panganiban.
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the two passageways mentioned were mere temporary pathways which respondent Panganiban requested
successively from his two neighbors Calimon and Legaspi when petitioner Baltazar closed the passageway through his property. When the path on the
eastern side (Lot 1025) was closed to the respondent, he was granted the use of the other on the western side (Lot 1028).
5

The finding of the Court of Appeals that the existence of the two passageways was not simultaneous and was granted by respondent's neighbors, Calimon
and Legaspi only upon respondent's request when petitioner Baltazar closed the claimed passageway is supported by the evidence on record.
6

In light of the above findings of the Court of Appeals, the underlying issue begging resolution is whether or not respondent Panganiban is entitled to claim
an easement of right of way over the Baltazars' property.
In Locsin v. Climaco,
7
this Court said:
By express provision of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only
after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's
own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
For respondent Panganiban to claim a compulsory easement of right of way, he must, therefore, first establish the existence of the four requisites stated
above.
It is not disputed that the first requisite has been established by the court a quo in its Order dated May 22, 1990.
8
Respondent Panganiban's property is
indeed surrounded by immovables on three sides and a river on the fourth.
As for the second requisite, Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court
9
states:
There would indeed be some point in looking askance at a reading of the law which would impute to it a strict requirement to pay
"proper indemnity" in advance of a suit the purpose of which, in addition to creating an easement, is precisely to fix the amount of
the indemnity to be paid therefor.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it ordered the remand of this case to the lower court for the purpose of fixing the proper indemnity.
10

With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was likewise able to establish that the isolation of his property was not due to his own act for
he merely bought Lot 1027, which was formerly part of the Baltazars' Lot 1026-A,
11
from petitioner Nestor Baltazar's predecessors-in-interest. The Court
of Appeals found that Lot 1026-B
12
which the respondents have been using as a right of way, has been "existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and
used by the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the lifetime of petitioner's grandfather, Fidel and his father, Onisimo Baltazar."
13
It was
also established that the right of way was "closed and obstructed by the petitioners when they closed the gate
14
and placed plants across the gate of Lot
1026-B when petitioners constructed their present residence."
15

As regards the fourth requirement, both parties agreed that the passage claimed by respondent as his right of way, compared to the other passageways, is
the shortest distance from respondent's lot to Braulio Street.
16

Petitioners could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway for, as borne out by the records, the same is separate and distinct from the gate used
by them to enter their lot and residence. Such being the case, we conclude that respondent is entitled to claim a compulsory easement of right of way
over petitioners' Lot 1026-B.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 137882. February 04, 2005]
SPS. ELIZABETH DE LA CRUZ and ALFREDO DE LA CRUZ,petitioners, vs. OLGA RAMISCAL represented by ENRIQUE MENDOZA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
37

This petition for review assails (1) the Resolution
[1]
dated 11 September 1998 of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners
from the Decision dated 31 July 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 91, Quezon City, for Demolition of Illegally Constructed Structure, and (2)
the Resolution
[2]
dated 05 March 1999 denying the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The following facts, as recapitulated by the trial court, are undisputed.
Respondent OLGA RAMISCAL is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at the corner of 18
th
Avenue and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy,
Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 300302 of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City.
[3]
Petitioners SPS. ELIZABETH and ALFREDO
DE LA CRUZ are occupants of a parcel of land, with an area of eighty-five (85) square meters, located at the back of Ramiscals property, and covered by
TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) in the name of Concepcion de la Pea, mother of petitioner Alfredo de la Cruz.
[4]

The subject matter of this case is a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent which is being used by petitioners as
their pathway to and from 18
th
Avenue, the nearest public highway from their property. Petitioners had enclosed the same with a gate, fence, and roof.
[5]

In 1976, respondent leased her property, including the building thereon, to Phil. Orient Motors. Phil. Orient Motors also owned a property adjacent
to that of respondents. In 1995, Phil. Orient Motors sold its property to San Benito Realty. After the sale, Engr. Rafael Madrid prepared a relocation
survey and location plan for both contiguous properties of respondent and San Benito Realty. It was only then that respondent discovered that the
aforementioned pathway being occupied by petitioners is part of her property.
[6]

Through her lawyer, respondent immediately demanded that petitioners demolish the structure constructed by them on said pathway without her
knowledge and consent. As her letter dated 18 February 1995 addressed to petitioners went unheeded, the former referred the matter to
the Barangay for conciliation proceedings, but the parties arrived at no settlement. Hence, respondent filed this complaint with the RTC in Civil Case No.
Q-95-25159, seeking the demolition of the structure allegedly illegally constructed by petitioners on her property. Respondent asserted in her complaint
that petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the current one they are using, which she owns. She prayed for the payment
of damages.
[7]

In support of the complaint, respondent presented TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) covering the property denominated as Lot 1-B in the name of
Concepcion de la Pea, mother of petitioner herein Alfredo de la Cruz. The aforesaid TCT reveals that a portion of Lot 1-B, consisting of 85 square meters
and denominated as Lot 1-B-2, is being occupied by petitioners. To prove that petitioners have an existing right of way to a public highway other than the
pathway which respondent owns, the latter adduced in evidence a copy of the plan of a subdivision survey for Concepcion de la Pea and Felicidad Manalo
prepared in 1965 and subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Pea prepared in 1990. These documents establish an existing 1.50-meter wide alley,
identified as Lot 1-B-1, on the lot of Concepcion de la Pea, which serves as passageway from the lot being occupied by petitioners (Lot 1-B-2), to Boni
Serrano Avenue.
[8]

On the other hand, petitioners, in their Answer, admitted having used a 1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land on the northern side of
respondents property as their pathway to and from 18
th
Avenue, the nearest public highway from their property, but claimed that such use was with the
knowledge of respondent.
[9]

Petitioners alleged in their Answer that in 1976, respondent initiated the construction on her property of a motor shop known as Phil. Orient
Motors and they, as well as the other occupants of the property at the back of respondents land, opposed the construction of the perimeter wall as it
would enclose and render their property without any adequate ingress and egress. They asked respondent to give them a 1.50-meter wide and 40.15-
meter long easement on the eastern side of her property, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the owner of
another adjacent estate. Respondent did not want to give them the easement on the eastern side of her property, towards Boni Serrano Avenue but,
instead, offered to them the said 1.10-meter wide passageway along the northern side of her property towards 18
th
Avenue, which offer they had
accepted.
[10]

Petitioners additionally averred in their Answer that they were made to sign a document stating that they waived their right to ask for an easement
along the eastern side of respondents property towards Boni Serrano Avenue, which document was among those submitted in the application for a
building permit by a certain Mang Puling,
[11]
the person in charge of the construction of the motor shop. That was why, according to petitioners, the
perimeter wall on respondents property was constructed at a distance of 1.10-meters offset and away from respondents property line to provide a
passageway for them to and from 18
th
Avenue. They maintained in their Answer that respondent knew all along of the 1.10-meter pathway and had, in
fact, tolerated their use thereof.
On 31 July 1997, the RTC handed down a Decision,
[12]
giving probative weight to the evidence adduced by respondent. The decretal portion
enunciates:
Plaintiffs claim for moral damages must be denied as no evidence in support thereof was presented at all by her. Consequently, plaintiff is not entitled to
exemplary damages.
[13]
However, for having been compelled to file this suit and incur expenses to protect her interest, plaintiff is entitled to an attorneys
fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the defendants to demolish the structure built by
them along the pathway on the eastern side of plaintiffs property towards 18
th
Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and to pay [the] plaintiff the amount of
P10,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees.
Costs against the defendants.
[14]

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal filed by petitioners from the RTC decision for failure to file brief within the reglementary period.
The fallo of the Court of Appeals Decision, provides:
38

WHEREFORE, for failure of the defendants-appellants to file brief within the reglementary period, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to
Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Compliance/Explanation filed by defendants-appellants, submitting the Letter-withdrawal of Atty. Judito Tadeo addressed to the said defendants-
appellants is NOTED.
Let a copy of this Resolution be likewise served on defendants-appellants themselves.
[15]

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners met the same fate in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 05 March 1999.
Petitioners now lay their cause before us through the present petition for review, raising the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE DENIAL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS RESOLUTION DATED
SEPTEMBER 11, 1998 IS SANCTIONED BY THE RULINGS AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT?
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE NONETHELESS ENTITLED TO A LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, ASSUMING NO VOLUNTARY RIGHT OF
WAY WAS GRANTED THEM BY THE RESPONDENT?
C. WHETHER OR NOT OPERATIVE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES TO BAR THE RESPONDENT FROM DEPRIVING THE PETITIONERS CONTINUED USE OF
THE SAID RIGHT OF WAY?
[16]

The issues rivet on the adjective as well as on the substantive law, specifically: (1) whether or not the Court Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal
filed by petitioners for failure to file appellants brief on time, (2) whether or not petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement of right of way,
and (3) whether or not respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of way being used by petitioners.
On the first issue, petitioners assert positively that the petition was filed on time on 30 April 1998, which is well within the 45-day period reckoned
from 17 March 1998, when the secretary of their former counsel received the notice to file appeal.
Petitioners arguments fail to persuade us.
Press earnestly as they would, the evidence on record, nevertheless, evinces contrariety to petitioners assertion that they have beat the 45-day
period to file appellants brief before the appellate court. It is clear from the registry return receipt card
[17]
that the Notice to File Brief was received on 12
March 1998 by one May Tadeo from the Office of Atty. Judito Angelo C. Tadeo, petitioners previous counsel. Thus, on 30 April 1998, when their new
counsel entered his appearance and at the same time filed an appellants brief, the 45 days have run out. For failure of petitioners to file brief within the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed said appeal pursuant to Section 1(b), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[18]

Neither can the members of this Court lend credence to petitioners contention that the written note of Atty. Tadeos office on the face of the Order
reads that the said office received it on 17 March 1998.
[19]

It is a rule generally accepted that when the service is to be made by registered mail, the service is deemed complete and effective upon actual
receipt by the addressee as shown by the registry return card.
[20]
Thus, between the registry return card and said written note, the former commands
more weight. Not only is the former considered as the official record of the court, but also as such, it is presumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise,
unlike a written note or record of a party, which is often self-serving and easily fabricated. Further, this error on the part of the secretary of the
petitioners former counsel amounts to negligence or incompetence in record-keeping, which is not an excuse for the delay of filing.
Petitioners justification that their former counsel belatedly transmitted said order to them only on 20 March 1998 is not a good reason for
departing from the established rule. It was the responsibility of petitioners and their counsel to devise a system for the receipt of mail intended for
them.
[21]
Rules on procedure cannot be made to depend on the singular convenience of a party.
Petitioners next take the stand that even assuming the brief was filed late, the Court of Appeals still erred in dismissing their petition in light of the
rulings of this Court allowing delayed appeals on equitable grounds.
[22]
Indeed, in certain special cases and for compelling causes, the Court has
disregarded similar technical flaws so as to correct an obvious injustice made.
[23]
In this case, petitioners, however, failed to demonstrate any justifiable
reasons or meritorious grounds for a liberal application of the rules. We must remind petitioners that the right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or
inherent right - it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute.
[24]
Thus, it may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the law.
[25]

Anent the second issue, an easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable property of another, by virtue of which the
owner has to refrain from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another thing or person.
[26]
The statutory
basis for this right is Article 613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
39

Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
Did respondent voluntarily accord petitioners a right of way?
We rule in the negative. Petitioners herein failed to show by competent evidence other than their bare claim that they and their tenants, spouses
Manuel and Cecilia Bondoc and Carmelino Masangkay, entered into an agreement with respondent, through her foreman, Mang Puling, to use the
pathway to 18
th
Avenue, which would be reciprocated with an equivalent 1.50-meter wide easement by the owner of another adjacent estate. The hands
of this Court are tied from giving credence to petitioners self-serving claim that such right of way was voluntarily given them by respondent for the
following reasons:
First, petitioners were unable to produce any shred of document evidencing such agreement. The Civil Code is clear that any transaction involving
the sale or disposition of real property must be in writing.
[27]
Thus, the dearth of corroborative evidence opens doubts on the veracity of the naked
assertion of petitioners that indeed the subject easement of right of way was a voluntary grant from respondent. Second, as admitted by the petitioners,
it was only the foreman, Mang Puling, who talked with them regarding said pathway on the northern side of respondents property. Thus, petitioner
Elizabeth de la Cruz testified that she did not talk to respondent regarding the arrangement proposed to them by Mang Puling despite the fact that she
often saw respondent.
[28]
It is, therefore, foolhardy for petitioners to believe that the alleged foreman of respondent had the authority to bind the
respondent relating to the easement of right of way. Third, their explanation that said Mang Puling submitted said agreement to the Quezon City
Engineers Office, in connection with the application for a building permit but said office could no longer produce a copy thereof, does not inspire belief.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court,
[29]
petitioners should have requested a subpoena duces tecum from said court to compel the Quezon City
Engineers Office to produce said document or to prove that such document is indeed not available.
The fact that the perimeter wall of the building on respondents property was constructed at a distance of 1.10 meters away from the property line,
does not by itself bolster the veracity of petitioners story that there was indeed such an agreement. Further, as noted by the trial court, it was Atty.
Federico R. Onandia, counsel of Phil. Orient Motors, who wrote petitioners on 25 August 1994 advising them that his client would close the pathway along
18
th
Avenue, thereby implying that it was Phil. Orient Motors, respondents lessee, which tolerated petitioners use of said pathway.
[30]

Likewise futile are petitioners attempts to show that they are legally entitled to the aforesaid pathway under Article 649 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining
to other persons, and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of
the proper indemnity.
The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 649 is subject to proof of the following requisites: (1) it is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; (4) the
right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
[31]
The first three requisites are not obtaining in the instant case.
Contrary to petitioners contention, the trial court found from the records that Concepcion de la Pea had provided petitioners with an adequate
ingress and egress towards Boni Serrano Avenue. The trial court, gave weight to TCT No. RT-56958 (100547) covering the property denominated as Lot 1-B
in the name of Concepcion de la Pea, mother of petitioner herein Alfredo de la Cruz. Said TCT indicates that a portion of Lot 1-B, consisting of 85 square
meters and denominated as Lot 1-B-2, is the one being occupied by petitioners.
[32]
In this connection, a copy of the plan of a subdivision survey for
Concepcion de la Pea and Felicidad Manalo prepared in 1965 and subdivision plan for Concepcion de la Pea prepared in 1990 revealed an existing 1.50-
meter wide alley, identified as Lot 1-B-1, on the lot of Concepcion de la Pea, which serves as passageway from the lot being occupied by petitioners (Lot
1-B-2) to Boni Serrano Avenue.
[33]
During the trial, petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz herself admitted knowledge of the existence of the subdivision plan of Lot
1-B prepared for Concepcion de la Pea by Engr. Julio Cudiamat in 1990. The Subdivision Plan subdivided Lot 1-B into three portions, namely:
(1) Lot 1-B-1, which is an existing alley, consisting of 59.60 square meters, towards Boni Serrano Avenue;
(2) Lot 1-B-2, consisting of 85.20 square meters, which is being occupied by petitioners; and
(3) Lot 1-B-3, consisting also of 85.20 square meters, which is being occupied by the sister of petitioner Alfredo dela Cruz.
[34]

From petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruzs own admission, Lot 1-B-1 was intended by the owner, Concepcion de la Pea, to serve as an access to a public
highway for the occupants of the interior portion of her property.
[35]
Inasmuch as petitioners have an adequate outlet to a public highway (Boni Serrano
Avenue), they have no right to insist on using a portion of respondents property as pathway towards 18
th
Avenue and for which no indemnity was being
paid by them.
Petitioner Elizabeth de la Cruz claimed before the trial court that although there was indeed a portion of land allotted by Concepcion de la Pea to
serve as their ingress and egress to Boni Serrano Avenue, petitioners can no longer use the same because de la Pea had constructed houses on it. As
found by the trial court, the isolation of petitioners property was due to the acts of Concepcion de la Pea, who is required by law to grant a right of way
to the occupants of her property. In the trial courts rationale:
Article 649 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of right of way is not compulsory if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietors own
acts. To allow defendants access to plaintiffs property towards 18
th
Avenue simply because it is a shorter route to a public highway, despite the fact that a
road right of way, which is even wider, although longer, was in fact provided for them by Concepcion de la Pea towards Boni Serrano Avenue would
ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of right of way, that mere convenience for the dominant
estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial necessity for it. In
40

Francisco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 527, it was likewise held that a person who had been granted an access to the public highway
through an adjacent estate cannot claim a similar easement in an alternative location if such existing easement was rendered unusable by the owners
own act of isolating his property from a public highway, such as what Concepcion de la Pea allegedly did to her property by constructing houses on the
1.50 meter wide alley leading to Boni Serrano Avenue. And, if it were true that defendants had already bought Lot 1-B-2, the portion occupied by them,
from Concepcion de la Pea, then the latter is obliged to grant defendants a right of way without indemnity.
[36]

We hasten to add that under the above-quoted Article 649 of the Civil Code, it is theowner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate
or use any immovable surrounded by other immovable pertaining to other persons, who is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring
estates. In this case, petitioners fell short of proving that they are the owners of the supposed dominant estate. Nor were they able to prove that they
possess a real right to use such property. The petitioners claim to have acquired their property, denominated as Lot 1-B-2, from Concepcion de la Pea,
mother of defendant Alfredo de la Cruz, who owns Lot 1-B-3, an adjacent lot. However, as earlier noted, the trial court found that the title to both lots is
still registered in the name of Concepcion de la Pea under TCT No. RT-56958 (100547).
[37]
Neither were petitioners able to produce the Deed of Sale
evidencing their alleged purchase of the property from de la Pea. Hence, by the bulk of evidence, de la Pea, not petitioners, is the real party-in-interest
to claim a right of way although, as explained earlier, any action to demand a right of way from de la Peas part will not lie inasmuch as by her own acts of
building houses in the area allotted for a pathway in her property, she had caused the isolation of her property from any access to a public highway.
On the third issue, petitioners cannot find sanctuary in the equitable principle of laches under the contention that by sleeping on her right to
reclaim the pathway after almost twenty years, respondent has, in effect, waived such right over the same. It is not just the lapse of time or delay that
constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to
assert it.
[38]

The essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had knowledge of defendants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack
of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event the relief is accorded to the complainant.
[39]

The second and third elements, i.e., knowledge of defendant's acts and delay in the filing of such suit are certainly lacking here. As borne by the
records, it was only in 1995 that respondent found out that the pathway being used by petitioners was part of her property when a relocation survey and
location plan of her property and the adjacent land bought by San Benito Realty were prepared.
[40]
She immediately demanded petitioners to demolish the
structure illegally constructed by them on her property without her knowledge and consent. As her letter dated 18 February 1995 addressed to
petitioners fell on deaf ears, and as no settlement was arrived at by the parties at the Barangay level, respondent seasonably filed her complaint with the
RTC in the same year.
[41]

Respondent, in her Comment,
[42]
brings the Courts attention to petitioners conversion of the pathway, subject matter of this case, into a canteen
and videoke bar, as shown by the pictures
[43]
showing the property bearing the signage, FREDS
[44]
CANTEEN/VIDEOKE KAMBINGAN. Respondent,
likewise, complains in her Comment about the structures installed by petitioners that encroached on respondents property line as a result of the
commercial activities by petitioners on the disputed property. Petitioners have implicitly admitted this conversion of the propertys use by their silence on
the matter in their Reply
[45]
and Memorandum.
[46]
Such conversion is a telltale sign of petitioners veiled pecuniary interest in asserting a right over the
litigated property under the pretext of an innocuous claim for a right of way.
Viewed from all angles, from the facts and the law, the Court finds no redeeming value in petitioners asseverations that merit the reversal of the
assailed resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated 11 September 1998 and 5 March 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
68216 are AFFIRMED. The Decision dated 31 July 1997 of the Regional Trial Court is likewise UPHELD. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.