Hontiveros vs.

Altivas
FACTS: Plaintiff and the defendant herein were each candidates for governor of the Province of
Capiz. It was found that the defendant, Jose Altavas, had beenelected governor by a majority of
votes, and the plaintiff, Ramon Hontiveros,presented a protest and asked that the election returns
from the variousmunicipalities be revised. In accordance with section 27 of Act No. 1582,
hepresented a bond guaranteeing the payment of all of the costs which might beincurred by reason
of his protest. The said returns were recanvassed. Thevotes were recounted and it was that Ramon
Hontiveros had received amajority of the votes. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court where
all of the questions were considered and the decision of the lower court was revoked"without costs
to either party in this court." The cause was returned to the lower court, and later the motion in the
present case was presented.

ISSUE: W/N the plaintiff is obliged to pay the costs by reason of his protest.
HELD:
Yes. It appears from the admission of the appellant, Hontiveros, that the lower court had rendered a
judgment against him for costs. That part of the judgment of the lower court was not modified in
the slightest degree by the decision of this court. Considering theprovisions of section 27 of Act No.
1582, in relation with section 2 of Act No. 2170, we areof the opinion that the plaintiff is under
obligation to pay the costs incurred by reason of his protest.The judgment of the lower court,
refusing to modify the judgment theretofore rendered against the plaintiff for costs, is hereby
affirmed, with costs. An election is the act of casting and receiving the ballots, counting them, and
making the return.

Nicolas-Lewis, et al vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 162759 August 4, 2006


Facts:
Petitioners were dual citizens by virtue of RA 9225. Petitioners sought to avail their right of suffrage
under RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Comelec, however, did not allow
petitioners to vote in the 2004 election, reasoning the petitioners faield to comply with the requirement
of 1-year residency prior the elections as provided for under Article 5, Sec 1 of the Constitution.
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual
citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed
to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
(R.A. 9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow
them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
ISSUE: Does RA 9225 require duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote?
Held: No. There is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to
vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as
much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225,
the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee
voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.

Cayetano vs Monsod
201 SCRA 210, 1991
FACTS
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25,
1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Challenging the validity
of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsods nomination, petitioner filed a
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did
not meet the requirement of having practiced law for the last ten years.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.
HELD:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he: . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Brillantes vs Yorac
Constitutional Law COMELECs Constitutional Independence
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding
commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship
of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then questioned such
appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the
COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantes claimed that the
choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence
of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence
of the COMELEC.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The
designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote
administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it
found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional.

COLUMBRES vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner filed an election protest against respondent who was proclaimed as mayor. The
RTC decided in favor of petitioner, but the decision was reversed by the 2nd Division of the
COMELEC in an appeal filed by respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
questioning the decision of the division to validate the marked ballots cast in favor of the
respondent. The MR was denied by the COMELEC en banc which declared that findings of fact
cannot be a subject of an MR. Hence this petition.
Two issues: (1) Whether the findings of fact of the COMELEC Division, especially in matters of
appreciation of ballots, is absolute and cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC en banc;
(2) Whether in appreciation of ballots, when a ballot is found to be marked, absent any evidence
aliunde, there is the presumption that the markings were placed by a third person, and therefore,
should not invalidate the ballot.
HELD:
(1) No. What is being challenged is not the sufficiency of evidence but the appreciation thereof by the
COMELEC Division. If the appreciation of the Division is erroneous, there is the implication that such
finding or ruling is contrary to law and thus, may be a proper subject of a motion for reconsideration.
(2) No. There is no such presumption in law. Instead, the legal presumption is that the sanctity of the
ballot has been protected and preserved.
The case was remanded back to the COMELEC en banc.


Soller v. COMELECG.R. NO. 139853
FACTS
Petitioner and private respondent (Saulong) were both candidates formayor of the municipality of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11,1998 elections. The petitioner was proclaimed as mayor by
themunicipal board of canvassers. Private respondent filed a petition withthe COMELEC to annul the
proclamation. Later, private respondentfiled an election protest against petitioner with the RTC. The
COMELECdismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent, whilethe RTC denied
petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved forreconsideration but said motion was
denied.Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for certioraricontending that respondent RTC
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing
privaterespondents election protest. The COMELEC en banc dismissedpetitioners suit. Petitioner now
questions this decision of the COMELECen banc.

ISSUE:Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to decide on the case.
HELD
The SC has ruled in previous cases that the COMELEC, sitting en banc,does not have the requisite
authority to hear and decide election casesincluding pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance.
Thispower pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by theCommission en banc as
regards election cases decided by it in the firstinstance is null and void. In the SCs view, the authority to
resolvepetition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest, likethe questioned order of
the trial court, falls within the division of theCOMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.


AMBIL vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar
during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the duly
elected Governor. Private respondent filed an election protest with the COMELEC, which was assigned
to the First Division.
Commissioner X prepared and signed a proposed resolution in the case. Commissioner Y dissented,
while Commissioner Z wanted to see both positions first before giving her decision. On 2/15/00,
Commissioner X retired and was replaced. On 2/24/00, petitioner and respondent received a purported
resolution in favor of private respondent promulgated on 2/14/00 and signed by Commissioners X, Y,
and Z. The First Division later declared that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet
promulgated. The Division later set a date for promulgation of a resolution of the case, and said that the
aggrieved party could then challenge it through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en
banc or through a certiorari case before the SC. The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the
promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the case.
HELD: The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to review via certiorari,
an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. The
instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do
not apply to election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to
elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before
the Supreme Court.
The SC declared the resolution signed by Commissioner X as void for various reasons. First, one who is
no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated
cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Second, the Clerk of the 1st Division denied the
release or promulgation of the resolution on 2/14/00 resolution. Third, the 1st Division even later said
that the parties should ignore the resolution since it was not yet promulgated. Lastly, Commissioner Z
could not have affixed her signature on the resolution, since on the same date an order was issued
where she said that she still wanted to see both positions before making her decision.

ABS-CBC VS. COMELEC
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that
ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."
2
The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had
not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We
directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE:WON the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies
before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration
HELD: This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over
to prevent a miscarriage of justice,
8
when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the
protection of labor,
9
when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,
10
or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent andcertiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
11

The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty
(20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4,
1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and
to obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the
essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.


Antonio V.A. Tan, petitioner,vs.Commission on Elections, et. al, respondents.G.R. No. 112093. October
4, 1994.VITUG, J.:
FACTS:
Antonio V.A. Tan, the petitioner, was designated by the COMELEC as the Vice-Chairman of the City
Boardof Canvassers of Davao City. Senforiano B. Alterado, one of the private respondents and a
candidate, filed a casequestioning the validity of the proclamation of Manuel Garcia and accusing the
members of the City Board of Canvassers of "unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass."
Meanwhile, the electoral protest of privaterespondent Alterado was dismissed by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"). The criminalcomplaint for "Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before theOffice of the
Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack of criminal intent on the part of
thereinrespondents. Still

ISSUE/S: WHETHER or NOT
the COMELEC may relieve any officer or employee paragraph from the performance of his duties
relating to electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions,
orders,decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute?

REASONING/HOLDING:
The Commission may relieve any officer or employee, exercise direct and immediate supervision and
controlover national and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law
enforcement agencyand instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative
to the conduct of elections. Inaddition, it may authorize CMP Cadets eighteen years of age and above to
act as its deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders, from the performance of his duties relating to
electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its instructions, orders,
decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the
corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all of such officers
or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of such violation or failure. The COMELEC's
mandateincludes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control over national
and local officials or employees, including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of thegovernment, required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections. In order to help ensure that suchduly deputized officials and employees of government carry
out their respective assigned tasks, the law has alsoprovided than upon the COMELEC's
recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of theDepartment of Justice in the
case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either to suspend or remove from office theofficer or
employee who may, after due process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply
withinstructions, orders, decision or rulings of the COMELEC.

MACALINTAL, PETITIONER VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, AND BONCODIN, RESPONDENTS
(Digest by Tish Bahjin Sourced from Class Digest)
FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court
upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously
and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering
that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates
the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the
independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3) Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-
President, and not to the votes of the Senators and party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec.
4 of the Constitution.
3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph
allowing Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the
COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
REASONS:
1) Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting
by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,
provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
xxx xxx xxx
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of
the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in that it violates the requirement that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election, as provided under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution which reads: Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election.
For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied on, among others, the discussions of the
members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter
qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress
shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee
voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the
Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended
to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the
residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction,
which may be applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates
that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of
Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy
the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in
Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later
became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim
on the unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
2)Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-
president, senators, and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
xxx xxx xxx
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the
outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the
scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections
therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or
countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order
the proclamation of winning candidates for President and Vice-President is unconstitutional and
violative of the following provisions of Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
Sec. 4.
xxx xxx xxx
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall
have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and
the vice-presidency, granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant
to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority
given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President
and Vice-President.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as
aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and
Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.
3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows:
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby
created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of
the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided, that of the seven
(7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and
the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission.
All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No.
9189 is unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through the JCOC vis--vis the
independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1,
which reads Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed by other
constitutional provisions, one of which is the aforementioned provision on the independence of
constitutional commissions. The Court has held that whatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent
from the other departments of the Government.
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and important part
in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission
may err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and
methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists,
and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body except
those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the
same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory
powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is
unconstitutional and must therefore be stricken off from the said law.
SECTION 8.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-
President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President
of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

BEDOL VS COMELEC Leave a comment
LINTANG BEDOL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 179830/ December 3, 2009
FACTS: As Chair of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) for the province of Maguindanao, the
respondent *petitioner+ discharged his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOCs performance
of its ministerial duty to canvass the Certificates of Canvass coming from the twenty two (22) city and
municipalities in the province.
At that time, respondent [petitioner] also was charged with the burdensome and gargantuan duty of
being the concurrent Provincial Elections Supervisor for the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan a neighboring
province of Maguindanao.
Respondent [petitioner] Bedol failed to attend the scheduled canvassing of the Provincial Certificates of
Canvass (PCOC) of Maguindanao of which he is the Provincial Election Supervisor which was slated on
May 22, 2007.
On May 25, 2007, respondent appeared before the Commission, en banc sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers (NBOC) for the election of senators to submit the provincial certificate of canvass for
Maguindanao, pursuant to his functions as Provincial Elections Supervisor and chair of the PBOC for
Maguindanao. Due to certain observations on the provincial certificates of canvass by certain parties,
canvassing of the certificate was held in abeyance and respondent was queried on the alleged fraud
which attended the conduct of elections in his area.
He was already informed of the resetting of the canvassing for May 30, 2007, but failed to appear
despite prior knowledge.
Respondents [petitioner] contention:
Bedol explained before the Task Force during its June 11, 2007 fact finding activity that, while in his
custody and possession, the election paraphernalia were stolen sometime on May 29, 2007, or some
fifteen (15) days after the elections. This was the first time such an excuse was given by the respondent
[petitioner] and no written report was ever filed with the Commission regarding the alleged loss.
Due to absences in the next scheduled investigative proceedings and due to failure and refusal to submit
a written explanation of his absences, respondent [petitioner] was issued a contempt charge by
COMELEC.
Petitioner was later arrested by members of the Philippine National Police on the basis of an Order of
Arrest issued on June 29, 2007 by the COMELEC after petitioner repeatedly failed to appear during the
fact-finding proceedings before Task Force Maguindanao.
Petitioner questioned the COMELECs legal basis for issuing the warrant of arrest and its assumption of
jurisdiction over the contempt charges. Nevertheless, he was declared in contempt by COMELEC.
Petitioner, then, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the COMELEC in the other
assailed Resolution dated August 31, 2007.
ISSUE: Whether or not the initiation and issuance of contempt order is within the constitutional powers
of the COMELEC.
RULING:
Powers of COMELEC
The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus
Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-
judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the
issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution
(Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue
rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
The exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or administrative duties,
and the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise
of judicial functions. It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what
the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he
acts judicially.
The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to
allow the initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the
above-quoted provision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly adopts the
procedure and penalties provided by the Rules of Court.
Findings of guilt of indirect contempt
Petitioner was found guilty of contempt on four (4) grounds.
First, he repeatedly failed to attend, despite notice of the scheduled[12] canvassing of the Provincial
Certificates of Canvass, the hearing of the Task Force Maguindanao; and refused to submit his
explanation for such absences, which he had undertaken to submit, in violation of paragraphs (b) and (f)
of Section 2, Rule 29 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Second, he unlawfully assumed custody of accountable election documents, which were lost while in his
possession, and consequently failed to deliver the same, in violation of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d)
Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
Third and fourth, he publicly displayed disrespect for the authority of the COMELEC through the media
(interviews on national television channels, and in newspapers and radios) by flaunting an armory of
long firearms and side arms in public, and posing for the front page of a national broadsheet, with a
shiny pistol tucked in a holster, in violation of paragraphs (a) and (d), Section 2, Rule 29 of same Rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.

Masangcay vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27
Facts : Masangcay was the provincial treasurer of Aklan who was charged withseveral others for
CONTEMPT by the COMELEC when it opened 3 boxeswithout the presence of the persons and/or parties
indicated in its Resolution.After appearing and showing cause why they should not be punished
forcontempt, the COMELEC sentenced Masangcay for imprisonment and imposinga
fine. Masangcay filed a petition for review with the SC.Issue : WON the COMELEC may
punish Masangcay for contempt for his acts.Ruling : When the Commission exercises a ministerial
function it cannot exercisethe power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial
innature.In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it didnot exercise any judicial
function. Such being the case, it could not exercise thepower to punish for contempt as postulated in
the law, for such power isinherently judicial in nature. The Commission on Elections has not only the
duty to enforce and administer alllaws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try,
hear anddecide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with theelections. In this
sense, we said, the Commission, although it cannot be classifiedas a court of justice within the meaning
of the Constitution (Section 30, ArticleVIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however
exercise quasi- judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law comeunder its
jurisdiction


18
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence isessential to the preservation of
order in judicial proceedings, and to theenforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, inthe, administration of justice.The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a
necessary incident andattribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been
invariablylimited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of thatpower by an
administrative body in furtherance of its administrative functionhas been held invalid

Montejo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118702, March 16, 1995

Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in the third district of
Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran was converted into a regular
province, 8 municipalities of the third district composedthe new province. As a consequence, the
composition of the third district was reduced to 5 municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in
the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and
the municipality ofPalompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalitiesfrom one
legislative district to another legislative district



Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But based on
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it denied to the COMELEC the major power of
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered
the COMELEC to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment made.Consistent with the limit of
its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any
authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an
imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the
issue involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioners remedy lies
with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to
reapportion.The Court held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the
second district and themunicipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.