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Toledo

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EP 3-7-1

Pressure Relieving System
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 SCOPE ....................................................................................................................................................... 3
2.0 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................... 3
3.0 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................................................. 4
4.0 SUMMARY OF PRESSURE RELIEF DESIGN PROCEDURE ................................................................. 6
4.1 CONSIDERATION AND LISTING OF ALL SOURCES OF OVERPRESSURE ................................... 7
4.2 SPLIT THE PLANT INTO EASILY HANDLED SEGMENTS ................................................................. 7
4.3 DEVELOP THE SUMMARY OF RELIEF LOADS TABLE .................................................................... 7
4.4 SELECT AND SIZE INDIVIDUAL RELIEF DEVICES ........................................................................... 7
4.5 SELECT AND SIZE THE DISPOSAL SYSTEMS .................................................................................. 7
4.6 ANALYZE THE RESULTS AND ITERATE IF THE DESIGN IS NOT FEASIBLE OR PRACTICAL .... 7
4.7 DEVELOP THE REGISTER OF PRESSURE RELIEVING SYSTEMS ................................................. 7
5.0 GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................................. 7
6.0 CAUSES OF OVERPRESSURE ............................................................................................................... 9
6.1 GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 9
6.2 OPERATOR ERROR .............................................................................................................................. 9
6.3 UTILITY FAILURE .................................................................................................................................. 9
6.4 EMERGENCY CONDITIONS IN INTEGRATED PLANTS .................................................................... 9
6.5 INTERNAL EQUIPMENT BLOCKAGE .................................................................................................. 9
6.6 REVERSE FLOW ................................................................................................................................... 9
6.7 STARTUP, SHUTDOWN AND ALTERNATE OPERATIONS ............................................................. 10
6.8 INCREASED PLANT CAPACITY ........................................................................................................ 10
6.9 CLOSED OUTLETS ON VESSELS ..................................................................................................... 10
7.0 DETERMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL RELIEVING RATES ...................................................................... 10
7.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................................................ 10
7.2 UTILITY FAILURE ................................................................................................................................ 11
7.3 EXTERNAL FIRES ............................................................................................................................... 11
8.0 OPERATOR INTERVENTION CONSIDERATIONS ............................................................................... 12
9.0 RELIEF DESIGN FOR LETDOWN STATIONS ..................................................................................... 13
10.0 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING ......................................................................................................... 16
11.0 THERMAL RELIEF ............................................................................................................................... 17
12.0 VACUUM RELIEF ................................................................................................................................ 17
13.0 COLD SERVICE ................................................................................................................................... 17
14.0 CREDIT FOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS.......................................................... 18
15.0 PRESSURE VESSELS......................................................................................................................... 18
16.0 SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS ......................................................................................... 18
16.1 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION GENERAL .............................................................................. 18
16.2 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION AGAINST TUBE RUPTURE ..................................................... 19
16.3 OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION AGAINST LIQUID THERMAL EXPANSION ............................ 19
16.4 EXTERNAL FIRE CONDITION ........................................................................................................ 20
17.0 AIRCOOLED HEAT EXCHANGERS ................................................................................................. 20
18.0 ROTATING EQUIPMENT ..................................................................................................................... 20
19.0 PROCESS AND UTILITY PIPING ........................................................................................................ 21
20.0 PROCESS FIRED HEATERS .............................................................................................................. 21
21.0 ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANKS ................................................................................................... 22
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EP 3-7-1

Pressure Relieving System
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22.0 LPG STORAGE .................................................................................................................................... 22
23.0 PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE SELECTION GUIDELINES ................................................................. 22
23.1 CONVENTIONAL PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES ........................................................................... 22
23.2 BALANCED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES .................................................................................... 23
23.3 PILOT OPERATED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES ........................................................................ 24
23.4 PILOT ASSISTED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES .......................................................................... 24
23.5 RUPTURE DISKS ............................................................................................................................. 25
24.0 SIZING OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES ........................................................................................ 25
25.0 ISOLATION OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES ................................................................................. 26
26.0 LOCATION OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES ................................................................................. 26
27.0 INLET PIPING TO PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES ............................................................................. 26
28.0 DESIGN MEASURES TO REDUCE RELIEF LOADS ......................................................................... 26
29.0 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM DESIGN ........................................................ 27
30.0 TABLES ................................................................................................................................................ 29

APPENDIX A REVISION LOG ........................................................................................................................ 30

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1.0 SCOPE
1.1 (*)Industry standards and practices for the design of pressure relieving systems are undergoing
significant review and revision. This Practice will be revised when these reviews and revisions have
been finalized. As such, this Practice provides general guidance for the protection of pressured
systems against overpressure and is meant to be used in conjunction with all applicable BP
corporate practices. In case of conflicts between BP corporate practices and this Practice, the more
stringent requirement, as determined by the Owners Engineer, shall apply. This Practice applies to
refineries, steam generating plants and auxiliary equipment, storage installations and vacuum
systems.
1.2 Requirements for the design, inspection and testing of pressure relief valves and rupture disk
devices shall be in accordance with EP 5-3-14 and EP 5-3-15, respectively.
1.3 Pressure limiting instrumentation shall be in accordance with EP 3-7-4.
1.4 Selection, sizing and design of relief disposal systems shall be in accordance with EP 3-7-2.
1.5 Any deviation to this Practice shall be in accordance with the procedure given in EP 1-1-3
1.6 An asterisk (*) indicates that a decision by the Owner or the Owners Engineer is required or that
additional information is furnished by the Purchaser.
1.7 A Revision Bar indicates all changes made to this Revision.
2.0 REFERENCES
The latest edition of the following standards and publications are referred to herein.
STANDARDS & PUBLICATIONS

Site Technical Practi ces
EP 113 Deviations to Site Technical Practices
EP 372 Relief Disposal Systems
EP 373 Register of Pressure Relieving Systems
EP 374 Use of Protective Instrumentation in Pressure Relieving Systems
EP 511 General Piping Design
EP 5314 Pressure Relief Valves
EP 5315 Rupture Disk Devices
EP 562 Piping for Rotating Equipment
EP 564 Piping for Pressure Relief Systems
EP 568 Steam Tracing
EP 711 Pressure Vessels
EP 1121 Fireproofing
EP 1311 Power System Design Practices
EP 13121 Electrical Tracing

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STANDARDS & PUBLICATIONS (CONT.)
API Publications
STD 520 Part I Sizing, Selection and Installation of PressureRelieving Devices in
Refineries. Part I Sizing and Selection
RP 520 Part II Sizing, Selection and Installation of PressureRelieving Devices in
Refineries. Part II Installation
STD 521 Guide for PressureRelieving and Depressuring Systems
(ISO 23251)
STD 526 Flanged Steel PressureRelief Valves
STD 2000 Venting Atmospheric and LowPressure Storage Tanks. (Nonrefrigerated
(ISO 28300) and Refrigerated)
STD 2510 Design and Construction of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Installations
ASME Codes
Sec VIII Pressure Vessels, Division 1
Sec VIII Pressure Vessels, Alternative Rules, Division 2
B31.3 Process Piping
3.0 DEFINITIONS
3.1 Accumulation The pressure increase over the maximum allowable working pressure of a vessel
during discharge through the pressure relief valve. Expressed as a percentage of the maximum
allowable working pressure or in pounds per square inch.
3.2 Atmospheric Discharge The release of vapors and gases from pressure relieving and depressuring
devices to the atmosphere.
3.3 Back Pressure The pressure that exists at the outlet of the pressure relieving device because of
pressure in the discharge system (see also Builtup back pressure and Superimposed back
pressure).
3.4 Balanced Pressure Relief Valve A pressure relief valve that incorporates means for minimizing the
effect of back pressure on the performance characteristics, such as, opening pressure, closing
pressure, lift, and relieving capacity.
3.5 Blowdown The difference between the set pressure and the reseating pressure of a pressure relief
valve and is expressed as a percentage of the set pressure or in pounds per square inch.
3.6 Builtup Back Pressure The pressure in the discharge header that develops as a result of flow
after the pressure relief valve opens.
3.7 Burst Pressure The static differential pressure at which a rupture disk device functions.
3.8 ClosedBonnet Pressure Relief Valve A pressure relief valve whose spring is totally encased in a
metal housing. This housing protects the spring from corrosive agents in the environment and is a
means of collecting leakage around the stem or disk guide.
3.9 Closed Disposal System A disposal system that is capable of containing pressures different from
atmospheric pressure without leakage.
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3.10 Cold Differential Test Pressure Measured in psig, is the inlet static pressure at which the pressure
relief valve is adjusted to open on the test stand. This pressure includes the corrections for service
conditions of back pressure or temperature or both.
3.11 Contractor Company or business that agrees to furnish materials or perform specified services at a
specified price and/or rate to the Owner.
3.12 Conventional Pressure Relief Valve A closedbonnet Pressure Relief valve whose bonnet is
usually vented to the discharge side of the valve.
3.13 Design Pressure The pressure used in the design of a vessel to determine the minimum
permissible thickness or other physical characteristics of the different parts of the vessel.
3.14 Flare A means of safe disposal of waste gases by combustion.
3.15 Hazard Quantification A mathematical method that combines the expected frequency of
occurrence of an undesired event and the magnitude of the consequences of that event.
3.16 High Reliability Trip System - High reliability trip systems are those systems which are used in place
of relief systems, or are used to reduce their size. They are normally composed of multiple detectors
and shutdown valves with signal voting systems. They require a full reliability analysis and regular
testing under strict supervision.
3.17 LetDown Station A letdown station is a flow restriction where the upstream operating pressure is
greater than the downstream design pressure. It normally consists of an arrangement of control
valves, valves, and/or orifices plates. Less obvious situations include reverse flow through pumps or
nonreturn valves, utility connections to processes, drains to closed drain systems, and heat
exchanger tube failures.
3.18 Lift The actual travel of the disk away from the closed position when the valve is relieving.
3.19 Liquid Relief - Liquid entering a flare or other closed relief disposal system through a pressure relief
valve or rupture disc, either on its own or in association with gas or vapor relief streams.
3.20 Maximum Allowable Accumulated Pressure Measured in psig, is the sum of maximum allowable
working pressure and the allowable accumulation pressure.
3.21 Maximum Allowable Working Pressure Measured in psig, is the maximum gauge pressure
permissible at the top of a completed vessel in its operating position for a designated temperature.
The design pressure may be used in place of the maximum allowable working pressure in cases in
which calculations are not made to determine the value of the latter.
3.22 OpenBonnet Pressure Relief Valve A pressure relief valve whose spring is directly exposed to the
atmosphere through the bonnet or yoke.
3.23 Open Disposal System A disposal system that discharges directly from the pressure relieving
device to the atmosphere with no containment other than a short tail pipe.
3.24 Operating Pressure The pressure, measured in psig, to which the vessel is usually subjected in
service.
3.25 Overpressure Measured in psig, is the pressure increase over the set pressure of the primary
pressure relieving device. Overpressure is termed accumulation when the pressure relieving device
is set at the vessels maximum allowable working pressure. NOTE: When the set pressure of the
first (primary) pressure relief valve to open is less than the vessels maximum allowable working
pressure, the overpressure may be greater than the set pressure per the ASME Code, Section VIII,
Division 1, paragraph UG25.
3.26 Owner The Toledo Refinery.
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3.27 Owners Engineer A Toledo Refinery appointed engineer.
3.28 Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve A valve that has the major flow device combined with and
controlled by a selfactuated auxiliary pressure relief valve.
3.29 Pressure Relief Valves A generic term applied to relief valves, safety valves and safety relief
valves.
3.30 Pressure Relieving System An arrangement of the pressure relieving device, piping, and a means
of disposal intended for the safe relief, conveyance, and disposal of fluids in a vapor, liquid, or mixed
phase.
3.31 Protective Instrumentation Instrumentation provided to prevent losses of all kinds, particularly in
process upsets or emergencies, as distinct from instrumentation provided for normal control.
3.32 Purchaser The party placing a direct purchase order. The purchaser is the Owners designated
representative.
3.33 Reliability Analysis A mathematical technique for assessing in probability terms the performance of
a component or system.
3.34 Relief Valve An automatic pressure relief device actuated by the static pressure upstream of the
valve, which opens in proportion to the increase in pressure over the opening pressure. A relief
valve is used primarily for liquid service.
3.35 Relieving Conditions Used to indicate the inlet pressure and temperature of a pressure relieving
device at a specific overpressure. The relieving pressure is equal to the valve set pressure (or
rupture disk burst pressure) plus the overpressure.
3.36 Rupture Disk Device A device that is actuated by static differential pressure and is designed to
function by the bursting of a pressure retaining disk.
3.37 Safety Relief Valve Normally used in gas and vapor service or in liquid service, is an automatic
pressure relief device suitable for use as either a safety or a relief valve, depending on the
application.
3.38 Safety Valve Normally used in gas and vapor service or in steam and air service, is an automatic
pressure relieving device actuated by the static pressure upstream of the valve and characterized by
rapid full opening or pop action.
3.39 Set Pressure Measured in psig, is the inlet pressure at which the pressure relief device is adjusted
to open under service conditions. In a safety or safety relief valve in gas, vapor, or steam service,
the set pressure is the inlet pressure at which the valve pops under service conditions. In a relief or
safety relief valve in liquid service, the set pressure is the inlet pressure at which the valve starts to
discharge under service conditions.
3.40 Superimposed Back Pressure The static pressure that exists at the outlet of a pressure relief
device at the time the device is required to operate.
4.0 SUMMARY OF PRESSURE RELIEF DESIGN PROCEDURE
The essential steps in the design of pressure relieving systems are summarized in this Section.
Details of each step are given in other Sections of this Practice or other Practices as specified below.

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Pressure Relieving System
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4.1 Consideration and Listing of All Sources of Overpressure
All contingencies that may result in the overpressuring of equipment are considered, including
external fire exposure of equipment, utility failures, equipment failures and malfunctions, abnormal
processing conditions, thermal expansion, startup and shutdown, and operator error. Section 6.0
gives guidance as to the sources of overpressure that must be considered.
4.2 Split the Plant Into Easil y Handled Segments
Using the P&IDs (or PFDs if not prepared) the plant or unit should be divided into related
operational segments. Each segment should be small enough for the designer to track the impact of
an upset, but large enough so that the impacts are contained within the segments being reviewed.
4.3 Develop the Summary of Relief Loads Table
For each item of equipment in the segments, the overpressure cases to be considered should be
used to identify the required individual relief loads. Section 7.0 provides guidance in determining
relieving rates. The Summary of Relief Loads as described in EP 3-7-3 should be assembled during
this step.
4.4 Select and Size Individual Relief Devices
After the Summary of Relief Loads has been assembled, individual pressure relief devices are
selected and sized. Sections 23.0 and 24.0 give guidance on the selection and sizing of pressure
relief devices. Appendix D of API RP 520 Part 1 covers the requirements for sizing pressure relief
devices when the relief is a flashing twophase flow.
4.5 Select and Size the Di sposal Systems
From the Summary of Relief Loads, common failure cases such as utility failures or the fire case are
evaluated and the maximum relief requirement for each lead, lateral, subheader and main header of
the common relief system can be determined. EP 3-7-2 gives guidance on the sizing and selection of
the relief disposal system.
4.6 Anal yze the Results and Iterate if the Design is not Feasibl e or Practical
Once the pressure relief devices and disposal systems have been sized, there may be obvious
mechanical design problems, such as excessively large header piping. If they exist, then the
individual relief contributions should be examined in detail. Changes to the design, Section 28.0 of
this Practice, should be explored to reduce individual relief loads where possible.
4.7 Develop the Register of Pressure Reli eving Systems
The final step in relief system design is to fully summarize and document the important details of
the relief system per Section 29.0 of this Practice. EP 3-7-3 gives the requirements for the Register
of Pressure Relieving Systems.
5.0 GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
5.1 This Practice discusses the principal causes of overpressure in refinery equipment and describes
design procedures for minimizing the effects of these causes. Overpressure is the result of an
imbalance or disruption of the normal flows of material and energy that cause material or energy, or
both, to build up in some part of the system. Analysis of the causes and magnitudes of overpressure
is therefore a special and complex study of material and energy balances in a process system.
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5.2 Although efforts have been made to cover all major circumstances, the designer is cautioned not to
consider the conditions described as the only causes of overpressure. Any circumstance that
reasonably constitutes a hazard under the prevailing conditions for a system should be considered in
the design.
5.3 (*) The probability of two or more entirely unrelated failures occurring at the same time is unlikely and
need not normally be considered in design, except where the consequences are particularly serious.
In such cases the hazards shall be quantified by the Owners Engineer. Hazard and Operability
studies (HAZOP) and other formal Hazard Analysis techniques are recommended. Proposed design
measures for limiting the hazard shall be subject to approval by the Owners Engineer.
5.4 It is important that a differentiation be made between two unrelated simultaneous failures, and a
single failure that puts a demand upon a protective system which may itself already be in an
unrevealed failure state. The latter does not represent a multiple failure case, and shall be
considered in the design of the relief system. For example, should an air failure also cause a control
valve in a cooling circuit to close, then both the air failure and the loss of cooling are considered as
part of the same failure.
5.5 It is the intent to provide a safe and reliable relief system, with appropriate relief capacity, pressure
relief devices, alarms, and shutdown capabilities to automatically prevent overpressure beyond safe
limits for all credible upset scenarios that may occur. In some circumstances, such as liquid relief for
normally nonfilled systems, operator intervention might be appropriate action for the mitigation of a
relief scenario. For Operator intervention to be a consideration in the pressure relief system design,
it must be formally reviewed and approved on a casebycase basis as defined in Section 8.0 of this
Practice.
5.6 Since vessel design takes into account both temperature and pressure, the possibility that
departures from the normally expected operating temperature range may occur during emergencies
has to be recognized. In these circumstances, the allowable stress of construction materials may be
so much reduced that failure occurs at pressures below the set pressure of the pressure relief
device.
5.7 Overheating either due to process control failure or fire, or autorefrigeration from the presence of
light hydrocarbons are typical examples. These may require provision of temperaturelimiting
systems per EP 3-7-4 or emergency depressurizing systems per Section 10.0 in addition to the
pressure relieving systems.
5.8 Vessels and equipment connected together in a system may be considered as one unit and the
pressure relief valve system designed for the complete unit. In such cases, any block valves in the
immediate piping must be locked or carsealed open so that no vessel can be isolated from the
pressure relief devices while connected to its source of pressure.
5.9 The basis for overpressure protection described in this Technical Practice is the ASME Boiler and
Pressure Vessel Codes, the ASME B31.3 Code for Process Piping and the API Standards and
Recommended Practices for Pressure Relieving Systems. Compliance with these Codes and
Standards is a requirement, or is recognized as the equivalent of a requirement in many locations.
Where more stringent codes apply, the local requirements must be met. Therefore, local codes must
be checked to determine their requirements.

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6.0 CAUSES OF OVERPRESSURE
6.1 General
6.1.1 All anticipated emergency conditions leading to possible overpressure shall be taken into account
during the design of pressure relieving systems. The causes of overpressure to be considered shall
include, but not necessarily be limited to, those items listed in Sections 4 and 5 of API STD 521.
6.1.2 Additional guidance on the causes of overpressure is given in this Section.
6.2 Operator Error
Operator error is considered as a potential cause of overpressure, although contingencies of
operator error are generally not considered. The following are examples of operator error items
which are generally not included:
1) failure to remove blinds
2) vacuum due to blocking in of a steamed vessel during unit turnaround
3) bypassing of emergency devices
4) operating with a closed block valve under a pressure relief valve
5) gross misalignment of process flow during startup
6) inadvertent opening or closing of a locked or car sealed block valve.
6.3 Utility Failure
6.3.1 Failure of the utility supplies (e.g., electric power, cooling water, steam, instrument air or instrument
power, or fuel) to refinery plant facilities will in many instances result in emergency conditions with
potential for overpressuring equipment.
6.3.2 Interruptions of utility supply are considered only on a single contingency basis, corresponding to a
failure of a single component of the generation or distribution system of one utility. Consideration
must, however, be given to the direct effect of one utility on another. If a supply failure in one utility
system, as a result of a single contingency, results in a complete or partial loss of another inter
related utility, then the dual failure must be considered. For example, in a plant where electricity is
generated by steam turbine generators, loss of steam production may cause direct loss of power.
6.3.3 Failures are considered on a local basis, such as loss of utility supply to one equipment item, and on
a general basis, such as loss of supply to all consuming equipment in the process unit.
6.3.4 Evaluation of the effects of overpressure attributable to the loss of a particular utility supply must
include the chain of developments that could occur and the reaction time involved.
6.4 Emergency Conditions in Integrated Plants
In integrated plants, a process upset in one unit may have an effect on other units (e.g., loss of flow
of a pumparound which is used as a source of heat for reboiling other towers). All possibilities such
as these must be carefully considered and the potential for resulting overpressure evaluated.
6.5 Internal Equipment Blockage
Contingencies such as collapsed reactor bed vessel internals (e.g., fixedbed reactor grids, coked
catalyst beds, accumulation of catalyst fines, plugging of screens and strainers, lines blocked with
coke, etc.), should be considered to identify any overpressure situations that could result.
6.6 Reverse Flow
(*) Overpressure as a result of reverse flow from a highpressure system shall be considered. No
credit shall be taken for the presence of a nonreturn valve or steam trap in a line unless a hazard
quantification shows that the nonreturn valve, or trap, and the system have an acceptable failure
rate. The acceptable failure rate will be specified by the Owners Engineer.
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6.7 Startup, Shutdown and Al ternate Operations
Not only design steadystate conditions, but also startup, shutdown, washout, regeneration,
alternate feed stocks, blocked operations and other possible conditions must be evaluated for
overpressure protection.
6.8 Increased Plant Capacity
When increases in plant capacity are considered, the entire pressure relieving system should be
reevaluated in accordance with plant Management of Change procedures. For example, a unit
operating at 120% of design capacity may require additional pressure relieving capacity.
6.9 Closed Outlets on Vessel s
6.9.1 The inadvertent closure of an isolation or control valve on the outlet of a pressure vessel while the
plant is onstream may expose the vessel to a pressure that exceeds the vessels maximum
allowable working pressure.
6.9.2 The closed outlet overpressure case can be eliminated if the isolation valve is carsealed or chain
locked open, and strict management procedures are in place to prevent the unpermitted closure of
this valve.
6.9.3 The closing of the isolation valve must be logged in and out, and the consequences of closing the
valve clearly communicated to the operator at the time of closing.
6.9.4 Periodic inspection shall be made to insure that locked or carsealed open, isolation valves are in
their proper position. TABLE 9 of EP 3-7-3 can be used for this purpose.
7.0 DETERMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL RELIEVING RATES
7.1 General
7.1.1 This section provides guidance for determining relieving rates of individual pressure relief devices.
Sizing of pressure relief devices shall be in accordance with Section 24.0 of this Practice.
7.1.2 Guidance for determining the relief loads associated with relief disposal systems and the sizing of
relief disposal systems is given in EP 3-7-2
7.1.3 Calculation of the quantity and properties of any vapor or liquid to be discharged under relief
conditions shall be completed on the basis of a knowledge of the complete operating system,
including process conditions, instrumentation, and utility systems. Reference should be made to API
STD 521 Section 5 for guidance on general principles, but calculation must be specific to the system
under consideration.
7.1.4 In particular the following conditions shall be considered (Paragraph references within parentheses
are in accordance with API STD 521):
1) Changes in feedstock or other process conditions.
2) The effect of a very large capacity source such as a wellhead or long pipeline.
3) Properties of process fluids under relief conditions (paragraph 5.3). For example, blockages
may occur due to freezing or hydrate formation.
4) Effect of closed outlets (paragraph 5.5).
5) Failure of automatic controls (paragraph 5.10). The possible failure of instrument systems shall
be taken into consideration, including all trip systems. Modern instrument systems may rely on
distributed shared loop systems. When this is the case, the possibility of simultaneous failure of
more than one control loop shall be considered.
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6) Utility failure (paragraph 5.6). Note that the designer shall not assume partial cooling water
failure (paragraph 4.3.6) unless it can be shown that all cooling water exchangers continue to
receive water when part of the cooling water pumping capacity is lost. Note that partial utility
failure can be worse than total utility failure.
7) Runaway chemical reaction (paragraph 5.13).
8) External fire (paragraph 5.15).
7.1.5 (*) If there is any change in the design conditions that could result in an additional cause of
overpressure, calculations for the revised conditions shall be carried out by the Contractor, and
submitted for approval by the Owners Engineer, to ensure that the Owners requirements for
overpressure protection are fully met. In the case of a modification to a relief system, they shall be in
accordance with plant Management of Change procedures.
7.1.6 It shall be recognized that a change in a control system design or philosophy could necessitate a
corresponding change in the design of an overpressure protection system. The following are
examples of this situation.
1) Replacing a system of a single control loop integrity by a shared control loop system.
2) Optimization linking control loops in a manner not considered in the original design.
3) Changing control valve trim size, or the removal or repositioning of limit stops.
4) Changes in protective instrumentation systems.
7.2 Utility Failure
In situations where fluid flow stops due to failure of its utility supply, but is in parallel with equipment
having a different energy source, credit may be taken for the unaffected and functioning equipment
to the extent that operation is maintained and the operating equipment will not trip out due to
overloading.
7.3 External Fires
7.3.1 Pressure relief devices shall be provided for the fire relief condition on all vessels and equipment that
can be subjected to a sustained external fire. Calculation methods shall be in accordance with API
520 Parts I and II, API 521 and the additional requirements given in this Practice.
7.3.2 In calculating fire loads from individual vessels, vapor is assumed to be generated by fire exposure
and heat transfer to contained liquids at operating conditions. For determining pressure relief valve
capacity for several interconnected vessels, each vessel should be calculated separately, rather than
determining the heat input on the basis of the summation of the total wetted surfaces of all vessels.
Vapors generated by normal process heat input are not considered.
7.3.3 No credit is taken for any escape path for fire load vapors other than through the pressure relief
valve (which may be a common relief valve for more than one connected vessel), nor is credit
allowed for reduction in the fire load by the continued functioning of condensers or coolers.
7.3.4 In order to determine the total vapor capacity to be relieved when several vessels are exposed to a
single fire, a processing area is considered as being divided into a number of single fire zones. EP 3-
7-2gives requirements for establishing fire zones and for determining relief loads for relief disposal
systems based on the fire case.
7.3.5 When a fire occurs, it is assumed that all fluid flow to and from the fire zone has been stopped.
Therefore, flow loads such as control valve failure or incoming feed streams are not additive to the
fire load. Credit is not generally given to flow out through normal channels, since they could also be
blocked during the fire emergency.
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7.3.6 Pressure relief devices shall be provided for the fire relief conditions on all equipment that can be
subjected to an external fire. A pressure relief device is usually not required for protection against
fire on any vessel which normally contains little or no liquid, since failure of the shell from
overheating would occur even if a pressure relief device were provided. In these cases,
consideration should be given to the use of emergency depressuring systems as described in
Section 10.0 of this Practice.
7.3.7 For liquid filled systems, the initial relieving rates correspond to hydraulic expansion. However, this
rate is valid for a limited time, after which the vapor generation will become the determining
contributor in the sizing of the pressure relief device. If it can be shown that an effective fire fighting
response can be made before the liquid reaches its boiling point, then the pressure relief device
need only be sized for the hydraulic expansion case.
8.0 OPERATOR INTERVENTION CONSIDERATIONS
8.1 Occasionally, a clear case can be made that a relief incident could be mitigated if an operator
intervened to cut feed, reduce heat input, etc. Any design incorporating Operator intervention shall
be formally evaluated on a casebycase basis to ensure it is safe and operable under subject
conditions. Per API STD 521, Section 5.4: The decision to take credit for operator response in
determining maximum relieving conditions requires consideration of those who are responsible for
operation and an understanding of the consequences of an incorrect action. A commonly accepted
time range for the response is between 10 minutes and 30 minutes, depending on the complexity of
the plant. The effectiveness of this response depends on the process dynamics.
8.2 Operator intervention, to prevent an incident from resulting in a relief case, may be considered only if
all of the following conditions are met:
8.2.1 The design and operation of the subject system complies with all pertinent sections of the ASME
Code, OSHA Standards, API, as well as Local, State and Federal Rules and Regulations.
8.2.2 At least two standalone, independent alarms are provided to clearly identify the potential conditions.
Additionally:
1) Instrumentation, not involved in the initiating incident, will clearly advise the Operator of the
incident.
2) Each alarm is easily recognizable by the Operator, both visibly and audibly, during all plant
operations.
3) Procedures are established to routinely verify that the alarms, and associated devices, are
functional and reliable. The devices will be included on the Critical Instrumentation List.
8.2.3 Relief will not occur for at least 10 to 30 minutes after the second alarm condition.
8.2.4 The Operator must be able to promptly correct the relief-causing incident or cut off sources of
overpressure before the 10 to 30 minute interval has elapsed.
8.2.5 Where Operator intervention is expected, such alarm indication and specific action required must be
clearly identified in the Unit Operating Procedures and training program.
8.2.6 The required response must be simple, direct and performed from one location. Credit should never
be taken for multiple actions, sequences or actions taken at two or more locations. If there is any
question about the ability of the Operator to properly interpret an incident and make a prompt and
effective response, then no credit should be taken for Operator intervention.
8.2.7 The relief analysis shall clearly identify the specific consequences of no operator intervention,
including calculating the actual time required to reach overflow and/or overpressure conditions
beyond the second alarm indication.
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8.2.8 A process hazards analysis (PHA) review is required for any pressure
relief system design that incorporates Operator intervention. The proposed
design, operating philosophy and PHA will also require the approval of the
Operations Supervisor and the Owner's Engineer.
8.2.9 When credit for Operator intervention is taken in accordance with this Section, it shall be
documented in the Register of Pressure Relieving Systems (or equal), in accordance with EP 3-7-3.
9.0 RELIEF DESIGN FOR LETDOWN STATIONS
9.1 This Section governs the general requirements for the protection of downstream facilities from the
effects of breakthrough of high pressure fluids at a letdown station. Examples include the low
liquid level control valves on high pressure gas/liquid separators, and steam pressure
reducing/desuperheating stations.
9.2 In considering process systems where fluids pass through a letdown station, as defined above,
from a high pressure system to a low pressure system, the low pressure system must be fully
protected from overpressure. Relief devices should be sized to take into account the fluid conditions
and all undesirable circumstances in the operation of the letdown station.
9.3 Design for Gas Breakthrough: The circumstances should include all valves across the letdown
station being open and gas breakthrough in liquid systems. Any bypass valves across the station
should be assumed to be fully open and not simply to have the equivalent opening to normal process
operation. This latter requirement may require smaller bypass valves or restriction orifices (in the
case of existing plants) to be installed consistent with normal process flows. A detailed description of
how to design for gas breakthrough is given in paragraph 9.16 of this Practice.
9.4 Design for Liquid Overfill
9.4.1 In addition to the gas breakthrough case, the opening of the letdown valve from the normal, liquid
containing, operating situation could displace the high pressure vessel liquid inventory into the low
pressure vessel. If this occurrence could cause overfilling of the low pressure vessel, when starting
from normal operating levels, then full liquid relief capacity will also need to be provided from the low
pressure vessel. This can take either of the following forms:
1) Full liquid relief capacity shall be provided, together with suitable means of disposing and holding
a sufficient quantity of liquid.
2) A high reliability trip shall be provided to stop further liquid inflow a sufficient time before the
equipment space is filled.
9.4.2 In addition, normal process trips to reduce the frequency of demand on these ultimate safety
systems are a sensible precaution.
9.5 Operating Conditions: The designer shall consider the full range of operating conditions from
purging, through prestartup and startup procedures to shutdown, regeneration and gas freeing.
If there is a range of operating conditions, then the extreme case must be used in the calculation.
The calculation of gas flow where gas breakthrough is possible should be based on gas at the
normal operating conditions and properties, unless it is known that there are situations, for example
at startup, where more arduous conditions are possible.
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9.6 Control Valve Sizing: In designing the relief system, the size of the letdown valves is one of the
limiting factors. It is vital that the installed valve size is reflected in the relief calculations and that the
basis is clearly defined. Since the control valve trim size and the size of any orifice plate in the
bypass are central to the relief case, this data should be listed with the pressure relief valve data as
part of the relief system and should not be changed without appropriate resizing calculations in
accordance with EP 3-7-3. In new plant design, control valve definition often comes late in the
program. Relief valve checks must be made after control valve selection.
9.7 Credit for Normal Outlets: The HAZOP approach, is needed to specify the operating scenarios under
which relief conditions including gas breakthrough could occur. Among these conditions there
normally will be one scenario, for example at startup, where the normal outlets in downstream
equipment will be blocked, preventing any credit being allowed for the flow through these outlets.
9.8 Credit for Operator Intervention: In the design of relief systems on letdown stations in either vapor
or liquid relieving situations, no credit shall be taken for operator intervention on the process plot.
9.9 Credit for Instrumentation: Where conventional design leads to an impractical or grossly uneconomic
solution, for example offshore or pipelines, then a high reliability protective instrumentation system
may be considered as an alternative to providing liquid relief. Consideration should be given to
minimizing the frequency and extent of the operation of relief valves. Any instrumentation (which is
not high reliability) used for this purpose shall not contribute to a reduction in the design capacity of
the relief system.
9.10 Design for Multiple J eopardy: Relief design philosophy has considered, and still considers that it is
unrealistic to design systems for simultaneous occurrence of two unrelated emergency conditions.
The application of the thought processes included in the HAZOP approach often identifies that
conditions which might otherwise be considered as separate have, in fact, a common cause. Such
identification requires these conditions to be included in the design.
9.11 Bypass Sizes and Restrictors
9.11.1 Where existing units need to be modified to meet the requirements of this Practice, the options
available for change are:
1) To remove the bypass
2) To install smaller bypass valves
3) To add restriction orifices
4) To lock the bypass valves closed
9.11.2 The options listed above are in descending order of acceptability.
9.11.3 All restriction devices shall be placed on a Preventative Maintenance program that monitors wear to
ensure that downstream overpressure protection is not compromised.
9.12 Temperature Effects: Since there can be appreciable temperature effects when hydrocarbon gases
are reduced in pressure, the significance of these temperature changes need to be considered in
both pressure relief valve sizing and the suitability of the materials of construction.
9.13 Interconnecting Pipework: Normally in design, pipework lengths and valve sizes are such that the
flow is determined by pressure drop through the valve rather than through the piping. However, this
is not necessarily so in all retrofit cases and checks should be made. Where credit is to be taken for
the influence of piping pressure drops, the relevant data needs to be recorded in the Register of
Pressure Relieving Systems as described in EP 3-7-3.

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9.14 Documentation: For LetDown Stations the Register shall include as a minimum:
1) A list of all the relief valves with their size, type, set pressure and design capacity. In addition,
the relief summary table (see EP 3-7-3) should be completed for new plants and provided for
existing plants on a selected basis.
2) A list specifying the data pertinent to a letdown station. This should include the size, type and
fully open flow coefficient of the limiting valves or orifices in every route between the high and
low pressure systems.
3) High reliability trip system data. For each system it should include a schematic with every
component specified together with the testing frequency and a reference to the study report
which defines the systems reliability.
4) Where credit is to be taken for the pressure drop in interconnecting pipework to reduce the gas
flow for the gas breakthrough situation, then the pipe lengths, diameters and fittings shall be
included.
9.15 All modifications to letdown stations shall be reviewed in accordance with the plant by a
Management of Change Procedure.
9.16 How To Design For Gas Breakthrough
9.16.1 To calculate the amount of gas breakthrough from a high pressure system to a low pressure system
with the letdown valve fully open, the high pressure system should be assumed to be at its normal
operating pressure and temperature and with its normal molecular weight gas. These values should
be modified if there is a known condition; for example, circulation during startups, where distinctly
different values prevail. Particular effort should be made to ensure that all possible operating
conditions have been considered.
9.16.2 The Cg (the valve sizing coefficient for gas) of the actual letdown valve(s) and any bypass valves in
their fully open position should be determined (Control valves have different loss/flow coefficients for
gas or liquid flow and since the valve will have been installed and sized for liquid, it may be
necessary to contact the Manufacturer for the information). With this data the Manufacturers
equation for gas flow can be used to calculate the volume flow between the high pressure system
operating pressure and the low pressure system relieving pressure.
9.16.3 In addition to the gas breakthrough case, thought needs to be given to the effect of displacement of
large quantities of liquid from the high pressure system and piping into the low pressure system. If
the low pressure system gas space is not large enough to accommodate this liquid then the pressure
relief valves and relief lines need to be sized to accept this liquid.
9.16.4 It should be noted that where manual bypasses are installed around the letdown valve they are
often much larger than the control valve. Therefore, the gas flow by this route could be several times
greater than through the control valve alone, requiring a corresponding increase in relief capacity.
The gas flow should be calculated on the basis of all control valves and the bypass valve being open
simultaneously. Since it is unlikely that such a large extra flow capacity is needed operationally, it is
sensible to reduce the flow possible through the bypass by removing the valve, modifying the valve
size or installing a restriction orifice. Having determined the quantity of material which can be
presented to the low pressure system, it is first necessary to check the capability of the existing or
intended pressure relief valve to cope with the flow. In many existing cases it will be found that the
pressure relief valve(s) is not sized for this case.
9.16.5 If a larger pressure relief valve is needed, a check must also be made to determine if the relief valve
inlet and outlet piping is adequately sized.
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9.16.6 This relief case may not be concurrent with other relief flows. In this case, pressure drop calculations
only need to consider the one case. It is a Code requirement that the size of the relief line is not
smaller than the pressure relief valve discharge flange. If other systems may relieve concurrently
into the same downstream pipework as a result of a common cause failure, for example, upon utility
failure, then the resultant total relief load must be taken into consideration.
9.16.7 Typically for refinery process plants, the low pressure system will have a design pressure of at least
100 psig for a conventional pressure relief valve or 45 psig for a balanced bellows pressure relief
valve.
9.16.8 It is worth noting that the discharge lines should slope continuously to the Knock Out Drum to
prevent liquid accumulations which would increase the pressure drop significantly. If liquid can
accumulate on the discharge side of a pressure relief valve it will increase the pressure at which the
valve will lift, perhaps endangering the vessel.
9.16.9 The answer to the choice of disposal route for the relief (to flare or blowdown) must depend on the
most practical individual solution. Since the gas breakthrough case may not be coincident with other
relief flows, there will normally be adequate flare capacity. Thus it would be the first choice for
consideration. In newer units there will normally be a large enough line feeding the flare close
enough to the low pressure system to make the cost of this route relatively low.
10.0 EMERGENCY DEPRESSURING
10.1 Means for emergency depressuring may be necessary in certain conditions. These include:
1) Potentially uncontrollable reaction conditions where rapid depressuring systems will be more
effective than normal pressure relief devices, in other words, pressure relief valves and rupture
discs.
2) Uncontrolled temperature rises that could lead to possible equipment failure at or below the
equipment design pressure.
3) Fire conditions, where the equipment is uncooled by process liquid contact, again leading to
failure at or below the equipment design pressure.
4) Units operating at a pressure above 1000 psig.
5) Specific requirements that are identified in a Process Hazards Analysis.
10.2 (*) Instrumentation shall be provided to sense potentially hazardous conditions, and initiate the
necessary corrective action. Failure modes of the instrumentation shall be considered, and a formal
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis report shall be prepared. Information on Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis shall be provided by the Owners Engineer.
10.3 In calculating the capacity of a depressuring system, it shall be assumed that during a fire there is no
feed to or product from a system, and that all normal heat inputs have ceased.
10.4 (*) The autorefrigeration effect of depressuring shall be considered in accordance with EP 5-1-1
and EP 7-1-1. Calculation procedures for estimating the temperature of vessels and pipework are
subject to the approval of the Owners Engineer.
10.5 The ability of existing or proposed flare disposal systems to accommodate depressuring loads shall
be checked before continuing the design of the system. The designer shall also consider coincident
relief loads on a common flare disposal system. EP 3-7-2 gives the requirements for the design of
relief disposal systems.

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11.0 THERMAL RELIEF
11.1 Thermal relief is not normally required in short isolatable sections of piping within battery limits.
However, liquid lines that can be blockedin during normal operation while subject to heat input from
external sources shall have thermal relief valves if the increase in fluid pressure will increase
pressures beyond those permitted by the relevant piping design code. Section 19.0 gives additional
information related to thermal relief of process piping.
11.2 Thermal relief shall be provided on equipment where fluid can be trapped between inlet and outlet
valves and where sufficient heat can be supplied to the fluid to increase the pressure above the
equipment design pressure. Such equipment shall include fired heaters, heat exchangers, vessels,
pumps and compressors. Additional information for thermal relief protection of various pieces of
equipment are given in Sections 14.4 through 22.0 of this Practice.
11.3 Thermal relief is not required to protect blockedin piping or equipment where the isolation block
valves are sealed or locked open during operation, closed only under permit and managed in
accordance with paragraph 6.9 of this Practice.
11.4 Where relief is to the process, the thermal relief valves shall discharge to a location that is always
capable of absorbing the relieved material. The location of other valves and their possible positions
at the time of discharge of the thermal relief valve shall be taken into account.
11.5 The sizing of the thermal relief shall assume that:
1) The fluid is initially at the most severe operating conditions.
2) The ratio of gas, vapor and liquid is the most severe of the predicted design conditions over the
life of the plant for the assumed flow, pressure and temperature.
3) Pumps and compressors on the process fluid continue to operate unless there is an automatic
shutdown initiated by the blockingin, for example, on low flow. Relief devices on pumps and
compressors and kickback systems will operate. Nonreturn valves will be effective in stopping
the flow.
4) Heat input will continue at the design operating rate. Where temperature sensors are located so
that the blocking of the process flow will give a low temperature at the sensor, then the heat
input will be the maximum possible. This will be based on the maximum flow of fuel to fired
heaters or of heating medium to the other equipment. Control valves on heater fuel or heating
fluids will be assumed to be fully open.
5) Where thermal relief valves discharge into a closed system the effects of backpressure shall be
considered.
12.0 VACUUM RELIEF
12.1 The possible need for vacuum relief on all vessels and systems shall be considered. Suitable
protection may be provided by vacuumbreaking systems, inert (noncondensable) blanketing
systems, etc. The basis of protection shall be included in the documentation required by Section
29.0.
12.2 As an alternative to providing vacuum relief, pressured equipment may be designed for full vacuum
conditions.
13.0 COLD SERVICE
13.1 Where autorefrigeration or freezing of released vapors may occur, for example, from low
temperature storage of methane to butane hydrocarbons, fluorocarbons or other low boiling
materials, the pressure relief device and downstream disposal system shall be constructed of
materials suitable for the minimum temperature encountered.
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13.2 Any nonflammable, nontoxic liquefied gas, for example, CO
2
, capable of forming solid particles on
discharge, shall be vented directly to atmosphere with no piping downstream of the pressure relief
device, except as required to ensure personnel safety.
13.3 Where the discharging process fluid may result in ice formation such as to prevent the reclosing of a
valve, the valve shall be heated and insulated as necessary per EP 5-6-8 and EP 13-12-1.
14.0 CREDIT FOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMS
14.1 (*) Pressure relief devices shall be provided for protection of individual equipment items or sections
of process plants, taking no credit for any provision of protective instrumentation systems, except in
special circumstances which will be subject to approval by the Owners Engineer. Examples of such
circumstances are:
1) Where there is no practical location to which relief can be discharged.
2) For protection against internal explosion.
3) For protection against uncontrolled chemical reaction.
4) Highly toxic, nonflammable material.
14.2 When credit is taken for protective instrumentation systems, they shall be Category 1 in accordance
with EP 3-7-4 and included in the Register of Pressure Relieving Systems (see EP 3-7-3).
14.3 Protective instrumentation used in lieu of pressure relief capacity shall be in accordance with the
additional requirements ASME Code, Section VIII, paragraph UG-140.
14.4 Guidance on the use of protective instrumentation systems is given in EP 3-7-4
15.0 PRESSURE VESSELS
15.1 To satisfy the requirements of Section VIII, Division 1 or 2 of the ASME Code, the pressure relief
device set pressure, or lowest set pressure in the case of multiple devices, shall not be greater than
the vessel design pressure, or maximum allowable working pressure, if applicable (see Table 1).
15.2 (*) Where intermediate isolation valves are provided in process lines for maintenance purposes to be
used only during plant shutdown, they may be taken as locked open, subject to approval by the
Owners Engineer. In this case, relief capacity need not be provided between the isolation valves.
The isolation valves shall be car sealed or locked open, and managed per paragraph 6.9 of this
Practice to prevent the unpermitted closure of this valve. If applicable to an exchanger, both sides
shall be vented and drained immediately after isolation. Note that this paragraph does not apply to
the isolation of pressure relief devices, which is covered by Section 25.0
15.3 Isolation valves in process lines shall be positioned so that the gates cannot fall and block or restrict
the line.
16.0 SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGERS
16.1 Overpressure Protection General
16.1.1 In exchanger systems consisting of more than one shell, both shell or tube sides interconnected
without intermediate isolation valves may be considered as single systems for the purpose of
overpressure protection design, except where severe fouling could occur.
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16.1.2 Overpressure conditions to be considered shall include all the possibilities set out in API STD 521
Section 4, and any other specific plant emergency condition. In particular the blockedin and burst
tube conditions shall be allowed for, together with any implications of more gradual tube leakage.
These overpressure conditions shall be met by designing for pressure containment whenever this is
economical.
16.1.3 Where tube failure produces the controlling relief case, the process design should be reconsidered to
check if it is economical to eliminate the relieving requirement, for example, by rerating the design
pressure of the lowpressure side of the exchanger so that the design test pressure equals the
design pressure of the highpressure side (see API STD 521).
16.1.4 In assessing the behavior of steam and cooling water systems for the burst tube and external fire
conditions, the following should be noted.
16.1.4.1 On steam systems, any inlet nonreturn valves or downstream steam traps, shall be taken as
equivalent to closed valves, i.e, the steam side is completely blocked in.
16.1.4.2 On cooling water systems, although a downstream pressure escape route may normally be open,
any isolation valves in it shall be regarded as closed in emergency, for example, particularly if light
flammable fluid is found to be leaking into a cooling water system. Accordingly in such cases, these
systems should normally be regarded as blockedin.
16.2 Overpressure Protection Against Tube Rupture
16.2.1 When required for a tube rupture scenario, pressure relief valves or rupture disks shall be located on
the shell or channel of the exchanger so as to discharge the minimum volume of fluid from the low
pressure side. For example, for single pass exchangers with high pressure in the tubes, this
connection shall be located near the top center of a horizontal shell. For high pressure in the shell,
the connection shall be located near the top center of the channel or the piping.
16.2.2 The design of a coil fitted into a vessel or a tank shall also take into consideration the burst tube
condition.
16.2.3 A complete single tube failure shall be taken for design purposes, with calculation in accordance with
API STD 521, Paragraph 5.19.3. Note that this specific case is regarded as sufficiently infrequent
such that relief protection to meet it is not required unless the resulting pressure on the lowpressure
side of the exchanger, and the associated pipework and equipment, could exceed the hydrostatic
test pressure, not the design pressure (API STD 521 Paragraph 5.19.2).
16.2.4 The possibility that the lowpressure side may have the capacity to handle the leakage without
unacceptable overpressure shall be taken into consideration. Valves provided only for isolation may
be assumed open unless their closure can be regarded as directly associated with operator action
after detection of the tube failure. Control valves may be assumed to maintain their normal operating
functions, and the effect of this on the flows to be relieved shall be taken into consideration.
16.2.5 Where the high pressure side operating pressure is more than twice the low pressure side
hydrostatic test pressure, a check shall be made as to whether the relief device response time is fast
enough to relieve the resultant material.
16.3 Overpressure Protection Against Liquid Thermal Expansion
16.3.1 Pressure relief devices for thermal expansion of trapped liquid contents shall be provided on heat
exchangers in the form of thermal relief valves which discharge back into the process, see Section
10.0 of this Practice.
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16.3.2 A heat exchanger shall be provided with a pressure relief device for thermal expansion if the cold
side can be blocked in between inlet and outlet valves with flow on the hot side. For cold side
temperature greater than 250 F, a relief valve shall be placed on the hot side to prevent
overpressure during startup or shutdown.
16.4 External Fi re Condition
16.4.1 Pressure relief capacity shall be provided on heat exchangers for the external fire condition on both
sides where they can be isolated without draining while the plant is operating, if in an area where a
fire could be sustained. This applies even if the exchangers are designed for pressure containment.
16.4.2 Sizing for the shellside shall be in accordance with API STD 520 Part I. Sizing for the tube side shall
be based on the recalculated heat transfer rate from the hot shell side fluid to the static boiling liquid
in the tubes.
16.4.3 On watercooled exchangers with the hot fluid on the shell side, pressure relief devices need not
necessarily be sized for steam formation if the maximum temperature of the shell fluid is below the
boiling point of water at the tube side design pressure. However, relief capacity shall be made
available for any steam generated by heat input into the channel and/or bonnet, possibly through
pressure relief valves provided for thermal relief.
16.4.4 For high boilingpoint liquids, vaporization due to external fire may not need to be considered per
paragraph 7.3.7 of this Practice. However, pressure relief devices for thermal expansion should be
provided. Consideration should be given to the thermal decomposition of high boiling point liquids
during a fire.
16.4.5 Where chemical cleaning is required on a routine basis during normal operation, pressure relief
devices for the fire condition shall be sized not only for the normal process fluid but also for water, to
represent a chemical cleaning fluid.
17.0 AIRCOOLED HEAT EXCHANGERS
17.1 Because of their large surface area, aircooled heat exchangers are capable of absorbing large
quantities of heat during a fire. However, because of their relatively small capacity, the high
calculated maximum rates of vapor release can only be sustained for approximately one to two
minutes, and in the case of free draining condensers, there is only a very small liquid holdup.
17.2 The use of isolation valves between the aircooled heat exchanger and associated vessels should
be avoided. The relief capacity on such vessels shall be checked to ensure that it is adequate for
the fire condition of the exchanger.
17.3 Where vessels are located below aircooled heat exchangers, for example in modular plant
construction, the intermediate floor shall be of solid construction, sloped and drained so that it will not
provide liquid holdup to sustain a fire. The pressure relief devices should then be sized on the
basis of hot air passing over the air cooler exchanger tubes.
17.4 If fire relief is to be provided for aircooled heat exchangers, the relief orifice area shall be calculated
by one of the methods given in API STD 520 Part 1.
18.0 ROTATING EQUIPMENT
Pressure relief valve requirements for rotating equipment and piping associated with rotating
equipment shall be in accordance with EP 5-6-2.

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19.0 PROCESS AND UTILITY PIPING
19.1 The pressure relief devices for process and utility piping should preferably be set at the design
pressure as defined in ASME B31.3, but in no case shall the pressure setting exceed the allowances
for variations from normal operating conditions permitted by ASME B31.3, or the maximum design
pressure of the weakest component in the system.
19.2 Each section of liquidfilled piping which can be isolated between two block valves will be examined
for the need to be protected from excessive pressure buildup due to thermal expansion of the
trapped liquid in the following cases:
1) Where the piping is heat traced.
2) Where the piping handles a liquid below atmospheric temperature.
3) Long lines (dock lines, etc.) operating at or near atmospheric temperatures which might be
blocked in and heated due to an increase in atmospheric temperature or solar radiation.
19.3 Protection against liquid thermal expansion shall be provided on sections of piping 100 feet or more
in length which can be blocked in by metal seated valves, and all volumes which can be blocked in
by softsealed valves. Protection shall be provided by an NPS 3/4 inch thermal relief pressure
relief valve set to relieve at 133% of the MAWP of the pipe. As an alternative, a bypass and check
valve may be installed around the block valve where leakage through the check valve is acceptable.
19.4 (*) When approved by the Owners Engineer, excessive pressure buildup in piping may be prevented
by drilling a 1/4 inch diameter hole through the flapper of a check valve (for example in pump
discharge piping). A hole of this size is usually too small to allow enough fluid to pass to cause
pump reversal; however, a careful process study of the piping system is required in each case to
determine the adequacy of this method. When a check valve flapper is drilled in this manner, the
valve shall be identified with a stainless steel tag attached to the valve body with a stainless steel
wire. The tag shall be steel stamped with 1/4inchhigh letters as follows: Flapper Contains 1/4
inch Hole for Thermal Expansion.
19.5 A pressure relief valve shall be provided to protect any piping section which might be overpressured
from any process or utility flow into the section during conditions of test, operation, or downtimes.
The weakest element of the piping section must be protected (for example, an expansion joint).
20.0 PROCESS FIRED HEATERS
20.1 The coil of any furnace where the process flow can be stopped by inadvertent closure of a valve in
the furnace outlet (operator error) is subject to potential overpressure and tube failure due to
overheating and consequent reduction in allowable stress. Unless such mechanisms of flow
interruption (arising for a single contingency) can be effectively eliminated, the furnace must be
provided with a pressure relief valve on the coil outlet. In these applications, a pressure relief valve
functions by ensuring continuity of flow through the coil as well as by limiting the maximum pressure.
It is therefore essential that the feed system be capable of providing the necessary flow at the
pressure relief valve relieving conditions.
20.2 Overpressure and tube failure may also result from valve closure on the inlet side of a furnace, or
from feed pump failure, if the coil remains pressurized by downstream equipment. In these cases,
however, overpressure occurs at or below the normal operating pressure (due to overheating at no
flow conditions), and a pressure relief valve cannot provide the necessary protection. The design
features required to prevent furnace tube overheating and subsequent overpressure are as follows:
20.2.1 Low flow alarms, fuel cutout on loss of process flow, and furnace feed reliability should be provided.
The low flow alarm and fuel cutout will provide some protection against coil failure due to overheating
from loss of feed or closure of an inlet block valve.
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20.2.2 Control valves in furnace inlets should fail open, or remain stationary and drift to the open position,
on actuating medium or signal failure, to prevent coil overheating.
20.2.3 If a block valve is installed in the furnace inlet, a pressure relief valve is not required and this valve
need not be carsealed or locked open. However, if handoperated valves or control valves are
provided in each inlet pass to provide for feed distribution in a multipass furnace, protection against
the loss of flow in any one pass should be provided by:
1) A limit stop or open bypass around each valve, so that flow cannot be completely interrupted.
The limit stops or bypasses should be sized to pass at least 25% of the design flow rate to that
pass.
2) A flow indicator on each pass, with a low flow alarm. The low flow alarm and fuel cutout should
be set to operate when the flow falls to 25% of the design flow rate.
20.2.4 If a pressure relief valve is provided on the furnace feed line, the valve should be located upstream
of the orifice which senses low furnace feed flow and actuates the fuel cutout, so that the fuel will be
cut out in case the furnace should be blocked at the outlet.
21.0 ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANKS
Pressure relieving arrangements for storage tanks to operate at or near atmospheric pressure shall
be in accordance with API STD 2000.
22.0 LPG STORAGE
Pressure and vacuum relieving devices for LPG storage applications are stipulated in API STD 2510,
Section 5.
23.0 PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE SELECTION GUIDELINES
23.1 Conventional Pressure Relief Valves
23.1.1 Conventional type valves are suitable for operation under any of the following conditions;
1) Backpressures (superimposed and builtup) are constant.
2) Superimposed backpressure is less than 5% and builtup backpressure is less than 10% of
the set pressure when operating with 10% overpressure.
3) Superimposed backpressure is less than 12% and builtup backpressure is less than 20% of
the set pressure when operating with 20% overpressure.
23.1.2 The most frequent applications of conventional type valves are as follows:
1) For discharge to atmosphere through short tailpipes.
2) Where set pressures are high.
3) Where discharging to a low pressure manifold system.
23.1.3 Constant back pressure may be experienced when the relief stream is returned to some other part of
the process; in this case conventional type valves are preferred. Constant back pressures are never
experienced when discharging to a closed system. Conventional type valves therefore have limited
application where relief streams are discharged to a closed system, since the back pressures the
valves can safely relieve against are limited to relatively low levels. Conventional type pressure relief
valves should only be used for atmospheric relief or for high set pressures, and within the limitations
of the particular manufacturers design.
23.1.4 In all cases the back pressure must not exceed the maximum pressure rating on the outlet side of
the conventional valve (refer to API STD 526 or Manufacturers data).
23.1.5 Conventional type pressure relief valves shall be in accordance with EP 5-3-14.
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23.1.6 (*) For flammable service, or for toxic service as defined by the Owners Engineer, bonnets of
conventional type pressure relief valves shall be vented to the discharge side of the valve.
23.1.7 Since the back pressure on the discharge side of a conventional type pressure relief valve may affect
both its opening pressure and flow characteristics, the effect of back pressure shall always be
determined by reference to the particular Manufacturers design information.
23.2 Balanced Pressure Reli ef Valves
23.2.1 Balanced type pressure relief valves are those in which the back pressure has very little influence on
the set pressure, see Figure 2 and 3 of API STD 520 Part I. These valves are of three types:
1) The piston type.
2) Bellows type.
3) Bellows with auxiliary balancing piston type.
23.2.2 Balanced type pressure relief valves should be used where high or variable back pressure conditions
preclude the use of the conventional type. All designs, such as, piston type, bellows type, and
bellows type with an auxiliary balancing piston, may be considered.
23.2.3 Balanced type pressure relief valves may be used for either constant or variable back pressure,
within the limitations of the particular Manufacturers design. For example, the back pressure
permitted by the mechanical design of the bellows, or the discharge flange rating, whichever is the
lower, shall be considered.
23.2.4 Balanced type valves are suitable for operation under variable or constant back pressure, either
superimposed or builtup. The maximum back pressure which a balanced type valve may be
subjected to should not exceed the lower of:
1) 5060% of the valve set pressure. At higher back pressures, the valve capacity reduction
becomes appreciable and if operation is required at these higher back pressures, the particular
valve Manufacturer should be consulted.
2) The maximum pressure rating on the outlet side of the balanced valve (refer to API 526).
23.2.5 A bellows is usually installed on a pressure relief valve that discharges into a closed system, for
example, a flare line or another part of the process. A bellows is used:
1) To compensate for the effects of back pressure on the valve disk so that the pressure in the
vessel at which the valve commences to discharge is not influenced by the back pressure, either
constant or variable.
2) To protect the valve spring, guides and top works from corrosion or fouling by the environment
on the discharge side of the valve.
23.2.6 Bonnet and bellows vents from balanced type pressure relief valves shall be routed with minimum
restriction to a safe location, as approved by the Owners Engineer. Particular consideration shall be
given to liquids above their autoignition temperature.
23.2.7 In bellows type pressure relief valves, the bonnet shall be vented separately from the discharge. In
no case shall the bonnet vent be plugged.
23.2.8 Bellowstype valves shall not be used in fouling conditions.
23.2.9 (*) In the auxiliary balancing piston type, vapor leakage into the bonnet, on bellows failure, is
restricted and the valve continues to operate as a balanced pressure relief valve. This type should
be used for critical and fouling services as specified by the Owners Engineer.
23.2.10 Balanced pressure relief valves shall be in accordance with EP 5-3-14.

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23.3 Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valves
23.3.1 A pilot operated pressure relief valve is one that has the major flow device combined with and
controlled by a selfactuated auxiliary pressure relief valve. This type of valve does not utilize an
external source of energy. The general principles of operation of a typical valve (shown in Figures
1014 of API STD 520 Part I) are as follows.
23.3.2 In a pilot operated valve, a differential piston is loaded by the process pressure through an orifice.
When the set pressure is reached, the small spring loaded pilot valve opens, venting the pressure
above the piston of the main valve, which then rapidly opens wide. When the blowdown is
completed, the pilot valve closes, restoring the process pressure above the piston and closing the
main valve rapidly.
23.3.3 These valves have a large number of static and moving seals that must all function, and have small
clearances in the pilot mechanism. The valves are therefore prone to failure especially in dirty
service or high temperature service.
23.3.4 Pilot operated valves should therefore only be considered for use on clean noncorrosive fluids, and
thus have somewhat limited application in the petroleum industry. Advantages of pilot operated
pressure relief valves are:
1) A pilot valve can be set more accurately than a pressure relief valve.
2) Both valve opening and closing are more rapid than orthodox pressure relief valves.
3) A pilot valve will maintain a tighter seat at operating pressures close to set pressure
23.3.5 If some form of pilot control is desirable, then the pilot assisted type should be chosen in preference
to the pilot operated type because such a valve will still operate, though at a slightly higher pressure,
in the event of a pilot failure.
23.3.6 Pilot operated valves have been used for high pressure service (hydrocrackers). Their use was
instigated because normally they can hold pressure at 5% above operating rather than 10% above
operating pressure as considered minimum for spring operated valves. Appropriate nonmetallic
gaskets were considered necessary.
23.4 Pilot Assisted Pressure Relief Valves
23.4.1 The pilot assisted pressure relief valve (conventional or balanced) is fitted with a simple, rugged air
operated diaphragm type actuator to which an air or gas signal from the pilot is fed to the underside
of the diaphragm, enabling it to supply full lift to the spindle of the pressure relief valve. The valve
then opens from the underside of the diaphragm and the valve closes rapidly.
23.4.2 Normally, the set pressure of the pressure relief valve spring will be approximately 5% higher than
the pilot set pressure. If the pilot or actuator fails for any reason, the valve will still be capable of
operating as an orthodox springloaded valve which will lift at a pressure approximately 5% higher
than the pilot set pressure.
23.4.3 This type of valve is therefore preferred over pilot operated valves with the additional advantage that
failure of the pilot does not render the valve inoperative. These valves should be considered for use
where:
1) Accuracy of set pressure is important.
2) Rapid opening and closing are required.
23.4.4 Pilot assisted pressure relief valves, generally, find limited application within process units.
23.4.5 (*) Pilot assisted pressure relief valves may also be used to give a full bore discharge to maintain
specific velocities when venting to atmosphere. However, their use shall be subject to approval by
the Owners Engineer.
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23.5 Rupture Disks
23.5.1 (*) Dependent on the application, various types of rupture disks may be used, such as, domed,
reverse buckling, or composite types. The use of rupture disks is subject to approval by the Owners
Engineer.
23.5.2 Disks shall be nonfragmenting, and shall be provided with means of retaining the disk after failure.
23.5.3 Reverse acting disks should not be fitted to liquid filled systems since there is insufficient energy in
the overpressured liquid to fully flip the disk. Provision should always be made for a gas pocket to
be within the system, preferably beneath the disk.
23.5.4 The generally preferred method of providing pressure relief is with pressure relief valves. However,
rupture disks may be used subject to the approval of the Site Engineering Authority for the following
cases:
1) For the relief of a pressure which is rising too fast for normal pressure relief valves, typically in a
reaction vessel.
2) In services where the operation of a pressure relief valve may be affected by corrosion or
corrosion products, or by the deposition of material that may prevent the valve from lifting in
service.
3) With highly toxic or other materials where leakage through a pressure relief valve cannot be
tolerated.
4) For low positive set pressures where pressure relief valves tend to leak.
5) Where it is necessary to provide for rapid depressuring to atmospheric pressure.
23.5.5 A rupture disk venting to atmosphere will not give the high velocity required for safe discharge of
flammable or toxic vapors for the complete duration of the discharge. As the pressure falls so will
the flow and consequently the discharge velocity fall. In such circumstances there are two options:
1) Do not use a rupture disk.
2) Use a pressure relief valve in series with, and downstream of, a rupture disk.
23.5.6 The bursting pressure and creep properties of a metallic disk may be affected by temperature
variation. Note that when a disk is specified to protect a system at an elevated temperature, the disk
may not give adequate protection at a lower temperature. The Manufacturers advice shall always
be sought when selecting a disk for a particular system.
23.5.7 The tolerance range of rupture disk failure shall be recognized. This is normally about 8590% of
the normal bursting pressure, however, some designs can be as low as 70%. The vessel or system
design shall take account of this.
23.5.8 Rupture disks shall not be used for pulsating flows or at working pressure too close to the design
bursting pressure. Normal domed (unscored) rupture disks can be operated at working pressures up
to 70% of the bursting pressure. Scored rupture disks can be operated at 8590% of the burst
pressure. Reverse acting disks can be operated at up to 90% in special circumstances. In all cases,
the Manufacturer should be consulted for the acceptable operating range.
23.5.9 Where a rupture disk is located upstream of a pressure relief valve, a means of indicating that the
rupture disk has failed shall be provided in the form of a pressure gauge or an alarm installed
between the rupture disk and pressure relief valve.
24.0 SIZING OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES
24.1 The calculation of the required free area for pressure relief valves and rupture disks shall be in
accordance with the methods described in API STD 520 Part I. The sizing of pressure relief devices
for flashing twophase flow shall be in accordance with Appendix C of API STD 520 Part I.
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24.2 In sizing relief devices, the set pressure and accumulation pressure shall be in accordance with the
ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1 or the ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 2, as applicable.
24.3 The quantity of material to be relieved should be determined at conditions corresponding to the
pressure relief valve set pressure plus overpressure, not at normal operating conditions. Frequently,
there is an appreciable reduction in required pressure relief valve capacity when this difference in
conditions is considerable. The effect of frictional pressure drop in the connecting line between the
source of overpressure and the system being protected should also be considered in determining the
capacity requirement. If the valve passes a liquid that flashes or the heat content causes
vaporization of liquid, this must be considered in determining pressure relief valve size (see
Appendix C of API STD 520 Part I).
24.4 The design of all pressure relief devices discharging to a closed relief system shall take into account
the maximum back pressure occurring at the discharge of the device for the particular overpressure
case under consideration. Additionally, the mechanical design shall be suitable for the maximum
back pressure to which a device can be exposed as a result of other relieving devices.
24.5 Inlet and outlet flange sizes and pressuretemperature ratings for pressure relief valves (orifice DT
inclusive) shall conform to the data contained in API STD 526. Inlet pressure limits are governed by
inlet flange pressure limits or by the Manufacturers spring design limits, whichever is the lower.
Outlet pressure limits are determined by the valve design.
24.6 The pressure and temperature used in valve sizing are the relieving pressure (set pressure plus
allowable overpressure) and the upset relieving temperature, not the relieving temperature. The
pressure and temperature used in valve material selection and inlet flange rating are typically the
design pressure and design temperature of the protected equipment.
25.0 ISOLATION OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES
25.1 The installation of block valves associated with relief devices shall be in accordance with EP 5-6-4
and the additional requirements of this Practice.
25.2 Strict management procedures shall be in place to prevent the unpermitted closures of locked or
carsealed open valves installed in pressure relief valve piping. The closing of these valves must be
logged in and out, and the consequences of closing these valves clearly communicated to the
operator at the time of closing.
25.3 Site procedures shall be used to insure that isolation valves in pressure relieving piping are
periodically checked to verify that the valves are sealed or locked in their proper position.
26.0 LOCATION OF PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES
The location and arrangement of pressure relief devices shall be in accordance with EP 5-6-4.
27.0 INLET PIPING TO PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICES
The design and layout of inlet piping to pressure relief devices shall be in accordance with EP 5-6-4.
28.0 DESIGN MEASURES TO REDUCE RELIEF LOADS
28.1 During the design stage, it may become apparent that some relief loads will either be impractical or
impossible to safely discharge.
28.2 Basic design measures which shall be considered to minimize the magnitude and frequency of
pressure relief shall include but not be limited to the following:
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28.2.1 The design of vessels and equipment for pressure containment in an emergency, rather than
pressure relief, if reasonably practicable and economical.
28.2.2 Independent subdivision of utility facilities, imported and/or generated on site, for example, power,
steam and compressed air, so that partial failure rather than total failure may be considered as a
controlling design condition.
28.2.3 The provision of two or more electrical feeders or generators to a site or part of a site requiring power
supplies, the loss of which may give rise to overpressure conditions. Electrical feeders and
generators shall be so rated, connected and protected, that failure of any single element will not
interrupt continuity of supply from other sources (refer to EP 13-1-1 for general electrical
requirements).
28.2.4 The design, selection and protection of control equipment and other service systems to minimize the
possibility of simultaneous failure of otherwise independent systems.
28.2.5 The use of auxiliary sources of power, such as diesel engines or steam turbines, to provide cooling
water under emergency conditions.
28.2.6 Consideration of the effect on relief systems when selecting all process and auxiliary drivers. All
types of drivers may be initially considered.
28.2.7 Provision of automatic reacceleration schemes for electric motor drivers, the loss of which may give
rise to overpressure conditions. These schemes may reaccelerate motors simultaneously or
sequentially depending on the capability of the power supply.
28.2.8 The use of the same utility for cooling as for heat supply, for example, steam or steam/hydraulic
drivers for air coolers and reflux pumps, where steamdriven feed pumps and reboiler pumps or
steamheated reboilers are used.
28.2.9 The provision of cooling water standby tanks to give a period of assured water supply, normally 30
minutes.
28.2.10 Consideration of layout for the external fire condition.
28.2.11 Protection by insulation of selected equipment against fire, if fire conditions require capacity in
excess of that required for any other emergency conditions, so that the discharge is kept within
acceptable limits. See EP 11-2-1, for insulation system requirements.
28.2.12 The use of protective instrumentation systems per EP 3-7-4.
28.2.13 Carsealing or chainlocking open the isolation valve at the vessel outlet as described in paragraph
6.9 of this Practice.
29.0 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM DESIGN
29.1 (*) Where a Contractor is responsible for the design of an overpressure protection system, the
design shall be completed as early as possible, and will always be reviewed independently and in
detail by the Owners Engineer. The specification will then be finalized following discussion between
the respective companies.
29.2 (*) Before the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams are approved, the Contractor shall submit to the
Owners Engineer his design basis for any overpressure protection system in the following form:
1) Statement of design basis.
2) List of protective instrumentation with schedule of maintenance and testing requirements, and
supporting Reliability Analysis if required. Protective instrumentation shall be in accordance with
EP 3-7-4.
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3) Pressure relief device summary table, giving flow rates, backpressure, temperature and
molecular weight or specific gravity for each device, for each overpressure case.
4) Pressure relief flow diagram.
5) The Manufacturer shall supply calculation sheets for all relief devices identifying the source of
the formulas, the sizing factors, and all assumptions used to size the device.
6) (*) The final version of the above information shall be included in the plant operating instructions,
and shall be subject to approval by the Owners Engineer.
29.3 Pressure relief devices, and other integral parts of overpressure protection systems shall be
identified with their item number and test details.
29.4 The Contractor shall compile a Register of Pressure Relieving Systems for retention by the Owner in
accordance with EP 3-7-3 that reflects the as built design. The Owners documentation and filing
system shall be subject to periodic HSEQ audits.
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30.0 TABLES
TABLE 1
PRESSURES FOR SIZING RELIEF VALVES PER THE ASME CODE.
SECTION VIII, DIVISION 1 OR 2
Conditions of
Valve Arrangement
Maximum
Set Pressure
Maximum
Accumulation
Single Valve Installations

P(1) 1.10P
Multiple Valve Installations
First Valve
Additional Valves
Supplemental Valves (2)


P
1.05P
1.10P

1.16P
1.16P
1.21P
Valves sized for Fire Case
Single Valve Installation


P

1.21P
Valves sized for Fire Case
Multiple Valve Installation
First Valve
Additional Valves



P
1.05P


1.21P
1.21P

NOTES:
(1) P is the vessel design pressure, or MAWP, if applicable.
(2) A supplemental valve is an additional valve which is sized to provide relief capacity for an additional hazard created by fire. The
other valves in the installation are sized for other nonfire contingencies.
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Appendix A Revision Log

Action Date Rev Approver Description

References,
misc.edits
01/2013 .2 BP Updates were made to correct
references to updated industry
standards.

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