ESSENTIAL SYSTEM CHOICES RELEVANT TO THE

CAPACITY OF ESCAPE ROUTES IN MULTISTOREY

BUILDINGS


Peter van de Leur & Martin Klein
DGMR Consulting Engineers, the Netherlands
& Nico Scholten
Foundation Expert Center Regulations in Building, the Netherlands


INTRODUCTION

Studies on the capacity of escape routes often concentrate on widths of doors, corridors and stairs,
on appropriate flow capacity data, and on travel distances. When comparing national building code
requirements on escape route capacity in various countries, important differences become apparent that are
rarely, discussed in literature on the fire evacuation of buildings. The codes themselves are seldom explicit
on the concepts and assumptions underlying them. When needed, these must be reverse engineered from
the code texts. This paper discusses their role in the relationship between escape route capacity and life
safety in case of fire.

The following items are discussed:
Scope of the evacuation that the code requirements on capacity regulate: fire compartment only, fire
storey only, multiple storeys or the complete building.
Limiting the time spent in the compartment of fire origin, in temporarily safe spaces, in protected
staircases, and in the building; how to interpret rules in terms of allowed number of occupants per
unit of egress element width;
Full or partial evacuation, or phased: immediate evacuation alarm in the compartment of fire origin,
followed automatically by delayed alarm to close and more distant parts of the building;
Choice of escape route (staircase), dependence on location in relation to the fire;
Dealing with different occupancy scenarios, or with one scenario only, the prevalent distribution of
persons;
Allowances for protective measures such as sprinklered vs non sprinklered building; level of
protection of egress elements;

Advanced fire safety engineering approaches often seem to skip these factors altogether, or glance over
them, sticking close to national code requirements for the factors. Researchers are interested in other
factors, and do not question the appropriateness of the code assumptions. They proceed immediately to
ASET-RSET analyses using model calculations.

A central hypothesis of this paper is that the above fire engineering approach strikes an inappropriate
balance by overlooking vital parameters in favor of less important ones. It may be attractive to not stray
too far from the flock when performing fire safety engineering, if only to improve the chances of its
acceptance by authorities having jurisdiction. From an international perspective however, sticking to
national code requirements for essential parts of an FSE analysis severely limits its credibility as a general
risk based method.

A second hypothesis is that major differences between national approaches as seen in building codes rarely
reflect well motivated differences between ideas. The authors argue that the national fixations merit
scrutiny and discussion, possibly leading to more international agreement on the right approach in different
situations. On a smaller scale, a good insight in well accepted approaches in other countries can be useful
to support alternative solutions in local projects.

Human factors influencing actual time delays are discussed, but the emphasis is on the limitations set by
the architectural features.

CODE REQUIREMENTS ON CAPACITY
The French code for public assembly buildings (ERP) specifies a minimum stair width roughly,
proportional to the number of persons in the building served at or above that level. The requirement is
0.6 m for every 100 persons or part thereof.

The US codes IBC and NFPA 5000 require a minimum width of stairs, level components and ramps for
each person served. For most occupancies these numbers are fixed. NFPA 5000 prescribes 7.5 mm per
person for stairs and 5 mm for doors and corridors. IBC reduces the numbers when the building is
sprinklered. The number of persons to be accommodated is the maximum probable population of the
compartment, with no limitations set to their distribution over available exits.

The bottleneck in a multistorey building evacuation usually is the staircases. A standard 1100 mm (44
inch) stair is sufficient for 147 persons (or 220 when sprinklered), far more than can be accommodated in
the stairwell between adjacent storeys, which in a small stairwell is around 45 persons. The 147 persons
therefore fill almost three levels of the staircase, or, the staircases can hold about a third of the maximum
population allowed in the building, see Figure 1 below.

Figure 1


Since the requirements do not change with increasing building height, the total number of persons served
by the stair increases at the same rate, and so does the evacuation time of the building. With a flow capacity
of 50 persons/minute, which is known from research to be optimistic (Bukowski, 2009), a 50-story
building takes up to 147 minutes to evacuate.

UK Applied Document B (ADB) requires stair dimensions sufficient to hold essentially all occupants for
simultaneous evacuation, or the occupants of the fire storey in case of phased evacuation.

The Dutch code requires sufficient width of doors and stairs to evacuate the smoke compartment of fire
origin within 1 minute, and to evacuate the storey of fire origin within 3.5 or 6 minutes. Within that time,
occupants must be able to enter a protected staircase. The 6 minute maximum waiting time applies if the
space is separated from the smoke compartment of fire origin by at least 30 minutes fire resistance, whereas
3.5 minutes is the maximum with only a smoke resistant separation.
The total available stair width must be large enough to evacuate the building within a fixed period of 15
minutes. Higher values apply with increased protection of the staircase: 20 minutes if the staircase has
lobbies, and 30 minutes if the staircase can only be entered from outside.

SYSTEM CHOICES
A previous paper [1], building on an approach by Bukowski [2], discussed some critical system
choices made -implicitly, in most cases - by the regulations of several countries, focusing on capacity
method versus flow method. The discussion provided reference levels for assessing a novel simple
calculation method developed by the authors for a Dutch Standard for sizing escape staircases [3].
The present paper is more comprehensive in treating more fully the list of system choice parameters in the
introduction.

Scope of the evacuation .
The Dutch building code recognizes three scopes, depending on occupancy type. For most occupancy
types, full and simultaneous evacuation of the building within a maximum of 15 minutes is the standard,
and capacities of egress components are sized accordingly. In institutional occupancies, evacuation of
patients ends in an adjacent fire compartment, whereas personnel and visitors evacuate the building.
Residential buildings are not expected to evacuate at all, the capacity of escape routes is not subject to
requirements.

US model building codes IBC and NFPA 5000 prescribe total evacuation unless that is impractical due to
building configuration, a provision covering health care and correctional facilities among others but
leaving the decision to local authorities.

UK, France and Australian codes follow the same policy as the US, in assuming total evacuation unless
impractical. UK ADB distinguished simulataneous and phased evacuation, with the simultaneous option
requiring staircases large enough to hold essentially all occupants; phased evacuation requiring much less
stair space.

Short term and longer term objectives of capacity requirements
US code requirements on escape route capacity dimension egress components on the assumption that the
occupants of the compartment of fire origin require fast evacuation to a safe location, without specifying a
maximum time to reach it. Protected exits (stairs, corridors) count as a safe location, as does an exit
towards a different fire compartment on the same floor. Occupants on other storeys do not require fast
evacuation, the longer term objective to safely evacuate the building does not influence the required
capacity

The French code serves the short term interest of the occupants of the compartment of fire origin as it
requires sufficient capacity for all occupants to leave the compartment and get into a protected staircase
within a short, although unspecified, time. For the longer term, it also ensures that a full evacuation can
take place in a relatively very short time, with the added benefit of keeping a continuous flow going for the
whole duration of the evacuation.

The UK Applied Document B requires that the stairs offer safety on the same level, allowing a fast transfer
from the compartment of fire origin to a safe location.

The objectives of the Dutch code are stated in terms of explicit times: to evacuate the smoke compartment
of fire origin within 1 minute, and to evacuate the story of fire origin to a protected staircase within 3.5 or 6
minutes. The longer term objective is to evacuate the building within 15 minutes. Higher buildings than 70
m height are not envisaged.

Time spent in the compartment of fire origin, in temporarily safe spaces, in protected staircases, in the
building.
The Dutch requirements have been discussed in the precious section. They contain an option to use
(automatic) phased evacuation, where occupants of the fire storey start evacuating before the rest of the
building who evacuate after a fixed delay, lessening the need for wide stairs. The alarm system and
emergency organization must support the option, and there must be visual and auditive separation between
floors.

No other codes are as explicit in the times allowed to negotiate the different parts of the escape routes. The
US Code requirements do not explicitly set a maximum time for occupants to leave the compartment of fire
origin or the storey, but a calculation can show what the requirements result in. If the 147 persons allowed
on a 1100 mm staircase have exclusive access to the staircase (due to phased alarming), they can enter the
staircase within 3 minutes, assuming 50 persons per minute flow capacity.

Table 1
No Case Max. residence
time on fire storey
[min]
Total evacuation
time [min]
1 147 persons on storey 4 3 4.5
2 147 persons on storey 3 and 4 5.5 7
3 220 persons on storey 4 4.5 6
4 220 persons on storey 3 and 4 8.5 10
5 43 persons on storeys 1-8 1 7

An example calculation using the model of NEN 6089 [3] quantifies the effect of one adjacent storey being
in open connection with the fire storey, both storeys with maximum population evacuating simultaneously,
see Figure 2. The time before the last person can enter the staircase increases to 5.5 minutes, see case 2 in
table 1.

Figure 2


In the corresponding sprinklered case, with a maximum of 220 persons served by the same 1100 mm
staircase on each storey, the corresponding times are 4.5 and 8.5 minutes respectively. The US code
apparently deems the risk acceptably low of having at the same time a maximum number of occupants and
a fast growing fire.

For comparison, case 5 in table 1 shows that in order to comply with the Dutch code, no more than 43
persons can be served by the stair on all 8 storeys of the example building if the storeys have no alternative
horizontal exits. The result is a rather low number of persons allowed, enough for office and hotel
occupancies but not for occupancies with higher occupant densities.

The US codes do not require a full evacuation, should it become necessary, to be completed within a
maximum time.

In the UK, no overall evacuation time is specified; but the large stair dimensions required in case of
simultaneous evacuation lead to short times, whereas phased evacuation leads to much larger times,
comparable to US.

Choice of escape route (staircase), dealing with different occupancy scenarios

The Dutch code requires compliance with the maximum residence times for all possible fire locations (in
terms of which smoke compartment is involved) and for all foreseeable distributions of occupants over the
building. This forces the designer to find reasonable choices for distribution of occupants over available
escape routes from each possible compartment of fire origin, and from other compartments on the same
storey given its unavailability. On the other hand, this allows a distinction between cases where people
urgently need to enter a staircase, but in a small number, and cases where a larger number of people take
the same route but with much less urgency. Figure 3 illustrates both cases in a situation with the fire storey
divided in two smoke compartments, each served by an identical stair. The fire is located in the rightmost
compartment. Its occupants, in urgent need of leaving the compartment, take all available exits. Half of
them moving to the other compartment on the same storey. This relieves the pressure on the staircase, as
only half of the normal number of occupants moves towards the staircase, and can enter the staircase within
the maximum allowed 1 minute. The number of people taking the other staircase is now larger than normal.
Being protected from the fire by a smoke resistant or fire resistant separation they can safely wait a little
longer to enter the staircase.

Figure 3


For similar reasons, no limits are set to the time to reach the staircases on the non-fire storeys.

The requirement to the overall evacuation time of the building is applied only for a scenario without a fire
in the building. All occupants can be assumed to evacuate without urgency, taking the conventional egress
route. The advantage of this choice is that the overall evacuation time remains a single number. Requiring
the overall evacuation time to remain below the same limit for all possible fire scenarios would
unnecessarily make the requirement even more restrictive.

None of the other codes studied requires the analysis to cover different fire and occupancy scenarios. That
reduces the burden on designers in most cases, but not always. It can, and does sometimes lead to awkward
discussions with authorities on the appropriate numbers of occupants to take into account. The Dutch
approach is more tedious, but makes the process more transparent and less prone to overlooking safety
critical situations.

Phased evacuation
With the exception of the UK, most of the codes studied do not explicitly treat phased evacuation. In
practice, phasing means that an automatic evacuation alarm is given only on the fire storey, sometimes also
on one or two storeys above and below. A decision to alarm other parts of the building is then left to
personnel in charge of handling the the emergency.

The Dutch code allows an automatic version of phasing as part of a full evacuation of the building. When
the storey of fire origin is alarmed, all other storeys are alarmed with a preset delay not exceeding 3.5
minutes. The delay gives the occupants of the compartment of fire origin undisputed access to the escape
staircases in the critical first minutes.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Many of the differences between the national codes of the Netherlands and those of other countries
fall in a category of quantitatively determined to minute detail versus quantitative only on one major
aspect, the rest too complex to foresee. It can be argued that the Dutch model overstretches by forcing the
designer to predict which routes occupants take in different scenarios, and that in practice this has little
value. The authors feel that this would not do justice to some important features of the approach. They
have the experience that the simple fact of being confronted with calculated residence times in the
compartment of fire origin is quite informative. The simple calculation method involved gives information
of the effect that simultaneous evacuation on other storeys has on the residence time on the fire affected
storey, and on the beneficial effects of having multiple compartments on a storey. Having this information
readily available has lead to sometimes very simple design choices that eliminate the most risky situations.
The authors feel that codes that do not make it necessary to calculate the time development of the
evacuation process can easily lead to a general underestimation of the risk elements: out of sight, out of
mind. This even seems to extend to general fire safety engineered analyses that often do not rethink the
assumptions behind the local code, and focus instead on aspects where an alternative solution is most
necessary or useful.

REFERENCES
[1] van de Leur , P.H.E., and Scholten, N.P.M., Design of flow and holding capacity of escape routes in
buildings, proc. 9th Int. Conf. on Performance-Based Codes and Fire Safety Methods, 20-22 June 2012,
Hong Kong

[2] Bukowski, Richard, Emergency Egress from Buildings, NIST Technical Note 1623, 2009

[3] NEN 6089, Determination of the collection capacity and the throughput capacity of
circulation spaces, March 2012.