Conflict of Laws Case Digest: HASEGAWA vs KITAMURA 538 SCRA 26 (2007)

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD.,

vs
MINORU KITAMURA

G.R. No. 149177
November 23, 2007

FACTS:

Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management
support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides
that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned Kitamaru to work as
the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR project was near
completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering &
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was named as
the project manger in the contract.

Hasegawa, Nippons general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had
no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up
to the substantial completion of the STAR Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that Kitamarus contract was for a
fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City.
Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippons contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals. Thus,
the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamarus ICA could only
be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex
contractus.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not
applicable to the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue.
It held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance &
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles
of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non
conveniens.

HELD:

NO. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, 3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further
question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one
do not always provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. The question of whether the law of a
state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment.

In this case, only the 1
st
phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to
validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over
the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property,
over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c
establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter
submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.

In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance & damages is one not
capable of pecuniary estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as
grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and
the state of the most significant relationship rule. The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound.

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of the place where a contract
is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place where a contract is
executed or to be performed. It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain
to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.
Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to apply to a dispute, the
court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a
case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was negotiated, was to be
performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into
account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue to be resolved.

Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules
proper for the 2
nd
phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the
substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction,
choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Further, Nippons premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet
pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, 1
st

there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when
the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of
such law must be pleaded and proved.

It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either
because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the
case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived from
the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited
by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided
by foreign sovereigns.

Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. 1st, it
is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as
a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends
largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the
RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.







KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and
Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal
detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the
China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial
court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the
latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as
amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign
transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section
8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar
circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case
and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that
Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of
RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to
due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted.
The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case
before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a
tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by
said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his
deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not
entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we
rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
___________
NOTES:
- On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen
Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion
for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each
day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued
Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from
Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.)
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.)
Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States;
they were married inHongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two
children. Subsequently, they weredivorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila is their conjugal
property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be declared
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is
barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedingsbefore the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the
certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue inthe case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the USA. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced
in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is
conjugal property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and
that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had
no community property as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that
the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?
HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and
Richard, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared
in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to
represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all
things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the
divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept
of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.















PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national,
were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal
Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before
the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a
certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal
of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor
approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled
PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower
court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it
was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made
permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows
that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing
of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time
of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.




REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. CRASUS L. IYOY, respondent.
G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After the celebration
of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children to the
care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to
their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely had five visits
in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the surname of her American husband in
the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on March 25, 1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having
herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a
divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status
shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to
respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground of
psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in the United
States of America and married another man and has established another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING:
1st issue:The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos, this Court
found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion,
and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article.
2nd issue:
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married
is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because
at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from
respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American
husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the
time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and
even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid
and subsisting.
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, Respondents.
Nationality Principle
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo
departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized by the United
State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he discovered that his
wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce.
Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will
and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters
administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified
declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to
inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce. In the
same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are valid according to their
national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not covered
by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a foreigner.


WOLFGANG ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen
Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified
on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental.

Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November
18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition
5
for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of
First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the
children was granted to the father.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a
German court.
2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?
RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section
50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties
as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and
Alexandra Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of
appropriate proceedings.