ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was
also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without
their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.
Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of
Police, took custody of about170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent
and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street, in the district of Sampaloc. That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the
respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their
jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead. The court ruled in favor of
the petitioner with the instructions; For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three
optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to
the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness
or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present.
Held: The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each,
plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true
principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in
hispower to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted
with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should
not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the
same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process,
may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act withim punity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded
AGUSTIN V EDU

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly
to equip them with a pair of reflectorized triangular early warning devices. Agustin is arguing
that this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars
are already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the
said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least
400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a
reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways,
will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road,
highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an
emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.

On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former,
however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and
equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in
passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by
Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or
less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the
Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority
to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after
independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept was set forth in negative
terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power
in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc
with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and
at least illimitable powers, extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public
needs. Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with
the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time. The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens
to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure communal
peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It
would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads
and streets designated as national roads . . . As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
ICHONG V HERNADEZ

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his
fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June
1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of
which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned
for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded
by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in
the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is
no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a
statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power
which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a
treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city
market.
GONZALES V HECHANOVA

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements
with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of
securing a certification from the National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in
cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Ramon
Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive
agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by
Macapagal.

HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers
of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of
conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts
adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements
not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation
of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set
up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated
by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal,certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when
it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.


In Re: Garcia

Facts:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting tothe required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that
he is a Filipino citizenbor n i n Ba co lod Cit y, of Fi l i p i no par e nt age ; t hat he ha d
t ake n a nd f i ni s hed i n Spa i n t he cour se o f "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was
approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central
University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating as"Licenciado en
derecho"; and thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and thatunder
the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the
RPand Spain, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to
the requiredbar examinations.

Issue:
Whether or not the treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition.

Ratio Decidendi:
The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and Exercise of Profession between the RP and
Spaincannot be invoked by the applicant. Said treaty was int ended to govern Filipino
cit izens desiring topractice thair profession in Spain, and the cit izens of Spain
desiring to practice their profession in thePhilippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is thereforesubject to the laws of his own
country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationalsdesiring to practice in
the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the applicant aremade expressly
subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in whose territory it is desiredto
exercise the legal profession.The aforement ioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and
Spain could not have been int ended tomodi fy t he laws and regulat ions governing
admission to the pract ice of law in the Philippines, for t hereason that the Execut ive
Depart ment may not encroach upon the const itutional prerogative of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the power
torepeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
PEOPLE VS LAGMAN

In 1936, Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth
Act 1 (National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he
has a father to support, has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman
further assailed the constitutionality of the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.

HELD: The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an
army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty
of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does
not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this
duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.
AGLIPAY V RUIZ

The 33
rd
Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church took place
sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof, Ruiz the then Director of Posts initiated the
production of stamps which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat
as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No.
4052, which provides for appropriation. Aglipay then appealed for the prohibition of the sale of
such stamps. Aglipay contends that the selling of stamps commemorative to a particular religious
event is in violation of Sec 13, Art 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the
appropriation or usage of public money for the use or benefit of any church or denomination
among others.

ISSUE: Is the sale of the stamps in support of a particular sect hence unconstitutional?

HELD: The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized
on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of
such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious
event. It merely said that the director of posts may use such fund in a manner as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the government. It is duly noted however that the elevating influence
of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored
the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. Religious freedom as a
constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

ONDOY V IGNACIO

Estrella Ondoy vs Virgilio Ignacio

Art II Sec 10 of the Constitution of the Philippines : The State shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development.

Facts:
Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According
to the chief engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was
invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore,
Estrella was asking for compensation from the death of her son while in the respondents
employ. However, the statement given by the chief engineer and oiler was ignored by the hearing
officer and therefore dismissed the claim for lack of merit. Even when a motion for
reconsideration was filed, this was also denied by the Secretary of Labor for the same reason,
that is, lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social justice
Applicable in this case?

Ruling:

Yes. Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It merely
disregarded the statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social
justice applied in this case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right
of the petitioner to the claim of compensation because her son was shown to have died while
in the actual performance of his work. To strengthen the constitutional scheme of
social justice and protection to labor, The Court quoted another case as between a laborer,
usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has
reason to demand from the latter the stricter compliance.
OPOSA V FACTORAN
Facts: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a
domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging
in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
original defendant was theHonorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by
the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper
motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that
the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the Court."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and,
the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative
or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the
motion is dilatory and the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which
is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of
the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192
creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural
law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion
in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well
settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.


Issues:

(1) Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

(2) Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.

(3) Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled.

(4) Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.


Held: As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot
be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to
have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would
be violative of the requirements of due process.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to
all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for thefiling of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of
the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept
of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Every generation has a responsibility
to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs
to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment andNatural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resourcesas may be provided for by law in order to ensure
equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of
the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its
mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting
of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or
legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is
the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It
must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.
BASCO V PAGCOR

On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco
and four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional
grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional
provision on local autonomy.

Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as
the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as
fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local
autonomy principle.

ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy.

HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.

A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing
powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and
limitation as Congress may provide.

Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose
taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed
that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and
abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise,
its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.

This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local
governments.
ANGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the
Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the
said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in
session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua,
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA,
notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss
arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back
by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election
protest and that the EC can not be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election
protest.

HELD: (a). The government established by the Constitution follows the theory of separation of
powers of the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) The system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often
makes difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies
thereof, the judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
(f) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the (1935) Constitution went into effect,
each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and
qualifications of their elective members.
(h) That the (1935) Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature with respect to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its
members, to the Electoral Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full,
clear and complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe
the rules and regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
(j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to retain the
power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the (1935) Constitution repealed not only section 18 of
the Jones Law making each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the
elections, returns and qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387
empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against
the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or
bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested or not, is not essential before such member-elect
may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against
whom no protest had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the
Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which protest against
the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
CASIBANG V AQUINO


Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino
20 August 1979

FACTS:
Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan. Casibang,his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying,
anomalies andirregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution
came intoeffect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the
ground thatthe trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new
Constitutionand the new parliamentary form of government.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot andacademic;
and
2.
Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of theentire local
government structure.

RULING:
1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, the constitutional grant of privilege to continue inoffice,
made by the new Const itution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials
or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as
indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an
elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that subject to the constraints specifically mentioned
in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention
of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for
elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced
proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right
to the contested office.
2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with
apolitical color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact
a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a
majorityo f a l l it s Me mber s, de f i ni ng a mo r e r espo ns i ve a nd a ccount a bl e lo ca l
gover nme nt allocating among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities,
andresources, and providing for their qualificat ions, elect ion and removal, term, sala
ries,power s, f unct ions a nd dut i es o f lo c a l o f f i c i a l s, a nd a l l ot her mat t er s r
e l at i ng t o t heorganization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing
form of local government shall not take effect until rat ified by a majorit y of the
votes cast in aplebiscite called for the purpose."

TANADA V CUENCO

After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied
by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the
Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the
bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the
SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9
members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority
senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the
NP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he
deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the
SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise the
issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question.
The termPolitical Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked
by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Taada was
whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those
will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its
own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

SANIDAD V COMELEC

In September 1976, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President
of his present powers. 20 days after, the President issued another related decree, PD 1031,
amending the previous PD 991, by declaring the provisions of PD 229 providing for the manner
of voting and canvass of votes in barangays applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date
of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that the
peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim NA evinces their desire to have
such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of
Oct 16.
On September 27, 1976, Atty. Pablito Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on Oct
16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose
amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the COMELEC to
supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on Oct 16,
1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. The Sol-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot
take cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue;
the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power;
the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable one. This is
especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by
proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a
particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the
contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the SC
is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the
Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a
constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be
found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can
declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

This petition is however dismissed. The President, who was also the legislature, can propose
amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in
sufficient time.
DAZA V SINGSON
Daza was chosen to be part of the Commission of Appointments and was listed as representative of the Liberal
Party. LDP was reorganized and 24 members from the Liberal Party transferred to LDP. Because of this,
the House of Representatives revised its representation by withdrawing the seat given to Daza and giving it to the
newly-formed LDP. Singson was chosen to replace Daza, in accordance to proportional representation.

Issues:
1.Whether the reorganized LDP can be deemed a stable political party
2.Whether it is necessary for the party to be registered to be entitled to proportional representation in the
CA

Held and Ratio:

Both petitioner and respondent invoke the case of Cunanan v. Tan. In the said case, 25 Members of the
Nacionalista Party reorganized themselves and formed the Allied Majority. 3 Nacionalista Congressmen,
originally chosen, were deprived of their seats by colleagues who joined the Allied Majority. Carlos Cunanans
ad interim appointment was rejected by the CA. Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contended the
validity of the rejection. The Court agreed that Allied Majority was merely a temporary combination; officially,
they were still part of the Nacionalista Party. Thus, the reorganization of the CA at that time was not based on
proportional representation. The Court held that mere shift of votes should not affect the organization of the CA, or
else, it would forever be at the mercy of the House of Representatives. The petitioner argues that LDP is
not a permanent party and has not yet achieved stability. However, the LDP has already been inexistence for
a year. They command the biggest following. They not only survived but prevailed. Regarding being a duly
registered party, the LDP was granted its registration as a political party by the COMELEC. Thus, shattering the
argument of the petitioner that registration is required