Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

1
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point


Authors Note

AlQaidasForeignFightersinIraq:AFirstLookattheSinjarRecordsisthelatestina
seriesofreportsfromtheCombatingTerrorismCenterdrawingonnewly
releasedinformationfromcapturedalQaidadocumentsmaintainedinthe
DefenseDepartmentsHarmonyDataBase.Thereportisapreliminaryanalysis
ofrecordscontainingbackgroundinformationonforeignfightersenteringIraq
viaSyriaoverthelastyear.ThedatausedinthisreportwascodedfromEnglish
translationsoftheserecordsandundoubtedlycontainssomeinaccuraciesdueto
imprecisetranslationaswellasthrougherrorsinthetranscriptionprocess.The
CTCplansfurtherstudiesbasedontheSinjarRecordsandexpectstohoneand
improvetheaccuracyofourdatabaseaswedoso.

TheauthorsthankJamesPhillips,CTCHarmonyProjectManager,forsignificant
assistancecoordinatingandcompilingtheinformationanddocumentsaswellas
CTCStaffmembersSherwetWitherington,VahidBrown,andWarrenPolensky
fortheirresearchandeditorialsupport.WealsothankColonelMikeMeeseand
ColonelCindyJebbHeadandDeputyHeadoftheUSMilitaryAcademy
DepartmentofSocialSciencesfortheircontinuedsupportoftheCTCs
HarmonyProject.

TheviewsexpressedinthisreportaretheauthorsanddonotreflecttheU.S.
MilitaryAcademy,theDepartmentofDefense,ortheU.S.Government.

JosephFelterandBrianFishman
CombatingTerrorismCenter
DepartmentofSocialSciences
USMilitaryAcademy
WestPoint,NewYork
8459388495
Joseph.felter@usma.edu,Brian.fishman@usma.edu

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Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Introduction

OnDecember4,2007AbuUmaralBaghdadi,thereputedEmirofalQaidas
IslamicStateofIraq(ISI),claimedthathisorganizationwasalmostpurelyIraqi,
containingonly200foreignfighters.
1
Twelvedayslater,onDecember16,2007,
AymanalZawahiriurgedSunnisinIraqtounitebehindtheISI.Bothstatements
arepartofalQaidasongoingstruggletoappealtoIraqis,manyofwhomresent
theISIsforeignleadershipanditsdesiretoimposestrictIslamiclaw.

InNovember2007,theCombatingTerrorismCenteratWestPointreceived
nearly700recordsofforeignnationalsthatenteredIraqbetweenAugust2006
andAugust2007.Thedatacompiledandanalyzedinthisreportisdrawnfrom
thesepersonnelrecords,whichwascollectedbyalQaidasIraqiaffiliates,first
theMujahidinShuraCouncil(MSC)andthentheIslamicStateofIraq(ISI).The
recordscontainvaryinglevelsofinformationoneachfighter,butofteninclude
thefighterscountryoforigin,hometown,age,occupation,thenameofthe
fightersrecruiter,andeventheroutethefightertooktoIraq.Therecordswere
capturedbycoalitionforcesinOctober2007inaraidnearSinjar,alongIraqs
Syrianborder.Althoughthereissomeambiguityinthedata,itislikelythatall
ofthefighterslistedintheSinjarRecordscrossedintoIraqfromSyria.TheSinjar
RecordsexistencewasfirstreportedbyTheNewYorkTimesRichardOppel,
whowasprovidedapartialsummaryofthedata.
2

TheCombatingTerrorismCenterispleasedtomaketheSinjarRecordspublicly
availableforthefirsttime.EnglishtranslationsoftheRecordscanbeaccessedat
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/FFBiosTrans.pdfandtherecordsintheir
originalArabictextathttp://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Foreign_Fighter_Bios
Orig.pdf.
3
ThepurposeofthisinitialassessmentoftheSinjarRecordsisto
providescholarsaccesstothisuniquedata,inthehopethattheirscholarshipwill
complementandcompetewithourown.TheCTCplansamore
comprehensivestudyonIraqsforeignfightersforreleaseinearly2008.
4

1
Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, For the Scum Disappears Like Froth Cast Out, posted to www.muslm.net on
December 4, 2007.
2
Richard Oppel, Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of the U.S., The New York Times, November
22, 2007, online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/world/middleeast/22fighters.html
3
Information recorded from these documents and used to generate the summary statistics is available in
spread sheet form on request. Please send request for this data to ctcharmony@usma.edu
4
For access to all captured documents released to the CTC and the CTCs previous reports incorporating
this information see: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony
3
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
TheCTChasnotalteredtheSinjarRecordsexcepttoformattheminamoreuser
friendlymannerfordistribution.TheCTCcannotvouchfortheauthenticityor
accuracyoftheserecords,excepttoconfirmtheywereauthorizedforreleaseby
theU.Sgovernment,whichiswhytheserecordsarepresentedintheirentirety.
TheCTCdoesnotredactorclassifyinformation.

Readersshouldbeawarethatanalyzingdatacapturedonabattlefieldisfraught
withrisk.Someofthepersonnelrecordswerefilledoutincompletelyor
improperly,somemayhavebeenlostbyalQaidaspersonnelinIraq,andsome
mayhavebeenaccidentallylostordestroyedbyU.S.forces.TheSinjarRecords
areanastoundingtestimonytoalQaidasimportationoffighterstoIraq,but
theyareaninherentlyimperfectrecord.Readersandresearchersshouldbewary
ofconclusionsdrawnsolelyonthebasisoftheserecords.

Background

AlQaidasalliesbeganmovingintoIraqevenbeforeU.S.forcesenteredthe
countryinearly2003.AfterfleeingAfghanistanandtraversingIran,Abu
MusabalZarqawislippedintoNorthernIraqsometimein2002.Atthattime,
ZarqawisorganizationwascalledTawhidwalJihad(MonotheismandStruggle)
andwasbuiltaroundabackboneofJordanians,Syrians,andKurdsthateither
rushedtojoinhiminIraqorhadbeenworkingwiththeKurdistanbasedjihadi
group,AnsaralIslam.

ZarqawididnotjoinalQaidauntilOctober2004,whenhesworeallegianceto
UsamabinLadin.TheneworganizationwascalledTanzimQaidatalJihadfi
BiladalRafidaynwhichwascommonlyknownintheWestasalQaidainIraq
(AQI).TheagreementbetweenZarqawiandhisnewmastersbeliedimportant
disagreementsthatremainedevenafterZarqawiformallyjoinedalQaida.
ZarqawiwassometimescriticalofalQaidaswillingnesstocooperatewith
apostatesagainstotherenemiesand,unlikeBinLadin,ferventlyarguedthat
alQaidasNearEnemyapostatesandtheShiaweremoredangerousthan
itsFarEnemytheUnitedStatesandtheWest.
5

AlQaidainIraqworkedhardtorecruitIraqisandbuildcordialrelationships
withnationalistandBaathistinsurgentsinIraq,butitsbrutaltacticsand

5
For more on these and other disagreements within al-Qaidas leadership see the CTCs recent Harmony
report, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms Within al-Qaida 1989-2006 at
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq3.asp
4
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
religiousconservatismalienatedmoreIraqisthanitattracted.InJanuary2006,
afterbloodybattleswithnationalistinsurgentgroupsandZarqawisillfated
attackonthreehotelsinAmman,Jordan,AQIsubsumeditselfwithinan
umbrellagroupcalledMajlisShuraalMujahidin(MujahidinShuraCouncil
MSC).AlQaidainIraqstillexisted,buttheMSCwasausefulwaytogiveAQI
aconciliatoryandIraqiface.Zarqawiwasatremendouslysuccessful
propagandist,buthiswantonviolencewasincreasinglycontroversialamong
Iraqissufferingtheravagesofcivilwar.Meanwhile,theMSCwasostensiblyled
byAbdullahRashidalBaghdadi,anamethatimpliesthemanwasIraqi.

AfterZarqawisdeathinJune2006,AQIquicklyreplacedhimwithAbuHamzah
alMuhajir,amantheUnitedStatesidentifiedasanEgyptiannamedAbuAyyub
alMasri.TheSinjarRecordsbeginshortlythereafter,andmanyaredocumented
onMSCletterhead.

InOctober2006,alMuhajirannouncedtheformationoftheDawlatalIraqal
Islamiyya(IslamicStateofIraqISI),andnamedAbuUmaralBaghdadi,another
purportedIraqi,itsEmir.LiketheMSC,theISIwasdesignedtoputanIraqiface
onalQaidaseffortsintheinsurgency,buttheneworganizationwasintended
tobemuchmoresubstantivethanitspredecessor.UnliketheMSC,theISI
totallysupplanteditsconstituentorganizations.Foritsfollowers,alQaidano
longerexistsinIraq,onlytheISI.

TheISIwasmeanttounifyresistancetoU.S.occupation,inspiresupportfromal
QaidasglobalsupportersbyimposingIslamiclaw,andensurethatalQaida
waspreparedincaseofaprecipitousU.S.withdrawalfromIraq.Today,theISI
bolstersitsreligiousauthoritybyreleasingreligiousinstructionstofollowersand
hascreatedafacadeofgovernancebyestablishingacabinetthatevenincludesa
MinistryofAgricultureandFisheries.

Despitetheseefforts,theISIwaspoorlyconceivedandislargelyfailing.Asthe
ISItriedtoimposeorder,italienatedtheIraqipopulationandotherSunni
insurgents;meanwhileitsweaknesshasleftitunabletocrediblyprovidesecurity
forIraqisorimposethereligiousstricturesexpectedbyalQaidasglobal
supporters.TheU.S.spokesmaninBaghdad,GeneralKevinBergner,even
claimedtohaveintelligencethatAbuUmaralBaghdadiisafictitiouscharacter
createdtofronttheISIwhilenonIraqispulledthestrings.
6

6
Dean Yates, Senior Qaeda Figure in Iraq a Myth: U.S. Military, Reuters, J uly 18, 2007, online at
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1820065720070718?sp=true
5
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

ThesheermagnitudeoffighterslistedintheSinjarRecordschallengesAbu
UmaralBaghdadisreassurancesthathisorganizationisbuiltonalocal
foundation.Althoughtherecordsarenotnecessarilyinconsistentwithhisclaim
thatthereareonly200foreignfightersleftinIraq,thescopeofalQaidas
programtoimportfighterstoIraqbelieshisefforttoconvinceIraqisthattheISI
isaninherentlyIraqiorganization.ThereisnodoubtthatalQaidasIraqi
affiliatessuccessfullyrecruitedmanyIraqis,buttheleadershipofboththeMSC
andtheISIremainlargelyforeign.Thus,theSinjarRecordsexemplifyal
QaidasfundamentalstrategicchallengeinIraq:meldingtheideological
demandsofitsglobalconstituencywiththepracticalconcernsofrelatively
secularIraqis.

MostofIraqsmilitantsdonotsufferthatstrategicproblem.Thevastmajorityof
militantsinIraqhavenothingtodowithalQaida,andtheyarefocusedonIraqi
problems:security,distributionofpowerandmoney,andsectarianism.Those
insurgentsareamixofSunninationalists,Bathists,Shiamilitias,andIslamist
organizations.MistakinganyofthesegroupsforalQaidaisnotsimplywrong,
itisdangerous.

TheISIspoliticalfailureshouldnotobscurethefactthatIraqhasinspired
thousandsofyoungmenfromaroundtheworldtojoinalQaidascause.The
SinjarRecordsareimportantnotjustforwhattheytellusaboutalQaidas
affiliatesinsideofIraq,butalsoforwhattheyrevealaboutitslogisticaland
recruitingcapabilitiesoutside.Thisanalysiswillexploresomeofthose
dynamics.Asstatedabove,theCTCwillreturntothesubjectinearly2008.We
offerthisdataandpreliminaryanalysisnowinthehopethatotherresearchers
willoffertheirowninsightsintothestrengthsandweaknessesofalQaida.

DescriptionoftheData

TheCTCreceivedacacheofmorethan700recordsfromUSSOCOM.After
eliminatingblanksandduplicates,theCTCexamined606translatedrecordsof
fightersthat,webelieve,enteredIraqviatheSyrianborder.Theserecords
containedvaryingamountsofdetailonthefighterspersonalbackground,group
affiliation,traveltoSyria,andintendedroleinIraq.Somerecordshad
considerablymoredetailthanothers.

6
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Figure1andFigure2belowareexamplesofatypicalrecordinthissamplein
bothoriginalArabicandinEnglishtranslation.Readersmaynotespelling
mistakesintheoriginalandtranslatedversions,andvaryingtransliterations.

Figure1:SampleRecordinOriginalArabicFigure2:TranslatedSampleRecord


Initial Findings

CountryofOrigin
SaudiArabiawasbyfarthemostcommonnationalityofthefightersinthis
sample;41%(244)ofthe595recordsthatincludedthefightersnationality
indicatedtheywereofSaudiArabianorigin.
7

Libyawasthenextmostcommoncountryoforigin,with18.8%(112)ofthe
fighterslistingtheirnationalitystatingtheyhailedfromLibya.Syria,Yemen,

7
After recording and comparing the information contained in the translated records, the CTC determined
that 34 records were likely duplicates of the same individual. These records were deleted from the sample
studied.
7
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
andAlgeriawerethenextmostcommonorigincountrieswith8.2%(49),8.1%
(48),and7.2%(43),respectively.Moroccansaccountedfor6.1%(36)ofthe
recordsandJordanians1.9%(11).
8

Figure3:ForeignFightersbyCountryofOrigin
Based on 595 records stating country of origin
Foreign Fighters Country of Origin
Algeria
Egypt
J ordan
Libya
Morocco
Other
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Yemen
250 200 100 150
Number of Records
50 0


TheobviousdiscrepancybetweenpreviousstudiesofIraqiforeignfightersand
theSinjarRecordsisthepercentageofLibyanfighters.(SeeAppendix1fora
briefsummaryofpreviousforeignfighterstudies.)Nopreviousstudyhas
indicatedthatmorethan4percentoffighterswereLibyan.Indeed,aJune2005
reportbyNBCquotedaU.S.governmentsourceindicatingthatLibyadidnot
makeatoptenlistoforiginnationalitiesforforeignfightersinIraq.
9
Aslateas
July15,2007,theLosAngelesTimescitedaU.S.Armysourcereportingthatonly
10percentofallforeignfightersinIraqhailedfromNorthAfrica.
10
TheSinjar
Recordssuggestthatnumberismuchhigher.Almost19percentofthefighters
intheSinjarRecordscamefromLibyaalone.Furthermore,Libyacontributedfar

8
The Other category included two fighters from France and one fighter each from Bosnia, Belgium,
England, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Sudan and Sweden.
9
Lisa Meyers, Who are the Foreign Fighters? MSNBC, June 20, 2005, online at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/
10
Ned Parker, Saudis Role in Iraq Insurgency Outlined, The Los Angeles Times, J uly 15, 2007, online at
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html
8
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
morefighterspercapitathananyothernationalityintheSinjarRecords,
includingSaudiArabia.

Figure4:ForeignFightersPerCapita
0 5 10 15 20
Number of Fighters per One Million Residents in Home Country
Yemen
Tunisia
Syria
Saudi Arabia
Morocco
Libya
J ordan
Egypt
Algeria
Foreign Fighters Per Capita

ThepreviousreportsmayhavecollectivelyunderstatedtheLibyancontribution
tothefightinIraq,buttherelativesynchronizationofearlieranalysessuggests
thatthepatternofimmigrationtoIraqhassimplyshiftedovertime.Inan
admittedlysmallsample,76.9%(30)ofthe39Libyansthatlistedtheirarrival
dateinIraqenteredthecountrybetweenMayandJuly2007,whichmayindicate
aspringsurgeofLibyanrecruitstoIraq.IfthenumberscitedbytheLos
AngelesTimesinJuly2007areanyindication,eventheU.S.Armymayhave
underestimatedtheLibyancontingentinIraq.

TheapparentsurgeinLibyanrecruitstravelingtoIraqmaybelinkedtheLibyan
IslamicFightingGroups(LIFG)increasinglycooperativerelationshipwithal
Qaida,whichculminatedintheLIFGofficiallyjoiningalQaidaonNovember3,
2007.
11

11
As-Sahab video released November 3, 2007, on the Al-Boraq Islamic Network; see OSC
FEA20071104393586
9
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
InMarch2007,theLIFGsseniorideologue,AbuYahyaalLibi,weighedinonal
QaidascontroversialdeclarationofanIslamicStateofIraq.Althoughjihadis
globallyweredividedoverthestrategicwisdomandreligiousacceptabilityof
declaringthestate,AbuYahyacalledforunityinIraq,andencouraged
mujahidineverywheretosupporttheISI:

ourbrothersareinneedofthebackingandaidoftheMuslimpeoples,with
theirbodiesandwealth,withshelterandprayer,andwithincitement.Thereis
nowaytoestablishandpreservestatesotherthanJihadinthePathofAllahand
Jihadalone....Thisisthepath,andanythingelseisfromthewhispersofSatan.
12

Whethertherewasaspring2007Libyansurgeornot,theLibyanpipelinetoIraq
seemsfirmlyestablished.Thevastmajority(84.2%)ofLibyansthatrecorded
theirroutetoIraqarrivedviathesamepathwayrunningthroughEgyptandthen
byairtoSyria.ThisrecruitingandlogisticsnetworkislikelytiedtoLIFG,which
haslongties(notallpositive)withEgyptianandAlgerianIslamistgroups.

TheannouncementthatLIFGhadofficiallyswornallegiancetoalQaidawas
longexpectedbyobserversofthegroup.BoththeideologueAbuYahyaalLibi
andthemilitaryleaderAbuLaythalLibihavelonghistorieswiththeLIFG,and
areincreasinglyprominentfiguresalongtheAfghanistanPakistanborderandin
alQaidaspropaganda.AbuLaythisnowanoperationalcommanderin
Afghanistan;andin2007,AbuYahyaissecondonlytoAymanalZawahiriasthe
mostvisiblefigureinalQaidaspropaganda.
13
Theincreasingprominenceof
LIFGfiguresinalQaidashighcommandmaybeafunctionofthegroups
logisticscapacity,includingitsnowdemonstratedabilitytomovepeople
effectivelyaroundtheMiddleEast,includingtoIraq.

City/TownofOrigin
Of591recordsthatincludedthecountryoforiginofthefighters,440also
containedinformationonthehomecity/townthefightershailedfrom.Themost
commoncitiesthatthefighterscalledhomewereDarnah,LibyaandRiyadh,
SaudiArabia,with52and51fightersrespectively.Darnah,withapopulation
justover80,000comparedtoRiaydhs4.3million,hasfarandawaythelargest
percapitanumberoffightersintheSinjarrecords.Thenextmostcommon
hometownsinrealtermslistedintheSinjarrecordswereMecca(43),Beghazi

12
Abu Yahya al-Libi, Iraq Between Stages, Conspiratorial Intrigue, Al Firdaws J ihadist Forums on March
22, 2007
13
Al-Qaeda Messaging Statistics, IntelCenter, September 9, 2007, online at
http://www.intelcenter.com/QMS-PUB-v3-3.pdf
10
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
(21),andCasablanca(17).City/townoforiginforSaudiArabia,Libya,Morocco,
Algeria,andSyriaarebrokenoutingreaterdetailbelow.

SaudiHometowns
TwohundredandfiveofSaudiArabianslistedintheSinjarRecordsnotedtheir
hometown.Riyadhwasthemostcommoncityoforiginwith25.6%(51).Mecca
contributed22.1%(44),Jeddah7.5%(15),AlJawf9.0%(18),Medina6.5%(13),
AlTaif5.5%(11),andBuraydah4.5%(9).Theremaining72fightershailedfrom
townsscatteredacrossSaudiArabia.

Figure5:MostCommonSaudiHometowns
25.6%
22.1%
9.0%
7.5%
6.5%
5.5%
4.5%
19.1%
Riyadh
Mecca
Al J awf
J eddah
Medina
Taif
Buraydah
Other
Based on 204/242 Saudi records with home town information
Saudi Arabia Fighters Home Town

LibyanHometowns
ThevastmajorityofLibyanfightersthatincludedtheirhometownintheSinjar
RecordsresidedinthecountrysNortheast,particularlythecoastalcitiesof
Darnah60.2%(53)andBenghazi23.9%(21).

11
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Figure6:MostCommonLibyanHometowns

Libyan Fighters Home Town

Based on 88/112 Libyan fighters records with hometown information
Darnah
Benghazi
60.2%
23.9%
4.5%
3.4%
5.7%
2.3%
A
Other
Misratah
Sirt
jdabiyah
BothDarnahandBenghazihavelongbeenassociatedwithIslamicmilitancyin
Libya,inparticularforanuprisingbyIslamistorganizationsinthemid1990s.
TheLibyangovernmentblamedtheuprisingoninfiltratorsfromtheSudanand
EgyptandonegrouptheLibyanFightingGroup(jamaahallibiyahal
muqatilah)claimedtohaveAfghanveteransinitsranks.
14
TheLibyan
uprisingsbecameextraordinarilyviolent.Qadhafiusedhelicoptergunshipsin
Benghazi,cuttelephone,electricity,andwatersuppliestoDarnahandfamously
claimedthatthemilitantsdeservetodiewithouttrial,likedogs.
15

AbuLaythalLibi,LIFGsEmir,reinforcedBenghaziandDarnahsimportanceto
LibyanjihadisinhisannouncementthatLIFGhadjoinedalQaida,saying:

ItiswiththegraceofGodthatwewerehoistingthebannerofjihadagainstthisapostate
regimeundertheleadershipoftheLibyanIslamicFightingGroup,whichsacrificedthe
eliteofitssonsandcommandersincombatingthisregimewhosebloodwasspilledon
themountainsofDarnah,thestreetsofBenghazi,theoutskirtsofTripoli,thedesertof
Sabha,andthesandsofthebeach.
16

14
Elie Austa, Fundamentalist Unrest, Agence France Presse, March 26, 1996.
15
Libya Said to Seal Off Area Following Unrest, Agence France Presse, March 25, 1996.
16
As-Sahab video released November 3, 2007, on the Al-Boraq Islamic Network; see OSC
FEA20071104393586
12
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Likeothergovernmentsintheregion,Libyaappearsconcernedaboutthe
possibilityofjihadiviolencewithinitsborders.InMay2007,theLibyan
governmentarrestedseveralLibyansonthegroundsthattheywereplanninga
carbombattacksimilartoanAprilattackinAlgeria.
17
AndinJuly2007,agroup
callingitselfalQaidainEasternLibyaannouncedasuicideattackinDarnah.
18

LibyasleaderMuammarQadhafihastakenmeasurestomitigatethethreatfrom
suchgroups,andhasreportedlyreleasedover80MuslimBrotherhoodactivists
inthehopethattheywillmoderatetheviewsofmoreviolentIslamistactivists.
19

IfLIFGisfunnelingLibyansintoIraq,itmayexacerbaterumoredtensions
betweenLIFGelementsoverwhetherornottoconcentrateonmilitantactivity
withinLibyasborders.
20
Suchdebatesarecommonamongnationaljihadi
movementsshiftingfocustoglobalissues.Thissortofdebatedisruptedboth
EgyptianIslamicJihadandtheEgyptianIslamicGroupinthe1990s.
21
Reports
suggestingthatLIFGsdecisiontojoinalQaidawascontroversialmaybe
exaggerated,buttheyprobablyreflectacontentiousdebateoverLIFGsfuture.
22

LIFGssupportforalQaidasIraqiaffiliatehasprobablyincreaseditsstaturein
alQaidasleadership,butcomplicateditsinternaldynamics.

MoroccanHometowns
Twentysixofthe36Moroccanfighters(72.2%)intheSinjarRecordslistedtheir
hometown.Ofthose,65.4%(17)hailedfromCasablancawhileanother19.2%(5)
werefromTetouan.Thefindingsaresomewhatsurprisingbecauseterrorism
researchershavefocusedonTetouanasahotbedofrecruitmentfortraveltoIraq.
Anecdotalreportssuggestthisfocusisappropriate,buttheSinjarRecordsarea
reminderofthelargerpictureofradicalizationandmobilizationinMorocco.

17
Kamil al-Tawil, The Americans Launch Rocket Attack Against Abu al-Layth al-Libi in Afghanistan;
Libya: Arrest of J ihadists Amid Fears of Al-Qaida Attacks, Al-Hayah, J une 22, 2007.
18
Statement on theFree Libya website posted J uly 11, 2007, online at www.libya-alhora.com
19
Gianandrea Gaiani, The Leader in Tripolis Methods to Isolate the Islamists, Sole-24 Ore, March 4,
2006.
20
Husayn al-Harbi, Bin Laden and Zawahiri Separated, Al Ray al-Amm, September 6, 2007.
21
For more on the debate within LIFG, see Mahan Abedins interview with Noman Benotman, available at:
http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=101
22
Ibid.; see also Sami Yousafzi and Ron Moreau, Al-Qaidas Family Feud, Newsweek, J uly 30, 2007,
online at http://www.mywire.com/pubs/Newsweek/2007/07/30/4074018
13
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Figure7:MostCommonMoroccanHometowns
Teroudant
3.8%
Tetouan
19.2%

AlgerianHometowns
Twentytwoof43AlgerianslistedintheSinjarRecordsnotedtheirhometown.
Ofthose,36.4%(8)werefromalWadand22.7%(5)werefromAlgiers.

Figure8:MostCommonAlgerian

36.4%
22.7%
9.1%
9.1%
22.7%
El Oued
Algiers
Baraki
Constantine
Other
Based on 22 Algerian records that included hometown information
Algerian Fighters Home Town
65.4%
Casablanca
11.5%
Tangier
Based on 26 Moroccan records that included hometown information
Morrocan Fighters Home Town
14
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
SyrianHometowns
Thirtyfiveofthe49SyriansintheSinjarRecordslistedtheirhometown.Syrian
recruitmentwaswidelydispersedexceptforDayralZawr,whichaccountedfor
34.3%(12)oftheSyrianslisted.DayralZawristhecapitalcityofaSyrian
regionalstatebythesamename.ThestatebordersIraq.

Figure9:MostCommonSyrianHometowns
Syrian Fighters Home Town
Based on 49/595 fighters from Syria in the SInjar sample
Other
Dar'a
Al Tal
Latakia
Idlib
8.6%
34.3%
Dayr Al-Zawr
11.4%
5.7%
5.7%
Al Hasaka
8.6%
11.4%
Al Dayr
14.3%

15
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Age
ThemeanreportedbirthyearoffighterslistedintheSinjarRecordswas1982;the
medianwas1984.ThedatethesefightersarrivedinSyriaontheirwaytoIraq
rangedfromAugust18,2006toAugust22,2007whichindicatesthattheaverage
agewas2425yearsoldandthemedian2223yearsold.
Figure10:BirthYearofForeignFighters
0 20 40 60 80
Number of Records
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1967
1952
Based on 413 records stating year born
Birth Year of Foreign Fighters



TheoldestfighterintheSinjarRecordswas54whenhecrossedintoIraq.Five
fighterswerebornin1990atleastoneofwhichwasstill16whenheentered
Iraq.
23
Sevenfighterswerebornin1989(1617yearsold)andfifteenin1990
manyofwhomhadnotyetturned18bythetimetheycametoSyria.The
youngestfighterinthisgroupwasAbdallahAbidAlSulaymanifromAlTaif,
SaudiArabia,whowasbornJune14,1991andarrivedinSyriaonSeptember23,
2006justthreemonthsafterturning15yearsold.
24

Thefightersoverallyouthsuggeststhatmostoftheseindividualsarefirsttime
volunteersratherthanveteransofpreviousjihadistruggles.Iftherewasamajor

23
Many records included birth year but not date of birth.
24
Some records included actual date of birth, others year born, and others no data on age of the fighter.
These figures are computed based on the estimated age in 2006. If fighters listed their year of birth in the
Gregorian system, we counted it as J anuary 1 of the record year. Similarly, when fighters listed their birth
year as a Hijri year, we considered it the first day of the year for conversion purposes.
16
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
influxofveteranjihadisintoIraq,itmayhavecomeearlierinthewar.The
incitementofanewgenerationofjihadistojointhefightinIraq,orplan
operationselsewhere,isoneofthemostworrisomeaspectsoftheongoingfight
inIraq.TheUnitedStatesshouldnotconfusegainsagainstalQaidasIraqi
franchisesasfundamentalblowsagainsttheorganizationoutsideofIraq.So
longasalQaidaisabletoattracthundredsofyoungmentojoinitsranks,itwill
remainaseriousthreattoglobalsecurity.

Occupation
MostfightersintheSinjarRecordsdidnotindicatetheirprofession,but157of
the606did.Ofthosethatdid,42.6%(67)werestudents.Theremaindervaried
widely.Fiveteacherswererecorded,aswellasthreedoctors,andfour
engineers.Theremainingresponsesvariedwidely,fromtheuseful(military:5)
tothebizarre(massagetherapist:1).

Figure11:OccupationofFighters
25

0 20 40 60 80
Number of Records
TEACHER
STUDENT
SKILLED WORKER
SELF EMPLOYED
PROFESSIONAL
POLICE
OTHER
MILITARY
MEDICAL
LABORER
BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATIVE
Based on 156 records stating occupation
Foreign Fighters Occupation

25
Student includes high school and university, secondary school, and includes religious schools.
Teacher includes high school, university, and religious schools. Military includes veterans.
Professional includes businessman, NGO, lawyers, and engineers. Administrative includes clerks,
judges assistants, and doctors assistant. Business includes business merchant and weapons merchant.
Other includes free jobs, employee, artist, painter, fitness trainer, massage therapist, bombmaker, and
farmer. Skilled worker includes carpenter, electrician, furniture maker, and welder. Unskilled worker
includes guard and driver. Laborer includes work, work in a factory.
17
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Work
MostofthefightersenteringIraqlistedtheirworkuponarrival,acategory
thatprimarilydistinguishesbetweenfightersandsuicidebombers.
26
The
categoryseemstoreflecttherolefightershopedtohaveupontheirarrivalin
Iraq,butitmightindicateanassignmentdeterminedbylocaladministrators.
ThetranslatedversionsoftheSinjarrecordsconverttheArabicwordistishhadiin
avarietyofways:asmartyr,martyrdom,andsuicidebomber.Theword
itselfmeansmartyrdomseeker.Wehavecodedallsuchindividualssuicide
bombersinanefforttoavoidconfusion.AlthoughalQaidasideology
embracestheconceptofbecomingamartyrduringthecourseoftraditional
militaryoperations,thepurposeofthesepersonnelrecordswastoenable
commanderstoefficientlyallocateindividualsforspecifictasks.Insuch
circumstances,istishhadilikelyreferstoindividualsintendedforsuicideattacks.

Ofthe389fightersthatdesignatedtheirworkinIraq,56.3%(217)weretobe
suicidebombers.Another41.9%(166)weredesignatedmoretraditionalfighters.
Severalrespondentslistedmorespecializedtasks,includingmediaoperations
(2),doctor(3),andlegalskills(1).Wehavechosentocombinethesuicide
bomberandmartyrdatacategories.
Figure12:WorkofAllFighters

Foreign Fighter Recruited Roles
Based on 389 fighters' records including information on intended work
Other
Fighter
Suicide Bomber
1.8%
41.9%
56.3%

26
Types of work are listed in various ways in the original Arabic and in translation. Listings such as
combatant, and fighters, were counted as fighter. Listings such as martyr, martyrdom, suicide,
and suicide mission are counted as suicide bomber.
18
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

NumerousobservershaveconcludedthatSaudiArabiansareoverrepresented
intheranksofIraqisuicidebombers.Onerecentstudyanalyzed94suicide
bombersinIraqanddeterminedthat44wereSaudi,7Kuwaiti,7European,six
SyrianandtheremainderscatteredacrosstheMideastandNorthAfrica.
27

TheSinjarRecordssupporttheconclusionthatthepluralityofsuicidebombers
enteringIraqbetweenAugust2006andAugust2007wereSaudi.However,they
challengethenotionthat,onceinIraq,Saudiforeignfightersaremorelikelythan
theircomradesfromotherlocationstobecomesuicidebombers.Libyanand
MoroccanfightersthatlistedtheirworkintheSinjarRecordsweremuchmore
likelytoregistersuicidebomberthanfightersfromothernations.

Figure13:IntendedWorkofFightersbyNationality
Country Suicide
Bombers
Fighters Other Total
SaudiArabia 50.3%(76) 48.3%(73) 1.3%(2) 151
Libya 85.2%(52) 13.1%(8) 1.6%(1) 61
Morocco 91.7%(22) 8.3%(2) 0 24
Syria 65.6%(21) 31.2%(10) 3.1%(1) 32
Algeria 13.9%(5) 83.3%(30) 2.8%(1) 36
Yemen 46.1%(18) 53.9%(21) 0 39
Tunisia 41.7%(10) 58.3%(14) 0 24

Ofthe244SaudifightersintheSinjarRecords,61.8%(151)listedtheirwork.
Ofthat151,50.3%(76)plannedtobecomesuicidebombers.Amongthe238non
SaudiswholistedtheirworkintheSinjarRecords,59.2%(141)weredenoted
asfuturesuicidebombers.LibyanandMoroccanjihadistswerefarmorelikely,
asapercentageoffighterswhoarrivedinIraq,tobelistedassuicidebombers.
Ofthe112LibyansintheRecords,54.4%(61)listedtheirwork.Fully85.2%
(51)oftheseLibyanfighterslistedsuicidebomberastheirworkinIraq.

RoutetoIraq
MostofthefightersintheSinjarRecordsdonotexplaintheroutetheytookto
Iraq.Furthermore,thefightersthatdidenterinformationabouttheirroutewere
veryinconsistentintheirmethodology.Somefightersincludedtheirhome
countryasastop,othersdidnot.SomeincludedIraqasastopontheirwayto

27
Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data
and Documentary Evidence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:6 (2006) 616-19
19
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Iraq.SomefighterslistedSyriaasastopontheirroutetoIraq,whileothers
seemedtothinkitwasassumedanddidnotmentionSyriadespiteprovidingthe
nameoftheircoordinatorinSyria.
28
Meanwhile,itisnotclearwhatfighters
consideredastop.Forsome,thatmayhavesimplybeenacountrytransited
onthewaytoIraq;forothers,itmayhaverequiredamoreextensivelayover.

DespitethedataprobleminassessingtheroutefighterstooktoIraq,itisclear
thatroutesdiffereddramaticallyfromcountrytocountry.Ofthe63recordsof
SaudisthatdescribedtheirroutetoIraq,47.6%listedadirectroutefromSaudi
intoSyria,whileanother36.5%(23)notedthattheytraveledfirsttoJordan,then
toSyria.LibyanfightersseemedtofollowanestablishedpathtoSyria.Ofthe52
LibyanfightersthatlistedtheirroutetoIraq,50traveledfirsttoEgypt,while2
flewdirectlytoSyria.FromEgypt,84.2%(43)flewdirectlytoSyriawhile13.4%
(7)wenttoJordanandthenenteredSyria.TheSinjarRecordsalsohintatan
establishedpathwayfromMoroccothroughTurkeyintoSyria.Ofthe12
MoroccanfightersthatdescribedtheirroutetoSyria,tenflewdirectlytoTurkey
whiletheothertwocrossedfirstintoSpainbeforetravelingtoTurkey.

Figure14:RoutetoIraq
29

0 10 20 30 40
YEMEN-SYRIA
YEMEN-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA
YEMEN-MALAYSIA-SYRIA
YEMEN-EGYPT-SYRIA
YEMEN-EGYPT-J ORDAN-SYRIA
TUNISIA-TURKEY-SYRIA
TUNISIA-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA
TUNISIA-GERMANY-TURKEY-SYRIA
SYRIA-LEBANON-SYRIA
SYRIA
SWEDEN-EGYPT-SYRIA
SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA
SAUDI ARABIA-J ORDAN-SYRIA
SAUDI ARABIA-DUBAI-SYRIA
SAUDI ARABIA-BAHRAIN-SYRIA
SAUDI ARABIA-BAHRAIN-EGYPT-SYRIA
SAUDI ARABIA-ALGERIA-J ORDAN-SYRIA
MOROCCO-TURKEY-SYRIA
MOROCCO-SYRIA
MOROCCO-SPAIN-TURKEY-SYRIA
LIBYA-SYRIA
LIBYA-EGYPT-SYRIA
LIBYA-EGYPT-J ORDAN-SYRIA
KUWAIT-SAUDI ARABIA-J ORDAN-SYRIA
J ORDAN-SYRIA
EGYPT-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA
EGYPT-IRELAND-FRANCE-SYRIA
ALGERIA-TUNISIA-LIBYA-SYRIA
ALGERIA-SYRIA
ALGERIA-SAUDI ARABIA-SYRIA
Route Taken by Fighters from Country of Origin to Iraq via Syria

50

28
AnexampleofthisisBaderShourie,recordnumber90.NMEC2007657770.
29
Figure 14, noting the routes fighters took to Iraq lists the country of origin, stopover nations, and Syria.
The Syria category includes mostly Syrian fighters, but includes several others that only listed Syria
20
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
TheSinjarRecordsdonotoffermuchinformationaboutthefighterstravelonce
inSyria.OnecluemaybethedisproportionatenumberofSyrianfightersthat
listedDayralZawr(34.3%)astheirhometown.Thereisanecdotalevidencethat
DayralZawrwasanimportanttransitpointforjihadishopingtoinfiltrateIraq,
atleastuntil2006.ADecember2005reportinAlHayahtrackedagroupof
AlgerianandSaudifighterstryingtocrossfromDayralZawr,throughthe
bordertownofAlbuKamal,andthenintoIraq.
30
Likewise,ayoungSaudithat
wascapturedinIraqrecountedhowhearrivedthereafterusingthesame
pathwayfromDayralZawr,viaminibustoAlbuKamalandbyfootacrossthe
bordertoalQaim.
31
AbuUmar,aPalestinianfighterwhocrossedintoIraqto
trainalQaidatroopsalsohasdescribedtransitingDayralZawronhiswayto
alQaiminIraq.
32
AlMuhajiralIslami,afrequentposteronSyriandissident
webforumsexplainedthattheDayralZawrsectionoftheborderwas
particularlyeasytocrossbecauseofthelinksbetweentribesoneithersideofthe
border.
33

TheSinjarRecordswerecapturedfarnorthofAlbuKamalinSyriaandalQaim
inIraq,whichsuggeststhatthesmugglingrouteforfightersintoIraqhasshifted
north.Nonetheless,thecityofDayralZawrmaystillbeanimportantlogistics
hubforfightershopingtoenterIraq.DayralZawrsitsontheroadnorthfrom
DamascusandEastfromAleppo,whichmakesitalogicallocationforalogistics
base,whetherheadingfurthereasttotheIraqicityofalQaimornorthtoSinjar.

30
Muhammad Muqaddam, Facts Disclosed by Fundamentalists, Al-Hayah, December 8, 2005.
31
Malfi al-Harbi, Al-Shayi, a Victim that was Lured to Iraq, Al-Riyad, November 21, 2007.
32
Interview with Abu Umar, Al Arabiyah 1905, December 7, 2007
33
http://www.globalterroralert.com/pdf/0805/roadtoiraq0805.pdf Global Terror Alert does not list the
original website, but it was likely the Syrian Islamic Forum that was hosted at www.nnuu.org during 2005.
21
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
EntryDate
Twohundredandthreeofthe606SinjarRecordsprovidethedatethefighter
enteredIraq.ThemostcommonmonthtoarrivewasNovember2006,when38
fighterswererecorded.ThesecondbusiestmonthwasJuly2007,with32
recordedarrivals.Interestingly,inDecember2006onlyonefighterwasrecorded
anditwassomeonenamedHafid,whostartedhisjourneyinBelgium.

Figure15:DateEnteredIraqbyMonth
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
N
u
m
b
e
r

o
f

R
e
c
o
r
d
s

o
f

2
0
2


C
o
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g

A
r
r
i
v
a
l

D
a
t
e
Aug-06Sep-06Oct-06Nov-06Dec-06J an-07Feb-07Mar-07Apr-07May-07J un-07 J ul-07Aug-07
Number of Foreign Fighters Arriving by Month

TheSinjarRecordsdonotlistanyfightersenteringIraqinMarchorApril2007.
Thisisafascinating,butsuspicious,statistic.Only3fightersarerecorded
enteringinFebruary2007,whichbolstersthenotionthattheISIslogistic
networkwasdisruptedforsomereasoninearly2007,butitisalsopossiblethat
therecordsforthattimeperiodwerelost.

ItispossibletoestimatetheentrydateforfightersintheSinjarRecordsby
trackingthewatermarksandletterheadonthedocumentsthemselves.The
IslamicStateofIraq(ISI)wasestablishedinOctober2006,whichindicatesthat
fightersrecordedonISIstationaryenteredIraqafterthatdate.Apparently,the
alQaidasaffiliatesdidnotexchangetheirstationaryimmediatelyaftertheISI
wasestablished.SomeofthefightersrecordedonMujahidinShuraCouncil
22
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
(MSC)stationarylistfightersthatarrivedinNovember2006aftertheISIhad
replacedtheMSC.ThefirstfighterlistedonISIstationaryisHafid,theBelgian
whoarrivedinDecember2006.Ofthe606totalrecords,56.1%(340)areclearly
listedasISIrecruits,while16.8%(102)arelistedonMSCstationary.

TravelingPartners
TheSinjarRecordsdonotprovidemuchinformationabouthowindividual
fighterswererecruited(orselfselected)forthefightinIraq.Thereisinteresting
evidence,however,thatmanyofthefighterssignedupingroupstotravelto
Iraq,ratherthanontheirown.Ofthe202fightersthatrecordedtheirdateof
arrivalinIraq,46.5%(94)ofthemarrivedonthesamedayasanotherindividual
fromtheirhometown.Suchevidencestronglysuggeststhattheindividuals
traveledtogetherasagroupand,insomecases,mayhavebeenrecruited
simultaneously.

OneofthelargergroupsbegantheirjourneyinDarnah,Libyaandarrivedin
IraqonMay9,2007.AbuAbbas,AbualWalid,AbuBakar,AsadAllah,and
AbuAbdalKabirallwereistishhadimartyrdomseekers.Thefivemendidnot
signupthroughthesamelocalcoordinatorinDarnah.AbuAbbas,wholisted
hisoccupationasEmployeesignedupthroughacoordinatornamedQamar,
AbualWalidandAbuBakarastudentandatrafficcopreceivedsupport
fromsomeonenamedSaraj.AsadAllahandAbuAbdalKabirreceivedhelp
fromacoordinatornamedBashar.AsadAllahwasateacher.Noneofthemen
knewtheircoordinatorbeforetheydecidedtogotoIraq.

ItisnotclearifthefivementraveledtogetherfromDarnahorinseparate
groups,butallfivewenttoEgyptandthentoSyria.OnceinSyria,thefive
probablyweretogetherasagroup.AllfivelistedamannamedAbuAbbas
(whotheyunanimouslyliked)astheirSyriancoordinator.Whenthefivemen
crossedintoIraqtheyeachcontributedseveralthousandSyrianLiratotheISI,
butdidnotreportanyformofID.

AlQaidasSyriaProblem
TheauthorsofthisreportbelievethatallofthefightersintheSinjarRecords
enteredIraqfromSyria.MostoftheSinjarRecordsofferevidenceoftransit
throughSyria,eitherbecausethecountryislistedasthefinalstoponthewayto
IraqorbecausethefighternamedtheirSyrianCoordinator.Furthermore,
SinjarsitsinNorthwestIraqapproximately10milesfromtheSyrianborder.Ina
locationsoclosetoSyriaandsofarfromotherborders,itwouldbesurprisingto
findrecordsofindividualsthatdidnotcrossintoIraqfromSyria.
23
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Itisnotclear,however,howcomplicitSyriasgovernmentisinthemovementof
personnelthroughitsterritory.TheSyriangovernmentisledbyaBaathist
regimedominatedbymembersoftheAlawitesect,whichisaformofShiaIslam
thatembraceselementssimilartoChristiantheology.

ThehistoryoftheSyriangovernmentsrelationshipwithalienIslamistmilitants
islongandcomplicated,rangingfromopensupporttobrutalsuppressionof
jihadiactivistsoperatingwithinitsborders.Syrianpolicytowardsuchfightersis
likelydrivenbyitsperceptionofnationalinterest,ratherthanideological
kinship.Inthelate1970s,forinstance,Syriasentthousandsoftroopsintosouth
LebanoninsupportofthePLOsguerrillaeffortsthereandprovidedlogistical
supporttoforeignvolunteerswhowantedtojointhejihadonthatfront,yetat
thesametimeitcarriedoutanextremelyviolentcampaignagainsttheSyrian
MuslimBrotherhoodsuprisinginsideSyria,aninsurgencythatalsoincluded
significantnumbersofforeignfighters.
34

SyriahasaninterestinkeepingtheU.S.backedregimeinIraqoffbalance,butit
mustalsofearabacklashfromjihadigroups,manyofwhichdespiseAlawite
apostasyasmuchormorethantheUnitedStates.Indeed,someofAbu
MusabalZarqawismostimportantearlyrecruitswereveteransoftheMuslim
BrotherhoodsuprisingagainsttheSyriangovernmentinthe1980s.
35
ForSyria,
supportingjihadigroupsisatbestadoubleedgedsword.

AnecdotaldatafromSyrianhistoryhintsatSyriasstrategytoday.Formerjihadi
militantAbulWalidMustafaHamidhasdescribedhowheandagroupofjihadi
volunteerstraveledfromAbuDhabitosouthLebanonviaSyriaintheearly
1980s;attheLebaneseSyrianborderheandhisentiregroupwerephotographed
andhadtheirpassportstakentobecopiedbytheSyrianintelligenceservice.
36

ThoughthisactionwasostensiblypartofthesupportthattheSyrianswere
providingtothesevolunteersastheymadetheirwaytoLebanon,AbulWalid
learnedanumberofyearslaterthatheandseveralotherofthemenprocessedby

34
For an insider's account of the Muslim Brotherhood insurgency against the Syrian government from the
Harmony Database, see Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, AFGP-2002-600080 and a case study developed using this
and other Harmony documents at Chapter 3 of Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaidas
Organizational Vulnerabilities available at http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aq_syria.asp
35
Fuad Husayn, Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qaida, serialized in Al Quds al-Arabi, May
14, 2005, p. 17.
36
AFGP-2002-600087, p. 17; excerpts of this source were also published by Muhammad al-Shafi'i in al-
Sharq al-Awsat on October 26, 2006, and subsequently translated by FBIS, GMP20061026866001.
24
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
SyrianintelligenceatthattimeweresubsequentlyplacedonSyriasterrorist
watchlist.
37

Syriawouldmuchratherbeatransitpointforjihadisthantheirfinaldestination.
SyriasleadersmaydeterminethataninfluxoffightersintoIraqsupportsits
nationalinterests,butSyriaiscertainlytrackingsuchfightersandlikelyhopes
thattheydonotsurvivetoleaveIraq.

TheSinjarRecordsdooffercluesabouthowalQaidasmugglesitsvolunteers
throughSyria.ManyofthefightersintheSinjarRecordslistedaSyrian
coordinatororcoordinatorsthatpresumablydirectedtheirtraveluponarrivalin
Syria.Ofthe606totalrecords,41.9%(254)listedatleastonecontactinSyria.
Manylistedmultiplecontacts.Giventhemultipledifferenttranslationsand
transliterationsoftheSyriancoordinatorsaswellascommonnameslikelyheld
bymorethanonecoordinator,itisdifficulttoaccuratelymapthenetworkof
SyriancoordinatorsandwhotheyhelpedtransitintoIraqafterarrivalinSyria.
Basedonthisinitialassessmentofthedata,severalnamedindividualsarelisted
morefrequentlyasthefighterscoordinatorinSyria.

ThefighterslistedintheSinjarRecordswereaskedtophysicallydescribetheir
Syriancoordinator,divulgehowmuchmoneytheSyriancoordinatordemanded,
andratethefightersoverallexperiencewiththecoordinator.Thesequestions
mayindicatethatalQaidasadministratorsinIraqmistrusttheirSyrian
coordinators.SuchsuspicioniscommoninalQaida.NumerousHarmony
documentsrevealalQaidasrigorouseffortstoensureitsagentsareusingfunds
efficiently
38
.

AlQaidaschallengeincoordinatingtransportationinSyrialikelyrunsmuch
deeperthanminorgraft.Mediareportssuggeststhatmanyofthehuman
smugglersalQaidausesinSyriaarefreelancersworkingformoneyratherthan
alQaidasideologicalallies,whichwouldexplainwhythetravelingfighters
handlersinIraqaresoconcernedabouttheirfees.
39
Someofthesenetworksare

37
AFGP-2002-600087, p. 17.
38
The tradeoffs Al-Qaida must make when balancing security and financial efficiency are described by
CTC Research Fellow J acob Shapiro in Section I of Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaidas
Organizational Vulnerabilities. See http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp for the CTCs
previous analyses of Harmony documents and a compilation of all documents released to the CTC by
USSOCOM thus far.
39
Hala J aber and Ali Rafat Suicide Bombers Head to Iraq from Damascus The Sunday Times October 7,
2007
25
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
likelycriminal,butothersmaybelinkedtoIraqiinsurgentfactionsthatwere
operatedfromSyriaaftertheU.S.invasion.
40

AsketchofSyrianCoordinatornetworksbasedonthelimiteddatainthisone
yearsampleisprovidedatFigure16.ThecorenetworkofSyrianhandlers
appearstostillbeactivewithacertainAbuUmarandAbuAbbasplayingkey
rolesincoordinatingforeignfightertransitthroughSyria.Theactivitiesofthe
auxiliaryhandlersthatcanbemeasuredusingthisdata,however,appeartobe
largelyinactivenow.

Figure16:ActiveSyrianCoordinatorNetworksOverTime
41

IfalQaidasSyrianlogisticsnetworksaretrulyrunbymercenaries,thereare
manypolicyoptionsavailabletocooptormanipulatethem.Itisalmost
inconceivablethatSyrianintelligencehasnotalreadytriedtopenetratethese
networks,butthatdoesnotprecludeAmericanagenciesfromattemptingthe
same.TheUnitedStatesabilitytodestroynetworksinsideofSyriaislimited,

40
Muidd Fayyad, Interview With Major General Muhammad Abdallah al-Shahwani, director of Iraq's
National Intelligence Service, al-Sharq al-Awsat, J anuary 5, 2005.
41
Network analysis software was used to generate this initial sketch of the Syrian coordinator networks.
The CTCs follow on report due out early next year will incorporate greater amounts of data and more
sophisticated use of this powerful analytical tool.
26
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
butitmaybepossibletobribeorotherwisecoercesuchcoordinatorstodisrupt
theiroperationsorrevealinformationaboutalQaidasorganizationinIraq.

OneofthepersistentmysteriesoftheIraqwarisexactlyhowIslamistgroupslike
alQaidawereabletocooperatewithIraqssecularSunniinsurgentsearlyinthe
insurgencyperiod.Sinceearly2007,relationsbetweenalQaidasISIandits
secularcounterpartshavedeteriorateddramatically,tothepointwhere
shootoutsandassassinationsbetweengroupsarenowcommonplace.Itis
conceivablethatdeterioratingrelationsbetweentheISIandsecularinsurgents
haveweakenedtheISIslogisticalchain,particularlyinSyria,whereIraqi
Baathistshavestrongties.

Conclusions

TheSinjarRecordsofferunrivaledinsightintoforeignfightersenteringIraq
betweenAugust2006andAugust2007.Thedatarevealsseveralcritical
findings:

SaudismadeupthelargestcontingentofforeignfightersenteringIraq.
Libyansweresecond(firstifmeasuredinpercapitaterms)andSyriansa
distantthird.Intermsofsheernumbers,Saudisconstitutedthelargest
groupofforeignfightersandcontributedthemostoverallsuicide
bombers,butthepercentageofSaudifighterslistedassuicidebombers
wasactuallylowerthannonSaudis.

RecentpoliticaldevelopmentsinAfghanistanandPakistan,the
prevalenceofLibyanfightersinIraq,andevidenceofawellestablished
smugglingrouteforLibyansthroughEgypt,suggeststhatLibyanfactions
(primarilytheLibyanIslamicFightingGroup)areincreasinglyimportant
inalQaida.TheSinjarRecordsoffersomeevidencethatLibyansbegan
surgingintoIraqinlargernumbersbeginninginMay2007.Mostofthe
LibyanrecruitscamefromcitiesinNorthEastLibya,anarealongknown
forjihadilinkedmilitancy.Libyanfightersweremuchmorelikelythan
othernationalitiestobelistedassuicidebombers(85%forLibyans,56%
forallothers).

TheSinjarRecordsreinforceanecdotalaccountssuggestingthatal
QaidasIraqiaffiliatesrelyonsmugglersandcriminalsratherthantheir
ownpersonneltofunnelrecruitsintoIraq.
27
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

ManyoftheforeignfightersenteringIraqarrivedwithagroupfromtheir
hometown,suggestingthatalQaidasrecruiterstrytoattractgroupsof
friendssimultaneously.

ThemajorityoffightersthatlistedtheiroccupationbeforetravelingtoIraq
werestudents.Universitieshavebecomeacriticalrecruitingfieldforal
Qaida.

TheSinjarRecordsrevealseveralweaknessesthattheUnitedStatesandother
governmentscanexploit:

AlQaidasrelianceoncriminalandsmugglingnetworksexposesittothe
greedofmercenaries.Inmanycases,theUnitedStatesshouldtargetwork
todestroythesenetworks,buttheU.S.mustremainflexibleenoughto
recognizeopportunitiestocoopt,ratherthansimplyannihilate,such
systems.TheU.S.maybeabletousefinancialincentivesandcreative
securityguaranteestosecurecooperationfromsomesmugglers.
42

TheLibyanIslamicFightingGroupsunificationwithalQaidaandits
apparentdecisiontoprioritizeprovidinglogisticalsupporttotheIslamic
StateofIraqislikelycontroversialwithintheorganization.Itislikelythat
someLIFGfactionsstillwanttoprioritizethefightagainsttheLibyan
regime,ratherthanthefightinIraq.Itmaybepossibletoexacerbate
schismswithinLIFG,andbetweenLIFGsleadersandalQaidas
traditionalEgyptianandSaudipowerbase.

TheIslamicStateofIraqhasfailedpoliticallybecauseithasbeenunableto
balancethepracticaldemandsofitslocalIraqiconstituencyandthe
religiousdemandsofitsforeignsupporters.TheISIsclumsyeffortto
balancethesedemandshasalienateditfromotherSunniinsurgents.The
U.S.shouldnotbecontenttoexploitthisfailureonlyinIraq.TheISIs
politicalfailureexemplifiesthefundamentalbankruptcyofalQaidas
ideology.TheU.S.,itsallies,andmoderatesofallkinds,candiscretely
usetheISIspoliticalfailuretoillustratethatlargerideologicalpoint.

42
See Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qaidas Organizational Vulnerabilities available at
http://ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_menu.asp
28
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
TheSyrianandLibyangovernmentssharetheUnitedStatesconcerns
aboutviolentsalafijihadiideologyandtheviolenceperpetratedbyits
adherents.Thesegovernments,likeothersintheMiddleEast,fear
violenceinsidetheirbordersandwouldmuchratherradicalelementsgo
toIraqratherthancauseunrestathome.U.S.andCoalitioneffortsto
stemtheflowoffightersintoIraqwillbeenhancediftheyaddressthe
entirelogisticalchainthatsupportsthemovementoftheseindividuals
beginningintheirhomecountriesratherthanjusttheirSyrianentry
points.

TheU.S.maybeabletoincreasecooperationfromgovernmentstostem
theflowoffightersintoIraqbyaddressingtheirconcernsaboutdomestic
jihadiviolence.

29
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Appendix1

ThefirststudyofforeignfightersinIraqwasauthoredinMarch2005byIsraeli
researcherReuvenPaz.Pazstudied154fightersidentifiedonjihadiwebforums
ashavingbeenmartyredinIraqandusedtheirmemorialbiographiesto
identifytheirnationality.
43
Pazsdatabreakdownlikethis:

SaudiArabia:94(61%) Algeria:2
Syria:16(10.4%) Morocco:2(onewaslivinginSpain)
Iraq:13(8.4%) Yemen:2
Kuwait:11(7.1%) Tunisia:2
Jordan:4 Palestine:1
Lebanon:3(onewaslivinginDenmark) Dubai:1
Libya:2 Sudan:1(livinginSaudiArabia)

InJune2005,anNBCNewsreportcitedaU.S.Armyofficialwholistedthetop
tencountriesoforiginforforeignfightersinIraq:Egypt,Iran,Jordan,Lebanon,
thePalestinianterritories,SaudiArabia,Sudan,Syria,Tunisia,andYemen.
44
The
officialwouldnotprovidethenumberoffightersfromeachcountry.

SeveralmonthsafterthePazreportwasreleased,itwascriticizedbyAnthony
CordesmanandNawafObaidoftheCenterforStrategicandInternational
Studies(CSIS)whoarguedthatPazoverstatedtheSaudipresenceinIraq.
45

CordesmanandObaid,whosedatawereprovidedbySaudiintelligence,claimed
thatthereweresome3000foreignfightersoperatinginIraq,butthatonly12
percentwereSaudi.TheCordesman/Obaidestimateslooklikethis:

Algeria:600(20%)
Syria:550(18%)
Yemen:500(17%)
Sudan:450(15%)
Egypt:400(13%)
SaudiArabia:350(12%)
OtherCountries:150(5%)

43
Reuven Paz, Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq: an Analysis, PRISM Series on Global J ihad, No. 1/3, March
2005, online at http://www.e-prism.org/images/PRISM_no_1_vol_3_-_Arabs_killed_in_Iraq.pdf
44
Lisa Meyers, Who are the Foreign Fighters? MSNBC J une 20, 2005, online at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8293410/
45
Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdoms Response,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2005.
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/050919_saudimiltantsiraq.pdf
30
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
31

InDecember2005,anotherresearcherusedinformationgleanedfromonline
sourcestoassessthenationalityofalQaidalinkedfightersinIraq.Citingalist
of429slainSalafijihadispostedonajihadilinkedwebforum,Muradal
Shishaniconcludedthat53percentwereSaudi,13percentSyrian,8percentIraqi,
5.8percentJordanian,4percentKuwaitiand3.8percentLibyan.
46

CitingstatisticsreleasedbyMultiNationalForcesIraqinlate2005,Alan
KruegerconcludedthatmostfighterswereSyrian,withSudanese,Saudis,and
Egyptiansalsocontributingalargenumberoffighters.Ofthe311fighterswhose
nationalitieswerereleased,onlysevenwereLibyan.
47

Twoyearslater,theLosAngelesTimescitedofficialU.S.militaryfigures
statingthat45percentofallforeignfightersinIraqcomefromSaudiArabia.
48

Accordingtothearticle,15percentarrivedfromLebanonandSyriaandanother
10percentwerefromNorthAfrica.TheLosAngelesTimesarticlealsocited
statisticsindicatingthat50percentofallSaudisarrivedinIraqtobecomesuicide
bombers.

46
Murad al-Shishani, The Salafi-J ihadist Movement in Iraq: Recruitment Methods and Arab Volunteers,
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 3:23, December 2, 2005.
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369842
47
Krueger, Alan What Makes a Terrorist (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 2006) pp. 83
48
Ned Parker, Saudis Role in Iraq Insurgency Outlined, The Los Angeles Times, J uly 15, 2007, online at
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimesA98.html