commentary

Regional Variations and Impact ­ ongress (INC) and the Nationalist Con-
C
gress Party (NCP) coalition at the helm.

of Delimitation in Maharashtra As political competition in the state be-

comes more and more intense and the re-
gional support base of the parties becomes
more and more volatile, the district has
Mala Lalvani become important as a political unit
­(Datar 2004). Both the Lok Sabha and the

An attempt is made here to bring
to the fore the politico-economic
dimension of regional variation
in Maharashtra and the possible
impact of delimitation on the
outcome of the 2009 assembly
elections. Empirical observation
shows that at least on paper,
delimitation with its greater
weight to the urban centres will
benefit the Bharatiya Janata
Party-Shiv Sena alliance over
the Nationalist Congress Party-
Congress coalition. However
there is a silver lining for the
Congress – the strongest factor
in favour of the Congress
remains the Maharashtra
Navnirman Sena.
This paper draws in parts on a study “Political,
Social and Economic Overview of
Maharashtra”. Financial support of the
Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore is
duly acknowledged. Sincere thanks to Abhay
Pethe, Ajit Karnik and Romar Correa for
their comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimer applies.
Mala Lalvani (mala.lalvani@gmail.com) is
with the Department of Economics, University
of Mumbai.
Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   October 3, 2009  vol xliv no 40
T
he state of Maharashtra has been
branded as a state with an impressive
past but uncertain future (World
Bank 2002). The fact that it accoun­ted for
nearly one-fourth of the gross value of India’s
industrial sector, earned it the reputation
of “power house of ­India”. Irresponsible
fiscal policy resulted in the state reeling
under a heavy debt burden – the debt-gross
state domestic product (GSDP) ratio stood at
26% in 2006-07. Interest payments cur-
rently take up 16% of the revenue receipts,
which is a much improved situation from
its share being 22% in 2002-03. While the
fiscal situation in the state has shown some
improvement in the recent past, this article
draws attention to the persistence of
­regional skewness in economic growth and
the political set-up of Maharashtra. It
­attempts to bring to the fore the political
underpinnings of the regional imbalances
on the economic front. We find that while
Maharashtra’s overall growth performance
has not been adver­sely affected by changes
in the incumbent party, the regional
progress or otherwise has most certainly
been affected by electoral outcomes.
1  Political History:
The Regional Dimension
The political history of Maharashtra is
clearly a story of Congress domination and
a weak opposition. Two dents have been
made in what could be termed as the Con-
gress “monopoly”. The first was in 1979
when the Progresive Democratic Front
(PDF) and Janata Party combine formed
the government, but then too it was Sharad
Pawar, an ex-Congressman, who became
chief minister despite being the minority
party in the coalition. The second stint of
a non-Congress government occurred in
1995 when the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) and Shiv Sena coalition assumed
­office. Barring these two phases, the
­Congress “fortress” has stood tall. Since
1999 the state has reverted to being a Con-
gress loyalist with the Indian National
asse­mbly elections of 2004 suggest that
coalition politics has changed the structure
of competition in the state. A prominent
feature of the 2004 election result that
Palshikar (2004) emphasises is the regional
variation. Clearly each of the administra-
tive regions of Maharashtra has its distinct
political history which appears to have
had a bearing on its economic perform-
ance. It is this politico-economic link that
we attempt to trace in this ­article.
The 2004 assembly election results of
Western Maharashtra once again proved
that it was a stronghold of the Congress-
NCP combine. It reflected the trend set in
the Lok Sabha polls of that year when the
alliance won 10 of the 12 seats in the re-
gion although the vote shares of the two
coalitions were not sharply different. The
Congress-NCP combine got 43% of the
votes while the Sena-BJP combine was close
at heels with 42% in the assembly elections.
Two important observations that one needs
to make here – first, the progress of this
region, especially the support to sugar co-
operatives here has happened at the ex-
pense of other regions of Maharashtra
and is directly linked to the fact that this
is traditionally a Congress stronghold
(Lalvani 2008). In fact, even a cursory look
at a list of names of prominent leaders in
Maharashtra’s politics, who have been as-
sociated with sugar ­co0peratives confirms
that all the political heavyweights hail
from Western Maharashtra, thus strength-
ening the argument that political clout of
Western Maharashtra far exceeds that of
the eastern region. These politically power­
ful sugar personalities when classified
­re­gionally makes the skewness appear
stark – 19 hailed from Marathwada, six
from Vidarbha and a whopping 68, that is,
73% were from Western Maharashtra region
alone! Also, the major reason behind this
success of Western Maharashtra is the de-
velopment of irrigation in this region (once
again at the cost of other regions of Maha­­
rashtra), has led to greater development of
15
commentary

MANOHAR
this region. The second observation to be an increase in votes in comparison to the
made here is that vote share of the BJP- Lok Sabha election. The two Congress
Sena in the 2004 elections, which was parties were virtually wiped out in this re-
RCSS POLICY STUDIES
close on the heels of the Congress-NCP, gion. The BJP-Sena alliance, however,
NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION
should serve as a clarion call for the Con- gained only a very minuscule fraction of
MEASURES IN SOUTH ASIA
gress-NCP in the 2009 assembly election. votes in this region. The entry of BSP in the Problems and Prospects
Table 1: Vote Shares in Mumbai in Lok Sabha Election 2009 (%) state of Maharashtra appears RCSS Policy Studies 35
Constituency MNS Shiv Sena BSP BJP NCP INC to have complicated the politi- Upendra Choudhury
81-7304-661-1, 2006, 122p. Rs. 250 Pb
Mumbai north 21.53 – 1.05 36.40 – 37.25 cal calculations of all other
Mumbai north-west 17.54 30.48 1.37 – – 35.91 parties. In the Lok Sabha elec- INDO-PAK CONFLICTS RIPE TO
Mumbai north-east 29.22 – 3.73 31.53 31.97 - tions of 2004 the BSP contest- RESOLVE?
Mumbai north-central 19.95 – 6.53 21.79 – 48.05 ed 46 seats and in the assem- RCSS Policy Studies 34
Mumbai south-central 18.09 30.36 3.08 – – 43.00 Rizwan Zeb and Suba Chandran
bly elections it contested in
Mumbai south 24.90 22.78 5.27 – – 42.46 81-7304-651-4, 2005, 116p. Rs. 250 Pb
272 seats. The BSP may not
In the Konkan region, Sindhudurg and have succeeded in capturing any seats but SMALL ARMS AND THE SECURITY
Ratnagiri districts have been strongholds of it certainly did cause a dispersal of Con- DEBATE IN SOUTH ASIA
the Sena-BJP alliance. It had won all the gress votes. The landslide victory of BSP RCSS Policy Studies 33
Salma Malik and Mallika Joseph
seats here in the 1999 assembly elections. under Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh, has 81-7304-625-5, 2005, 90p. Rs. 225 Pb
In 2004 the Sena-BJP repeated the perform- added to its strength even in other states
ance in Sindhudurg, the home district of and it has emerged as a significant player STABILITY THROUGH ECONOMIC
former Sena chief minister Narayan Rane, in the political stage of Maharashtra. As COOPERATION IN A NUCLEAR
ENVIRONMENT
but lost ground to the NCP in Ratnagiri by far as economic development goes, this re- RCSS Policy Studies 31
losing two seats. Mumbai city holds pride gion has consistently ranked third. Bar- Saira Yamin
of place in Maharashtra. Mumbai has for ring Nagpur and Wardha all other districts 81-7304-635-2, 2005, 84p. Rs. 225 Pb
many years now been seen as the fortress of Vidarbha did not support the Congress-
MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY BETWEEN
of the Shiv Sena and BJP. But the Lok Sabha led government in the 1999 and 2004 Lok
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
elections in April 2004 saw the Congress Sabha and assembly elections. Once again A Conceptual Framework for
challenging this dominance. The Congress the observation that Nagpur and Wardha Sustainable Security
fared reasonably due largely to dalit, Mus- improved their relative ranks on per capita RCSS Policy Studies 30
Manjrika Sewak
lim and non-Maharashtrian votes. Konkan income between 1993-94 and 2003-04
81-7304-621-2, 2005, 136p. Rs. 255 Pb
region as a whole contributes almost 40% seems to point in the direction of Congress
to the state domestic product (SDP) of strongholds performing well. In fact, four THE ROLE OF MEDIATION IN
­Maharashtra. However, within this region, districts where non-Congress candidates RESOLVING INDIA-PAKISTAN
CONFLICT
development has been concentrated in won the 1999 assembly elections, viz,
Parameters and Possibilities
Greater Mumbai, Thane and Raigad, while ­Gadchiroli, Chandrapur and Akola in RCSS Policy Studies 29
Ratnagiri and Sindhudurg districts in the Vidar­bha region have experienced a decline Amit Dholakia
region have been as worse off as any back- in their relative ranks on the per capita 81-7304-629-8, 2005, 132p. Rs. 255 Pb
ward districts of Vidarbha or Marathwada. ­basis during the same period (Saban 2006).
ELITE PERCEPTIONS IN FOREIGN
Vidarbha was traditionally a stronghold Marathwada region is divided into 46 POLICY
of the Congress. The region voted for assembly and eight Parliament constituen- Role of Print Media in Influencing
­Indira Gandhi even during the country’s cies. The Congress held sway until the 1999 India-Pakistan Relations 1989-1999
worst anti-Congress wave in 1977. But the assembly elections, when the Shiv Sena RCSS Policy Studies 26
Smruti S. Pattnaik
Congress fortress began crumbling in 1985 emerged as the single largest party bagging 81-7304-577-1, 2004, 190p. Rs. 350 Pb
with the growing influence of the BJP and 17 seats while its ally, the BJP, garnered
the Shiv Sena. The demand for a separate nine. The Congress got just 10 seats while NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION
state of Vidarbha has often provided a fer- the NCP six. Independents bagged the re- MEASURES AND RESTRAINT REGIME
IN SOUTH ASIA
tile ground for politicians to lure voters in maining four seats. The NCP has little say RCSS Policy Studies 25
this region. The Congress Party’s worst while the BJP limits its resources and ener- Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
performance came in the 1995 assembly gy to its strongholds. People welcomed the 81-7304-569-0, 2004, 112p. Rs. 250 Pb
polls, when it won only 17 of the 66 assem- Shiv Sena because it enjoys a reputation of
bly seats, with the BJP-Sena combine bag- putting its weight behind the common man for our complete catalogue please write to us at:
ging 33. It was a photo finish in 1999, with and discouraging feudal culture. In this MANOHAR PUBLISHERS & DISTRIBUTORS
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Website: www.manoharbooks.com
Bahujan Samaj­wadi Party (BSP) registered During the period 1993 to 2003, three
16 October 3, 2009  vol xliv no 40  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly
 commentary
Table 2: Impact of Delimitation Region-wise r­ esponsibility to ensure liquidation of the tabulated in Appendix A. Mumbai is a
Region Existing Seats Post-Delimitation Seats
­backlog. A subsequent committee which classic example of how the changing de-
Konkan 65 75 reviewed the indicators afresh in 1994. mographic concentration of population
Vidarbha 66 62
The committee has shown that between could lead to a shift in the power centre in
Western Maharashtra 62 58
1984 and 1994, disparities had actually the assembly of Maharashtra. In the exist-
North Maharashtra 49 47
widened across the regions. The regional ing delimitation, the island city of Mumbai
Marathwada 46 46
Source: Times of India, 14 September 2009. variation is apparent from the relative has 17 seats while the suburbs too have 17.
contribution of the According to the new delimitation the
Table 3: Regional Variation: Relative Contribution to Gross State Domestic Product
(current prices, %) various divisions to suburbs would get 26 seats and the island
Division 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07* state GSDP (Table 3). city would get 10 seats.
Konkan 39.13 39.09 39.96 40.69 40.90 40.07 38.52 The share of Mum- In the Lok Sabha 2009 elections the
Nashik 12.49 12.77 12.63 12.61 12.65 12.75 13.88 bai alone in the Gross clean sweep by the Congress in Mumbai is
Pune 22.00 21.75 21.19 21.39 21.94 22.34 22.77 District Domestic Pro­ clearly on the back of the surprise sprung
Aurangabad 10.05 9.80 9.88 9.37 9.28 9.46 9.62
duct (GDDP) is seen by the MNS, whose candidate was runner
Amaravati 6.58 6.68 6.52 6.18 5.85 5.86 5.85
to be around 23%. up. The party-wise distribution of the vote
Nagpur 9.76 9.90 9.81 9.75 9.38 9.52 9.36
­Mumbai, Nashik and shares in the various constituencies in
Coefficient of variation 73.17 72.83 74.72 77.17 78.50 76.60 29.85
Mumbai 21.89 22.56 22.76 23.40 23.72 23.10 21.40
Pune divisions together Mumbai in ­Table 1 (p 16) clearly point to
Mumbai+Nashik+Pune 56.39 57.09 56.59 57.40 58.30 58.20 58.05 contribute almost 60% the poten­tial threat that the MNS poses for
*Provisional. to the GSDP of Maha­ the Shiv Sena.
rashtra. The contri­
­districts (Aurangabad, Parbhani and Latur) bution of Konkan (primarily because of Appendix A
in Marathwada (all three voted for the BJP- Mumbai) to the GSDP is the highest at District New Distribution of Seats Existing Change
(Delimitation 2002) Distribution of Seats
Shiv Sena in 2004 Lok Sabha election), ex- 40%. Amravati’s contribution ranging be-
Nandurbar 4 5 -1
perienced decline in their ranks based on tween 5% and 6%, is seen to be the lowest.
Dhule 5 5 0
per capita incomes (Saban 2006). The coefficient of variation has stood
Jalgaon 11 12 -1
around 30%.
Buldhana 7 7 0
2  Regimes and Economic Growth
Akola 5 5 0
Two distinguishing characteristics of the 3  Impact of Delimitation Washim 3 4 -1
economic growth in Maharashtra are its The political strongholds of individual Amravati 8 9 -1
regionally skewed pattern of growth and ­coalitions are almost certain to face some Wardha 4 4 0
its heavy dependence on the performance tremors in forthcoming assembly elections Nagpur 12 11 1
of Mumbai. In fact, this regional skewness 2009 on account of two factors (a) delimi- Bhandara 3 5 -2
goes back in time to 1960 when the state tation, and (b) the Maharashtra Navnir- Gondiya 4 4 0
of Maharashtra was formed by merging man Sena (MNS) factor. The new political Gadhchiroli 3 3 0
Chandrapur 6 6 0
the contiguous Marathi-speaking areas of boundaries that have been drawn up by
Yavatmal 7 8 -1
Bombay State, Madhya Pradesh and the Delimitation Commission would most
Nanded 9 8 1
­Hyderabad State. Of these three regions, certainly have a bearing on future of the
Hingoli 3 3 0
the area from Bombay State was better forthcoming state assembly elections in Parbhani 4 5 -1
­developed both in economic and social Maharashtra. In Maharashtra, it appears Jalna 5 5 0
­indicators though the Marathi-speaking as though the delimitation exercise will al- Aurangabad 9 7 2
region lacked a distinct business class of ter the power centre from the rural areas Nashik 15 14 1
its own. The other two were less deve­ to the new urban areas of Maharashtra. Thane 24 13 11
loped or relatively backward and for years, The urban belt of Mumbai, adjoining satel- Mumbai suburban 26 17 9
these regional disparities were carried lite townships, Nashik and Pune that earlier Mumbai city 10 17 -7
forward. Western Maharashtra, with the had 52 seats in the assembly will now have Raigarh 7 7 0
Pune 21 18 3
dominance of a successful political entre- 73 seats ahead of the sugar belt which will
Ahmadnagar 12 13 -1
preneurial class that emerged later kept now have a reduced number of assembly
Bid 6 7 -1
the region ahead. seats from 75 to 63. With nearly 100 out of
Latur 6 6 0
This triggered in 1984 the setting up of the 288 assembly seats in Maha­rashtra Osmanabad 4 5 -1
the Fact-Finding Committee on Regional now predominantly urban, the BJP-Shiv Solapur 11 13 -2
Imbalance headed by the economist, Sena have an advantage over the ruling Satara 8 10 -2
V M Dandekar. In 1994, three regional NCP-Congress, at least on paper. But much Ratnagiri 5 7 -2
­development boards were set up to give a depends on how each party plays its cards as Sindhudurg 3 4 -1
statutory guarantee to the policy and well as on the emergence of new “spoilers”. Kolhapur 10 12 -2
process of removing regional disparities, The district-wise change in assembly Sangli 8 9 -1
with the governor having a special seats under the delimitation exercise is Grand total 288 288

Economic & Political Weekly  EPW   October 3, 2009  vol xliv no 40 17

commentary

The structure of the 26 seats in the
s­ uburbs of Mumbai as per the new delimi-
tation exercise is such that most new
­constituencies would have a sizeable
Hindu­t va vote bank, e g, Bandra has been
broken up into Bandra East and Bandra
West assembly seats. Bandra East has a
significant minority population that is not
sympathetic to Sena-BJP, but that makes
­Bandra West a safer bet for the Sena-BJP
than before. Important constituencies
which have been split are Bandra, Santa
Cruz, Andheri, Amboli and Kandivali.
Similarly south Mumbai till now con­
sidered a safe bet for the Congress is now
facing a merger of the Shivadi, Worli and
the newly constituted Byculla assembly
segments. These seats have a substantial
saffron vote bank and could dampen
the Congress chances of scoring a win
here again.
Opposition strongholds such as Opera
House have been merged with the exist-
ing assembly seats in a fashion that will
adversely affect the chances of the
­Congress. It is felt that Mumbai and its
neighbouring Thane district, which
­include many satellite towns of the metro­
polis like Thane, Kalyan-Dombivali,
Navi Mumbai and Mira-Bhyander, have
seen a population explosion in the last
decade-and-a-half and will send more
than 60 MLAs to the assembly. These
­areas may well decide who will be the
chief minister.
The delimitation exercise is going
to throw a major challenge to the NCP
too   as 13 seats in its stronghold of
Western Maha­rashtra have been merged
with ­urban areas. Earlier, Western
­Maha­rashtra used to send 73 MLAs to
the assembly.
On paper, delimitation is expected to
benefit the BJP-Sena over the NCP-Congress
as its leadership is considered urban. A
region-wise break-up of the change in
seats (Table 2, p 17) seems to further vin-
dicate this hypothesis:
Post-delimitation the seats available
to Vidarbha and Western Maharashtra
(Congress-NCP strongholds) have reduced
while that of Konkan (BJP-Shiv Sena
strongholds) have risen. However, there is
a silver lining for the Congress in this en-
tire exercise. Most new constituencies in
the suburbs have a significant non-Mahar-
ashtrian population. Also, the sizeable
north Indian population in at least one-
third of these seats will make it difficult
for the Sena-BJP. However, if the recently
concluded Lok Sabha 2009 elections is
any indicator, what appears to be the
strongest factor in favour of the Congress
remains the MNS factor.
References
Datar, A (2004): “Of Regional Variations and Shifting
Strongholds”, The Hindu, 24 October, http://
www.hindu.com/2004/10/24/
stories/200410240195 1500. htm (viewed on 12
September 2009).
Lalvani, M (2008): “Sugar Cooperatives in Mahara­
shtra: A Political Economy Perspective”, Journal
of Development Studies.
Palshikar, S (2004): “Issues in an Issue-less Election:
Assembly Polls in Maharashtra”, Economic & Poli­
tical Weekly, October.
Saban, A (2006): “Regional Structures, Growth and
Convergence of Income in Maharashtra”, Econo­
mic & Political Weekly, 2 May.
World Bank (2002): Maharashtra: Reorienting Govern­
ment to Facilitate Growth and Reduce Poverty,
Vols  I and II (World Bank).

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18 October 3, 2009  vol xliv no 40  EPW   Economic & Political Weekly