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Ireface
VI
IART l TH GNALGY F HLNANRlGHTS
i . TheTriumphofHumanRights
i
z. ABriefHistoryofNaturalLav l. TheClassicalBeginnings z

ABriefHistoryofNaturalLavl l . From NaturalLavto

NaturalRights
|)
|
NaturalRightinHollesandLocke
6,
,
RevolutionsandDeclarations. The Rights ofNen,
CitizensandaFevthers
,
6. TheTriumphofHumanity. From i ),toi ,,andfrom
NaturaltoHumanRights
i o,
IART ll TH IHlLSIHY F HLNANRlGHTS
)
The ClassicalCritiques ofRights. Burke andNarx i |)
. Su/jc:lum and Su/jc:lu: The Freeand
Sul ectedSulect
i
,

Lav's Sul ects . Rights andLegalHumanism

zz,
i o. Hegel'sLav. Rigbts andRecognition
z6
i i . IsychoanalysisBecomestheLav. Rights andDesire z,)
i z. The lmaginaryDomainandthe Future ofLtopia i ,
i
The Human Rights ofthe ther
|
i |
Thend ofHuman Rights
)i
Billiography
i
lndex
,)
t/c.c
This isthehnalpartofatrilogythatRonnieVarringtonandmyself
planned in the late i ,os. The hrst tvo volumes clmc!ctn
ut|ptu!cn:c andul|:c A|:ctt|c! vere pullished in i,,i and i ,,|
and contriluted to the creation ofa distinct British critical legal
movement and to the turn of legal scholarship tovards ethical
concerns. This finalvolume ofthe trilogy completestheintellectual
ourneyRonnieandlstartedviththeaimofreconstructinglegalthe-
ory for a nevvorld ofculturalpluralism, intellectual openness and
ethicalavareness. Fate ordainedthat l vould nothave theprivilege
ofdiscussingideas , disputing arguments and vriting this lookvith
Ronnie. Thc En! j Iumcn I|ghl isdedicatedtohim.
Vhen l startedmy career, my then Head ofDepartmenttoldme
thatifl persistedvith my theoretical interests, my academic future
vould le limited. Afevyearslater, an article ofRonnie andmyself
vas reected ly a learned lav ournal lecause it used vords like
' deconstruction' and 'logocentrism' , vhich could not le found in
the D. Hovthingshave nov changed. urarticlevas eventu-
ally pullished and vent on to le translated in hve languages, a
rather unique achievement in lav. The vord ' deconstruction'
appears commonlyinlav textlooksandarticles. Aninterestinthe-
oryisapositive advantage foryoungscholars applyingforacademic
posts.
Legal education has leen experiencing recently something ofa
Renaissance, vhich has put itlack vhere itlelongs, at the heart of
theacademy.The CriticalLegalStudiesmovementvaspivotalinthis
development. But l shouldaddthatforme thegreatestachievement
ofcriticallavyers is that they teach, research and vrite under the
guidingprinciplethatalavvithout usticeisalodyvithoutsouland
alegal educationthatteachesrulesvithoutspiritisintellectuallylar-
renand morallylankrupt. Thislook, a critique oflegalhumanism
inspired ly a love ofhumanity, lelongs to that climate. ltaims to
offeran advancedtextlookoflegaltheoryandhumanrightsforthe
melancholic lavyeratthe endofthe most atrocious century inthe
historyofhumankind.
N11 1!1\1
lhadtheamazinggoodfortunetoleinvolvedintheestallishment
and phenomenal success ofthe Birkleck Lav School in the early
i,,cs. This successvouldnot haveleenpossillevithoutthe extra-
ordinarygroupofcommittedacademicsandimaginativescholars,my
formerandcurrentcolleagues ,vhomadeBirkleckthelestlittlelav
schoolinBritain. l ove manyintellectualdeltstoallofthem andin
particular to Peter Goodrich and Nicola Lacey, my predecessors as
HeadsoftheBirkleckLavSchool. Peter'shistoricalsensitivity,fiery
imagination and acerlic sense ofhumour have contriluted to the
vritingofthislookandthevidercriticallegalpro ectinmanyvays,
manyconsciousandacknovledged,othersunconsciousandopaque.
Nicola's graciousvisdomandfriendly advice inrelationto this and
manyotherproectshas leeninvalualle. Criticallegalstudiesvould
not have leen such an inHuential movement vithout those tvo
charismaticfriends .
Manycolleaguesandfriendshavecontrilutedtothevritingofthis
lookover the last tvoyears. l cannotmention them all. Butl have
great pleasure in thanking s ome friends, vhose contrilutions are
close to the surface ofthe text. l shouldlike to thank inparticular
AlexandraBakalaki,BillBovring,juliaChryssostali,LindsayFarmer,
Peter Fitzpatrick, Rolando Gaete, Adam Gearey, Shaun McVeigh,
Les Moran, TimMurphy andAdam Tomkins. The students ofthe
HumanRightscourseattheBirkleckLavSchoolhavecontriluted
tothislookthroughloththeirhugeenthusiasmandcommitmentto
humanrightsandtheirsuspicionstovardsallgrandiosestatementsly
the poverful. ver the years , l learned more from themthan they
possillylearntfromme.
Researchforthislookvas greatlyfacilitatedlyvariousgrantsand
fellovships. Birkleck College gave me a long sallatical leave after
the completion ofthe estallishment ofthe Lav School. Part ofthe
research vas carried out at the uropean Lniversity lnstitute,
Florence andatthe Lniversities ofPrincetonandthe Cardozo Lav
School, Nev York, vhere l held various fellovships in i,,, and
i,,. Yiota Cravaritouvas agreathelp andinspirationat Florence,
jeanneSchroederandDavidCarlsonvereimportantsourcesofedi-
ficationinNevYork,vhileKostisDouzinasandNancyRauchpro-
vided the most vonderful hospitality and animated discussions in
Nev York. NatasaSmilanic andMariaKyriakouvere invalualle
research assistants at various points of the pro ect. My daughter
Phaedra suffered seriously in the summers ofi,, and i,,, vhen
ratherthan going svimming vith her, l keptvritingandleing an
1!1\1
2
u
'
soci

alle

an

d irritalle companion. Nicos and Anna Tsigoniapro-

videdinspiratronandchallengedideas. Finally,mydeepestthanksgo
tojoannaBourkevho, throughouthercnnu m|tc/||| ofi,,,, kept
leingaresourcefulandtolerantcompanyandaltogetherfalulous .
Ltyc, ctc, August i ,,,
PART l
i1 1111` 1
i'1 1i`
!
T|c Tt|um| .}Iumca I|_|/s
A nev ideal has triumphed on the vorld stage. human rights . lt
unites left and right, the pulpit and the state, the minister and the
relel, the developing vorld and the lilerals of Hampstead and
Manhattan Human riglts have lecome the principle oflileration
fromoppressionanddomination,therallyingcryofthehomelessand
the dispossessed, thepoliticalprogramme ofrevolutionaries anddis-
sidents Buttheirappealisnotconhnedtothevretchedofthe earth.
Alternative lifestyles , greedy consumers ofgoods and culture, the
pleasure-seekers and playloys ofthe Vestern vorld, the ovner of
Harrods,theformermanagingdirectorofGuinnessPlcasvellasthe
formerKing ofGreecehaveallglossed theirclaimsinthe language
ofhuman rights Human rights are the fate ofpostmodernity, the
energy ofoursocieties,thefulnlmentofthenlightenmentpromise
ofemancipationandself-realisation. Vehaveleenllessed- orcon-
demned- tofightthetvilight lattles ofthe millennium ofVestern
dominance andthe opening skirmishes ofthenevperiodunderthe
duallanners ofhumanityand right. Humanrightsare trumpetedas
the nollest creation ofourphilosophy and urisprudence and as the
lestproofoftheuniversalaspirationsofourmodernity,vhichhadto
avait ourpostmodernglolalcultureforits ustlydeservedacknovl-
edgement.
Humanrightsvereinitiallylinkedvithspecihc classinterestsand
vere the ideological andpoliticalveapons in thehghtofthe rising
lourgeoisie against despoticpoliticalpoverand static social organi-
sationButtheirontologicalpresuppositions,theprinciplesofhuman
equality and freedom, and their political corollary, the claim that
politicalpovermustlesulectedto the demands ofreasonandlav,
havenovlecomepart ofthestapleideology ofmost contemporary
regimes and their partiality has leen transcended. The collapse of
` 1ycJ ' .. L :|) I MRR , o1uuJcr ' L Iy) z( MRR z|z; 10c 0rmcr
|u C0n:l1ul/uc 0}|rtc|c' |rcc:c ^l. z_yoI/| Occluicd udmissiLlc z: ^iil I S.
Z 1 1!J !! !J11 1\`
communismandthe elimination ofapartheidmarkedtheendofthe
last tvo vorld movements vhich challenged uleral democracy.
Humanrightshave von the ideologicallattles ofmodernity. Their
universalapplicationandfulltriumphappears tole amatteroftime
andofadustmentletveenthespiritoftheageandafevrecalcitrant
regimes. lts victoryis none otherthatthecompletionofthepromise
of the nlightenment, of emancipation through reason. Human
rights are the ideolog after the end, the defeat ofideologies , orto
adoptavoguishtermtheideologyatthe `end ofhistory`.
Andyetmany doultspersist.- Therecord ofhumanrightsviola-
tions since their ringing declarations at the end ofthe eighteenth
century is quite appalling. `lt is an undenialle fact` vrites Galriel
Marcel`thathumanlifehasneverleenasuniversallytreatedasavile
andperishallecommodityas duringourovnera`. lfthetventieth
centuryistheepochofhumanrights ,theirtriumphis ,tosaytheleast,
something ofa paradox. ur age has vitnessed more violations of
their principles than any ofthe previous and less `enlightened`
epochs. Thetventiethcenturyisthe centuryofmassacre, genocide,
ethniccleansing,theageoftheHolocaust.Atnopointinhumanhis-
tory has there leen a greatergap letveen the poorand the richin
the Vestern vorld and letveen the north and the south glolally.
`No degree ofprogress allovs one to ignore that never lefore in
alsolutengures,havesomanymen,vomen, andchildrenleensul-
ugated, starved, or exterminated onearth`. Novonderthenvhy
the grandiose statements of concern ly governments and inter-
national organisations are often treated vith popular derision and
scepticism. But should our experience ofthe huge gapletveenthe
theory and practice ofhuman rights make us doult their principle
and question the promise ofemancipation through reason and lav
vhenitseems toleclosetoitsnnalvictory?
Lcsitc thc cnormous amountolbooksonhumanrights, thcjurisrudcnccolrights is
dominatcd by nco-Kantian libcrals. Jhcrc arc a fcv notablc cxcctions Rolando Cactc's
Humca F|_|/s caJ /|c I|m|/s o} Ct|/|:c|Fccoa Adcrshot, Lartmouth, I ) is a ovcrlul
cxrcssion ol thc doubts about human rights dcmagogucr, and thc limitations olrcason`s
cmanciator,ability Fromalcgalandhistoricalcrscctivc, thcmostlar-goingcriticismof
human rights is thc small classic by Nichcl \illcy, I Itc|/ c/ |cs Jto|/s Jc |'|ommc !aris,
! 1.I, IS) cmard ourgcois, |||oso||c c/ Jto|| Jc | '|ommc. Jc Kca/ u Mctx !aris,
!l F. , I o) , isthcbcstcriticalintroductionto thcclassicalhilosohyolhumanrights. In
a morc olitical vcin, thc rcccnt collcction Humca F|_|/s . qty Ycct a cditcd by Jony
vans Nanchcstcr, NanchcstcrLnivcrsity !rcss, I S) cxlorcs somc olthc most vidc-
srcad conccrns aboutthc statc olintcmationalhumanrightslav
CabriclNarccl, Ctcc/|vc|Jc||/y,| ,RRosthaltrans ) , lcvYork.Farrar,Strauss, I 6|
]acqucsLcrrida, Sc:/tcjtMct ! Kamultrans. ) London,Routlcdgc, I |) S ;
1 1!J !! !J11 1\`
Tvo preliminary points are in order. The first concerns the con-
ceptofcritique. Critiquetodayusuallytakestheformofthe`critique
ofideology`, ofan externalattack on the provenance, premises or
internalcoherence ofits target. Butits original Kantian aim vas to
explore the philosophical presuppositions , the necessary and sufn-
cient `conditions ofexistence` ofaparticular discourse orpractice.
Thisisthetypeofcritiquethislookaimstoexercisenrstleforeturn-
ingtothecritiqueofideologyorcriticismofhumanrights.Vhathis-
toricaltra ectorylinksclassicalnaturallavvithhumanrights?Vhich
historical circumstances led to the emergence ofnatural and later
humanrights?Vhatare the philosophical premises ofthe discourse
ofrights? Vhat is today the nature, function and action ofhuman
rights, accordingtolileralismanditsmanyphilosophicalcritics? Are
humanrights aformofpolitics?Aretheythepostmodernansver to
theexhaustionofthegrandtheoriesandgrandiosepoliticalutopias of
modernity? uraimis nottodenythepredominantlylileralprove-
nance and the many achievements of the tradition of rights.
Vhatever the reservations ofcommunitarians , feminists or cultural
relativists, rightshavelecomeamaorcomponentofourphilosoph-
ical landscape, ofourpolitical environmentandourimaginaryaspi-
rations and their significance cannot le easily dismissed. But vhile
political lileralism vas the progenitor ofrights, its philosophy has
leenless successful in explaining their nature. The lileralurispru-
dence ofrights has leen extremely voluminous lut little has leen
addedtothecanonicaltextsofHollesandKant. Despitethepoliti-
cal triumph ofrights, its urisprudence has disappointedly veered
letveen the celelratory and legitimatory and the repetitive and
lanal.
Take the prollem ofhumannature and ofthe sulect, a central
concern ofthis look, vhich could also le descriledas alongessay
onthelegal) sul ect. Thehumannatureassumedlylileralphiloso-
phyis pre-moral. According to lmmanuel Kant, the transcendental
self, thepreconditionofaction andgroundofmeaningandvalue, is
acreatureofalsolutemoraldutyandlacksanyearthlyattrilutes. The
assumption ofthe autonomous andself-discipliningsulectisshared
lymoralphilosophyandurisprudence, luthasleenturnedinneo-
Kantianism, from a trarscendental presupposition into a heuristic
device Ravls) oraconstructiveassumptionthatappearsto offerthe
lest description oflegal practice Dvorkin) . As a result, ve are left
vith `thenotionofthehumansul ectasasovereignagentofchoice,
a creaturevhose ends are chosenrather then given,vhocomes ly
+ 1 !J !J !J11 \`
hisaimsandpurposeslyactsofvill, as opposed,say, to acts ofcog-
nition`. Thisatomocentricapproachmayofferapremiumtolileral
politics and lav lut it is cognitively limted and morally impover-
ished. ur strategy differs . Vevill examine fromlileral and non-
lileralperspectivesthemainluildingllocksoftheconceptofhuman
rights. the human, the sulect, the legal person, freedom and right
among others. Burke, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Sartre, psychoana-
lytical, deconstructive, semiotic and ethical approachesvill le used,
first, to deepen our understanding ofrights and then to criticise
aspects oftheir operation. No grandsynthesis can arise from such a
cornucopiaofphilosophicalthought andnot much commonground
exists letveen Hegel and Heidegger or Sartre and Lacan. And yet
despite the alsence ofahnal anddennitive theory ofrights anum-
lerofcommonthemes emerge, oneofvhichispreciselythatthere
canle no general theory ofhumanrights . The hope is thatlyfol-
lovingthephilosophical critics oflileralism, Kant's original defini-
tion of`critique` can le revived and our understanding ofhuman
rightsrescuedfromtheloredomofanalyticalcommon-senseandits
evacuation ofpoliticalvision and moralpurpose. Thisis a textlook
forthecriticalmindandthefieryheart.
Humanrightscanleexaminedfromtvorelatedlutrelativelydis-
tinct mainperspectives, a sulective and an institutional. First, they
help constitute the legal) sulectas loth freeand sulectedolav.
But human rights are also a poverful discourse and practice in
domesticandinternationallav. urapproachispredominantlythe-
oreticallutitvilloftenlecomplementedlyhistoricalnarrativeand
political and legal commentaries on the contemporary record of
human rights. To le sure, criticisms lasedonthe videspreadviola-
tions ofhumanrights are noteasily reconcilalle vithphilosophical
critique. Philosophyexploresthe essence orthemeaningofatheme
or concept, it constructs indissolulle distinctions and seeks solid
grounds ,vhile empirical evidence is soiledvith the impurities of
contingency,thepeculiaritiesofcontextandtheidiosyncrasiesofthe
olserver. n the other, empiricist, hand, human rights vere from
theirinceptionthepoliticalexperienceoffreedom,theexpressionof
thelattletofreeindividualsfromexternal constraintandallovtheir
self-realisation. lnthissense, theydonotdependonalstractconcepts
Cactc, o cit ,suran z, i z,
' Fora gcncral discussion ofthc rclationshi bctvccn contincntal and ^nglo-^mcrican
hilosohy in rclation to thc concct ollrccdom, scc ]can-Luc lancy T|c Icr|ca:c
rccJom Stanlord, StanlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i )
1 !J !J !J11 \` 3
andgrounds . Forcontinentalphilosophy,freedomis, asMarxmem-
orallyput it, the `insight into necessity`, forAnglo-American civil
lilertarians,freedomisresistanceagainstnecessity. Thetheoryofcivil
lilerties has moved happily along a limted spectrum ranging from
optimisticrationalismto unthinking empiricism. ltmay le, that the
`posthistorical` character ofhuman rights should le sought in this
paradox ofthe triumph oftheir spirit vhich has leen drovned in
universaldisleliefalout theirpractice.
But, secondly, have ve arrived attheendofhistory?' vertvo
centuries ago, Kant's Ct|l|uc, the early manifestos of the
nlightenment, launchedphilosophical modernity through reason's
investigation ofits ovn operation. From that point, Vestern self-
understandinghas leendominatedly the idea ofhistoricalprogress
throughreason. mancipationmeansforthemodernstheprogressive
alandonment ofmyth and pre udice in all areas oflife and their
replacemently reason. lnterms ofpolitical organisation, lileration
means the sul ectionofpoverto the reason oflav. Kant's schema
vas excessively metaphysical and laloriously avoided direct con-
frontation vith the `pathological` empirical reality or vith active
politics. But Hegel's announcement that the rational and the real
coincideidentifiedreasonvithvorldhistoryandestallishedastrong
link letveen philosophy, history and politics. Hegel himselfvacil-
lated letveen his early leliefthat Napoleon personified the vorld
spiritonhorselackandhislateridentincationoftheendofhistoryin
the Prussian State. Andvhile the Hegelian systemremainednercely
metaphysical, it vas used, most notally ly Marx, to estallish a
dialectical) link letveen concepts ano alstract determinations and
events in the vorld vith the purpose ofnot ust interpreting lut
changingit.
Hegelianism can easilymutate into akindofintellectualournal-
ism. the philosophical equivalent ofa lroadsheet column in vhich
therequirements ofreasonare declared eithertohaveleenfulfilled
historically as in right-ving Hegelians and more recently the mus-
ings ofFukuyama) orto le still missing as in messianic versions of
Marxism) . lnloth, the con ictletveenreason andmyth, the tvo
opposingprinciplesofthenlightenment,villcometoan endvhen
humanrights , theprinciple ofreason, lecomesthe realisedmythof
SccFrancisFukuyama,T|cIaJH|s/oqcaJ/|cIcs/Mca London,!cnguin,i z) and
Lcrrda`s crtical commcnts in Sc:/tc:tMcrx, o. cit. , sura n. q. Jhc Ccrman dcbatc is
rcvicvcd in Lutz licthammcr, o/||s/o|tc. Hcs H|/ot, Comc /o ca IaJ` London, \crso,
i z)
1 !J !J !J11 L`
postmodernsocieties. Myths ofcourselelongtoparticularcommu-
nities, traditions and histories, their operation validates through
repetition andmemory, a genealogical principle oflegitimation and
the narrative oflelonging. Reason and human rights, onthe other
hand, areuniversal, theyare supposedtotranscendgeographicaland
historicaldifferences. lfmythgetsitslegitimatorypotentialfromsto-
riesoforigin,reason'slegitimationisfoundinthepromiseofprogress
expoundedinphilosophiesof history.Aforvarddirectionisdetected
in history vhichinexorally leads to human emancipation. lfmyth
looks to leginnings, the narrative ofreasonand human rights looks
tolc|c| andends.
ln postmodernity, the idea ofhistory as a single unified process
vhichmovestovardstheaimofhumanlilerationisnolongercred-
ille, andthediscourseofrightshaslostitsearliercoherenceanduni-
versalism. The videspread popular cynicism alout the claims of
governmentsandinternationalorganisationsalouthumanrightsvas
sharedlysome ofthe greatestpoliticalandlegalphilosophers ofthe
tventieth century. Nietzsche's melancholic diagnosis that ve have
enteredthetvilightofreason, Adorno andHorkheimer's despairin
the L|c|c:l|:s lhc En||ghlcnmcnl '' and Foucault's statement that
modern`man`vasameredravingonthesands oftheoceanofhis-
toryalouttolesveptavay, appearmorerealisticthanFukuyama's
triumphalism. The Frankfurt sages arguedthatthe con ictlctveen
|cgc and mylhc could not lead to the promised land offreedom,
lecause instrumental reason, one facet ofthe reason ofmodernity,
had turned into its destructive myth. The dialecticnolongerrepre-
sents the voyage ofhomecoming ofthe spirit. Reason's inexoralle
march andits attemptto paci( the three modernforms ofcon ict,
conictvithinself, con ictvithothersandconictvithnature,led
topsychologicalmanipulationandtheGulags , to political totalitari-
anismandAuschvitz,finallytothenuclearlomlandecologicalcat-
astrophe. Asanevtragedyunfoldsdailyineastandvest,inKosovo
and ast Timor, in Turkey and lraq, it looks as ifmourning more
thancelelrationslecomesthe endofthemillennium.
Lnfortunately political philosophy has alandoned its classical
vocationofexploringthetheoryandhistoryofthegoodsocietyand
Cianni\attimo, TcIaJo}MoJcn|/yCambridgc, CambridgcLnivcrsity!rcss i 88)
css|m, T|c Trcncrca/So:|c/y Cambridgc, !olity i z) Chatcr I.
Costas Louzinas and Ronnic Varrington vith Shaun Nc\cigh, os/moJcra
jur|sruJca:c. Tc|cuo}/cx/|a /|c /cx/s |cu London, Routlcdgc, i i ) Chatcrs I and .
0
London,\crso, i ,)
1 !J !J !J11 L` 7
has gradually deteriorated into lehaviouralpolitical science and the
doctrinaire urisprudence ofrights. n the side ofpractice, it is
argualle that Home Secretaries should come fromthe ranks ofex-
prisoners or refugees, Social Security Secretaries should have some
experience ofhomelessness and life on the dole, and that Finance
Ministersshouldhavesufferedtheinfamyoflankruptcy. Despitethe
consistentprivileging ofexperience over theory, this is unlikely to
happen. fficial thinking and action on human rights has leen
entrusteoin the hands oftriumphalistcolumnvriters , lored diplo-
matsandrichinternationallavyersinNevYorkandGeneva,people
vhose experience ofhuman rights violations is connned to leing
servedaladlottle ofvine. lntheprocess, humanrightshaveleen
turned from a discourse ofrelellion and dissent into that ofstate
legitimacy.
At this time ofuncertainty and confusion letveen triumph and
disaster, ve should take stock ofthe traditionofhuman rights. But
canvedoulttheprincipleofhumanrightsandquestionthepromise
ofemancipationofhumanitythroughreasonandlav,vhenitseems
to le close to itsnnalvictory? ltshouldle addedimmediately that
the claimthatpoverrelations canle translated fullyinthelanguage
oflavandrightsvasneverfullycredilleandisnovmorethreadlare
than ever. Ve are alvays caughtinrelations offorce and ansverto
thedemandsofpovervhich,asFoucaultarguedforcefully,areloth
carriedoutanddisguisedinlegalforms.Rec

ntmilitaryconictsand
financial upheavals have shovn that relations offorce and political,
class and national struggles have acquired an even more pervasive
importanceinourglolalisedvorld,vhiledemocracyandtheruleof
lavareincreasingly usedto ensurethat economicandtechnological
forces are sulected to no other end fromthat oftheir continuous
expansion. lndeed,oneofthereasonsthatgivesnormativeurispru-
dence the unreality, aloutvhichlav students so often complain, is
itstotalneglectoftheroleoflavinsustainingrelationsofpoverand
it
`
descent into uninteresting exegesis and apologia for legal tech-
nique.
Atthe time oftheirlirth,humanrights,follovingtheradicaltra-
ditionofnaturallav, vere atranscendentgroundofcritiqueagainst
the oppressive and commonsensical. ln the i ,os too, in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, ast Germany, Romania, Russiaandelsevhere, the
term `humanrights` acquiredagain,for alriefmoment, the tonal-
ityofdissent,relellionandreformassociatedvithThomasPaine, the
French revolutionaries, the reform and early socialist movements .
O
1 !J !! !J11 L`
Soon, hovever, the popular re-dennition of human rights vas
llankedoutlydiplomats,politiciansandinternationallavyersmeet-
inginVienna,Beiingandotherhumanrightsamloreesto reclaim
the discourse fromthe streets for treaties, conventions and experts.
Theenergy releasedthroughthecollapseofcommunismvaslottled
up again ly the nev governments and the nev manas in the ast
vhichlookthesameasthegovernmentsandmanasoftheVest.
Against this lackground, it is highly topical to ask vhether the
state ofhumanrightsis the outcome ofintrinsictraits orvhetherit
is a contingent development vhich vill le overcome as the fev
rogue regimes around the vorld come to accept the principles of
civilised life. To le sure, such enquiries are often treated vith
incredulity, ifnot outright hostility, for many, to question human
rightsis to side viththeinhuman, the anti-human andthe evil. But
ifhumanrights havelecometherealisedmyth ofpostmodernsoci-
eties,theirhistorydemandsthatvere-assesstheirpromiseavayfrom
theself-satisfiedarroganceofstatesandlileralapologistsandattempt
to discover political strategies and moral principles that do not
dependexclusivelyontheuniversalityofthelav, thearchaeologyof
myth ortheimperialismofreason.

The tradition ofnaturallavvas exhaustedvelllefore our century,

although it has recently en oyed something of a revival.
Contemporary urisprudenceexaminesnaturallavaspartofthehis-
tory ofideas, as anintellectualmovementandpoliticaldoctrine that
cametoadeservedendinnlightenment'sassault onmyth, religion
and preudice. Standard textlooks start the examination ofnatural
lav vith Antigone's `unvritten lavs` and move to the Stoics for
vhom natural lav emlodied the `elementary principles ofustice
vhich are apparent, theylelieved, to the ' eye ofreason' alone`. ' '
Ciceroenterslriey. `thereisatruelav,rightreason,inaccordance
vith nature, it is unalteralle and eternal`. He is accompanied, in
cameo appearances , ly Aquinas, Grotius and Blackstone, vhose
statement that `naturallav islindingall overtheglole, no human
lavshaveanyvalidityifcontrarytoit`isexplainedinaratheremlar-
rassed fashion. ' For all these vriters, the right and the natural are
unitedinsome unclearfashion, althoughthedefinitionofnatureand
'' Nauricc Cranston, Hc/ cte Humca F|_|/` London, odlcy Mcad, i ,) IO-i i
M NcCoubrcy, T|cIcvc|omca/o}^c/utc||/Ic_c| T|cory London, CroomMclm, i 8,) is
agood cxamlc olthis vhistlc-toui stylc ol juiisrudcncc
' Cranstonibid , II
1 !J !! !J11 L` V
theidentityofits authordiffervidely, changing fromthepurposive
cosmos to God, reason, human nature and individual self-interest.
The mutation ofnatural lav into natural rights in the seventeenth
century is hailed as the first victory ofmodern reason over the
medievalvitches andLockeandBentham, thenglishcontrilutors
to the delate, are acknovledged as the early precursors ofhuman
rights. Locke is the modern revitaliser ofthe morilund tradition,
vhile Bentham is the dennitive delunker ofany remaining `non-
senseonstilts`. Thepottedhistoryofnaturallavendsviththeintro-
duction of the Lniversal Declaration ofHuman Rights in i ,| ,
vhich turned naturalistic `nonsense`into hard-nosedpositiverights.
For the first time in history, those unvritten, unalteralle, eternal,
God-givenorrationalnctionscanstopleingemlarrassed. Theyhave
leen fully recognised and legislated and en oy the dignity oflav,
alleit ofa somevhat soft kind. God may have died, according to
Nietszche, lut at leastve have internationallav. More recently, a
nevurisprudence ofrights, theexplicitpurposeofvhich isto mit-
igatethemoralpoverty oflegalpositivism,hasquietlyacknovledged
the naturallavaspartofits genealogy.' `
Likeallsimplifiedhistory, thisstandardpresentationofnaturallav
has some elements oftruth, lut suffers also fromanumlerofcrip-
pling philosophical and historical defects. lts overall perspective is
that ofevolutionary progressivism. tLe presentis alvays and neces-
sarily superior over the past, history is the forvard march ofall-
conqueringreason, vhich erasesmistakesandcomlatsthepreudices
ofintellectualpositionsandpoliticalmovements. Thehistoryofnat-
urallavisatypicalexample ofVhighistoriography, invhichevery
ideaorepochisinexorally movingtovardsthepresent. ln this ver-
sion, theinternationalrecognitionofhumanrightsmarkstheendof
the ignorant past vhile retaining and realising, at the same time, its
potential for individual freedom and equality. There is an olvious
empiricaldifficultyviththisapproach.morehumanrightsviolations
have leen committed in this rights-olsessed century than at any
otherpointinhistory. Butitisthephilosophical question ofhistori-
cismthat concerns ushere.
Theprollemvithhistoricismcanle statedsimply. ifallhistorical
movement is relentlessly progressive and all thought inescapally
historical, in that it can only arise or acquire validity ifit lecomes
` ^nthonyLisska, Hu|ac: T|cory ^c/urc|Lu Cxlord, Clarcndon, i 6) Chatcrs
I, 2 and ollcracomrchcnsivcrcvicvolthc rcccntrctumol naturalisminlcgalandolit-
icalhilosohy
1 !J !! !J1T L`
generally acceptedat aparticularhistoricalperiod, noideals orstan-
dards exist outside the historical process and no principle can udge
history and its terror. According to the political philosopher Leo
Strauss, historicism argues that ahhuman thought is historical and
hence unalle to graspanythingeternal `. ' ' Strausshas arguedforce-
fully that,politicalphilosophysinceMacchiavelli, hassufferedfrom
anextreme historicism,invhichtheidealhasleenconsistently and
perilously identined vith the real and has lost its critical purchase.
HistoricismisexemplihedlytheHegelianclaimthattherealandthe
rationalcoincideand,in urisprudence, lythe riseofpositivism.
Forthe classicallegal tradition, nature vas a quasi-ol ective stan-
dardagainstvhichlav and convention could le criticised. But the
cognitiveandnormativepositivisationofmodernityhasexpelledhis-
toricaltranscendenceorexteriority.Theceaselessdemandthatalltra-
dition, orderorruleleinaccordvithhumanfreedomhasledtothe
total demystihcationnotustofthemythicalandreligious aspects of
the vorld, lut ofallattempts to udge historyfromanon-immanent
position. lnlav, this trendisapparentinanumlerofdevelopments
vhich undermined and eventually destroyed the pre-modern legal
cosmos. thealandonmentofsulstantiveconceptsof usticeandtheir
replacementvithproceduralistandformalones, theidentihcationof
lavvith rules positedly the state andthe destruction ofthe older
traditionaccordingtovhichlav!|/c|cn or,as)isvhatleaostoa ust
outcome in the relations amongst citizens , the replacement ofthe
idea ofa right according to nature ly natural and human rights
vhich, as attrilutes ofthe sul ect, are individual and sul ective and
can hardly estallish a strong community. A society lased on rights
does not recognise duties , itacknovledges onlyresponsililities aris-
ingfromthereciprocalnatureofrightsintheformoflimitsonrights
fortheprotectionoftherights ofothers.
lfthevalue ofhuman thoughtis relative to its context andallis
doomed to pass vith historical progress , human rights too are
infectedvithtransienceand cannot leprotectedfromchange. nly
those rights adopted ly lav domestic or international) have leen
introduced into the history ofthe political institution and can le
used, foraslongasthey last, to defendindividuals. Thelegalism of
rights goes hand in hand vith the voluntarism ofpositivism and
lecomes a very restricted protection against the all-devouring state
' ' Lco Strauss, ^c/um| Lu caJH|s/oty Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, I 6,)
Chatcrs I andz andat i z
'` ibid ; i
1 !J !! !J11 L`
legislative and administrative pover. Claims alout the existence of
non-legislatedrights are nonsense uponstilts` andhctionslikethe
leliefinvitchesandunicorns.`' As aresult, farfromthehistori-
calhavingto le udgedly the criteria ofrightsand ofthelav, his-
toryitselfasveknov,lecomesthe' trilunalofthevorld',andright
itselfmust le thought ofas lased on its insertion in historicity`. '
Thesymptomofthediseaseishomoeopatheticallydeclaredtoalsole
its curelut, like many less respectalle therapies, itleads to aneven
greatermalady.
Vhen nature is no longer the standard of right, all individual
desirescanleturnedintorights. Fromasul ectiveperspective,rights
inpostmodernityhavelecomepredications or extensions ofself an
elalorate collectionofmasksthesulectplacesonthefaceunderthe
imperativetoleauthentic, toleherself`,tofollovherchosenver-
sion ofidentity. Rights are the legal recognition ofindividual vill.
People acquire theirconcrete nature, theirhumanityandsul ectiv-
itylyhavingrights. Fromthelegalpointofviev,thegeneralagree-
mentthatadesireorinterestisconstitutiveofhumanity`sufficesfor
the creation ofa nev right. ln this vay, is and ought are collapsed,
rightsarereducedtothefactsandagreementsexpressedinlegislation
or,inamorecriticalvein, tothedisciplinaryprioritiesofpoverand
domination. AsStraussputsitstarkly, criticisingthereplacementof
transcendentnaturalrightlythesocially immanentgeneral vill, if
theultimatecriterionof usticelecomesthegeneralvill,i . e. thevill
ofafreesociety, cannilalismis as ustas its opposite. very institu-
tionhallovedlyafolk-mindhas toleregardedas sacred`.
Legal humanismlyunitingrightandfacton the terrain ofhuman
naturehasundoultedlycontrilutedtotheriseoflegalpositivismand
historicism. Historicismis theindispensallecompanionofindividu-
alism and, the fascinationvith history, theparadoxical result ofour
olsessionviththepresent.Veareinterestedinhistory,lecauseve
vanttounderstandandcontrol ourage andlecausevelelievethat
historycanmakehumanitytransparentto its self-reection. History
is an - inadequate - antidote for those philosophies ofsuspicion
vhich declared the human nnitude and opaqueness. Today, it is
' ' ]crcmycntham, Hact:h|:c|c||c:iein]. Valdron cd. ) , ^oascncuoaS/||/sLondon,
Ncthucn, i 8,) , j .
' ' Luc Fcrry and ^ain Rcnaut, tom /|c Fg|| Mca /o /|c Fcu|||:ca IJcc F. !hili
trans. ) Chicago,LnivcrsityolChicago !rcss, i z) i .
'
s
Scc,\illcy, o cit , suran. z, Chatcrs I andzcs|m.
' Lco Strauss, Hc/|s o||/|:c||||oso|y Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, i ,)
, i .
Z 1 !J !! !J11 L`
impossille notto lehistoricist, notto lelieve that everything hap-
pensandisvalidatedinhistory, itisalmostimpossille nottolelieve
thatrightiscoevalvithlegalrights. Theseol ectionshaveledtothe
recent proliferation oftheories , vhich try to rescue the realm of
rights from the relativism ofhistoricism ly presenting themas the
immanentstructureofVesternsocieties, theinescapalledemandsof
moralreasonorloth. 'Yetatheoryofhumanrightsvhichplacesall
trustingovernments,internationalinstitutions, udgesandothercen-
tres ofpullic orprivate pover, including the inchoate values ofa
society,defies theirtc|cn ! 'cltc, vhichvaspreciselytodefendpeople
fromthose institutions andpovers . Butis a strong theory ofrights
possille in our highly historicised vorld? The claim that human
rightsareuniversal,transculturalandalsoluteiscounter-intuitiveand
vulneralletoaccusationsofculturalimperialism, onthe other hand,
the assertion that they are the creations ofuropean culture, vhile
historically accurate, deprivesthem ofany transcendentvalue. From
the perspective oflate i:odernity, one can le neither a universalist
noraculturalrelativist.
Herevereachthegreatestpoliticalandethicalprollemofourera.
ifthe critique ofreason has destroyed the leliefin the inexoralle
march ofprogress, ifthe critique ofideology has svept avay most
remnants ofmetaphysical credulity, does the necessary survival of
transcendence dependon the non-convincing alsolutisatioti ofthe
lileral conceptofrightsthroughits immunisationfromhistory? r,
are ve condemned to eternal cynicism, inthe face ofimperial uni-
versals and murderous particulars? Sloterdik has argued that the
dominantideologyofpostmodernityiscynicism,ancn|ighlcnc! ]c|c
:cn:|cunc. ltisthatmodernised,unhappyconsciousness, onvhich
enlightenmenthaslalouredlothsuccessfullyandinvain. . . Vell-off
and miseralle at the same time, this consciousness no longer feels
affectedlyanycritiqueofideology,itsfalsenessisalreadyreexively
luffered`. ' Thegapletveenthetriumphofhumanrightsideology
andthedisasteroftheirpracticeisthelestexpressionofpostmodern
cynicism, the comlination ofenlightenment vith resignation and
apathy and, vith a strongfeeling ofpolitical impasse and existential
claustropholia, ofan exitlessness in the midst ofthe most molile
society. The only recommendation offered ly a critic ofhuman
rights isto adopt ironical distance tovards thosevho askusto take
' SccChatcrbclov
' !ctcrSlotcrdijk, Ct|/|uccjCya|.c|RccscaN ldrcdtrans.) London,\crso, i 88) ,
1 !J !! !J11 L`
rights seriously and t o accept the `contingency, uncertainty and
painfulresponsilility`forformsof `civillifeandcivilisationthatvill
eventually perish`. lrony of ,ourse is one of the most potent
veapons of the cynicism and self-serving nihilism ofpover and
pover-holders and canhardly le used onits ovn as apoliticalpro-
gramme ofresistance to cynicism. But can there le an ethics that
respects the pluralism ofvalues and communities? Canve discover
inhistoryanon-alsoluteconceptionofthegood,thatcouldleused
asaquasi-transcendentprincipleofcritique?Thelastpartofthislook
leginsthismostdifficultandpressingoftasks , ofseekinginhistorya
standpointcriticalofhistoricism.
The meaning ofhistory and ofhistoricaldeterminationframes a
secondandsulsidiaryquestion. Vhatisthe link, ifany,letveenthe
classical traditionofnaturallav and the modern tradition ofnatural
andhumanrights?`TheFrenchDeclarationofRightsstartedatrend
lyproclaimingtheserightsas `natural,inalienalleandsacred`. ltvas
folloved ly the American Declaration oflndependence, according
to vhich `all men are created equal, and| are endoved ly their
Creatorvith unalienalle Rights`, a statement repeated verlatimly
Article i ofthe i,| LniversalDeclarationofHumanRights. These
ratherextremestatementspresentnaturalandhumanrightsasadirect
continuationofthe classicallavtradition. They have receivedvide
support fromlileral philosophers.john Finnis claims thatrights are
extrapolations from `principles alvays inherent in the natural lav
tradition`. 'Alan Gevirthlelievesthat all human leings, lyvirtue
oftheirhumanity,recogniseinthemselves andothers ,rightstofree-
domandvell-leing.Hegoesontoarguethatrightsexistevenifthey
do not receive `clearor explicit recognition or elucidation`. jack
Donnellyarguesthatvhilehumanrightsvereconceivedinthesev-
enteenthand eighteenth centuries, they en oy a universal character
Cactc, c :|/. , sura n. z, i ,z
` V lack, Cn connccting natural rights vith natuial lav, crcac y Icrc:|c i o,
i 8-zo. FrcdNillcrhas rcccntly argucd that ^ristotlc`s thcory oljusticc hasan imlicit
doctrinc olnatuialrights, inF. Nillcr, ^c/utc,us/|:c, caJR|_|/|aHt|s/c/|c' c||/|c Cxlord
Lnivcrsity !rcss, i ,) rianJicrcyhas also argucd thatanaturalrightsthcory couldbc
lormulatcd in^ristotclianlanguagcbutitvas not Jicrcy claims thatnaturalrights thco-
rics dcvclocd,urstinthccarlyNiddlc^gcvcllbclorcthc gcncrallyaccctcdoinionthat
thcy hail lrom thc scvcntccnth ccntury rian Jicmcy, T|cJcc c}^c/urc| R|_|/s ^tlanta
Ccoigia, Scholars!rcss, i ,) Chatcrs i and i1 SccChatcrs z, and|bclov
' ]ohnFinnis, ^c/urc|Icu caJ ^c/uru|R|_|| Cxlord, Clarcndon, I8o)css|m.
` ^lanCcvirth,RccscacaJMctu||/y LnivcrsityolChicago!rcss, I,8) ,andHumca
R|_|/s LnivcrsityolChicago !rcss, i 8z) IntroductionandChatcr I .
JII JII LNII !! ILN/l II CIJS
that makes them appucalle t o all societies . For Michael Perry,
finally,theideaofhumanrightsis`ineliminallyreligious`andindis-
solullylinkedvith Catholicandscholastic versions ofnaturallav.`
Leo Strauss , MichelVilleyandAlasdairMaclntyredenythe con-
nection. Forthe neo-Aristotelians, the political philosophers ofthe
seventeenth century createda radically nev moral andpolitical dis-
courselased onindividualrightsvhichdestroyedthe classicaltradi-
tionofnaturallav.Naturalrightsarecreationsofmodernityandtheir
originsaresuccessivelyplacedintheearlyMiddleAgesTierney) ,the
fourteenth century Villey) , or the seventeenth MacPherson,
Maclntyre, Shapiro and pretty much everyone else) . Again, the
philosophercreditedviththecrucialstepinthetransformationfrom
natural lav to natural rights varies from Villiam of ckham to
Grotius, Holles orLocke. Behindthisperiodisationandaccredita-
tion lies the famous quarrel letveen the `ancients and moderns`.
Strauss , Villey and Maclntyre lelieve that the passage from the
ancientstothemodernsvascatastrophic. ForMaclntyre, `naturalor
human rights are h ctions` inventions ofmodern individualism and
should le discarded. Kenneth Minogue, Maurice Cranston and
johnFinnis, onthe other hand, see thisradical change as anecessary
stageintheprocess ofhumanemancipation.
Throughout this look, it vill le argued that perhaps loth the
relativism ofhistoricism and the ahistorical universalism oflileral
theorists, for vhomall societies and cultures have leen ormust le
sul ectedtothedisciplineofrights, are vrong. Historicismdoesnot
acceptthathistorycanle udged,fortherightsfanatics, historyends
in the universal acceptance ofhuman rights vhich turn political
conHict into technical litigation. For tle former, the hope oftran-
scendence ofthepresenthasleenlannedvhile, forthe latter, tran-
scendence still survives inthe outposts ofempire intheform ofthe
aspiration to achieve aVestern-type individualist consumersociety.
To defendthe idea oftranscendencevithout alandoningthe disci-
pline ofhistory,ve needtore-examinetheor:ginandtraectoryof
naturallav.
' ]ackLonnclly, Ca|vcrc|HumcaFg||s|a TcoqcaJrc:||:cIthaca,ComcllLnivcrsity
!rcss, I 8) 88-Io6, Louis Mcnkin, TcH_c F|_|| lcv York, Columbia Lnivcrsity
!rcss, I o) Introduction and Chatcr .
` Nichacl !crry, TcJccqHumcaF|_|| lcvYork, Cxord Lnivcrsity !rcss, I 8)
Chatcr I .
SccbclovChatcrs and|.
^lasdairNacIntyrc,Hjcrl|r|uc London, Luckvorh, I8o) ,o.
JII JII LNII !! ILN/l II CIJS 3
Fromthis perspective, the nextfourchapters offeragenealogyof
humanrights,intheformofanalternativehistoryofnaturallav,for
vhich thepromise ofhuman dignity andsocial usticehas not leen
metandcanneverlefullyrealised. urmainguidesvilllethecon-
servativepoliticalphilosopherLeoStrauss , theCatholiclegalphiloso-
pherandhistorianMichelVilley, andtheMarxistphilosopherrnst
Bloch. Natural lav represents a constant in the history ofideas,
namely tLe struggle for human dignity in freedom against the
infamies, degradations and humiliations visited on people ly estal-
lishedpovers , institutions and lavs. Thepolitical philosophers Luc
Ferry andAlainRenaut have accusedStrauss andVilley ofextreme
anti-modernismandhave claimedthattheirvorkamounts to a call
for a return to a pre-modernAristotelian universe. `' The idea ofa
return to the ancients is meaningless and cannot le imputed, l
lelieve, to our authors. ln any case, the premise lehind our lrief
historyis neither the superiority ofthe past northe inevitallypro-
gressive present, lutthepromise ofthe future. YoungMarx vrote
thatthe task ofphilosophy is to achieve `ahumanisednatureand a
naturalisedhumanity` . Thisisalsotheunfulfilledpotentialofnatural
lav and luman rights vhich, to use rnst Bloch's evocativephrase,
expresses the `forvard-pressing, not-yet-determined nature of
humanleing`. `' Tlere-tellingoftlehistoryofnaturallav triesto
follovBloch's impulse and tease out ofthe tradition its often con-
cealedconcernfortheunnnishedpersonofthefutureforvhom us-
ticematters. Naturalrightvasvrittenoutofmodernlavlecauseof
its critical potential. lts tradition unites critics and dissidents more
thananyotherphilosophyorpoliticalprogramme.Naturallavistoo
importanttoleavetotheologiansandhistoriansofideasandthenar-
rative in the first part aims to rescue from the tradition those ele-
ments, oftensuppressedinthe `ofhcial`histories,vhichlinknatural
lav and contemporary human rights struggles. The sulstantive and
methodolog:calstakes are high. is there aplacefortranscendencein
adisenchantedvorld?Vhattypeofrightsandlyextensionofsocial
lond can a critical attitude adopt after the exhaustion ofthe great
modernnarratives oflileration?

The triumphofhumanrightsvasdeclaredafterthecollapseofcom-
munism. Paradoxically hovever this coincided vith the `death of
`' Fcrr,andRcnaut,ocit , suran. i ,, Chatcr I .
`' mstloch, ^c/urc| Lu caJHumca I|_a|/y Lcnnis]. Schmidt trans. ) Cambridgc
Nass, NIJ!rcss, I 88) xviii.
JII JII LNII !! ILN/l II CIJS
man` asthesovereigncentreofthevorldannounced,i ntheseven-
ties andearly i ,os, lysocialtheoryandphilosophy.lnthatperiod,
the highly inuential thought ofMarx, Nietzsche and Freud and
their follovers, the great philosophers ofsuspicion` according to
Paul Ricoeur, successfully challenged the assumptions of lileral
humanism, the philosophy of the progressive realisation of the
'vhole man' throughout history`.` Humanism explores vhat is
right according to human nature, in its natural dignity or scientinc
ol ectivityandturnsman` into the endofhistorical evolution, the
standardofrightreasonandtheprincipleofpoliticalandsocialinsti-
tutions. According to humanism, humanityhas tvo unique charac-
teristics. it can determine its ovn destiny and, secondly, it is fully
conscious ofitself, transparent to itselfthrough self-olservation and
re ection. Both premises vere seriously undermined ly the great
critics ofmodernity.Marxdelunkedthelelief,alvaysalittlesuspect
to uropean ears, that irrespective ofsocial and economic lack-
ground, people canacquirerichesand controltheirdestinythrough
the operations ofthe market. Nietzsche andhis disciples Heidegger
and Foucault, destroyed the claimthat the enlightenment values of
rigorous method, lourgeois self-reliance and Christian piety could
lead to endless progress , harmonise humanity and its environment
and make knovledge a universal human good. Finally, the psycho-
analysis ofFreudandhis epigonesfatally underminedtheleliefthat
vehave mastery andcontrol over our selves . lfanything, the selfis
split` andlacking, the creation offorces andinuences leyondour
control and even comprehension. From the social and economic
environmenttothestructuresoflanguageandcommunicationtothe
unconscious , ourcenturyhasre-discoveredfateinthe formoffini-
tude andopaqueness: destinyhasleenre-interpretedassocialdeter-
mination orindividual necessity and, individual freedom has leen
placedinapermanentstateofsiege, threatenednotsomuchlydic-
tators ofleftorrightlutlyelements andforcesvhicheitherhavea
constitutive role inthe creationofindividuals orlurkinthe recesses
ofself, making themselves knovn vhen reason sleeps, in dreams,
okes andlinguistic slips. paquevithregardto itself, andfinding
itselfthrovninto avorldfoundedon otherprinciples, the sul ect-
thought ly early modern philosophy to le the foundation loth of
itselfandofreality- vasshattered.Vithitvereunderminedtheval-
` Lucicn Scvc, Mca |aMcr|st T|cor,Susscx, Marvcstcr!rcss, i ,8) 6,
JII JII LNII !! ILN/l II CIJS 7
ues ofhumanism. self-foundation, consciousness , mastery, freevill,
autonomy.```
Buttheannouncementofthedeath ofman`hasleenaccompa-
niedly the mostprotracted campaign to re-claimthe individual, as
thetriumphantcentreofourpostmodernvorldandto declarefree-
dom,intheformofautonomyorself-determination,astheorganis-
ingideal ofourlegal andpolitical systems. Vehave seenthis inthe
endlesslyproclaimed return ofto) the sul ect,inthe importance of
identityandidentity-relatedpolitics,inthereturnofmoralitytopol-
iticsandofhumanism tolav. lnlileral urisprudence, the return to
thesul ectisevident,ontheright,intherecentdominationofrights
theories and, on the left, in the moralism ofpolitical correctness.
Vhile philosophyandsocial theoryinsist on the social construction
ofselfandontheroleofstructure,systemandlanguageintheorgan-
isation ofthe vorld, the desire to return to a pristine condition of
selfhood and to re-instateitsfreedomandpropriety, deconstructed
and demystifiedly the philosophies ofsuspicion, returneddramati-
callytolav. But can the sovereignsul ectofrights le squaredvith
the deconstructionofsul ectivity?
Thisis notanidle question.Rightsverethefirstpullicacknovl-
edgement ofthe sovereignty ofthe sul ect and inuenced strongly
the modern metaphysics of sul ectivity`.`' The anti-humanist`
philosophersdidnot discusshumanrightsatreatlength,vithafev
exceptions . ` n the otherhand, fromAdorno to Arendt andfrom
LyotardtoLevinas,theyallcommentedonthevayinvhichhuman-
ismcanle turnedinto the inhuman, its dreamofarationally eman-
cipated society transformed into the nightmare of totalitarian
administration or lureaucratic technocracy. Foucault, Lyotard and
Derridalecamerepeatedly involvedvithpoliticalandhumanrights
`` ^lain Rcnaut, T|cIrcojt|caJ|v|Juc|. H Coatr|hut|oa to cH|stor, ojSuhc:t|v|ty N
Lccvioscand F !hili trans ) !rinccton l], !rincctonLnivcrsity!rcss, i ,) xxvii.
`' SccChatcrs , and8
`` Nichcl Foucaultisthc most obvious Mcvascquallycriticalolthchilosohyolsub-
j cctivityandolthclcgalandcontractualrcscntationolovcrFoucaultargucdthatthcthc-
or, olrightdisguiscddiscilinar,racticcs anddomination and hocdto shov hovright
is, in agcncralvay, thcinstrumcntolthis domination- vhich scarcclynccds saying- but
alsotoshovthccxtcnttovhichandthclormsonvhichright . transmits andbringsinto
laynotrclationsolsovcrcigntybutoldominationNygcncralrojccthasbccn,incsscncc,
to rcvcrsc thc modc olanalysis lollovcdby thccntircdiscourscolright to invcrit, to
shov hovlorccrclationshavc bccnnaturaliscdinthcnamcolright. NichclFoucault,
Jvo Lccturcs. Lccturc Jvo. i| anuar, i ,6 in oucr/Kaou|cJ_c L. Cordon cd
K Socr trans) lcv York. !anthcon, i 8o, ,-6 Cn thc othcr hand, Foucault morc
thanmanyahilosohcrvas closclyand continuouslyinvolvcdvith divcrscrights strug-
glcs
O JII JII LNII !! ILN/l II CIJS
campaigns. l t looks as if philosophical anti-humanism and the
defence ofthe humanarenaturalallies. Butthislinkage ofthemost
severecritiqueofhumanismviththeintellectualandpoliticalstrug-
gles for dignity and equality infuriated lilerals. Alain Renaut, a
French lileral political philosopher vho, vith Luc Ferry, spear-
headedanumlerofill-manneredpoliticalattacksonpoststructural-
ist philosophers, admitted light-heartedly alout his accusations that
thoughvehaveofteninsistedonrigorouslyexaminingtheprollem
ofsul ectivityvithreference to humanrights , ve did notmeanto
udge allpossille philosophies ly a sort of'litmus test' that vould
measure theircompatililityviththe i,, DeclarationoftheRights
ofMan- posing, asitvere, asintellectualmagistrates avardingcer-
tificatesofcivicresponsilility`. `
Andyettheseparadoxicallinksandsupernciallyunnaturalalliances
couldperhapsleexplained.Thisisamaintaskofthislook. Human
rights`isacomlinedterm.Theyrefertothehuman,tohumanityor
human nature and are indissolully linked vith the movement of
humanismanditslegalform. Butthereferenceto rights` indicates
theirimplicationviththedisciplineoflav,vithitsarchaictraditions
and quaint procedures. Legal institutions occasionally move in tan-
demviththeaspirationsofpoliticalphilosophyortheplansofpolit-
ical science lut more often the tvo diverge. The rights ofman`
enteredthevorldscenevhenthetvotraditionscametogetLerfora
lriefsymlolicmomentinearlymodernity, representedlythevrit-
ings ofHolles, Locke and Rousseau, ly the FrenchDeclaration of
the Rights ofMan and Citizen andlytheAmericanDeclaration of
lndependence and Bill of Rights. The convergence of political
philosophy and constitution-making estallished political and legal
modernity, lutit vas short-lived. Philosophy, lav and sciencesoon
divergedandmovedindifferentdirectionstore-comlineagain,after
theSecondVorldVar,inthenevconfigurationofhumanrights.
Legalsystems areolsessedviththestoryoftheirorigins ,thefoun-
dationalmomentvhichendovsthemvithvalidityandconsistency.
Peter Goodrich has distinguishedletveen ideational` and institu-
tional sources oflav. ldeational sources refer to the claims a legal
systemmakesto an externalandalsolute ustificationforlegal reg-
ulation`.`' lnstitutional sources, on the other hand, are empirically
verinalleinstitutions ,suchascustom,statute,constitutionandprece-
`' Rcnaut, o cit. , suran. , xxviii
!ctcrCoodrich,FccJ|a_/|cLuCxlord,lackvcll, i 88) Chatcr i
JII JII LNII !! ILN/l II CIJS V
dent.Theintroductionof humannatureanditsrightsi nthelegaldis-
course ofthe eighteenth century marked a nev ideational source.
The legal institution vith its history, tradition and logic had to
accommodate the extravagant claims ofthis revolutionary idea. An
important consequenceofthis nevcomlinationofphilosophy, his-
toryandlegalpracticevasthattheconceptofhumannatureispulled
tovardstvo contradictoppositions. ltisaskedtoformtheprinciple
oflav and politics, in other vords, to lecome the nev ideational
source oflav, to come lefore and found the lav. But the entitle-
mentsofempiricalpeopleremainthegrantandtheirconcretenature
the creation ofthe legal system. Holles remarked in the Ict|clhcn
that ctscnc in latine signines the !|sgu|sc, ct culuct! cppcctan:c j a
man, counterfeited on the Stage, and sometimes more particularly
that partofit,vhichdisguiseththe face, amaskorVisard. And from
the Stage, hath leen translated to any Representer ofspeech and
action, asvell inTrilunalls , as Theaters . . . invhich sense Cicero
useth itvhere he saies, Lnus susl|ncc ltcs ctscncs, Ac|, H!tctsct|| c
u!|:|s` .`Peoplemustlelroughtleforethelavinordertoacquire
rights , duties,poversand competencies vhichgivethesul ectlegal
personality. Thelegalpersonisthecreationoflegalortheatricalarti-
nce, theproductofaninstitutionalperformance. lnthediscourse of
humanrights,thispctscnc ormask, thecreationoflav,mustletrans-
formedinto lav'sprogenitororprinciple, thesul ectvho comesto
lifeonthestageoflavmustalsocomeleforethelavandsupportits
maker. Thethreepersons ofCicero, the me` orego, thelegalsul-
ectandthe udge are the three facets vho, fusedin one, villform
the holytrinityofthe human, the lavand its sul ects, and createthe
groundprinciple ofmodern man, fatherand son,!ctcnl |c |c|, loth
leforeandafterthelav .`
ln this sense, human rights are loth creations and creators of
modernity, the greatest political and legal invention of modern
politicalphilosophy andurisprudence. Theirmodern charactercan
le traced in all the essential characteristics. First, theymark a pro-
found turn in political thought from duty to right, from :|t|lcs and
communitasto civilisationandhumanity. Secondly, theyreversethe
traditionalpriorityletveenthe individual andsociety. Vhile classi-
cal andmedievalnaturallav expressedtherightorderofthe :csmcs
` Mobbcs,Icv|c/|ca RichardJuckcd) Cambridgc Lnivcrsity!rcss, i 6) Chatcr i 6,
I I 2.
`]acqucsLcrrida, Lcvantl aLoi , i nA doll cd ) , KqccaJ/|c Cca/cmcrcq Cr|/|:c|
cr]crmca:c: Cca/cacryFccJ|a_s loomington, Indi+na Lnivcrsity !rcss) i 8
Z JII JII LNII CI ILN/l II CIiS
andofhuman communities vithinit, an orderthat gave the citizen
his place, time and dignity, modernity emancipates the humanper-
son, turns him from citizen to individual and estallishes him at the
centre ofsocial and political organisation and activity. The citizen
comes ofage vhen he is released fromtraditional londs and com-
mitments to act as anindividual, vho follovs his desires andapplies
his vill to the natural and social vorld. This release ofhuman vill
andits enthronementas the organisingprinciple ofthe vorld had a
numler ofimportantpolitical implications. Lnconstrainedfreedom
can destroyitself Freed vill must le restrained lylavs and sanc-
tions , theonlylimits itunderstands. Thesearenotintrinsic orinte-
graltoitlutempiricalandexternal. Freedomandcoercion,lavand
violence are lorn in the same act. ltvas the great achievement of
Holles, the hrst and prolally the lest theorist oflileralism and
modern natural rights, to realise that vhen human nature lecomes
sovereignandunfettered,itneedsasitscounterpointapullicpover
vhich shares in all particulars the characteristics ofthe undivided
andsingularfreevilloftheindividualandliteraliseshis metaphori-
cal unlimited pover. The sovereignty ofunshackled vill hnds its
perfect complement and mirror image in the sovereignty of the
state. The Leviathanisthemirrorimageandtheperfect,alltoo per-
fectpartnerofemancipatedman.
Theroadfromclassicalnaturallavtocontemporaryhumanrights
is therefore markedly tvo analyticallyindependent lut historically
linkeddevelopments. The first transferredthestandard ofrightfrom
nature to history and eventually to humanity or civilisation. This
processcanlecalledthepositivisationofnature.ltsreversesideisthe
- incomplete - legalisation ofpolitics vhich madepositive lav the
terrain ofloth pover and its critique. The second trend, closely
linkedviththefirst, vasthelegalisationofdesire.Manvasmadethe
centreofthevorld,hisfreevilllecametheprincipleofsocialorgan-
isation,hisinfiniteandunstoppalle desire vasgiven pullic recogni-
tion. This tvin process determined the tra ectory vhich linked
historically lut separated politically the classical discourse ofnature
andthecontemporarypracticeofhumanrights.Buthumanrightsare
alsotheveaponofresistanceto stateomnipotenceandanimportant
antidote to the inherent alility ofsovereign pover to negate the
autonomy ofthe individuals invhose name it came into existence.
Humanrights are internallyfissured. they areusedasthe defenceof
theindividualagainstastatepoverluiltintheimage ofanindivid-
ualvithalsoluterights. ltisthisparadoxattheheartofhumanrights
JII JII LNII CI ILN/l II CIJS Z
vhichlothmovestheirhistoryandmakes theirrealisationimpossi-
lle. Human Rights have `only paradoxes to offer`, their energy
comesfromtheiraporeticnature. ''
'' Jhc phrasc comcs lrom a lcttcr ol Clympc dc Cougcs, thc author ol thc I ,i
Lcclaration olthc Rights olVoman and Citizcn.]oannc Scotti na|y IcmJoxcs| o_t.
rca:hcm|a|s|s caJ|hcFgh|s o}McaCambrdgc, Nass. , MarvardLnivcrsity!rcss, I 6) at
|, uscs thccxprcssiontodcscribcthcpositionolvomcninrcvolutionar, Francc Curpoint
ismoic gcncral. thcvholcficldolhumanrightsischaractcrscdbyparadoxcsandaporias
Z
. Bt|/ I|s/.ty / ^c/utc| Icu
!. T|c C|css|.c| Bc_|aa|a_s
Despite vars , genocides, holocausts, the ever more atrocious and
imaginativevaysoppressionandexploitationdiscover,humanitystill
lelieves thata state ofindividual andsocialgrace exists, even vhen,
particularlyvhen, thevolnshpartofmanisatitsvorse. Thisquest
forthejustsocietyhasleenassociatedfromclassicaltimesvithnat-
urallav,the `unvrittenlavs` ofAntigone.
Natural lav is a notoriously open-ended concept and its under-
standingis cloudedinhistoricalandmoraluncertainty.Accordingto
rik Volf, there have leen some seventeen meanings ofthe vord
ncluta|c andnfteenofju andtheirpermutationsleadtosomez, , def-
initions ofnaturallav.' But vhateverits differentmeanings, natural
lav vas for many centuries the capital city of the province of
jurisprudence andpoliticalphilosophy. lts tLinking vas profoundly
hermeneutical, itattended to ends and purposes, meanings and val-
ues, virtue and duty. Today nature and lav, concepts inextrically
tvinnedformostoftheVesterntradition, have leenradically sepa-
ratedand assignedto differenteven opposingnelds. Classicalnature
has leen replaced ly a meaningless natural vorld vhich has leen
drapedviththedignity`ofolj ectivityandthestullornnessoffacts.
lts studylythe naturalsciencesenj oysa status andlegitimacyvhich
eludesthesocialsciences, philosophyorjurisprudence. Natureitself,
hovever, has leen reducedto inert matter, the unresponsive target
forhumaninterventionandcontrol.
Themodernlavsofnatureareuniversal, immutalleandeternal,
asetofregularitiesorofrepeatedpatterns. Thelavofgravityorthe
secondlavofthermodynamcsarefollovedinpractice, inthesense
thatonecannotchoosetodisoleythem. Theyarethere,lrutefacts,
verinalle or falsinalle logical alstractions deriving from common
olservations ofnatural phenomena. lfnatural lav is ofthe same
rianJicrcy, 1hcIJcc e}^c|urc|Fgh|s ^tlanta, Scholars!rcss, I ,) |8.
Z / III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
order,itsnormsvouldlesomethinglikeanindependentlogicaland
moral ensemlle, a set ofnorms thatloth is andoughtto leoleyed
lypeople. Naturallavvouldleanolectiveorderofrulesornorms
somethinglikethenaturallavsofmodernscience. ltsapplication, the
olservalle pattern ofphenomena that can le sulsumed under the
conceptoflav, vouldlinkexternalnature, socialandpoliticalinsti-
tutions and the inner life ofindividuals. Did the Greeks , vho nrst
introduced the idea into the universe ofpolitical philosophy and
urisprudence, understandnaturallav as an immutalle set ofrules?
Vhatisthemeaningofnaturallavforthephilosophicalimagination
ofthe Greeks andtheuristic creativityoftheRomans?
I . 11V1 11 _ 1b 1 L1 1 L11b b 1 L11 LV11L1
Greekphilosophyoffersaconvenientstartingpointforexploringthe
genealogy ofhumanright. Thesurvivingphilosophicalfragments of
thePresocratics, theearliestphilosophers,arefullofreferencestous-
tice, inusticeandright. Heracleitoslelieved that things regardedas
opposites are infactunitedand cannot exist vithout their contrary.
Thereisnoupvardpathvithoutthedovnvardfr.6,) , therevould
lenoheatifthereverenocold fr. ,) , usticevouldleunknovn
vere itnotforinustice fr. 6o) . -Andinhis mostfamousfragment,
Heracleitos tellsusthat `varis universal and usticeis strife`. Butif
usticeis strife, its cessation vould meanthe end ofthe vorld. The
oldest extant text of Vestern philosophy is a fragment ly
Anaximanderonustice, vhichhaslecomethesul ectofanimpor-
tantphilosophical and philological delate culminating in a famous
essay ly Heidegger.` The fragment reads. `lut vhere things have
their origin, there too theirpassingavayoccursaccordingtoneces-
sity,for theyareudgedandmake reparation !|!cnc| !|/cn) to one
another for their inustice c!|/|c) according to the ordinance of
time`. ' An archaic, original inustice, an c!|/|c that comes lefore
Mayckbclicvcs that Mcraclcitos is thc carIicst hilosohcr to cmhasisc thc rimar,
charactcr olinjusticc. Movcvcr this is inaccuratc as thc ^naximandcr lragmcnt is carlicr.
F.^ Mayck,Icu,Ic_|s|c||oa,I||cr|y,\ol. z London,Routlcdgc andKcgan!aul, I ,6) I6z,
n. andscc]. umct,Icrly Crcck Ih||osohy |th cd. , London,^ C lack, Io) I 66.
` NartinMcidcggcr, Jhc^naximandcrFragmcnti nIcr|y Crcck Th|ak|a_ L. F. Crcll
andF. Cauzzi trans. ) lcvYork. Marcr andRov, I ,,) .
' Jhis is our translation and cmhasiscs thc lcgal and moral asccts olthc lragmcnt.
Mcidcggcr's cssay discusscs thc various mis)translations olthc lragmcnt. lictzschc in his
carIybutosthumouslyublishcdIh||osohy|a|hc Ttc_|:H_c|hc Crccks N.Covantrans )
I JII CL/S S I C/L IICI llI lCS Z3
timemarkstheleginningofleingsandimposesadeltorculpalility
onpeople, thingsandinstitutions. History the ordinance oftime) is
theneldinvhichthereparationorrestitutionoftheoriginaryinus-
ticevillleattemptedandvillfailaseverythingvillreturnofneces-
sity toitsoriginal inustice. Butvhile inusticesvere clearly felt,in
Homeric times, thedevelopment ofa theory ofusticehadto vait
the discoveryofnature.
Archaic Creece did not distinguishletveenlavand convention
orrightandcustom. Customisastrongcement,itlindsfamiliesand
communities nrmly lut it can also numl. Vithout external stan-
dards, the development ofa critical approach tovards traditional
authority is impossille, the given goes unchallenged and the slaves
stayinline, avievexpressedlyHeracleitos, vhosaidthatusticeand
in ustice are man-made and God does not care alout either. Leo
Strausshasarguedthat`originally,theauthorityparexcellenceorthe
rootofallauthorityisthe ancestral. Throughthediscoveryofnature,
the claim ofthe ancestral is uprooted, philosophy appeals from the
ancestral to the good, to that vhich is good intrinsically, to that
vhichis goodlynature`. Greekphilosophy, natureandtheideaof
theustverelorn togetherinanactofresistance againsttraditional
authorityandits in ustices. This developmentisapparentinthehis-
tory ofthe vord !|/c, the key Greek termfor a cluster ofconcepts
and vords connoting the rightful, lavful orust. lnarchaic Greek,
!|/c meanttheprimordialorder,the vay ofthevorld. 'ltincluded
ncmc| and lhcmc|, customs andnorms ofconductvhich, according
to Parmenides , vere lindingonloth gods and mortals. cmc, the
vordlaterusedforlav, originallyhadthesamemeaningasclhc. As
Chicago,Rcgncry, i 6z)translatcsit thus. Vhcnccthingshavcthcirorigin,thcymustalso
assavay accordingtoncccssity,lorthcymustaythccnaltyandbcjudgcdlorthcirinjus-
ticc according to thc ordinancc oltimc Jhc classical translation olm_mca|Ircso:rc||:s
byLicls statcs that butvhcrc thingshavc thcir origin, thcrc too thcirassingavay occuis
accordingto ncccssity, lorthcyay rccomcnsc andcnalty to oncanothcrlor thcirrcck-
lcssncss, according to firmly cstablishcd timc quotcd in Mcidcggcr, ocit , sura n. j , |i .
Finally[. NRobinson,HaIa|roJu:||oa|oIcr|y CrcckIh||osohyoston,MoughtonNimin,
I 68) . j|translatcsit as lollovs. Into thoscthingslromvhichcxistingthingshavc thcir
cominginto bcing, thcirassingavaytoo, takcslacc accordingto vhatmust bc, lorthcy
makc rcarationto oncanothcrloi thcirinjusticcaccordingtothc ordinancc oltimc.
LcoStrauss,^c|urc|IcucaJH|s|oryChicago,LnivcrsityolChicago !rcss, I6 ,) i .
' ForMcidcggcrJ|kci s notjusticcbutthcovcrovcringstructurcol cing,i t cmcrgcs
andshincsinitscrmancnt rcscncc ashys|sandis gathcrcdtogcthcrinits collcctcdncss as
|o_os, Costas Louzinas and Ronnic Varrington,us||:c M|s:crr|cJ dinburgh, dinburgh
Lnivcrsity!rcss, I |) 88 McidcggcrdiscusscsJ|kc,hy|sand aomos in Nartin Mcidcggcr,
Ha Ia|roJu:||oa |oMc|chys|. R. Nannhcimtrans. ) lcvYork, Loublcday ^nchor, I 6I )
Z
/ III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
Heideggerhasshovn,thencmc| vereinitiallythepastures ofhorses
andvanderingforpasturage, laterthevordtookonhemeaningof
possessionandregularusage,indicatinglothhalitandacceptedprac-
tice and movement, lefore settlinginits classicallegalmeaning. By
thetimeoftheclassicalperiod, themeaningof!|kc toohadchanged
to rightfuludgment, !|ka|cn vas the right and ust and !|ka|cs the
rightfulperson. '
Thepassagefromthearchaicconceptof!|kc andncmcs totheclas-
sical !|ka|cn and phys|kcs ncmcs natural lav) is punctuated ly the
discovery ofnature. hys|s as a normative and legal concept is not
usedinthe extantliterature leforethefourth century. Sophoclesin
Hnl|gcnc uses insteadthetermunvritten lavs. The idea ofnatural
lavappearedfully developed,for the nrst time, inAristotle vho in
hisIhclct|: vrote that.
ly lav l mean on the one hand particular lav and on the other gen-
eral lav, special leing that deuned ly each group in relation to itselC
this leing either unvritten or vritten dovn, and the general lav
leing that of nature. For there is something of vhich ve all have an
inkling, leing a naturally universal right and vrong, even if there is
no community letveen the tvo parties nor contract, to vhich
Sophocles' Antigone seems to le referring.
` ^ccording to Liddcll and Scott, Crcck-Ia_||sh Icx|:oa 6th cd. , Cxlord, Clarcndon,
i z) J|kcmcans custom, usagc, ught as dccnds on custom, lav, ajudgmcnt, latcr) lav-
suit,thctrialolacasc. I|kc|oamcans arcgularvayolliving, duc lorm, latcr) rightlul,lav-
lul, just
Itvasn`t/cus, notinthclcast
vho madc thisroclamation,notto mc
lordidthat]usticc ,I|kc) , dvcIingviththc gods
bcncaththc carth,ordainsuchlavslor mcn.
lordidIthinkyourjCrcon`sj cdicts hadsuchlorcc
thatyou, amcrcmancouldovcrfidc
thcgrcatunvrittcnandccrtainlavs olthc gods.
Jhcyarc alivc, notjust todayorycstcrday,
thcylivclorcvcr, andno oncknovs.
vhcnthcyvcrcurstlcgislatcd.
Sohoclcs, Ha||_oac in Trcc Thc|ca I|cy R. Faglcs trans.) London, !cnguin, i 8|)
||6-,,. Jhctcrmhys|sisfirstrclatcdtolav,inLcmosthcncs`oration ''Icr|S|chcaouCn
thcCrovn, C. \inccand ]. \incc trans.) London,Mcincmann, i ,|) ^ similarlormula-
tion is lound in ^ristotlc, Thc Hr| Fhc|or|: H C. Lavson-Jancrcd trans. ) London,
!cnguin, i i ) ^ i j 68b. Jhclaviscithcrarticularorcommon.yarticularlavImcan
thatvrittcndovnina constitution, andbygcncralI mcanthoscunvrittcnlavsvhicharc
hcldto bc agccdbya. Jhis and thcquotationimmcdiatclybclov arc thccarlicstrclcr-
cnccsto link thc common, unvrittcnlavs vith naturc.
ibid. , i j ,jb
! JII CL/S S I C/L IICI llI lCS Z7
Natureasacriticalconceptacquiredphilosophicalcurrencyinthe
hfthcenturyvhenitvasusedlytheSophistsagainstcustomandlav
and,lySocratesandPlatoinorderto comlattheirmoralrelativism
and restore the authority ofreason. The Sophists represented the
privilegedyouth ofAthensvho, in equalmeasure, despised the old
religious taloos and the constant training for var. They set phys|s
againstncmcs andindividualopinionagainsttraditionandgavephys|s
a normative meaning, in vhich to reason` meant to criticise`.' '
They arguedthat the ncmc| aresocialconventions andlavs andnot
part ofthe natural order. Nature as the highestnormustines, in a
rather eclectic vay, vhatever the instincts lead humans to desire. ' '
Callicles in Ccg|as and Thrasymachus in the Icpu/||: anticipated
Nietzsche, vhentheyarguedthathumanlavsvereaninventionof
theveakinordertoprotectthemselvesfromthestrong. Thenature
ofthe Sophists comlined the savage vith the universal and stood
loth for the right ofthe strongestandfor equality for all. Vith the
Sophists, the critique oflav andthe figure ofthe naturallyfreeand
self-servingindividual enteredthehistoricalscene.
Plato'sresponsetothesophistchallengevastore-definethenor-
mative character ofnature ly shoving that, far from contradicting
lav,itsetsthefundamentalnormofeachleing. Plato' slatedialogue,
the Iaus, extended the concept ofphys|s to include thevhole cos-
mos. Butthisvasnotareturntothepre-classical!|kc. Thenevorder
vasthatofthesoul andofthetranscendentspiritualvorlditinhal-
its,itvasthehighestandmostnaturalorderandanimatedtheempir-
icalcosmos. 'Thedistinctionletveenthetvonaturesfollovedthe
Platonic opposition letveen the vorlds of forms and reality lut
acquiredpoliticalsignincance much later. As Louis Dupre argues, it
laid the philosophical lasis for the later attempts to integrate the
classical conceptofnaturevith that ofa Helrev-Christian Creator
leyond nature`. ' ` But that had to vait. The signincance ofthe
delateletveenPlatoandtheSophistsvasthatlyuxtaposingphys|s
' ' mstloch, ^c|utc|IcucaJ HumcaI|_a||yL) Schmidt trans. ) Cambridgc,Nass,
NIJ!rcss, i 88) ,-.
' ' JhcclassicaltrcatmcntolaomosinCrcckthoughtis]acquclincdcRomilly,IcIo|Jcas
|c casec Crc:quc. Jcs or|_|ae J Hr|s|o|c, !aris. Lcs cllcs Lcttrcs, I ,I ) , scc also Nartha
lussbaum, Jhcctrayal olConvcntion. ^ rcadingoluriidcs' Hc:u|c, in 1hcrc_||||y
CooJacss Cambridgc, CambridgcLnivcrsity !rcss, I 86) j ,-|zI .
' !lato, ThcIcusJ]Saundcrstrans) London,!cnguin, I88) . Vhcn jthcignorant]
uscthctcru'naturc` , thcymcanthcroccssbyvhich thcrimarysubstanccsvcrccrcatcd.
utilit canbcshovn that soul camcf:rst, notfirc orair, and that itvas onc olthc urst
thingsto bc crcatcd,itvillbc quitccorrcctto saythat soulisrccmncntlynatural, 8zc.
' ` Louis Lurc, Icssc_c| oMoJcra||ylcvMavcn,YalcLnivcrsity!rcss, I j) I,.
ZO
/ III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L^V.
and ncmcs i n their various meanings, i t opened the vhole lasis of
classical civilisationandinstitutional existencetoradical questioning
and innovation and gave rise to political philosophy andurispru-
dence. Turningnatureintonormorintothestandardofrightvasthe
greatestearlystepofcivilisationlutalsoacunningtrickagainstpriests
andrulers.' 'Tothisday, vhenknovledge andreasonare sul ected
to authoritytheyarecalled theology` orlegal learning` lutthey
cannotlethephilosophypractisedlythe Greeks. '
Classicalnaturalrightvasradicallyanti-historicist,ortouseaterm
anachronistically, it had something ol ective` alout it. But as the
radical splitletveenthesul ectandol ect, amainstayofmodernity,
hadnotoccurredyet, therightreasonrevealedinnaturehadnone of
its modern characteristics . Lnlike ol ective` statements, natural
rightvasneitherstatic, norcertain, nordiditmirroraninertnature.
To understandits meaning, ve need to lracket our contemporary
assumptions alout nature and culture andplace itvithin the teleo-
logicalcosmosofantiquity.
Classical ontology lelieved that the cosmos, the universe and
everything in it, animate or inanimate, has a purpose, lc|cs or end.
The Greek cosmosincludedthe phys|s ofleings, the clhcs ofsocial
mores ,thencmcs ofcustomsandlavsand,mostimportantly,the|cgcs
orrationalfoundationofallthatexists,vhichfoundedthe cosmosas
a closed lut harmonious and ordered universe. ntities vere
arrangedinahierarchicalvay,eachholdingitsuniqueanddifferen-
tialplacevithintheoverallschemeaccordingtoitsproperdegreeof
perfection, at the top the incorruptille imponderalle luminous
spheres, at the lottom, the heavy, opaque material lodies`. ' The
end ofa leingdeterminedits place in the vhole and vas identical
vith its nature. Thenature ofeachishispurpose`vroteAristotle
and Aquinas, in his Ccmmcnlcty cn Ht|slcl|c 's hys|:s, repeated that
` Jhc Frcnch oliticalhilosohcrs Fcrry and Rcnaut havc argucd that Strauss is an
cxtrcmc anti-modcmist vho advocatcs thc rctur to classical culturc. Jhcy havc totally
misscd hovcvcr thc critical intcnt olStrauss` analysis. Jhis is ncccssarylor thcirargumcnt,
according tovhich, Strauss`naturalismisarathcrstcrilcauthortarianismandcannotbcrcs-
cucdlrom^ristotclian cosmology. LucFcrryand^lain Rcnaut, rom|hcF|_h|s Mca|o |hc
Fcu|||:ca IJcc Franklin !hili trans. ) Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, i z) z-|.
ForarcsonsctothcircculiarMcidcggcranlibcralism, scccmardouigcois,Ih||osoh|c
c|Jro|| Jc| 'hommc!ars,!.\ F. , i o) .
` Strauss, o. cit. , suran , z.
' ' landincarrct-Krcgcl,IcIro|| Jc| 'hommcc|/cJro||ac|urc|!aris,!.\ F. , i 8)|6.
Itshouldbccmhasiscdhcrc that this cosmologyis intrinsicallylinkcdviththcincgalitar-
iannaturc olclassical natuialrght andolits socictics Foi^rstotlc, slavcryvas natuial and
thcrcforc notanallrontto naturalrght.
I JII CL/S S I C/L IICI llI lCS ZV
nature acts for an end. '' The nature ofathingorleingis , first,its
efncient cause, its cncgc|c or potential for perfection, secondly, its
developing essence and, hnally, its end oraim, thepurposetovards
vhichitmoves, itsactualisedpotentialvhenitmaturesandlecomes
aperfectspecimenofitskind.' Theendorlc|cs isastateofexistence
atvhichdispositionorpotencyreachesfulnlmentorperfection. The
natureoftheacorn,forexample,istolecomeamatureoaktree, the
purpose of the vine to produce sveet-tasting grapes. Similarly,
the purose ofahuman isto achieve his potential, to pass fromthe
nascentto hisfully developedstate. achild's endis to lecomeavir-
tuous adult, acarpenter'stoproduce excellenttalles, acolller'sthe
perfectsandals. Aristotle's concept ofnature vas therefore rich and
complex.loththeefhcientandnnalcause, thegermpresentatlirth
andtheaimleings tendto realise naturally.
Butifthenature ofathingorleingisitsstate offulnlmentorper-
fectionandeverystage inlife is astationfromits transientpresence
toitsnaturalend,leingcannotledistinguishedfromlecomingand
essencefromexistence. Natureitselfunliketheinertmatterofmod-
ern science, represents the principle ofmotionin apurposeful cos-
mos, invhichacorns, lamlsandinfantscanonlyleunderstoodasa
developing order of meaningful and future-looking interrelations.
ForAristotle, phys|s vasmotion, asource or cause ofleingmoved
andofleingatrestinthattovhichitlelongsprimarilyinvirtueof
itself`. ' Beingvasalvays onthevay, ina ourneythatvillnever
end, lecauseperfectionvas alvays astep too far, astate alvays still
tocome.
lservingthe nature ofthe cosmosandofthings andleingsinit
involvesimputing onthemaims,purposesandendspolitically,inthe
pc||s, alvaysinconunctionvithotherthingsandleings. Theseteloi
arenotarlitrary, theyaredeterminedlythedispositionalcharacter-
isticsofeachleing,lyits orderofneedsandvantsvhich,lypoint-
ingtoitsnaturalconstitution,createsastrongmoraldutytostriveand
achieve it. The good ofan entity is the completion ofthe move
tovardsits end,theever-deferredtransitionfrompotencytoactual-
ity. Aleing'snature correspondstoits specific operationorvork, a
` ^naccountol^ristotlc`stclcologyisloundin^lan Cothhcl( ^ristotlc`s Concction
olFinalCausality, o/zFcv|cuMc|chys|:,zz6-,|, i ,6. For^quinas`s^ristotclianism,
scc ^nthonyLisska,Hqu|acs's Thcoqo}^c|urc|IcuCxlord, Clarcndon, i 6) Chatcr|.
' ^ristotlc, Mc|chys|: L. osctock trans ) Cxlord, Clarcndon, i |) |. |, I oI a,,
Io||||: M Rakhamtrans ) CambrdgcNass, Locb, i o) I , I, I z,za.
' Ihys|: L.osctocktrans. ) (Cxlord, CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i 6) II, i , i zb, z i- .

/ I II II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
leingis goodifitdoesitspropervorkvell, ifitfollovsitsnature.
l ts perfectionconstitutes its vell leing orcu tc|n and offers precise
guidanceinethicalandpracticalmatters. lnthissense, the goodlife
is life according to nature and no separation letveen is and ought
exists. Thenaturalteleologyofthe ancients, theirpurposefulnature,
could thus lecome the lasis ofa strong ethics ofvirtue and value.
Right accordingto nature is vhat contrilutes to the leing'sperfec-
tion,vhatkeepsitmovingtovardsitsend,vrongorun ustisvhat
violently removes itfromitsplace, disruptsits naturaltrectoryand
prevents itfromleingvhatitis`. ' Naturalrightisthereforeloth
transcendenttoreality,anideal `, andcanle conndentlydiscovered
through olservation and reasoning, althoughthis does notmake it
ol ective`inthemodernsense. Theideaofaneternalinertnature
istotallyalientoearlynaturallav.
Vithin this lroadframevork, thevarious schools ofclassicalphi-
losophy inteqreted nature differently. For the Sophists , phyi vas
the essence ofthings vhich vas not sacred or solemn, lut simply
vhat endures throughchangeandremainsconstantlehinddiversity.
Theirphilosophicalsuccessors , the CynicsandtheHedonists, associ-
atednatureviththesimplicityofanimalityandtheindulgenceofpri-
vate pleasures. The Cynics fought traditionand artince in its many
forms and attacked all institutional invention, fromluxurious living
to properq, family and the polis. The Hedonists taught pleasure,
against the dog-life ofDiogenes, Aristippus led a life ofluxury and
preachedthatnatural isvhat contrilutes to happiness , the only cri-
terion for udging the value ofinstitutions. Depending on vhether
thecharacterofinnatenaturevasmeanttosufferoren oy,frugality
and pleasure lecame the tvin aims ofnatural lav. To this day, the
Cynics and the Hedonists are the forefathers ofmany revolutionary
movements,althoughpreachingtheuniversalrighttopleasurevitl-
out hypocrisy is more dangerous, for the ricl and poverful, and
hardertofulnlthanthe message ofmeagrefrugalityoftheCynics. '
Manytimesinthehistoryofnaturallav,aninitiallyrevolutionary
idea vas co-opted ly the estallished povers, tamed and domesti-
cated. picurus turnedthe hedonistpleasures ofthe Heshvith their
revolutionarypotentialintotheprivateandtranquilenoymentofthe
philosopher and made a life in contemplation the prerequisite of
human dignity. His insistence on the privacy ofthe undisturled
delights ofthemindledhimto doult the sacred origin ofthepolis,
' FcrryandRcnaut, o. cit. , suran. i|, |..
' loch, o. cit. , suran. i o, .
I JII CL/S S I C/L II CI llI lCS
he taught, instead, that cities vere estallishedthrough a contract of
free and equal individuals vho entered it to protect theirsecurity.
The purpose ofthe polis and the lasis ofolligations that carry the
forceofnaturallavisutility, theaimofthelavistopreventmutual
in ury and harm. But despite the individualistic character of
picureanism,itssuspicionofpullicpoversanditscritiqueofin us-
tice, nature and its pleasures remained totahy private and had no
immediate effectonthe social organisation vhichvas sustainedly
slavesvithno olviousstakeintherealmofhappiness.
The nnal and most dramatic mutation in the early relationship
letveenphyi and ncmc vas introducedly the Stoics. The Stoics
remainedfaithfultothesuperiorityofaprivatelifeoftranquillityand
re ection. Theypreachedandpractisedc/ctcx|c orimperturlalility,
the supreme duty ofself-control overpassionsandirrationality. But
vhileforpicurus ,happinessaccordingtonature ledtoalife ofdig-
nity, the Stoics made vell-leingtle outcome ofalife dignined ly
thepride ofleinghuman. The dignihedpersonvassomeonevhose
headvas heldhigh . . . thepersonvho heldhimselfupright,vho
fromthe outset relatedtonaturalright. . . Apridethatvas univer-
sally formal set an all-encompassing attitude of kinship on the
autonomousindividual`. The Sophistshadsetphyi againstncmc,
the Stoics expanded ncmc into the necessary lond ofthe universe
andidentinedthetvo. Thenevnaturallavvas universalandeven
divine, its sacred character communed a sullime pathos to its fol-
lovers. Thispassionagainstpassionstransgressedclassdividesforthe
nrst time and united slave pictetus) and emperor Marcus
Aurelius) . The Stoics kept referring to a golden age, governed ly
unvrittenlavsvhosecontentvastheinnateequalityandunityofall
in a rational empire of love. An extremely anthropocentric, yet
divinely sullime, naturegoverned lynecessityvas held overposi-
tivesocietyandlecamethe sole criterionofvalidlav`.`
VhiletheStoicsverenotparticularlyinterestedin urisprudence,
and their quietism alloved them to accept loth democracy and
monarchy, theymade a lasting contrilution to legal thought. Their
universal humanity, lased onthe rational essence ofmanandequal
rightsforthevholehumanrace, vas adramaticdeparturefromthe
Greek vorld offree and slaves or Hellenes and larlarians. The
contact vith the ancient prophets oflsrael, vho vere the hrst to
lay claim to an analogous position, vas a singular event full of
ibid. , I2.
` ibid . . , i .
Z / III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
consequence. Theunityofthehumanrace, thenaturalrighttopeace,
formaldemocracy,mutualaid. . . cametoletheleginningsofamore
orlessdenniteconcept`. 'Buttheserevolutionaryideasvereinitially
cominedtotheinvardlookingandausteregazeofthephilosopheror
theidealisedlutalsentperfectionofthehellenisticvorld.Theirmore
concrete application vould have to vait for the lav ofthe Roman
mpireandthepoliticaldeclarations ofearlymodernity.
Ve can conclude, that despite their differences, classicalphiloso-
pherssavnatureasastandard, vhichmustlediscoveredlecauseit
is occludedlyacomlinationofconventionandancestral authority.
Philosophy starts vhen it distinguishes letveen the truths alout a
topic given ly lav, convention or the received opinion !cxc) and
the truth or the good arrived at through the dialogical critique of
receivedvisdom and the olservation ofits nature. Forthe classical
philosophers,naturevasnotustthephysicalvorld,thevaythings
are` or everything that exists lut, a term ofdistinction, a norm or
standard used to separate the vork ofphilosophical and political
thought from vhat olstructs or hides it. Nature vas philosophy's
veapon, theunsettlingandrevolutionaryprometheannreusedinits
revolt against authority and the lav. lts discovery` and elevation
into an axiologicalstandardagainst convention emancipated reason
fromthetutelage ofpoverandgaverisetonaturalright.
Thepossililityof udgingtherealinthenameoftheidealcanonly
startvhenvhatisrightlynatureconfrontstherightfullycustomor
pastpractice. Theconcept ofrightvasfreedfromitssulectionto
historyorcommonopinionandlecameanindependenttoolforcri-
tique. The autonomisation ofright vas the necessary precondition
for the development of a theory ofustice from vhich current
arrangements canlecriticised. Thusnaturevas usedagainstculture
to create the most cultured ofconcepts. But ifnaturevas a tactical
movemotivatedlytheneedtocomlattheclaimsofauthorityvhich
ruledearly Greeksociety, its discovery`vasnotso mucharevela-
tion orunveilinglutan invention orcreation. Naturemustpresent
itselfas vhat vas occluded ly culture lecause philosophy cannot
come into existence orsurvive,ifitsulmitsto ancestral orconven-
tionalauthority. lnthissense, theoriginsofphilosophy andthe dis-
covery ofnature vere revolutionary gestures, directed against the
claims to authority ofthe pastand oflav-as-customandgivingrise
to critiqueinthename of ustice.
' ibid , i 6
I JII CL/S S I C/L IICI llI lCS
1 1 . 111I 11 _ 1b 1 L1 1b 1 1111
The cunning and manipulative oratory ofthe Sophists, the simple
or the luxurious life ofCynics and Hedonists, the invard looking
picurean or the philosophically egalitarian Stoic did not detract
fromthecentralmethodologicalandsulstantivepositionoftheclas-
sics. lserving the natural constitution ofhumans indicates that
peopleliveincities orpc|ci, theyareAristotle'spoliticalanimalstcc
pc|ili:c. No lare individual human nature exists outside of the
group, no separate individuals can le found in a natural condition,
except for monsters. Love and affection, pity and friendship form
the natural kernel ofnatural right, lecause pleasure is achieved in
association vith others. Human nature can le perfected only in the
political community and, as a result, the virtue ofustice acquired
centralimportance. lndividualhappinessvasto achieve one's stan-
dards ofexcellence` and political activity aimedto facilitateperfec-
tion and the realisation ofvirtue. A citizen can lecome excellent
onlyin a ustcityand a city canlecome ustonlyifits citizenslive
a life ofvirtue. Accordingly, personal morality and political ethics
had the same end, peaceful activity in furtherance ofvirtue. The
perfect natural order encompassed the perfect political order.
Nature included the germ oflav.
justice, thenaturalaimofpoliticallife andthetopicofparamount
importance in classical philosophy, vas a necessary accompaniment
of naturalright. Theenquiryaloutusticeinvolvedtvointer-related
dimensions , vhich can le analytically distinguished. one concerned
thepolitical order, the othervas more specificallylegal. Thefirstis
associatedvithPlatoandlaterthe Stoics, the secondvithAristotle.
Takentogether, theypresentathoroughgoinguse ofthemethodof
naturalrightinthe consideration ofthe sociallond. Vevill exam-
ine theminturn, emphasisingthoseaspects ofthe classicaldoctrines
vhicharemostlyrelevantto the genealogy ofhumanrights.
The philosophy of Plato is preoccupied vith the question of
ustice. HisIcpu/|i: remainstothisday one ofthemostsustaineddis-
cussions ofthe topic in vorld literature. The questis conductedin
theformofadialogueletveenSocrates , thedefenderof usticeasthe
right orderin the city, andvarious Sophists, presentedas purveyors
ofcommon-sensical opinions. The dialogue proceeds through the
refutation ofvarious definitions andargumentsalout ustice, vhich
Socrates shovs to le vrong and to descrile in ustice rather than
/ I II II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/I I/V.
ustice. TheSocraticquestfortrueusticei sarefutationofin ustice
throughreason.
Socrates starts lydismissing conventional theories vhichpresent
usticeas givingpeople their due, tellingthe truthandpaying one' s
deltsornnallydoinggoodtofriendsandharmtoenemies. Hethen
turns to the main challenge. The cynical viev of the Sophist
Thrasymachus, thatvhatpassesfor ' ustice' ' isthe expressionofthe
interestsoftherulers , thevealthyandthestrongand, as aresult,the
trulyrighteousmanalvayslosesout. ltisintheinterestofthevir-
tuous, accordingly, to act un ustlyandpromotehis ovn proht since
inustice gives more strength, freedom and mastery than the mis-
nomer' ustice' ' . ThechallengeofThrasymachusgoestotheheartof
the rationalist dialectic. He chides Socrates to stop playing to the
gallery ly refuting others . . . lt's easier to ask questions than to
ansverthem. Giveusanansveryourself andtellusvhatyouthink
ustice is`. ' But vhile Socrates shovs that the position ofThrasy-
machus islogicallycontradictoryandmorallyuntenalle,heendsthe
exchangelyadmittingthathedoesnotknovthemeaningof ustice.
Heholdstotheleliefhovever,that usticeisgoodandin usticeevil
andthat usticeisalvaysmore advantageousthaninustice. Reason
commandsthatitisletterto sufferaninustice thantocommitone.
ButSocratessoonadmittedthatvhilephilosophyiscommittedto
the rule ofreason, reasoning alone cannot prove the superiority of
ustice. He vas thefirst to understand one ofthe great conundrums
ofmoralphilosophy, namely thatmoral knovledge does not neces-
sarily and automatically lead to moral action. As vid put it later,
t|!cc mc||ctc ptc/cuc, !c/ct|ctc cuct l knov the good and approve
ofit,lutlfollovevil) . Topersuadehisaudience, therefore, Socrates
supplements his argument vith a numler ofnon-rational claims.
righteousness should le practised lecause it lrings happiness, an
argumentvhichisloth close to Thrasymachus' detested utilitarian-
ism and is acceptalle only to those already righteous. Although he
dismissesthetheoryof usticeasretrilution, henarratesthe religious
mythsofRadamanthusandrviththeirthreatsofdivineretrilution
forevildeedsintheafterlife. Finally,headmitsthatvhilephilosophy,
` Mayck, o. cit , suran z, \ol. z, I 6z.
' JhcSohistCalliclcsin C_|cshadargucd,inaroto-lictzschcanmanncr,thatmcn
arcdividcdbynaturcintothcstrongandthcvcakandthatlavandconvcntionarcthccrc-
ations olinlcriorsvho uscthctalkoljusticc to dragthcirsucriors to thcirovnlovlcvcl.
!lato, Co|cs V Mamiltontrans. ) London, !cnguin, i 6o)
' !lato, Fcu|||:L Lcc trans ) London, !cnguin, I,|) j j 6c.
z-
ibid , j ,|b
I JII CI/S S I C/I IICI llI lCS 3
the practice ofvisdom and knovledge, is thelestteacher ofcon-
scienceandthe city, the externalauthority ofparents andlegislators
mayle the only realistic source availalle for teachingvirtue to the
many.
The philosophical Repullic is a programme for the lestpolity, a
quasi-constitution for the city that practices ustice. lt must le
constructed ly the philosopher vho, in usingreason, clarihes and
promotestherequirementsofhumanexcellenceaccordingtonature.
Butthe Socraticquestalsopaysattentionto theexigenciesandcon-
tingenciesofthehistoricalsituation. Nopolitycansurvive oracquire
legitimacy, if it does not acknovledge the importance and take
account ofthe unenlightened` opinions ofits citizens, their con-
ventionsandcustoms. ThesuccessoftheRepullic, theapplicationof
naturalrighttopoliticsinothervords ,dependsontheuncertainand
alvays fragile acceptance of the philosopher's design ly his
fellov citizens and on alarge measure ofchance. ltis a utopia, it
does notexistinthe present, anditsrealisationinthefuture cannot
leguaranteed. Naturalrightrevealedinreasonisthenecessarypre-
conditionoftheustpolity,lutitisnotsufncient.ltmustlead usted
to practical and political circumstances and considerations , it must
restrain its rationalism andtailorits truthto the opinions and emo-
tionsofthemany.
The otherstrikingcharacteristic ofthedialogueisthatdespitethe
manyrationalandnon-rational arguments canvassed, Socrates offers
nodefinitionof ustice. justice ishrstreplacedlyreason,laterlythe
idea ofthe good, vhich is presented as its sulstance and ultimate
value. Butvhile the good oftheindividualand ofthepc|| provide
the necessary criteria for choosing letveen competing courses of
action, thegooditselfis notaccessille to reason. Similarlyvithus-
tice. Socratesafnrmedrepeatedlythatusticeandthegoodexistand
are the highest value. But every attempt to denne or descrile them
vas soonalandoned as the dialogue circled around ustice and the
goodvithoutresolution.Theclosestvecometothemeaningof us-
ticeisvhenSocratescomparestheconstitutionsoftheidealcityand
ofthesoul. Theylothfollovtheprincipleofdoingone'sovnand
proper task` uum cgctc. The right constitution leads to a lalanced
relationshipletveenthe three classes ofcitizens in the city andthe
threeparts ofthe soul inman. Theperfectionofthe parts and their
harmonious and proportionate relationship makes the cityust and
Strauss,o.cit. , suran. , I j
/ III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
the citizenvirtuous. Butuum cgctc is atotally formalprinciple, and
canscarcely determnevhatistocountasproperandasduetoeach.
Butthisonlysustainedattempttodescrilethe characteristics of us-
tice vas soon alandoned, vhen Socrates acknovledged that the
comparisonofstateandsoulmaynotleappropriate. `'
This endlessandinconclusivecirclingaroundusticeandthegood
leads eventually to the recognition that the good may le cpc/c|nc
cu|c, leyondBeingandessence, attheothersideofknovledge and
reason. As Plato admitted in his seventh pistle, ve can never fully
knovthe goodforit doesnotadmit ofverlalexpressionlike other
lranchesofknovledge`.`'justicetoo, thepoliticalexpressionofthe
good, cannotlediscoveredinlavsandinvrittentreatises, as ithas
noessenceoritsessenceliesleyondimmediatelifeinthecityinthe
sky`. But, vhile it cannot le rationally dehned, ustice exists and
reveals itselfto philosophers and lavgivers in mysteriously divine
vays. The quest forustice exemplines the paradox ofreason, for-
mulatedlySocratesinthemostextrememanner.reasoningleadsto
unreason. Faithsurfacesthreetimes andinthreeforms.faithinother-
vorldlyustice, faithinauthority, andfaithinrevelation`.`Behind
themeanderingdialoguesliesSocrates'ultimateargumentfor ustice.
hissacrihceonthealtarofa usticethatcannotledennedoritssupe-
riorityprovenrationallylutvhichmustleactedupon, evenatthe
greatestofcosts . Socrates' deathis thestrongestargumentaloutthe
inherentinustice ofthelav. Afterhissacrih cethe lurdenofproof
liesviththosevholelieveinlav's ustice.
Thc Icpu/||: isthefirstattempttoraise usticeintoauniversaleth-
ical idea, totally independent ofits historical context. People must
leave the cave or prison ofempirical existence and enter the ideal
vorld offorms lefore theycangrasp the operation ofthe goodand
of ustice. Vhat is most remarkalle in the dialogue, hovever, isits
unsverving attack on all conventional and traditional vievs. The
truthaloutusticemaynotleaccessilleatall,invhichcasevehave
an olligation to remainsilentin these matters.`` ltmayle that the
only contrilution philosophy can make is to denounce the many
`' Fcu|||:, n. z, sura, | , .
`' !lato, istlc \II i n IhccJtus caJ I|s/|cs lI caJ \III, Mamilton trans. )
London, !cnguin, I ,)

; |I c Foralull discussionolthc!latonic scarchlorthcmcaning

ol justiccandthcgoodandhis admissionoldclcat,sccMansKclscn, Jhc Nctamorhoscs
olthc Idca ol]usticc in !. Sayrc, Ia/cttc/c/|oas o}MoJcra Ic_c| Ih||osoh|cs lcv York,
CxlordLnivcrsity !rcss) I |,
` ^gncsMcllcr,cyoaJus/|:cCxlord,lackvcll, I8,) ,j
`` !lato, I|s/|c ll, j j,
I JII CI/S S I C/L IICI llI lCS 7
inustices, torefutethefalsehoodsofthecommonsenseandtomake
it understand the natural purpose ofthe pc||. At the end, Socrates
seems to acceptthatas no rationalargumentcanconclusively usti(
histheoryof ustice, hemustofferhisovnsacrinceasultimateproof
andthegravestoffenceagainstreason. lndoingso,hisargumentsand
his action are oined in a paradoxical formulation vhich may le
called the cpct|c c] jul|:c: to leustmeans to actustly, to le com-
mitted toaframe ofmindandfollovacourseofactionthatmustle
acceptedleforeconclusiverationalustincation.`'
Theclassicaltheoryof usticecanledescriledthereforeasaneth-
icalandpoliticaldoctrine,vhichaimstolringaloutthroughdelate,
persuasionandpoliticalactionthe lestpolity or regime` invhich
human perfection and virtue in association vith others can le
achieved. ltsmethodological tools are the olservationofnatureand
rationalargument.Butitvouldlemisleadingtosaythatthisregime
is given` orfound`innature. Naturalrightoffersanalternativeto
historical determinismand to conventional and authoritative opin-
ion.Becauseusticeislydefinitioncriticalof vhatexists,philosophy
adopts nature as the source ofits prescriptions and claims a natural
olectivity` foritsright. But thisidealisnot givenlyGod,revela-
tion or even an immutalle natural order. lt is a construction of
thought and its actualisation is deeplypolitical. From Anaximander
toSocrates,earlyphilosophyclaimedthatmenneedandhaveasense
of inustice. They unceasingly luild legal and moral systems to
achieveusticelutusticeisnotfullyofthisvorld.Therightfulindi-
vidualandsocialorderstrivetotranscendtheinfamiesofpresentlut,
ustice is accessilletohumanthoughtinalimitedvayanditsreali-
sation isvery difh cult, evenimprolalle. As Straussput it, thelest
regime,vhichisaccordingtonature,vasperhapsneveractual,there
is no reason to assume thatit is actual at present, and itmaynever
lecome actual . . . ina vord, the lestregimeis . . . a ' utopia' `. `
justiceisthuscaughtinanunceasingmovementletveenknovledge
andpassion, reason and action, this vorldandthe next, rationalism
andmetaphysics .
`' Jhcaoriaolrcasonandjusticciscvcnstrongcrinthc]cvishtradition. Jo bcjust,thc
]cvmustobcy thclav,vithoutanyrcason orjustiucation. Forubcr, ]cvs actinordcrto
undcrstandvhilcLcvinasdcnounccsvhathccaIsthcvcstcrntcmtationoltcmtation,
thc- Crcck - dcmand to subordinatc cvcr, act to knovlcdgc and to ovcrcomc thc
urity and innoccncc ol thc act mmanucl Lcvinas, ^|ac Tc|muJ|: FccJ|a_s
loomington, IndianaLnivcrsity!rcss, i o) o-,o.
`' Strauss, o. cit. , suran. , I
O
/ III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
1 1 1 . 1V1 b I11 11 11 L11 _ 1b 1 L1
Aristotle'si:cmc:hccn Elhi: and, inparticular, itschapteron justice
arefoundationaltextsforVesternlav. `Thediscipline oflavlti:lc
cnu vasenunciatedintheElhi:s and uridicalactivityvaspresented,
for the nrst time, as relatively autonomous frommorals orpolitics.
Accordingto thelegalhistorianMichelVilley, verylittle canorhas
leenaddedtolegaltheoryortotheideaof usticepresentedthere. `'
Aristotle starts ly distinguishingletveengeneral andparticularus-
tice. justicelelongstothevirtues,notasoneofthemlutasthetotal-
ityofvirtue. General usticeisthe moral dispositionvhich renders
menapttodoustthings, andvhichcauses themtoactustlyandto
vishvhatisust`. lthastvo characteristics. first,itisidentinedvith
the vhole ofvirtue as exercised in the pc|i and, secondly, it is
addressedtothe goodofothers`c||clticn cgclhcn. `Butgeneralus-
ticeismuchmorethanthemoralityofthemoderns.Aristotle' s!i/cic
cnct, theustman, hasallthevirtuesandexercisesthemforthegood
ofthe othersandthecity. lnthis sense, generalusticeresemllesthe
Platonic dennition vithout the strong metaphysical element. lthas
elementsofpoliticalandsocialmoralityanditisrelatedtothelavlut
isviderthaneither. Asthelavcoversmanyaspectsofhuman exis-
tence, theustandthelavfulmaycoincide. Theun ust`man1sfirst
a lav-lreaker, secondly, he vho takes more than his due. But
Aristotleadds,inanearlycorrectivetolegalism, thatlav-lreakingis
un ust, onlyifthelavis rightly enacted`.` The prime example of
anunustlavisthatvhich doesnotfosterthe other-regardinggood.
Butitisparticularorlegalusticevhichopensavhollynevvay
oflookingatlegalrelations . Tounderstandits strange tomodernears
nature, ve should start ly examining the end and nature oflav.
justicetodayisaprincipleorideal tovardsvhichsocietiesaspire,the
alsent) soul ofthe lody oflavs. For Aristotle, hovever, this dis-
tinction letveen lav andustice did not exist. The vord used to
expressthisintimatelyconnectedclusterofethical,legalandpolitical
concepts vas !i/cicn. The !i/cicn means the right orust state of
`' For a discussion ol ^ristotIc`s cthics scc VFR. Mardic, Ht|s|o||c's I|||:c| Tcoq
Cxlord,CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i 8o) , ]. C. Lrmson,Ht|s|o||c'sI|||.Cxlord,Iackvcll,
i 88) .
`' NichcI \illcy, I Jto||c||cs Jto||s Jc| `|ommc!aris,!. L. F, i 8) Chaptcr|.
` ^ristotIc, ^|:cmc:hccaI|||.s ]. ^. K. Jhomsontrans ) London,!cnguin, i ,6)k\,
i i zb o-i i oai 8.
` ibid , I I zb
I JII CL/S S I C/L IICI llI lCS V
affairs inaparticularsituationorcon ict, accordingtothenature of
thatcase. Particularusticeexistsincities, vhenitsdemandsarecon-
testedlytvo parties, itrequiresthe interventionofathirddisinter-
estedperson, the !i/clc orudge. Hisudgment is the !i/cicn, the
lavful and theust solution. The !i/cicn is therefore the ol ect of
udicial decision-making, the action ofthe ustman and the end of
lav. ltisastate ofaffairs inthevorld, adistrilutionofthingsorthe
ustshare decidedlytheudge and, as the ol ectof ustice, the aim
ofhuman acts andthe outcomeof udicialconsideration. Asuridical
art, the !i/cicn aims at the rightproportion letveen things or an
external relation to le estallished letveen persons on the lasis of
things`.''Therightfuludgmentdistrilutesproportionatelythingsto
people, givesthemtheirfairorustshareaccordingtothepatternof
rightrelationships. The uristis notconcernedvithupholdingindi-
vidualentitlementsorrightslutvitholservingthecosmicandcivic
order,fromvhichhederivesguidance. Thevayofthingsandofthe
vorld teaches the udge patterns of proportionate distrilutions,
vhich he must respectandpromote. The idea ofproportionis cru-
cial, it lringsustice close to the aesthetic leauty immanent in the
harmony ofthe vorld.
The !i/cicn shouldnotle confusedvithmorality orgeneralus-
ticeandit does notresultfromtheapplicationofmoralprecepts or
legal rules. Greek cities had moral rules andAntigone's unvritten
lavsfallintothatcategory,lut these vereclearlydistinguishedfrom
legalustice. Theideaoflavas commandmentorrule accompanied
lysanctions originatedinjevishandlaterChristianconcepts oflav
andvasnotofgreatimportanceinclassicalGreece. '' Particularus-
tice, theartofthe udge, vas notaloutmorality, utilityortruthlut
aloutthesharingofexternalgoods , oflenents,lurdensandrevards.
lt vas concerned vith distrilution and retrilution and constituted
theproperol ectoftheuridicalart. Thetask oftheudgevaspre-
cisely to reach the right outcome in the sharingofexternal goods.
Plato too vrote that the aim ofthe uridical art !i/cli/c) is to
discoverthe !i/cicn and nottostudythe lavs , vhichare onlysup-
plementary to this task, an unustlav is notlavproperly speaking,
lecausetheroleofthe urististofindtheustsolution. 'Theudge,
'' RaIph NcIncrny, laturaI Lav and laturaI Rights in Hqu|acs oa Humca H:||oa
Vashington,L C , CathoIicLnivcrsityol^mcrica!rcss, i z) zi ,.
'' NichcI \ilIcy, Likaion-Jorah in Sc|:c Essc|s Jc I|||oso||c Ju Ito|| !aris, LaIIoz,
i 6) .
' !Iato, TcLus, supran. I z, I\, ,I , .
/ II II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
like all citizens, mustseekthegoodandtheudicialvocationis us-
tice.
Aristotle'sdescriptionoftheudicialartisdetailedandpracticaland
follovs the method ofnaturalright. A ustdistrilutioninvolvestvo
elements.arecognitionofastateofaffairs ,ofanequitalleproportion
sulsisting amongstthings, and a distrilution ofthe disputed things
accordingtothis arrangement. First,olservation, forclassicalphilos-
ophy, the source ofnatural lavvas the natural organisation ofthe
cosmos. Theustoutcomeisalreadyinscriledinthenatureofthings
and relationships , in the cosmic order ofinterrelated purposes and
ends and avaits its recognition and pronouncement ly the udge.
Thecosmosandeverythinginit,includingthepc||s, arepartofauni-
versalharmony, the variousparts and constituents are properlylal-
anced. Thecitydoesnoten oyperfect ustice, ofcourse. Butfamilies,
social groups andcities, vhich have come into leingspontaneously
and, graduallydevelopedtheirpoliticalrelations,values andconstitu-
tions ,areprengurationsoftheperfectorder.Theycanserveasmod-
elslecausethehopeoftheperfectlyustcitypresupposesthatvecan
extracttheideaof usticefromitsexistingimperfectapproximations.
lservingrealityisthefirststeptothediscoveryoftheustsolution.
Theudge actslike a lotanist or anthropologist. he olserves the
connections and relations amongst his fellov citizens, the vay in
vhichtheyarrange theiraffairs, inparticularthevayinvlicthey
distrilutelenefitsandlurdens.Buttheustdecisionisalvaysprovi-
sionalandexperimental,transientanddynamicinthesamevaythat
human nature is alvays on the move, letveen the actual and the
potentialandcontinuouslyaduststochanges,nevcircumstancesand
contingencies. Findingthe!|/c|cn istheaimoftheclassicaluristlut
thatisneverfullyandnnallyachieved,itremainsalvaysastepavay,
fullusticeisdeferred,notyethere andneverfullydone. lnthissense,
seekingtheustinvolvestheolservationoftheexternalvorldasvell
asafuturalortranscendentelement. lfveunderstandthevordlav
as synonymous to a formulated rule, there isno naturallav` vrites
Villey. '`Naturalrightisamethodologicalprinciple thathelpsinthe
discoveryoftheustsolution,notinourconscienceorsomestrictset
ofrules, lutin the external vorld ofhuman relations. The natural
lavisanunvrittenlav,itscontentisneverfullyknovn,ithasnoth-
ingtodoviththeideaofapositiveruleorcommandmentprevalent
inmodernity.
'` Nichcl\illcy, Ic:cas J'H|/o|tcJc |ch||osoh|cJuItc|/ !aris, Lalloz, i 6z) z|o
I JII CL/S S I C/L ICI llI lCS
Furthermore,findingtheustsolutionvasadiscursivepracticeand
apolitical act. ltinvolvedthelearnedchoiceoftheudgevho con-
siders all the circumstances ofthe case and the particular conditions
persistingatthe time. '' Theuristdiscovers the !|/c|cn lyusingthe
artoflav.itskeyprincipleiscu!cm c|lctcm pctlcm. therearealvaysat
least tvo conicting parties vho must le heard and that makes the
style ofargument rhetoricalandthe method dialectical. The dialec-
tic vas anintegralpart ofclassical thought, until the Renaissance, it
vasthemainscholarlymethodintheology,philosophyandlav.The
dialecticallyustsolutionisnotdeducedfromageneralrule,norisit
the outcome ofa logical exercise lutthe application ofknovledge
aloutthe nature ofthings. ltvillle discoveredinreality, througha
considerationofarguments , examples andanolservationoftherela-
tionshipamongsttheparties. The udgeconsidersthepleadingsofthe
parties and compares their conictingandcontradicting opinions as
partial expressions of reality. By putting terms and arguments to
delate,udges arrive at their decisions dialectically. notthe only or
truthfulopinionlutthelestinthecircumstances. Thefinalingredi-
entvaspolitical. indecision-making, the legislator orudgesupple-
mentstheolservationofnature,thedialecticalconfrontationandthe
rationalustincationvith an act ofvillvhich cannotle fully theo-
rised.Dialecticsisalvaysprovisional,opento nevarguments,expe-
riences and concerns. Legaludgment, conducted in the realms of
ptax|s andlc:lnc ratherthanscience, cp|slcmc, isalvays accompanied
lya degree ofuncertainty, vhichislroughtto an endlythe deci-
sion. The !|/c|cn is therefore an act ofudicial vill vhich, starting
from a comlination ofnatural olservation and argumentative con-
frontation, adds a precise meaning and determination the punish-
mentforsuch atortisthesacrificeoftvo goats) andlringstheissue
toaclose.
ln Roman civil lav, the method lecame explicitly casuistical, it
startedandnnishedviththecaseathand.Thecasuistsstayedcloseto
thefacts ofthe casefromvhichtheyextractedthesolution cx ]c:lc
jus ct|lut) . They exploredexistingopinionsrelatingto the case, they
looked at doctrinal authorities , at opinions ofurisconsults and at
availalle rules. xamplesfromthepast,unustoutcomes, hypotheti-
cals and cases previously considered, vere used to illuminate the
present situation. The authorities vere not treated as true or
linding, they Ladpersuasive only pover. Theudge intervenedly
'' Cnc cannotknovinadvancc thc contcntolositivcjusticc, itdccndsonthc lrcc
dccisionolthclav-givcr,^ristotlc,I/h|:, ocit, suran. j6, \II. 6. i
Z ^ III II II S JCIY CI l^JLI^L L^V.
confrontingthe contradictoryclaims oftheparties, clari(ingvords
and terms, putting the litigants in direct confrontation. This poly-
phonic procedure in vhich litigants and authorities, vitnesses and
precedents , opinions, reasonsandarguments,thesicandthenunc` ,
are lrought into dialogue is the gist ofthe dialectic, and the vay
through vhich jus emerged. And as social shares vere part ofthe
vider cosmc order, aust distrilution vas politically and ethically
right lut also aleautifulexpression ofthevidercosmicharmony.
Finally,Aristotle'stheory of ustice cannot le understoodoutside
its intricate connection vith phtcncs|s or practical visdom. For
Aristotle, virtueisthegeometricalmeanletveenexcessandlackor
defect. The moral agent is the prudent man or phtcn|mcs vho
acquireshismoralsenseanddiscriminationinthecourseofalifefull
ofexperience. His practicaludgment is alvays situatedinthe con-
crete circumstances ofthe caseat hand. Aristotlearguedthat equity,
cp|c|/c|c, is therectihcationoflegalusticencmcs insofar as thelav
isdefective.Lavsaregenerallut the ravmaterialofhumanlehav-
iour`issuchthatitisoftenimpossilletopronounceingeneralterms.
Thususticeandequitycoincide, andlotharegood, jlut|equityis
superior`. ' As people and life have an irregular shape` the lav
shouldlelike the leaden Leslian rule. ' ustas this rule is not rigid
lutisadaptedtotheshape ofthestone, sotheordinanceisframedto
fitthecircumstances`. 'Thereisnomodelorllueprinttoguidethe
udge, histruevocationisoftento decidetheustvithoutcriteriaor
rules. Thevarietyofcircumstances andthe unique situationin each
case means that, to achieve equity, theudgemust decide fromcase
to case vithoutresort to strictcriteria. To leust, theudge must
develop and h ne tune the art ofevaluating the conicting forces,
relationsandclaims.Themean,socentralinAristotelianethics, can-
notledehned outside eachspecific situation. justiceisthevork of
theust,lutvhethertheudgeisustor not cannotle udgedprior
tohis udgment.Particularusticeastheartofevaluation, calculation
and distrilutioncannotletheoretically specihed outside ofits con-
text.
ThisisvhyLeo Strauss, moreinterestedinthepoliticalthanlegal
aspect of ustice, found Aristotle less important than Plato. Strauss
lelievedthattheAristotelianemphasisoncircumstanceandsituation
turnedusticeandnaturalrightinto concreteudgments andactions
andturnedthemavayfromgeneralschemesandtheories.ButStrauss
'' ^ristotlc, I/||:, o. cit , sur+n j6, \,x, i i j,+; ,-bz|.
'' ibid , \,xi, I I j,bz|-I I j8+i I
I JII CL^S S I C^L IICI llI lCS
tooagreedthatforlothPlatoandAristotlenaturallavhadachange-
alle character and recognisedthe varialility ofthe demands of us-
tice. '' Thereis a universally valid hierarchy ofends, lutthere are
no universally valid rules ofaction`, Strauss concluded. Vhile the
hierarchy ofends is sufncientforpassingudgment on the level of
the nolility ofindividuals and groups andofactionsandinstitutions
. . . itis insufncientfor guiding ouractions`. ' General ustice, the
vhole ofvirtue`, vhich demands the goodofthe other`remains
anelusive,alvaysdeferredhorizonagainstvhichlegaludgmentand
political plan must le precariously conducted. lt may le that
Lyotard'sverdictthat itisimpossilletoproducealearneddiscourse
uponvhat usticeis` appliesequallyto classicandmoderneffortsto
createatheoryof ustice. 'ThereservationsofStraussremainimpor-
tant nonetheless. The only thematic treatment of natural right
vhich is certainly ly Aristotle and vhich certainly expresses
Aristotle' s ovn viev covers larely one page ofthe Nicomachean
thics `.'
Aristotle is a theorist ofustice and, despite Villey's attempts to
identi( the tvo, natural rightandusticefollov differentand often
conHictingpaths. Theirinvention in classical Greece at around the
sametimehelpedtheirconfusionlut, theirlatertra ectoryseparated
them. lnnormaltimes,usticeremainsavirtueimposedfromalove.
veninitsAristotelianprudentandequitalleversion,ustice usesa
numler ofelements vhich distanceitfromnatural right. First, legal
ustice, rather than challenging existing hierarchies, presupposes a
natural andinstitutionalequililriumvhich acts as the empiricaland
logicallackgroundofproportionaludgments.Secondly,Aristotelian
udgesareprudentpatriarchs . ThegoldenageofStoics, ontheother
hand,hadnoauthorityorudgeand,Themis,thegoddessofcustom,
hadnouseofscalesforveighingpeopleandthings.justicevascen-
tral for those vho try to devise the lest, most acceptalle, form of
exercising pover, not for philosophers concerned vith dissent and
opposition to estallished customs or lavs. As Bloch argued, Plato
'' Str+uss, o. cit. , sur+n. ,, JI ,,
' ibid., i 6z-j
' Lyot+rd st+tcs th+t 'I +m closcstto ^ristotlc,insol+r +shcrccogniscs- +ndhc docs so
cxlicitlyinthcF|c/or|:,+svcll+sinthc^|:omc:|ccaI/||:s, th+t+judgcvorthyolthcn+mc
h+s no truc modcl to guidc hisjudgmcnts, +nd th+tthc truc n+turc olthcjudgcis to ro-
nouncc judgmcnts +nd thcrclorc rcscritions, j ust so, vithout critcri+, ]c+n-Fr+nois
Lyot+rd+nd]c+n-LouJhcb+ud,us|Ccm|a_. Clodzichtr+ns.) N+nchcstcr,N+nchcstcr
Lnivcrsity !rcss, i 8,)z6.
'' Str+uss, o cit , sur+n. ,, I ,6
++
/ I II II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
andAristotlemadeoutof usticethatvhichStoicismnevermadeout
ofnature, namely, the genius ofdomination`. ' For Plato, ustice
regulatesthesoulasmuchasthecity,ithasadiscipliningfunction. it
co-ordinates andsulugates thefaculties ofthepersonandensures
that each citizen carries out his alotted duties and responsililities.
Despite its utopian element, Platonicustice remained philosophi-
callyaloofandpoliticallyauthoritarian.
Aristotle'spragmatic politics madehimless authoritarian, lut us-
ticeasalegalvirtuevasscarcelylikelytosendtheslavesmarchingto
thecgctc ofAthens. Stoicnaturallav,vithitsphilosophicalquietism,
didnotdothateither,itlaidhoveverapossillefoundationforfuture
relellion. ln the hierarchicalAristotelian cosmos, classes andpeople
vereassignedtheirexactvalueandcosmicsignincancelytheirnat-
ural state lut, at the same time, they vere constrained to that state
alone. lndividualusticeand theustman hadan independent place
inAristotle, luthis actionsdidnotrefertointentions, emotions and
passions. ltvasratheranexternalqualityvhichcouldledecided,as
Villey put it, ol ectively.judicial impartiality vas its model, along-
sidethe situatedandexille ol ectivityofnature. Bothvereneces-
sary for deciding vhat the citizen's share vas. Very little in the
standards oflav,virtue orvaluecouldchange undersuchaconcept
ofustice. They remain the measure ofdominant relations vhich,
ustice, vith its mathematical aptitude, could calculate and veigh
exactly. Fromtheperspective ofradicalnaturalright,usticevasnot
acritiquelutacriticalapologyofpositivelav.Thereisconsideralle
distance letveenthispatriarchalconceptionof usticeandthephys|s
that philosopherand relel set precisely against the assignments and
distrilutionsoflav.
Ve can concludethat the discovery ofnature and the method of
natural right vas the relellion ofphilosophy against the veight of
custom and ofthe past. Natural right claimed the truth ofnature
against common sense and the dignity ofargument and dialectic
against the lanality and oppression ofreceived opinion. But as the
nature ofthe classical teleological vorld vas a dynamic concept,
nevernnishedorperfectedlutalvaysonthemove,naturalright,the
outcome ofthe olservation ofnature and ofthe dialectical con-
frontation ofopinions, vas also provisional and changealle accord-
ingto nevcontingencies. As the dictate ofolservednature, natural
rightvas quasi-ol ective, as the outcome ofdialectics, itvas deeply
' loch, op.cit. , supra. i o, p.
I JII CL/S S I C/L IICI llI lCS +3
interpretative andpolitical. Both ol ective andconstructed, natural
rightlecamea non historicistlut deeplyhistoricalandculturalstan-
dardfor udgingthevorld.
Vhenthismethodisappliedtothepolity,usticeisshovntohave
tvoaspects,apoliticalandalegal. Political ustice explores theover-
allorganisationofthe pc|| andtriestoimagine theperfectconstitu-
tion, the most leautiful and harmonious arrangement ofthe social
lond. Butustice or theustis also the end, loth the aim and out-
come, oflegalaction. justiceas an ideal, isneverfully ofthis vorld,
itforms the horizon against vhich currentpractices are udged and
foundlacking.Theustastheoutcomeoftheuridicalprocessisloth
presentandfuture-looking. The conceptof usticeistherefore split.
an ideal or generalustice vhich promises a future perfection and
udges reality in its name and, a legal or particularustice vhich
upholds and redresses proportionalequalityin the everydaydealings
ofcitizens,lutalsoreproducestheexistinglalanceletveenfreecit-
izens andslaves , menandvomen, Greeks andlarlarians. Legalus-
tice could also face loth vays, its provisional udgments reached
againstthehorizonofapurposeful orderandaperfectusticealvays
deferred to the future. But this vill have to vait. The Greeksvere
indelted to philosophers, tragedians and dissidents, rather than to
udges, for upholding natural right against theustice from alove.
They remain to this day apoverful lens that helps see through the
hazy air ofoppressive and unquestioning received opinion into a
truthvhichislothfuture-lookingandtimely.ccasionally,veneed
aremotesatelliteinordertogetthelestvievofourovnearth.
J
. Bt|q I|s/.ty ^c/utc| Icu
II. t.m ^c/utc| Icu /. ^c/utc| Ig|/s
1 . 11 b I1 Lb 11 11V11 V1 L1
TheRomansadoptedthe Greekapproacht o usticeandRomanlav
developed into the most advanced ancient legal system. The Latin
vords for usticeandlavderive fromthe same root, their semantic
neld is the same in Greek and Latin J|/c|oa andus for right/lav,
J|/c|osyac andus||||c forustice) . The Romanus, like the Greek
J|/c|oa,vasloththelavfulandthe ust,' theaimoftheuristineach
disputevastoserve usticelyaimingatthe ustsolutionjus, |JuoJ
us|umcs|and uso|c.|umus||||cc) .ThenrstlinesoftheDigeststate
thatus||||ccs|.oas|cascaJctc|ucco|ua|csussuum.u|uc|t||ucaJ|and
that lav derives fromustice. cs| cu|cm cus||||c cc|c|umus+ ` And
vhen theDigestsays thatus cs|cts|oa|c|ccqu|orthatthe ol ectof
usticeis |oacs|cc|cctc, c||ctum aoa |ccJctc, suum.u|uc|t||uctc, itfol-
lovs theAristotelianconceptionofparticularustice.
FortheRoman urist,asforthe Greek,theusvasnotacollection
of ruleslutthe ustandrightfuloutcomeofadispute.TheDigestsays
that our proper civil lav is not vritten lut consists solely ofthe
interpretations of the urists `. The opinions of the urisconsults
startedleingvritten and eventually acquired a persuasive force for
' Somc lcgal historans dcrvc thc ctymology ol]us lrom thc Latinussum andu|co, to
ordcr. JhisossiblcassociationhasbccnuscdtoInkusvithlcgalositivism.Butu|crcdocs
not mcan commandmcnt in Latin. Jhc scmantictcld olthc Crcck J|kc|oavith its link
bctvccnjustandlavlulinnucnccdthc LatinandlcdtoasimilarIink Scc Nichcl \iIlcy, I
Jro|/c/|csJrod Jc |'|ommc !ars, !. L. F , I 8j) j, |8.
Jhomas^quinas, Summc Thco|o_|cc, z. zac., ,. i .
` Igcs/ i . 1I OLlian, Ias/|/u/cs I. I. I.
' Jhclullassagcis.'us/|/|ccs/:oas/casc/crc/ucvo|ua/cs]ussuum:u|uc/r||ucaJ|:)]ur|s
rcc:c/csua/|cc:.|oacs/cv|vcrc, c|/crumaoa |ccJcrc,suum:u|uc/r||ucrc,.)ur|s-uJca/|ccs/J|v-
|acrum c/uc|umcaorumrcrumao/|/|c, us/|c/uc |aus/|s:|ca/|c. I|_cs/I, I, IO, Llan.
' Hu/e/ror|umus:iv||c,uoJs|acs:r|/o|aso|cruJca/|um |a/crc/c/|oac:oas|s/|/.I|_cs/,
I, z. z, !omonius .
O
/ III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
later cases lut the method remained dialectical and casuistical.
`Startingfromthestudyof ustandunustdeterminations,urispru-
dence rises to general knovledge and comes to formulate ' denni-
tions ' , ' rules' , 'verdicts'- opinionsofthe urisconsults`. Theus.|c||c
is a collectionof ustdecisions andurisprudentialrules, ofthepro-
cedural decreesofthemagistrates and, later, ofthedecreesof urists
oftheimperialcourtandhaslittleafnnityvithcontemporarysystems
of lav, except vith the common lav lefore the assault of the
uropean codi(ing spirit. The Digest states clearly that `the rule
descriles arealitylriey. Theus does not derive fromthe rulelut
theusthatexistscreatestherule`. ` Theusdesignatestheustshare
ofeachcitizeninhisrelationshipvithothers. Theutcare notindi-
vidual rights lut real entities in the vorld, `ol ective` relations
amongst citizens. They are often things and especially incorporeals
lutthey include also institutions, such as the marriage, paternity or
trade. Gaiuslists amongsttheutc `theus ofluildinghouseshigher
and olstructing the light ofneighlouring houses , or not doing so,
lecausei tolstructs theirlight, theus ofstreams and gutters, thati s
ofaneighlourtakingastreamorgutterover ovthroughhisyardor
house` . Cutting through the contemporary distinction letveen
rights andduties, theutcreferalso to citizens' civic dutiesandlur-
dens. The duty to serve in the army, for example, is aus and, the
lrutal execution ofa parricide is also called the murderer'sus. But
predominantly,usistheustoutcomeofdistrilution, thecalculation
ofthe ustproportionamongstexternalthingssharedlythe citizens.
ltisalsothe endoftheustactorudgment,theaimoftheartoflav
|JcJuoJ|ctm|ac|usc.|us ]us|||||cc) . Fortheclassicallavyers, ' 'jutcare
plainlynotrightsinthemodernsense`u AsMichelVilleyhasargued,
inLlpian'sdennitionof usticeassuumus.u|uc|t||uctc,the ]usrefers
not to an individual right lut to theust share or due determined
vithinanestallishedstructureofrelationshipsandvaryingvitheach
person'sstatus and role. '' Like the Greek J|/c|oa, therefore, theus
' \illcy, ocit. , suran i , 66.
' Fc_u|ccs/uccrcm ucccs/|rcv|/crcacrrca/ . us aoac rc_u|csumc/urscJcurc, uoJcs/,
rc_u|c)c/ I|_e/, ,o, i ,, I Paul.
TcIas/|/u/cso}Cc|u F. Lc/aluctacd , Cxlord, i |6) , .
RichardJuck, ^c/utc|F|_|/ T|cor|c Cambridgc, CambridgcLnivcrsityPrcss, i ,)
.
0
Nichcl\illcy, Lcs Crigincs dc lanotion du droitsubjcctivc inIcoas J`||s/o|rc Jc |c
|||oso||c Ju Jrc|/ Paris, Lalloz i 6z) zzi-,,, L ormc/|oa Jc |c cnsecur|J|uc MoJcrac
Paris, Nontchrcticn, i 68). Ithas bccn argucd that thc concct olthc Romans and carIy
glossatorscloscsttoindividual rightisnot]us but Jom|a|umvithitsimlicationsolrocrty,
osscssion and control and to that cxtcnt \illcy is vrong For a rcvicv olthis dcbatc, scc
I I I ICN l/JLI/L L/V JC l/JLI/L II CIJS V
differslothfromamoralcodeandfromasystemofpositivelavsreg-
ulatingconduct.
AristotelianconceptsoflegalusticesurvivedandthrivedinRome,
vhere the Stoic ideas ofnatural lav, simplified and transformedly
Cicero, vere also applied for thefirst time. As the Greek city-states
started dissolving, nrst in the Macedonian and later in the Roman
mpires , the idea ofalav common to allimperial sul ects, ofaus
ca||um, startedtotake hold. The Stoicshadstayedavayfromdirect
politicalinvolvement, lutthemoralityofuniversalhumanity,vhich
they espoused and lased on norms deriving from rational human
nature, couldle used equally vell to restrain theirrationalpassions
ofindividuals and ethnic andlocal nationalisms, in favourofa nev
cosmopolitanism. TheStoicChryssipus, forexample, descrileduni-
versalhumanityasanation, vhileforPosidonius,thevorldvas`the
commonvealth ofgods and men`. ' ' Butitvas Cicero, an eclectic
Stoicandapragmaticlavyerandpolitician,vhoturnedtherational
universalityofStoicismintothelegalideology ofRome.
Cicero rationalisedRomanlavandclaimedthatmany ofits cen-
tral tenets could le tracedlack to universal rational norms. lnthe
process, the Stoic `commonnotions`, through vhich menpartook
ofuniversalreasonandlecame avare ofitsdictates,verepsycholo-
gised. The ot||os |oos or right reason ofthe Greeks, vhich united
naturalnecessityviththelavsofreason,vasturnedintothetc.|ctc||o
ofgoodsense, `thoughofcourseasacommonsensethathaslecome
thesupreme source oflav`. ' VhentheRomanurists spoke of ]us
ac|utc|corusednatureto explain orquali(legalconcepts,theirterms
had less ofanAristotelian tint and more ofa practical import. `For
' natural'vastothemnotonlyvhatfollovedfromphysicalqualities
ofmen and things , lut also vhat, vithin the framevork ofthat
Juck ibid , ,- Nichcl \illcy`s rcsonsc vas that vhilc Jom|a|um mcant mastcry ovcr
vords or things, it vas not a lcgal construct but a rc-lcgal rcality rcstrictcd by lav. For
\iIlcy, thc vholc structurc ollanguagcinRomcvas built around conccts dillcrcnt lrom
oursinvhichthc conccts olthc subjcctandsubjcctivc rights hadnolacc. SccI Jro|/c/
|csJro|/s Jc |'|ommco. cit , suran I , ,|-i o|. Juck agrccd that thc classical Romans did
nothavcathcor,aboutlcgalrclationshisinvhichthcmodcrnnotionolasubjcctivcright
laycd anyart,ibid. at Iz Mc dillcrslrom\illcy, hovcvcr, vhobclicvcdthatsubjcctivc
rights vcrc introduccdaltcrthc nominalist rcvolution inthc i |th ccntur,, andargucs that
thc urst glossators coIascd thc conccts ol]us and Jom|a|umin thc i zth ccntur, and crc-
atcd thc origins ola thcory olrights For an cxhaustivc rcvicv olthc dcbatc, scc rian
Jicrncy, TcIJcco}^c/um|F|_|/ ^tlanta, Scholars Prcss, i ,) Chatcr

uotcd i n rnst loch, ^c/urc| Lu caJ Humca I|_a|/y L. [ Schmidt trans. )
Cambridgc,Nass,NIJPrcss, i 88) i |
z
ibid , zo
3 / I HI II II S JCHY CI l/JLH/L L/V:
system, seemed tosquare vith the normal and reasonalle order of
human interests and, for this reason, not i n need offurther evi-
dence`. ' ` Still, theRomanus continuedto signi(a set ofol ective
relationsinthevorldand,like Greeklav, didnothaveaconceptof
individualrights.AndvhileAristotleanduniversallegalitymayhave
pragmatically coincidedfor alriefperiod, throughthe needs ofthe
Romanmpire, theysoondiverged again. Aristotelian usticemade
itslastgrandappearanceinthevritingsofThomasAquinasandthen
graduallydescendedinto positivism. The naturalright tradition, on
the other hand, inHuenced ly Stoicism and Christianity, moved
tovardsacommand-theoryoflavandasul ect-lasedinteqretation
of rightandpreparedthemodernconceptionof humanrights.Letus
examine closersome ofthemainelementsofStoicthoughtvhich,
misdigestedandeclecticallyrevisedlyCicero,exertedsuchimmense
in uence onlaterpoliticalandlegal thought.' '
The Stoicteachingradicallychangedloththe classicalmethodof
arguing alout the naturally right and the content ofnature, the
sourceoflav. Naturelecame thesourceofadennite set ofrulesand
norms , ofa legal code, and stoppedleing a vay ofarguing against
institutional crystallisations and common opinions. The Stoicsvere
the first pagans to lelieve that natural lav vas the expression ofa
divine reason vhich pervaded the vorld and made human lav one
ofitsaspects. Cicero'sfamousquotationfromtheRepullicisvorth
quotingatlength.
The true lav, is the lav of reason, in accordance vith nature knovn
to all, unchangealle and imperishalle, it should call men to their
duties ly its precepts and deter them from vrongdoing vith its pro-
hilitions . . . To curtail this lav is unholy, to amend it illicit, to repeal
it impossille, nor can ve le dispensed from it ly the order either of
senate or of popular assemlly, nor need ve look for anyone to clari(
or interpret it, nor vill it le one lav in Rome and a different one in
Athens, nor othervise tomorrov than it is today, lut one and the
same lav, eternal and unchangealle vill lind all people and all ages,
and God, its designer, expounder and enacter, vill le the sole and
universal ruler and governor of all things. `
ThisGod-given,eternalandalsolutenaturallavhadlittletodovith
thenaturalrightoftheSophists or ofPlato andAristotle.
' ` nsLcvy, latural Lav inRoman Jhought, i | S/uJ|c c/Io:umca/c H|/or|cc c/
ur|s i , at ,.
' ' Nichcl\illcy,H|s/o|rcJc|c |||oso||cJuIro|/, !aris |thcd. , i ,,)|z8-8o.
' ` Ciccro, Fcu|||:l. Ruddtrans) Cxlord, CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i 8) III, zz.
I I I HCN l/JLH/L L/V JC l/JLH/L HI CIJS 3
Next, the conceptofnature. The Aristotelian nature vas a nor-
mative concept vhich comlined the essence ofa thing vith its
potentialforgrovthandperfection,theefficientandnnalendofthe
cosmosandofallleingsandthings. Stoicnaturevasmuchmoresta-
tic. ltsnormative charactervasretainedlutlecamean omnipresent
anddeterminingspiritpacumc) , the|oos orreasonfoundasseedling
in everything. This omnipotent |oos unites man and vodd, in
humans, it acts like the artist's nre.' itlegets and sculpts the lody
and makes it cohere ly assemlling its components |oos sct-
mc||/os) . 'Butit also commands the vholevodd, in the same vay
thattheemperorcommandshisempire.DiogenesLaertiusvrotethat
nature is the force vhich constrains the vorld . . . a stalle force
vhichderivesfromitself, producestheseminalreasonsandcontains
vhat comesfromit`. ' Naturevas thereforeontologisedandspiri-
tualised. it lecame the creative spirit or life principle vhich, in its
purestate, isGodvhileinmanresidesinthesoul. Thesoul , Cicero's
c|s|aac|c, is an internal forcevhichunites human vith divine |oos
and makesthemdiscernthelav ofnature,vhichthey are loundto
olserve.
^c|utc |a|||umut|s said Cicero. ' The lav, human institutions,
rules and all vorldly order proceed from a single source, all-
poverful nature, thesole{aas |cumc|ut|s' and |oosdisclosesthem
to man. Nature commands , itis a moral preceptvhich orders men
tooleythesovereign|oosvhichruleshistory.Naturalrightlecame
amatter ofintrospectionand revelation ratherthan ofrational con-
templationanddialecticalconfrontationandledtoanalstractmoral-
ityofprecepts vhich anticipatedKant. As a result, tvo possililities
vereopened.lnthenrst, nature,vithitsprinciplesofhumandignity
and social equality, vas retained as a category ofsocial and legal
opposition and as the content ofright. The second and dominant,
hovever, equated natural vith positive lav and the real vith the
rational and anticipated Hegel. lt privileged the passive and private
moralityofthehappysoul andsanctionedexistinginstitutions, social
hierarchiesandinequalitiesviththeimprimaturofreasonandnature.
I|ys|s, vhich had started its career in opposition to aomos, came
hnallytoleidentifiedvithit.
o
Ciccr, Ic ac/urcJcorumR. V.Valshtrans) Cxlord,Clarcndon, i ,) II. zz. ,,.
' ' ibid. , II i i . z, II. zz. , 8.
' LiogcncsLacrius ,\II . i |8 , quotcdin\iIlcy, suran. |, p. ||o.
' Ciccro, Ic|avca/|oacH N. MubbcIltrans ) London,Mcincmann, i |) II, zz, 6,.
z0
Ciccro, Ic Ic_||us l Ruddtrans) Cxlord, CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i 8) I , ,
3Z
/ I II II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/I I/V.
Hovvcouldonehndthecontentofthisnatural lav:?Therightrea-
sonortc.|ctc||oproceedsEomthe Godof|oosanditscommandsare
placedintheconscience, throughthecommonnotions`mentioned
alove. Thelogoshasleeninscriledonthesoul andtheparamount
dutyis to follov its commands. The sage does not need to olserve
nature or the city lut only to listen to his inner voice. Stoicism
lecameareligionvithreasonitsgodandlav, andvithnaturalright
closertotheprivatemorality ofconsciencethantotheclassicallegal
method. The Stoicconceptsofnatureandlavhadmoreincommon
vithChristianitythanvithAristotleandleddirectlyto themodern
idea ofhuman nature. Let us summarise some Stoic innovations
vhichpavedthevayto thelegalhumanismofthemoderns.
The lav no longerderives fromexternal lut fromhumannature,
man'sreason. Maniscelelratedas arationalleingandisgivenapre-
eminentpositionalovetherestofnature,againstAristotelianphysics,
invhichtheforceofnatureharmonisedandhierarchisedhumansand
animals. ' As a result, vhilenature and reason vere initially closely
connected, reason eventually came to replace nature as the principal
source oflav. Folloving its commands is to follov our nature. But
reason is also rationedandnot everyone had equal access to it, the
surest guideto its commandsisthe reason ofsages tc||o mcasucsc|-
ca||s) . `` Thus, the idea that the legislator orudge is themouthpiece
ofthespiritorreasonof laventeredthehistoricalstage. `Finally,lav
andtheustresideinthecollectionoflegalandmoralrulesdiscovered
ly the human spirit. The J|/c|oa ofthe Greeks and theus ofthe
Romans lecameidentinedvith a set oflavs |ccs andlecame a sys-
temofrationalrules, discoveredlythe reason ofthesages.
jacques Derrida has called the dominant tradition of Vestern
metaphysics, logocentric`. ' lnthe Stoics , ve nndthefirstexpres-
sion ofaphilosophical and ideological construction ve have called
logonomocentrism`. ltidentines the |oos as reasonvith thelav
' Ciccrorvidcsalurthcrsimilarity.rcfiguringCrotius,!ullcndorlandthc i ,thccn-
turynaturalists,hcstarsvithhumannaturcinordcrtocxlainthcnaturcolsocictyandlav.
In Ic Ic_||us, ! , and in Ic _:||s N.J. Crilfin and . N. ^tkins trans. ) Cambridgc,
CambridgcLnivcrsity !rcss, II) ! I\.I I , Ciccr givcs a lcgallyrclcvant Iist olhuman
traitsandinclinationsvhichincludc, c|cMobbcs,scllrcscrvation, ctc.
Ic Ic_||us, II. |
` Ciccroclaims in Ic Ic_||usthatthc univcrsal rcasonandthcrulcsolthc sagcs comc
lrom]uitcr II. |) .
' ]acqucs Lcrrida, Ctcmmc/o|o_y C. Sivak trans) altimorc, Jhc]ohns Mokins
Lnivcrsity!rcss, i ,|)
' Costas Louzinas and Ronnic Varrington vith Shaun Nc\cigh, os/moJcra
ur|sruJca:c Routlcdgc, II) z,-8 .
I I IICN l/JLI/I I/V JC l/JLI/I II CIJS 3
andpresentsrationalrule asthefoundationandspiritofcommunity.
Beingis equatedvith presence, vith vhat is present in conscious-
ness, andviththeprimacyof|oos as aomos. lndeed,leingispresent
in lav and this immanence gives rational lav an ontological pre-
eminence. Rationalism, the cult ofthelegislatorand ofrules associ-
atedvithlegalpositivism, thecelelrationofindividualrightsvhich
derivefromhumannature, theyallappearforthenrsttimetogether
in late Stoic thought and Cicero. But lav's ontological dimension
also promotesideas ofhumandignityandsocialequality. Thelavas
reasonthatlegets thevorldpushestovards an, admittedly alstract,
fraternity ofall humankind. ln this latter aspect, Stoic natural lav
remains one ofthe mosthonouralle chapters in the history ofideas
andislinkedviththelatertheoriesofnaturalandhumanrights.
But the main force moving the lav tovards a theory ofnatural
rightsvasitsgradualchristianisation. jevishcosmologydidnotpos-
sessaninclusiveandpurposiveconceptofthecosmos. Forthejevish
religion, theuniverseisthe creationofGod. ltdisplays his omnipo-
tenceandpresencepreciselythroughhisalsenceand, assuch, itcan-
not acquire the autarchic normative veight of the Greek |ys|s .
Similarly, Christianity claimed that the vorld had leen created cx
a||||o through the free act ofGod. Nature, the invention ofGreek
philosophical imagination, vas turned into the creation ofan all-
poverfulleing. The cosmosvasreducedtothenaturaluniverse, the
natural ends given to all things and leings vere turned into their
providential positionin the plan ofsalvation, and teleology lecame
eschatology. Nature retained a limited only normative character
expressingintimevhatfromalleternityresidesinGod`and con-
nrming andcomplementingdivinelav.
Theseeds ofChristian naturallav couldlefoundperhaps in St.
Paul'sstatement, inspiredly Stoic teachings, that Godhasplaced a
naturallavinourhearts Romi i. i,) . Thisvastheleginningofthe
idea that conscienceis the rule ofGodingrainedinthe heart. After
thevictoryofChristianity, theuslecameintertvinedvithmorality
and tookthe form ofa set ofcommandments or rules , the paradig-
maticallyjevish type oflegality. ventually, the Christian Fathers,
commentingon the Bille, startedusingthe term,asto mean divine
command and, natural lav to signi( the Decalogue. Gratian's
Lc.tc|um,pullishedinthetvelfthcentury,statedthatthenaturallav
iscontainedinthe Gospelsandis antecedentlothinpoint oftime
' Louis Lurc, asc_c/oMoJcra|/y lcvMavcn,YalcLnivcrsity!rcss, I) o.
3+
/ III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V
andinpointofrankto all things. Forvhateverhas leenadoptedas
custom, orprescriledinvriting, ifcontrarytonaturallavistoheld
nullandvoid. . . Thuslothecclesiasticalandsecularstatutes,ifthey
are shovn to le contrary to natural lav, are to le altogether
re ected`. ' This usage vas adoptedlythe medieval canonists and,
hnally, inthefourteenthcentury,uscametomeanindividualpover
orsul ective right.
A crucial link in the christianisation oflav must le sought in
Augustine'stheoryof usticevhichcomlinedsomeofthecharacter-
istic difficulties of Plato's metaphysics and Aristotle's rationalism.
Aristotlelelievedthata secularisedversion ofJ|/c, the order ofthe
vorld,stillexistedandustlavsandconstitutionsverepartofit.His
identificationoflavvithusticevas thereforeavayofstrengthen-
ing the authority oflav, vhile retaining the dynamic character of
ustice according to nature. Augustine, on the other hand, equated
thetvoinordertounderminetheauthorityoflavofthestillpagan
Roman mpire. He dehnedustice, like Aristotle, as |t||uctc suum
.u|uc. Butvhile for Aristotle, a man's due vas determined ly the
c||osofhiso||sandtheudgments ofthepracticallyprudent,forthe
Christianlishop, man's due vas to serve God. Thevirtue of ustice
vasdefinedasotJocmot|s,theloveoforder.lyattrilutingtoeachhis
properdegreeofdignity,usticeleadsmentoanidealstateinvhich
the soul is sulected to God and the lody to the soul. \hcn this
orderisalsent, man,lavandstateare unust. justiceisthereforethe
loveofthehighest good orGod.
Vhere, then is the ustice of the man, vhen he deserts the true God
and yields himself to impure demons as the romans do) ? . . . ls he vho
keeps lack a piece of ground from the purchaser, and gives it to a man
vho has no right to it, un ust, vhile he vho keeps lack himself from
the God vho made him, and serves vicked spirits , is ust? . . . Hence,
vhen a man does not serve God, vhat ustice can ve ascrile to him
. . . And if there is no ustice in such an individual, certainly there can
le none in a community composed of such persons.
Lnustlavisnolavandanunuststateisnostate. Vithoutustice,
stateslecome greatrolleries. \here therei s notrueusticethere
canleno lav. Forvhat is done lylav isustly done, and vhat is
upustly done cannotle done ly lav. Forthe unustinventions of
' Ic:tc/um,L 8, z,
zs
Ic C|v|/c/c Ic| N.Lods,[[ Smith and C Vilson trans) dinburgh, i 8,z) k I\,
Ch |.
I I IICN l/JLI/L L/V JC l/JLI/L II CIJS 33
men are neither t o le considered nor spoken of as rights.`
Augustine's denunciation ofthe in ustice ofthe pagan state and its
lavvasaconsequenceofhis deep pessimismaloutthehumancon-
dition. The originalsinandthefallmadeitimpossilleforsecularlav
andustice to redeem people from evil. Ve can never knov fully
God'svishes ,andusticevillalvaysremainapromisethatcannotle
fulhlledinthislife. justiceisadivineattrilutevhichdoesnotlelong
tothisvorld. lndeed, ourfallennatureissoignorantthatvecannot
fully understand even fellovhumans. Christianprinces andudges,
despite good intentions, cannot expect therefore to understand
people vell enough to pass correctudgments. Secular ustice is a
misnomer and a poor approximation for the ustice of God and,
vhile necessary, its successvill alvays lelimited. Asjudith Shklar
puts it.
ustice fails on tvo grounds, cognitive and practical, and the realm of
in ustice is revealed to le so extensive that it is quite leyond the cures
of even effective political lav and order . . . ln the Augustinian vision
inustice emlraces more than those social ills that ustice might allevi-
ate. lt is the sum of our moral failures as sinful people, vhich from the
outset dooms us to leing un ust. `'
Butvhileinusticesare denounced, theearthlycityis calledthe .|c|-
|cs J|c|o||. lts lavs come into existence and are called ust out of
necessity. The function ofstates andlavs is to coerce men, restrain
their.u|J||cs orinhnite desire and keep thepeacein these cities of
thedevil.Thestatehasnointrinsiclegitimacythereforeandeventhe
mostsuccessfulnations are certaintodecline andfall. ltslimitedutil-
ity is to meet internal and external violence vith violence. Against
the classical tradition, Augustine argued, that not only does the
removal of usticenotleadto thelreakingup ofa state, lutinfact
thereneverhasleen astatethatvas maintained ly ustice`. `' The
fevpredestinedto lesavedvillstayin ||c.|c||cs |cttcac asctct|a|,
itinerantforeigners,untilthey ointherealmoftrueusticeinthecity
ofGodafterthislife.
Augustine gave religious expression to the strengths and difficul-
ties ofclassical theories of ustice. He agreedvithPlato thatvecan
neither fully knov nor achieveustice in this vorld. But vhile all
attempts are lound to fail, ve must continue the doomed quest
ibid, kXIX, Ch z i
`' ]udith ShkIar, Tcc:e Iau/|:clcvMavcn,YaIc Lnivcrsity!rcss, i o) z.
`' Linoigongiari, Jhc!oliticaIIdcasolSt^ugustinc, i nSt. ^ugustinc, Tco||/|:c|
Ht|/|ag Mcnry !aoIuccicd ) VashingtonL. C. , Catcvay, i z) |.
3
^ III II II S JCIY CI l^JLI^L L^V.
through lavs and institutions vhich vill never achieve vhat they
promise. Vith Aristotle, Augustine accepted that ustice is suum
.u|uc. Butthelove ofGod replaced theo||tically situatedlove of
usticeand udgments los

t t|eir exi(ility. The

`
le
'
ame lo

thmo
'
e
certain, inan attempt to imitate Gods alsoluteustrce, andimpossi-
llesincethegapletveenGodandhumanityisunlridgealle.justice,
identinedvith God's love, doesnotlelongto this vorld, inustice
lecomes the condition ofhumanity. And yet, Augustine's invard
turntotheselfinhis Coass|oas,hisemphasis ontheusticeofasov-
ereignlegislatorandonthecoerciveroleofstatepoverprengurethe
urisprudence ofmodernity. At the same time, his city ofGod re-
denned the idea ofutopia for a Christian audience, as a place of
unllemished vell-leing. The Stoics had placed their utopia in a
mythicalpast,vhilethecityofGodlelongstoanunknovnlutpre-
determined and certain future. Augustine has leen called a
propheticutopian` , the chiefsource ofthatideal ofavodd order
vhich is haunting the minds of so many today` lut also a
Macchiavelian`. ` lfvelrackethisChristianmetaphysics, heisthe
first political philosopher vho loth accepted and legitimised the
might ofthe state andproposeda higher ustice vhich state lava-
grantlyviolates. Augustine's Christian peregrines vere asked not to
contrastthetvo lut to tolerateeventhevorst, andifneed le, the
most atrocious form ofpolity`.`` But the uxtaposition leiveen
heaven and earth and theirsharp separation had created the condi-
tions for their eventual comparison and comlination. As the tvo-
vorldmetaphysicsvasgraduallyveakened,thetimecamevhenthe
principlesofheavenveremadeto usti(firstandto condemnlater
theinfamiesofearth.
1 1 . 11 V1111 N1 11V11 11 I 1I1b 1[11 1b
The classical theory ofJ|/c|oa/us survived i npart i nthe vork of
ThomasAquinas. Llpianhaddenned urisprudenceasthesearchfor
ust solutions carried out through the knovledge of things`' and
Aquinas' theory ofrightfaithfullyfollovedthis dennition.` Michel
` ticnnc CiIsonquotcdinIntroductionto T|co||/|:c| Hr|/|a_s, o. cit. , suran. ] ,
VI1.
`` IcC|v|/c/cIc|, ocit. , suran z8, X\III, z.
`' Igcs/, I . I . i o
`` Jhc First ^rticlc i nSummc ' chatcr on]usticc statcs catcgoricaIly that thc objcct ol
us is thc just or right and ollcrs thc !hilosohcr ^rstotIc) as main cvidcncc lor thc
I I. I ICN l^JLI^L L^V JC l^
Villey has forcefully argued that, despit:
Aquinas remained an Aristotelian in G
Aquinas'specificcontrilutiontourispruc
chapter on Lav ofthe Summc T|co|o|c
examined chapter onjustice. The sim
generalusticeandAquinas'us|um are st
T]hat vhich is correct in the vorks or
direct reference to the agent vhich pert
is constituted ly a reference to the other

IJS
fore, that i n our vorks, vhat responds t o \1L Lti. ... ,

demands of a certain equality acna||/a/cm is vhat is called right ns-

/nm. `'
3V
The stronglink remains vhen ve move from general to particular
ustice. ThevariousAristotelianmeaningsofJ|/c|oa/usareretained.
us is the lavful and the ust, ustice, as auridical activity, is the art
through vhich the ust lecomes knovn and vhich tends tovards
estallishingauststate ofaffairs. As the ol ectof ustice, us is again
alegal qualityinherentinaexternalentity,anol ectivestateofaffairs
ratherthanasulectiveright, forvhichAquinashasnovordorcon-
cept. Theus as ust outcome is an arrangement ofthings amongst
peoplethatrespects , promotes orestallishestheproportionorequal-
ityinherentinthem,andtheseproperrelationsareolservalleinthe
externalvorld. Rcsus|c, |JuoJus|umcs|,vritesAquinasand, |scm
tcmus|cm, theustthingitself`'
ln all these respects, Aquinas folloved the teachings of the
Philosopher`, vhomhe endlessly quoted. But his most important
andnovelcontrilutiontourisprudencevas thefourfolddistinction
letveen eternal, natural, divine and human lav vith its religious
overtones, found in the Summc's chapter onLcx. Here the lav has
noneoftheuncertaintiesandhesitationsassociatedvithAristotleand
the classics. Natural lav is dennite, certain andsimple. No doult is
expressed alout its harmonyvithcivilsociety and the immutalle
character ofits fundamental propositions`, formulated ly God the
lavgiverinthe SecondTalleofthedecalogue`. `Theseprinciples
ofdivinelavsufferno exception in the alstractand, theiruniversal
roosition SJ II-II, ,,, Saint Jhomas ^quinas, a Icu, Morc||/y caJ o||/|:
V.aumgarhandRRcgancds) Indianaolis,Mackctt, i88) i j , SccgcncraIly,^nthony
Lisska,Hu|aa' T|coq^c/utc|IcuCxlord, Clarcndon, i ) .
`' ibid.
ibid , i ; 8.
` LcoStrauss,^c/urc|IcucaJH|s/cyChicago,Lnivcrsityol Chicago!rcss, i ,) i ||.
3 / IHI II II S JCHY CI l/JLH/L L/V.
through lavs and institutions vhich vill never achieve vhat they
promise. Vith Aristotle, Augustine accepted that ustice is suum
.u|uc. But thelove ofGod replaced theo||tically situated love of
ustice andudgments losttheirHexilility. Theylecameloth more
certain, inanattempttoimitate God'salsoluteustice, andimpossi-
llesincethegapletveenGodandhumanityisunlridgealle.justice,
identified vith God' slove, does notlelongto this vorld, in ustice
lecomes the condition ofhumanity. And yet, Augustine's invard
turnto the selfinhis Coa{css|oas,his emphasis ontheusticeofasov-
ereignlegislatorandonthecoerciverole ofstatepoverprehgurethe
urisprudence ofmodernity. At the same time, his city ofGod re-
defined the idea ofutopia for a Christian audience, as a place of
unllemished vell-leing. The Stoics had placed their utopia in a
mythicalpast,vhilethecityofGodlelongstoanunknovnlutpre-
determined and certain future. Augustine has leen called a
propheticutopian`, the `chiefsource ofthatideal ofavorld order
vhich is haunting the minds of so many today` lut also a
Macchiavelian`. ` lfvelrackethisChristianmetaphysics, heisthe
hrst political philosopher vho loth accepted and legitimised the
mightofthe stateandproposedahigherusticevhichstatelav a-
grantly violates. Augustine's Christianperegrines vere asked notto
contrastthetvolut`totolerateeventhevorst,andifneedle, the
most atrocious form ofpolity`. `` But the uxtaposition betveen
heaven and earth and theirsharp separation had created the condi-
tions for their eventual comparison and comlination. As the tvo-
vorldmetaphysicsvasgraduallyveakened,thetimecamevhenthe
principlesofheavenveremade tousti(hrstandto condemnlater
theinfamies ofearth.
1 1 . 11 V1111 N1 11V11 11 I 1I1b 1[11 1b
The classical theory ofJ|/c|oa/]us survived i npart i nthe vork of
ThomasAquinas. Llpianhaddennedurisprudenceasthesearchfor
ust solutions carried out through the knovledge of things`' and
Aquinas' theoryofrightfaithfullyfollovedthis dehnition. `Michel
V11
` ticnnc CilsonquotcdinIntroductionto T|cIo||/|:c| Ht|/|a_s,o. cit ,suran. i ,
`` Ic C|v|/c/cIc|, o.cit , suran z 8 , X\III, 2.
`' Igcs/, l l io
`' Jhc First ^rticlci nSummc ' chatcron]usticc statcs catcgorcally that thc objcct of
us is thc just O right and ollcrs thc !hilosohcr ^rstotlc) as main cvidcncc lor thc
I I I HCN l/JLH/L L/V JC l/JLH/L HI CIJS 37
Villey has forcefully argued that, despite the Christian inHuence,
Aquinas remained an Aristotelian in many resp
'
cts

Villey .nds
Aquinas' specificcontrilutiontourisprudencenotinteoftencited
chapter on Lav ofthe Summc T|co|o|cc lut in the less frequently
examined chapter on justice. The similarities letveen Aristotle's
general usticeandAquinas 'us|umarestriking.
T]hat vhich is correct in the vorks of ustice, in addition to the
direct reference to the agent vhich pertains to all the other virtues] ,
is constituted ly a reference to the other person. lt is the case, there-
fore, that in our vorks, vhat responds to the other, according to the
demands of a certain equality acna||/a/cm is vhat is called right ns-
/nm. `'
The stronglink remains vhen ve move from general to particular
ustice. ThevariousAristotelianmeanings ofJ|/c|oa/usareretained.
usisthelavfulandtheust,ustice, as auridical activity, is theart
through vhich the ust lecomes knovn and vhich tends tovards
estallishingauststate ofaffairs. As the ol ect of ustice,usis again
alegalqualityinherentinaexternalentity,anol ectivestateofaffairs
ratherthanasulectiveright, forvhichAquinashasnovordorcon-
cept. Theus as ust outcome is an arrangement ofthings amongst
peoplethatrespects ,promotesorestallishestheproportionorequal-
ityinherentinthem, andtheseproperrelationsareolservalleinthe
externalvor!d.Rcsus|c |JuoJus|umcs|,vritesAquinasand, |scm
tcmus|cm, theustthingitself`'
ln all these respects , Aquinas folloved the teachings of the
Philosopher` , vhom he endlessly quoted. But his most important
andnovelcontrilutionto urisprudencevas thefourfolddistinction
letveen eternal, natural, divine and human lav vith its religious
overtones, found in the Summc's chapter onLcx. Here the lav has
noneoftheuncertaintiesandhesitationsassociatedvithAristotleand
the classics. Naturallavis dehnite, certain and simple. No doult is
expressed alout its harmony vith civil society and the immutalle
character ofits fundamental propositions`, formulated ly God the
lavgiverinthe SecondTalle ofthedecalogue`. `Theseprinciples
ofdivinelavsufferno exceptionin the alstractand, theiruniversal
roosition. SJ II-II, ,), Saint Jhomas ^quinas, a Icu, Motc||/y caJ Io||/|:
V aumgarhandRRcgancds) Indianaolis,Mackctt, i p33) i ) Sccgcncrally,^nthony
Lisska, Hu|acs' T|coty,]^c/utc|IcuCxlord, Clarcndon, i pp6) .
`' ibid
`' ibid i 3.
` Lco Strauss,^c/um|IcucaJH|s/oqChicago,LnivcrsityolChicago!rcss, i p6,) i ||.
3O
/ III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
validity is emphasisedlytheir inscriptioninhuman conscience. At
thesanetime,thenaturallavrevealedintheDecaloguepresupposed
afallenhumanityandasinful natureand, asadivineremedyagainst
sin, itlecameexilleandrelative. ^c|utc|om|a|scs|mu|c||||s,vrote
Thomas, andthis exililitycanleadto amendments notustinpos-
itivelavlutintheusac|utc|citself Naturallavcannotlelegislated
inrules orcanons oflehaviourand does not accept arigidorfixed
formulation. lt offers only general directions as to the character of
people and the action ofthe lav. These are supple and exille,
imprecise and provisional, context dependent and situation follov-
ing. To le sure, this God-ordained and nevly-found exilility
allovedstate authorities alarge degree ofdiscretion.
Aquinas succeeded in integrating lav and state into the divine
order through the mediation ofrelative natural lav. vhile the state
vastheresultoftheoriginalsin,itvasalsoustifiedlecauseitserved
the hierarchical celestial order as its human part. State lav and its
coercion vere necessary punishment and indispensalle remedy for
sins ocac c| tcmcJ||c.cc||) and they vere open to criticism only if
theydid not follovthe edicts ofthe Church. At the same time, the
state vas responsille for the vell-leing and security ofits citizens
and, the Decalogue, the compendiumofrelativenaturallav`, fur-
nished itvith the necessary rules. Thus in equating the Decalogue
vith natural lav, Thomas helped turnit into a technical, rational
canon ofpositivelav`,` avayofinterpretingandusti(ingreality,
analmostexperimentalmethod. ''
Andvhile Thomasseparatednaturalandeternallavandassigned
them respectively into the here and the here-after, he also linked
them through a series ofhierarchised divine mediations. Nov, all
men knov the truth to a certain extent, atleast as to the common
principlesofnaturallav . . . andinthisrespectaremoreorless cog-
nisantoftheeternallav`.''justiceisthecanonicalformofthismedi-
ation and a principle ofgradual participation in the divine order.
ven an upust lav, insofar as it retains some appearance oflav
throughleingframedly one vho is inpover, is derived fromthe
eternal lav, since all pover is from the Lord God, according to
Romans`. ' Natural lav and ustice came againtogetherandustice
` loch, o. cit , suran , z,.
'' Nichcl\illcy, ^brcgcdudroitnaturclclassiquc in6Hr:||vcsJc|||oso||cJuIro|t,
z,-,z, ip6i) , ;o, L ormct|oa,o. cit , suran O, z6- o
'' Summc Tco|o_|cc,SJI-II, . p , d^r. 3).
' ibid
I I I ICN l/JLI/L L/V JC l/JLI/L II CIJS
3V
ingivingto eachhisdue- vhetherthatlearequitali ntheformof
punishment or revard, or distrilutive according to merit - it
expressed a gradation, namely, that architectonic hierarchy vhich
Thomism had erectedas the mediation letveen earth and heaven,
heaven and earth`.'` ln this vay, Thomism ustified fully the
medieval order, once its rulers andmasters had acceptedthe domi-
nance ofthe Church. The Stoic golden age as vell as Augustine's
City ofGod,themythicalpastandtheunknovnlutcertainfuture,
vere partiallypresentinthe medieval cityandthe relativisednatural
lavlostitsalilitytoopposepositivelav. MichelVilleydistinguished
letveenAquinas' conceptsof usand|cxandpresentedtheformeras
the legal conceptctcx.c||ca.cvhile restricting |cx to morallav and
itscommands.ButAquinas,follovingstandardpractice, occasionally
distinguished and at other times equated the tvo terms. '' Villey's
sharp distinction letveen the classical and Thomistus/J|/c|oa and
thejudaeo-Christian|otc|or|cxcannotlesustained,lecausethetvo
vere complementary. Theustandolectiveshareofexternalgoods ,
vas often determined through the application of|cx, oflav or
precept.
ButthegreatestprollemvithAquinas,fromtheperspectiveofthe
natural lav tradition, lies in Aquinas' definition ofustice. justice
turnedintoa categoryofnaturallavandexpressedtheadvantage of
churchandfeudalhierarchy,itsdemandsveresatisnedaslongasthe
lavvasadministeredvithoutpre udiceandexception. Thistypeof
ustice represented the inauthentic and relative natural lav vhich
repressedsinsandatonedforguilt. Classicalnaturallav,ontheother
hand, vas not alout theust application ofexistinglavs. lt vas a
rational and dialectical confrontation ofinstitutional and political
common sense. The Thomistic suum .u|uc |t||uctc alloved the
scholastics to comline Aristotle and the ldTestament concept of
usticeasretrilution, inavaythatretainedloth Greekclasshierar-
chies and thejudaic patriarchal principle, itselfalien to social divi-
sions. Maimonides lrilliantly comlined severity of form and
relativity ofcontent in his dennition ofustice. justice consists in
grantinghisrightto everyonevho hasaright, andingivingtoeach
livingleingthatvhichheshouldreceiveaccordingtohisrights`. '
But thisustice vhich completes relative natural lav, as its highest
virtueandideal,isverydifferentfromclassicalnaturallav. Freedom,
'` loch, o cit. , suran. , z3
'' Jicmcy, o. cit , sura n IO, zz-z,
'' Cu|Jc}ort|ccr|cxcJ, III, Chatcr ] .
/ I II II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
communal property and alundance ruled the Stoic edenic age, lut
fortheChristianFathernaturallavlecame, afterthefall, thelavof
retrilution, accompaniednecessarilylycourts,punishmentsandthe
authorityofthesvord.Thus, theChurch alandonedthe Stoicposi-
tions on rational freedom andhuman dignity and inthisvaythe
vorst cm|cttcssmca|ofnaturallav,namely, oppressionvas founded
uponnaturallavitselfas somethingthat had leen relativised`. ' lt
vashandeddovnfromalove, itvaslasedoninequalityanddomi-
nation and underpinned and promoted social differentiation.
Distrilutive ustice gives to each that vhich corresponds to his
degree ofimportance pt|a.|c|||cs) vithin the community`.'` This
hierarchical usticelecomes thefoundationofan un ustrule. ltvas
represented throughout medieval urope in the form ofus||||c, a
severe voman vhosescales veigh each person'sdues, vhosesvord
decapitatesthe enemiesoforderandChurchandvhosellindfolded
eyes ,addedinthelateMiddleAges, symlolisetheimpartialityof us-
tice. 'AsBlochpithilyolserved,thisisnotacategorythatthought,
ustinallydissatisfied, couldconsiderits ovn`. '
ThomasvasthelastthinkerintheAristotelianlegaltraditionof ]us
ac|utc|candthemostprominentofthe nevreligiousnaturalism |cx
ac|um|c) . Historiansvillarguealouttherelativeprominenceof usor
|cx and ofthe legal or religious-moral aspects ofhis vork. But as a
direct result ofhis teachings, the nev legislative povers ofChurch
andstateverelegitimisedand,naturallavteachingvasalsorledly
theology. The religious re-dennition of natural lav profoundly
underminedthepoliticalandprudentialcharacteroftheclassicaldoc-
trinesof usticeandthecriticalemphasisofnaturallav. Theidealcity
ofthe future, vhich for the Greeks and Romans vould le luilt
throughrationalcontemplationandpoliticalaction, vas replacedly
the non-negotialle other-vorldly city ofGod. God, the lavgiver,
infuseshiscommandsvithalsolute certainty, naturallavisnolonger
concerned vith the construction ofthe ideal moral and political
orderandthe ustlegalsolution,lutviththeinterpretationandcon-
nrmation ofGod's lav. AfterAquinas, usticelargely alandonedits
critical potential forurisprudence. Vith its pathos vacated and its
roleasprimordialstandardgone,itturnedinto a coldvirtue`. The
'' loch, o cit , suran I I , z.
'' Summc T|co|o_|cc, lI-z, . i , znd^rticlc i -,).
' Nartin]ay, Nust]usticcbclind,inCostasLouzinasandLyndalcad,IcucaJt|c
Imc_c Chicago, LnivcrsityolChicago !rcss, i ) Chatcr
' loch, o cit suran I I , 8
I I I ICN l/JLI/L L/V JC l/JLI/L II CIJS i
vordsurviveslutitssupremacyi nnaturallavdisappears,andalove
all, the undenialle moment of condescension and acquiescence,
inherent in the severity that the vord confers upon itself, disap-
pears `. ' Rousseau denned it as the love ofman derivedEom the
loveofoneself`' andinthisformulation, associal ustice, itmigrated
fromlavtoeconomicsandsocialism.Freedomandequality,not us-
tice, villletherallyingcriesofmodernnaturallav.
1 1 1 . 11 1 N11 I I 11 1 11 N1 1111
There i s one final and crucial aspect i n the genealogy ofhuman
rights, vithout vhich ve cannot understand the urisprudence of
modernity. This is the process through vhich the classical and
medievaltraditionofol ectiveusturnedintothatofsul ectiverights
and the sovereign individual vas lorn.john Finnis has argued that
thetransitionfromAquinas'usdennedas thatvhichisus||ac|cca
s||uc||oa' tothatofSuarezas somethingleneficial- aouct- u||.|
cctsoa |cs' vas a vatershed`. lt re-dennedthe concept ofright
as a pover` or lilerty` possessedly an individual, a quality that
characterises his leing. The detailed historical steps leading to this
vatershedhave leenexaminedlyRichardTuckand Michel Villey
andmore recentlylyBrian Tierney`andthereisnoneedtorepeat
themhere.TheremainderofthisChaptervillsignpostonlythemain
stationsinthisimportanttransition.
Thelirthofmodernmanandofindividual rights passesthrough
thetheologyofCatholic scholasticism,vhich discoveredtheprinci-
plesofnaturallavinthevayGodcreatedhumanleings. Theessen-
tial nature ofman vas created ly God and all main elements of
naturallavcanlededucedfromthemoralityofthecommandments.
Moral andpoliticalolligations derivefromrevealedtruthand, as a
result, Christianlove andthe.ct||csofprovidencereplacedthequest
forthelestpolity. Thenrstradicalstepinthisdirectionvastakenly
the Franciscan nominalists Duns Scotus and Villiam ofckham.
Theyvere the nrst to argue, in the fourteenth century, againstthe
dominantneo-Platonicvievs, thatthe individualformis notasign
`' ibid |j
` ' ]can]acqucs Rousscau, Im||c oroaIJu:ct|oa ^. loom trans ) London, !cnguin,
i i ) IV
` ]ohnFinnis, ^cturc|IcucaJ^cturc|Fg|| Cxlord, Clarcndon, i 8o) zo,.
`` Richard Juck, o. cit , sura n. , Nichcl\illcy, Ic ormct|oa Jc |c casec

}ur|J|uc
MoJcrac,ranJicrcy, o.cit. , suran i o, Chatcr I.
UZ / III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
ofcontingencynori sthehumanpersontheconcreteinstantiationof
theuniversal. nthecontrary,thesupremeexpressionofcreationis
individuality, as evidencedinthehistoricalincarnationofChrist,and
itsknovledgetakesprecedenceoverthatoftheuniversalformsofthe
classics. Nominalismre ectedalstractconcepts anddeniedthatgen-
eral terms like lav, ustice or the city represented real entities or
relations . For Villiam, collectivities, cities or communities, are not
naturallutartificial. Thetermcity` , forexample, referstothesum
total ofindividual citizensandnotto an ensemlle ofactivities , aims
and relations, vhile lav` is a universal vord vith no discernille
empiricalreferentandhas no independent meaning. Society, as Mrs
Thatcheracontemporarynominalistvouldsay, doesnot exist, only
individuals do. Medieval science avoided totalities and systems and
concentratedonparticularslecause, arguedthe nominalists, all gen-
eralconcepts and structures ovetheirexistencetoconventionallin-
guistic practices andhave no ontological veight orempiricalvalue.
Thus , meaning and value lecame detached from nature and vere
assigned to separate atoms orparticulars , opening the road for the
Renaissance concept ofthe genius, the disciple andpartner ofGod
andlaterforthesovereignindividual,thecentre ofthevorld.'
The legal implications of nominalism cannot le overstated.
Villiamarguedthatthecontrolexercisedlyprivateindividualsover
theirlivesvasofthetypeofJom|a|umorproperty and, further, that
this natural property vas not a grant ofthe lav lut a lasic fact of
humanlife. The alsolutepoverofthe individual over his capaci-
ties, anearlyprengurationoftheideaofnaturalrights ,vasGod' sgift
to man made inhis image. At the same time, the nominalists lased
theirethics on divine commands anddeduced thevholelavfrom
theirprescriptions. Thelavvasgivenlythe divinelegislatorvhose
vill is alsolute andolligatory for humansctscandnotlecause it
accorded vith nature or reason. lndeed, Duns Scotus argued that
God'svillhaspriority overhisreasonandthegoodexistedlecause
the mnipotent villedand commanded it and not on account of
someotherindependentquality. lnthisvay,thesourceandmethod
ofthelavstartedchanging. ltvas gradually movedfromreason to
Vill, pure Vill, vith no foundation in the nature ofthings`.
`' rst Kantorovicz, Jhc Sovcrcignty olthc ^rtist. ^ notc on LcgaI Naxims and
Rcnaissancc Jhcorics ol^rinSc|c:tcJStuJ|cs lcv Yor, [ [ ^ugustin, p6;)
`` \ilIcy,H|sto |tcJc|c|||oso||c,ocit. ,suran. |, ;,-z6, , IcJro|tct|cs Jro||,o. cit ,
suran I , i i 3-z ; , Juck, o. cit, suran. p, ;-; .
`' Rommcn quotcd in [ N. KcIIy, H S|ort H|story o Hcstcra Ic_c| Thcoq Cxlord
Lnivcrsity!rcss, ppz) |,
I I I ICN l/JLI/L L/V JC l/JLI/L II CIJS
Similarly, the urist'staskvasnolongerto nnd the ustsolutionlut
to interpretthelegislator'scommandsforthefaithfulsul ects.
The separation ofGodfromnature and the alsolutisation ofvill
prepared the ground for God's retreat and eventual removal from
earthly matters. The celelration ofan omnipotentandunquestion-
allevillvasloththe preludefor thefullaldicationofdivine right
and the foundation stone ofsecular omnipotent sovereignty. Legal
positivismanduntrammelledstateauthoritarianismfoundtheirearly
precursorinthosedevoutdefenders ofthe poverofGod. Andina
movethatvastolerepeatedlythepoliticalphilosophersofthesev-
enteenthcentury, the Franciscans comlined alsolute legislative vill
viththe nominalist claimthat onlyindividuals exist. The comlina-
tion led pretty directly to a strongly individualistic politicaltheory
vhich had to undergo only a fev modifications to emerge as
somethingvery closetothe classicrightstheoriesofthe seventeenth
century` . ' The mutation ofolective natural lav into sulective
individual right, initiated ly Villiam, amounted to a cognitive,
semantic and eventually political revolution. Villey descriles it as a
Copernican moment` emphasising its theoretical and epoch-
makingafhnitiesviththe nevscientificvorld. From thatpointon,
legalandpoliticalthoughtplacedatthecentreof itsattentionthesov-
ereignandtheindividualviththeirrespectiverightsandpovers.
Thesecondscholasticschool, arguedthatnaturallavisalranchof
morality andlinkedreligious rules ofconductvith modern reason.
TheSpanishscholasticstotallyalandonedtheideaof usasanol ec-
tivestate ofaffairsandadoptedfullyanindividualistic conceptionof
right.AcrucialtextinthistransitionvastheseventeenthcenturyLc
Lc||uslythe SpanishjesuitFranciso Suarez. Suarezarguedthatthe
true, strict and proper meaning` of us is, akind ofmoralpover
{c.u||cs vhich everyman has, either overhis ovnproperty orvith
respecttothatvhichisduetohim`. Grotius too savusasaqual-
ity orpoverpossessedly a person. Grotius returnedand expanded
the Stoic tradition according to vhichus ac|utc|c cs| J|.|c|um tc|cc
tc||oa|s. `Butlyaskingthelavtoaccordviththerationalnature of
man, hefinally alandonedloth the classicalandtheChristiantradi-
tions ofnaturallav. Nature, perceivedas solely aphysical universe,
lecameradicallyseparatedfromhumanity,itvasemptiedoftheends
` Juck, ocit , suran. p, z|
` Finnis, o. cit , sura n. ,z, zo6-,
` Crotius, Icurc c|| ct cos I||tc Ttcs Lav olVar and !cacc, F KcIscy trans)
Indianaolis, obbs-Ncrrll, p6z) vol, p
+ / III II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
andpurposesof theclassicsortheanimisticsoulof themedievalsand
stoodvithoutmeaningvalueorspirit,afrighteningandhostileforce.
The right, no longer ol ectively given in nature orthe command-
ment ofGod' s vill, follovs human reason and lecomes sul ective
andrational. Thenaturallyrightlecomesindividualrights.
The theologicalin uencevasstill evidentinthe vork ofallgreat
philosophers ofthe seventeenth century ma|c su| rc||oac Lc|vas
their rallying cry, a slogan destined to a transient lut all-important
existence. lt destroyed the medieval vorld viev lut it soon suc-
cumled to its ovn humanistic tendencies andled to the death of
God. Descartes explicitly linkednevphysics andtheology, Holles
andLocke organisedtheir civil stateunderthe auspices ofGod. /
great philosophers vrote a knd ofpolitical theology and lelieved
that God undervrote their systematic efforts. A laicised deism
replaced Christvith the God ofReason and eventually vith Man
lecome God. Butinadifferentsense thegreatnlightenmentvrit-
ers, Descartes, Holles, Locke and Rousseau, despite their differing
conceptions of natural right and social contract, represented the
relellion ofreason against the theocratic organisation ofauthority.
The modern naturalrights tradition, vhich turned violently against
ancient cosmology and ontology and redefined the source ofright,
vas areactionto the co-optation ofnaturallavlyreligion and the
accompanyingloss of uridicalexilility,politicallatitudeandimag-
inative utopianism vhich characterised the classical tradition. The
seculartheologyofnaturalrights placed the alstractconceptofman
at the centre ofthe Lniverse and transferred to him the adoration
offeredlythemedievalsto God. Theforvardlookingandpruden-
tialaspects ofthe theory ofthe lest polity` vere underminedlut,
at the same time, the openness ofclassical natural lav lecame a
potentialhorizonofindividualidentityandright.
Medieval constitutional theories and utopias had leen organised
around the ideas ofthe fall and the divine legislator. But the early
modern undermining ofthe secularpover oftheology, meant that
the relative natural lav, vhich regulated humanity in a state ofsin,
could no longer le used to usti( oppressive social and political
regimes. Thegraceofdivineauthorityandtheauraofitsearthlyrep-
resentativecouldnotcaptivatethesoulofthepeopleand,initsplace,
modernnaturallavattemptedtore-constructthe constitutionusing
reason alone. picurean ideas, according to vhich theo||svas the
outcome ofan original contract, and the Stoic leliefthat the lav
should le in harmony vith the reason of the vorld, acquired
I I I ICN l/JLI/L L/V JC l/JLI/L II CIJS 3
renevedimportance. Butthisvasthe naturallavofmodernmer-
chants and not ofancientsages, itattrilutedcontemporarylegaland
social arrangements to a primordial assemlly and a freely-entered
contract.
Theideaofanoriginalcontractvasaccompaniedlythedeviceof
a state ofnature in vhich menlivedlefore enteringsociety orthe
state.Againsttheancients,forvhomnaturevasastandardofcritique
transcending empiricalreality, the nature ofRousseau, Holles and
Lockevas anattemptto discoverthe commonelements ofhuman-
ity,thelovestcommondenominatorlehindthedifferingindividual,
social and national characteristics and idiosyncrasies. This quest for
the permanent, universal and eternal, had to deductfromempirical
people vhateverhistorical, local or contingent factors had addedto
their nature`. The natural man or ao||cscccc vas not a primitive
forefather ofthe patrons ofParisian salons or ofLondonmerchants
lut had similarities vith them. As species representative, man uc
man, hevasanartificial construct ofreason, a nakedhuman leing
endoved only vith logic, strong survival instincts and a sense of
morality.AccordingtojohnRavls,vhofamouslyrepeatedthemen-
talexperiment,naturalmantoilsandcontractslehindaveilofigno-
rance`. ' The nctiondrevits poverfromthe importance contract
had acquired inearlycapitalism. ltvas onlyin an emergingmarket
society that all important institutional and personal questions could
leaddressedthroughtheputativeagreementsofrationalindividuals.
But despite assurances to the contrary, the man ofnature vas not
totallynaked. his natural` instinctsanddrives differedvidelyfrom
onenaturallavyertothenext. Forsome,naturalmanvas competi-
tive and aggressive, for others peaceful and industrious , for others
loth. ternal nature seemed to follov current social priorities and
politicalconcernsandtolequiteclosetothepreoccupations,hopes
andfears ofthecontemporariesofthetheorist.
Thefictional contractlecame a deviceforphilosophicalspecula-
tionsaloutthenature ofthesociallondandpoliticalolligation, the
model constitution and the rights ofempirical menin London and
Paris. Alstraction, the removalofconcrete characteristics, vas seen
aslogicallynecessary. Thephilosophicalconstructvas askedtoactas
a refutation of loth feudal society and alsolutist government,
througLthe operation ofarevolutionary andpreviouslyunheard of
termination clause vhich authorised the people to overthrovtheir
o0
]ohnRavIs,H T|coq,j ust|.c CxlordLnivcrsity !rcss, i ,z) Jhcvcilconccals all
thc majorindividuaIisingcharactcristicslromthc contractors.
/ I HI II II S JCHY CI l/JLH/L L/V.
government i n case ofnon-performance ofits contractual olliga-
tions , andas thellueprintforthe constitutionalarrangement still to
come. lnthissecondfunction, thecontractualdeviceintroducedthe
rationalismofthenlightenmentinto the constitution. Legalnorms
and social relations vere shamelessly deducedfromaxiomatic nor-
mative propositions original evil and desire for security, original
goodnessandsocialility, individualfreedomandtheneedto restrict
it, etc. ) .
Thevariousschoolsofmodernorrationalnaturallav,despitetheir
differences, shared a numler of characteristics. ' First, they all
lelieved that sociallife and the state are the result offreeindividual
activity.VecandetectheretheheavyinHuenceoflegalmentality. lt
isdeeplypleasingtoalavyer, steepedinthedoctrine ofcontract, to
lelievethatlegalformsandfreeagreementslieatthelasisofsociety.
Social contracttheories adoptedthe contract doctrine of construc-
tiveknovledge`. the contractorsvilledallreasonalle consequences
oftheiragreement,vhilevhatcouldnothaveleenrationallyvilled
vas not villed atall restrictions onproperty and capital accumula-
tion, for example, vere unreasonalle and a political system that
enforcedthem lrought the contract'sterminationclauseinto opera-
tion) . Secondly, ifthelegal andsocial order derives froman original
agreement, itvas realisedthrough thepoverofreasonand logic to
deduce a complete andgaplesssystemofrulesfromafev axiomatic
principles. Theessenceofthestatevastolerationallyreconstructed
fromitsvalidelementsandustinedonlylymeansofreasonedargu-
ment, lasedonitsfoundingprinciplesinthecontract,indeedreason
vasdeclaredthe essenceofthestate. Theprestigeofthenaturalsci-
ences vas thus transferred to political philosophy and natural lav
lecameapure discourseofdeductionmodelledon mathematics.
Thenatural sciencesintheirquestforpredictalilityandcertainty
discardedirregularities, naturallavfollovedsuit. The methodologi-
calpurityofmathematics complementedperfectlytheleliefinuni-
versal homogeneous concepts and eternal lavs, vhich lecame a
central tenet ofrational natural lav. The iron lavs and the strict
necessityandhomogeneityofNevton'smechanicalnatureverere-
interpretedasanormativeuniversalityandvereco-optedinthenght
against the hierarchical society offeudal privilege. Rational natural
lav and natural rights lecame the discourse ofrevolution. The lil-
eralversion ofThomas Paine inspiredtheAmericans, the democra-
o
Ioch, o. cit ,suraI. I i , ,-o
I I IHCN l/JLH/L L/V JC l/JLH/L HI CIJS 7
tic of jean-jacquesRousseauthe French. Nopoliticalphilosophy or
versionofnaturallavvasvorthyofthename,ifitvasnotgrounded
on universal principles or did not aim at universal ends. The great
discoveries, the marvellous inventions and the triumph ofthe mer-
cantile andurlan economies, aidedlythe levelling exchange-value
ofmoney, comlinedto increase the cachet oftheuniversal. Butthe
discourse oftheuniversal soon lecamethe companionofcapitalism
andthe upholderofthemarket,theplacevhere,accordingtoMarx,
humanrigltsandBenthamreignsupreme. Therationalismofnatural
lavtoo, havingconsignedtheclassicalconceptionofpoliticsandthe
searchforthe lestpolity` to the history ofideas ,lecamethelegit-
imatorydiscourse ofutilitariangovernmentsandvasusedagainstthe
emergingsocialistandreformmovements. Aside-effectofthisram-
pant rationalism vas the intellectual impoverishment ofurispru-
dence. the violence at the heart oflav and ofpullic and private
pover,vhichhadhelpedre-organisethevorldaccordingtothenev
political and economic orthodoxies, vasvritten out ofthe texts of
lav, vhich lecame olsessed vith normative questions, vith the
meaningofrights , sovereignty orrepresentation. Muchoftheunre-
alistic rationalism vhich still ledevils urisprudence hails from this
golden age ofnaturallav. This idealism not only totally olfuscates
lav's role in the vorld, it also distorts our understanding oflegal
operationslecause.
it serves no purpose to pick out partial relations and even partial ten-
dencies in real life and insert them into the head as an arithmetical
prollem . . . in order to come up vith a logic that formally is like iron,
lut remains veaker and unreal from the point of viev of content . . .
formal necessity, that is , the alsence of contradiction in the deduction
and form of a proposition, is hardly a criterion of its truth in a dialec-
tical vorld.

But alongside this lav-aliding and somlre nature, vhich accorded

viththelourgeoisinterestsincalculalilityandcertainty, adifferent
conception ofa ac|utc |mmc.u|c|c lurked lelov the surface, in the
pure and harmonious nature of classicism, the edenic visions of
romanticismandtheperfectililityofutopiansocialists.Thismarginal
conception ofapurinedandperfectnature linkedvith the classical
traditionofnature asstandardandprovideda critical andredemptive
perspectiveagainsttheinusticesandoppressionsvhichthesocialsys-
tem,ustinedlyrationalnaturallav, tolerated and evenpromoted.
oz
ibid. , I I .
O / I II II II S JCIY CI l/JLI/L L/V.
This conceptofnature vould eventually comline vith the idea of
socialutopiaandprovidetheradicalside ofhumanrights.

Attheendofthishistoricalourney,itisimportanttorememlerthat
classical naturallav vas luilt on the intrinsic connectionletveen
naturalrightand ustice. The same terms, J|/c|oa andus, connoted
loththeustandthelav,andthelusinessoftheclassicallavyersvas
todiscovertheustsolutiontoacon ict. Thislinguistic linksurvives
todayinthe doulle meaningofthevordustice, asthetranscendent
idealoflavandastheadministrationofthe udicialsystem.Butclas-
sicalrightvasnotamorallavthatlurksinthehumanconscienceas
auniversalsuperegoandplacesallunderthe same moral commands.
ltvasratheramethodologicalprinciplevhichallovedthephiloso-
pherto criticise sedimented traditionandtheurist to discover the
ustsolutioninthecaseinhand. Classicalnaturallavcontainedapas-
sionforusticelutitdidnotcoincidevithit. Naturalrightentersthe
historical agenda, directly orindisguise, everytimepeople struggle
to overthrov all relations in vhich man is a degraded, enslaved,
alandonedordespisedleing`.`justice, onthe otherhand, has too
oftenleenassociatedvithamoralistic, patriarchalattitude,invhich
distrilutionsandcommutationprotecttheestallishedorderandper-
petuate theinequalities andoppressionnaturallavtriestoredress.
Genuine natural lav, vhich posits the free vill in accord vith reason,
vas the first to reclaim the ustice that can only le oltained ly strug-
gle, it did not understand ustice as something that descends from
alove and prescriles to each his share, distriluting or retaliating, lut
rather as an active ustice of lelov, one that vould make ustice itself
unnecessary. atural lav never coincided vith a mere sense of us-
tice. '
Forthosefighting against inustice and for a society that transcends
the present, naturalright has leen the method andnaturallav has
definedthecontentofthenev. Thisisthelinkletveennaturallav,
naturalandhumanrights. Butthevoluntarismofmodernnaturallav
cannotprovideasufncientfoundationforhumanrights. ltsinevitalle
intertviningvithlegalpositivismmeantthatthetraditionvhichcre-
ated natural and later human rights has also contriluted to the
repeated and lrutal violations ofdignity and equality vhich have
accompaniedmodernity,likeitsinescapalleshadov.
'` Ioch, o. cit . , suraG. I I , xxviii-xxix.
'' ibid. , X.
+
^c/utc| I|_|/ |a I.||cs cac I..|c
From Plato' s Rcu|||. to early modernity, philosophy placed the
searchforthelestpolityatitscentre.ThomasHollescontinuedthis
tradition vhich lrought together political thought and legal con-
cerns.Hisearlyvorksveregeneraltheoriesoflav. ThelaterLcC|cc
and Lcc|c||caand theposthumous L|c|oucchangedsomehovtheir
emphasis, inanattemptto createascienceofpoliticsvhichaccord-
ing to Arendt, vould make politics as exact a science as the clock
did for time`. For most commentators, the main achievement of
Hollesliesinhispoliticaltheory,vhichhasalsoleendenouncedly
othersforits authoritarianismandparochialism. lfonecouldanalyt-
icallydistinguishletveenpoliticalandlegaltheory,adifficulttaskfor
thatperiod, itisargualle thatHollesmadeamore lastingcontrilu-
tionto the science oflav. in his radically nev method ofanalysing
legalfoundations, inhisre-definitionofthetraditional uridicalcon-
ceptsoflav,rightand ustice, finally, inhisadustmentoftraditional
sourcesandendsoflavtotheconcerns ofmodernity. TheinHuence
ofHolleshasvanedinpolitics, viththeriseofthepurerlileralism
ofLocke and the democratic tradition ofRousseau. But his re-
invention oftheuridicalvorldremains unsurpassed. Ve can sum-
marise his contrilutionlysayingthat Holles is thefounderofthe
moderntraditionofindividualrights, thenrstphilosophertoreplace
fullytheconceptof usticeviththeideaofrights. lfthisaspectofhis
vorkis understood, legal positivism lecomes the necessary accom-
paniment and partner ofrights discourse and some ofthe lileral
critiques ofHolleslosemuchoftheirvalidity.
Holles' revolutionary contrilution tourisprudence is perfectly
illustratedly the follovingstatementfromthe leginningoftheXlV
Chapter of Lcc|c||ca, entitled f the first and second Naturall
Laves , andofContracts`, vhich is vorth quotingatlength.
TH RlGHT F ATLR, vhich Vriters commonly call ns
^a/nra|c, is the Lilerty each man hath, to use his ovn pover, as he
7
l/JLI/L II CIJ Il ICIIIS /lL L CCKI
vill himselfe, for the preservation of his ovn ature, that is to say, of
his ovn Life, and consequently, of doing any thing, vhich in his ovn
]udgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to le the uptest means
thereunto.
BY LlBRTY, is understood , according to the proper signifrcation
of the vord, the alsence of externall lmpediments . vhich
lmpedimens may oft take avay part of a mans pover to do vhat hee
vould, lut cannot hinder him from using the pover left him, accord-
ing as his udgement and reason shall dictate to him.
A LAV F ATLR, ,Icx^a|nra||s) is a Precept, or generall Rule,
found out le reason, ly vhich a man is forlidden to do, that, vhich
is destructive of his life, or taketh avay the means of preserving the
same, and to om:t, that, ly vhich he thinketh it may le lest pre-
served. For though they that speak of this sulect, use to confoundu,
and Icx, I|_/|and Lau, yet they ought to le distinguuished, lecause
RlGHT, consisteth in lilerty to do, or to forleare, Vhereas LAV,
determ:neth, and lindeth to one of them. so that lav, and Right, dif-
fer as much, as lligation and Lilerty, vhich in the same matter are
inconsistent. '
This concise and epigrammatic statement, is a clear declaration and
dehnition ofthe modern rights ofman. lt remains unsurpassed in
clarity andprecision in the early modern literature ofnatural rights
andclearlyindicatesits ontologyandtheology. Like Leviathan him-
self, thisstrikingstatementisjanus-like. ltisstillinconversationvith
theAristoteliantraditionvhichdistinguishedletveenrightJ|/c|oa,
us) andlav aomos |cx) andattriluted the dignity ofnature to the
former. Butjanus' otherfacelookstothefuture. Naturalrightisnot
the ustresolution ofa dispute offered ly a harmonious cosmos or
God's commands. lt derives exclusively from the nature ofeach
man`. Thesourceorlasisof rightisnolongertheolservationofnat-
uralrelations,philosophicalspeculationaloutthe lestpolity`orthe
interpretationofdivine commandmentsluthumannature.
Hovdidthischangeofsourceaffecttherelationshipletveenlav
and right or ustice, the structuringprinciple oflegal activity in the
pre-modern vorld? For the classics, the lav aomos and the right
J|/c|oacoincide,andustice, anothervordforright,vaslav'solect
andend.Thetvoconceptsveresocloselyconnectedthattheyvere
oftenusedassynonyms,somethingHollesvantedtoavoid.Holles
' Jhomas Mobbcs, Icv|ct|ca Richard Juck cd ) Cambridgc Lnivcrsity !rcss, i )
Chatcr i
4
, i
l/JLI/L II CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI 7i
occasionally confusedthe tvo terms luthealso presented the rela-
tionship as a clear evolutionfromthe state ofnature to civilsociety.
TheHollesianstateofnature,hasnoorganisedcommunityandlav,
except for the natural lav ofself-preservation. But this lav is not
properlylav`. lnaradicalmove,vhichvillirreversillychangethe
concept ofustice, Holles identified right vith freedom from
lav and fromall external and social imposition. Lavs are not con-
ducive to riglt lecause they restrain freedom. But the lav ofself-
preservationis different. it derives fromhumannature andas suchit
doesnot impose external constraints orrestrictlilerty.
Vith this move, Holles separatedthe individual fromthe social
orderandinstalledhimatthecentre,asthesul ectofmodernityand
thesourceoflav. Theclassicaltraditiondiscoveredthenaturallyright
ly olservingrelationshipsinhumancommunities. For Aristotle and
Aquinas,urists could find the model oflegal organisation and the
ansvers to legal prollems in the natural order oftheir vorld. This
orderfellvell short ofthe ideal, lut included sufficientelements of
theperfectpolityto giverisetodirectphilosophicalandlegaldelil-
erationsalouttheustsolution. lndividualsverenaturallysocialand
political and no useful conclusions could le reached vithout the
olservation oftheir communities and socialinteractions. The start-
ingpointofHolles, astudentofStoicismandnominalism,vaspre-
ciselythe opposite. The eye ofthe olserveris nolongertrainedon
society lut onthe isolatedindividual in apre-social state ofnature.
Naturalrightisnottolesoughtintheharmoniousorderofthepolit-
ical community lut in its opposite, the natural characteristics ofa
Crusoe-like hgure. Human nature, Holles lelieved, has certain
commontraits,theolservationofvhichvilldeterminevhatisnat-
urallyright. Naturelecomesthereforeascientifichypothesis,itslav
takestheformofolservalleregularitiesorcommonpatternspresent
in all men. Because humannature is ol ectively given, reason can
deducefromanolservationofthevaymenactuallylehave, aseries
ofnatural lavs that should le folloved ly the Commonvealth.
Reasonhas leen freedfromthemetaphysicalclaimsofStoicism and
Christianity, it is no longer a spirit, does not reside in the soul and
doesnothavemuchtosayalouttheessenceofthings. Reasoniscal-
culation`vritesHollesandtruereasonispartofhumannature. ln
Mobbcs, Ic Cororc, I, z, at ] ClbyrightrcasoninthcnaturaIstatcolmcn,I undcr-
standnot, asmanydo, aninlaIIibIc laculty, butthcactolrcasoning, thatis, thccculiarand
trucratiocinations olcccryman conccring thcsc actions olhis, vhichmay cithcrrcdound
to thc damagc orbcncut olhisncighbours, IcC|vcII, i at i
7Z l/JLI/L II CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
itsnevrole,reasoncandiscoverthelestmeansandco-ordinatetheir
actiontovardsadesiredend.Thisisthecalculative,instrumentalrea-
son ofthe moderns andits task in the field ofmorals andpolitics is
nottoguidetheconscienceluttoluildasciencethroughtheolser-
vationofthe externalvorldandhumannature.
Vhen reason comes to examine human nature and develop the
science ofpolitics, it discovers there desire, reason's negation and
adversary. lndeed, vhilethefirstnaturallavisunrestrictedfreedom,
the secondis the duty to keeppromises andthe tventy-odd other
lavs offeredfromtheolservationofhumannaturerefertopassions,
suchasgratitude,socialility,moderationandimpartiality thevirtues)
orrevenge,lackofgenerosityandarrogancethevices) .Thepassions,
desire, appetite andaversion,are themostpoverful humanforce.
But vhatsoever i s the olect of any mans Appetite or Desire, that is
it, vhich for his part calleth CccJ: And the olect of his Hate and
Aversion, viI, And of his Contempt, l/|c aaJ Ia:oas|Jcra||c v r r For
Morall philosophy is nothing else lut the science of vhat is CccJ,and
Ic|||, in the conversation, and Society of man-kind. CccJand Ic|||,
are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions , vhich in differ-
ent tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different .
Desire is strongerthan reason. Vhen reasonconfronts it, itmust
eitheracknovledgeitsimpotenceortryandrecruitthepassionstoits
ovn - alvays endangered - advantage. Desire and pleasure, pre-
sentedasinstinctualforcesordrives`inthepsychoanalyticaltermi-
nology, acquire central political and legal signincance, and turn the
theologicalnomnalismofthemedievalsintoascientific`individu-
alism. Thisradically nevconceptvillprovide the idea ofindividual
rights , strugglingtoemergeinthereligiouslyinspiredvritingsofthe
scholastics ,vithasecularandpragmaticallyfecundfoundation. The
centrality ofthepassions, lothempirically olservedandmetaphysi-
callyassertedasnatural, turnsthemoralphilosophyofHollesintoa
political hedonism and prepares the ground for utilitarianism. The
endof lavisnolongervirtueandustice, lutindividualpleasure,and
reasonisthemaininstrumenttothisend. Thisapproachmakesnat-
ural right no longer the fair share ofa legal distrilution, a state of
thingsintheoutsidevorld, lutanessentialattrilute ofthesul ect.
Rightisa poverthat lelongs to the individual, a sul ective quality
vhichlogicallyexcludesallduty.Thisispreciselythelasisofthedis-
tinctionletveenlavandright. thelavimposes dutiesand does not
` Icv|ct|ca,suran. I, Chatcr, , Chatcr I, I!C.
l/JLI/L II CIJ Il ICIIIS /lL LCCKI 7
conferpovers, this makes it the opposite ofright. Vhen right isa
shareofsocialgoods , itisalvayspartofrelationships, itimplies duties
andislydennitionlimited.Nevnaturalrightisthepoverofdoing
anything`, anunlimitedandundividedsovereigntyoftheself
Vhenveturnfromsourcetoform,naturalrightisdennedas the
lilertyofman| ofdoinganythingashevillehimselfe`andlilerty
as the alsence ofexternallmpediments`. 'Rightmeans doing, itis
an active state oflodily motion guided lyvill vhich, against the
schools,isnolongerdefinedasrationaldesirelutasthelastappetite
in delilerating`, desire's final state vhich puts the lody and its
appetitesintomotionand,throughtheiraction, realisesitsendinthe
vorld. TheCartesiandivideletveenspiritandlodyisalsenthere.
Manistreatedasaforce ofnature, an agent ofaction, motivatedly
desire and seeking pleasure. Lilerty is negative, it is an innnite
license, afreedomofmotionthathasnoinherentlimitationslutonly
external, empirical constraints, most notally in the lilerty ofother
mentopursuethesameends ortoengageinmotionthatputsthem
onacollisioncourse.
The natural anthropology ofHolles is a concise statement of
modernity. Folloving a felicitous and novclassical presentation of
the movefromtheancients tothemoderns, manis no longercon-
ceived as a mirror ofsome superior and external reality lut as the
lamp, thesourceandcentre oflightillumnatingthevorld.Beingis
no longer the creation ofa divine nrst cause nor does it approach
reality as a copy ofa pre-existing original. Man is productive, his
essence is to le found in his doing` and lodily motion`, he
lecomesthecreatorandcauseofactionsandthelestoverofmean-
inguponaprofanereality. Theselfas agentrecogniseshimselfasthe
centre ofdecision making vith a pover that springs neither from
pure emotions nor from pure intelligence. The pover ofvill is
unique. This pover finds its perfect manifestation in decision. ln
endingdelileration and takinga decision, the desiring selfproects
itselfinthe vorldandlecomes a sovereignagentfor Holles oran
autonomous and responsille sul ectfor Kant. lmagination andart,
too, are no longer conceived as resemllances of a transcendent
reality offorms, nor is the artist a craftsman imitating the divine
Jcm|outc . The model of the modern artist is the inventor and
' ibid , Chatcr q, I
` ibid , Chatcr, qq
' Chrs Jsaitouridcs, Lcviathan-Noby Lick. Jhc !hysics olSacc, Vlll/ Lu caJ
Ctit|uc,zz-z| , I,
7+ l/JLI/L II CIJ Il ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
imagination, inits alility to co-ordinate the faculties, lecomesitself
transcendental. Finally, in the practical realm, agency lecomes
central. The sulect is enthronedas a free agent, as the immediate
sourceofactivityandthe cause ofactionsthat emanate fromit. The
modernselffulnlsitselfinvhathedoes , ouractionsexpressourtrue
existence, andasaresultve canonlyknovvhatvemake.
But the unencumlered desire and action ofnaturalright creates
tvo difnculties. First, itis sharedequally ly all. Nature hath made
menso equall, inthefacultiesoflody,andmind. . . theveakesthas
strengthenoughtokillthe strongest . . . andastothefacultiesofthe
mind, . . . l hnd yet a greater equality among men than that of
strength`.Thisnaturalequalityofdesireandstrengthhasnothingin
common vith the classical hierarchical conception ofright and of
ustice. Traditional political philosophy had claimed that man can
perfect himselfin political society and hadmade duty the primary
moral fact. From Aristotle to early modernity, the ustoutcomevas
determined according to a person's due in a community, suumus
.u|uc|t||ucaJum. lntheo||sorthe.|c||cs, thenaturalhierarchyofthe
parts ofthe soul oramongst thevarious classesprovidedan order, a
measurevhichvas also theprinciple ofustice. Butvhen nature is
emancipated from the harmonious and hierarchical order of the
ancients,itlecomesalsoluteequality,aterrille equivalenceofforce,
vhichknovsonlytheusticeofdesireandtheconstraintofforceund
lav. Secondly, as aresultofHolles'sidentincation ofpleasure vith
thegoodandofpainanddeathvithevil,moralitycannotdistinguish
letveen the different types ofpleasures and pains and is unalle to
create a scheme ofvalues. The Desires and otherPassions ofman,
are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions vhich proceed
fromthesePassions,tilltheyknovaLavthatforlidsthem`.ltispre-
ciselythiscomlinationofunlimitedlilertyofaction, ofequality of
povers and ofthe moral indifference ofdesireandits olects that
leadstoa varre ofeverymanagainsteveryman`.
The political recognition ofdesire leads to the primacy ofright
over duty. Vhen the individual lecomes the centre ofthe vorld,
vhen fear, hate and love are the only ends ofaction, everyone is
entitledtoself-preservationandtothemeanstoachieveit. achman
is the soleudge ofthe right means and every action inpursuit of
' Lcviathan, suran I, Chatcr i , 8.
Mobbcsstatcsthatvhat mcnLcsirc,thcyarcaIso saydto LC\. andtoM^J thosc
things, lor vhich thcy havc ^vcrsion So that Lcsirc, and Lovc, arc thc samc thing,
Lv|ct|ca,suran I , Chatcr, j 8 .
l/JLI/L II CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI 73
desireislynatureust. Tothisvarofeverymanagainsteveryman,
this is also consequent. that nothing can le unust. The notions of
rightand vrong,ustice and inustice, have there no place. Vhere
thereisnocommonpover,thereisnolav.vherenolav,noinus-
tice`. Theprimacyofdesireleadsto the estallishmentofcivillavs
|ccs) . Classicalandmedievalcosmology, thesourceofnaturalright,
assumed anaturalhierarchy ofspheres andleing. Holles turns the
cosmologyintoananthropologyandtransfersthehierarchicalmodel
from the universe to human desires. Death, the denial ofnature, is
themostnaturalofallfacts , andthefearofdeaththemostpoverful
ofallpassions. Lncontrolleddesirefindsitslimitinthedesireandfear
ofthe otherand in death. The desire ofself-preservationmakesmen
alandon unrestricted freedom in return for the security oflered ly
the commonvealth created through their contractual sulection to
theSovereign. ' `ltisnotnaturethereforelutdeath, as thenegation
ofnature,vhichisthemostnaturalandstrongestofpassions. Death
isthelasis ofnaturallavandthe target ofcivil lavs. Because equal-
ityis unlimited,lecause desireisuncontrollalle, deathlecomesthe
masterandthepoverofthe Sovereignmustle totalandillimitalle.
The Sovereign is a Mortall God`, its only limit is death, the
alsolute master`. The lav is the outcome ofdesire and ofa death
drive vhich, vell lefore Freud's discovery, linked lav, desire and
mortality. Lnlimitedpassion creates unlimited sovereignty, violence
and its fear are the ground oflav. Both natu

al right and the state

entrustedvithitslimitedprotectionaredeathlound.As Leo Strauss
put it, inHollesdeathtakestheplace ofthe |c|os'.
1 1
Theimpassecreatedlythefreepursuitof desirelyequalscanonly
le lroken through a covenant that erects a CommonPover` and
transfers naturalrightto it. The ol ectofagreementisto.
conferre all their pover and strength upon one Man, or upon one
Assemlly of Men, to leare their person, . . . and therein to sulmit
their Vills, every one to his Vill, and their ]udgements, to his
]udgement. This is more than Consent or Concord, it is a real Lnitie
of them all, in one and the same Person, made ly Covenant of every
man vith every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to
every man, Ian//cr|scaaJ_|icnmyI//Ccicra|a_ myscq, /c //|s
Maa, cr/c//|sHsscm||ycmca,ca//|s:caJ|/|ca, //a///y_|icn//yI|_//
/c/|m, aaJHn//cr|sca||/|sa:/|cas|a||kcmaaacr . v the ssence of the
ibid , Chatcr i j , o
0
ibid
' ' Strauss, ^ctum|LucaJH|stoqChicago, Lnivcrsity ofChicago !rcss, i ,) i 8 i
7
l/JLH/L HI CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
Connon-Vcalth . . . is ac ctsca cu/cscH:/s a_rca/Mn|/|/nJc, |y
mn/na|| Ccccaaa/s cac u|// aac//cr, /acc maJc //cmsc|ccs cccry cac //c
Hn//cr, /c //c caJ/cmaynsc//cs/rca_// aaJ mcaas c//cm a||, as /cs/a||
//|akcxcJ|ca/,{cr//c|rca:c aaJ CcmmcaI(/ca:c
_ 1
TheSovereigncreatedthroughthecovenanttakes the characteristics
ofnaturalman andhis right. TheLeviathanhas unrestrictedpover,
his sovereignty cannotle forfeited, he is the sole legislator, himself
notsulectedtothelav' `and,hisrightsareindivisille, alsoluteand
incommunicalle. Civillavis to every sulect, those Rules, vhich
the Common-Vealthhathcommandedhim, lyVord,Vriting, or
othersufncientSignoftheVill, to make use of, fortheDistinction
ofRight,andVrong, thatis tosay, ofvhatis contrary, andvhatis
not contrary to the Rule`. ' ' These lavs, folloving consistently the
earlieranalysis, are commands and impositions. the end ofmaking
Laves , isnoother,lutsuchrestraint . . . AndLavvaslroughtinto
theVorldfornothingelse, luttolimtthenaturall lilertyofpartic-
ularmen`.' Thecreationsofalsolutelegislativepoverarenecessary
eventhoughtheyviolatethehrstnaturallav ofunrestrictedfreedom
lecauseoftheuncertaintyandinsecurityofequaldesiresandforces.
Civillavsareproperly lavs`. ' Theyderivefromnature, notasits
spontaneousaccretions, lutas artinces. ve have derivedcivilrules
from nature, vhich gives us natural lavs, through the use ofart,
assistedlyreason, itselfnaturallutalletotransformnatureandadapt
to the needs ofa vorld ofsin, adustthem to the circumstances of
sociallife`.' 'Civillavsarelothnaturalandtheoutcomeofthepul-
lic reason ofthe Sovereign and, unlike unchangealle natural lav,
adapt to social need, evolve and vary. Natural lav did not create
property rights, lecause natural humanity enoyed resources com-
munally lefore the fallvhile, afterthe fall, uncertainty aloutgoods
dominated. Civil lavs are necessary therefore for the creation of
rights. They distrilute richesandcreateproperpropertyrights.
' Icv|ct|ca, suran I, Chatcri 8 , i zo-i
' ` Forhavingthc ovcrto makc, andrccallavs, hcmayvhcnhclcascth,lrcchim-
sclllromthat subj cction, Ic C|vc, \I, i |, at 8 , Icv|ct|ca, Chatcr z6. Jhis isthc rcason
vhyMobbcsissohostilctothccommonlavtradition,aricularIythcclaimassociatcdvith
Sir dvard Cokc that common lav is sucrior to thc lav olking and !arliamcnt. Scc,
I|c|o_uc |ctucca c |||oso|ctcaJc StuJcat o} t|c Commoa Icu Ia_|caJ |. Croscy cd ,
Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, i ,, .
' ' Icv|ct|ca, suran. I , Chatcr z6, i 8
' ` ibid , i 8 ,
i o
ibid.
' ibid. , i 8 8
l/JLH/L HI CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
Jhc distriLution ol thc natcrials ol this nourishncnt, i s thc constitu-
tion ol ninc and thinc and his, that is in onc vord roricty, and
Lclongcth in all kinds ol connonvcalths to thc sovcrcign ovcr . . .
Jhc introduction ol roricty is an cllcct ol connonvcalth vhich
can do nothi

ng Lut Ly th
`
crs
'
n that rcrcscnts it, it is thc act only
ol thc sovcrcign, and consistcth thc lavs, vhich nonc can nakc that
havc not thc sovcrcign ovcr. ' "
77
nce the Commonvealth has leen estallished, the natural right
that led to its foundation is transferred to the rdinances of
Souv

eraignPover`. Vhencivillavs ,Leviathan'ssoleresponsilility,

are given the task ofprotectingtherights ofindividuals naturallav
inannalfeatoftrans-sulstantiationlecomesidenticalv.thcivillav.
Thelav ofNature and Civill Lav, contain each other, and are of
equalextent . . . The Lav ofNature thereforeis apart ofthe Civill
Lav in all Common-vealths of the vorld . . . And therefore
ledience to the CivillLav is also part ofthe Lav ofNature`. '
Civillavandrights are the secularversion ofnaturallav. lts source
remainsthe same, anaturalreasonadaptedonlytotheexigenciesof
the secularvorld, lutthe practical necessities ofcivillife oftenlead
tocommandsvhichcontradictnaturallav.Asaresult,aftertheiden-
tircation

fcivil

and natural lav,ustice vas radically re-denned.

First,andinkeepingvithnaturallav,lNjLSTlCisnootherthan
||c ao| Icpotmca.c Coccaca|. And vhosoever is not Ln ust is
` 'B dl
. `

us| . utsecon y, LavesaretheRules of just,andLnust, noth-

ingleingreputedLn ust,thatisnotcontrarytosomeLav`. 'Atthe
endofalongprocess,naturalrightvas turnedinto state-givenindi-
v;dualri

ht
`
an+ usticelecameolediencetothelav.Theonlyprin-
ciple of usticeis conformityvithstatelavs.
At first, contractual consent appears to le the foundation of
Leviathana

dthem

dernstate. Butthisisasleightofhand. Thepri-

ma
'
yofdesireleadsinexorallytothesocialcontract,vhichpresents
societyas the outcome ofindividualfreedomand agreement. To le
sure, a covenant lased on those premises cannot vorkunless it is
turnedintothetotalsul ectionofall tothecommands ofthestate.
Theviolencethatmarkedtheleginningandtheforcenecessitatedly
t|efearofdeath, enters civillavandlecomesitsinescapallecondi-
tion and supplement. The command ofthe Sovereignlecomes the
' ibid , i 8,.
' ibid , i 8 ,
z0
ibid. , Chatcr I ; , i oo.
' ibid. , Chatcr z6, i 8|.
7O
l/JLI/L II CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
lasis of all authority. Lavs are lavs lecause of their source and
sanctions, notlecauseoftheirreason.Thesupremacyofstateauthor-
itymirrorsthenaturalneedomoftheindividual,Leviathan, theper-
fect partner and necessary constraint ofthe individual, loth shares
andinauguratestheindividual's attrilutes.
The pover ofthe Sovereign is therefore the result ofindividual
desire and right. Lilerahsm, the political philosophy vhich treats
rights as the fundamental political fact and eventually identifies the
functionofthestateviththeirprotection,fndsitsfoundationaldoc-
umentinHolles. Rightsarenaturalvhiledutiesconventional,they
arisefromthecontractand, as thecontractmeanstotalsulectionto
thestate, theyultimatelyderivefromthevilloftheSovereign. Legal
positivism is the inevitalle accompaniment ofthe individualism of
rights. TheLilertyofaSulect,lyeththereforeonlyinthosethings,
vhich in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath praetermit-
ted`. `BurkecomplainedthattheParisianphilosophers. . . explode
orrenderodious orcontemptille, thatclassofvirtuesvhichrestrain
theappetite. . . lntheplaceofallthis, theysulstituteavirtuevhich
theycallhumanityorlenevolence`. 'Butthereplacementofvirtue
anddutyvitharightderivinglogicallyfromhumannatureandpolit-
icallyfromthevillofthe Sovereignhadalready leen completedin
Holles. / theelementsofpoliticalandlegalmodernityarepresent
in Lcc|c||ca. individual prior to society, natural and later human
rights lased on lav's recognition of desire, the conventional
Sovereign, made in the image ofthe free individual, vhose right
estallishesindividualright,legalpositivismandthe centrality ofvill
and contract. Most of all, ve fnd in Holles the internal link
letveendesire, violenceandlav.
One couldargue, therefore, that the doctrine ofsovereignty is a
legaldoctrine, lecauseallpoverandrightslelongstothe Sovereign
not through grant or custom lut as ofright. According to Strauss,
naturalpullic lav, the disciplinecreatedinthe seventeenthcentury
lyMacchiavelliandHolles, loveredthegoalofpolitics `. Classical
politicalphilosophyhad distinguishedletveenthe idealofthe lest
polityand that ofthelegitimate regime. Thelatter dependedfor its
realisationonthepracticalvisdomofthestatesman,vhoadustedthe
idealtotheexigenciesoftimeandplace. Modernnaturallavansvers
theprollemoftheustsocial orderonceandforall.
zz
Strauss, o cit , suran. II, i 86 lI
z
ibid. , Chatcrzi , i |8
z+
urkc quotcd inStrauss, ocit , sura n I I , . i 88.
l/JLI/L II CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
Jhough nothing can Lc innortall, vhich nortals nakc, yct, i l ncn
had thc usc ol rcason thcy rctcnd to, thcir Connon-vcalths night
Lc sccurcd . . . lor Ly thc naturc ol thcir Institution, thcy arc dcsigncd
to livc, as long as Nankind, or as thc Iavcs ol aturc, or as usticc is
scllc, vhich givcs thcn lilc. `
7V
The nev science ofpolitics, lased on the dogmatism ofstate and
rights, is almost identical to the legalisation ofpolitical life. ' lt
i

tends to give auniversallyvalidsolutionto the politicalprollem

sismeantto|euniversallyapplicalleinpractice`and,lynecessity,
itreplacestheideaofthelestpolityviththatofefficientandlegiti-
mate government. ` ln legal terms, the study ofends is replaced ly
the
`
t

dy

fmeansandtechniques,vhiletherightsoftheSovereign,
as distinguishedfromtheirexercise, allovan exactdefnitionvith-
outreferencetothecircumstancesoftheirapplication, lut thiskind
ofexactnessisagaininseparalle nom moral neutralty. right declares
vhatispermitted, as distinguishedfromvhatishonouralle`.
lnthenevclimate,themaintaskofpoliticslecomesthedesignof
the right institutions. But modern constitution-luilding lears no
relationship to the lest polity` ofthe classics. The institutions of
modern politics shouldle sovalue-neutral that, accordingto Kant,
theyshouldleacceptalleeventoanationofdevils`, guidedlyrea-
soneddesireandfear. Vhencommonvealthcometole dissolved
not ly external violence, lut intestine disorder, the fault is not i-
men,astheyarethemc||ct, lutastheyarethe
_
c/cts,andorderersof
the

`.Vhenthelusinessofpoliticsisfocusedontheeffciencyor
legitimacyofpoverratherthanitsendsandprudentuse,allthechar-
acteristicsofthe Sovereignvilllevisitedonitsnotionalprogenitor,
theindividualandhishumanrights. Povercanguaranteethesocial
order ly conquering human nature and manipulating its passions.
The mortall God`, created in the imaginary image ofman the
maker`, must nov shape man, the matter`, inits ovnimage. An
apparentcontradictionseemstoaccompanythereforethecreationof
Leviathan. Assoonasheislorn, he destroys thenaturalrightsofhis
progenitor, ofthe sul ects vho contractedto create him. The sul-
ec:s
^
ho voluntarily entered into sulmissionin order to safeguard
theirrghts, mustnovlaythemdovnandconsenttotheiralolition.
zo
Loc

trnairismmadcitsfirst acaranccvithin oIiticalhilosohy- lorIavycrs arc

altogcthcr ina class by thcmsclvcs - in thc scvcntccnth ccntury, Strauss, o.cit , sura n
I I , i z
z
ibid., i o, i i
zs
ibid. , i ,
zv
Iv|ct|ca, suran i , Chatcrz, zzi .
O l/JLI/L II CIJ Il ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
The recognition and protection ofnatural right prepares its disap-
pearance. Tothatextent,naturalrightisalvays deferred,amirageor
heuristic devicevhichexplainsthe creationofmodernpolitics.
Lutthisisnotthevholepicture.EveninHolles'authoritariansys-
tem,naturalrightsurvivesintvoforms. ltsurvives,frst,intheperson
ofthe Sovereignand in the construction ofstate pover. Sovereign
right retains all the characteristics of the individual natural right.
Leviathan's unique and infinite right is the civil expression ofthe
alsolute right in the state ofnature. The Sovereign retains alsolute
poverlothinrelationtoitssulectsandtheotherSovereignsininter-
nationallav. Thesulectsdonotgivethe Sovereignarightorpover
hedoesnotpossess,theysimplyforfeittheirrightofresistance. Forthe
nominalist Holles , rights lelong only to individuals. Communities,
multitudes ,thepeopleaspeoplecanhavenoright. Forsovereigntyto
lecome operative and offer its services, it must lelong to a singular
sulect. This happens tvice. First, in the fction ofthe artifcial per-
sonality, ofLeviathan,thecrovnorthestate.Secondly,inthedemand
that the reallearer orsymlol ofsovereignty should le amonarch, a
naturalpersonratherthanParliamentorthepeople. Sovereigntyisan
attriluteofindividuality,itsfctitiousconstructionisnecessarylecause
collectivitieshaveno rights.
Lut the sulectstooretain rights. They do notforfeitthe rightto
self-defence and to freedom ofconscience. More importantly, they
acquirethosecivilrightsvhichvereeopardisedinthestateofnature
anduponvhichthemorallegitimacyofthe staterests. lnparticular,
theyacquiretherighttoproperty. Hollesinauguratesalegalsystem
lased on the realisation and safeguarding ofindividual rights. An
individualnaturalrightisloththefoundationandtheoutcomeofthe
edifce. ConHictingnaturalrightsleadto thepact,vhichgiveslirth
to Leviathan, vholaysdovnthe lavin ordertoprotect andsecure
individual rights. Civil lav is created through the unstoppalle
advance ofindividual rights, lav's endis the creation ofrights. But
theseareprivaterightsonly.Pullicrights ,rightsagainstthestate, are
totally excluded. The creation and enoyment ofprivate rights is
accompaniedlyanalsenceofvhatvenovcallhumanrights. The
pricefor the protectionagainst others is minimal protection against
the state. Private rights are the end and value ofthe system oflav,
vhich lecomes a system ofsul ective rights , oftheir preconditions
andconsequences . contracts, astrongstateandan alsolutelav.
lnthistransitionfromnaturalrighttoindividualrights ,theoldlink
vithusticevassevered.Holles defnedusticeasthe olligations to
l/JLI/L II CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
O
keep promises andtooleythe lav. The formeri snecessai norder
to keep the fragile social peace ofa society lased largely on private
agree

ents,
'
hile the latter is the logical consequence ofthe lack of
anyrg

ht
'
against the Sovereign. Pullic andprivaterights,vhilefor-
mally

simi

r, are clearlydistinct.Thepreconditionofindividualprop-
ertyrg|t
`
is the alsence ofpoliticalandhumanrights , sul ectionthe
precondition offreedom. This is the tragedy ofindividualism, miti-
gatedlytheintroductionofdemocracylutstillpresentinthevarious
(or
'
s ofri

eo-lileralism. lts attempt to estallishlav and a system of

social r

elations on t.eir d

nia|, the isolated individual andhis rights,

can easily

endup viththeirfrghteningmirrorimage, an omnipotent

sta
'
e, vhich destroys rights in their name. Despite urisprudential
claimstothecontrary,individualandhumanareoftenlitterenemies.

joh

Locke'spoliticalvritings are commonlypresented as the early

manifesto ofhlerahsmand as the opposite ofHolles' totalitarian-
is

`. YetthemainassumptionsofLockedidnotdifferradicallyfrom
hispredecessor. Thestateofnature hypothesisvasagainatthelasis
ofthepolitical constituti on. Lutthe status ofnaturallavisamligu-
ous. lts rules are not imprinted onthe mind as a duty`.' On the
contrary,conscienceisnothingelselut ourovnopinionorudge-
ment ofthe moral rectitude orpravity ofour ovn actions`. ' Like
Holles,hovever,desireisthemainspringofhumannature.lature
. . . ha
'
putintom

nadesire ofhappiness, andanaversiontomisery,

these
,
ind

ed, areinnatepracticalprinciples`. The righttopursue

happinessistheonlyinnateright,itcomesleforeandfoundsthelav
ofnatur
`
.Menmustleallovedtopursuetheirhappiness ,nay,can-
notle hindered` .
Happinessdependsonlifeandthedesireforself-preservationtakes
precedence over the pursuit ofhappiness vhen the tvo come into
conH ict.lnthestateofnature,manisthesoleudgeofhisactionsand
maydovhathethinksfit`. ltfollovsthatthenaturalstateisfullof
fear and danger. Reasonvillspeace and teaches manvhatis neces-
sarytothatend.TheonlyremedytotheconstantconH ictofthestate
ofnatur
`
istheestallishmentofcivilsocietyorgovernment,andnat-
urallavisthesumofitsdictates asregardspeaceandmutualsecurity.
`' ]ohn Lockc, Ha Isscy Coa:cra|a_ Humca CaJcr tcaJ|a_!.. H lidditch cd. ) Cxlord,
Clarcndon, i ,,) , I, ,
`' ibid. , I, , 6-.
` ibid , I, , I 2.
`` ibid.
OZ l/JLI/L II CIJ I l ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
Buti freasoncompelsthe alandonmentofthestateofnature,itdic-
tatesalsothepoversofthegovernment. ltssupremeprincipleisthat
all pover should emanate from the natural rights of individuals.
Locke's social contract vas as much one ofsul ection as that of
Holles .Everymanputshimselfunderanolligationtoeveryoneof
thatsocietytosulmittothedeterminationofthema ority,andtole
concluded ly it`. Their supreme pover to remove or alter` the
estallishedgovernmentdoesnotextendtothecontractofsul ection
oftheindividualtothecommunityand,vhiletherightofresistance
survivesthecontract,itisdormantandqualifed. Butvhilethestate
ofnature appears very similar in Holles and Locke, Locke con-
cludedthattherightofself-preservationleadstolimitedgovernment.
The lestvayforsafeguardingindividualrightsistosulordinate the
executive to the lav, through the medium ofthe legislature. The
pursuitofhappinessandself-preservationrequirespropertyand,the
mainpurposeofcivilsocietyshouldletheprotectionofproperty.As
aresult, thelegislativelody sbouldleelectedlythevealthyclasses
solelyto ensurethattherights ofpropertyverenot eopardised.
The status ofproperty differentiated HollesfromLocke. Vhile
Hollesinferredthefundamentsofthestateofnaturefromanexam-
ination ofthe pullic lav ofhis time, Locke reconstructed human
naturefromanolservationofthelavandtherightsof property. The
naturalright to property follovs fromthe right ofself-preservation
andis notusttheright ofmotionanddoing`. Humannature and
desire aredirectedatol ects, atthethingsvhichmeet man's desires.
Meatanddrinkcanleusedonlyifeaten,onlyiftheylecomeappro-
priated ly the individual. Similarly, all other essentials for self-
preservation and happiness can le appropriated in order to satis(
man's devouringright. Therighttoproperty islasedonthenatural
property each man has over his lody and skills, his vork and pro-
duce. Vheneverhemakes somethingvithhis ovnlalour,he adds
to the ol ect a part ofhimselfand acquires property rights over it.
Man,lyleingmasterofhimselfandproprietorofhis ovnperson
andtheactionsoflalouroverit,hasinhimselfthegreatfoundations
ofproperty`. 'Admittedly, thisnaturalpropertyrightislimited, in
the natural state, man can appropriate vithhis lalouronlyvhatis
usefulandnecessary forhis self-preservationandhappinessandmust
avoid needless vaste. After the social contract, hovever, and the
introductionofmoney,allrestrictionsupontherightofpropertyare
`' Sc:caJTrcct|scCovcramcat! Laslcttcd ) CambrdgcLnivcrity!rcss, i 6o)scc ||.
l/JLI/L II CIJ Il ICIIIS /lL LCCKI O
relaxed. Man can nov rightfully and vithout inury possess more
thanhecanmakeuse of Theintroductionofmoneymakesitplain
thatmenhaveagreedto disproportionateandunequalpossessionof
the earth, theyhavinglyatacitandvoluntary consentfound outa
vay, hovamanmayfairlypossessmorelandthanhehimselfcanuse
theproductof`. Civillavahovsthepossessiveindividualtoamass
asmuchpropertyandmoneyashevisheslecausecapitalaccumula-
tion vorks for the common good. The day-lalourer ofEngland,
Locke remarks, although divestedofhisnaturalrightto the fruit of
hislalour,isletterofffeeds , lodgesandiscladletter)thantheking
ofa large and fruitful territory` in America.' lt follovs that the
great and chiefend therefore ofmen's uniting in commonvealths
andputtingthemselvesundergovernmentisthepreservationoftheir
property`. ' Capitalism is right andustlecause naturalman is the
alsolutelordofhis ovnpersonandpossessions `.
Locke' steachingonpropertyvas muchmorerevolutionarythan
his political and constitutional doctrines and had important and
unforeseen effects. The individuallecomesthe centre and origin of
the moral and political vorld lecause he creates and oves value
throughhisovn effortsandis thus emancipatedfromnature andall
sociallondsvhichpredatedthe contract. Self-relianceandcreativity
lecome the marks ofhuman achievement, acquisitiveness the mark
ofself-realisation and dignity. Lnderstanding and science stand in
thesamerelationto the 'given' invhichhumanlalour, calledforth
to its supreme effort ly money, stands to the rav material . . . all
knovledge is acquired, all knovledge depends on lalour and is
lalour`. Lalouris the natural means ofescapefrom nature. This
departure fromnature throughhuman endeavourleads to happiness
and the greatest happiness lies] inhavingthosethingsvhichpro-
ducethegreatestpleasures`. Butsincenature cannotleknovn, no
distinctions canlemadeeitherletveenhigherandloverpleasures.
Theonlyguidanceinthealsenceofthesummum |oaumistheavoid-
ance ofthe summum mc|um. Desire is alvays movedlyevil, to y
it` andthe highest evilis death. The ol ectofdesire andfearcoin-
cide. lature creates the desire ofvhatitfears most. Lalour, theart
imitatingnature, shovs thatthevaytohappinessistoturnavayand
negatenature.Andaslalouraddsvaluetoallthingsandleings,every
`` ohnLockc, scc O
`' ibid., scc |i
` ' ibid i z|.
` Strauss, o cit , suran I I , z|.
O+ l/JLI/L II CIJ Il ICIIIS /lL LCCKI
selfor thing is mallealle and can lecome the target ofconscious
intervention andinvestment. Man can fashion himselfthrough his
endeavouras muchas he canfashionthephysicalvorld. Thegreat-
est happiness turns outtole the greatestpovertoshape andacquire
things. lature, includinghumannature, vhich started as the mea-
sure of all things, ends up leing ust matter, to le controlled,
exploited and shaped either ly the self-fashioning individual orly
the all-poverful Sovereign. The fear and desire of the other are
unitedinanevsocialand political systemvhichmakesthe desiring
individualandthedesiringLeviathanthemirrorimageofeachother.
VithLocke, the transitionfromnaturallavto naturalrights and
from the purposeful cosmos to humannaturevas completed. The
lav's end is no longer to deliver ustice as an ol ective relation
amongst people, nor is natural right a varning against sedimented
lavsandcommonopinions. Theiraimistoservetheindividualand
promotehishappiness`, inothervordshisdesireexpressedthrough
hisfreevill. Butthatmeansthatindividualsnolongerpursuevirtue
or strive for the good and politics are not interested in pragmatic
approximations and prudent udgments lut in the application of
truths. Theproliferationofmanydesiresdestroyedthegood,asithad
doneviththeonetruth.Theemptiedplaceofthegoodvasflledly
the fearo( evil,symlolisedlydeathandlroadlyinterpretedasthe
non-achievement or frustration of desire. Avoiding the bad has
lecome the end of modern societies. it is the outcome of the
enthronement of desire as the principle of individual and social
action. The only distant reminders ofthe old lestpolity` are the
various utopias , memories ofa communal past and promises ofa
future goodsociety, mostofthem self-conscious alout theirimpos-
silility. Thehumanrightsannouncedlythegreatrevolutionsofthe
eighteenth century shared lriey the utopian aspiration. They
extendedfreedomfromtheprivatetothepullic,unlikeHolles, and
theysupplementeditvith equality, unlikeLocke. Lutthesemoves
verenotfinalorirreversille. Theroadfromthenaturalrightsofthe
revolutionstothehumanrightsofouragehasvitnessedthetriumph
oflothindividualistichumanismandofthecannilalismofstateand
individual)desire.ThedialecticsofdesireinauguratedlyHollesand
Locke,andsanctifiedlyHegelandFreud,haveturnedevilanddeath
into the greatest fear and desire. But evil andits fear cannot replace
the pursuitofthe) good. Humanrights are caughtinthis continu-
ous see-sav letveen the lest and the vorst, letveenhopefor the
future andthemanyoppressionsofthepresent.
D
Ici.|u/|.as cac Lc.|ctc/|.as
T|c I|_|/s / Mca

C|/|.cas cac c cu /|cts
The symlolic foundation and starting point ofmodernity can le
timed at the passing ofthe great revolutionary documents ofthe
eighteenth century. the American Declaration of lndependence
i,,6) , theBillofRights i,,i ) , the French Lc.|ctc||oa Jcs Lto||s Jc
| 'Hommcc|Ju C||oyca i,,) . ' ltssymlolicclosurehasleenplacedat
thefalloftheBerlinVallini ,,. lnletveen,thenaturalrightspro-
claimedlythe eighteenthcenturydeclarationsmutatedintohuman
rights , their scope andurisdiction expanded from France and the
StatesoftheLniontothevholehumanityand,theirlegislatorsvere
enlargedfromtherevolutionaryassemlliestotheinternationalcom-
munityanditsplenipotentiariesanddiplomatsinlevYork, Geneva
andStraslourg. lnthese tvo longcenturies, the revolutionaryideas
loth triumphed in the vorld scene and vere violated in the most
atrociousandunprecedentedvays.
Theprinciplesofthedeclarationsvereas revolutionaryinthehis-
toryofideasasveretherevolutionsinthehistoryofpolitics. Vecan
follovthe themes, concerns andfears ofmodernityin the traectory
oftherightsofman. lfmodernityistheepochofthesulect,human
rights have paintedthe vorld in the image andlikeness ofthe indi-
vidual. Theimpactofthe FrenchDeclaration,in particular, hasleen
profound. The LniversalDeclaration ofHuman Rights, adoptedly
theGeneralAssemllyoftheLnitedlationsin i ,|, follovedclosely
the FrenchDeclaration, loth in sulstance andform. As a contem-
porary commentator put it, the framers ofthe Ll declaration of
' Forahistor,olthcFrcnchLcclaration,sccLynnMunt cd), Thcrca:|Fcvo|ut|oacaJ
HumcaFg|t:H r|qTo:umcatcqH|stoqoston,cdlordooks , I6o,CailSchvaband
]ohncanncncy cds), Thc rca:| Fcvo|ut|oa o} ,3 caJ |t Imc:t Vcstort, Crccnvood
!rcss , I ,)
SccStchcnNarks,Fromthc'SinglcConluscd!agc`t othc'LccaloguclorSixillion
!crsons` . Jhc Roots ol thc Lnivcrsal Lcclaration ol Muman Rights in thc Frcnch
Rcvolution, zcHumcaFg|t Qucrtcr|y|,-, i|, at|6i i 8)
O II\CLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
i ,| follovedthemodelestallishedlyt.eFren
'
hDecl

rati
_
nofthe
RightsofMan and Citizen ofi ,,, vhile sulstituting man for the

'h ' h h t``

more amliguous uman t roug ou .
This Chapter vill discuss lrieHy the eighteenth centu
'
revolu-
tionarydocumentsvithspecialemphasisonFra
'
ce. l
'
smain

concern
is notvith the sulstance ofrightslutvith theirphilosophicalpre-
suppositions ,paradoxesandamliguities ,vhich
^
ereenunciatedfrst
inthese documents andeventuallycametodon:inatethevorld.
The FrenchDeclarationstartsasfollovs.
Jhc rcrcscntativcs ol thc Frcnch Icolc constitutcd in ationaI
^sscnLly, Considcring that ignorancc, lorgctlulncss or contcnt lor
thc rights ol nan arc thc solc causcs ol uLlic nslortunc and govc
'
n-
ncntal dcravity, Iavc rcsolvcd to cxound in a solcnn dcclaration
thc natural, inalicnaLlc and sacrcd rights ol nan . . =
l . In rcscct ol thcir rights ncn arc Lorn and rcnain l
'
cc a
'
d cqual.
Jhc only crnissiLlc Lasis lor social distinctions is uLlc utiLty.
.. Jhc ain ol cvcry olitical association is to rcscrvc thc naturaI and
inalicnaLlc rights ol nan. Jhcsc rights arc thosc ol liLcrty, rocrty,
.

sccurity and rcsistancc to orcssion.

ThePreamlletotheAmericanDeclarationoflndependence, drafted
lyjeffersonin i ,,6, isllunter.
^ll ncn arc crcatcd cqual and arc cndovcd Ly thcir crcator ccrtai
'
inalicnaLlc rghts, that ai1:ong thcsc arc Iilc, IiLcrty and t|c
'
rsuit
ol Iaincss. Jo sccurc thcsc rights Covcrnncnts arc institutcd
anong Ncn dcriving thcir just ovcrs lron thc conscnt ol thc gov-
crncd.
TheFrenchDeclarationandtheAmericanBillofRightshavemany
similarities vhich can le attriluted to the common philosophical
inuencesnthetvosidesoftheAtlantic. Bothdocumentsproclaim
theirrights toleuniversalandinalienalle. Theylothstat

ethatlim-
itations andrestrictions onthe exercise ofrights mustle introduced
lymeansoflavslegislatedlydemocraticallyelectedlodies. Finally,
they loth protect similar rights. religious freedom and freedom of
expression,thesecurityoftheperson, dueprocessoflavandthe
l
re-
sumption of innocence in criminal proceedin

s . The revolu
'
i
'
ns
vere united in their rhetorical at least) commitment to a political
systemvhichguaranteesfreedomand equality. Butthetvo revolu-
` Lynn Munt, JhcRcvolutionary Crigins olMumanRights o. cit. , suran. I , j .
' Lcclaration olthc Rights olNan and thc Citizcn i nS . Fincr, \. ogdanor and
. Ruddcn, Comcr|a_ Coas/|/u/|oasCxlord. Clarcndon, i ,) zo8-io.
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZI lS /lL / IIV CJIIIS
O7
tionsandtheirdocumentshadalsoanumlerofdifferencesandidio-
syncrasies . Both similarities and divergences inHuenced the future
courseofLumanrights.
I . P 1 V 1 1 b IV L11 LI11V b I I
V1L1 11 11V L1
The differences letveen the political aspirations ofthe American
Var oflndependenceandthe social aims oftheFrench social revo-
lution have leen extensively discussed. The aim ofthe American
documents vas to legitimise political independence from Britain,
vhile that ofthe French, the overthrov ofthe social order ofthe
ca.|ca tc|mc. The Americans usedloth historical and philosophical
arguments to support their nevly estallished rights. They claimed,
frst, that the natural rights ofthe declarations vere expressions of
divinevill and are-statementonlyofthetraditionallilerties ofthe
freelorn Englishman` . According to an inHuential essay ly the
GermanuristGeorgjellinek, theAmericanDeclarationandtheBill
ofRights, despitetheirapparentnovelty,vereinspiredlytheEnglish
charters ofright. theMagna Carta, the Haleas CorpusAct ofi 6,,,
the Bill ofRights of i6, and the legal rights to freedom ofcon-
scienceandreligionrecognisedinthe Coloniessincetheendofthe
seventeenth century. These historical texts, hovever, did not con-
stitute general declarations aloutthe relationsletveensul ects and
political pover. lnstead, they had estallished remedies and proce-
duresfortheprotectionofpredominantlyfeudalandprivaterights.
History vas complemented ly a second naturalist argument,
evident in the Declarations of Virginia of i z june i ,,6 and
lndependenceof| july i ,,6. therights ofmanvouldle estallished
and lest protected, ifsocietyisleftlargelyfreefromstateinterven-
tion. Thisvastypicalmodernnaturalism. ThomasPainehadargued,
intheR|||s o{Mca, thattherevolutionariesmustrestrictthegov-
ernment to a minimum and allov the natural lavs ofcommodity
exchange and social lalour to operate vithout regulation or hin-
drance. Men oley these lavs , vhose action coincides vith natural
rights,lecauseitisintheirinterest,leffree, theyvouldleadtoastate
` Ccorg]cllinck, IcIe:|ctc/|oa Je Jro|/sJc |`|ommc c/Ju:|/oyca C. Fardistrans.) !aris,
i oz)
' Jhomas !ainc, T|c F|_|| Mca, c|a_ caHasucr/o Mr. urkc` H//c:k oa /|c rca:|
Fcvo|u/|oa M. Collins cd.) London,!cnguin, i 6) .
OO
II\CLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
ofsocialharmony, invhichgovernmentalinterventionvouldleall
lut redundant. The Americans, already pragmatist in outlook,
lelievedthattheirdeclarationsverelotharestatementandclarifca-
tionofthelegapositionoftheirEnglishancestorsandthe common
sense`ofthematter. lndependencefromEnglandvouldallovsoci-
ety to develop its immanent lavs, vhose vorkings coincidedvith
the enlightenedself-interestofindividuals.
Theveightofhistoryvasmadetosupporttheself-evidentnature
ofthelavsoffreemarketandthepotentialconHictletveenhistori-
cismandnaturalismvasresolved, Gordianknot-like. the contradic-
tionletveenthe tvo approaches vas denied and theirresultsvere
declaredidentical. Therevolutionvasnotasupremeactofvilland
itsaimvasnottoconstructtheoreticallyandlegislatenovelrights. l t
simply cleared the ground for the full implementation ofexisting
lavs. These vere lasically sound and could lead to individual and
social happiness, if the inuences distorting them vere removed.
Thus, vhilethe declarationofrightschangedthelasis oflegitimacy
ofstatepover,theirsulstanceremainedlargelyunaltered.American
rightsvere natural, theyalready existed and vere vell-knovn and
the government's ol vas to apply prudently pre-existing lavs to
nevsituations.
lnFrance, theAmericaninHuencevas acknovledgedinthepar-
liamentary delates ofjuly and August i ,, lut a sharp distinction
vas dravnletveenthe tvo Declarations. AsRalaudSaint-Etienne
statedinthe lationalAssemlly,the frstpriorityfor anationinthe
process ofleinglorn is to destroythe oldorderandstartafreshly
estallishinganevlegislativepover.Asaresult,theneedtostartvith
ageneraldeclarationofrightsvasnotpressingfortheAmericans.But
fortheFrenchnation,vhichalreadyexisted,thefirstpriorityvasto
constitute ratherthanustdeclare the rights since theyare aninte-
gral part ofthe Constitution`.` The differentpriorities dictated dif-
ferent forms for the tvo lists ofrights. the French prefaced their
Constitutionvith the Declarationmakingitthe groundandlegiti-
mation ofconstitutional reform, vhile the Bill ofRightsvas intro-
ducedasaseries ofamendmentstotheAmericanConstitution.
' uotcdinlandinc arrct-Krcgcl, IeJro|ts Jc/ `|ommcct|cJro|tacturc|!aris, ! 1.F ,
i 8) , .
^ccordingto arrct-Krcgcl, ahistoranolthcFrcnchRcvolution, inFranccthcdcc-
laration olrights rovidcd thc basis lor govcrmcnt itsclland vas conscqucntly draltcd
bclorc thc constitution, ibid , , ClMunt, o cit , suran I, i , .
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / IIV CJIIIS OV
The central provision oftheFrenchDeclarationvastheright of
resistance to oppression, an expression ofthe deeply political and
social character of the revolution. As Miraleau declared in the
Constituent Assemlly, the Declaration vas not a list of alstract
declarationslutanactofvaragainsttyrants`. FortheFrench, the
Revolution vas an act ofsupreme popular vill, aimed at radically
reconstructing the relationship letveen society and state according
to the principles ofnatural rights. Lnlike the Americans, there is
nothing olvious or common-sensical alout this act and its conse-
quences. The ca.|ca tc|mc had degradednature and corrupted the
constitutionanditvasthe taskofphilosophy to assistindravingup
arationalschemeforthenevstate, lasedontheprotectionofrights .
As Halermas put it, the French lelieved that vhen philosophical
insightandpullicopinionareseparated,thepracticaltaskfallstothe
|||oso|cto securepoliticalrecognitionforreasonitselflymeansof
hisinHuenceonthepoverofpullicopinion.Thephilosophersmust
propagate the truth, mustpropagate theirunalridged insights pul-
licly`. ''TheRevolutiontookphilosophytothelarricadesand,once
victorious, appointedititschiefadviser.
Thepullic andpoliticalnature ofthe Revolution is evidentatall
levels. The rights lelong to man` and citizen` marking a close
relationship letveenhumanityandpolitics, thedifferenceletveen
thenatural rights ofmanandthepoliticalrights ofthe citizenisleft
unclear, the SupremeBeing` vitnesses only and does not legislate
orguidetheD
`
laration, vhichistheactoftherepresentativesofthe
peopleactingasthemouthpieceofRousseau'sco|oa|ccactc|c. Finally,
theproclaimedrights vere not an end inthemselves lut the means
usedlytheAssemllytoreconstructthelodypolitic.Halermascon-
cludesthatinAmerica, itisamatter ofsettingfreethespontaneous
forces ofself-regulation in harmony vith latural Lav, vhile in
France, theRevolution] seeks toassertforthefrsttimeatotal con-
stitution inaccordancevith laturalLavagainst adepravedsociety
andahumannaturevhichhasleencorrupted`.' '
uotcdinlorbcroobbio,T|cH_coF|_|t Cambridgc, !olity, i 6) 8, Cl Jhc
toncolthcLcclarationisaarcntlyabstract, but vhocvcr cxamincsthcindividuallibcrtics
listcdvithahistorian`s cyc, soonrcalizcsthatcachoncrcrcscntsaolcmicalantithcsis ola
sccific ascct ol socicty and thc statc at thc timc, Lc Ruggicro, Stor|c Jc| I||crc||smo
Iuroco, quotcd inobbio, ,, ln |
i0
urgcnMabcrmas, T|coqcaJrc:t|:c London,Mcincmann, i ,|) 88.

ibid , i o,
V
II\CLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
Ve can detect, in these formulations , the legal expressionofthe
pro ectoftheEnlightenment. ' Theneverapromisedtheemanci-
pation ofthe individual from all forms ofpolitical oppression pri-
marily and, potentially, fromclass orsocialtutelage. More generally,
emancipationmeanttheprogressivealandonmentofmythandpre -
udice i n all areas oflife and their replacement ly reason. Kant's
Ct|||ucs, vhichlaunchedphilosophical modernity throughreason's
investigation ofitsovnoperation, defnedtheVesternvorld-viev
as historical progress through reason. Emancipation extends to all
aspects offalsity and oppression, from leliefs and superstitions to
physical, social and economic needs and insecurities. ln political
terms,lilerationmeansthesul ectionofpovertothereasonoflav.
The AmericanDeclarationadds to emancipationtherightto happi-
ness. The American dream` vasalreadyimplicitinthe foundation
ofthe American State. This secondaim, mutedatits inceptionlut
today asimportantintheVest as emancipation, is thequestforthe
goodlife, intheform ofself-realisationorself-fulflment. ltislased
ontheleliefthatindividualsarealle to developtheirinnateimagi-
nativeandcreativepoversthrougheconomicimprovementandpar-
ticipation inscientifc, literary and culturallife. Emancipationenters
the vorld stage as a negative principle or defensive veapon against
political oppressionandis associatedvith thevalue ofdignity. Self-
fulflmentisapositiveforce, lasedonthepresumedhumanpotential
forimprovementandhappiness. ltsoonlecameassociatedviththe
value ofequality vhich aspires to stop dominationand enalle indi-
viduals to shape themselves and the vorld. Lileration and dignity
are not automaticallylorn ofthe same act, rather theyreferto each
otherreciprocally` vrites ErnstBloch. Vith economict|ot||y ve
fndhumanistict|mc.y'. 'Both, hovever, areunderpinnedlythe
massivesul ectiveturnofmodernculture, anevformofinvardness
in vhich ve come to think of ourselves as leings vith inner
depths`. ' 'lfemancipationis grounded onthe leliefinan essential,
innatehuman nature, concealed and overlaidlytraditionand cus-
z
SccgcncrallyrstCassircr, T|c|||oso|yt|cIa||_|tcamcatFCA.Kocllnand]!.
!cttcgrovc trans.) !rinccton l|, !rinccton Lnivcrsity!rcss, I 68) csccially Chatcr \I,
Lucicn Coldmann, T|c|||oso|yt|cIa||_|tcamcatH Naastrans.) London, Routlcdgc
andKcgan !aul, I , )
' ` rstloch, ^cturc|LucaJHumcaIga|tyL.] Schmidttrans) , Cambridgc,Nass,
NIJ!rcss, I8 8) X
" Charlcs Jaylor, Mu|t|:u|turc||sm. Ixcm|a|a_ t|c o||t|. Fc:o_a|t|oa !rnccton l],
!rinccton Lnivcrsity !rcss, I|) z, Lavid Marvcy, ust|.c, ^cturc caJ t|c Cco_rc|y
I crca:c Cxlord, lackvcll, I 6) I zo-,o
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / IIV CJIIIS Vi
tom, self-realisation makes nature the target ofconscious interven-
tion. Aninherent tensionletveenthetvoaimsisevidentfromthe
leginning.
Butthetvorevolutionsandtheirdocumentsverealsovitnessto
tvo alternative strategies for the achievement oftheir ends. The
French ispredominantly moralandvoluntarist. Humanrightsare a
form ofpolitics committed to a moral sense ofhistory and a pro-
active lelief that collective action can overthrov domination,
oppression,andsuffering.Vemakeourhistoryandvecantherefore
udgeit,vhenvecome acrossHagrantinstancesofpersistenthistor-
icalimmorality. Theagentofhistoryandthedefnitionofoppression
have differedvildly since the eighteenth century. at the collective
end, social revolutionaries, anti-colonial relels and the lATO
lomlers ofYugoslavia vere all involved in political crusades ofa
moralcharacter. Theyare accompanied, attheprivate end,lychar-
ity donors, aid contrilutors andlettervriters to The Guardian and,
in-letveen,lyhumanrightscampaignsandlGOs. Thegreatpolit-
icalmovementsofoureravhichappealedtonaturalorhumanrights
are the descendants ofthe French revolutionaries. they include the
anti-slavery and decolonisationcampaigns, the popular fght against
communism,theanti-apartheidmovement,protestmovementsfrom
thesuffragettestothecivilrightsandfromthesyndicalistandvork-
ers' movements tothevariousresistancesagainstforeignoccupation
anddomestic oppression.
The American strategyvasinitially morepassiveandoptimistic.
Certainsocialtraitsandlavs, allovedfreeactionandvithsomegen-
tleencouragement,villleadinexorallytotheestallishmentandpro-
motionofhumanrights and the almostnaturaladustmentletveen
moraldemandsandempiricalrealities . Freemarkets,legalprocedures
andtheruleofnationalorinternationallavcanrecti(humanrights
aluses through their normal operationandimposetheprinciples of
dignityandequalityontyrannicalas muchas ondemocraticregimes.
Thehugestandard-settingenterpriseintheLnitedlationsandother
international andregionalinstitutions andthevarious courts, com-
missions and human rights procedures for supervising compliance
and implementation lelongto this second strategy. lf according to
Lenin,socialismvasthecomlinationofSovietdemocracyandelec-
tricity, for President Carter, thefirstgreatexponent ofa moralfor-
eignpolicy, humanrights are the comlinationofcapitalismandthe
rule oflav. Their success depends on larristers not larricades, on
reportsnotrelellionsandonprotocolsandconventionsnotprotests.
VZ
IIVCLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
Fromthemoralityofhistoryt othemoralityoflav,andnomthesig-
nificance oflocal culture to thepredominance ofahistoricalvalues,
allthemainhumanrightsstrategiesandargumentsverepre-figured
in the classicaldeclarations. Thisradicalre-conceptualisationofpol-
itics,lavandmoralityhadanumlerofphilosophicalpresuppositions
andimportantconsequences, tovhichvenovturn.
1 1 . 11 1VIL1111 I I LVI1111b b V111I
Aftertherevolutions, everyaspectoflifevasreconstructedinaccor-
danceviththeprincipleoffreevill. The earlydeclarationsvere the
firstpullic expressionoftheprinciple and, despiteotherdifferences,
theAmericanandFrenchRevolutionsvereunitedintheirdeclara-
tory intent. But there is a paradox at the heart ofthe declarations.
theypronouncedtherights ofman`inorderto rescuethemfrom
ignorance` and forgetfulness` lut, it vas the act ofdeclaration
itselfvhich estallished the rights as the ground ofthe nev polity.
Hov canveexplainthisparadox?
Thepoliticalphilosophyvhichpavedthevay to the revolutions
lelieved that natural rights express the immanent lavs ofsociety
vhichhadleendistorted,throughlackofrepresentationinAmerica
andtheunenlightenedattitudesoftheca.|catc|mcinFrance. These
rightspromoteindividualfreedomlyfreeingpeopletopursuetheir
interestsvithoutconsiderationforsulstantive moralvalues. Society
shouldleseparatedfromthestateandturnintoamorallyneutralter-
rain in vhich free private activity, commerce, trade and economic
transactionstakeplace. Theonlyrestrictionsplacedupontheseinter-
est-maximisingindividuals shouldle external. positivelavdivorced
from virtue loth creates the preconditions offreedom, mainly in
contract, andimposes constraints uponindividual activity, paradig-
matically in criminal lav, to allov the reconciliation ofconHicting
interests.Thelavoffreedomisatthesametimethelavofcoercion,
legalitymayhaveleenseparatedfrommoralityluthasasindispens-
alle companionthepolice, theprisonandthegallovs.
Here vemay discernafrst ansver tothe paradox. The constitu-
tional assemllies introduced a nev type oflegislative pover and of
positive lavvhich, vhile coercive, vas groundedonthe assertion
thatitoriginatedfromandestallishedindividualfreedom. Therev-
olutionvaslegitimisedlyreferringlacktothenaturalautonomyof
individuals. theirrights arediscoveredly the rationalinsight ofthe
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / IIV CJIIIS V
French |||oso|c or the common-sense ofthe American man of
affairs,thisvay, theylothprecedethenevorderandareitslegisla-
tivecreations. Vhetherthroughthefictitiousoriginalsocialcontract
orthroughthedivine derivationandself-evidentcharacterofrights,
the coercive pover ofthe state isustifedlyfreely entered agree-
ments orthe freelyarrivedinsights ofautonomous individuals. The
declarations construct therefore a nev polity under pretext of
uncoveringordescrilingit. lnlinguistic orspeechact`terms, they
are performative statements disguised as constative. The text, the
supreme expression of revolutionary vill, acts on the vorld and
changesit.
The classical declarations claim that human rights lelong to
man`. They therefore presuppose logically a sulstratum orsu|c.-
|um, man`, to vhom they are given. But the only ontological or
methodological precondition ofmodern philosophy is the equally
shared freedom ofvill, vhich exists in a pristine form lefore any
predicate or determination. The self-grounding nature of modern
manmeans that his empirical reality is constructed out ofthe pro-
claimedrightsonconditionthattheyarepresentedashiseternalenti-
tlements . Man` in the alstract, legal personhood at large, needs
these extravagantassertionsinordertoascendto thehistoricalstage
and succeed God as the nev ground ofleing and meaning, and
human nature is invented as a retrospective ustifcation for the
unprecedentedrights createdlythe declarations. As Lyotardputit,
manshouldhavesignedthePreamlleoftheDeclaration`.'
Butthereverseseemsequallyvalid.i t vasthelationalAssemlly,
asrepresentativeoftheFrenchnation,vhichproclaimedtherightof
man` and, in so doing, ushered man` onto thevorldscene. The
essenceofman`liesinthisactofproclamationinvhichhelinguis-
ticallyassertsandpoliticallylegislatesvithout anygroundorauthor-
ity other than himself Language performs its vorld-makingpover
and estallishes apoliticalsystemlased ona self-referential, ground-
less freedom. lt is in the nature ofhuman rights to le proclaimed,
lecause there is no one outside historical humanity to guarantee
them. lnthe act ofproclamation, man` lothrecognisesandasserts
his nature as free vill. The revolution is an act ofself-foundation,
vhichsimultaneouslyestallishesthelearerofrightandthepoverof
thelegislator,asthehistorical representative ofitsovn construct, to
createallhumanrightcx a||||o . Fromthatmoment, a nev declara-
' ` ]can-Franois Lyotard, T|c I crcaJ C van dcn ^bbcclc trans.) Nanchcstcr,
NanchcstcrLnivcrsity!rcss, i 8 8) i |,.
V+ IIVCLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
tion ofrights has a common and immutalle element that refers to
man` or humannature and legitimises the legislator and varialle
contentsvhich opennevareasofentitlementandfreeaction.
Theparadoxve encounteredis not unique totherevolutionary
documents. lt vill accompany many nev constitutions and human
rights enactments vhich departfromthe pre-existing constitutional
order. A lill ofrights or constitution has tvo aspects. the enuncia-
tion, theactofdeclaringperformative)and,secondly,thestatement,
the content of the enunciation constative) . The performative
dimensionacts outtheassertionofthelegislatorsthattheyareautho-
risedto pronouncerights and, in doingso, itintroduces them. The
specifc claimsto life, lilertyandthe pursuitofhappiness`, onthe
otherhand,statetheserightsandgivethemsulstance. Thefrstpara-
dox quicklyproliferates into others vhichvillprevent declarations
andBillsfromeverleingfullyimplementedorfromgroundingasta-
llesocialorder. Theinternaltensions oftheoriginalFrenchtextare
evident everyvhere. in the contrast letveen man and citizen,
letveen principle and exception, letveen citizen and alien and
letveenmenandvomen,slaves , llacks,colonials ,allthoseexcluded
frompoliticalrights.Asaresult,contradictionsdevelopintheinsta-
lilityoftherelationletveenthe aporeticalcharacterofthetextand
theconHictualcharacterofthesituationinvhichitarisesandvhich
servesasitsreferent`. ' 'Similarly, thepointofapplicationofthetext
is also conHictual. As performatives, the declarations carryout their
vorklyleingputinto effectinthefuture, inamyriadofsituations
and circumstances, manyunforeseenlythe constitutionallegislator,
many in conict vith its original intentions. ' ' Human rights are
futurelookingandindeterminate, theylecomeactualvhenthe act
ofenunciation performs its effects in various settings vhich, legit-
imised ly the declaration, put its specifcs into practice. As a state-
ment of entitlements, a Bill ofRights creates a forvard-looking
grammar ofaction and its applications often differ from the alvays
contestedmeaningofitssentences .
Ve vill examine lelov hov the performative character ofthe
enunciation anchors a series ofclaims ly groups, initially excluded
' ' ticnncalibar, JhcRights olthc Nan and thc Rights olthc Citizcn, in Mcsscs,
C|csscs, IJccs: StuJ|csoao||t|:caJ|||oso|y|qorc caJqtcrMcr ]. Svanson trans. ) lcv
York, Routlcdgc, i |) -,, |I
' Mans-Ccorg Cadamcr, Trut| caJMct|oJ !ondon, Shccn and Vard, i ,,) z|-|i ,
CostasLouzinasandRonnicVarringtonvithShaunNc\cighostmoJcn]ur|sruJca:c: Thc
LuTct|a t|c TctsoLu!ondon,Routlcdgc, i i ) Chatcrsz and
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / I IV CJIIIS V3
from certain rights. ' ` Such claims, ifsuccessful, are only indirectly
relatedto the foundationaltext.Ve are faced,therefore, vithapar-
adigmaticallyopentext, vhosereferenceisapastconHictandvhose
performance villhelp decide future struggles. lnterpreting human
rights lav, vhich meansperformingorapplyinga code orgrammar
to a conH ict, is ly definition controversial. The endless, repetitive
and ratherloringAmerican delate on constitutional interpretation
letveen lilerals, strict constructionists and federalists `, vho claim
tofollovthe intentions ofthefoundingfathers, isnotustaloutthe
politicsofinterpretation. ' ltratherdisguises thefactthatinterpreta-
tionispolitics lecausehumanrightsispoliticsly othermeans. Both
originanddestinationsofaBillofRightsare steepedin conHict. Asa
result, the text is more thananypieceofliterature amodelofunde-
cidalility, andmorethananypartyprogrammeapoliticalmanifesto.
The force ofthe declarations should not le sought therefore in
their appeals to fctitious original pacts or divine sources or in the
equally mythical institutional rights ofthe self-governing and self-
taxingEnglishmen. lndeed, the French declaration makes no refer-
ence at all to a social compact. The declarations create and exhaust
theirovnlegitimacyintheiractofenunciation. Thereisnoneedto
give any further argument,ustification or reason for their genesis
lesidestheproclamatoryactvhichconfersuponthelegslatorsloth
therighttolegislatetheserightsandtoclaimthattheyalreadylelong
toallmen`.Butvhileman`inthealstractorhumannatureisthe
ontologicallearerofrightsingeneral,nohumanrightinthealstract,
no right to right has leen created or developed. ' Human rights
involve alvays specifc claims to free speech, security ofthe person
etc. The ontologicalgroundremains groundless, vithout sulstance
and determination, an empty vessel vhich authorises the legislator
and receives content and predication from historical acts oflav-
making. Human rights install the radical contingency oflinguistic
proclamationinto theheartofconstitutionalarrangements.
' SccChatcr.
' NichcllcRoscnbcrg cd. ) , Coast|tut|oac||m, IJcat|ty, Ig rca:ccaJIc_|t|mc:yLurham,
Lukc Lnivcrsity !rcss, i |) ,ustIatcqtctct|oas crkclcy, Lnivcrsity olCaliloria !rcss,
i 8) .
z0
SccRcnataSalccl, ThcSo||jrccJom !ondon, Routlcdgc, i |) i z-,
V
II\CLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
. 11 11L 11 I I 11b V1L

1

Vhenman`replacedGodasthegroundofmeaningandaction,the
protection ofhis rights against state poverlecame the legal essence
ofmodernity. Buttherearemanyprollemsviththisman`, appar-
ent fromthe leginning ofthe human rights tradition. The alstract
man` ofphilosophyisfartoo empty. Togroundahistoricalconsti-
tution,hemustlecomplementedlyothersulstantivecapacitiesand
characteristics, Man as species existence may le the ground ofthe
epistemologicalrevolution ofmodernity, lut the political constitu-
tion canscarcelyle organisedaccordingto suchaformalprinciple.
Lavis the terrain onvhich alstract nature acquires concrete form.
The legal sul ect as the vehicle oflegal rights mediates letveen
alstracthumannatureandtheconcretehumanleingvhotravelsin
life creating herovnuniquenarratives andacting them out onthe
vorld. As vevillexamineindetaillelov, the recognition oflegal
sul ectivityis ouraccessionto apullicsphere oflegalrights, limita-
tions and duties, lased on the assumption ofa shared, alstract and
equal essence and of a calculating, antagonistic and fearful exis-
tence. '
Article i oftheFrenchLcJctc||oa, repeatedalmostverlatiminthe
LniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,statesthatallmenarelorn
equalinrightsandindignity`. Alstractanduniversalhumannature,
theessenceofthehumanspecies,isparcelledouttoeveryoneatlirth
in equalshares. Thisis evidently agreatfallacy. Peopleare notlorn
equalluttotallyunequal. lndeed, infancyandchildhoodarethelest
examples ofhuman inequality and dependencyupon others, upon
parents, family memlers, and community netvorks, vithin vhich
humanlife starts , develops andends. Oncethe slightestempiricalor
historicalmaterialisintroducedintoalstracthumannature, onceve
move from the declarations onto the concrete emlodied person,
vithgender, race, class andage, humannaturevithitsequality and
dignity retreats rapidly. This type ofaffirmative syntax characterises
humanrightsdeclarations.Rightstheoristsarguethatsuchstatements
arenormativeoraspirationalandnotstatementsoffact. Theyshould
le readas allmenshouldlecome equalinrightsanddignity`. But
thisdefence is only partially successful. Rights mustlepresentedas
constativeasstatementsoffact) inordertoestallishtheirfalse) self-
z
Sccbclov, Chatcrs 8and.
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / IIV CJIIIS V7
evidenceandlegitimisetheirlegislators. veareonlydeclaringvhat
hasalvaysleenyournaturalconditionandentitlements`. Thestate-
mentisfalselutthegapletveenitsnon-existentrealityanditsfuture
applicationisthespacevherehumanrightsdevelop. Tothatextent,
humanrights are apresentlievhichmaylepartiallyverifedinthe
future.
Andthatfuture hadandstillhas to vait. Letus examine, lrieHy,
the contents ofhuman nature in its country oforigin, France. The
Marquis de Condorcet and a fev pre-revolutionary philosophers
arguedthatnaturalrightslelongtothealstractman,lecause ' they
arederivedfromthenatureofman' , definedas ' asensitiveleing. . .
capalle ofreasoning and ofhaving moral ideas' `. But after sex,
colour and ethnicity vereadded, this alstract disemlodied human
nature tookavery concrete form, that ofavhite,property-ovning
man. Menrepresentedhumanitylecause their reason, moralityand
integritymadethemanexactimageoftheman`ofthedeclarations.
Comparedviththisprototype ofhumanity,vomen'sHeetingfeel-
ings`andnaturaltendenciesprecludedtheiralilitytoliveuptothe
individualprototype`. Anyliological,psychologicalorsocialdiffer-
encefromthemalemodelvereinterpretedashandicapsandsignsof
inferiority.
NaIcncss vas cquatcd vith individuaIity, and lcnaIcncss vith othcr-
ncss in a uxcd, hicrarchicaI, and innoLiIc oosition nascuIinity
vas not sccn as lcnininity`s othcr) . Jhc oIiticaI individuaI vas thcn
takcn to Lc Loth univcrsaI and naIc, thc lcnaIc vas not an individ-
uaI, Loth Lccausc shc vas non-idcnticaI vith thc hunan rototyc
and Lccausc shc vas thc othcr vho conurncd thc naIc) individuaI`s
individuaIity. ``
Asaresult,thedaysfollovingtheRevolutionveresomeofthedark-
estinthehistoryofvomen.'Femalenaturevascaughtletveenthe
eternelle malade` of Michelet and the hysterical voman` of
Charcot andvas definedasprivate andpractical, hervocation deli-
cate, fragile and emotional, indispensalle for domestic tasks lut
zz
uotcd in]oan Scott, a|ycmJocs to _cr. rca:| cm|a|sts caJt|c F|_|| Mca
Cambrdgc Nass. , Marvard Lnivcrsity !rcss, i 6) 6. For a history olvomcn rghts, scc
!. Molunan, LcmmcJcas |c cnecJcsIum|crcs !aris, Crhys, I,,) , . \arikas, Lroit
naturcl,naturclcmmncctcgalitcdcsscxcs,FcvucIatcnct|oac|cJcsFc:|cr:|csctJcsSyat|cscs
caS:ica:c So:ic|cs, -|, i8,
` ibid. , 8.
z
licolc ^raud-Luc, Vomcn ntracd. lrom !ublic lon-cxistcncc to !rivatc
!rotcction, in ^. ^raud and . Kingdom, Homca' F|_|| caJ t|c Fg|| Mca
^bcrdccnLnivcrsity!rcss, i o)
VO
II\CLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
totally unsuitalle to the exercise ofpolitical and legal rights. ln
Octoler i ),, , the Convention representative Falre d'Eglantine
denounced vomen vho vere claiming citizen rights and vere not
occupees du soin deleursmenages, desmcresinseparalles deleurs
enfantsoudesfillesquitravaillentpourleursparentsetprennentsoin
de leurs pluseunes soeurs, mais . . . un sorte des chevaliers errants,
. . . des filles emancipees, des grenadiers femelles `. Portalis, the
maininspiration lehindtheCodelapoleon, exaltedvomen'sdel-
icate andfne tact, vhich gives themasixthsenseandvhichislost
anddoesnotgetperfected,exceptviththeexerciseofallthevirtues,
fnally, their touchingmodesty . . . vhich they cannotlosevithout
lecomingmore viciousthanve, men`. 'As late as i ,i :, the emi-
nenturistMauriceHauriouarguedthatavomanisnotanull`lut
a nonexistent` citizen, likeaincestuousorsamesexmarriage.'
Vomenvere not given the right to vote, in France, until i ,.
Vomen'sfranchisevastheol ectofa conspiracyofsilence, alleit
unofficially, onthepartofalltherevolutionaryandpost-revolution-
aryconstitutions. . . Thepretextistolefoundinthesulstantiveref-
erencein the Code to female nature andthe necessities ofeveryday
life` . Similarly, vomen's rights to education and vork vere not
recogniseduntilvell into thetventieth centuryandstill today they
havenotleenraisedtothefullstatusofhumanityorofthe man` of
the revolution. As a contemporary commentatorputs it, ve cannot
contemplate a declaration ofthe rights ofvomen lecause nous
aloutirions alors a la destruction du concept d' tre humain`.
ElizalethKingdomconcludesthatvhateverthegeneralcritiqueof
the i ),Declarationasasocialdocument,itsformal constitutionof
the rights ofthe citizen could not relially incorporate the lost
rights` ofpre- andpost-revolutionaryvomen`. '
The prototype ofhuman nature vas notust male, it vas also
vhite. The French Coloniesverepopulatedmostlylyslaves atthe
` uotcdibid , zi .
' uotcdibid , I I
' ibid., i |
_^rnaud, Vomcni nthc oudoir, Vomcnat thc !ools. i 8o|, thc Mistor,ola
Con!incmcnt, in ^-] ^rnaud and Kingdom, Homca' F|_|/s caJ /|c F|_|/s Mca
^bcrdccnLnivcrsity!rcss, i o) i .
R adintcr, I`Ca|vcrc||/e Jcs Iro|/ Jc | `Hommc Jcas uacMoaJc|utc||s/c, Strasbouig,
Conscild` uroc, i 8, z.
`' lizabcth Kingdom, Ccndcring Rights, in-] ^raud and . Kingdom, Homca`
F|_|/s caJ/|cF|_|/s o}Mca ^bcrdccnLnivcrsity !rcss, i o) For dcunitc statcmcnts on
thc currcnt lcminist osition on rights, scc Lucc Irgaray, T||ak|a_ /|c I ctca:c K Nontin
trans.) lcvYork,Routlcdgc, i|) ,licolaLaccy, Cascckc||cSu|c:| Cxlord,Mart, i 8)
JII II CIJS CF NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / FIV CJIIIS VV
time of the Revolution. Slavery vas alolished in metropolitan
France, in i ),:, and tvo years laterfurtherafeld, inan attemptly
therevolutionariestodefeattheBritishintheCarillean,lutthisvas
temporary. ' lt vas restored ly the Empire, in i o:, and vas not
alolishedagainuntil i . Race, likegenderequality,vasunknovn
totheDeclaration.AsjoanScottconcludes ,individualityvasracially
defned. The superiority ofvhite Vestern men to their ' savage'
counterpartslayinan individuality achieved and expressed through
the socialand affective divisions oflalourformalisedlythe institu-
tionofmonogamousmarriage`.
The historical unreality and emptiness ofthe concept ofman`
andthe relatedincompleteness andindeterminacy ofhuman rights
discoursevereatthecentreoftheirearlycritiquesfromrightandleft.
Ve vill examine lelov the critiques ofBurke andMarx in some
detail.Butvecananticipatehere theirattackonman`, asanalltoo
concrete alstraction. l have met ltalians , Russians, Spaniards,
Englishmen, Frenchmen, lutl do notknovmaningeneral` vrote
theFrenchconservativejosephdeMaistre.EdmundBurkeagreed,
rightsarea metaphysicalalstraction`,'theiralstractperfectionis
their practical defect`. Vhat is the use of discussing a man's
alstractrighttofoodormedicine?Thequestionisuponthemethod
ofprocuring and administering them. ln that delileration l shall
alvays advisetocallintheaidofthefarmerandthephysician,rather
than the professor ofmetaphysics`. `' Rights are not universal or
alsolute,theydonotlelongtoalstractmenluttoparticularpeople
in concrete societies vith their infnite modification` ofcircum-
stances, traditionandlegalentitlement.
Marx, at the otherendofthepolitical spectrum, agreed. Manis
inthe mostliteralsense ofthevord:ooao||||/oa, notonlyasocial
`' C1R ]amcs dcscribcs an intcrcsting incidcnt during thc scssion ol thc lational
^sscmblyvhich abolishcd slavcr,in i ,|.^blackvomanvhohadrcgularIyattcndcd thc
^sscmblylaintcdvhcnthcabolitionvotcvasasscd Cnhcaringthis,arcrcscntativcaskcd
thatshcbcadmttcdtothcsitting Shcvassatncxtto thcscakcrvithtcarsinhcrcycsand
vas grcctcd vith alausc. T|c |c:kc:o||as. Toussc|a/ J` uvcr/urc caJ /|c Sca Iom|a_o
Fcvo|u/|oa lcvYork, \intagc, i 8o) i |o-i .
` ]oanScott,o cit. , suran. 2 2 , I I Sccinlraarti vlorthc trcatmcntollorcigncrsin
ost-rcvolutionar, Francc
`` uotcd in Claudc Lclort, T|c o||/|:c| orms MoJcra So:ic/y Cambrdgc, !olity,
i 86) z,,.
`' dmund urkc, Fc:/|on oa /|c Fcvo|u/|oa | a rca:c ]. C. ^. !ockock cd.)
Indianaolis, Mackctt, i 8,) , 8 ,
`` ibid , i c, .
`' ibid. , 8 ,
i
II\CILJI ClS /lL LI CL/I/JI ClS .
animal, lut an animalvhich candevelop into an individual only in
society`. `' Theiragreementis onlypartial andfollovsAristotle and
Montesquieu, ly emphasising the concrete action and historical
provenanceofrights. Butthecritiqueofthealstractman` ofrights
is notsimply an attack on their excessive rationalism or their meta-
physical speculativism`. For Marx, the man` ofthe rights, rather
than leing an empty vessel vithout determination, and therefore
unreal,nonexistent, is toofullofsulstance. Therights ofthedecla-
rations , underthecloakofuniversalityandalstraction,celelrateand
enthrone thepoverofaconcrete, too concrete man. the possessive
individual,the marketorientatedvhitelourgeois male vhose right
to property is turned into the cornerstone ofall other rights and
underpins the economicpoverofcapitalandthepoliticalpoverof
thecapitalistclass. ForBurkeandMarx,thesul ectofrightsdoesnot
exist. ltis eithertoo alstracttolerealortooconcretetoleuniver-
sal. lnlothcases, thesul ectisfakelecauseits essence does notand
cannotcorrespondvithrealpeople.
1 N. V1 L1b L1 11 L11V1111 I1` 1` 11 I11 11
Al struggle against oppression, vhen successful , divides into the
excitement ofnevly-found freedom and the urge for order. The
eighteenth century revolutions and declarationsvere expressions of
relellion against the old destined to mature, frst, into the passion
and, then, into the loredom ofthe nev. But history had to vait
lefore the potential grev into the actual and naturalrights mutated
intohumanrights. lnthemeantime, as vithmostsuccessfulrevolu-
tions , the emphasis shiftedfromfreedomto lav andfromnature to
order.laturalrightslinkthepromise offreedomtothedisciplineof
lav. The institutionofrightsvasnotunknovnto theca.|catc|mc.
Privatelavrights andsome protections againstadministrative aluse
vere recognised in civilian France, vhile the American colonists
enoyedmanyofthe commonlavremedies and protections ofthe
free-lornEnglishman`.Vhatdistinguishedtherevolutionaryfrom
earlier conceptions ofright vas the claim that a nevtype ofstate
organisationvas to le grounded onthe recognitionandprotection
oftheserights.
`' Karl Narx, CruaJr|ssc in L. NcLcIan cd), Sc|c:tcJ Hr|t|a_s Cxford, Cxlord
Lnivcrsip!rcss, i ,,) |6.
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / IIV CJIIIS i i
But herevecomeacross one moreparadox. Humanrights vere
declaredinalienallelecausetheyvereindependentofgovernments ,
temporal and local factors and expressed in legal form the eternal
rights ofman. lfall men share acommonhuman nature, thereisno
needto invokeanypoverfortheirproclamationandnospecialleg-
islation vas necessary since all lav-making pover nov emanated
fromthe sovereignpeople. Yet,the FrenchDeclarationis quite cat-
egoricalastotherealsourceofuniversalrights. LetusfollovlrieHy
itsstrict!ogic. Article i statesthatmenarelornandremainfreeand
equal ofright` , Article : that theaimofanypoliticalassociationis
to preserve the natural andinalienalle rights ofman` andArticle ,
proceeds to define thisassociation. TheprincipleofallSovereignty
lies essentiallyviththe nation. lo group, norindividualmay exer-
cise any authority that does not expressly proceedfromit`. Finally,
accordingtoArticle6, Thelavisthe expressionofthe generalvill,
all citizenshave therighttovork tovards its creation either inper-
sonorthroughtheirrepresentatives `.
Rights are declaredonlehalfofthe universal man`, lutthe act
ofenunciation estallishes the pover ofaparticulartypeofpolitical
association, the nation and its state, to lecome the sovereign lav-
maker and secondly, ofa particular man`, the national citizen, to
lecome the lenefciary ofrights . First, national sovereignty. The
declarations proclaim the universality ofright lut their immediate
effectis to estallish the loundless poverofthe state and its lav. lt
vas the enunciation ofrights vhich estallished the right ofthe
Constituent Assemllies to legislate. ln a paradoxical fashion, these
declarationsofuniversalprinciple perform`thefoundationoflocal
sovereignty. Theprogenygavelirthto its ovnprogenitorandcre-
atedhiminhis ovnimageandlikeness.
The metonymical relationship and the mirroring effect letveen
the sovereign` manofthe declarations andthe sovereign` stateis
alsoapparentininternationallavandpolitics. Thestandardpresenta-
tionofstatesintheinternationalsceneisofaunitary,freeandvilling
actorvho, liketheindividual,isautonomousandformallyequalvith
others. lnternational lav is littered vith analogies letveen man and
stateanditslegitimacyisfoundedonthem.lnternally,theprincipleof
popular orinBritainparliamentary)sovereigntystatesthatthevillof
allcitizenslecomes trans-sulstantiated, through elections, votesand
lav-making,intoasingulargeneralvillvhichexpressesthecommon
interestofthe nationandresemlles, inallparticulars, thefreevillof
theindividual. lnternationally, thisfreeandunitedvillis confronted
Z II\CLLJI ClS ^lL LICL^I^JI ClS .
vithsimilaractorsand,asaresult,allthemaintropesofeighteenthcen-
turypoliticalphilosophycomeintoplay. The state ofnature alsence
ofinternationallav) ,thesocialcontractthetreatycreatingtheLnited
lations) and the fearful andcalculatingattitudeto others characterise
also thenatureandrelationsofthese oversizedindividuals .
Thekeyprincipleofterritorialintegrityandnon-intervention, for
example,ispresentedasthelogicaloutcome ofthenegativefreedom
that states and individuals en oy equally. ln international lav,
n]ations are regarded as individual freepersonslivingin a state of
nature . . . Sincely nature all nations are equal, since moreoverall
men are equalinamoralsensevhoserights and olligations are the
same, therightsandolligationsofallnationsare the same`.Every
singletraitofthe naturalman ofthe declarations has leen displaced
onto the state and, undoultedly, the grand proclamations sound
morerealistic inrelationtotheautonomyandfreedomofactionof
the state. Sovereign man and sovereign states are defned not ly
connectionorrelationshipslutlyautonomyindecision-makingand
freedomfromthe pover ofothers. Security is understoodin terms
notofcelelratingandsustaininglifelutasthecapacitytoindifferent
to ' others' and, ifnecessary, to harmthem`. legative lilerty and
formal equalityleadto the contractarianism oftreaties andto recip-
rocal relations letveen mutually disinterested parties in vhich l
olserve yourterritorial integrity negative lilerty) lecausei ndoing
solreinforceasysteminvhichyouareexpectedtoolservemine`. ''
lnternationallavpresupposesasul ectsimilarinallparticularstothat
ofthe declarations. The modern nation-state came to existence and
acquired legitimacy ly pronouncing the sovereignty ofthe sul ect
andadoptingallitscharacteristics. lnthiselaloratehallofmirrors,the
fctions ofthe free individual and of the all-devouring Leviathan
lecameintimatelyconnectedcompanionsanddeterminedthepolit-
icaltraectoryofmodernity. lfthe declarationsusheredintheepoch
oftheindividual,theyalsolaunchedtheageofthestate,mirrorofthe
individuaIHumanrightsandnationalsovereignty, thetvo antithet-
icalprinciples ofinternationallavverelorntogether, theircontra-
dictionmore apparentthanreal. Butvearerushing. Letusreturnto
thedeclarationsandtheireffects.
` uotcd in Fiona Robinson, Jhc limits ola rghts-bascd aroach to intcrnational
cthics, in Jony vans cd.) , Humca Fg|| qty Yccr oa H rccrc|c| Nanchcstcr,
NanchcstcrLnivcrsity!rcss, i 8) 6z.
`` \. S. !ctcrson andA Sisson Ryan, C|o|c| CcaJcr lsucs ouldcr, Vcstvicv !rcss,
i ) |
'' ibid., 6 .
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS ^lL ^ II CJIIIS
ltvas notustthestate-as-individualthatvasthe other side ofthe
coinofrights. The legislatoroftheproclaimeduniversal community
ofreasonvas none otherthan the historicallegislatorofthe French
orAmerican nation. The sovereignty ofthe nation hadust leen
assertedattheexpenseoftheprivilege ofastate orclass.Anditvas
impossilletoleapleyondthatpointintotheunfoldingofhistory`.''
From that point, statehood, sovereignty and territory follov the
principle ofnationality. lftheDeclarationinauguratedmodernity, it
also started nationalism and all its consequences. genocides, ethnic
and civil vars, ethnic cleansing, minorities, refugees, statelessness .
Citizenshipintroducedanevtype ofprivilege vhichvasprotected
forsomelyexcludingothers.Aftertherevolutions , nation-statesare
defined lyterritorialloundaries,vhich demarcate themfromother
states and exclude other people and nations. Citizenship shifted
exclusionfromclasstonation,vhichlecameadisguisedclasslarrier.
Thus , theuniversallegislatorandtheKantianautonomoussulect
turn intoa mirage, assoon as empirical characteristics areadded to
them.Theprincipleofautonomyiscreatedinthemouldingtogether
ofthe split selfand the split communitythatmodernity introduced
againstthehorizonofanallegeduniversalcommunity. Thisparadox
vas first acted out ly the French revolutionaries. The lational
Assemllynotionally splititselfinto tvo parts. aphilosophical and a
historical. The frst legislated on lehalf of man` for the vhole
vorld, the secondforthe onlyterritoryandpeopleit could, France
and its dependencies. The gap letveen the tvo is also the distance
letveen the universality ofthe lav ofreason eventually ofhuman
rights) and the generality of state legislation. From that point
onvards, itremains unknovn.
vhcthcr thc lav thcrcLy dcclarcd is Frcnch or hunan, vhcthcr thc
var conductcd in thc nanc ol rights is onc ol conqucst or onc olliL-
cration, vhcthcr thc violcncc cxcrtcd undcr thc titlc ol lrccdon is
rcrcssivc or cdagogical rogrcssivc) , vhcthcr thosc nations vhich
arc not Frcnch ought to Lcconc Frcnch or Lcconc hunan Ly
cndoving thcnsclvcs vith Constitutions that conlorn to thc
Lcclaration. `
The French Assemlly, ofcourse, did not and could not legislate
for the vorld, vhat it didvas to attempt to make the discourse of
` ulia Krstcva, ^c/|oas u|/|ou/^c/|oac||m L Roudicz trans.) lcvYork, Columbia
Lnivcrsity !rcss, i ) , z6
' Lyotard, ocit , sura n I , i |, Jhis statcmcnt sccms to rcrcscnt also thc ost-
Kosovo latc modcrity, iloncsubstitutcs^mcricanlor Frcnch.
i +
II\CLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
universal rightpart ofthe foundationmyth ofmodern France. The
universality ofthe claims vas the reasonvhyto manythe French
Revolutionseemedtopossessthecharacteristics ofareligiousupris-
ing.AsToquevilleputit, therevolutionseemedmoreinterestedin
theregenerationofhumankindthaninthereformofFrance`.
Andyet,lyintroducingthedistinctionletveenhumanleingand
citizen, theDeclarationacknovledgedthetensionletveentheuni-
versalandthelocalandaccepteditshistoricalspecifcity. Theperfor-
mative contradiction letveen the declaration of rights for all
humanity vhich created the pover of the lational Assemlly to
estallish these rights only for theFrenchintroducedan element of
exclusionandviolenceinconstitutionalpolitics. Fromnovonpolit-
ical legitimacy derives from the fact that the legislator and the
addresseeofhis commands thelegalsulects) areoneandthesame.
The essence ofpoliticalfreedomisthatthe sul ects vhomakelav
are also lav's sulected. Democratic legislation is introduced on
lehalfofthe citizens vho, intheRousseauan version ofthe social
contract, participate inthe creation ofthe generalvill. But thelav
ofthestate, despiteitsgeneralityexcludesfromthecommunityofits
sulects all those vho do not lelong to the nation. There is a gap
letveen the sul ectofthe statement ve the peoplelegislate norm
x`andofitspassiveformvethepeopleoughtto oleyx`. Thefirst
group consistsofthelegislators, thevotersandthosevhoseinterests
are represented inpolitics. The secondincludes additionally others,
aliens, immigrantsandrefugeesasvellas internalaliens, the enemy
vithin` , vhoaregivennoticethatiftheycomeincontactviththe
state,theauthorityofitslavvillleengaged. Theyaresul ectedto
the lav lut they are not lav's sul ects. A necessary dissymmetry
develops thereforeletveenthe addressees ofthelav sul ects, citi-
zens, the nation) and those others, its secondary and potential
addressees. As Kristeva puts it, never has democracy leen more
explicit,foritexcludesno-one- exceptforeigners`.
lmmediately afterthe FrenchRevolution, the lationalAssemlly
adoptedadecreevhichallovedthenaturalisationofmostforeigners
residing in France. Cosmopolitan cluls and nevspapers vere
founded, foreignersoined the revolutionary army and, in i ),:, a
numlerofforeignradicals andvriters vere giventhe honorarytitle
of French citizen, lecause they had leen ahies of the French
'` ^cxis dc Jocqucvillc, I`caocatc_|mcct|c revo|ut|oa !aris, Callimard, i 6,) 8
'' ]uliaKristcva, Strca_cr tourc|vcs LconRoudicztrans) ColumbiaLnivcrsity!rcss,
ii) i |.
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / IIV CJIIIS i 3
people` andhadattacked the foundations oftyrannyandprepared
thevayforlilerty`. TheyincludedPriestley,Paine vho lecame
amemlerofthe lationalAssemllyrepresentingthePas-de-Calais) ,
Bentham, Villerforce, Clarckson, Vashington, Hamilton and
Madison. Buttheclimatechangeddramaticallyafterthefrstdefeats
in the revolutionaryvars and the victory ofthejacolins. By i ),,
foreignersvereforliddento stayinParis andothermaorcitiesand
tovns , theyvere excluded frompullic service, political rights and
pullic lodies and the property ofEnglish and Spanish citizens vas
confscated.ManyrevolutionaryforeignersandcosmopolitanFrench
vereexecutedduringtheTerror. Thescaffoldtookcareofthecos-
mopolitan'slot,vhilenationalism- perhaps 'regretfully' and'reluc-
tantly' - lecameparamountinlothmindsandlavs`. ' Tom Paine
vasarrestedinDecemler i ),, , hevasluckytoavoidtheguillotine
and vas released ten months later through the intercession ofthe
American Amlassador vho claimed that he vas an American citi-
zen. lt should le noted`, Kristeva dryly concludes that those
steps againstforeigners] verenotas harshas thosetakenduringthe
varofi ,i `andpaleintoinsignifcancevhenve reachthevarof
i ,,,.
The elevationofthe nationallavinto the onlyupholderofrights
and the resultingtreatment offoreigners as lesserhumans, indicates
that the separationletveenman and citizenis amaincharacteristic
ofmodern lav. The nation-state comes into existence through the
exclusion ofotherpeople and nations. The modern sulectreaches
herhumanitylyacquiringpoliticalrightsofcitizenship,vhichguar-
antee heradmissiontotheuniversalhumannaturelyexcludingfrom
thatstatus othersvithno rights. Thecitizenhasrights anddutiesto
theextentthathelelongstothecommonvillandtothestate. The
alienis nota citizen. Hedoes nothaverightslecauseheis notpart
ofthestateandheisalesserhumanleinglecauseheisnotacitizen.
Oneisamantogreaterorlesserdegreelecauseoneis acitizento a
greater orlesserdegree. The alien isthe gap letveenman and citi-
zen. Themodernsulectisthe citizenandcitizenshipguaranteesthe
'` ibid, i ,6
'' hsanlaraghi, JhcRcublic`sCitizcnsolMonourin ,3.HaIJcct|ctC|ca_cJt|c
Hor|J, in 1|c C^ISCCour|cr,unc i 8, i ;
'' ibid. , i 6o
' Jhislascinatingstor,isnarratcdin^lbcrtNathicz, LFevo|ut|oact|cs etrca_cr !aris,
LaRcnaissanccduLivrc, i z8) Foraconcischistor,, onvhichthcrcscntaccountisbascd,
sccKrstcva, suran. ||, i |8-6,
'` Kristcva, suran ||, i 6i .
i II\CLLJI ClS /lL LICL/I/JI ClS .
minimumrequirements necessary forleinga man, a human leing.
Velecomehuman through citizenship andsul ectivityislasedon
thegap, thedifferenceletveenuniversalmanandstatecitizen.
Vecanconcludethatthe man` ofthe declarationsisanalstrac-
tion, universallutunreal,an unencumlered`entitystrippeddovn
ofitscharacteristics. As the representative ofReason, hehas notime
or place. The citizen, on the other hand is alvays a Burkean
Englishman`. S)hehas the rightsand duties given to himlystate
lavs and national tradition, s) he must le sul ected to the lav in
orderto lecomelav'ssul ect. AsjayBernsteinputsit, citizenship
stands letveen and mediates the alstract particularity ofpersonal
identity and the alstract universality ofhuman rights. lndividuals
onlyhaverightsinconunity`. 'Forthosevholackrepresentation
verylittleisleft. Thestateless, therefugees, theminoritiesofvarious
qpeshavenohumanrights.Vhenlileralstatesclaimthattheyalol-
ishprivileges and protect universal rights, they mean thatprivileges
are nov extended to a group called citizenry, still a small minority.
Modernsul ectivityislased onthose othersvhoseexistenceisevi-
dence ofthe universality ofhuman nature lut vhose exclusion is
alsolutely crucial for concretepersonhood, in other vords for citi-
zenship.
ltmayleargued,therefore,thattheDeclarationofHumanRights
isthepreconditionofsovereigntyandisinescapallyintertvinedvith
legislation. The modernsovereign comesinto itsomnipotentlifely
proclaiming the rights of citizens. Looked from this perspective,
human rights are attempts to luild a protective principle against
Leviathan, lased on the recognition ofdesire and its erection as a
counterprinciple to the desire ofthe state. lfmodernpullic lav is
the legalisationofpolitics, humanrightsarethelegalisationofdesire
and their main components mirror closely the characteristics of
Leviathan.TheHollesiannaturalrightfindsitslimitintheotherand
the alsolute other is death. These tvo principles that appear to le
contradictory, to speak to tvo totally different logics, are the tvo
sides ofthesame coin. Theirhistorical comlinationcouldonlysuc-
ceedinalsoluteapocalypticmoments , atvhicharevolutionaryclass
graspshistoryandimposesaradicalnevlogic. Butthiscomlination
oflav and revolutionary reason vhich can change the root ofthe
ancientriversofhistoryisonlyfeasillethroughapocalypticviolence,
` 'ay crstcin, Rights, Rcvolution and Community. Narx`s ' Cn thc ]cvish
ucstion` in !ctcr Csborc cd. ) , So:ic||sm caJ t|c I|m|ts I||crc||sm London, \crso,
i i ) i-i i , i i|.
JII II CIJS CI NIl, CI JI ZIlS /lL / IIV CJIIIS i 7
manlecametheprincipleofpoliticsinamomentaryeruptionandits
accompanyingdeclarationsinFrance andAmerica. Oncethecontra-
dictorylogicvasnormalisedandput into practice, thetvo limls of
the paradox, according to vhich man can have inalienalle rights
vhenhehasnorightsotherthanthosegrantedtohimlythesover-
eign,lreakupanddeterminetvoopposingtra ectories. Thatofsov-
ereignty, legal positivism and utilitarian intervention and, that ofa
self-creatingdesirevhichispotentiallycriticalofthestateanditslav.
Positivismisan attack on allprinciplesoftranscendence. The radical
pro ect ofhuman rights, vhile accepting modernity's re ection of
religioustranscendence, insistsontheimportance oftheprincipleof
transcendenceforthe reconstruction ofhistoricalforms andinherits
the classical task ofimagining a political and legal order vhich is
leyondthehereandnov.
U
T|c Tt|um| / Iumca|/y. t.m ,3 /. 3
cac {r.m ^c/utc| /. Iumca I|_|/s
1 . 1 11L11 1 I 11V11 V1 Lb
l t i s acommonhistoricallessonthatvictoriousrevolutionariesturned
rulers canlecomeas oppressive as theirpredecessors. ltis no von-
der, therefore, that the years folloving the pullication ofthe great
declarationssavadeclineinthepopularityofnaturalrights. Therea-
sons vere politicalandintellectual. Politicahy, the greatmonarchies
ofthenineteenthcenturytreatednaturalrightsas adangerous , revo-
lutionarydoctrinevhich couldle effectivelyutilisedlythe emerg-
ing democratic and socialist opposition movements. The dominant
political forces and social classes ofthe nineteenth andearlytventi-
eth centuries vere closely linked vith the revolutions ofthe eigh-
teenth. They had vivid memories of their ovn victories and
appreciated fully the incendiary potential ofnaturalist ideas vhich
had leen successfully used against the old regimes in France and
America. As Bentham insisted, these rights vere notust nonsense
and fallacies, theyvere also mischievous and anarchical. ' Theiruse
inpolitical discourse, duringthatperiod, vas extremelylimitedand
theyverealmostunknovntolav. Thegradualevolutionandeven-
tualdominationofa comlinationoflimiteddemocracyandunlim-
itedlegalpositivism meant thatthe sovereignpeople defnedin an
extremely restricted vay) could do no vrong. / assertions of
human rights ly the groups and classes excluded from citizenship,
vomen, llacks, vorkers or political and social reformers, vere
dismissedasselfshattacksagainstthe commongoodandthe demo-
craticvill. Thisvas the eraofstateandempire-luilding, ofutilitar-
ianismandsocialengineering,thetimeofemergenceofnationalism,
' ]crcmycntham,Hacr:||:c|c||c:|cs,|c|a_cacxcm|ac/|oao/|cIc:|cm/|oaoF|_|/s|ssucJ
Jur|a_/|crca:|Fcvo|u/|oain]crcmyValdroncd ) , ^oascascuoaS/|||London,Ncthucn,
i 8,) |6-,6.
i i JII JHI LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
racism and sexism. lt vas not that these ideas and practices vere
unknovnlefore thenineteenth centuryluttheynovlecame the-
orised and respectalle elements of European culture. lndividual
rights and the associated legal constraints vere not part ofthe frst
phase ofmodernity.
The intellectual reasons for the decline vere more complex. Ve
vih examine in the second part the devastating critiques of natural
rightslysomeofthefnestmindsofthelateeighteenthandnineteenth
centuries. Edmund Burke derided their alstraction and rationalism,
jeremy Bentham their olscurantism and indeterminacy, Karl Marx
theircloselinkvithclassinterestsvhich, despitethetheory'sapparent
claims ,madethemantipathetictohumanemancipation.Theyahcon-
trilutedtothefatalunderminingoftheintellectualpresuppositionsof
naturalismalongsidemany otherfactorsatvork. Themostimportant
intellectual force in lav vas positivism. The positivist approach and
empiricism, its handmaiden, already dominantinthe naturalsciences
andtriumphantintechnologyvithitsmanymarvels,migratedtolav
andthe emergingsocialsciences.AsHolleshadaccuratelypredicted,
themostimportantpoliticalconsequence ofthepositivisation ofnat-
uralrightsvas the emergence ofthe legislative Leviathan. Thepover
offreevill to shape thevorldaccordingto its preferencesvasshad-
oved ly the unlimitedcompetence ofthe state to shape individuals
accordingto the dictates oftc|soa J'|c|and political expediency and,
individual freedomvas reHected in the legislative and administrative
alilityofthestatetointerferevithandregulateallaspectsofsociallife.
The free and villing individual fnds no inherent restrictions to his
vorldmakingpover, similarly, the statefnds no limits to thescope,
reachandlreadthofitssovereignty.Theleginningsofallmodernlav,
vhichislydefnitionpositedlav, canletracedinthismirroring.pos-
itivism, the claim thatvalid lav is exclusively createdly acts ofstate
vill,istheinescapalleessenceoflegalmodernity, themirrorimageof
theclaimthatthe individuallegislatesthe ends andaimsofhis action
andarrangeshislifeplanthroughsovereignacts ofchoice. One could
argue, ly paraphrasing Foucault, that the ideal ofemancipation vas
shadoved ly the technology of legislation and the aim of self-
fulflmentlytechniquesofdiscipliningthesulectandofshapingthe
lodypolitic andthe docile andproductiveindividuallody.
The process of positivisation united the ma or Vestern legal
systems. ln England, john Austin and A. V. Dicey removed all
SccChatcr,.
I !CN i , 8 JC ) 8 i i i
remainingnaturalistfallaciesfromurisprudence andproclaimedthe
alsoluteprimacyofstatelav.Dicey'sclassicIa|toJu.||oa|o ||cLcuj
||c Coas|||u||oaarrogantlydismissedthealilityoftheFrenchtradition
vithitsBillsofRightsandspecialJto||cJm|a|s|tc||cctoconstrainpul-
lic pover. Vithus theprinciples ofprivatelavhave . . . leenly
theactionoftheCourtsandParliamentsoextendedasto determine
thepositionoftheCrovnanditsservants. . . Theconstitutionisthe
resultofthe ordinarylavoftheland . . . thelavoftheconstitution
is notthe sourcelutthe consequence ofthe rights oftheindividu-
als`. Dicey's Victorian comlination ofEnglish parochialism and
imperial triumphalism expressed a vider turning avay from moral
principle and natural right, seen as metaphysical alstractions and
myths, tovards a more pragmatic appreciationofthe greatpotential
ofstatepoverleftto its untrammelledresources . Burke's aggressive
traditionalismhadfnally lecome the principle ofthe Constitution.
lntheLnitedStates, racerelationsveredefnedforacenturylythe
apartheidprinciple ofseparatelutequal` vhichvassetasideaslate
as i ,,|.
+
The free speech guarantee ofthe First Amendment, the
most litigated right in the history ofthe American Constitution,
vouldhavetovaituntili , i , foritsfrstoutingleforethe Supreme
Court. ln continental Europe, Hannah Arendt noted that, lefore
theSecondVorldVar, humanrights vereinvokedinacqua.|oq
vaytodefendindividualsagainstthepoverofthestateandtoshield
them from the social insecurity`. Thoseurists and philanthropists
vho tried to use human rights to protect minorities shoved an
uncanny similarity inlanguage and composition to that ofsocieties
forthepreventionofcrueltytoanimals`. AndtheGermanlegalthe-
orist Otto Gierke, vritingin i , |, as the lazis vere takinghold,
lamented that in Germany, natural right` and humanity` have
novlecome almost incomprehensille . . . andhavelost altogether
theiroriginallife andcolour`.'
This processvas facilitatedandacceleratedlythe transformation
ofpolitical philosophy andurisprudence into political science, the
` ^. \. Iiccy, IatrcJu:t|oa to t|cStuJyot|cIcut|c Coas t|tut|oaLondon, i 8 8 , , Ioth
cdn, i ,) vithintroductionbyICS Vadc, i 8-.
' rouav ocrJoIJu:ct|oaoTockc |, L.S. |8 i ,|) . JhcjudiciaIar olthcstrug-
gIclordcscgcgationis toIdinRichardKIugcr, S|m|cjust|:cLondon,^ndrcIcutsch, i ,,)
` S:|ca:kv. Ca|tcJ Stcte, z| ! 5. |, i i ) .
' Mannah ^rcndt, T|c r|_|n o Totc||tcr|ca|sm SanIicgo, Marvcst ooks, i ,) z ,
zz
Ctto Cicrkc, ^cturc| Icu caJ t|c T|coq o So:|cty transIatcd vith Introduction by
rcstakcr) Cambrdgc, CambridgcLnivcrsity!rcss, i j|) zoi -z.
i iZ
JII JII LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
turnof historyintothephilosophyof historyandlytheevolutionof
grand social theory. Hegel, Comte, Durkheim, Marx, Veler and
Freudreplacedtheearlierinterestinindividualrightsvithanexam-
ination ofthe socialprocesses and structures vhich shape sul ectiv-
ityandaction. Asthecreatorofsociology,AugusteComteputit,the
spiritoftherightsofman
vas usclul in dcnolishing old lcudal-nilitary olicy and in cxloding
thc nyth ol divinc rights Ly insisting on thc rights ol nan. !ut it vas
totally incaaLlc ol roj ccting any ositivc concctions to rclacc
thosc it had dcstroycd, cvcry so-callcd liLcral rincilc vas in lact only
a `dogna crcatcd Ly trying to crcct sonc criticisn ol thc thcologi-
cal into a ositivc doctrinc, c. g. , thc dogna ol liLcrty ol conscicncc -
ncrc aLstract cxrcssion likc nctahysics) , ol thc tcnorary statc ol
unLoundcd liLcrty in vhich thc hunan nind vas lclt Ly thc dccay ol
thc thcological hilosohy. "
ln this intellectual climate the idea ofsociety vas invented, it vas
givenpriorityovertheindividualandlecamethemainolectofsci-
entificinquiry. Durkheim'scollectiveconscience,Marx'sprimacyof
the economic overthemoral aspects ofhistorical development and
Veler'sprocess ofrationalisation delivered severe llovs to thenat-
uralistidea,vhichhadplacedindividualsandtheirrightshigherthan
societalclaims orhadassertedthat societyvas the outcomeofcon-
tractual agreements. Societiesvere nolongerseenas theproductof
delilerate individual action norvastheprotection ofnatural rights
their main task. As historianjoan Scott put it, ly the end ofthe
nineteenthcentury,theindividualvas definedlysocialtheoristsnot
in opposition to the social or society, lutas its product`. Forthe
emerging socialtheory, structure lecame politically andcognitively
more important than agency, individuals had lov epistemological
value and vere the targets ofmultiple externaldeterminations and
internalisedconstraints . Thenevlylileratedindividualsoonlecame
the ol ect ofdisciplinary pover and his putative sovereignty and
rightgavevaytotechniquesofnormalisation. '
Animportanteffectofthistheoreticalturn,vasthecreationofthe
conceptofideology. ldeologyvas defned either asfalse conscious-
T|c os|t|vc |||oso|y /Hu_ustc Comtc Marrict Nartincau cd. andtrans.) London,
j rdcd , i 8j)\oI 2, , i .
` oanScott, a|y crcJocs to _cr:rca:| cm|a|sts caJt|cF|_|ts /Mca Cambridgc
Nass MarvardLnivcrsity!rcss, i 6) , O.
0
NichcI Foucault, I|s:|||ac caJ ua|s| T|c |rt| / t|c r|soa Marmondsvorth,
!cnguin, i ,) , NichcI FoucauIt, T|c H|story / Scuc||ty, lo|umc I. Ha IatroJu:t|oa
Marmondsvorth, !cnguin, i 8 i )
i i
ness , vhich couldle correctedlyscience, oras a set ofideas repre-
sentingnarrov,sectionalinterestslutclaimIngthedignityoftheuni-
versal. laturalrightslecameaprimeexampleofideologicalillusion,
against their alsolutistpretensions, theyverenov seen as conven-
tional and interested discourse ofthe most dulious character. Re-
interpreted ideologically, natural rights turned from eternal into
historically and geographically local inventions, from alsolute into
contextually determined, from inalienalle into relative to cultural
and legalcontingencies. lo longer the lasis ofsociety orthe main
purposeofitsaction,naturalrights lecame disputedentities, ol ects
ofhistorical analysis and ideological delunking. The nev morality
vas amorality ofgroups, classes , parties andnations, ofsocialinter-
vention,legalreformandutilitariancalculations . laturalrightsvere
reducedtothescrapheapofideas,theirrelevanceexhaustedviththe
endofthelapoleonicadventures. Theyplacednoolstacleintothe
pathofpoverandcouldle removedorrestrictedatvillinorderto
promotestatepurposesandsocialengineering.
Hegel's philosophy ofhistory, althoughantitheticalto utilitarian-
ism,furtherunderminednaturalrights. Thehistoricistreactiontothe
FrenchRevolutionhadinsistedthatallknovledgeissituatedandcan
le acquired only vithin clear historical constraints. The historical
horizoncannotletranscended,lecauseitformsthealsolutepresup-
position ofall understanding. Hegel radicalised historicism, vhile
Burke had argued that the attempt to resolve fundamental philo-
sophicalprollemsfromatranscendentperspectivevasalsurd,Hegel
turnedthis insight into the spirit ofhistory. The claimthattheratio-
nal, theactualandtherealhadfinallycoincidedintheHegeliansys-
tem meant that the quest for visdom had finally leentransformed
intovisdomitselfandthatthesearchfortheidealpolity`hadcome
to an end. ' ' Vhen Hegelheard, fromhisstudy, thefury ofthelat-
tleofjena,hefamouslydeclaredthathesavinlapoleonreasonon
horselack` . lapoleon'sandreason' s` defeatledHegelto diagnose
thecompletionofthesystemcloserto homeandto identi(itvith
the Prussian State. Eithervay, thespirithadleenincarnatedinhis-
toryandreasonhadsulectedpovertothedemandsofright. Rights
had triumphedin the Rc.h|s|cc| and there vas no need to fght for
theirrealisationanylonger.
latural rights passed avay alongside the alstract man of the
eighteenthcenturyvhosenaturetheyhaddefned. Vhenanideaor
i
Lco Strauss, ^cturc|IcucaJH|stoq Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, i 6 ,) j j .
utsccChatcr i olor arcsonsc to this crticismlromaMcgclianosition.
i i + JII JII LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
conceptisentrustedinthehandsofhistoriansorsociologists,itsvital-
ity has leenlost, its usefulness has migrated fromhistoryto histori-
ography and its excitement displaced from political lattles to
academicdisputes .Evenmore,vhenanideallecomeslavandadis-
sident movement governmentallegitimation, it often turns into its
opposite. As the great philosopher E. M. Cioran put it, the man
vhoproposesanevfaithispersecuted,untilitishisturntolecome
a persecutor. truths legin ly a conHictviththepoliceandend ly
callingthemin,foreachalsurdityvehavesufferedfor, degenerates
intoalegality, aseverymartyrdomendsintheparagraphsoftheLav
. . . AnAngelprotectedlyapoliceman- thatishovtruths die, that
is hov enthusiasms expire`. '
Radical natural lav, on the other hand, from the Stoics to early
modernityhadusednatureas themarkerofthefutureinthepresent
andhadalvays suspectedthereductionofrighttotherationalorthe
real. As Heideggerputit, froma differentperspective, higherthan
actuality stands possilility`.' Vhat is cannot le true or self-
identical, lecause at the heart ofthe present lurks vhat is still to
come. But thehistoricistre ectionofnaturalrightmeant that
all right is ositivc right, and this ncans that vhat is right is dctcr-
nincd cxclusivcly Ly thc lcgislators and thc courts ol thc various
countrics . ov it is oLviously ncaninglul, and sonctincs cvcn ncc-
cssary, to scak ol `unjust lavs and `unjust dccisions. In assing
such judgcncnts vc inly that thcrc is a standard ol right and vrong
indccndcnt ol ositivc right and highcr than ositivc right. a standard
vith rclcrcncc to vhich vc arc aLlc to judgc ol ositivc right. Nany
colc today hold thc vicv that thc standard in qucstion is in thc Lcst
casc nothing Lut thc idcal adotcd Ly our socicty or our `civilisation
and cnLodicd in its vay ollilc or its institutions . . . Il thcrc is no stan-
dard highcr than thc idcal ol our socicty, vc arc uttcrly unaLlc to takc
a critical distancc lron that idcal. ' '
The loss ofthe criticalideal and the legal translation ofthe utopian
perspectivehadcatastrophiceffects. Theroadletveenthedemiseof
naturalrightsinthenineteenthandearlytventiethcenturies, andthe
recent pronunciations ofthe final triumph ofhuman rights , passes
throughtvovorldvars,ahugenumleroflocalvarsandinnumer-
alle atrocities and humanitarian disasters . ltis lit ly the fres ofthe
Holocaust.
- , N. Cioran, H S|ottH|s/oqIc:cy R Movard trans) London, uartctooks,
i o) ,|
' ` NartinMcidcggcr, c|a_caJ T|mc lcvYork, Marcr andRov, i 6z) 6

' Strauss,o cit. , sura n i i , z- .

1 1 . 1 1 VV1b 1 b 1 111 V1 b 1 11 V1b 1 b 1 111 1111b b 1b
I 1 1V11 I11 11 V1 Lb
i i 3
Humanrights enteredthevorldsceneaftertheSecondVorldVar.
The historyoftheir inventionhas leenrepeatedly and exhaustively
toldandvill notle attemptedhere. ' lts symlolicmomentsinclude
the luremlergandTokyo Trials, thesigningofthe Charter ofthe
LnitedMations i ,,) andtheadoptionoftheLniversalDeclaration
of Human Rights i ,) . Folloving these foundational acts, the
international community launched a long campaign of standard-
setting. Hundredsofhumanrights conventions,treaties, declarations
and agreements have leen negotiated and adopted ly the Lnited
lations , ly regional lodies, like the Council ofEurope and the
Organisation ofAfricanLnity, andlystates. ' Humanrights diver-
sifedfromfrst generation` civil andpoliticalornegative` rights ,
associatedvith lileralism, into secondgeneration, economic, social
andculturalorpositive`rights,associatedviththesocialisttradition
and, finally, into third generation` or group and national sover-
eignty rights , associated vith the decolonisation process. The frst
generationorllue`rightsaresymlolisedlyindividualfreedom,the
second, or red` rights ly claims to equality and guarantees ofa
decentlivingstandard,vhilethethirdorgreen` rightslytheright
to self-determination and lelatedly the protection ofthe environ-
ment. Butvhatlies lehindthisapparently unstoppalleproliferation
ofhumanrights?
The most olviouschangeinthetransitionfromnaturaltohuman
rightsvasthereplacementoftheirphilosophicalgroundandinstitu-
tional sources. The lelief that rights could le protected either
through the automatic adustment of the entitlements ofhuman
natureand the action oflegalinstitutions , orthroughthelegislative
divinations ofpopular sovereignty, proved unrealistic. As Hannah
Arendtputititisquiteconceivallethatonefnedayahighlyorgan-
ised andmechanisedhumanityvillconclude quite democratically-

^mongst many, scc thc loIIoving thcorcticaly mindcd introductions to thc history
and hIosohy olhuman rghts. Louis Mcnkin, ThcH_c ,jF|_|/s lcv York, CoIumbia
Lnivcrsity!rcss, i o) , lorbcrtoobbio, T|cH_cF|_|/sCambridgc, !oIity, i 6) , ]ack
IonncIIy, Ca|vcrc|Humca F|_|| |a T|coq caJ rc:t|:c Ithaca, CorcII Lnivcrsity !rcss,
i 8)
' Jhc most comrchcnsivc comcndium olthc last roIilcratingintcrationaIIav of
humanrghts, scc IanrovnIic cd) q cs|:Io:umca/soaHumcaF|_|/s Cxlord,CIarcndon,
i |)
1 1 JII JII LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
namelylymaoritydecision- thatforhumanityasavholei t vould
lelettertoliquidatecertainpartsthereof`.''Herstatement,phrased
as a prediction, has already lecome a terrille historical fact. The
market` ofhumandignity and equality didnot conceal a hidden
hand` andpeoplevotedandstillvoteforregimes andparties deter-
mined to violate all human rights, as the examples of Hitler's
GermanyandMilocevic'sYugoslaviashov.lftheFrenchRevolution
andthefirstproclamationofrightsverereactionsagainstmonarchic
alsolutism, the internationallavofhumanrightsvas a response to
Hitlerand Stalin, to the atrocities and larlarities ofthe Var and to
the Holocaust. ln this latest mutation ofnaturalism, humanity or
civilisationvassulstitutedforhumannature, theFrenchmenofthe
Lc|ctc||oa vere enlarged to include the vhole humanity, inter-
nationalinstitutions andlav-makers replacedthedivinelegislatoror
thesocialcontractandinternationalconventionsandtreatieslecame
the Constitution alove constitutions and the Lav lehind lavs. An
endless process ofinternational and humanitarian lav-making has
leen put into operation, aimedatprotectingpeople fromthe puta-
tive assertions oftheirsovereignty. Toparaphraselietzsche, ifGod,
the source ofnatural lav, is dead, he has leen replaced ly inter-
nationallav.
Thehigherstatusofhumanrightsisseenastheresultoftheirlegal
universalisation, ofthetriumphoftheuniversality ofhumanity. The
lavaddressesallstatesandallhumanpersons uchumananddeclares
theirentitlementstoleapartofthepatrimonyofhumanity, vhich
hasreplacedhumannatureastherhetoricalgroundofrights.Andyet
human rights declarations have little value as a descriptive tool of
societyanditslond.TheFrenchandAmericanrevolutionariesvere
avare ofthegapletveentheiruniversalclaimsandtheirlocaluris-
dictionandusedittolegitimise theiractions. lnternationallegislators
have lost that historical avareness and discretion. Comparing their
documents viththoseofthe eighteenthcenturyislike comparinga
jane Austen novel vithitsperiodcostume adaptationfortelevision.
lt vas clearly understood` said an American delegate to the San
FranciscoconferencevhichdraftedtheLlCharterthatthepbrase
'VethePeoples' , meantthatthepeoplesofthevorldverespeaking
throughtheirgovernmentsattheConference, andthatitvaslecause
the peoples ofthe vorld are determinedthat those things shall le
done vhich are stated in the preamlle that the governments have

^rcndt, o. cit , suran 6, z.

1 1 7
negotiatedtheinstrument`. ' Therhetoricalorganisationofthispas-
sageis instructivelecauseitrepresentsadmirally the logic ofinter-
nationalhumanrights. Vhatthe people` have determinedisvhat
the governments have expressedand negotiated and vhat has leen
putintheCharter. Statepover, pullicandprivate domination and
oppressionhave leendissolvedinthisperfectchain ofsulstitutions.
peoples and states have finally merged and the governments orthe
internationalorganisationsspeakforloth,asthereisnoothervayfor
thatmytbicleast,the people ofthevorld`, toexpressitself
Everystateandpovercomesunderthemantleoftheinternational
lavofhumanrights, everygovernmentlecomescivilisedasthe lav
oftheprinces`hasfnallylecomethe universal`lavofhumandig-
nity. But this is an empirical universality, lased on the competitive
solidarity ofsovereign governments and onthe pragmatic concerns
andcalculationsofinternationalpolitics. Thevarialleuniversalismof
classicalnaturallavortheKantianuniversalisationactedasregulative
principles. theygaveaperspectivefromvhich eachparticularaction
couldleudged, intheoryatleast,inthenameoftheuniversal.The
empirical universality ofhuman rights, on the other hand, is not a
normative principle. ltisamatter ofcountinghovmanystateshave
adopted hov many and vhich treaties, or hov many have intro-
duced vhich reservations or derogations from treaty olligations.
Vhennormative universality lecomes a calculalle glolalisation, it
turnsfroma lofty, alleit impossille ideal, into the lovest common
denominator of state interests and rivalries. The community of
humanrightsisuniversallutimaginary,universalhumanitydoesnot
existempirically andcannotactas a transcendentalprinciple philo-
sophically.
Lniversalpositivisedrights closethe gapletveenempiricalreality
andtheidealleftopenlythe Frenchsplitletveenmanandcitizen,
despite its olvious prollems. A state that signs and accepts human
rights conventions and declarations can claim to le a human rights
state. Human rights are then seen as an indeterminate discourse of
statelegitimationorastheemptyrhetoric ofrelellion, itcanle eas-
ilyco-optedlyallkindsofopposition, minorityorreligiousleaders,
vhose political pro ect is not to humanise oppressive states lut to
replace themviththeirovnequallymurderousregimes.
s
Lco !asvoIsky inCommittcconForcignRclations, Tc C|crtcrt|c Ca|tcJ ^ct|oas
Hccr|a_s quotcdinlorman Lcvis, Mumanrights,Iavanddcmocracyinanunlrccvord
in Jonyvans cd.) , Humca F|_|ts }ty Yccr oa. H rccrc|sc| Nanchcstcr, Nanschcstcr
Lnivcrsity!rcss, i88) 88.
i i O
JII JII LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
Letus novturnnomfoundationst oinstitutions. Theveaknesses
and inadequacies ofinternationallav, particularly vhen facedvith
individuals, are vell-knovn. Traditionally, the lav of civilised
princes` hadno interestandgave no |o.uss|ca

J|to ordinaryp
'
ople.
This has certaimy changed since the adoption of the Lniversal
Declaration,luttheconceptualprollemsremain. First, humanrights
are stillpredominantly violated orprotectedatthelocallevel. They
verecreatedas asuperiororadditionalprotectionfromthe state, its
military and police, its political and pullic authorities, its udges,
lusinesses and media. These are still the culprits or - rarely - the
angels. lrrespective of vhat international institutions say or hov
many treaties foreign secretaries sign, human rights are violated or
upheldinthestreet,thevorkplaceandthelocalpolicestation.Their
reality isBurkean notKantian. Even atthe formallevel, theprovi-
sions ofnational constitutions and lavs are much more important
thaninternationalundertakings.
Thisleads to arelatedpoint. Humanrightstreatiesandcodesarea
nev type ofpositivelav, thelast and most safe haven ofa su|cact|s
positivism. Codification, fromjustinian to the CoJc ^co|coa, has
alvays leen the ultimate exercise of legislative sovereignty, the
supreme expression ofstate pover. Ve examined alove, hov the
early declarations of rights helped lring into legitimate existence
thesovereignty ofthenation-statevithitsaccompanyingthreatsand
risks for individual freedom. Something similar happened vith the
post-var expansion ofinternationallav into the humanrightsfeld.
lationalsovereignty andnon-interventioninthe domestic affairs of
statesverethekeyprincipleonvhichthelavvasluilt,fromtheLl
Charter to all important treaties. Vhile the maor povers fought
toothandnailoverthedefnitionsandprioritiesofhumanrights,they
unanimously agreed that these rights could not le usedtopiercethe
shield ofnational sovereignty. Human rights vere a maor tool for
legitimising nationally and internationally the post-var order, at a
pointatvhichallprinciples ofstateandinternational organisationhad
emerged fromtheVarseriouslyveakened. The contradictoryprin-
ciples ofhuman rights and national sovereignty, schizophrenically
loth paramount in post-var international lav, served tvo separate
agendas ofthe great povers. the need to legitimse the nev order
through its commitment to rights, vithout exposing the victorious
statestoscrutinyandcriticismalouttheirovnagrantviolations.As
Levis put it, the delate alout human rights and the upholding of
humandignity,vasinrealityaprocessofre-egitimationoftheprin-
i iV
ciples ofsovereignty and non-interventionin the domestic affairs of
sovereignstates. The mostpoverful states, throughthehumanrights
discourse, made their priorities the universal concern ofothers`. '
Once again human rights vere a main vay for underpinning the
poverofstates.
Lav-makinginthehugelusinessofhumanrights hasleentaken
over ly government representatives, diplomats , policy advisers,
internationalcivilservants andhumanrights experts. Thisisagroup
vith littIe legitimacy. Governments are the enemy against vhom
humanrights vere conceivedas adefence. Lndoultedly, theatroc-
itiesofthiscenturyshookandshockedsomegovernmentsandpoliti-
cians as much as ordinarypeople. But thelusinessofgovernmentis
to govern not to follovmoralprinciples. Governmental actions in
theinternational arena are dictatedlynationalinterest andpolitical
considerations and, morality enters the stage alvays late, vhen the
principle invoked happens to condemn the actions ofa political
adversary. Vhen human rights and national interest coincide, gov-
ernmentslecometheirgreatestchampions .Butthisistheexception.
Thegovernment-operatedinternationalhumanrightslavisthelest
illustrationofthepoacherturnedgamekeeper.
2
Prollems in lav-making are confounded ly difficulties ininter-
pretation and implementation. The international mechanisms are
rudimentary and can scarcely improve vhile national sovereignty
remains the paramount principle in lav. The main method is the
dravingofperiodic orcJ|o.reports alouthumanrightsviolations ,
the main veapon, adverse pullicity and the doultful force that
shame carries in international relations. There are various types of
` lorman Lcvis, ibid., 8. Forthc rcIationshi bctvccn domcstic olicics and intcr-
national attitudcs, scc ! C. Laurcn, oucrcaJ ruJ|:c. T|co||/|. caJ I||omc:y Fc:ic|
I|s:tim|ac/|oa Cxlord, Vcstvicv !rcss, i 6 znd cdition)) .
z 0
^ncxtrcmc ilIustration ol this robIcm cxistcd until i 8 , in thc most succcssluI
human rightsmachincry,thcurocanMumanRightsConvcntion VhiIcthcConvcntion
rovidcdlorascmiandaluIyjudicialbodythcCommissionandthcCourt) ,thcunaldcci-
sionincascsnotrclcrrcdtothcCourtvas takcnbythcCommittccol Ninistcrs^sarcsuIt,
manyoIiticallycontrovcrsiaIcascsvcrcIcltto thcNinistcrsvho, oltcn,rathcrthanaccct
thc dccisions olthc invcstigatoryCommission utthcm on hoId. Jhc robIcmvas com-
oundcdbythclactthatthcindividuaIvhohadIaunchcdthccomlaintvasnotcntitlcdto
rclcrthccasc to thc Courtlorfinaldctcrmination Jhis has changcdviththcimlcmcnta-
tion olthc iith !rotocol to thc Convcntion and thc mcrgingolCommission and Court
ut thc mcmbcrs olthc ncv unitcd Court arc still nominatcd by thc govcrmcnts and,
lrmastcxcrcncc, arcrcluctanttovotcagainstcrccivcdnationaIintcrcsts. Indccd, many
olthc ncv aointccsto thc ncvCourarclorucrdiIomatsorcivil scrvantgiving risc to
scrousdoubts about thcir indccndcncc Itmay soundimossiblc but, unlcss govcrmcnts
arc rcmovcdlromthcrunningolhumanrghtsinstitutions, thcscvilIhavcIittIclcgitimacy
i Z JII JII LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
reporting. monitoring, the most common, i s carried outusually ly
volunteers and experts around the vorld under the auspices ofthe
LlHumanRightsCommission.Specialrapporteurs`appointedly
theCommissiondravupreportsaloutspecifcareasofconcern,like
torture, or alout individual countries vith a poor human rights
record. Lnder another model, states are invited to sulmit periodic
reports alout their compliance vith certain treaty olligations, to
committees created for that purpose the most famous leing the
Human Rights Committee under the lnternational Covenant for
CivilandPoliticalRights) .
Veak implementation mechanisms ensure that the shield of
nationalsovereigntyisnotseriouslypierced,unlesstheinterestofthe
greatpoversdictatesothervise,as recent events intheBalkans have
proved. The var crimes trilunal for the former Yugoslavia issued,
earlyinitslife, indictmentsagainstKaradicandMladic, thegenoci-
dal leaders ofthe Bosnian Serls. But the lnternational Force for
Bosnia has not leenallovedto take steps to arrest them. ln a sym-
lolicillustrationofthestatusofhumanrightslav,theForcehasleen
authorised to arrest them, ifthey happen to come across them, lut
nottoseekthemout. ' Finally,inafevinstancesinternationalcourts
or commissions investigate complaints ly victims ofhuman rights
alusesandconductquasi-udicialproceedings againststates. But the
urisprudence of human rights courts is extremely restricted and
duliousanditsrapidchangesindirectionconfrmsome ofthevorst
fears oflegalrealism.larristersappearingleforeinternationallodies
suchastheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights quicklylearnthatitis
letterpreparationtoresearchthepoliticalaffiliations ofthe govern-
ment-appointedudges than to readthe Court's case-lav. ltisvell-
knovn that changes in the political orientation ofthe appointing
governments are soon reHected in the personnel ofinternational
humanrights courts andcommissions .
z
^ similaroutcomc lollovcd thc indictmcnt olNiloscvic during thc Kosovo var. ^s
!rcsidcnt Clintonadmittcdaltcrthc cndolthcvar, thcl^JC Kosovo lorcchasnotbccn
authorscdto arrcstNiloccvicandhisarrcignmcntisnotimmincnt
-- Cnly thc urocan systcm lollovs a lully-ncdgcdjudicialroccdurc and has adcvcl-
ocd casc-lav vcn in uroc, hovcvcr, lor most olits cxistcncc thc Strasbourg organs
dcclarcd admissiblc andcxamincd lcvcrthat olallthcalicationssubmittcdtothcm
Jhis crccntagc has slightly incrcascd sincc thc admission olthcastcrn urocan statcs in
thc ninctics Jhcjurisrudcncc olthc urocan Commission and, cvcnmorc olthc Court,
haslollovcdthcoliticalvicvsolthcaointinggovcrmcntsvhichhavccnsurcdthatthcir
nominccsarcidcologicallysymathcticto thcirvicvs. Foraconsidcrcdvicvolthcolitical
rioritics and mcthods olhumanrights cours and institutions, sccRolando Cactc, Humca
F|_||caJt|cI|m|t o}Cr|t|:c|Fccsoa ^ldcrshot, Iartmouth, pp) Chatcrs 6,, and 8.
iZi
ln this light, the creation ofa permanent var crimes trilunal
acquired increased signifcance. A treaty setting up an lnternational
CriminalCourtlCC)vasadoptedinRomelyrepresentativesofi :o
countries, injuly i ,, . The Court vih haveurisdiction over var
crimes and crimes ofaggression, crimes against humanity and geno-
cide. lt vill replace c! hc: var crimes trilunals, like those of
luremlerg, Tokyo, Yugoslaviaand Rvanda andvilllein a letter
position to defendits actions from the standardcriticism that inter-
nationalcriminallialilityamounts to aparticularlyvindictive case of
victors'ustice`. Lndoultedly, all measures vhich remove human
rightsandtheiradministrationfromgovernments,themainvillainsof
thepiece, arevelcome. lndependentudges,sensitivetotheplightof
the oppressed and dominated ofthe vorld and appointed for long
periodsvithsecurityoftenure,areletterqualifedtoudgevarcrim-
inalsthandiplomatsandc! hc governmentalrepresentatives.
Thisisnottheplacetoexamineindetailthemanycriticismsofthe
useofcriminalresponsililityasamethodofpromotinghumanrights,
norofthespecificshortcomingsofthetreatyofRome. Afevgen-
eral comments are, hovever, necessary. The symlolic value and the
emotional force generated ly var crime prosecutions are undoult-
edlyconsideralle,particularlyforthoseontheright`sideofthecon-
ict vhich led to the crimes. But as ve knov from domestic
experience, the individualisation and criminalisation ofpolitics has
rarelyended political conH ict. Similarly, one suspects that not many
varsoratrocitiesverepreventedlecauseleadersfearedfortheirfate,
ifdefeated, and, not many dictators vere deterredlyluremlergor
vill le deterred ly Pinochet's soourn in Surrey. Criminal punish-
ment, like all individualisedlegal procedures, is likely to have little
effectonmassive human rightsviolations , particularlyiftheminimal
media coverage ofthe YugoslavVar Crimes Trilunal andthe non-
existentoftheRvandanoneareanindicationofpopularinterest.
One incidentintheprocess ofsettingup the lCCdeservesmen-
tion. TheLnitedStatesvas thegreatestenthusiastforsettingup the
trilunals forYugoslaviaandRvanda. Vhenit cameto negotiations
forthecriminalcourt,hovever,theAmericanpositionvasreversed.
TheAmericansfoughthard,usingthreatsandrevards ,topreventthe
-` Mcnr, Stcincr and !hili ^lston, Iatcract|oac| Humca F|_|ts |a Coatct Cxlord,
Clarcndon, i 6) Chatcr i , rcvicv thcdcbatclcadingto thc cstablishmcntolthc Court.
For carly crticisms olthc Jrcaty olRomc, scc Stcvc Jully, ^vain Conccit Jhc Romc
Statutc olthc ICC and thcnlorccmcntolMumanRights, I I Hg cCcvc| ppp, i 6-zo,
Nortcncrgsmo and Iavid Jolbcrt, Rccctions on thc Staturc olthc ICC, I I H|_ c
Ccvc| ppp, z i-6
i ZZ JII JII LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
universalurisdiction ofthe court. They claimed that the court
vould le used for politically motivated prosecutions against
American soldiers vhen, as the vorld's last superpovervith glolal
interests, they invade or intervene on foreign soil. The Americans
tried to restrict the court'surisdiction to nationals ofstates vhich
have ratified the treaty, something vhich vould have undermined
the premise lehind the nev court. David Scheffer, the American
representative, statedthat,iftheconferenceapproveduniversaluris-
diction for the court, the Lnited States vould actively oppose` it
fromits inception. The conference, anxious to include the ma or
international military pover in the treaty, seriously restricted the
court' spovers andveakeneditsindependence, lut didnot give the
alsolute guarantee thatnoAmericansoldiervould ever le lrought
lefore the court. As a result, the Lnited States vas one ofseven
countries, vhich included lraq, Lilya and China states vhich
American foreign policy has often demonised) , to vote against the
fnalandmuchcompromisedversion.
TheLnitedStatesusuallypromotestheuniversalismofrights. lts
re ectionofthevorldcriminalcourtvasacaseofculturalrelativism
vhich took the form ofan imperial escape clause. lt vas also an
implicitadmissionthatvarcrimesandatrocitiesarenottheexclusive
preserve of rogue` regimes. lt should not surprise us.
Lniversalism, domestically and internationally, comes vith an opt
outfacility. This isnot usta question ofthehypocrisy ofpover, a
claimtouniversalitycanlemade,ifonepoveratleastisnotcovered
lyitand is alle to define the parameters ofthe universal. Thisvas
Franceinthe early modern orderandtheLnitedStatesinthe nev
vorldorder.
1 1 1 . 11 V1 Lb 11 b 11 `1 ILV1 b `
The historyofhuman rights has leen markedlyideologicalpoint-
scoring and intense conHict letveen Vestern lileral and other
-' LStroosviIIquit,aIIics varcd, T|c CucrJ|ca,]uIyi o, i 8, j .
- ScIl-intcrcstbrngs courtinto contcmt, T|c CucrJ|ca,]uIy i |, i , i ,
-' Rcccnthistorograhyhasshovnthatatrociticsarcacommonoccurrcnccinvarsand
havc bccn committcd by aIIicd lorccs in both vord vars and in \ictnam Scc]oanna
ourkc, Ha Iat|mctcH|story K||||a_: c:c to c:cK||||a_ |a.et| Ccatuq Hcqcrc London,
Cranta, i )Chatcr6. Jhcconccrvasthcrclorctoavoidhaving^mcricansoIdicrstrcd
ioratrocitics by an intcrnationaIbody and try thcm, ilncccssary, undcr^mcrcan miIitary
and crminaI Iav, asin thc casc olCoIoncICaIIanaltcrthcNyLai massacrc
i Z
conceptionsofhumandignity.Bothprollemsvere evidentfromthe
inception ofthe international human rights code. The ideological
coloursoftheLniversalDeclarationvereevidentlyVesternandlil-
eral. The memlers ofthepreparatory committee vereMrs Eleanor
Roosevelt, aLelaneseChristianandaChinese. johnHumphrey,the
Canadian Director ofthe LlDivision ofHumanRights , vho vas
asked ly the committee to prepare a frst draft, recalls that the
Chinesememlersuggestedatapartythatheshouldput his] other
dutiesasideforsixmonthsandstudyChinesephilosophy,aftervhich
he] mightle alletoprepareatextforthe committee`. Humphrey
preparedthetext,vhichvassulstantiallyadoptedlythecommittee,
lut his response to the suggestion indicates the Vestern attitude
vhicheventuallylecametheuniversalistsideofthedelateinoppo-
sitiontoculturalrelativism. ldidn'tgotoChinanordidl studythe
vritingsofConfucius`. 'The|tccccuxtccm|o|tcsheusedtoprepare
his draft came, vith only tvo exceptions, from Vestern English
languagesourcesviththeAmericanLavlnstitutesulmissionamain
inHuence. Omy one of the seven principal drafters vas not
Christianand, as StephenMarksremarks, thelevelofthegroup of
drafters] as philosophers andmoralistsfalls short oftheir eighteenth
centurypredecessors`.
Humphreythoughtthathis draft attemptedto comlinehuman-
itarian lileralism vith social democracy.`' The social democratic
component ofthe Declaration consisted ina numler ofeconomic,
socialandculturalrightsvhich,accordingtoAntonio Cassese, con-
siderally reducedthe impact ofVestern ideas lysecuring approval
forsome fundamentalpostulates ofthe Marxistideology. `' Thatis
not hovthe Soviet delegate sav it, for vhom the Declaration vas
ustacollectionofpiousphrases `. TheSovietllocandSaudiAralia
alstainedfromthe final vote inthe General Assemlly, vhile South
Africavotedagainst. ButtheSovietpositionvasnotunique. SimIlar
sentiments have leen expressed ly the American representative to
the Lnited lations during President Reagan's administration, vho
called the Declaration a letter to Santa Claus` and, ly LS
AmlassadorMorrisAlram,vhoaddressingtheLlCommissionon
' ]ohnMumhrcy, HumcaF|_|t caJt|cCa|tcJ^ct|oas ingovkcr, i 8|) z
- ibid , j z
-` Narks, Fromthc 'SingIc Conluscd!agc't othc ' IccaIoguc lorSixillion!crsons` .
JhcRoots olthcLnivcrsaI IccIaration olMuman Rights inthcFrcnch RcvoIution, zo
HumcaF|_|t Qucrtcrly|o i 8) .
`' Mumhrcy, ocit , suran. z,, |o
`' ^ntonio Casscsc, HumcaF|_|t |ac C|ca_|a_ Hor|J Cambridgc, !olity, i o) ||.
i Z+ JII JII LNII !! ILN/lI JY.
Human Rights, dismissed the right t o development as dangerous
incitement` and littlemorethananemptyvesselintovhichvague
hopes andinchoate expectations canlepoured` .
Folloving this inauspicious leginning, human rights lecame a
mainideologicalveaponduringthe ColdVar. Thelattlelinesvere
dravnaroundthesuperiorityofcivilandpoliticalovereconomicand
social rights. As a result, the attempt to produce an inclusive and
lindingBill ofRights vas alandoned and tvo separate covenants
vere dravn and eventually adopted, in i ,66, some eighteen years
later. Humanrights, follovingVestern priorities vere hierarchised.
The Civil and Political Rights Covenant creates a state duty to
respect and ensure to all` the listed rights art. z, lCCPR) . The
Economic and Social Rights Covenant is much more exille and
equivocal. memler states undertake to take steps, individually and
throughinternationalassistanceandco-operation. . . vithavievto
achieving progressively the full realisation` ofthe Covenant rights
art. z, lCESCR) . Still,vhiletheAmericanshavetakenaleadingrole
insettingstandardsandusehumanrightsviolationstocriticise other
countries , ittooktventy-sixyearsfortheLnitedStatestorati(the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant, forty years for the Genocide
Conventionandtventy-eightforthe Conventionagainstracialdis-
crimination. TheStateDepartmentpullishes annuallyhugecountry
reports on human rightspractices. Congresshas not ratifed, hov-
ever, the Economic and Social Rights Covenant, the Convention
lanningdiscriminationagainst vomen and, it is the only country,
vith Somalia, that has not ratifiedthe Convention on the rights of
children. lnApril i ,,,, human rights organisations led lyAmnesty
lnternational launched an unprecedented appeal vith the Ll
HumanRights Commission, askingit to take action against human
rights aluses in the Lnited States. Vhen ve use international
humanrights standards , then clearly the LS is failing the testdaily`
stated AmnestyDirectorAndre Sane launching the appeal. Human
rightsgroupspointtoaconsistentpatternofviolationsvhichinclude
unchallengedpolicelrutality,thetreatmentofasylumseekers,prison
`- uotcd in loam Chomsky, ^Icttcrto Santa CIaus, Tc T|me H|_|crIJu:ct|oa
Su|cmcat, i Fcbruary i , z , loam Chomsky, Tc Cm|rc||c ,] CS oucr lcvYor,
ScvcnStorics, i ) .
`` ^ muchmorcmodcstrtish annuaIrcort onhumanrghtsvasubIishcdlorthcurst
timcbythcIcartmcntlorIntcrationaIIcvcIomcnt,in^riI i 8. !artolncvLabour`s
cthicaI forcign oIicy, itvas comarcd in styIc and lormat jtoj a big ubIic comany
announcing its rcsuIts, vith ubcat tonc and cororatc and gIossy mood Thc
CucrJ|ca,^riI 22, i 8, I
iZ3
conditions and the death sentence and explain that these and other
violations disproportionatelyaffectracialminorities` .
ButtheLnitedStates doesnothaveexclusiverights tohypocrisy.
During the ColdVar, any criticism ofhuman rights aluses ly the
communist states vas folloved ly a ritual Soviet denunciation of
Britishpolicies in lorthern lreland and ofAmerican racism, and a
similar approach has leen adopted ly many developing countries
after the fall ofcommunism. The Europeans and their Lnion have
notfared much letter. ln i ,,,, theELlaunched an initiative enti-
tled a Human Rights Agenda for the lev Millennium`. A com-
mitteeofsccsorvisemen`vasaskedtodravupasetofEuropean
human rightspolicies tomarkthe ,oth anniversary oftheLniversal
Declaration. A group ofacademics and human rights activists vas
convened, as part of this initiative, under the auspices of the
EuropeanLniversitylnstitute,todravupdetailedreportsonvarious
humanrightsconcernsandadvisethesccs.Atameetingoftheadvi-
sory group held in Florence, in Octoler i ,,,, as part ofthe pro-
gramme, a respectalle researcher presented an early draft ofthe
report he had leen asked to prepare on the vork ofEuropean
supervisory lodies`. The rapporteur proposed to look into the
EuropeanConventionofHumanRights, theEuropeanConvention
againstTortureandthereportsoftheEuropean Commissionagainst
Racism and lntolerance and summarise prollems identifed ly the
respective organs. At that point, the European Commission repre-
sentativesstrongly ol ectedto theinclusionofareportofthiskind,
althoughitvouldle lased onofficial, pullished andvidelyavail-
allematerials . TheBrusselsofficialfundingtheluxuriousconference
threatenedtovithdravthefunding,promptingadelegatetoinquire
vhether she could vait until after lunch. lt lecame clear, during
heated exchanges, that the offcial political purpose lehind the
agenda`vastopresentarosyEuropeanpicture,tolinkaidandtrade
toVesternhumanrightsprioritiesandtogiveEuropeanrepresenta-
tivesininternationallodiessomethingtosay, as one delegateputit,
vhenEuropevas ustifiallyallegedly) criticisingothersforhuman
rightsviolations andvas unustifally) attacked inreturnforapply-
ingdoullestandards. The exercisevas not aloutvashingEuropean
`' ^mncstyurgcscurbonLS 'humanrghts abusc` , Tc CucrJ|ca,^rI i|, i .
Itis noticcabIc that thcurocan CourtolMumanRightshasruIcdthatthc conditions ol
dctcntion in^mcrican dcath rovs amount to a vioIation ol^rticIc j olthc Convcntion
vhichrohibitstorturc,inhuman anddcgradingtrcatmcnt Soct|a_v CK i8) II MRR
|.
iZ
JII JII LNII OF ILN/lI JY.
dirtylinen`i npulliclut, aloutshovinghovseriouslyEuropeans
vievhumanrights.
The respectedresearcherand afev academicsfoundtheposition
ofthe Brussels officials unpalatalle. The metaphorical lunch vas
saved,hovever,througharatherstrangecompromise. theresearcher
vouldleallovedtopresentthereportlut, insteadofcataloguingthe
violations under an alphaletical list ofEuropean states vhichvas
thoughtunacceptally critical) , he vould present them thematically
thus minimising the emlarrassment ofthe culprits. After this inci-
dent, itvasnosurprisethatthepullicationofthefinalreportofthe
sccs vas accompanied ly controversy. lt vas videly reported that
European governments moved lefore pullication to dovngrade
proposals that the European Lnion should set up a special depart-
ment headedly a nev commissioner to co-ordinate human rights
vork throughoutEurope. References to the inhumane and degrad-
ing treatment ofdetainees and details ofdeaths ofasylum-seekersin
police custody inthe initialreportvere deleted fromthefinalver-
sion. But the report did conclude, despite the efforts ofthe Claret-
pinchingeurocrats, thatEurope' sstrongrhetoric onhumanrightsis
notmatchedlythereality`.
lfideological point-scoring is the symlolic prize lehind human
rights controversies, trade and market-penetration is often the real
stake. An interesting example comes from the ourishing Sino-
Vesternrelations. Thesevereallegedlyseriouslydisrupted,afterthe
Tiananmen square massacre ofhundreds ofprotesting students in
Mayi ,,andthevidespreadrepressionofdissidentsvhichstilltakes
placeinChina.Butthiscoolingofrelationslastedforalimitedperiod
and normal relations vere soon resumed. lt has leen repeatedly
reportedthateverytimeaVesternleadervisitsBeiing,lists ofvell-
knovn dissidents are handed to the Chinese authorities. Cynical
diplomats say it keeps the humanrights lolly quietat home. From
time to time, China earns diplomatic credit ly releasing a lig
name`. ` Chinahas leen particularly adept in usingtrade deals to
avoidinternationalopprolrium.Asaresult, noresolutioncriticising
Chinese violations has leen passed ly the Ll Human Rights
Commission. Similarly, theBritishGovernment,despiteitsethical`
` uioc`s human rghts rhctorc at odds vith rcaIity, T|c CuctJ|ca, Cctobcr io,
i88. JhcunaI rcort LcadingbycxamIc. ^ Muman Rights ^gcnda lorthcurocan
LnionlorthcYcarzoooisubIishcdin!hiIi^Iston, JhcurocanLnionandMuman
Rights CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i ) acndix
`' Jhcrccoldisscnt, T|c CuctJ|ca,Nay j i , i , Cz.
iZ7
foreignpolicy, vent ahead, in i ,,), vith the deal to sell Havk ets
to the genocidal lndonesian regime of President Suharto during
vhose long and repressive reign halfa millionEast Timorese vere
killed. As an opposition politician put it, other governments vill
giveRolinCookprettyshortshrift, ifhegoesaroundthevorldlec-
turing them alout human rights vhen they knov the British
Government has issued eighty-six nev export licenses forarms] to
Turkeyandtventy-tvo to lndonesia letveenMay i ,,)andApril
i ,,] `. 'Accordingto recentrevelations, the LnitedStates trained
the lndonesian military, including an elite anti-insurgency force
involvedinEastTimormassacres untillate i ,,despitethe offcial
suspensionoftheprogramme afterearliermassacres in i ,,i . Britain
too made a significant contrilution to lndonesian military training
vhich vas suspendedafevdays lefore the Llpeacekeepingforce
arrivedinEastTimor.
ThefashionallemoralturnintheforeignpoliciesofVesterngov-
ernments, vlich characterised the late nineties, indicates that the
symlolic capital ofhumanrightshas increasedin the Vest. Clinton,
BlairandShroeder, despitetheirdifferences, claimtoleunitedinthe
pursuitofethicallyinformedinternationalrelations. Butvehavelit-
tle evidence of such a turn, vhich is historically and theoretically
improlalle. American and British-led lATO vas prepared to take
militaryactionagainst lraq andagainstthe Serls over Kosovo, vhile
little protest vas heard alout the killing ofsome zc, ccc Kurds ly
Turkish forces over the last tventy-fve years, the genocide ofthe
peopleofEastTimorlylndonesianforcesforoverthirtyyears, orthe
ethniccleansingofSerlsfromCroatia. SaddamHusseinandSlolodan
Milocevic are old-time dictatorssteepedinColdVar anti-American
rhetoric. Successive Turkish governments , on the other hand,
vhether military dictatorships or democracies supervised ly the
armedforces, have alvays leen strongly pro-American and avalued
ally in the sensitive easternMediterranean. Similarly, the lndonesian
dictatorSuhartohadleenarelialleVesternallyandmaoranti-com-
munistforcein south-eastAsia,untilhevasoverthrovnlythedaily
protests ofpeoplevho tookto the streetsfor months, despiteleing
killedandmaimedlythe dictator'ssecurityforces.
Thesediscrepanciesgive risetocriticismsofthehypocrisyorcyn-
icism ofthe great povers . But these accusations vould le valid, if
`` Robin Cook`stomolthc gIobaIbadIands, T|c CucrJ|ca, ^rIzz, i 8, 6
` LS aidcdbutchcrsolJimor, T|c |scrvcr, Sctcmbcri , i . SccaIso]ohn!iIgcr,
Lndcr thcinucncc, T|c CucrJ|ca, Sctcmbcrz i , i , i 8
iZO
JII JII LNII CI ILN/lI JY.
one accepted, counterfactually, that foreignpolicyi s guidedlythe
consistency of Kantian moral principles. To paraphrase Richard
Rorty, ifthatvaspossille,moralforeignpolicy,lIkeethniccleansers,
vould vash the vorld clean ofpreudice and oppression. But the
moralclaimis eitherfraudulentornaive. Experiencetellsothervise.
human rights, lIke arms sales, aidt othe developingvorldandtrade
preferences or sanctions, are tools of international politics used,
accordingtotheclassicalGreeksaying,tohelpfriendsandharmene-
mies. Everygooddiplomatloaststhatprincipledconsistencyinfor-
eign affairs is impossille inpractice, undesiralle in negotiations lut
indispensalleinthepullicpresentationofpolicy.Moral consistency
requires the existence ofa common international and transcultural
morality vhich vould underpinpolicy initiatives to the satisfaction
ofhumanity's conscience. Butnone ofthese elementsexists or can
come aloutininter-state relations. As loamChomsky putit, the
sophisticatedunderstandthattoappealtolegalolligationsandmoral
principles is legitimate, lut as aveaponagainstselectedenemies`.
The criticism ofhypocrisy is valid, therefore, only in relation to
governmental claimsthatforeign affairs canle guided ly ethics or
humanrights . Theforeignpolicyofgovernmentsisinterest-ledand
as alien to ethical considerations as the investment choices ofmulti-
nationalcorporations.
ltisthereforeunconvincingtopresentthesu|cact|spositivismof
government-legislated international codes, government-appointed
commissions and politically motivated enforcement mechanisms as
theremedyforthepositivismofnationallav,itspersistentinhuman-
ity andits divorce fromethics andustice. Peoplearestillmurdered,
torturedandstarvedlynationalgovernments, lavs andinstitutions.
Thegreatestcrimeslyandagainsthumanityhaveleencarriedoutin
thenameofnation,orderorthecommongoodandthereisnocon-
vincingevidencethatthisislikelytocometoanendlecausehuman-
ity has leen declared sacrosanct. The Rousseauan Jto|/s Jc |'|ommc
andtheBurkean rights ofthe Englishman` verethe legal facet of
the enlightenment promise of emancipation. They have clearly
provedinsuffcientandtheirinternationalre-statementcannotle the
soleansvertoman'sinhumanitytoman.
`` Chomsky, o. cit , suran. z, z|.
i ZV
1 N. 11 V1 Lb 11 1 1b 1 I IVL1
These criticismshaveacquiredgreat urgencyinthevake ofthevar
over Kosovo, the first var officially conducted to protect human
rights. According to Tony Blair, this vas austvar, promoting the
doctrineofinterventionlasedonvalues, vhileRolinCookdeclared
that lATO vas a humanitarian alliance`. The var gave us the
opportunitytovitnessandevaluatethese claimsandthe recent eth-
icalturninvesternforeignpolicyinfull action.
Throughout history, people have gone to vars and sacrifced
themselves at the altar ofprincipleslike nation, religion, empire or
class. Secular and religious leaders knov vell the importance of
adding aveneerofhighprinciple to lov endsandmurderous cam-
paigns . ThisisequallyevidentinHomer's lliad,inThucidides'chill-
ingdescriptionofthe Athenian atrocitiesinMelosandMytilene, in
thechroniclesofthecrusadesandinShakespeare'shistoricalplays. ln
the most famous passage of the c|ooaacs|ca |ct, the defeated
Meliansarguedunsuccessfullythat,iftheAtheniansslaughteredthem
aftervinninginlattle, theyvouldlose ah claimto moralsuperior-
ityandlegitimacyamongsttheiralliesandcitizens. Forthepragma-
tistAthenians, hovever, alimitedgenocidevouldgiveaclearlesson
totheirvaveringalliesandvouldleofgreatpoliticalvalue, unlike
themoraland huiranitarianposition. The Athenians comparedter-
rorandmoralprincipleaccordingtotheirlikelyeffect,chosethefor-
mer and providedan early example oftcc|o||/|/. Stalin's turn to the
Orthodoxpatriarchandhisuseofreligiousthemesinthedefenceof
theSovietfatherlandagainstthelaziattackin i ,| i , despitedecades
ofreligious persecution, vas a good illustration ofthe moral and
metaphysicalturnoftentakenlypragmatic orscareddictators. The
theoryofthe' ustvar`, ontheotherhand,developedintheMiddle
Ages, vas an attemptlythe Church to serve Caesarvithoutalan-
doningfullyitspledges to God.

'' Jhc contcmorar, rcligious thcor, oljust var has a numbcr olcomoncnts. lorcc
shouldbcuscdto dclcndunjustaggrcssion,thcrcshouldbcroortionalitybctvccnharms
innictcd throughthcuscollorccand cndshocdlor,thctargcts choscnshouldbc military,
lorcc should ncvcr bc ancndinitsclI Itisarguablc that tvo clcmcnts olthc dcunition ol
just var thc sccond andthird) vcrcmissinginthc Kosovo var. Jhc churchcs, vith somc
rcscrvations, cithcrsuortcd thcvarorrcmaincdsilcnt. ^ltcrthccndolthcvar, arcort
by thc Church olngland`s oard olSocial Rcsonsibility statcd that thc scalc olthc
humantragcdyhascrcatcdthccrcctionthatl^JC` sactionrcciitatcdrathcrthanrc-
vcntcd thc human catastrohc. Church ol ngland qucstions air camaign, Tc
i JII JII LNII O F ILN/lI JY.
The cynicismofthepoverfulisvell-knovnandhasleentreated
vithvry smileslyvritersandpoets. ShakespeareasmuchasBrecht
vas fascinated ly the vay in vhich the havks ofvarput on the
H eece ofmoralist andpreacher, letterto persuadesoldiersandciti-
zensaloutthevalue ofdyingandkillingforthe cause. Themorali-
sation ofvar is relatively easy vhen the moralisers are victims of
externalaggression, lutthe crusaders, the empireluilders, thecolo-
nialistsandthelazisverenotlackinginmoralhighgroundeither.
Thealilitytopresentmostvarsasustandthelackofamoralarliter
vho could sift through conictingrationalisationshasmade theust
varoneofthehardestmoralmazes. Thequestionoftheusticeofa
var or ofalilerationstruggle a. k. a. campaign ofterror) hasalvays
presented an interesting paradox. for the varring parties there is
nothing more certain than the morality of their cause, vhile for
olservers there is nothing more uncertain than the rightness ofthe
comlatants' conHicting moral claims. As C. H. Vaddington put it,
thevars, tortures,forcedmigrationsandothercalculatedlrutalities
vhich make up so much ofrecent history, have for the most part
leen carried out ly men vho earnestly lelieved that their actions
vereustifed, and, indeed, demanded, lytheapplicationofcertain
lasicprinciplesinvhich theylelieved`. ' Varistheclearestexam-
ple ofvhatLyotardhas calledthe differend`.
^s distinguishcd lron a litigation, a dillcrcnd vould Lc that casc ol
conhict, Lctvccn at lcast) tvo artics, that cannot Lc cquitaLly
rcsolvcd lor lack ol a rulc ol judgncnt alicaLlc to Loth arguncnts.
Cnc sidc`s lcgitinacy docs not inly thc othcr`s lack ol lcgitinacy.
Iovcvcr, alying a singlc rulc ol judgncnt to Loth in ordcr to sct-
tlc thcir dillcrcnd as though it vcrc ncrcly a litigation vould vrong
at lcast) onc ol thcn and Loth ol thcn il ncithcr sidc adnits that
rulc) . `
All this seems to have changedin the late tventieth century. Ve
are told that the nev vorld order is lased on respect for human
rights, that universal moral standards have leen legislated and
acceptedlytheinternationalcommunityandthatlegaltrilunalsand
moral directorates have leen set up to navigate through conicting
moralclaims. Onemayle slightlysuspicious ofthemoralprolityof
CuctJ|ca, i]uly i , i| NichaclValzcr, us|caJ Caust Hcr :H Morc|Humcatu|t|
H|stoti:c|I||ustrct|oas London, !cnguin, i 8o) is thc bcst introductionto thc toic.
'' C. M. Vaddington, T|c It||:c|Ha|mc|London,^llcnLnvin, i 6o) i 8,.
'- ]can-Franois Lyotard, T|c Ij[crcaJ C \an dcn ^bbcclc trans ) Nanchcstcr,
NanchcstcrLnivcrsity !rcss, i 8)xi
i i
the Security Councilofthe Lnited lations, vhichincludes a state
vhich only a fev years ago slaughtered its ovn demonstrating stu-
dents China) , or anothervhichhas ratifedthe smallestnumler of
human rights treaties and has voted against settingup the nev per-
manentVarCrimesTrilunal LSA) . These concerns lecome even
more serious vhen one realises that the Lnited States and Britain
ventaheadvith thelomlingoflraqin i ,,and ofSerliain i ,,,
vithout the authorisation ofthe Security Council ofthe Lnited
lations,tLeonlylodyentitledtoordermilitaryactionindefenceof
internationalpeaceandsecurity. ThevillingnessofVesternpovers
to useforceforapparentlymoralpurposeshaslecomeacentral and
vorrying) characteristic of the post-Cold Var settlement. But
Vaddington's lav still stands . The Serlian lrutalities vere carried
outinthe name ofnational sovereignty, territorial integrity and the
defenceofhistoryandcultureagainstterroristandforeignaggression.
lationsovetheirlegitimacytomythsoforigin,narrativesofvictory
and defeat, lorders and imagined or real historical continuities lut
notto humanity. OntheVesternside, Vaddington's lasicprinci-
ples` have leen re-defned as reason, emancipationand cosmopoli-
tanism and have helped generate an ethical impulse` in pullic
opinion vhich has put some pressure onVestern governments.
But vho authorises the discourse ofthe universal? Vill universal
humanrights overcomemoral disagreement orare they one side of
the conict?Aretheya rule of udgment`vhichcanreconcilethe
differends,inLyotard'sterms, or, aretheyonemore differendinthe
conHict?
Threeinstancesvhichstandoutinthe i ,,os, canhelpusconsider
this question. First, the continuing sanctions against lraq and the
reneved lomling of that country since i ,,. The economic
emlargo,imposedlytheLlaftertheendoftheGulfVarinorder
to force the regime to destroyits veapons ofmass destruction, had
alreadytakenits tolllythattime. The sanctionsvere slightly eased
in i ,,, undertheoilforfood`programme,aftertheVorldHealth
Organisationfoundthatmostlraqishadsufferedfromnearstarvation
foryearsand z percentofallchildrenvereseriouslymalnourished.
OperationDesertFox,vhichinvolvedthellanketlomlingofmil-
itaryandassociatedtargets, vaslaunchedinDecemler i ,,, on the
'` JhisvasaricularycvidcntinritaindurngthcKosovoconnict,vhcrcconsistcntly
high majoritics suortcd thc var. Jhc ^mcrcan rcaction vas morc mutcd. ^ majority
ooscd thc var vhcn rcsondcnts vcrc askcd to contcmlatc moic than ulty ^mcrcan
casualtics
i Z JII JII LNII O F ILN/lI JY.
eve ofthe vote to impeach President Clinton ly the American
Congress. TheLnitedNationsvere notconsultedleforethepresi-
dentialdecisiontostartthelomling,althoughtheSecurityCouncil
vas in session discussing the latest report ofthe Lnited Nations
veaponinspectorsvhenthe decisionvastaken. Thedailylomling
oflraqisiteshascontinuedrelentlessly,aftertheendofthatoperation,
luthas gonelargelyunreported.
Thecomlinedeffectsoftenyearsofsanctions,lomlingandmis-
managementoffoodandmedicalsupplieslySaddam'sregimehave
lrought the country to the lrink of collapse. Repeated reports
descrile hov lraqi urlan society has leen ruined and the social
falricseriouslydegraded.AccordingtoaVesternreporter, thevest
isconductingamonstroussocialexperimentviththepeopleoflraq.
Aonceprosperousnationisdrivenintothepre-industrial darkages.
ltvill takeyearstofathomthe harmleingdonetothelives ofz i . ,
million peoplelyapolicyintended . . . to lring lraq lackinto the
internationalcommunityofnationslytopplingSaddamHussein`.''
Dennis Hollovay, the LN humanitarian co-ordinator in lraq,
resignedhispostinthesummerofi,, , statingthatthesanctionshad
killedonemillionlraqis,halfofvhomverechildren.Vhenthissta-
tisticvasputtoMadeleineAllright,ini ,,, sheresponded. lthink
thisisaveryhardchoiceluttheprice- vethinkthepriceisvorth
it`. 'Currently,accordingtoLNSCestimates,fourtonvethou-
sandchildrendieeverymonthlecauseofpoorvatersupplies, inad-
equatefoodandlackofmedicines.
ltisinterestingtocomparethevillingnessoftheVesttollockade
andlomlitserstvhilealliesinlraqviththeresponsetotheRvandan
genocide. During a fev long months, in i ,,, one million people
vereslaughtered,invhatremainsvithCamlodiathegreatestgeno-
cideofthetventiethorhumanrights`century, aftertheHolocaust.
According to the minutes ofinformal Security Council meetings
vhichhaverecently emerged, theLnitedNationspeacekeeperssent
detailedmessagesaloutthedevelopinggenocide,earlyinApril i ,,,
andvarnedthatthesituationvouldquicklyvorsenvithoutthepres-
enceofLnitedNationsofhcers. General Dallaire, thecommanderof
theLNpeacekeepingforcesentsixmessages to NevYork, thenrst
asearlyasjanuary ii , varningofthe impendingcrisisandrequesting
permission to actlut received a routine ansver fromthe secretariat
'' Iraqislallingaar Vc arcruincd, T|c CucrJ|ca, ^rl z|, i , i|
' uotcd ibid Foi a rcccnt and moving rcscntation olthc damagc sanctions havc
innictcdonthcIraqicolc, sccamcs uchan, Insidc Iraq 6, Crcatc i) , i 6-z
i
orderinghimnotto act. 'ThehrstpriorityoftheLnitedStatesand
Britain, vas to vithdrav the peacekeepers lecause any casualties
vouldhaveanegativeimpactonpullicopinion`. Accordingtothe
historian Linda Melvern, Karl lnderfurth, the American LN repre-
sentative, stated that the peacekeeping force vas not appropriate
novandnevervillle`andthatthe Lnited States had no stomach
forleavinganything there`. '` Havingspent oper cent ofthe time
decidingvhethertovithdravthepeacekeepersandonly
.
zc percent
trying to get a ceasehre`, the Council finally voted, onApril z|, to
vithdravthepeacekeepers, exceptforatokenforceofz,c. Fivedays
later, the Council President proposed a resolution declaring that a
genocidevastakingplace andputtinginto effectthesanctionsofthe
GenocideConvention. Thevesternpoversolj ected,theBritishrep-
resentative did not vant the vord genocide used lecause it vould
maketheCouncilalaughingstock`.'Thelivesofthefevhundred
vesternpeacekeepersvereclearlymoreimportantthanthehundreds
ofthousands ofAfricans. General Quesnot, a French general vho
knev the Rvandan situation vell, estimated that
.
z,ccc to z, ,cc
' determined' soldiersvouldhave sufh cedtohalttheslaughter`. 'As
theNigerianamlassadorrhetoricahyasked, hasAfricadroppedfrom
themap ofmoralconcern?`.
Finally, Kosovo. Since the collapse ofYugoslavia, in i,, i , the
LnitedStatesplayedacuriouspokergame`viththeSerlPresident
Slolodan Milocevic, trying to isolate him, on the one hand, and
treatinghimas the dealcuttingguarantorofitspeaceplans` onthe
other. 'According to T|c I.oaom|s/, at the end ofi ,,, American
thinkingvasifyoucan' tloml, atleastsupportdemocracy`, apol-
icyofthelallotloxandthecruisemissile`, onecouldsay. Nohelp
orsupportvas given, hovever, totheSerlianoppositionvhichfor
manymonthsini,,andi,,)hadmolilisedhuge crovdsdailycall-
ingfordemocraticreforms. Thcpreferencefordemocracycame too
late. Afevveekslater, NATvarplanesstartedlomlingtargetsin
'' ^lisondcsForgcs,Iccvc^oactotc||t|cStoq: Ccao:|Jc|aFucaJclcvYork, Muman
RightsVatch, i ) i ,z-,
' LindaNclvcrn, Movthc systcm lailcdtosavcRvanda, T|c CuctJ|ca,Lcccmbcr,,
i8, i o
' ^lison dcs Forgcs, ocit. , 6 8- Vhcn thc LS vas askcdby varous lCCs tojam
RJLN,aradio stationvhichvasincitinggcnocidc, thc StatcLcartmcnt, altcrrccciving
lcgal advicc, rcsondcd that thc traditional^mcrican commitmcnt to lrccdom olsccch
vasmorcimortantthandisrutingthcvoiccolgcnocidc, 6|i .
'` Jhc lull stor, is chillingly told in ^son dcs Forgcs, Ignoring Ccnocidc, ocit. ,
,,-6 , and6o,.
`' VillSlobodanNiloccviclall, T|cI:oaom|st,Lcccmbcr,, i 8, , i.
i+ JII JII LNII !! ILN/lI JY.
Kosovo,SerliaandMontenegro.Vastherestilltimefornegotiations
and sanctions?Vasfurthertalkingpointless, as NAT claimed?Ve
vill neverknovlut Mary Rolinson, the LN High Commissioner
forHumanRights, has statedthatVesternattitudes in i ,, `repre-
sented a fundamental failure of the international community`.
Despitethe effortsofherofncetoalertgovernmentstothelooming
crisis`nonevaslistening`. '
Astricthierarchisationofthe value oflife vas again evidentdur-
ingthe conHict. The Lnited Nations monitors vere vithdravn, in
March i,,,, lefore the lomling campaign started. More impor-
tantly, every precaution vas taken during the var to eliminate the
likelihood ofNAT casualties . The possilility ofengaging ground
troops vas repeatedly and categorically denied ly NAT spokes-
menuntillateinthecampaign. Thelomlers evatextremelyhigh
altitudes some i, , ooo feet) vhich put them leyond the reach of
anti-aircraft nre. The tactic vas successful. NAT forces concluded
their campaign vithout a single casualty. But there vere serious
side-effectstoo. frst,totalairdominationvithoutthevillingness to
engage in a ground var did not stop Serl atrocities. vidence
emergingafterthevarshovsthatthevorstmassacresoccurredafter
the start ofthe lomling campaign. According to NAT sources,
several hundred Allanians vere killed ly Serls after March i ,,,
and the ight ofAllanians vas dramatically accelerated. lt is rea-
sonalle to conclude that the declared var aim of `averting a
humanitarian catastrophe` failed ladly. Secondly, as a result ofthe
high ight altitudes ofthe lomlers, the likelihood ofcivilian `col-
lateraldamage`increasedsignificantly. Civiliansverekilledintrains
andluses, inTVstationsandhospitals, in the Chinese mlassy and
otherresidential areas. ne ofthe most grotesque mistakes vas the
killing ofsome ), Allanian refugees vhoseragtag convoy vas hit
repeatedly, onApril i . Partofthe explanationofferedlyacontrite
NAT vas that tractors anJ trailers cannot le easily distinguished
fromtanks and armouredpersonnel carriers at an altitude ofi,, ooo
feet.
FromHomertothiscentury,varintroducesanelementofuncer-
tainty, thepossililitythatthe mightymightlose orsuffer casualties.
lndeed, accordingtoHegel,thefearofdeathgivesvaritsmetaphys-
ical value, ly confronting the comlatants vith the negativity that
encircleslifeandhelpingthemrisefromtheirdailymundaneexperi-

uotcdin Kosovo. thcLntoldStory, T|c |sctvcr, i 3 uly i ppp, i6

i3
ences tovards the universal. ln this sense, the Kosovo campaign
vas not a var lut a type ofhunting. one side vas totally protected
vhile the other had no chance of effectively defending itselfor
counter-attacking.Manyretired) armyandarmchairgeneralsargued
duringthecampaignthatitcouldnotlevonsviftlyvithoutground
troops. Theyvereprovedpartlyvrong. Avarvithoutcasualtiesfor
your side, an electronic game type ofvar or Reagan's unleatalle
`starvars`, maylethe dreamofeverymilitaryestallishment.Buta
varinvhich asoldier'slifeis more valuallethanthatofmanycivil-
ians cannot le moral or humanitarian. ln valuing an allied life at
manyhundredSerlianlives, thedeclarationthatallare equalindig-
nityandenjoyanequalrighttolifevascomprehensivelydiscredited.
Finally, asvelearnedaftertheendofthevar,thetotalprotection
of Vestern aircrevs meant that the success of lomling vas
extremely limited. Despite NAT' s cautious triumphalism during
the campaign, only thirteen Serlian tanks vere hitin elevenveeks
ofintensivelomlingand thevastmaj ority ofSerlian surface to air
missilessurvived. Civiltargetsvere easierto identi( anddestroy. A
fevveeksafterthestartofthevar,GeneralMichaelShortoftheLS
Air Force toldj ournalists thatvhatvas necessaryforsuccessvas to
hit civilian morale. His tactic vas going to le `no pover to your
refrigerator. Nogastoyourstove,youcan'tgettovorklecausethe
lridge is dovn- the lridge onvhichyou heldyourrock concerts
andallstoodvithtargets onyourheads. Thatneedsto disappear`.`
Accordingtonrstestimates,somefiftylridgesveredestroyedasvell
asanumlerofTVandradiostations ,hospitals,schoolsandnurseries,
cultural, economicandindustrialsites, computernetvorks andelec-
tricitygeneratingplants.'Thetargetingofthecivilianinfrastructure
- InordcrnottolctcoIcj bccomc rootcdandsctinthisisolation, thcrcbybrcaking
uthcvholcandlcttingthccommunitysiritcvaoratc, govcrmcnthaslromtimctotimc
to shakc thcm to thcir corc byvar. ythismcans thc govcrmcnt uscts thcir cstabIishcd
ordcr,andviolatcsthcirrighttoidnccndcncc,vhilcthcindividualsvho, absorbcdinthcir
vay ollilc, brcak loosc nom thc vholc and strivc altcr thc inviolablc indccndcncc and
sccurity olthc crson, arc madc to lccI by govcrmcnt in thc task Iaid onthcmthcirlord
andmastcr, dcath Mcgcl, Tc|caomcao|o_y o{S|t|t^.\ Nillcrtrans) Cxlord, Cxlord
Lnivcrsity!rcss, i p,,)z)z- ]acqucsIcrrida, C|csLincoln,Lnivcrsityollcbraska!rcss,
i p36) commcnts. So var vould rcvcnt colc lrom rotting, var rcscrvcs 'thc cthical
hcaltholcolcs`,asthcvindagitatingthcscasuriucs thcm, kccsthcmlromdccomos-
ing, lrom thc corrution, lromthc utrclaction vith vhich a 'continuaI calm` and a 'cr-
ctualcacc` vouldinfccthcalth, i ci and i i-|p
` T|c |sctccr, i 6 Nay, i ppp, i ; .
' !rolcssor Ian rovnlic, thc cmincnt human rights cxcr, in cvidcncc to thc
IntcrnationalCourof )usticc said,onNayio, i ppp. Jhcrcisnogcncralhumanitaranur-
osc to thc bombingsj thc attcr oltargcts indicatcs olitical uroscs unrclatcd to
i
THE TPl LMPH OF HLMANl TY.
and the repeated mistakes led Mary Rolinson t o state, after four
veeksoflomling,thatthecampaignhadlostitsmoralpurpose`.
N oneofthis explainsorjustifiestheatrocitiescommittedlySerls
and the systematic ethnic cleansing ofthe Kosovo Allanians. The
actions ofthe Serlianpolice, paramilitaries andarmyvillenterthe
annals of tventieth century larlarism alongside those of Hitler,
Stalin, Saddam Hussein and Pol Pot. No moral arithmetic exists to
allovusto comparethenumlerofmassacredAllaniansviththatof
themaimedSerls, orofthegassedKurdsviththatofstarvinglraqis.
NorvouldafevTexan orScottishdeadsoldiersinKosovolalance
outthehundredsofkilledcivilians. ToparaphrasetheHolocaustsur-
vivormmanuelLevinas,ineverypersonkilledthevholehumanity
dies.
This couldletheleginningofanansvertotheuniversalismIl~
SHS relativism delate. Serls massacred in the name of threatened
community, vhile the allies lomled in the name of threatened
humanity. Bothprinciples,vhentheylecomealsoluteessencesand
definethemeaningandvalueofculturevithoutremainderorexcep-
tion, can nnd everything thatresists them expendalle. Ve can see
vhylylrieyexploringtheirstructure,astheymovefromthemoral
tothelegaldomain. Theuniversalistclaimsthatallculturalvalueand,
inparticular, moralnormsarenothistoricallyandterritoriallylound
lutshouldpassatestofuniversalconsistency.Asaresult,judgments
vhich derive their force and legitimacy from local conditions are
morally suspect. Butasalllifeissituated, an unencumlered`judg-
ment lased exclusively on the protocols ofreason goes against the
grainofhumanexperience, unlessofcourseuniversalismanditspro-
cedural demands have lecome the cultural tradition ofsome place.
The LS vould le a prime candidate, lut even die-hard lileral
Americanscannotclaimthisfortheircountry,astheydieinthehands
oftheirrightfulgun-tottingcompatriots,agoodexampleofthemur-
derousnatureofaculturalrelativismvhichhasturnedthepossession
of guns into the most sacrosanct right and vivid expression of
Americanparochialism.Thecounter-intuitivenatureofuniversalism
canleaditsproponent, to extreme individualism. onlymyselfasthe
real moral agent oras the ethical alliance oras the representative of
theuniversalcanunderstandvhatmorality demands. Moral egotism
humanitarian rcasons, T|c CucrJ|ca, Nay i i , i ppp, 3. Jhc Courdcclincd thc Scrbian
Covcrnmcnt's alication to dccIarc thc bombing ilIcgal, aIthough it cxrcsscd conccrs
aboutits cllcctsoncivilians.
'' Shilt inbombing avaringto Scrbs, Thc CucrJ|ca, Nay zp, i ppp, |
i7
easilyleadsintoarroganceanduniversalismintoimperialism. ifthere
isonemoraltruthlutmanyerrors,itisincumlentuponitsagentsto
imposeitonothers . Vhatstartedas relellionagainstthe alsurdities
oflocalismendsuplegitimisingoppressionanddomination.
Culturalrelativismispotentiallyevenmoremurderous,lecauseit
has privileged access to community and neighlourhood, the places
vherepeopleareklledandtortured. Relativistsstartfromthe olvi-
ous olservation that values are context-lound and use it tojusti(
atrocitiesagainstthosevhodisagreeviththeoppressivenessoftradi-
tion. But the cultural emleddedness ofselfisanunhelpfulsociolog-
icaltruism,thecontext, ashistorytraditionandculture,ismallealle,
alvays under construction rather than given and unchanging.
Kosovoisagoodexampleofthisprocess. ltvasonlyafterMilocevic
vithdrevitsautonomyini ,,anddeclaredthatitvouldremainfor
everintheYugoslavstate, as the cradle ofthe Serlnation, that Serl
oppressionstartedandtheKLA, theAllanianLilerationMovement,
lecameactive.Betveenthatpointand i ,,,, afratricidalnationalism
tookholdofthetvocommunitieslutitvasnottheresultofancient
enmities, itvas createdandfannedlytherespectivepover-holders.
Thisprocessvas evenmoreevidentinRvanda.Thegenocidethere
vas not committedly monsters lut ly ordinarypeople vho vere
coaxed,threatenedanddeceivedlylureaucrats,themlitary, politi-
cians, the media, intellectuals , academics and artists into lelieving
thatkillingvas necessary to avoid their ovn extermination in the
hands oftheirvictims . The trilal rivalry letveen Hutus and Tutsis
vas re-denned, fanned and exaggerated to such a point that the
action`lecame eventuallyinevitalle.
Toooftenrespectforculturaldifferences, anecessarycorrectivefor
the arrogance ofuniversalism, has turned into a shield protecting
appaling local practices. Vhen the Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad attacked the Lniversal Declaration lecause it
vas formulated ly the superpoversvhich did notunderstand the
need ofpoor countries` adding that the Vest vould rather see
people starve than allov for stalle government. Theyvouldrather
have theirgovernment chasingdemonstrators inthe street . . . there
are other things in human rights other than mere individual free-
dom`, 'hevas expressingnothis cultural traditionlut his dismay
thathumanrightsmayleusedinoppositiontohisregime,oneofthe
most oppressive in the vorld. The same amliguityis evident vith
'' SccAisondcsForgcs, sura, n. |6,Chatcr z.
' uotcdinNarks, o. cit, suran z3, |6i
iO THE TPl LMPH OF H LMANl TY.
respect t o minorities vithin minorities. thnic groups, like the
Frenchin Quelec, religioussects , like the scientologists, andpoliti-
calparties,likesomeVesterncommunistparties ,demandautonomy,
humanrightsandrespectfortheirpractices onlytousethemtosup-
press smallerminoritiesintheirlody, thenglishspeakers, heretics,
traitors, thosevho donotconform.Again,thecauseoftheprollem
isnotthetruismthatvaluesarecreatedinhistoricalandculturalcon-
texts lut, an exclusionary construction ofculture as immanent to
lelonging andthe interpretation ofmajority values as the alsolute
truth, these traits mimic, atthelocal level, state disdainand oppres-
sionofallminorities. AccordingtotheFrenchphilosopherjean-Luc
Nancy, communitarian authoritarianism is catastrophic lecause it
assigns to community a.ommoa|c|a, vhereas communityis amat-
terofsomethingquite different,namely, ofexistence inasmuch as it
is |acommon,lutvithoutlettingitselflealsorledinto acommon
sulstance`. Thedifferenceletveenauniversalismpremisedonthe
essenceofmanandarelativismpremisedontheessenceofcommu-
nity is small, in their common determination to see man and
community as immanent, they form the general horizon of our
time, encompassing loth democracies and their fragile juridical
parapets` .
Both universal morality and cultural identity express different
aspects ofhuman experience. Their comparison in the alstract is
futile,astheendlessdelateshaveshovn,andusuallyproves, inaself-
fulfilling fashion, the position from vhich the comparer started. '
Theuniversalismandrelativismdelatehasreplacedtheoldideolog-
ical confrontation letveen civil and political, and economic and
social rights, andis conductedvith the same rigour. Yet the differ-
ences letveen the tvo are not pronounced. Vhen a state adopts
universal` humanrights, it vill interpret and apply them, ifat all,
accordingtolocallegalproceduresandmoralprinciples,makingthe
universalthe handmaiden oftheparticular. The reverse is also true.
eventhoselegal systemsvhichj ealously guardtraditionalrights and
cultural practices against the encroachment of the universal are
alreadycontaminatedlyit./ rightsandprinciples,evenifparochial
]can-Luclancy, T|caoctc/|vc Commua|/y !. Connorcd) NinncaoIis, Lnivcrsity
ofNinncsota!rcss, ippi) X iii. Scc chatcr 3 bclov.
` ibid.,
'' MiIlaryLim andKatc Crccn, Vhat is this Jhing about FcmaIc Circumcision, ,/
So:ic|caJIc_c|S/uJ|e 6;-3,, i pp3) ,McnryStcincrand!hiIi^Iston, o. cit. , suran. z ,
Chatcr | givcs an ovcrvicv olthc dcbatc
i V
intheircontent,sharetheuniversalisingimpetusoftheirform. lnthis
sense, rightscarrytheseedofdissolutionofcom runityandtheonly
defenceistoresistthe ideaofrightaltogether,somethingimpossille
in the glolal capitalist vorld. Developing states vhich import
Hollyvood tums, Big Macs and the lnternet, import also human
rights villy nilly. As Prime Minister Mohamad's comments make
clear, his ends and those ofAmerican foreign policy are identical,
after all, even though the means may differ at times. The people
cannotdO lusiness, cannotvorklecauseoftheso-calledexpression
ofthe freedom ofthe individual`. ' The claims ofuniversality and
tradition, rather than standing opposed in mortal comlat, have
lecomeuneasyallies ,vhosefragileliaisonhasleensanctionedlythe
VorldBank.
ne could conclude, that loth positions can lecome aggressive
anddangerous. Vhen theirrespective apologists lecomeconvinced
alouttheirtruthandthe immorality oftheirdemonisedopponents,
theycan easily move frommoraldisputeto killing. Atthatpoint, all
differencesdisappear. Fromthepositionofthevictim,thelulletand
the smart` loml killequally, evenifthe formertravelsafevyards
only from the gun ofthe ethnically proud soldier, vhile the latter
covers a huge distance fromthe plane ofthe humanitarianlomler.
Baumancommentsthat.
vhiIc univcrsal valucs ollcr a rcasonaLlc ncdicinc against thc orcs-
sivc oLtrusivcncss ol arochial Lackvatcrs, and connunaI autonony
ollcrs an cnotionally grati[ing tonic against thc stand-olfish calIous-
ncss ol thc univcrsalists , cach drug vhcn takcs rcgularly turns into oi-
son. Indccd, as long as thc choicc is ncrcly Lctvccn thc tvo
ncdicincs, thc chancc ol hcalth nust Lc ncagrc and rcnotc.'`
ne could only add that the name ofthe common poison is self-
satisnedessentialism. vhethercommunal, state oruniversal itsuffers
from the same heteropholia, the extreme fear and demonisation of
the other.
Arethereanycircumstancesinvhichforcefulinterventionisjus-
tinalle?Thisauthor'sansverisahighlyqualinedycs,inextremecases
andonlytopreventgenocide. TheLnitedNationsSecurityCouncil
canandhasauthorisedtheuseofforcetopreventorstopthreatsto
internationalpeaceandsecurity, inothervords, topreventsulstan-
tialrisktotheinterestsoftheinterveningpovers.Thereisnogreater
oi
uotcdinNarks, ocit. , suran. zp.
oz
/ygmuntauman, os/moJcraI/||:s Cxlord,IackvclI, i pp) zp.
i + THE TPl LMPH O F HLMANl TY.
threat t opeace than genocide and nogreater threat t othe national
interests ofthird states than the disintegration ofa state vith the
resulting con icts, mass migration andloss ofmarkets. lfthe inter-
national community vere to legitimise such humanitarian` inter-
ventions on a permanent lasis on something more than the
contingent and often interested agreement ofa fev greatpovers, a
nevinstitutionalframevorkisneeded.The role ofgovernmentsand
governmental organisations , like NAT, should le minimised. `
venconsistentlilerals arevearyofregionalgroupings,poverllocs
andlessthanuniversal ahiances interveningas representatives ofthe
universal. As Bauman argued, vith the universalism-promoting
agencies vell short oftruly universal sovereignty, the horizon of
' actuallyexisting' or, rather, realisticallyintended) universalitytends
to stop at the state loundary . . . Consistently universalistic can le
onlyapoverlentonidenti(ingthehumankindasavholeviththe
populationsuljectedtoitspresentofprospective rule`. 'This typi-
cally French eighteenth century position perfectly encapsulates the
current American mood, as shovn in the opposition to the
lnternationalCriminalCourt.
Representatives ofthevictimsandofnon-governmentalorganisa-
tionsoperatingintheareaofinterventionshouldleactivelyinvolved
in decision-making. Theaims and methods ofthe campaign should
leremovedfromthepovergamesofpresidents,primeministersand
generals andfocusonprotectingindividuals. Themilitaryshould le
in close contact vith local democratic organisations and olservers
and should aim to enalle them to protect civilians and help them
overthrovthemurderousregime.Nopersonorcommunitycangain
theirdignityorfreedomthroughforeigninterventionoragiftfrom
alove. Theinterveningpovers canonly help localpeople re-assert
theirrightsagainsttheirgovernment.Finally, aclearsetofguidelines
shouldregulatetheconductofthevarandminimisecasualtiesonall
'` Kofi^nnan, thcLlSccrctar,-Ccncral,rcmindcdthc CcncraI^sscmblyolthcorgan-
isation,altcrthcarvalolthcast Jimorcacc-kccingforcc, olthcinactioninRvanda
in i | andaddcd. Jhc inabilityolthc intcrational community inthc casc olKosovo to
rcconcilc . . . univcrsallcgitimacyandcllcctivcncssindclcnscolhumanrghtscanbcvicvcd
as atragcdy. ^nnanays trbutc to svilt action, T|c CuctJ|ca, Sctcmbcrz i , i , i|
^nnan`sstatcmcntisavaringtothcVcst. thcunivcrsalhastobcauthorscdbythcglobal
thc Ll) or it vilI losc its crsuasivc lorcc ut this is a dcmarcation and status disutc
bctvccnLlandl^JC, notoncaboutthcmcaningolunivcrsalsIlanormativcunivcr-
sal cxists, itmakcs no dillcrcncc vhcthcr itis ut lorvardbythc vholc vorld ora singlc
souI Convcrscly, ilitdocs not, uttingastrongmajority bchind itvillmakcno dillcrcncc
toitsstatus.
'' auman, o cit , suran 6z, |I
i+i
sides. Suchavaraimstorescuethevictimsandpreventputtingmore
peopleatriskandnottoengageanothergovernment. None ofthese
conditionsexiststodayanditvouldlepioustoexpectthattheyvih
developsoon.
Butthemostimportantpointisthis. humanitarian`varisacon-
tradictioninterms.Varandits consequences, lomlingandmaim-
ingpeople can neverle part ofhuman rights and morality. ven if
veveretoacceptthatalargepartofthemotivefortheKosovocam-
pa;gnvas humanitarian, thevarvas not andcouldnot le moral`.
Bomlingdoesnotprotectpeopleanddoesnotpreventatrocities. A
destructivevar,lydehnitionadevastatingnegationofhumanrights ,
can le seen as humanitarian only lecause human rights have leen
hijackedly governments, politiciansanddiplomats andentrustedin
the hands ofthoseagainstvhom theyvere invented. ln avorldin
vhichhumanity's duesaredecidedlythepoverful, theinhumanity
ofdictators can only le confronted vith the inhumanity ofsemi-
smart lomls ` and civilian collateral oamage`. But in these cir-
cumstances, therighteouscommitthecrimethey setouttoprevent.
N. 1

V1 11

I 111 `
lti s argualle, therefore, that the grandiose claims aloutthe impor-
tance ofinternational human rights are a little exaggerated. These
rights,lyleingpresentedasadescriptionorstatementaloutthestate
oflav, present the legislator humanity or its self-appointed repre-
sentativesinNevYork, GenevaorStraslourg) asco-extensivevith
theright-holders allconcretepeopleinthevorld) .Vritingin i ,,i,
Hannah Arendt expressedvithtypicalacuitythis dilemma.
Nan ol thc tvcnticth ccntury has Lcconc just as cnanciatcd lron
naturc as cightccnth ccntury nan vas lron history. Iistory and naturc
havc Lcconc cqually alicn to us, nancly, in thc scnsc that thc csscncc
ol nan can no longcr Lc conrchcndcd in tcrns ol cithcr catcgory.
Cn thc othcr hand, hunanity, vhich lor thc cightccnth ccntury, in
Kantian tcrninology, vas no norc than a rcgulativc idca, has today
Lcconc an incscaaLlc lact. Jhis ncv situation, in vhich `hunanity
has in cllcct assuncd thc rolc lorncrly ascriLcd to naturc or history,
vould ncan in this contcxt that thc right to havc rights, or thc right
ol cvcry individual to Lclong to hunanity, should Lc guarantccd Ly
hunanity itscl It is Ly no ncans ccrtain vhcthcr this is ossiLlc. '`
'` ^rcndt, ocit. , suran. 6, z8
+Z THE TPl LMPH O F HLMANl TY.
This dilemmai s lestexemplifiedlythetreatmentofrefugeesand
otherpopulations eeingnaturalorman-made disasters. This is the
greatesthumancatastropheofthetventiethcenturyoutsidevarand,
inethnic cleansing, itreaches the nadirofthemanyevils ofnation-
alism. Refugees have replaced foreigners as the main category of
othernessinourpostmodernandglolalisedvorld.Theforeignervas
thepoliticalpreconditionofthenation-stateandthe othertheonto-
logical precondition ofindividual identity. Vhen the roving for-
eigner arrives at the lorders ofthe state, the assumptions ofnational
andpersonalintegrity comeunderseverepressure. Fornationallav,
the refugee is a threat to theprinciple ofterritorialjurisdiction. But
she also representstheviolenceattheinceptionofthemodernstate,
the exclusionofotherpeoples, nationsandminoritiesnecessaryfor
the creation ofterritorial andlegislative sovereignty. Forthe citizen
ofour glolalisedvorld, the refugee represents a threat toj ols and
amenities, lut also a deeper threat to the construction ofnational
identity. As ve sav, the modern sulject reaches her humanity ly
acquiring politicalrights vhich guarantee heradmissionto the uni-
versalhumannature, lyexcludingfromthatstatusthosevhodonot
have such rights. lt is thelavofthe nationstatevhichdennesthe
alienasalienandtherefugeeasrefugee. Thealienisnotacitizen.She
doesnothave rights lecause she is notpart ofthestateandsheisa
lesserhuman leinglecause she is not a citizen. ln the terms ofthe
French Declaration, the alien is the gap letveen man and citizen,
letveen human nature and political community lies the moving
refugee. To have citizens vemusthave aliens, to have a home ora
homecountryothers mustnotshareit,ortheymustleinmovement
or in transit, in perpetual otation or in orlit, like those medieval
madpeoplevho vere travelling the rivers ofuropeinthe ships of
thefools. ''Lnalletospeakourlanguage,havinglefthercommunity
andvithno community, therefugee isthe alsolute other. She rep-
resents inan extremevay thetraumathatmarks the genesis ofstate
and selfandputs to the test the claims ofuniversalisation ofhuman
rights.
The alsolute otherness ofthe refugee is evident in a numler of
vays. Hannah Arendt revieving the great movement ofrefugees
and stateless persons after the First Vorld Var, people vho today
vouldhaveleencalled economicmigrants`, concludes that they
'' Rclugccsarccommonlyutinortitundcrthcurstsalccountr,rulcvhichallovs
a statc to scnd back arclugccto astatc shc comcslrominvhichshc docsnothavcalcarol
crsccution
+
vere persecutednot lecauseofvhattheyhad done orthought,lut
lecause ofvhat they unchangeally vere - lorn into the vrong
kindofraceorthevrongkindofclassordraftedlythevrongkind
ofgovernment`. ''Peoplelecomerefugees notfortheircriminalor
revolutionary acts, lut for vho they are. Most ofthem have done
nothing vrong, except to ee, to move across frontiers, to cross
loundaries. Their rightlessness, the alsence oflegal personality, is
not a consequence ofsevere punishment or the sign of extreme
criminalityluttheaccompanimentofutterinnocenceandofmove-
ment, ofasacrificialcirculation. Therefugeeisdennednotlyvhat
shehas done ordoes- the denning characteristic ofmodernhuman
nature- lutforvho she is, for herleingratherthanfor her action
andlecoming. lnthis, shej oins the othergreatdangerousleings of
modernity, the mad, the homosexual, thejev. But as her threatis
on the move she also represents the great postmodern danger, the
vrrus.
Refugeestatusisnottheresultofthelackorlossofthisorthatright
lutofthe total loss ofcommunityand ofthe legalprotections asso-
ciatedvithit.Rightlessnessaccompaniesthelackofcommunityand
the glolalisation of national lav and right. Refugees have leen
removedfromtheirovncommunityandarekeptoutsidethelounds
ofall potential receiving ones . lt is not so much that they are not
equalleforethelav, lutthatthereisnolavforthem. ltisnotthat
theyarenotpersecuted,lutthatnonevantstopersecutethem.The
vorldoflarlaritythus comes to aheadinasinglevorldcomposed
ofstates , in vhich only those people organised into national resi-
dences are entitled to have rights. The 'loss ofresidence' , a 'loss of
social framevork' vorsened ly the 'impossilility to nnd one' are
characteristics ofthisnevlarlarity issuedfromthevary core ofthe
nation-state system` in a glolalised vorld. ' The rightlessness that
accompanies removalfromthe community shovs the deeptruthof
the critique ofhumanrightslydmundBurke and the communi-
tarians vho insist that only national lav can create and effectively
protect rights. ln a glolalised vorld, in vhich nothing is exempt
fromstate sovereignty, and human rights have lecome posited and
universal, the refugee istherepresentative ofthenon-representalle,
shehasnostateorlav,nonationorpartytoputforvardherclaims.
nly in a completely organised humanity`, comments Arendt,
'` ^rcndt,suran. 6, zp|
' Kristcva,S/rca_cr /ourc|veLconRoudicztrans. )ColumbiaLnivcrsity!rcss,i pp )
, i
i ++ THE TPl LMPH O F HLMANl TY.
`could the loss ofhome and political status lecome identical vith
expulsion ofhumanityaltogether`.Therefugeeisthetotalotherof
civilisation, the zero degree ofhumanity. She represents the state of
natureinallitsstarknakednessandthevorldnnds nothingsacredin
the alstractnakedness ofleing human. But as Lyotardargued, `to
lanish a stranger is to lanish the community, and you lanish your-
selffromthecommunitytherely`. `'

Allthisdoesnotmeanthathumanrights treaties anddeclarationsare

devoid ofvalue. At this point in the development ofinternational
lav,theirvalueismainlysymlolic. Humanrightsareviolatedinside
thestate, thenation, thecommunity, thegroup. Similarly, thestrug-
gle to uphold them lelongs to the dissidents, the victims , those
vhose identity is denied or denigrated, the oppositions groups, all
thosevho arethe targets ofrepressionanddomination. nlypeople
onthegroundandlocalactioncanimprovehumanrights, outsiders,
includinghuman rights organisations, canhelply supportingthem.
Fromthisperspective,internationalconventionsareofusetohuman
rights activists , ly offering a standard for criticising their govern-
ments. Vhen a state has adopted aparticular set ofrights, itvillle
harder,althoughlynomeansimpossille,foritsgovernment,todeny
committing olvious aluses . Similarly, external monitoring and
reportingmayraiseavarenessaloutastate'sviolationsandthesham-
ingthat accompanies exposure maylead to improvements. But the
successesofmonitoringarelimitedandtheadverse effectsofpullic-
ityareintangille andtakelongincoming.
VhenGreecevasforcedtoleavetheCouncilofuropein i ,,,
aftertheuropean Commission ofHumanRights found that every
article ofthe Conventionvasviolatedlythe colonels, the response
ofthedictatorsvascharacteristic. Theystatedvithgreatfanfarethat
theuropeanCouncilandCommissionvereaconspiracyofhomo-
sexuals and communists against hellenic values and dramatically
increasedrepression. Similarly, vhile Pinochet'sChileandthe South
AfricaofapartheidvererepeatedlycondemnedlyLNhumanrights
lodies and the General Assemlly, the regimes attacked ' meddling
foreigners' and survived for decades. Nigel Rodley, the Lnited
Nationsspecialrapporteurontorture since i,, , savthe usesofhis
taskasfollovs.
'` ^rcndt, o. cit, suran 6, z,
`' ]can-FrancoisLyotard, JhcCthcr`srights, in aHumcaF|_|| StchcnShutcand
Susan Murcy cds) , lcvYork. asic ooks, i , i 6
F ROM i , 8 TO i 8 i +3
Jhc inlormation gcts to lamilics that somconc outsidc is invcstigating
or acaling to thc govcrnmcnt. Cccasionally thc risoncr lcarns ol this
too. ^nd I lccl that somchov thc dri, dri ol cxtcrnal dcmands that a
govcrnmcnt do somcthing or sto things likc torturc vill havc an cllcct
. . . It`s not thc L that can changc things dircctly. It`s grous in thc
country itscl Intcrnational monitoring givcs thcsc lorccs, Loth non-
govcrnmcntal and vithin govcrnmcnt, somc suort. ''
lfthe victims ofrepression lecome recognised in the eyes ofthe
internationalcommunityas actors , thevalue ofinternationalhuman
rightsvillincreaseforthosevho matter.
The tradition ofhuman rights, from the classical invention of
natureagainstconventionto contemporarystrugglesforpoliticallil-
erationandhumandignityagainststatelav, hasalvays expressedthe
perspectiveofthefutureorthe `notyet`.Humanrightshavelecome
the cry ofthe oppressed, the exploited, the dispossessed, a kind of
imaginary orexceptionallavforthosevhohavenothingelse to fall
lackon. lnthissense, humanrightsarenot theproductoflegislation
lutpreciselyitsopposite. Theysetlimitto ` force, declaredlavsand
' founded'rightsregardlessofvhohas,ordemands,orusurpsthepre-
rogativetofoundthemauthoritatively)`. 'Humanrights,astheprin-
ciple ofhope, vorkinthe gap letveen idealnature andlav, orreal
people and universal alstractions. Thepromise ofafuture invhich,
in Marx's memoralle phrase, people are not `degraded, enslaved,
alandoned, or despised` does not lelong to governments and
lavyers. ltcertainlydoesnotlelongtointernationalorganisationsand
diplomats. ltdoesnotevenlelongtothealstracthumanleingofthe
declarations and conventions or ofthe traditional humanistphiloso-
phy,includingtheKantiansulj ectvhich,forDerrida,is`stilltoofra-
ternal,sulliminallyvirile, familial,ethnic, nationaletc`. '`Theenergy
necessary for the protection, horizontal proliferation and vertical
expansionofhumanrights comesfromlelov,fromthosevhoselives
have leenllightedly oppression or exploitation andvho have not
leenofferedorhavenotacceptedthellandishmentsthataccompany
political apathy. ln the meantime, ve can leave the Lnited Nations
and their diplomats to their standard setting and their lunches and
returntothestateorthecommunity,theonlyterritoryvherehuman
rightsareviolatedorprotected.

JhcvorIdisvatching. ^survcy olhumanrightsIav, T|cI:caom|s/,Icccmbcr,

i 8, 6
' ]acquasIcrridaquotcdi nLI||crc/|oa, lovcmbcrz|, i |, 8.
` uotcdi nauman, os/moJcn|/ycaJ||I|s:ca/ca/s Cambridgc, !oIity, i ,)
PART l l
i1 i11`i` 1
i'1 1i`

T|c C|css|.c| Ct|/|ucs I|_|/s But|c cac Mct
1 . 11V1 11 1 1 b IV1 L1 b I V1 Lb
l fthe eighteenthcentury declarations are thefoundationofthe dis-
course of rights, Burke's and Marx's reH ections on the French
Revolutionarethefoundationalcritiquesofrights.Latercriticshave
developedandexpandedtheirmainpointsinanumlerofdirections
lut have not added much nev. Ve examined lrieHy alove, the
ol ections ofBurke andMarxto the alstract man` ofthe declara-
tions.Letus nov take acloserlookatthe classicslyemphasisingthe
points ofcontinuityletveentheearlyandcontemporarycritics.
First, Burke. Edmund Burke's essay ReHections on the
RevolutioninFrance`vasthefrstconsideredattackontherecently
inauguratedtheoryofthe rights ofman.' lts commercialsuccessand
politicalinuencecannotle overestimated. Pullishedinlovemler
i ),o, as an immediate and emotional response to eventsin Paris, it
soldsome i ), ooocopieslytheendofthatyearandventontomany
editions in the folloving years. The exaggerated invective of the
essay and many ofits predictions soundolsolete today, achapterin
thehistoryofreactionarythought, vhichfnally exited thehistorical
sceneaftertheSecondVorldVarandthevorld-videspreadofmass
democracies and human rights. The eulogies forthe ancient consti-
tutionrepletevith deferencetovardsthe monarchandthe aristoc-
racy, theinsistencethat rights areantithetical totheEnglishvayof
life, theproclamationofthenaturalsuperiorityofEnglishinstitutions
and temperament, sound almost comically alsurd to contemporary
Britishears. Devolution, the HumanRights Act i ,,, the reformof
the House ofLords and closer links vith Europe have turned the
i ,,os into the decade ofrights and constitution-making, and have
' dmund urkc, Fjc:/|oas oa /|c Fcco|u/|oa |a Frca:c ]C. A. !ockock cd. ) London,
Mackctt, i 8,) .
+O THE CIAS S l CAI CPl Tl QLES CI P l G H T S
condemnedBurke'spredictionsandmusingst otheannalsof apecu-
liarlyinsularEnglishheritageputtorestlyBrusselsandTonyBlair.
But there is something oflasting relevance in Burke's attack on
thepretendedrightsofthesetheorists`. Mostcriticsofrightslelong
today to thepoliticalleftandhardlyknov, letalone use, the eune
ideas andpolemics ofan eighteenthcenturyarch-conservative. Yet
many ofBurke's comments aloutthe difhculties facedlyanycon-
sistenttheorisation ofhumanrights have not leenprovedvrong or
improved ly contemporary critics. Hannah Arendt agreed vith
Burke's emphasis onthe local character ofthe protection ofrights .
MichelVilleyremindedusthatBurkevasnoordinaryreactionary.`
He fervently supported the American revolution and vas scathing
aloutthetreatmentoflndiansandhomosexualslytheEnglishestal-
lishmentofhisday. FeministandcommunitariancriticsshareBurke's
critique ofthe alstract, indeterminate character ofrights discourse,
eventhoughtheydespisehispolitics. Finally,postmodernapproaches
tolav,inuencedlytheethicsofalterityassociatedviththephiloso-
phiesofLevinasandDerrida, arecritical oftherationalismofrights
andemphasisetheirsituatedandemleddedcharacter. lnthis ,theyare
not too removed from Burke's assertion that only individualised
ustice canprotectfreedom. 'Letus return to Burke's attack onthe
revolution andits rights from a contemporary critical perspective.
Vhatarehismainarguments andlines ofattack?
1 . Burke'smaincriticismisthatrightsdiscoursesuffersfrommeta-
physicalidealismandrationalism. The proponents ofrightsfollova
clumsy political metaphysics, they are metaphysical rationalists or,
speculatists`, thevorstinsultinBurke's richvocalulary ofaluse.
Speculatismistheleliefthatpoliticalpractice,theartofthepossille,
shouldleguidedlytheory,thattheintricatevelofpoliticallifeand
- Mannah^rcndt, T|cr|_|as Torc||/cr|ca|sm Marvcstook, 979) joo.
` Nichcl\illcy, Lahilosohicdudroitdcurkcin Cti/|ucJc|ccasec]ut|J|ucmoJ-
crac!ars, Ialloz, I ,,) . \ilIcyrcscntsurkcas atruc^ristotclianvhohas adjustcdlcgal
hiIosohyto thc circumstancc olhis timc Mc rcluscs to construct thclav according to
thc idca olhuman csscncc orrcason but, likc classical naturallavycrs, according to vhat
cxistsinnaturc, ositivcIy, I ,& For\ilIcy,urkcisnotagainstrightsbutagainst abstract
libcrtyvhich, likcothcrabstractions,docsnotcxist.Rightsarc,onthccontrar,,manyand
divcrsc,alvaysrclativcto saccandtimc, I ,I
' C Iouzinas and R. Varrngton,us/|:cM|s:ctr|cJ dinburgh, dinburgh Lnivcrsity
!rcss, I |) Chatcr |, ^Vcll-loundcdFcarol ]usticc I I /zLavandCritiquc I I , , I I ,
NarinosIiamantidcs,thicsinLav.IcathNarksona' StilILilc` , \I/zLucaJCr|/|uc,
zo, I , , Nar ^rmstrong, Facc to Facc vith ChiId ^busc. Jovards an thics ol
Listcning, X/z LucaJCr|/|uc, I |,, I .
Rcncctions, o cit , suran I, , I .
L LPKE A N D MAPX +V
the complexandancientpatrimony oflegal duties and entitlements ,
shouldle re-arranged accordingto some plan conceivedlyhuman
reasonandcarried outlyradicalaction. TheFrenchRevolutionvas
thefrst completerevolution` , ledlyphilosophers , metaphysicians
andmenofletters, notassulordinateinstrumentsandtrumpetersof
sedition,lutas the chiefcontriversandmanagers`. Thesephiloso-
phers aimed to uproot the ca.|ca t|mc in all its institutional and
moralpoverandtore-dravthemap ofnationandstate completely,
folloving philosophical prescriptions and recipes. But this is the
greatest folly. Political practice and practical visdom or prudence,
differfromtheoreticalspeculation,theformerisconcernedviththe
particular and the changealle vhile theory vith the universal and
immutalle. lo aspectofpoliticscanleconceivedinthealstract.
Thescience ofgovernment` dealsvithmoralityandtheproper
endsofgovernmentastheypresentthemselvesinthehereandnov.
Similarly vith the means ofpolitics. no political method or tool is
universally valid and applicalle, trusted methods must often le set
aside in deference to the tvists and turns of chance or{ot/uac.
Contingency,contextandchanceratherthantheoreticalspeculation
determine politics. Circumstances vhich vith some gentlemen
passfornothing) giveinrealitytoeverypoliticalprincipleitsdistin-
guishing colour, and discriminating effect. The circumstances are
vhatrendereverycivilandpoliticalschemeleneficialornoxiousto
mankind`.Politicalorpracticalandtheoreticaludgmentsarethere-
fore opposed. theformerinvolveconcrete cases andcannotvaitfor
long,loundas they are to pressingneedsandto deadlines. Practical
udgments cannot le suspended until all the arguments have leen
canvassedandassessed,theymustle satisfedthereforevithalover
degree ofcertainty and clarity than theory. Theoreticaludgments,
on the other hand, are detached and impartial, cold and languid.
Theory legins each time fromthe leginning and goesallthe vay,
practice starts vithprecedentand conventionand comes quickly to
an end. Finally, theory re ects errorandpreudice, vhile the states-
manputsthesetogooduse.
ForBurke, therefore, thestandpointofthe alsoluteanduniversal
llinds the politician to the realities ofthe particular and concrete
and turns him into a metaphysician and prophet, full ofrhetorical
' ibid ,j
' ibid. , ,.
Lco Strauss, ^c/utc| F|_|/ caJ H|s/ory Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, I6;)
j I o-I
i 3
THE CIAS S l CAI CPl Tl QLES OF Pl GHTS .
hyperlole notunlike Burke's ovn) lutunalle to rule. Speculative
politicians of the French variety, fascinated ly mathematics and
olsessed vith ct|ot| deductive reasoning, devise constitutions and
lillsofrights.Butvhilethistypeoftheoreticalreasonmaylealleto
produce simple andclear ideas andpatterns, it is totally unsuited to
political affairs . lts proponents lecome moral geometers` and use
reasontoconstructgeometricalandarithmeticalconstitutions`.But
theirsimplicityandplainness cannot match themessinessoflife and,
asaresult, vhen thesemetaphysicalrights enter into commonlife,
likerays oflightvhichpierceintoadensemedium, are, lythelavs
of nature, refracted from their straight line`. Rights are not only
cognitivelyvrong intheirconception, theyare also morally vrong
intheirapplicationvhichtries to makelife follovthe orthopaedics
ofreason. Political prudence, on the contrary, computes, lalances
andvorksvithcompromises,calculationsandexceptions,itrequires
delicateandsultleskills, adiscernmenthonedthroughlongexperi-
enceandpracticeratherthanthroughalstractthinkingandthestudy
oftreatises.
The cognitiveconfusionandmoralpovertyofrationalistconstitu-
tionmakersandrights enthusiastsiscompoundedlytheirignorance
of history and human nature. They lelieve that human reason,
unaidedlyhistory, traditionandpracticalvisdom,cancreate stalle
andlegitimateinstitutionsluttheyarehopelessly deluded. Thecon-
stitutional tradition must le approached vith humility lecause an
elementofmystiqueis necessaryto giveanaurato the living consti-
tution. lnthe Rqc./|oasandhisearlieressay onthe Bccu/(ju| caJ/|c
Su|||mc, Burkedevelopedanaesthetictheoryofpoliticsvhichasso-
ciatesthesullimevithlanguageandverlalexpressionandtheleau-
tifulvithvisionandimagery. ''Thesullimeisthefeelinggenerated
leforeineffalle, distant, terri(ingpover. People sulmitto thefig-
ureofGod, KingorFatherlecausethesemalefguresofpovergen-
erate terror and pain, they are avesome.' ' They make us sulmit
through an overvhelming force vhich cannot le fully compre-
hended. But this political aesthetic ofsullimity must le protected
fromvisualisation. An image or a painting gives a clear idea ofits
` Rcn cctions, o. cit , suran I, , q.
' ' dmundurc, H |||oso||.c| Iau|q |a/o /|c r|_|as o} /|c Su|||mc caJ /|c ccu/qu|

|. JouItoncd ) lotrcIamc,LnivcrsityollotrcIamc!rcss, i ,8)

' ' urkc`satrarchaI subIimityis cchocdin Frcud`stotcmicmytholthc gcncsisolIav
and is a kcy thcmc in !icrrc Lcgcndrc`s thcory olthc atcrnity ol Iav Scc Chatcr I I
bcIov
LLPKE AND MAPX i 3i
ol ect, leaves nothingt oimagination and doultand canleudged
accordingtoconventionalcriteriaofaestheticleauty. Aclearidea`,
Burkeremarkspithilyisthereforeanothernameforalittleidea`.'
The sullimei s olscure, i toveraveslutalso createsintensepleasure
intheattempttocomprehendvhatovervhelmsthemindanddefies
reason.
Burke uses this analysis to reinterpret the Protestant iconoclastic
tradition in 3 political direction. lnvisilility, darkness and visual
deprivation are the political signs ofsullimity. despotic govern-
ments, vhich are founded on the passions ofman, and principally
uponthepassionoffear,keeptheirchiefasmuchasmayle fromthe
pullic eye. The policyhas leenthe same inmanycases ofreligion.
Almost all heathen templesaredark`. ' lnBurke'shierarchy ofthe
sullime, language comes lefore imagery and, unvritten lav con-
vention and custom lefore vritten positive lav. Saxon customs
operate letterthanlavs` andprovided thelasisforlaterlavsand
the constitution vhich only fashioned or fnished vhat had leen
createdlytheancientoraltradition. Allyoursophisterscannotpro-
duce anythingletteradaptedtopreservea rationalandmanly free-
domthanthecoursevehavepursued,vhohave chosenournature
rather than our speculations, ourlreasts rather than ourinventions ,
for the great conservatories and magazines ofour rights and privi-
leges` vrites Burke. ' 'A visille, vritten constitution, on the other
hand, is criminal`. ' The real constitution is an organism, some-
thinglike ahumanlody, constitutedas acommunityofsensesvith
distinctpoversandprivileges, amixedleingofnaturalandconven-
tionallehaviour,acreatureof liologyandhalit,pleasureandpain`
i

andpreservedlyimmemorialcustom.
Theconstitutionshouldthereforecultivateemotionalattachments
and affections. lts symlolic forms and representations should le
moving and leautiful. ln an exquisite phrase, vhich reminds his
arch-enemy lut fellov stylist Rousseau, Burke posits the principle
ofconstitutional politics thus. to make us love our country, our
' Su|||mccaJccu/jju|,o. cit , suran IC, 6
' ` ibid , ,
' ' Fc:t|oas,o cit , suran. I , ]1

' ' dmund urkc, ^caI lrom thc lcv to thc CId Vhigs, quotcd in VJ.
NitchclI, :oao|o_y Chicago, LnivcrsityolChicago !rcss, i 86), I qI .
' ' ibid , i |z. uikc`s osition onthc ngIish constitution vas an imortant, aIthough
otcn unackn
'
vIcdgcd, innucncc on ith ccntury constitutionaIvritingslrom agchot to
Iiccy and

stil Iurs bchind contcmorary dcbatcs on rtish arliamcntary sovcrcignty,

mcmbcrshi olthc urocan Lnion andthc introductionof a ill olRights.
i 3Z THE CIAS S l CAI CPl Tl QLES O F P l G H T S .
countryoughttolelovely` .Theconsciousplanningoftherational-
istconstitutionmakers, onthe otherhand, eliminatesthe secretand
sacredpartofthe constitutionandleaves forceonlyto underpin the
poverofthestate.
Cn thc schcnc ol this LarLarous hiIosohy . . . Iavs arc to Lc su-
ortcd onIy Ly thcir ovn tcrrors, and Ly t|c conccrn, vhich cach
individuaI nay und in thcn, lron his ovn vatc sccuIations, or can
sarc to thcn lron his ovn rivatc intcrcsts. In thc grovcs ol thcir
acadcny, at thc cnd ol cvcry vista, you scc nothing Lut thc galIovs.
othing is Iclt that cngagcs thc allcctions on thc art ol thc com-
nonvcaIth. Cn thc rinciIcs ol this ncchanic hiIosohy, our insti-
tutions can ncvcr Lc cnLodicd, il I nay usc an cxrcssion, in crsons,
so as to crcatc in us Iovc, vcncration, adniration or attachncnt. !ut
that sort ol rcason vhich Lanishcs thc allcctions is incaaLIc ol lilIing
thcir Iacc. '
Constitutions and human rights cannot replace this kind ofattach-
ment. On the contrary, they threaten the organic composition and
constancy ofthe commonvealthlydisconnectingit into the dust
and povder ofindividuality` , and veakening its cement ly the
unprincipledfacilityofchangingthestateasoften,andasmuch, and
inasmanyvays asthereareHoatingfanciesorfashions` .

lntheseformulations, Burke haspredatedsome ofthemainargu-

mentsofpsychoanalyticalurisprudencelytvohundredyears . ' To
avoid the evils ofinconsistency and versatility . . . ve have conse-
cratedthe state thatnomanshouldapproachtolookintoitsdefects
orcorruptionlutvithduecaution. . . , thatheshouldapproachthe
voundsofthe state astothevoundsofafather,vithpiousaveand
tremlling solitude`. ' Similarly, for Pierre Legendre, the state and
theconstitutionrepresentthepatriarchalprinciplevhichisnecessary
for loth sulect and the commonvealth.' Vithout reference

and
reverence for the principle of paternity, social reproduction,
Legendre's principle of fliation, vould le destroy

d lecause,
according to Burke, no one generation could link vith another.
Menvouldlecomelittleletterthaniesofthesummer`. '
z. The rationalism ofrights discourse makes their formulationso
alstract and generalastorenderthemunreal and unrealisalle. This
` Fqc:t|oas,o cit.,suran I , 68.
s
'Cn this schcmc olthings, a kingis Lut a man, a quccn is Lut a voman, avoman!S
Lut ananimal, andan animalnotolthc highcst ordcr`, iLid 6,.

iLid. , 8
-' SccChatcr I I Lclov.
' Fqc:t|oas,o. cit , suran I , 8 j .
LLPKE AND MAPX
i 3
arguirent has tvo distinct strands. First, the alstraction of rights
makestheminoperalleandendsleingtheirgreatestpracticaldefect.
Alstraction is necessary ofcourse, ifthe great plan ofrights is to
cohereinthefaceofallthegreatdifferencesofpeopleandplaceand
circumstance. lndeed, the more metaphysically true and consistent
theirformulationis,themoreformalandgeneraltheymustappearto
leand,asaresult,thegreatertheirpoliticaldisutilityandmoralfalse-
ness . Vhatisthe use ofdiscussingaman'salstractrightto foodor
medicine?Thequestionisuponthemethodof procuringandadmin-
isteringthem. ln thatdelilerationl shallalvaysadvise to callinthe
aidofthefarmerandthephysician,ratherthantheprofessorofmeta-
physics`. Vhat is the use ofthe alstract right to life or to free
speechandpresstothevictims offamineandvarortopeoplevho
are cannot readthroughlackofeducationfacilities?Vhatistheuse
ofproclaimingtherighttohealthcareinaplacelikeHaitivhereone
lasic hospital covers more than tvo million people and AlDS
patientsareroutinelyturnedavaylecausetheycannotletreateddue
tothelackofresources?Burke'scomments ,madesometvohundred
years ago, sound prohetic in light ofthe lurdens placed on the
developingvorldlyhugedeltandthemismanagement,corruption
andinefficiencythathasfollovedhumanitarianaid.
Burke's attack focuses mainly on the metaphysical delusions of
constitution designers and rights enthusiasts, lut lavyers do not
escapecensure. Theytoocanturntospeculatism`, vhentheyassert
thatthelav,repletevithitsalstractionsanduniversals, canprovide
ansvers to political questions. lndeed, according to Strauss, Burke
questionedlesstherightsthanthevisdomofexercisingtheserights
. . . he tried to restore the genuinely political as against a legalistic
approach`. There is no greater insult to the victims ofnatural or
manmadecatastrophes, offaminesandvar, ofearthquakesandeth-
niccleansing, ofepidemicsandtorture,thereisnogreaterscornand
disregardthantole told that, accordingtothe relevantinternational
treaty, theyhavearighttofoodandpeace, to ashelterandhome or
tomedicalcareandanendtomaltreatment. Thecontemporarypro-
fessors ofmetaphysics and moral geometers are the diplomats and
internationallavyers , thegovernmentemissariesandthefunctionar-
ies ofinternationalorganisations. They constructcodesofrights and
entitlements vhich allov governments to appease their collective
consciencein the most pullic ofvays. Humanrightshave lecome
-- iLid. , j .
-` Strauss, o cit. , suran 8, j oj .
i 3+ THE C IAS S l CAI CPl Tl QLES CI P l G H T S .
thesymlolof superiorityof Vesternstates ,akindof mantra,therep-
etitionofvhichsoothesthepainfulmemoryofpastinfamiesandthe
guiltofpresentinustices. Vhenthishappens ,Burke'sfears are con-
frmed. humanrightsllockthefuture.
Burke'ssecondcriticismaddressesthealstractnatureofthesul ect
ofhumanrights. Themanvithoutdeterminationofthedeclarations
isnotonlyanon-existentperson, heisalsosoindeterminatethathis
pale outline can provide very little protection. For Burke, human
natureissociallydeterminedandeachsocietycreates itsovntypeof
person. lo generalrights ofmanexisttherefore, or,iftheydo,they
haveno value. The onlyeffective rights are createdly a particular
history, tradition and culture. The commonhumanity advertisedin
the declarationsofrightsisimaginary,realhumanityconsistofasit
veresomanydifferentspeciesofanimals`. 'Bothconservative and
radical critics ofrights agreed. The Frenchjoseph de Maistre stated
that l have met ltalians, Russians , Spaniards , Englishmen,
Frenchmen,lutl do notknovmaningeneral` . Marxthoughtthat
only concrete individuals exist, historically and socially determined
andshapedlytheirclassposition. Anotherearlycritic, H. A. Taine
foundtheFrenchdeclarationas.
nothing Lut aLstract dognas, nctahysical dcunitions, and norc or
lcss litcrary axions, and thcrclorc norc or lcss lalsc, sonctincs vaguc,
sonctincs contradictory, suscctiLlc to various intcrrctations . . . a
kind ol onous sign-Loard, usclcss and hcavy vhich . . . is in dan-
gcr ol lalIing on thc asscrs-Ly and is cvcr day shakcn Ly violcnt
hands. `'
The ontological unreality ofthe alstract man ofrights inexorally
leadsto theirlimitedusefulness.Alstractrights are so removedfrom
theirplaceofapplicationandtheconcretecircumstancesoftheper-
sons vho suffer and hurt that they are unalle to match their real
needs. `
Against those useless alstractions , Burke advertised the rights of
the freelorn Englishman. These rights, inherited from their fore-
fathers, have a longpedigree and ancient provenance vithout any
reference vhatever to any other more general or prior right. `
' Fqc:/|oas, o. cit. , suran. I , I 66.
` _uotcd i n Claudc clort, Iolitics and Juman Rights`, i n T|c o||/|:c| Fotms o}
MoJctaSo:|c/y CamLridgc, Iolity, IS6) 66.
zo
J, A Jainc, Ics t|_|acsJc|cFtca:c Coa/cmotc|ac. LFcvo|u/|oa, | ' cact:||c,quotcdin
lorLcrto oLLio, Tc._co}F|_|/s Iolity, I6) S6
z
Jhisis thc main crticismolcommunitarians againstthc univcrsalismolrghts.
LLPKE AND MAPX
i 33
Longevity, localprovenance and organic evolution guarantee rights
letterthanthe rational plans ofsophisters,oeconomists,andcalcu-
lators `. Rights exist and are violated in communities and only
domestic lav andlocal custom canprotectthem effectively, ifthey
are disposedtodoso. Burke assumedthelenevolenceandsuperior-
ity ofEnglishlavagainstthe metaphysicalgrandeur ofthe French.
But at the end ofthe tventieth century, this assumptioncannotle
easilyentertainedinrelationtotheBritishoranyotherdomesticlegal
system. lndeed, the internationallav ofhuman rights has emerged
from the realisation that, ifanything, people need to le protected
mostfromtheirlocalcustodiansoflegality.
. Therationalismandalstractionofrightsturnthemintoalsolute
moralprinciples, equallyapplicalleagainst oldandlenevolentgov-
ernmentsasvellasthemostviolenttyranny`. theseadmitnotem-
perament, and no compromise. any thing vithheld from their full
demandisso muchoffraudandinustice`. This isthedeep,political
fearof Burke,theconservativepolitician.Therightsofmanmayhelp
import the French disease. ln France, they have led to the greatest
infamies, to regicide andthemurderofaristocrats andudges. They
arenovputforvardtotheEnglishpeopleandarecanvassedagainst
Englishlavand the constitution. This mustle stopped, these rights
are extreme, against them no agreementislinding . . . nogovern-
mentcan]lookforsecurityinthelengthofitscontinuance, orinthe
usticeandlenityofitsadministration`. Theirpropagation,rather
than protect, vill inevitally lead to tyranny. Kings vill le tyrants
frompolicy vhen sul ects are relels from principle`

The close
linkletveentherights ofmanandrevolutionaryterrorcolours the
essay.
Such alsolute rightsforget that differentsocietiesleadto different
institutionalarrangements.Burkevantstovindicatethe
tcc|rightsof
man`, presentedinAristotelianfashionasamiddle,incapalleofdef-
inition,lut notimpossilletole discerned`.' Lntilpover andright
coincidefully,thesemeanrightsarevhatispracticallyreasonalleand
can neverle inconsistentvithvirtue andthefrstofallvirtues, pru-
dence`. ln this sense, the visdom ofthe ages vith its super-added
ideas ,furnishedfromthevardroleofamoralimagination, vhichthe
heart ovns, and the understandingratifes, as necessary to cover the
Fqc:/|oas, ocit. , sura n. I , 66.
iLid. , , i
`' iLid , 6S.
`' iLid , ,|
i 3 THL ClAS S l CAl CRl Tl QULS O F Rl CHTS .
defects ofour naked shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity` is
more important than the machinations ofreason or the science of
constructing, renovating or reforming a commonvealth.
Constitutionsthatgrovorganicallyaremuchletterthanthosemade.
lo vise legislator canconstructthe lestpolity, thatcomesthrough
theimitationofnature, inagreatlengthoftimeandlyagreatvari-
ety ofaccidents`.

=
These premises make Burke the founder ofcommunitaranism.
Likemanycontemporarycommunitarians,Burkecomlinedadegree
ofrelativismvithastrongpreferenceforaparticularlocaltradition,
that oftheEnglish constitution, themostperfectinthevorld. The
constitutionisnotthe outcome ofconsciousplanningorofunityof
design, lut the gradual accretion and crystallisation, from time
immemorial, ofinstitutional patterns and legal remedies vhich are
notdirectedtoaparticularpurposeoraimluttothegreatestvariety
ofends. Thisvariety andtheimportanceplacedonindividualfeel-
ingandinterest` indicatesthattheAristotelian hierarchicalteleology
has leen irretrievally lost and the continuous references to the
Aristotelian themes ofvirtue, the middle or the organic community
areremnantsonlyofantiquity,frghtingarearguardactionagainstthe
spirit ofindividualism. ln the alsence ofclassical teleology, vhich
recognisedthegoodinthepurpose ofeachentityasitcoheresvith
thevhole, theAristotelianmeanlecomestheoutcomeoflalancing
and compromises letveen goodand evil or evenletveen evil and
evil. Despite Burke's longing looks to the past, politics has moved
fromits classicalvocationandhasturnedintothescienceofcalcula-
tion and computation ofinterestslymeans ofadding, sultracting,
multiplying anddividingmorally and not metaphysically ormathe-
matically`. '
This change is evident in all the key concepts ofBurke. latural
lavisnolongerastandardforthetheoreticalconstructionofthelest
polity. lthaslecome a natural process ofselection, throughvhich
the force oflavhasleen transferredfromdivine commands to the
positiverulesoftheEnglishconstitution. Similarly,individuallilerty,
thehighestgoalofthepolity,suffersifitsimplementationisentrusted
tosystematicplanningandexcessivereH ection.Thesocialordermust
le left to develop naturally` to allovthe freeourishing ofindi-
viduality. But this is avery differentsense ofnatural` fromthat of
` ibid 6,.
`` Strauss, o. cit , suraI. 3, i |
` ' Fqc:/|oas,o. cit , suraI I , ,|.
BURKL AND MARX i 37
the classics . The hiddenhandofthemarket economyhas movedto
politics and the constitution and has found its perfect example in
England.
lfBurke discoveredtheimportance ofhistoricalurisprudence, as
Strauss points out, historicalforhim meant thelocaland accidental.
Historyispresentedasasecularisedandpartlyintelligilleprovidence,
invhichtheeternalhasleentemporalised.TheEnglishconstitution,
presentedratherunrealistically as theunintended outcome ofacci-
dentalcausation` ,isthelestexampleofthisprocessofalmostnatural
selection. But hov can thisBritishsuperiority le estallished?Burke
attimesseemstoinvoketheideaofnaturalright,vhichprecededthe
immemorialconstitutionlutvaslaterfullyemlodiedandprotected
lyit,atothers,heclaimsthattheconstitutiondoesnothave,orneed
anyreferenceto,apriorright.Butthecontradictionisonlyapparent.
Hispreferencefortherealrights`ofEnglishmenagainstthosecon-
trivedlyreasoneddesignshasnoneedofexternalvalidationthrough
naturalistustifcations orothervise. The constitutionisthe guaran-
tee ofitsovngoodnessandtranscendentstandardscanledispensed
vithifthestandardisinherentintheprocess`.Burke'sphilosophy
ofrealrights`lecomes aparochial eulogy, lasedonthe claimthat
alatent orimmanent visdom ofright is present in the English lav
andconstitution, anempiricistprevievoftheHegelianclaimthatthe
actualandthepresentcoincideviththerational.
Burke'slegacyismixed,lutitvouldnotleinaccuratetosaythat
all maor critiques ofrights share some aspect ofhis positions. Yet,
despite his stylish, pertinent and unsurpassed invective against the
metaphysical arrogance ofthe rights fanatics, hevas the frstvriter
to claim that ordinary lav is the lest depository and guarantor of
rights. The recent triumphalism ofrights has made the critique of
their rationalism, alstraction and alsolutism highly topical. But in
another sense, lileral theorists are folloving in Burke's footsteps
vithouthis historicalsensitivity. Contemporarylilerals, vho claim
thatrightsarelothimmanentinVesternlegalsystemsandcanactas
aprinciple ofcritique ofstateactivity,have adopted Burke's histori-
cism and added to it the rationalism ofrights he so eloquently
denounced. lndoingso, theyareleftviththecomlinedprollemsof
historicismandrationalismvithoutthe redeeming qualities oftran-
scendence.
`` Strauss, o. cit. , suraI. 3, I Q .
i 3O THL ClAS S i CAl CRi Ti QULS OF Ri CHTS
1 1 . 1V2 I 1 V1 Lb I 1
Thecontrilutionof MarxandMarxismt othetheoryandcritiqueof
human rights has leen fundamental. Lnderstandally, for many,
Marxism hasleenindissolullyassociatedviththe CommunistBloc
anditsideology,andisconsideredasasimplisticandlrutaldismissal
ofhumanrightsandtheiraspirations. lfvetake acloserlook,hov-
ever, at the huge ocuctc ofMarx and his epigones , a more complex
pictureemerges.TheearlyvritingsofMarxvereanattempttocon-
tinueandradicalisetheHegeliandialectic,to turnitonitshead` ,ly
acceptingthedialecticalmethodlutreectingitsidealistassumptions
alout reason's incarnation in history. ln his later political vritings,
Marxlecame more interested, alleit still froma criticaldistance, in
the potential ofpolitical and economic rights. But the impression
remains, fortifedlythe record ofthe communist states , thatMarx
expressedaradicaloppositiontovards humanrights.
To understand Marx's detailed and nuanced approach to human
rights , ve mustplaceitvithinthe viderperspective ofhisthought.
TheleststartingpointishiscommentaryontheFrenchDeclaration,
inthe early essay a /|ccu|s| Qucs/|oa. `'Marx, folloving Hegel,
arguedthatthe revolutionsplitthe unifedsocialspace offeudalism
into apolitical domain, vhichvas confnedto the state, and apre-
dominantlyeconomicone, civilsociety.Asaresult,individualsvere
released from the communal londs of the ca.|ca t|mc, lecame
atomisedandadistinctionvasdravnletveentherightsofmanvith
their egotistic content and the emerging, unclear and still idealistic
image of the citizen and his rights. Marx lased the distinction
letveen man and citizen or society and state on his fundamental
claim that the French Revolution vas lourgeois and political and
vould le supreseded ly another, universal and social. Hegel had
famously claimed during his Yena years, that seeing lapoleon on
horselack vas like seeing the spirit lecome incarnate. Marx dis-
agreed, the revolution, despite appearances, had not completed the
historicalprocess. Theuniversalandtheparticular,humanityandthe
vorld stoodstill opposedto each other. Vhile, in theory, the state
vasentrustedviththetaskofservingtheuniversalgood,inrealityit
promotedthenarrovclassinterests ofthelourgeoisieanditsdomi-
nanceovercivilsociety. TheFrenchRevolutionsucceededineman-
`' ]arl Nar, 'Cnthccvish _ucstion` in Iatly Tcxts D Nccllan tians. ) Cxlord,
lackvcll, i p,i ) , 3,-i i |
BURKL AND MARX i 3V
cipating the capitalist economy politically, vhat vas necessary nov
vasasocialrevolutionthatvouldlringaloutfullhumanemancipa-
tion.
Therights ofmanverethedominantideologyoftherevolution.
Theserightslelongtothealstractuniversalmanluttheypromote,
inpractice, theinterestsofaveconcreteperson, theselfshandpos-
sessiveindividualofcapitalism.Fromthisperspective,Marx'scritique
ofhumanrightsvastotalandconstant. Rightsidealiseandsupportan
inhumansocialorder, underpinnedlythealstractmanofthedecla-
rationsand,theyhelpturnrealpeopleintoalstractciphers.Theman
ofhumanrightsisalstractandempty.
nan lrccs hinscIl lron a constraint in a oIiticaI vay, through thc statc
vhcn hc transccnds his Iinitations, in contradiction vith hinscIf and
in an aLstract, narrov and artiaI vay. Furthcrnorc, Ly cnanciating
hinscIl oIiticaIIy, nan cnanciatcs hinscIl in a dcvious vay, through
an intcrncdiary, hovcvcr ncccssary this intcrncdiary nay Lc. `
Thesul ectofhumanrightslosesherconcreteidentity,vithitsclass,
genderandethnic characteristics, all realhuman determinations are
sacrifcedonthealtarofthealstractmanlackinghistoryandcontext.
Butatthesametime,thisalstractmanstandsinforarealpersonand
hisrightssupportsomeonerepleteofsulstance. Theemancipationof
the unreal man, sul ects real people to a very concrete rule. the
rightsofmanasdistinctfromtherightsofthecitizenarenothinglut
therightsofthememleroflourgeoissociety,i. e. egotisticman,man
separatedfromotherman andthe community` .
Again vhen Marx examined specific rights his criticisms vere
scathing. The freedomtheyproclaimisnegative, lased ona society
ofisolated monads vho see each other as threat and hindrance to
theirends. Theprivatepropertyofthemeansofproductionseparates
peoplefromthetoolsoftheirlalouranddividesthemintocapitalists
andvage lalouring slaves. Thefreedoms ofopinion and expression
arethespiritualequivalentofprivateproperty, apositionvhichmay
have leen slightly exaggeratedat a time ofpoliticalupheaval, vhen
Marxvrote, lutvhichsoundsmoreplausilleintheeraofMurdoch,
Turner and Gates. Formal equality promotes real unequality and
underminesrealanddirectrelationsamongstpeople.
Right Ly its vcry naturc can consist onIy in thc aIication ol an cquaI
standard, Lut uncquaI individuaIs and thcy vouId not Lc dillcrcnt
`' iLid pz
` iLid. , ioz.
i
THL ClAS S l CAl CRl T l QULS CI Rl CH1S .
individuals il thcy vcrc not uncqual) arc ncasuraLlc only Ly an cqual
oint ol vicv, arc takcn lron onc dcunitc sidc only . . . Cnc vorkcr
is narricd, anothcr not, onc has norc childrcn than anothcr and so on
and so lorth . . . Jo avoid all thcsc dclccts , right instcad ol Lcing cqual
vould havc to Lc uncqual.`
A. . :-..|:, ..|, :|- :.,|: :. .-..:.:, ....::..:. |..|., .||-.: .::.i...|,
|-:--. i-.:i.| ..!.v.!..|. ..! ....-:, 1|- .|:..:- .....| v.|.- ..
..: :|- .||.. ,..! |.: :|- :....|- .i :|- .|..-, :|- ..:--
....-: .i |..:,-... ....-:,, :|- ....:...- i.: |..:,-...; -,.-
.. ,''|..| .. -.::..:-! .:| |--.., .....| -..- ..! .||.. .:!-:
.. . |.,||, ...a..:..| ....-:,
|. :|.. |..:,-... |.|| .i .::.:. , ..v.| :.,|:. ...:: .-|i..|.-..
|.|- .|.:... ..! :|- .:.:- :-|..- :-|.,... ..! :|- C|.:.| ..!
|-..- . :-::-.::..| ....-|-.v-., .. |..| .....| !.v...... .:- :--
.:.:.|, i.:,.::-. ..! :|- ..:..-.. .::....:- -..||, .. ..|.: ..v-
-:-.,.:,
Nanj livcs in thc olitical cornunity, vhcrc hc rcgards hinscll as a
connunal Lcing, and in civil socicty, vhcrc hc acts sinly as a rivatc
individual, trcats othcr ncn as ncans, dcgradcs hinscll to thc rolc ol a
ncrc ncans, and Lcconcs thc laything ol alicn ovcrs. Jhc olitical
statc, in rclation to civil socicq, is just as siritual as is hcavcn in rcla-
tion to carth . . . In thc statc . . . vhcrc hc is rcgardcd as a sccics Lcing,
nan is thc inaginary ncnLcr ol an inaginary sovcrcignty, divcstcd ol
his rcal, individual lilc, and inluscd vith an unrcal univcrsality. ''
:-. :|.. |.v- . !..||- |.i- . .....| |.i- .i .::.i- ..! :.v.:- ...a..:
!.:.., :|- .:|.., --| ..! . .-...!, |..| |.|- . -:.|.:...|
.||.:|, .. !-v.:-! :. .||.. .|.:...| ..:.v.:, .. .:...: .i :|- ..-
.. ,..!, |.|- :.v.:- ..:-:-.:. .:- .||-,-!|, :-.:.:.|, .|..-
!..-! |. :-.|.:,, . .|-.: |.-:.:.|, ..|.:!...:-. :|- .|.:...| :.,|:. .i
:|- -:|-:-.| ..:..-. :. :|- ....:-:- ..:-:-.:. .i |..:,-... .. :--
.-.:-! .. ..:.:.| :.,|:. l..|.:, ..! |.|-::, .:- .!-.|.,...| i..:....
|..| |-|.., :. :|- .:.:-, |.|- :|- :-.|.:, :|-, ...:... .. .i . ....-
-:, ..! !..|, -x..:-..- .i -x|..:.:..., .:-..... ..! ..!.v.!..|..
:.:x .. .:.:...| :.. .i :|- :.,|:. .i :|- ..:..-. l.: :|.. .. ..:
|-....- :|-.- :.,|:. .:- i.|.- ..! .:-...v-, |.: |-....- :|-, .....:
!-|.v-: |.: :|-, :...- .:|.. :|- ...i..-. .i |..:,-... ....-:,
`` KarNarx,Crtiqucolthc Cotha!rogrammc in Sc|c:/cJ Ht|/|a_s IavidNcLcIIan
cd.) Cxlord, CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i p,,) ,6p
'' V cnjamin, Crtiquc ol\ioIcncc, in Rcncctions lcv York, Schockcn ooks,
i p,3) i o|
'
ibid , p|
BURKL AND MARX ii
i.|.:...| -.....:... . . .i ...:.- . ,:-.: :.,:-.. A|:|..,| . : ..
..: :|- i..| i.: .i |... -.....:... .. ,-.-:.|, .: .. .-v-::|--
|-.. :|- i...| i.: .i |... -.....:... ....!- :|- :-.-.: .:|!
.:!-: '|.c--!, .|.:...| :.,|:. .:- ..: :.,|:. .i .. ...|.:-! ...!
.:|!:.. ..:. |..-|i .:|..: :-,.:! i.: .:|-: -. 1|-.-
:.,

|:.
,

:
`
.

. .|.:...| .....:,, .. |..| .. ....:. .. .-..-.
|-.., ,

. v.|

.-! .. . .....| |-.., ..! .. . .:.| -:... '`

.: |

|- .|.:...| o,|:. :-i.,.:- :|- i.:.:- .....:,, :|- ...

.

..v.:... .| :|- :-v.|.:... ..! .:. !-.|.:.:... .. :. .|.::..: .|.-

:.. i:.

..-:, ..! ...i..- :|- ..:. :|- .-.:.:- !.... .i :|-

.:.:- 1.

..., :.-::, ..! :-|.,... ..:. .....| ...:.:.:...., |-|..,..,

:. :|- o

.:- .|-

:- ..! :.:-.:-! i:. .:.:- ..:-:v-.:... :|:..,|

:|- .-:.... .i o,|:. , .|-. :|- .:- -ii-.:.v- ..! ..i-,..:!.
:|-.: !....

.-

|-::
-
: :|.. :|- -!.-v.| i..... .i .||.. ..! :.v.:-
.-: |. :|. !..|-....| i.:.|.:..., :|- ... .. .i |... c.,|:.
.. :. :-

v- .|.:.. i:. ....-:, ..! !-.|.:....- :|- -....,

)|- .-.

.:..

:-.-.:. :|- .:.:- .. ,.|.:...||,, !.....:, |.|- ..-
.:.|..: ...-:, . |-:- :-.| ,-......, .-: |.-. 1|- |..:,-...
.|..!..-.: .i

:|- !.:-.: .|.:...| .-: .i i-.!.| |.:!. ..! |..,.,
.. :|- :-...!.:... i.: :|- ...-.!..., .i |..:,-... ....-:, ..! .:.
...:.|..: :....|-.
1|- :.,|:. .i .., |.|- .|| :.,|:., .:- ..: ..:.:.| .: ...|.-..||- |.:
|..:.:.

.| .

:-.:.

.. .i .:.:- ..! |. 1|-.: --:,-..- ..! !..|-.:...|

.
-
:.:... . ..:- ..|-x |.|- :|- .-.:.:.

. |-:--. .:.:- ..!

...-:, .. :|- ..:..- .i -...... .|..,-. .. ....-:,, :|- .:.:-
:a:.
-
! :|- ...!.:.... .i -x..:-..- .i ...:.|.., |..| |:..,|: .: :.
|.i-, ..:. |-,.||, :-..,...-! :.,|:. ..! ....-.:.:-! :|- .. ..:.:.| ..!
-:-

..| n... :.,|:. .:- :|-:-i.:- :-.| ..! -ii-.:.v- |.: :|-,
..|.-v-

.| .:- ..! !.ii-:-.: i:. |.: .. ..:-.: |...i.: ..

|-,.| i.: . .

..::.-! .. :|- :.:-.:... .i ..:.:.| :.,|:, :|- .::..-

:.:.| ..c |..:.o..| ...!.:.... .i ..v.| ....-:, .:- ..:-..-! ''A :-.|
:-v.|

:... ..|! |- .....| ..! ..: ..: .|.:...| ..! ..|! .|.|..|
|- o,|:. .i :.-::, ..! :-|.,..., |..| -:-:..:- :|- .....|
..-..|.:, ..! .|... !....:... C.-.:.., .. :|- r-v.|.:... .i
1 s,s, :.:x ..|- .i . v-:, !.ii-:-.: :.,|: |..| ..|! :-:-.-.: :|-
..o: .i ...| . :-v.|.:... 1|- :.,|: :. .:| .., .. :|- |..:,-...
'- ibid. , p,
' ` ibid , p , p|,p, .
' ' |

R h R I

ay
,

rstcm, ig t, cvouti
'
n

and Community.

Narx's ` Cn thc ]cvish

ucstion m !ctcr Csbornc cd) , Sooc|/sm caJ /|c I|m|/s I||ctc||sm London, \crso
ippi) i op.
.
l
l
.
|
i Z
THL ClAS S i CAl CRi Ti QULS O F Ri CHTS .
sense, nonsense, a vretched, pious vish. But lehind the right to
vorkstandspoverovercapital. The appropriation ofthe means of
production, theirsul ectionto the associatedvorkingclass . Thatis
the alolitionofvagelalour, capitalandthemutualrelationship`. '
The proletarian revolution vill realise the aspirations ofhuman
rights ly negating loth theirmoralistic form and idealistic content,
exemplifiedly the alstract and isolated man. The comlined nega-
tion ofcontent and form, in communism, vill give fundamental
rightstheirtruemeaningandvillintroducerealfreedomandequal-
ity for a nev socialisedman. Freedomvill stop leingnegative and
defensive, a loundary and limit separating selffromother, andvill
lecomeapositivepoverofeachinunionvithothers. Equalityvill
no longer mean the alstract comparison ofprivate individuals lut
catholic andfullparticipationin a strong community. Property vill
ceaseleingthelimitationofeachtoaportionofvealthtotheexclu-
sionofallothersandvilllecomecommon. Realfreedomandequal-
itylookto the concrete personin community, alandonthe various
formal definitions ofustice andsocial distrilution andinscrile on
their lanners the principle from each according to his alility, to
eachaccording to hisneeds`. The FrenchRevolution, onthecon-
trary, consecratedtherightto holdproperty andtopracticereligion
and, in this vay, the capitalist pre-conditions ofexploitation and
oppressionvere ideologically reversedinthe discourseofrights and
verefraudulentlypresentedasfreedoms.
Therealrights ofthe citizen pertain to the spirit ofthe revolution
andvillle fully realisedonlyvhen the actualindividual man takes
the alstract citizen lack into himselfand, as anindividualman inhis
empirical life, in his individual vork and individual relationships
lecomesaspecies-leing, manmustrecognisehisovnforcesas social
forces, organise them and thus no longer separate himselffrom this
socialpoverintheformofpoliticalpover`.'Thisrealisationofrights
inassociationvithothersvillreconcileuniversalityandhumansingu-
larity and, as a result, state lav, the effect and defender ofthe earlier
gapletveenthetvo,villlecomeolsoleteandvitheravay. lncom-
munism,humanqualities, aptitudesandinterestsvillnotledescriled
as rights, theyvill le the attrilutes ofindividual existence, accepted
andcelelratedas integralelements ofeachperson. Capitalism, vhich
'` ]arINar, JhcClassStiugglcin Fiancc. I &|&to I & ,o' quotcdinFciiyandRcnaut,
Fiomthc Rights olNanto thcRcuLlican Idca` F.Ihili tians. ) Lnivcisity olChicago
Iicss, I z) ocit , &&
'' a/|cca|s| Qucs/|oa, ocit. , suian. j6, Io&
BURKL AND MARX i
inventedrights, cannot realise theirpromise andgivestheman exclu-
sively negative form. But vhen their real preconditions come into
leinginsocialism, theyare nolongerofuse anddisappear. ltlooks as
ifhumanrightshavelittlepositiveroleinMarxism.
Lndoultedly many prollems plague Marx's analysis , some con-
tingent onthehistoricalconstraints ofhisperiod, othersmore struc-
turalandlasic. Themostimportantistherelativedevaluationofthe
social superstructures` - ofmoral, legal andpolitical institutions -
and the excessive privileging ofthe economic lase`, vhich had
catastrophic effects forthe analysis ofhumanrights. These are vell-
knovn criticisms andhave leenextensively commentedupon. But
Marxvasthefrstradicalcriticofrightsvhoinsistedontheirhistor-
ical character against the assertions ofthe naturalrights ideologues.
Afterthe critique ofMarx, it lecame clear thatvhile human rights
verepresentedaseternal,theyare thecreationsofmodernity,vhile
theypassedfornatural,theyaresocialandlegalconstructs ,vhilethey
verepresentedas alsolute, theyare the limitedandlimitinginstru-
mentsoflav,vhile theyverethoughtofas alovepolitics, theyare
the product ofthe politics oftheir time, fnally, vhile they vere
assertedasrational, theyaretheoutcomeofthe reasonofcapitaland
not ofthe pullic reasonofsociety. All these reversals letveenphe-
nomena and reality meant that, for Marx, human rights vere the
primeexample ofideologyoftheirtime.
But vhatever his criticisms ofhistorical rights , Marx expressed
forcefully sentiments , not dissimilar to those ofradicalnatural lav,
and lasedhis attacks on capitalism on the principles ofdignity and
equality,vhichonlysocialismcouldrealise. lnhiscritiqueofHegel's
|||oso|y R||/, Marxvasunequivocal. The critique ofreligion
endedviththe doctrine that man is the highestleingforman, and
thus vith the categorical imperative to overthrov all relations in
vhichmanisadegraded,enslaved,alandoned,ordespisedleing`.''
Marx sidedvith those vho, despite the declarations , vere neither
freenorequal. Hemayhavedespairedoftheidealismandunreality
ofhumanrights lut notviththeiraim. AsErnstBlochput it, pre-
ciselyvithrespecttothehumiliatedanddegraded,Marxisminherits
some ofthisvealth ofnaturallav . . . SocialismcanraisetheHagof
the ancientfundamental rights vhich has fallen elsevhere`. ' One
'' ]arI Naix, Cr|/|uc o}Hc_c|' |||oso|y Fg|/, Intioduction in Icr|y Tcx|, o. cit ,
suian. j 6, I I ,-I z, at I zj
' Irst loch, ^c/um| Ica caJ Humca I|_a|/y I. Schmidt tians) CamLrdgc Na. ,
NIJIicss, I &&) I &&
1 + THL ClAS S l CAl CRl Tl QULS O F Rl CHTS .
could argue that Marx vas critical ofhuman rights , lecause they
vere not human enough and their entitlements vere not equally
shared.His exaltedleliefinthescientificcharacterofhistheoryoften
derailedhismoralvision, lutMarxcannotlefaultedforlackofpas-
sionate commitment to the end ofhuman dignity and social vell-
leing. '

Contemporary critiques ofhumanrights follov the patternofthose

earlyreactionstothedeclarations. TheBurkeanpositionemphasised
thehistoricalcharacteroflavandrightandreectedtheexistence of
transcendentoruniversalstandardsortheiralilitytocriticisethecon-
crete reality and pover oflegal institutions. lts contemporary left
ving` versions can le foundintheories ofcommunitarianism, legal
pluralism and multi-culturalism. But Burke's appeal to the innate
visdom ofthe British constitution, vhich allegedly expresses the
nature` oftheEnglishmanandprescrilesitsforms andrightsvith-
outanyreferencetopriororhigherright,havealso ledtoconserva-
tiveversions. lnthese, thestateorthenationanditslavareidentifed
vith traditionand endovedvith apeculiarkind oftimeless timeli-
ness. The next, althoughnotinevitalle step, leadsto the celelration
ofautocraticlegalismorofanindigenous proceduralism. the pastis
rightlecauseitisthepastorthelavis ustlecauseitrepeatsancient
practice orcustomandisaccordedlegitimacyanddignitylecauseit
is immersedinarchaicformalities. Traditionlecomesthe guarantee
ofitsovnvalidityand goodnessvithoutreference to external crite-
ria or principles. For right-ving Burkeans , the non-recognition or
the violation ofhuman rights is logically impossille, rights are the
creations ofstatelavandthe udgmentofrightisinternaltothehis-
tory ofthe institution. Thisvas oftenthe- unspoken- premise of
those vho opposed the introduction ofa Bill ofRights inBritain.
Communitarians,ontheotherhand,re ecttheidentificationofcom-
munityvith state lav andopposethe incursions ofuniversalprinci-
plesintotheterritoryofcommunityvalues.
Burke' s theory vas a critique ofthepoliticalphilosophy oftran-
scendence, Marx's of the impossilility of transcendence. Burke
insisted on the goodness oftradition and particularity against the
claimsofreason anduniversalism, vhereasMarxsavinthe emerg-
'` Costas Iouzinas and Ronnic arrington, Iomnation, cxloitation and sullcrng.
Narxismandthc ocningolcloscd systcms olthought`, i p36/|joutac|o}/|cHmct|:ca ct
ouaJc/|oa, 3oi-||
BURKL AND MARX
1 3
ingnevorderse
'
tionaland classinterestsmasqueradingasuniversal.
Th

y are loth rght and vrong. Right can only le grounded on

nationalandlocallavs , andtraditionsandthedeclarationsofhuman
rightsremaina nonsenseonstilts` unlesstranslatedintothe culture
andlav

fa parti

ular society. But unless the universalisingidea of

human r
-
h

ts retains a transcendent position and dignity tovards

local conditi

ns, no valid or convincing critique ofthe lav can le

mounted. Rights are local lutcanonly le criticised and redirected
fr
'
m the point ofviev ofan unrealised and unrealisalle universal.
Rightoperatesasacriticalfunctiononlyagainstafuturehorizon that
of the impossille) ideal of an emancipated and self-constit.ting
humanity.
Marxtoo vasrightinpointingthedissymmetryletveentheuni-
versal man` ofrights a

d the concrete capitalist vhose image fills

the fr

me ofthe alstraction. Contemporary feminist or criticalrace

t|eor

sfollovthispathofcritiqueofideology.theman`ofhuman
rg|ts is literally aVestern vhite middle-class man vho, under the
'
laims ofnon-discrimination and alstract equality, has stamped his
image onlav and humanrights and has lecomethe measure ofall
things and people. But Marx neglected the possilility that the
groundlessness ofthe discourse ofrightsandthe non-determination
ofthe concept ofman - admittedly more asserted than real in the
eightee

th c

entury - vould install indeterminacy in the heart of

humanidentityandundecidalilityinpoliticsandthuscreatethecon-
+ition
`
ofruture self-realisation. Concrete people can le recognised
in theiru
+
uen

s andrealisetheirpotential iftheyare allovedto

shape

theiridentities

rreely outsidethe diktats ofstate,lav orparty.

ln this sense, the crtique ofthe false alstraction ofhuman nature
finds itshoriz

n, not intrue alstraction, lut in the proliferation of

l
'
cal andpartialcontents thatvillfill the empty man` vithamul-
titude ofcolours, shapes andcharacteristics.
1 1 1 . 1b 1V 1V21 b 11 1 1I11 1 Lb I
11 V1 Lb
+heM

rxist cri
'
ique ofhu

an ri

hts vas extensivelymolilised ly

rght-vi

gandlileraltheorstsdurngtheColdVartoprovethatthe
com

un

st

Gulags and lunat.c asylums vere logical extensions of

Marxisms immanent totalitaran tendencies. The standard response
of pro-Soviet Marxists vas tvofold. they argued that social and
i THL CLAS S i CAl CRi Ti QULS OF Ri CHTS
economic rights vere superior to the classical lileral rights lecause
material survival and decent conditions oflife are more important
than the right to vote or to form and oin political parties.
Furthermore,meetinglasiceconomicandsocialneedsvastheindis-
pensalle precondition for the effective exercise ofpolitical rights.
The rightto afreepress is ofno interestto astarvingandilliterate
peasant in an African village` ran the argument. These ideological
arguments vere seemingly strengthened ly comparisons letveen
LasternandVesternpractices. Thecommuniststatesguaranteedfull
employment,sulsidisedfoodpricesandprovidedstate care fortheir
citizens from cradle to grave. Vestern governments , on the other
hand,toleratedarmiesofunemployedinordertolringdovnlalour
costsandallovedpeopletostarveanddieiftheycouldnotaffordpri-
vatehealthcare.
Lileral intellectualsandVestern governmentsrespondedinkind.
Civil and political rights have a clear priority over social and eco-
nomicones .Historically,theyverethefrsttoenterthevorldscene,
andthey are superior lecause oftheir negative andindividualistic
character. Their aim is to place limits around state activities, thus
openingareasfreeofpoliticalandlegalinterferencevhereindividu-
als can exercise their initiative vithout prohilitions or excessive
regulation. For early lilerals, this negative conception offreedom,
freedomasthealsenceofconstraintorstateimpositions,istheheart
ofhumanautonomyandrights.Lconomicrights , ontheotherhand,
arenotproperlegalrights. Theyare claimedlygroups, notindivid-
uals, theyare positive` intheiraction, in othervords, theycallfor
extensive state interventionineconomyandsociety,forheavy taxa-
tion andcentral planning, all necessary inorderto deliver thelevels
ofemploymentpresupposedlytherighttovorkorthevelfarepro-
visionnecessary forfreehealth care oreducation. Finally, economic
andsocialrights arenot usticialle`. theycannotleguaranteedly
legislation in a lileral state and, moreover, courts cannot enforce
them.Theappallingoppressionofdissidentsvasseenasproofofthe
correctnessoftheVesternargumentsandtheassertionthatthemar-
ket is the superior, ifnot the only, mechanism ofdistrilution vas
recitedas amantrainresponseto the communistclaims alout capi-
talist squalorandunemployment.
This lriefsummary ofarguments , conducted on the H oorofthe
humanrightslodies, intheLnited lations andinnumerous acade-
mic ournalsfromthefftiestotheeighties, indicatesthefruitlessand
politically motivatedcharacter ofthe delate. lnpractice, hovever,
BURKL AND MARX i 7
these tvo diametrically opposed positions vere leing superseded.
The velfare statehadalready createda safety netfor thepoorestin
theVest andlarge parts ofthe developingvorldhadstartedadopt-
ing a cautious pluralismviththeattendingcivil andpoliticalrights .
lnthis climate, the collapseoftheSovietllocandtheAuericantri-
umphalismthataccompaniedit,lroughtthehumanrightsarguments
to an end. After i ,,, theMarxistandleft-vingcritiques ofhuman
rights seemeJ irrelevant at lest, and disastrously vrong at vorse.
Socialistreservations aloutthe all-conqueringpovers ofthemarket
andthecentralityoftheindividualvereunderminedvithsuchfinal-
itythatsoonone expectedthemtole totallypurgedfromtheannals
ofthehistoryofideas . This vasthe time ofthe ends `. ofideology,
of history, ofLtopia and of the leginning of the human rights
mIllennium.
Butthis euphoric picture, penned inthousands ofVesternnevs-
paperarticlesandpromotedatalllevels ofinternationalpolitics,had
leenshatteredlythelatenineties. Theunprecedentedhumanitarian
disasters of the decade and lATO's conduct ofthe var against
Yugoslavia,thefirstvartole explicitlyfoughtfortheprotectionof
human rights, lrought the doults, reservations and critiques of
humanrightslackontothepoliticalandtheoreticalagenda. Thecivil
versus economic rights delate hasleensupersededlythatletveen
universalists and cultural relativists or communitarians, lut human
rightsare here tostayandnoargumentcan detract fromtheirglolal
appeal. But it is preciselylecause the earlyideological andpolitical
confrontationsvhichdefnedtheirdiscourseandpracticehavecome
toanend, thatvecanhave,forthefrsttime,amoredetachedexam-
ination oftheir prollems. ln this re-assessment ofthe function and
prollems ofrights, the Marxist tradition occupies, historically and
intellectually,acentralplace. Overthelasttventyyears,post-Marxist
theorists have leen trying hard to explore loth the unexplored
potentialandthelimItationsoftheMarxistcritique. '
lndeed, respect for human rights and democracyvas the main
platform on vhich Vestern Luropean communists in ltaly, Spain,
Greece and GreatBritainlroke avay fromtheirearlierunqualifed
adulation anddefence ofthe SovietLnion, and moved tovards the
`' Scc amongst many, licos Ioulantzas, S/c/c, oacr, So:ic||sm Iondon, lcv Iclt
ooks, I ,8) , ClaudcIclort, T|co||/|:c|Formso}MoJcraSo:|c/y CamLridgc, Iolity, I 86) ,
Imcsto Iaclauand ChantalNoullc, Hc_cmoay caJ So:|c||s/S/rc/c_y Iondon, \crso, I8) ,
cndy rovn, Rights and Idcntity i nNodcrnity. Rcvisiting thc `cvish _ucstion` ` in
^SaratandJ.]camscds),Jca/|/|cs,o||/|:caJFg||^nn^rLor,LnivcrsityolNichigan
Ircss, I,) 8 ,-I)o, aycrnstcin, o.cit. , suran qq.
i O 1HL ClAS S l CAl CRl Tl QULS OF Rl CHTS
strategy ofa democratic road to socialism'. This fundamental re-
evaluationvaspartly dueto the appallingviolations ofallaspects of
human dignity and equality suffered ly the Spanish, Portuguese,
Greek and Chilean people, and predominantly amongst them ly
leftistradicals, duringtheAmerican-supporteddictatorshipsinthese
countries and elsevhere in the last sixtyyears. The simple lipolar
dividesoftheColdVarverenotalletoexplainthevholesomevio-
lation ofminimumpolitical rights in many Vestern capitalist states
vhichloastedfortheircivilandpoliticalfreedomsorthevoefullack
ofmanylasic amenities in the communist countries vhich prided
themselvesfortheiruniversally guaranteedeconomicrights.
This process ofre-assessment ofold orthodoxies had important
practical effects. One ofthe most olvious vas the alandonmently
Vestern communist parties ofhard-line policies and symlols and
their emergence as left ofcentre democratic socialist parties, most
spactacularly in ltaly. The ltalian Communist Party had leen
excludedfromgovernmentforsomefifty yearslutlecamethenat-
uralandtrustedpartyofgovernmentinthelatenineties, afteritsre-
lranding as the party of the democratic left. These political
developmentsvere accompaniedlyparallelmovesintheory. Ernst
Llochandmanypost-Marxists ,like licos Poulantzas, ClaudeLefort
andEtienneLalilar, emphasisedthecentralityofrightsforsocialism.
LeyondtheideologicalpyrotechnicsoftheColdVaranditsdemise,
Marxist thought took on the challenge ofhuman rights. Lut can
Marxism make a contrilution to the post-Cold Var assessment of
humanrights?
One ofthemaintasks ofpost-Marxistsvas to explore the ideo-
logical reversals' vhich, according to Marx, characterised human
rights. lrrespective of the original accuracy of these insights , the
reversalshadleenstalilised,humanrightshadleenextendedincon-
tent and scope, andhadlecome a main expressionofrelellionand
protestagainstdominantpolitical andsocialforcesandofempover-
mentofthe dispossessed. lnthevakeofFoucaultanddiscoursethe-
ory, velearntthat ideological' concepts are notfalse. To le sure,
one Marxistschoolhadconsistentlypresentedideologyasfalsecon-
sciousness' and, in the vork of the French philosopher Louis
Althusser, had made the strong claim that Marxism as science'
emergedonlyvhenthelaterMarxalandonedtheidealismandide-
ological misrecognitions ofHegel. ' Lut for another post-Marxist
`' Iouzinas and arrington, os/moJcta ut|stuJca:c Iondon, Routlcdgc, II )
Chatcr6.
BURKL AND MARX i V
traditi

n, inH uenced ly the ltalian political leader and philosopher

Antonio Gramsci, political ideas and concepts are neithertrue nor
falselutthetoolsthroughvhichvemakesenseofourvorld.lnlav
and politics, therefore, the taskis not so much to discard vrong'
ideologicalconcepts,likehumanrights ,luttore-defnethemagainst
vhatever conservative connotations theymay have acquired, adust
them to the proect ofpopular politics and luild around them a
hegemonic'lloc. Lut the analysis, critique andre-assemlly ofthe
conceptofhumanrightsvas onlypartiallycarriedout.Marxistthe-
'
reticaltools , evenvhenrevorkedinademocraticdirection,proved
inadequate. Afullercriticalunderstandingofhumanrights fromthe
leftvouldhavetovaitthe re-discoveryofHegelandthe use ofthe
insights ofpsychoanalysis andpostmodernethics.
lt vould le a serious mistake, hovever, to ettison fully the
Marxist tradition. lts contrilution to our understanding ofrights is
stillindispensalleandhas informed,quite oftenvithout attrilution,
man
`
contemporarycriticalapproachestorights,suchascriticallegal
studies,feminismandcriticalracetheory.Onepointthatunitesmany
post-Marxist theorists is a reneved emphasis on the importance of
political rights andaction. Marxlelieved, asve sav, thatpolitical
emancipationandcitizenrights vere alimitedimprovement on the
pol.t.callyintegratedsocietyoffeudalismvheresociallelongingand
political pover vere organically linked. The political state treats
people as ifthey are free and equal and, as a result, the desire and
struggle for real freedom and equality enters the historical agenda.
Lutmoreimportantly,politicalrightsintroducedforthefrsttimethe
principle ofpullicity into politics and led people to alandon their
privateisolationandcollalorateincommoncampaigns. Theserights
are exercisedin associationvith others and re ect, admittedly inef-
fectuallyforMarx, the individualistic characteroftherights ofman.
Politicalrights are exercisedonlyincommunityvith others.Vhat
constitutes theircontentisparticipationincommunity, inthepolit-
ical community orstate. They come underthe category ofpolitical
freedom'. Lutthe drift ofthe overall theoryand the emphasis on
the inadequacy ofpolitical emancipation meant that these insights
remainedmarginalandincomplete.
` aycm
`
tcin,Iti
''
nca

liLarandcndyrovncmhasiscthcsigniucancclaccdLy
Naronthcightsolcitizcnshi ClaudcIclort, onthc othcrhand, criticiscsNai,thcurst
dcLunkcrolidcologicalIctions, ollallingavictimolidcologyandtakingthc claimsolthc
Frcnch Icclaration atlaccvalucvithoutrcalisingthcirrcvolutionarydcmocraticimort.
` a /|cjcu|| Qucs/|oa, o. cit. , suran. j6, Io(.
i 7
THL ClAS S i CAl CRi Ti QULS Ol Ri CHTS .
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:-
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v.!-.

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:-..|: ..!-:-.:..:-! :|- ..:.:- ..! ..,..i.....- .i |... :.,|:.
A....!.., :. i-i.:: ..! ...::. :.:x :|- ... ..v-|:, ..! ..|.-v--
-.: .i :|- :-v.|.:... .. .:. .|.:...| .|.:..:-: |:. ....-.. .|..|! |-
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C|:..:... v.|.- -|| |-i.:- :|- :-v.|.:... 1|- :.|- .i C|:..: |.!
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,.... ..:. ..! :.:-.:-! :|- ..|] -.:. i:. .!

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l.: :|- |.., i.||.-! :|- |. ..! -.i.:.-! ..:..-.. :

,|:. .. .:: .i
|.. .. ..:.:- .: .. .. -x-:...- .i |.. i:--!. v|.|- |.:-! .. o.-
..|- :|-:-i.:- :|- |.., i...! .. |...!.:.-. :. |.. .||

.. i..: |. :|..
.-..- |, ..|-:.., .. :|- !-..:.:.. .:.:- ..! |... o,|:. :|-

-v-
.|.:... ...:...-! :|- ::.!.:... |..| |.! .-.:.:-! .-: i:. o,|:
..! |..|-!,- |.: .. . .- !.:-.:... 1|- .|.|.:... .i ...:.|,
!-:..|-! :|- ..,- .i .-: :.,|: ..! ....-:, i:. :|- |..,. |.!,
1|- ..:.:-.| -:.|.: |..| |.! .,|.|..-! ..! .

.-! |. ..!
]..:..- ..v-:-.,.:, ..! ..:... .-..|.: ....-:.. ..!

.o:..| i.:.-.
!....|v-! ..:. . ,:..! .i -.|- .. !-.|.:-! ..v-:-.,.
1|- -..-..- .i :|- !-..:.:.. .:.:- .. :|.: |.|- .-: ..! :.,|: .:-
..: i.||, .-.:.:-! .-: |-..-. :|- .|]-.: .i |. ..! .:. |-,.:...,
:|- ..|]-.: .i .||.. !...:.:... |. :|.. .- ...i,.:.:...

i
^
-:
..! :.,|: |... :.,|:. .:- :|- |-.: -x.|- .i . .|-:- |..| . ..:
...::.||-! |, ..! ..!--! .. :.,:..:...||, -x:-:..| :. .-: :.:x
.. |.. .-.| :. .::..| :|- i:-..| n-.|.:.:... :-.-.:-! .:. i:--!.. ..
.-,.:.v- ..! ...|.:-! :|- .. .. ...|.:-! ..!.v.!..| |..:-! ..|, |,
:|- :.,|:. .i .:|-:. l.: |- i..|-! :. ..!-:.:..! :|.: :|- i:--!.. .i
...... ..! -x:-..... ...:.:.:-! . .- i.: .i .|.:... .

! .i ...-..
:. :|- .||.. .|-:- 1|- .:....., -ii-.:. .i |... o,|:. .i .., -:-
...i:..:-! ..! :-v-:.-! |, :|- ....,.:.:... .i :|- :.,|: :. i:-- .--.|
onc ol nan`s| nost rccious rights, to stc out ol hinscll and to
"
akc
contact vith othcrs, through sccch, vriting and thought . . . It 1b thc
indccndcncc ol thought and oinion vith rcgard to ovcr, thc sc-
BURKL AND MARX i7i
aration Lctvccn ovcr and knovlcdgc, that i s at stakc i n thc alfirna-
tion ol thc rights ol nan, and not only or not csscntially thc slit
Lctvccn thc Lourgcois nan and thc citizcn, Lctvccn rivatc rocrty
and olitics.
|: .. :.:x. :-i...| :. :|..| .. .|.:...| :-:. :|.: :-v-.:-!
|. i:. :-..,....., :|.. .- :,- .i !-..:.:.. .|.:... v|-.
|... :.,|:. |-..- :|- .|:..:- :-i-:-..- .i .|.:... .|| -.:.||..|-!
:.,|: ..! ]..:..- .:- .-. :. .-.:... ..! .|.||-.,- v|.|- .. ...:-
.|...| ....-:.-. :|- -:... .i :|- |.., ...:-! ..v-:-.,.:, ..! ]..:..-
.: .-: ..! |..|-!,- ..! ,..:..:--! :|- ...:, .i ....-:, ..
!-..:.:.. ....-:.-. :|- |..- .i .-: |-..-. -:, 1|- .....|
...- ... .. |..,-: |- .,|.|..-! |, .., ..- |.!, .: ....-: ..
.:|-: .:!. .. i...!.:... .: .:|-: ...:.:, :....|- ... ..i-,..:!
:|- .|.:,. ..:-,:.:, .: |..,-.-.:, A. . :-..|: :|- .|! ....-: .i
...:.:, :.,|: -...:.., i:. G.! .: |.., ..! :.!..:.., ...-|.|-
:|:..,| :|- |.!, .|.:.. |-..-. i:.,-.:-! . .|:.|...:, .i
:.,|:. !-v-|. :-...:.., :|- .::-:. .i .|| .-: :-|.,.... .: ,:|-
...| ...:.|...| .: ..|.: :. :.|- |.|! .i :|- 1|.. |.|- :|-
:.|- .i |. .|.-. :|- ....|.|.:, .i ....., :.,|: :. .-: .
|... :.,|:. .|.:, ,.-. ..| i.::|-: .: :-.:. ..! ...-:. :.,|:. :|.:
|.v- ..: ,-: |--. -.:.||..|-! .:. |.,.. -x:-.!. ..:. .:-.. .i ..:.v.:,
:|- .:.:- .....: -.:.:-|, ..:-: ..! .:. |..:. :-... .-. :. i.::|-:
...:-.:.:... ..! -x...... i:. :|- |-,.| :-..,..:... .i .::.|-. .:
::.!- ...... :. :.,|:. :-|.:.v- :. .:| .: :. .....| .-..:.:, :|-:- |..
!-v-|.-! .. :|- |.... .i :|- :.,|:. .i .. . |.|- |..:.:, :|.: ::...-
,:-..-! :|- |...!.:.-. .:|.. |..| :|- .:.:- .|..-! :. !-i.- .:.-|i
. |..:.:, :|.: :-.... .-. 'v|.: ...-. :|- :....|- .i |...
:.,|:. .. :|- - .,.|....|,:...||, -x|...-! - !-..:- .i -.|- i.:
...:, ..! .-..:.:, :|-.: .:.v.., i.: :|- :....|- .i :|- C.- i.: .
.- ...:.:, |..:.:...| ..:.: |- .: ..:... .|... .: .::, .: . .-
i...!.:....| :....|- .: |. |..| .|| |:-.:|- ......:-.., ..!
..|-:-..- ..:. :|- !..-|-:-! |.!, .i :|- .....| ..! :|- i:.,-
-.:-! ..! |-:-:.,-.-... .::.,,|-. i.: |... :.,|:.
..|.:|, :|- :.:x..: |.|...|-: l:.-..- l.|.|.: |.. .:,.-! :|.:
:|- i:-..| r-v.|.:... :.:.-! :|- :--.!-:. ..|] -.: ..:. :|- .!-
-:. ..:..-. :-|..-! ...:.|...| .:| ..|.: ..v-:-.,.:, ..!
.-.-! . .|.:...| ...- i.: .:,.-.: ..! .:.:..- |..-! .. ..:..-.
`' cloit, Jhc IoliticalFoimsolNodcinSocicty`, o. cit , n o, zo-I
`` iLid , z|.
`' iLid, z &
i7Z
THL ClAS S l CAl CRl Tl QULS Ol Rl CHTS
equalityasapre-requisiteoffreedom.' Balilar, likeLefort, criticises
Marxforplacingtoomuchemphasisontheseparationletveenpul-
lic andprivate andletveencitizen andmanandmisunderstanding,
asaresult,thepoliticalnoveltyoftheFrenchDeclaration. ratherthan
separating, itidentifedman and citizen, itlro

ght tog
'
therfor the
frsttimefreedomandequaliqandcreatedauniversalrghttopoht-
icalparticipation.Balilararguesthatvhileequalityandfreedomare
not the same, the conditions for their successful application and
expansionareidentical.Theproofisnegative. undernoconditionsis
equalitysuppressedvhilefreedomsurvivesandviceversa.Capitalism
denies equalityanddestroysfreedom, as evidencedininfantmortal-
ity,theshortenedlife expectationandtheruinedlivesoftheVestern
underclass andthe poorin the south. Communism denied political
rights and endedup vith a society ofhuge disparitiesamongst citi-
zensandalmostfeudalprivilegesforthepartycadreandstateoff cials.
There are no examples ofrestrictions or suppressions offreedoms
vithoutsocialinequalities , norofinequalitiesvithoutrestrictionsor
suppressions offreedoms`.The equationofequalityandfreedom,
their indissolulle link, means that all rights-claims are politicised.
theyexpressademandforanextensionofthemeaningofcitizenship
orforafurtherexpansionoffreedomandequalityandinscrileinde-
terminacyornegativeuniversality` attheheartofthepolity.
In this indclinitc ocning conc to Lc inscriLcd - and attcnts to do
this can Lc sccn Lcginning vith thc rcvolutionary criod - thc rights-
clains ol salaricd vorkcrs or dccndants, as vcll as thosc ol voncn
or slavcs, and latcr ol thc coloniscd. Such a right vould latcr Lc lor-
nulatcd as lollovs. //c cmaa:a/|cac //c crcsscJ:aa ca|y |c //c|rcua
ucrk, vhich cnhasiscs its inncdiatcly cthical signilication.
Thetaskofhumanityisself-emancipationthroughcollectivepolit-
icalaction. Thismeans,logically, thattherecanlenolilertyvithout
equality, ontologically, thatthemaincharacteristicofhumanleingsis
their collective construction ofindividual freedom and, politically,
that emancipation cannotle agft lut must le achievedincommu-
nityandcommonactionvithothers. Thehumanityofmanisiden-
tifednotvithagivenoranessence, leitnaturalorsupra-natural,lut
vitha practice and a task. the taskofself-emancipation from every
`' Scc Chatcr 3 Lclov
` aliLar, 'JhcRightsolthc Nan` andthc 'Rights olthc Citizcn` ` inMcscs, C|csscs,
Jccs CamLridgc,Iolity, pp|) |p.
` iLid.
BURKL AND MARX i 7
domination and sulection ly means ofa collective and universal
accessto politics`.
Humanrights arethelegaltitle andinstitutional
guarantee ofthe indeterminate. For Balilar, the sul ection to social
superiors, God or king, vhich characterised the pre-modern vorld
came to an end vith the identifcation ofsulect and citizen in the
French Revolution. But, in his attempt to redeem humanrights for
radicalpolitics,BalilarexaggeratestheegalitarianeffectsoftheFrench
RevolutionanditsDeclaration. ltis truethatthedemocraticpolitics
ofmodernity estallished a pullic space in vhich political equality
couldhelpminimisetherealinequalitiesoftheprivatesphere. Thisis
theequalityofcitizenship createdthroughthe exerciselycitizensof
identical political freedoms. But the citizenry remained severely
restrictedinitscompositionlyracial, ethnic, legalandgenderexclu-
sionsformorethanacentury, andcitizenshipstillfollovsoftenarli-
trary territorial loundaries, as the collapse of Yugoslavia clearly
shoved. Thehopedforextensionofpoliticalrightstothevholepop-
ulation andtheir expansion into social economicandcultural rights
can le explained, from Balilar's perspective, as the transfer ofthe
logicofequalpoliticalfreedomto areaspreviouslyconsideredaspart
oftheprivateorsocialdomainvithitsacceptalle`inequalities. The
fght forvorkers andunionrights, forexample, politicised theplace
of vork and, vhen successful, expanded citizenship ly making
inequalities and differences in treatment at the vorkplace as illegiti-
mateasthedenialoftherighttovoteoroffreeexpressioninthepul-
lic domain. '
Fromadifferentperspective,jean-FranoisLyotardemphasisesthe
vayinvhichhumanrights constructpeopleandpolitical structures
in a manner that makes the otheralvays present. Lsinglinguistic
philosophy,Lyotardarguesthatthelasichumantraitiscommunica-
tion. The structure of interlocution organises relations letveen
speakers on the lasis oftheir similarities and differences and helps
arrangetemporality. Thespeaker'sl`alvaysaddressesayou`nov
and,villinturnlecomeyou`totheinterlocutor'sl `inthefuture.
ldentity and community, the l` and the ve`, are effects ofthis
alternatingconversationand, theotherastrace, asanactualorpoten-
tial interlocutor, remains emledded in loth. This ontological and
'' aliLar, SuLjcction and SuLjcctivation', inoan Copjcc cd.) , Suos|a_ /|c Su|c:/
ondon, \crso, pp|) z
'' Forananalysisalongthcsclincs,sccIrncstoaclauandChantalNoullc,Hc_cmoaycaJ
So:|c||s/S/tc/c_y, o cit. ,suran ,o, Chatcr ;
' ]can-Franoisyotard,JhcCthcr`sRights', in aHumcaFg||StchcnShutcand
SusanJurlcy cds) lcvYork, asic ooks, i pp) i ;-|,
i7+ THL ClAS S l CAl CRl Tl QULS OF Rl CHTS
linguistic structure demands thatfreedomofexpression, the institu-
tionalisation ofthehumanisingcapacityofspeech,lecomesthefun-
damental human right. But like humanity, this right remains under
constantthreat. Theultimatehorrorandthestrongestalectionisfelt
vhen the right and capacity to speak are taken avay. This is vhat
happened to the Holocaust victims, vho vere denied the right to
speak and le addressed ly others. As a result,
'
hey ver
'
removed
fromhumanity, neitherInoryou, thedeporteeispresentinthelan-
guage ofhis lords and in that ofthe deportees themselves only as a
third person, vho is to le eliminated' .` ln this approach, every
questionor address toanotherpresupposesarequestnot tole a.an-
doned to the alection ofspeechlessness and to le alloved into
community. Lyotard, likeLefortandBalilar, argues thatmodernity,
lyintroducingarighttospeak,haslegitimisedthehumancondition.
Butheisalsomorecautious. thetotalandnon-speakingOther,God,
deathorunconsciousalection,islothathreatandthedesire ofthe
sul ect. ltlurksinthelackgroundand,asaresult,theproectofindi-
vidualorgroupintegrityisnevercompleteorsafe.
Thepoliticalturnofthepost-Marxistsisavelcome corrective to
theearliereconomicreductionismandhascontrilutedtoourunder-
standing ofhumanrightsmuchmore than the manytired and trite
repetitions oflileralrights theorists. Thepost-Marxistreiutations

of
theclassicalcritique emphasisethepoliticalcharacterofrghtsvhich
arguallyveakenstheiratomising effects. Lefort andBalilar offer a
paradigmatic image ofthepostmodernpoliticalcondition,invhi
'
h
freedomhasleenfreedfromthe formalism oflileralisminan exis-
tential direction and, equalityaccompaniesfreedomas itsindispens-
allepartner. Butthe excessive politicisationofrightscarriesits ovn
prollems .Emphasisingtheirpoliticalcharacter,inothervordstheir
equalising potential, is not alvays useful. Right-claims organised
around gender and sexuality, for instance, prioritise difference and
identity rather than equality and participation and their theoretical
tools can scarcely emerge from the re-vorked Marxist repertory.
lndeed, one ofthe characteristics ofcontemporary popular human
rightscampaignsistheside-steppingofformalpoliticalinstitutionsin
favour ofdirect action and single issue initiatives. These hovever
challengetheMarxistclaimthatonlypoliticscanlringtogetherthe
manyanddisparatesocialconHictsandunitefragmentedstrugglesto
acommoncause.
'` iLid I |
BURKL AND MARX
i 73
The excessive valorisation ofhuman rights is one instance ofa
vider tendency amongst post-Marxists vhich lovers the critical
threshold vhen faced vith lav and legal history. ln theirustified
concerntorescuehumanrightsfromvulgarMarxismandtoempha-
sisethe importance ofthe FrenchRevolutionagainstrevisionisthis-
torians , they underestimate the often counter-productive role of
legalisminthehistoryofrights .'Theuridifcationandinternation-
alisationofLumanrightshasledtoattemptstoimposealogicofclo-
sure and planned extension vhich invalidates the messy and open
practice ofrights, so vell presentedly the French theorists. Pover
andrightmayhaveleenpartlyseparated,asLefortinsists,andthecit-
izens mayhave leen declared sovereign, according to Balilar. But
legal rightsremainastatelanguageandpovercanshapetheminits
ovnimage.Throughtheirformalequalityandlessthanuniversalcit-
izenship, rights emerged as ahighlyparadoxical institution. loth an
instrumentofemancipationanda means forempoveringlourgeois
dominance. Their history has leen equally amliguous, they have
leenusedto protectfromarlitrarypoverluttheyhavealsohelped
secureandnaturalisedominantsocialpovers andtheirclass,gender,
race, andethnicexclusions. lotonlydidlourgeoisrightsdiscourse
mask, lydepoliticising, the socialpover ofinstitutions suchaspri-
vatepropertyorthefamily, theyalso organisedmasspopulationsfor
exploitationand regulation, thus functioningas a modality ofvhat
Foucault termed 'lio-pover' `. As a result oftaking lav at face
value, the critical purchase ofthe French philosophers is seriously
undermined.
1 N. 11 V1 Lb 11 1I11 1
LefortandBalilar,thepostmodernandpost-Marxisttheoristsofpol-
itics,haveparadigmaticallydeconstructedtheuniversalpretensionsof
human rights lut have left the universalist claims oflegal reason
intact. ln an attempt to rescue radical politics from the political
excesses and theoretical veaknesses of communism, they have
neglected the paradoxical nature ofrights and forgotten the often
reactionaryandviolentrole oflav. Buthumanrightsarejanus-like,
they carry the dual alility to emancipate and dominate, to protect
and discipline. The Marxist philosophervho first emphasised their
'' Scc ChatcrLclov.
' rovn, o cit , suran o, &
i 7 THE ClAS S l CAl CPl Tl QLES Ol Pl GHTS .
paradoxical action vas Ernst Bloch. His grandiose and eloquent
utopianism, steepedincentralEuropeanjevishculture andGerman
romantic values remains unsurpassed although, after the collapse of
communism, it is no longer fashionalle or politically correct`.
Blochrepresentsagenuineadvance onMarx,heretainsthemainele-
mentsofhiscritiqueofrightslutdiscoversinthetraditionofnatural
lavandrightthehistoricallyvarialle lut eternalhumantraittoresist
dominationandoppressionandtoimagineandfghtforasocietyin
vhich manvillvalkupright`. Therecanle norealfoundationof
human rights vithout an end to exploitation and no real end to
exploitationvithouttheestallishmentofhumanrights.
AccordingtoBloch,fromtheSophistsandthe Stoicstothe mod-
erns, nature vas constituted in different vays as a category vhich
confronted existing social relations as a fetish against social
defaults `. `But thestruggleletveenthis ever-changingnature and
thesedimentedvorldofpositivelavvasalvayslostuntilmodernity
inventeddemocracyandsocialisminthevorkofRousseauandMarx
respectively. Rousseauresolvedtheprollemofhov toprotectindi-
vidual freedom, ly estallishing an immediate relationship letveen
the citizens and the general vill thus turning natural lav from a
philosophical or religious construct into a historical institution.
latural lavlecamethelavlegislatedlypopularsovereigntyandthe
general should ensurethatthe principle ofindividualfreedomcould
onlyexistin ahumanrights community. lnthis sense, politics and
rightsvereindissolullyconnectedandguaranteedtheachievements
oftherevolutionlysul ectingthe governmentto theconstantcon-
trolofcitizens. laturallavvasnolongerdeducedfromthealstract
rule ofreason and axiomaticpropositions alouthuman nature, lut
lecame the outcome ofthe concrete reason ofpeople. For the frst
timeinhistory,rightor]lecamesynonymousviththerightsofthe
people, politics adopted the idea ofequalityforall, and the triptych
oflilerty, equality and fraternity acquired normative veight. But
property counted as one ofthe inalienalle rights and, as a result,
equalityvas restrictedto politicsandeventheretovhitemales,the
potentialofrightsvasnotallovedtomaterialise. Thisvasthehigh
oo
loch`scomLinationolutoianism,intcrcstinnaturallavandquaLucdsuortlorthc
socialist rcgimcs, mcantthathcdidnotlcaturcinthc anthcon olcstcrnNarxists, dcsitc
his grcat intcrcst and alunity vith altcr cnjamin and thc Franklurt SchooI Jhc ony
ollcrngs in Inglish arc, \inccnt Ccoghcgan, Itas/ |o:| Iondon, Routlcdgc, I 6) and
|. L Ianicl andJ Noylan cds) , !o/ Yc/ tc:oas|Jct|a_Itas/|o:| Iondon, \crso, I y)
o
!c/utc|IcucaJHumcaI|_a|/y, o. cit , sura n |S, I z.
BLPKE AND MAPX i 77
pointofnaturallav, luttheepochinvhichitourishedvasanillu-
sion, for out ofthe .|/oyca there came the lourgeois, it vas a fore-
shadoving, for the lourgeois vas udged ly the .|/oyca'.
Expanding Marx's
distinctionletveenmanandcitizen,Blochsavthelatterasaprefg-
uration ofthe future socialised freedom. Although the idea ofciti-
zenship had leen damaged ly its lourgeois misuse, it did not
represent alarriertofreedomasitdoesintheegotismofthe Jto|/s
Jc |

|ommc . . . indeed, as Holderlinpointedout,italvays possessed

the capacityofself-purification`.
The foreshadoving, the prophesying ofa future not yet and not
everpresenthelpsintheself-purifcationof moralideascontaminated
lythepoverful. The triptych ofthe French Revolution shovs this
strategy at vork. Freedom as ethical and political, as personal and
pullic, as needomofchoiceandofaction,isthealilityto act.oa/tc
{c/um, thusinaperspectiveofastillocavorld,onenotyc/Jc/ctm|acJ
c||/|cucy/o /|ccaJ'.`'Oppressionanddominationareolviousvio-
lationsoffreedom,lecausetheyturnpoliticalpoverand economIc
conditionsinto inescapalle destinies. Butfreedomisalsoirreconcil-
allevithafullydeterminedandclosedvorld,invhichtheonlypos-
sille personal intervention is a udicious adustment to dominant
ideas and the exploitation ofgivenandinescapalle structures to the
sul ect's advantage, an advantage vhose contours have leen vell
demarcatedandloundariesarestrictlypoliced. lnthissense, freedom
is enhancedlythe alility ofrights to extendthelimits ofthe social
andtoexpandandre-defineselfandgroupidentities. ltoperatesonly
ifasyetunclosedpossililitiesremaininthevorldandisextinguished
vhen the doulle determination ofthe sul ectas free andsulected
movestovards the pole ofsul ection. Butin a regulatedvorld, in
vhichlittlemarginofplayisallovedoutsidetheparametersofglolal
capitalism and authoritarian order, needom might come to mean
resistancetothefreedom` toovnandcontrolevermoreol ectsas
theultimatesignofself-expressionortothe freedom`todefneand
shape life according to a closed list of rights defined ly moral
experts` . Freedom cannot le defned in advance, except as the
humancomportmentinthefaceofolective realpossilility`.` ' lts
everyexercise opens inturnanevvistavhich,ifpetrified,lecomes
os
iLid., 6,.
o
iLid., I yy.
'' iLid., I 6z .
i
iLid I 6
i 7O
THE ClAS S l CAl CPl Tl QLES Ol Pl GHTS .
itselfanexternallimitationthatmustle overcomeagain. Freedomis
an amliguous concept, that starts from past determinations and
crystallisations and continuouslydehes them inthe name ofan ever
elusiveanddeferredfuture.
The openness of the concept of needom has alloved its co-
optation ly ideologies and movements hostile to its essence, like
those ofde-regulated market capitalism or ofneo-lileral lav and
economics. This cannot happenvith equality, freedom's tvin con-
cept. lts meaning may le restricted to equality lefore the lav or
olscured as the equality ofsouls in God'splan ofsalvation, lut its
olvious and gross violations cannot le concealed. The huge gap
letveennorthandsouth,letveenrichandpooror, initspostmod-
ern version, letveen the satishedmiddle classes and the disenfran-
chised underclass, cannot le falsihed. The life threatening
consequences ofpoverty exempli(the fact, vell-knovnfor overa
hundred years, that there can le no freedom vithout economic
equality.Thefirsttaskoffreedomaslilerationfromoppressivedeter-
minations, isthereforetoeliminateeconomic deprivation. Freedom
notlinkedtoequalityisachimera. Equality'svorktothisday, some
onehundredandhftyyearsafterthehrstsocialistsidentiheditsinter-
nal linkvithfreedom,is aloutgivingaminimumoffreedomtothe
greatma ority ofpeopleinthevorld. Vhiletheir action differs, the
aimofequalityandfreedomcoincide. theyarelothinclinedtovards
the|umca|Jca|||ythathasyettoarrive, namely,thatidentityvhich
alvays threatens, alvaysglimmersliketheharmonyofmenviththe
imagetheyhave ofthe |umcaum'. '`
This identity that is notyet` dravs itsinspiration fromthepast
andthe lesttraditionsofradicalnaturallav.Bloch'shumanismpre-
sentsMarxismastheheirofrelelsandreformers,vhoreplacedfaith
togods andloyaltytokingsvithhumandignityandequality. Butas
realityisalvaysincompleteandthepresentpregnantvithfuturepos-
sililities, allrealismhasutopiaatitscore. Ltopiaisthenameforthe
greatpoverofimaginationvhichhndsthefuturelatentineverycul-
turalproductandpreservesthekernel ofradical enthusiasminevery
ideologyitcriticises. laturallav,despiteitsmanyreligiousandreac-
tionary formulations, emerges from this revisionist history as the
unvavering passion to save the dignity of the |umcaum. Vhile
Bloch'scriticisms oftheillusions oflourgeoisnaturallav` aredev-
astating, heconcludesthat menvereinagreementintheintention
' iLid. , I 6y.
BLPKE AND MAPX i 7V
ofueeingthemselves fromoppressionand installing human dignity,
atleastsincethe time ofthe Greeks. But onlythisvillisimmutalle,
andnot . . . ' man' andhisso-called eternalright`. '
latural lav vas perfectly complemented ly the great social
utopias ofthe nineteenth century. Thetvo share many characteris-
tics ,luttheyhaveimportantdifferencesasvell. More, Campanella,
Lacon, Oven, Fourier and St Simonvrote theirutopias castingan
eye to naturallavideas. Butvhile the naturallavyers derivedtheir
schemes Crightsfromaxiomaticprinciplesalouthumannatureina
vay resemlling mathematical deductions and scientihc proofs , the
utopian imaginationusednarratives , images andallegoriestopro ect
the future society. latural lav dravs its pover from the great
thinkers ofthe past vhile utopias are imaginary pro ections ofthe
future.Moreimportantly,naturallavaimstoalolishdegradationand
uphold human dignityvhile social utopias aim to reduce suffering
and promote human happiness, to lring alout the cu :c|a orliving
velloftheGreeks.Admittedly,manyofthese utopiasvereunrealis-
ticdisplaysofphilanthropyandhadnopossililityofsuccess . Bloch's
principle ofutopiadoes not coincide vith thevarious grand places
andschemesofthatname. Hismagnumopus T|ct|a.||c,jHocis
not restricted to formal plans lut encompasses under the utopian
moment day-dreams andprivate reveries ofordinary everyday life,
theapocalypticvistasof religionandmysticism,thesullimetalleaux
ofliterature, music and artlutalso thefairy-tales, folksongs , carni-
valsandpagantraditionsofpopularculture. Afree-H ovingutopian
energy`ispursuedinhighandlovhistory, channelledintoamul-
tiplicity offorms, some reactionary, someprogressive, utopianismis
thereforenot confinedto ' theLtopia' ' . ' Ltopianismisadreamof
thefuture,fuelledlythepastandimmanentinthepresent.
Happiness and dignity have marched separately during the ages
and, ve are repeatedly told, thattheirdefiniteseparationisalso the
greatestachievementoflileralism).But therecanlenohumandig-
nityvithout the endofmiseryandneed, lutalso nohumanhappi-
ness vithout the end ofold and nev forms ofservitude`. ' This
dialectical relationship letveen dignity and happiness or letveen
rights and utopiapermeates the edihce ofloth t|a.||c,jHoc and
^c|um| Lcu caJ Humca L|a||y, although the priorities seem to
change, as Blochlecame increasingly avare ofthe aluses ofcom-
'` iLid., I I .
' " Ccoghcgan, o cit , suia n. 66, I |,-6
'` !c/um|Lu caJHumcaI|_a|/y, o. cit. , suia n. |S, zoS .
i O THE ClAS S l CAl CPl Tl QLES O l Pl GHTS .
munism anda sense ofmelancholystartedpermeatinghis texts. But
the main argument throughout his vork is that the Enlightenment
promiseremainsunfulflled. Veare concernedvithapeculiarher-
itage. ltslestremains in aleyance andis still to le appended. Vhat
ispastdoesnotreturn,especiallynotinanout-of-datevaylutitcan
letakenatitsvord. ltisustasurgentsuo moJotoraisetheprollem
ofaheritage ofclassicalnaturallavasitistospeakoftheheritageof
social utopias`. ' Bloch's narrative did notinvolve a simple appro-
priationorrepetition ofthepast. Theradicalimpetus ofnaturallav
hadleenimplicit,fromtheStoicsuntilearlymodernity,andthetask,
startedlutstillincomplete, is to redeem a past not fully present to
itselfand re-activate moments that remaineddormantin the mar-
gins ofillusionary excess`. For the utopianist, tradition does not
follovlineartimeandisnotadirectdescentfromthepast.ltisrather
arestrospective recreation ofthe past remIniscent ofthepsychoana-
lytical interpretation ofa contemporary symptomas the effectofan
unknovnlut activeunconsciouscause. Andasthis pastis putinthe
service of an undetermined future, utopia can le defined as the
rememlranceofthefuture. lnthis,veareremindedofthetheseson
history ofValter Benamin, the other great messianic Marxist, for
vhomallhopelies inamemory ofpastdefeatsandresistances. The
dangeraffectsloththecontentofthetraditionanditsreceivers. The
same threathangs over loth. that oflecoming a tool ofthe ruling
classes. ln everyerathe attempt must le made anev to vrest tradi-
tion avay froma conformismthatis aloutto overpoverit` .' lt is
preciselythis conformismvhichthreatenshumanrightsvhenthey
lecomeatoolofstates,governmentsandinternationalorganisations.
Bloch, despite his criticisms ofthe authoritarian tendencies of
communism, remained too closely connectedviththe regime and
didnotfullyappreciatehovthis comlinationofthe lesttraditions
ofnaturallav andsocialutopia` cameto violate ahhis lasic princi-
ples andhopes . Butinhis latervork, naturallav andhumanrights
are given priority over utopia. Vhile state lav vhich supports
oppression anddominationhas noplaceinthe societyofthe future,
humanrightsvillleattheheartofsocialismandvillensurethatthe
pathosofthe freeindividualseemslike avarningagainstanycon-
'' !c/utc|Icu caJHumcaI|_a|/y, o cit , suia n. |8, xxix
'' Oavid Kaulmann, Jhanks loi thc Ncmor. loch, cnjamin, and thc !hilosohy ol
Iistoi`, in Oanicl and Noylan, o cit suia n 66, |I .
Valtci cnjamin, "Jhcscs on thc !hilosohy ol Iistoi', i n I||um|ac/|oas H Zohn
tians ) lcv Yoik, Schockcn, I 6) z, ,
BLPKE AND MAP iOi
fusion or mixing up ofcollectivity vith the herd or herd charac-
ter`. '' ForBloch, the stipend` ofhumanrightstakes the concrete
utopianform ofapromisevhichanticipates arealhumanity still to
come. Freedom, equality,fraternity,theorthopaideiaoftheupright
carriage, ofhumanpride, andofhumandignitypointfarleyondthe
horizonofthelourgeoisvorld`.'Thisprincipleofhope`,accord-
ing to vhich all relations in vhich man is a degraded, enslaved,
alandoned or, despised leing` should le overthrovn, remains as
validtoday as it has even leen and forms the lestustifcation and
mosteffectiveendforhumanrights. Butitssuccessisnotguaranteed
andtherecentrhetoricaltriumphofhumanrightsmayle one more
instance ofco-optation ofnaturallav lythe poverful for the pur-
poses of conformist conservatism, similar to earlier theological
attempts. As the nev millennium opens vith a promise ofsatisfed
uniformityforsome and oppressive dominationformany, a state of
affairs not dissimilar to that of all previous temporal landmarks,
utopianhopeis one ofthefevprinciplesleft.
' !mst loch, T|c t|a:||c o} Hoc l. and S !laicc and !. Knight tians. ) Cxloid,
lackvcII, I86) ,|y
' !c/utc|IcucaJHumcaI|_a|/y, o cit. , suia n. |8, I y|
o
Su|c./um cac Su|c./us : T|c tcc cac
Su|c./cc Su|c./
Vhetherve dealvith the sul ectinphilosophy, thepersoninlav,
the agent in sociology or the selfin psychology, the constitution,
meaning and actionofthe sul ectis adefningcharacteristic ofour
modernity. lndeed, according to a philosophical tradition vhich
stretches from Descartes to Kant and Heidegger, modernity is the
epoch in vhich the voddvas sul ectifed`. Despite the indiffer-
ence of urisprudence to thesematters, there can le nolegalsystem
vithoutalegalsulect, no humanrightsvithout the human` and
nomoralityvithoutaresponsilleselfandagentofchoice. Butthere
ismore. lfthesul ectistheengineandsymlolofmodernity,thetan-
gille contours ofits figure appeared frst in legal and moral dis-
courses. The modern sulect started its ourney in the annals and
operationsoflav,as thelegalsul ectofrights. ltcouldnotle other-
vise, the sul ectcomesto existence leforethelav, sul ectedto its
norms andheldresponsilleatitslar. Lavandsulectareintimately
relatedandhumanrightsaretheparadigmaticplaceinvhichhuman-
ity, sul ectandthelavcome together. ln asense, allmodern moral
and legal philosophy is a long meditation on the meaning ofthe
legal)sulect.
ThisChapterturnstothequestionofthesul ect. Afteralriefhis-
toricalintroductionto the ideaofhumanity,vevill examine, frst,
thephilosophyoflmmanuelKant,themostadvancedandstillunsur-
passed early defence of the centrality of the sul ect and of the
normativityofhumanity.Vevillthenturntothreecritiquesofthe
sul ective turn ofmodernity. frst, the friendly critique ofexisten-
tialism vhich emphasises the groundlessness of freedom and the
nothingness` ofhumanity. Secondly, Heidegger's ontological cri-
tique, according to vhich, modernity's forgetfulness ofBeingturns
theforceofhumanity's endless questformasteryandcontrolagainst
humanity itself Finally, in a more political and historical direction,
i O+ 3 LBEC TLA AND 3 LBECTL3.
ve vill examine hov the needom ofthe sulect, celelrated or
threatening, has another side. the sul ect i s philosophically hailed
into existenceasavihingandautonomousentitylutitsgenealogyis
oneofsul ectiontolavanddominationlypover.
i . 1 11III1b b 11_1L. 11 11 b 1VV1
c. HumcascaJ|umca|/y
Vhatentitiesarethelegitimatelearersofrights? The ansverappears
olvious. humans, rights existfor the sake ofhumanity, theyare the
acme ofhumanism. And yet, ifve question the self-evidence of
common sense, the intellectual reasons for creating human rights
insteadofrightsforalllivingleings arenot clear. The ideaof|umca-
|/cs or ofthe human leingis not self-defning or self-determining.
Classicalnaturallavandearlymoderndefnitionsofrightsdrevtheir
normative force fromclaims alout vhat counts as characteristically
human and derivedtheirprescriptionsfromthe natureandneeds of
humanness `. But theirdefnitions ofthe human` differedvidely
accordingtoage,placeandschoolofthoughtand,similarly,theposi-
tion ofhumanity in the vorld and its relation to otherleings has
varied enormously in all ages. Human slaves have leen excluded
fromhumanitythroughouthistory,intheMiddleAges ,ontheother
hand, pigs, rats, leeches and insects accused ofvarious crimes vere
formallysummonedto courts oflav,triedvithallthepomp ofdue
processandacquittedorconvictedandpunished. ' Legalrecognition
hasrarelyfollovedthemodernunderstandingofhumanityand, asa
result,humanrightsgive risetoanumlerofdiffcultconceptualand
ontologicalquestions.
Can vehave a concept ofrights vithouthaving a defnition of
vho orvhatishuman?Andevenifveveretoassumethatvecan
ansver the question ofhumanity, vhen does the existence of a
humanleingand the associatedrights legin andvhen doesitend?
Vhataloutchildren, the mentally orterminally ill, prisoners?Are
' can Vaitici, Icsro Jcsca|mcuJuMoycaH_cJ aos ]our !aiJs, Iachcttc, I yo) , Luc
Fcii, T|c !cu I:o|o_|:c| rJcr Caiol Volk tians ) \nivcisity oI Chicago !icss, I z)
l22V1.
^t common lav, it uscd to Lc thc casc that iisoncis, iI convictcd oI Iclonics, lost all
thcii civil iights and liLcitics. Jhcy cvcn lost thc iight to Liing lcgal iocccdings, so that thcy
Lccamc, in lcgal tcims, non-colc. ` Oavid Fcldman, C|v|| I||cr/|cs caJ Humca F|_|/s |a
Ia_|caJcaJ Hc|cs CxIoid, CxIoid \nivcisity !icss, I ) zy6 In a slov ioccss, gicatly
THE FPEE AND S LBJ ECTED SLBJ ECT iO3
they fully human, entitledtoall the rights thatlelongtohumanity
or, are they only partially human since their rights are severely
restricted?Dotheyen oyfeverrightslecausetheyarelesserhumans
oronaccountofsome other quality?Vhat alout animals? The ani-
malrights movement, from deep ecology and anti-vivisectionmili-
tancytoitsgentlergreenversions,hasplacedthelegaldifferentiation
letveen human and animalfrmly on the political agenda and has
drafted a numler ofBills ofanimal entitlements. lmportant philo-
sophicaland ontological questions areinvolvedhere. Atone endof
thedelate, rightsareleingpromotedforthoseanimals,likethegreat
apes, vho are genetically closest to humans. The dividing line
letveenhumanityandanimalityismaintained lutmovedalong.At
the other deep end, the divide itselfis challenged and humans are
seenas one, non-privilegedspeciesinthe organic continuum ofthe
cosmos.
Companies and othernon-human legalpersons have leengiven
legalrights, ofcourse, forcenturies. ChristopherStone,anAmerican
lavprofessor, has argued that trees, parks and othernatural ol ects
tooshouldlegivenrights, andaFrenchauthorhascalledforturn-
inggreenleltzonesintolegalsul ectsviththepovertogotocourt,
throughrepresentatives, to protecttheir ecosystemfromintrusion.
ltappears, therefore, that legalsul ectivity has not leenexclusively
lestoved on humans, its use as an economic strategy indicates that
the distinction letveen humanity and its others is not strict or
unchangealle. The meaning ofhumanity vas not conclusively set-
tledvhenvealandonedclassicalthoughtorsettledforaveaksense
of natural lav c|c Hart. As Leo Strauss argued, the question of
human nature has continued to haunt modern thought and has
Iacilitatcd Ly dccisions oI thc !uiocan Couit oI Iuman Hights in thc scvcntics and cight-
ics, isoncis havc Lccn admittcd to a sccond class humanity. Scc Stchcn Livingstonc and
Jim Cvcn, r|soaIcu CxIoid, CxIoid \nivcisity !icss, I ) aiticulaiIy Chatcis , 6
and Io
` Jhc Cicat ^c iojcct, a giou oI scicntists, hilosohcis and lavycis vhich includcs
among othcis Oouglas ^dams, Hichaid Oavkins, anc Coodall and !ctci Singci, has diavn
u a list oI iights Ioi laigc iimatcs and aigucs that chimanzccs, oiang-utans and goiillas
should Lc givcn iights to liIc, liLcity and Iiccdom Iiom toituic. !ctci Singci, Hights Ioi
chims`, Tc CucrJ|ca, z uly I , , !ctci Singci and !aola Cavalici cds) , T|c Crcc/
Hc tcc:/:Iuc||/y|qorcHumca|/y London, Fouith !statc, I ) .
' ChiJstohci Stonc, Should Jiccs havc Standing? Jovaids Lcgal Hights Ioi latuial
CLjccts`, I yz Sou/|cra Cc|jjota|cIcuFcv|cu
` NaiJc-^ngclc Icimittc, Lc concct dc divcisitc Liologiquc ct la cication d'un status
dc la natuic' in I`|ommc, |c ac/urc, |c Jro|/ !aiJs, ouigcois, I SS) .
' I.L.^. Iait, 1hc Coa:c/qIcuCxIoid, Claicndon) I S-.
i O
3 LB}EC TLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
lecome more complicated asa result ofthe contradictions engen-
deredlypositivescienceandhistoricism`.'Buthovdidvearriveat
themodernconceptofhumannatureandhumanity?
Premodernsocietiesdidnotdevelop ideas offreedomorindivid-
uality. Both Athens and Rome had citizens lut not men` , in the
senseofmemlers ofthehumanspecies. Theso.|c/cscact||umca|vas
alsent from the cotc and the{otum. Free men vere Athenians or
Spartans, Romans or Carthaginians lut not persons , they vere
Greeks orlarlarianslutnothumans. Thevord|umca|/cs appeared
for the frst time in the Roman Repullic. lt vas a translation of
c|Jc|c,theGreekvordforeducationandcultivation, ctuJ|/|oc/|as/|-
/u/|o |a |oac ct/cs scholarship and training in good conduct) . The
RomansinheritedtheideaofhumanityfromHellenisticphilosophy,
in particular Stoicism, and used it to distinguish letveen the |omo
|umcaus,theeducatedRomanand|omo|ct|ctus. Thefrsthumanism
vas the result ofthe encounterletveen Greek andRoman civilisa-
tion and the early modern humanism of the ltalian Renaissance
retained these characteristics. lt vas presented as a returnto Greek
andRomanprototypes andvas aimedatthelarlarismofmedieval
scholasticismandthe gothic north.
A different conception of|umca|/cs emerged in Christian theol-
ogy,superllycapturedinthePaulineassertion,thatthereisnoGreek
orjev,freemanorslave. Allmenareequallypartofspiritualhuman-
ity vhich vas sulected anduxtaposed to deity. They can all le
saved through God's plan ofsalvation andenoy eternal life in the
truecityofheaven.lfforclassicalhumanism,manisa:ooa|ooac.|oa
orca|mc|tc/|oac|c, forChristianmetaphysics, manisthevesselofthe
soul. nlyhumans, not animals, trees orspirits , possessanimmortal
soul, only humans can le saved in Christ. To le sure, this spiritual
universalismvas accompaniedlya strict political and socialhierar-
chy. During the Middle Ages, the only sulectvas the king, God's
representativeonearth.Butthereligiousgroundingofhumanityvas
undermined lythelileral political philosophies ofearlymodernity.
The foundation ofhumanity vas transferred fromGodto human)
nature and equality vas re-defined as political, in a process vhich
strengthenedtheintellectualtrendandthepopulardeterminationto
recognise the centralityofindividuality. Thisvas themostdramatic
effect ofthe Enlightenment. By the end ofthe eighteenth century,
theconceptofman`hadlecomethealsoluteandinalienallevalue
CIaudc Lcloit, T|co||/|:c|otmso}MoJcta So:|c/y (|ohn Jhomson cd ) CamLrJdgc,
!oIity, I S6) z|o
THE FPEE AND SLBjECTED SLBjECT i O7
around vhich the vhole vorld revolved. Humanity, manas species
existence, enteredthehistoricalstageas thepeculiarcomlinationof
classicalandChristianmetaphysics.
Humanism lelieves that there is a universal essence ofman and
that this essencelelongs andis the attrilute ofeach individualvho
isthereal, empiricalsul ect. Asspeciesexistence, manappearsvith-
out differentiation or distinction in his nakedness and simplicity,
united vith all others in an empty nature deprived ofsulstantive
characteristics. This is the man ofthe rights ofman, an alstraction
thathasaslittlehumanityaspossille, sincehehas ettisonedallthose
traitsandqualitiesthatluildhumanidentity.Aminimumofhuman-
ityis vhatallovs man to claimautonomy, moral responsilility and
legal sul ectivity. Man enters the historical scenelyphilosophically
severinghis tiesvith family, community, kinship andnature andly
turning his creativity and vrath against tradition and preudice, all
that created,nourishedandprotectedhimin the past. The universal
man ofthe declarations is an unencumlered man, human, all too
human. Hissoulunitesvith all others in Christandhisontological
minimalismlinks him to humanityphilosophically. As species exis-
tence, allmenareequal, lecausetheyshare equallysoulandreason,
theJ([ctca/|csc.(j.aletveenhumansandothers.But,asvesav,this
equality,themostradicalelementofthedeclarations , appliedonlyto
the alstract man ofspecies existence and his institutional foil, the
legalsulect. lthadlimitedvaluefornon-propermenthatismenof
noproperty) evenlessforvomenandvasdeniedaltogethertothose
defnedasnon-humans slaves , colonialsandforeigners) .
Bythe middle ofthenineteenthcenturyandafterthe alolitionof
slavery, humanityreacheditsfinalmodernformulationinuxtaposi-
tionto thenon-humanvorldofanimalsandol ects. Butthe non-
humanvermin` ofthe concentration camps, the potential ofvorld
annihilationofnuclearveapons andrecentdevelopmentsingenetic
technologyandrolotics,indicatethateventhismostlanalandolvi-
ousofdefnitionsisnotdefniteandconclusive.Humanity'smastery,
like God's omnipotence, includes the alility to re-define vho or
vhat counts as human and even to destroy itself From Aristotle's
slavestocylorgsandBladeRunner,theloundariesofhumanityhave
Il thc csscncc ol man is to Lc a univcisaI attrJLutc, it is csscntiaI that :oa:tc/csu|c:/scxist
as aLsoIutc givcns, this imIics an cmiiicism ol thc suLj cct. Il thcsc cmiiicaI individuaIs aic
to Lc mcn, it is csscntaI that cach cairics in himscIl thc vhoIc human csscncc, ilnot in lact,
at Icast in iinciIc, this imIics an idcaIism ol thc cssca:c. So cmiiicism ol thc suLj cct
imIcs idcaIism ol thc csscncc and vicc vcisa. ' Louis ^Ithussci, otMctU Uicvstci tians.)
London, ^IIcn Lanc, I 6) zzS
i OO
3 LB}ECTLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
leen shifting. These shifts can letraced i nthe history ofthe legal
institution. Vhathistoryhastaughtusisthatthereisnothingsacred
aloutanydefnitionofhumanityandnothingeternalaloutitsscope.
Humanitycannotactasanct|ot|normativeprincipleandi smutein
the matter oflegal and moral rules. ltsfunctionlies not in a philo-
sophical essencelutinitsnon-essence, inthe endlessprocess ofre-
defnition and the continuouslutimpossille attemptto escapefate
andexternaldetermination.
|. Kca/caJ/|ccu/oaomousmoJctasu|c./
Criticsanddefendersofmodernityagree thatthemodernageisone
ofendlessdynamismandceaselessinnovation,ofcontinuousleapsof
imagination, triumphs ofscience and technological lreakthroughs.
lolimits seemto restrainhumanity'salilityto assertitspoverover
nature and continuously revrite the loundaries of the vorld.
Genetictechnologypromisestodeliverusfromillness, adversityand
evendeath. Thevicarious, metaphoricalimmortalityofphysicaland
intellectualprocreationisalouttole overtaken,vearetold,lythe
literaleternityofcloningandcryonics .Accordingtotheprophets of
the nev millennium, our civilisationvhichplacedits greatest pre-
miumonproductionandconsumptionseems onthevergeofover-
coming scarcity and the associated economic, generational,
'
thnic
and political conH icts. Vhat lies lehind this endless
`
xpansion

f
humancreativityandthe attendant andceaselessextensionofdomi-
nation over the vorld? The transitionto modernity, inphilosophy,
ethics and aesthetics vas long and tortuous. But vhat vere the
philosophicalpresuppositionsofthesul ectiveturnofmodernitya

d
ofthe rights revolution? Vhat is the essence ofmodern man or, in
Kantianterms , vhatisman`?
Thisisapreliminaryissuetoourmainconcern, thequestionofthe
legal sul ect. Vevillfollov the lirth ofthe sul ect in the critical
philosophy ofKant,startingviththefacultyoftheoreti

calrea
'
on. ln
thepremodernvorld,truthvasgivenindivinerevelationoritcon-
sisted in the adequation letveen a thing and its man-made image.
!inst Cassiici, T|c |||oso|y o} /|c Ia||_|/camca/ F. C.^ KocIIn and ! !cttcgiovc
tians ) !iinccton l, !iinccton \nivcisity !icss, I 6S) , Naitin Icidcggci, c|a_ caJ T|mc
lcv Yoik, Iaici and !ov, I6z) , Costas !ouzinas and !onnic Vai
'
ngton vit| Shaun
NcVcigh, os/moJctaut|stuJca:c T|cLuo} Tc/|a/|cTc/so} Lu!duLuigh, !duLuigh
Lnivcisity !icss, II) Chatcis i and z, !ichaid Kcainy, T|c Hckcq 1mc_|ac/|oaLondon,
Iutchinson, ISS) , ^gncs IcIIci, cyoaJ]us/|:c CxIoid, IackvcII, I Sy)
THE F PEE AND S LBj ECTED S LBJ E CT i OV
Descartesvasthefrsttoarguethatthephenomenalvorldshouldle
approached on the analogy of the sul ect's self-understanding.
Thinkingnotonlyestallishedthecertaintyandcentralityofthesul-
ect, lutalso turnedthevorldinto an ol ect, setleforethe sul ect
as target of representation, cognition and intervention. After
Descartes, philosophy lecame a meditation on the sulect and its
relationshipvithitsopposite, theolect. Myrelationtothevorldis
lasedonmyunderstandingofmyselfovertime. Thevorldvasthus
reduced to its representation, in Heidegger's phrase, it lecame a
vorldpicture` andmanthecentreofeverythingthatis.
ButitvasKant's theoreticalanthropologyvhichfnally reversed
therelationshipletveennatureandhumanity. Kant'sfrstcontrilu-
tionvastosystematisetheCartesianrevolutionandmakeexperience
andtheory prerogatives ofthe sul ect. The sul ectis the thinking
thing`, thatvhichthinksinits capacity ofthinking,andinitsthink-
ingrelationviththe ol ectofthought. Accordingto Kant's princi-
pleofapperception,themanifoldsensationsandrepresentationsthat
lomlarduscanlesynthesisedandmakethevorldappear,insofaras
theylelongto asul ect. The thinking l`lies lehindandorganises
theseothervisechaoticperceptionsand,indoingso,itlecomescon-
sciousofitselfl , thesul ect, amtheleingvhocanlothorganiseand
doult the perceptions ofthe outside vorld and, insofar as l have
doults,itcannotle doultedthatl exist. The sul ectpossessescon-
sciousness, conscienceandlanguageandispresentandtransparentto
itself lntentionality,self-understandingandfreedomareallattrilutes
ofthecoincidenceofselfvithitselflnCartesianterms,lehindevery
.o|/o there isan co, the apodictically certain andlastlasis of udg-
mentuponvhichallradicalphilosophymustlegrounded`
_ 1
AfterKant's epistemological revolution, the real follovs the lavs
of rationality and a perfect correspondence is declared to exist
letveen the principles governing the human mind and the vorld.
Truthexpressesanevcertaintyconqueredthroughtheexamination
ofthe contents ofhuman consciousness and knovledge. All truth
originates and existsinman and, as aresultofthis cognitive revolu-
tion, thecompleteunderstandingandmasteryofthevorldlecomes
possille. Leilnizclaimedthata||||cs/s|actc/|oac,thattheprincipleof
reason, this most human offaculties, applies fully andanimates the
vorld. This claimvasontologisedandradicalisedlyHegelvho, ly
identi(ingtheidealandrationalvithreality,proposedaprincipleof
'' !dmund Iussci!, T|cct| Ic:/utcs (hc Iaguc, lijhoII, I 6|) y
V
3 LB}ECTLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
radical unity letveen the tvo. Butthe necessary precondition vas
the discovery ofsul ectivity and its elevation to cosmic principle.
Hegelusedtoshoutexcitedlytohisstudentsthatmodernphilosophy
arrivedonlyvhen manvas conceivedas sul ect.
Classical thought made nature a criticalprinciple independent of
man'svillandsuperiortohisinstitutionsandcustoms. lovnature
vas reducedto inert matter, deprived ofvalues, a meaningless and
purposeless chaos vhich man canconquerand controllydiscover-
ingin itregularities, patternsandlavs. Sul ectand olect, freedom
and necessity, vill and proscription are the tvin outcomes ofthe
sameprocessvhichturnedthehumanleingintosulectandground
ofleing and the vorld into an ol ect and picture for the sul ect.
Their history from that point is irrevocally loth separated and
linked. Thelinkisman'stc/|o,vhichinclearandconciseideas,num-
lers , concepts and categories, descriles and orders the vorld. Man
andthe vorldno longer existside-ly-sideinavideruniverse. The
ideaofnature as standardis lost lut, ascompensation, mancannov
treat nature, including social and human nature, as artefacts and
imposeorderandchange onthem. Tornfromthenaturalhalitatof
thepremodernvorld,deprivedofthelimitedcertaintiesofexistence,
humanity emlarks in an endlessquestforfulflment, its essence the
continuousinventionofnevvorlds.
Butthesul ectisnotustarationalentity, itisalsoaleingofvill.
lts relation tothevorldislothcognitive andactive. Modernvillis
alvays directedtovardsanoutside, actionpro ectsthesovereignself
initsorientationtovardsothersandinitsvork,vhichlestovsvalue
onnature. The pover ofvillisunique,itisnolongerslottedinthe
naturalvorld, itsprings neitherfromemotionsnorfrompure intel-
ligence lut follovs the sul ect's desires and interests. Descartes
descriled itas thesame inusas itis inGod. Modernvillknovsno
theoretical lut only empirical limits. lt is the alsolute pover of
choice,anindivisillesovereigntyoftheselfThispoverfndsitsper-
fectexpressionin decision. ln making a decision, the selflecomes
agent,anautonomousandresponsillesulect,vhosemarkisfound
inhis externalmanifestations, thoseactions that canle imputed on
him. Vithoutfreevill, there canleno selforsul ectand, vithout
anagent, there canle nofreeaction. Therecanle no agentvith-
outthispoverthatlinkstheactionto thesulectvho decidesupon
itandtherelyassumesfullresponsililityforit`.' '
' ' ]! Vcinant and ! VidaI-laquct, My/| caJ Tm_cJy |a Ha:|ca/ Ctcc:c lcv Yoik,
Zonc ooks, I o) ,o
THE FPEE AND S LBjE CTED S LBJ ECT V
l nthe classicalperiod, the goodandusticecoincidedas didmoral
udgment and political action. ' ln these conditions, ethical conHict
inevitally took tragic dimensions and created Antigones. But vith
freedomthe mainaspiration and achievementofmodernity and sul-
ectivityits ontological corollary, themodernsulectlecomesfreeto
decidevhatisgoodforhimselfand,hisactionscannotlerestrictedto
theunquestioningapplicationofnormsandrules.Modernconscience
andvilllecomelegislative. sulectscannovexaminetherulesthem-
selves and can reect and replace them. And vhile the classical link
,e
'
een
'
ocietyandcitizenremains,itscontentchanges radically.leg-
islatrvevillcannolongerrefertoaconsensualhorizonofsharedpur-
posesandmust,forthefrsttime,constructthegood`almostcxa||||o
on tvo
'
ondition
`
.

it mus
'
le acceptalle to the nevly emancipated
lour
-`
oislutadditronally itmusthave thealilityto shape thevirtu-
ousci
'
izenof
'
hemodernstate.Freedom,reasonandmoralitymustle
comlinedagainstalackgroundofapolyphonyofvalues. Theoretical
anthropologymustlesupplementedvithapracticalside.
Theconundrumofafreedvillthatmustfnditslimitationinitself
founditsalmostperfectsolutioninthepracticalphilosophy ofKant,
vholrought together sulectand ol ectunderthe reignofreason.
Kant's Ct|/|uc ,j tc./|.a| Rccsoa is the foundation of modern

d ' K urspru ence. ant set out to deducethe moral) lavinthe same
v

ythat

hearr.vedattheprinciplesofknovledgeinthefrstCt|/|uc.
Hisstartingpointvastheexperienceofpersonal,socialandintellec-
tual.ragmentationofearlymodernityandhisinterestvaslothphilo-
sophicalandpolitical. Hevantedto shovhovfreedomandreason
are inseparalle in their common concern to enlighten man and
releasehimfromhisself-incurredtutelage,his inalilitytomakeuse
of his understanding vithout direction from another`. ' ' Reason
acco
'
dingly has tvo forms. ln the theoretical domain the sul ect
a

cquires knovledge ly using c t|ot| forms ofintuition space and

time) and categories ofunderstanding identity/difference, cause/
effect, necessity/contingency, sulstance/accident) to construct the
manifolddataofexperienceascoherentandunifed.Practicalreason,
'
nt|eotherhand,helpsunitethepersonalitylysul ectingconHict-
inginclinationsanddesirestoanct|ot|morallav. lnthissense, rea-
sonactsastheprinciplethatunitesthesul ectandthevorld.
' Oouzinas and Vaii+ngton, us/|:c M|s:ctt|cJ !dinLuigh \nivcisity !icss, I )
Chatci
' ` ImmanucI Kant, Ct|/|uctc:/|:c|Fccoa London, NacmIIan I ,6).
' ' iLid , j

i VZ
3 CBEC TCA AND 3 CB}EC TC3
Butmoral reason i s fundamentally different from its theoretical
version.Thetheoreticalmeta-language ofscience- theprinciplesof
causalityandnon-contradiction- isthesameviththatusedforfirst-
order olservation a scientist uses the same form oflanguage for
experimentation, for example, and for expressing axioms and
hypotheses) . Vith the moral lav, hovever, no simple homology
exists . Adehningdissymmetryseparatesprescriptivefromconstative
statements . ln ethics, thelanguage offacts, commands andproscrip-
tions YoumustX`) andthemeta-languageofnormsandrules lt
isdecreedthatincircumstancesY, personsoftype Z shouldX`) are
not isomorphic. As aresult, knovledge cannotle thelasis ofmoral
udgmentsandactionnorcanprinciplesoflavle extractedfromthe
examinationofparticularcommands . Furthermore, asthegoodisno
longer given and cannot le derived from experience, moraludg-
mentsarenotemotionalreactionstoperceptionsandempiricalprop-
erties. Morallavdoesnotfollovcausality,onthecontrary, morality
is the cause ofacts. Vhat is moral lav's status then? ln a move that
resemllestheoperationsofaestheticsinthe Ct|/|uc,] uJmca/,Kant
deducesthelavlyanalogy, csjitvere afactofnature amenalle to
reason as ifit vere a universal lav ofnature`. The lav exists lut
canno: le derivedfrom other sources or statements. lt is a fact of
reason`and not ofexperience, andfreedomisthe result ofits oper-
ation.
These ideas give Kantian practical philosophy its revolutionary
character.Moralityisnolongergroundedinapre-existingideaofthe
goodnordoesitderivefromanexternalsource. Classicalphilosophy
made the mistake, Kantlelieved, ofpositinghrst goodandeviland
then fashioning the moral lav accordingly. The ancients openly
revealed this errorly devotingtheirethicalinvestigation entirely to
the definitionofthe conceptofthe highestgoodand thus positedan
olect vhich they intend sulsequently to make the determining
ground ofthevillinthe morallav`.' But in so doing theirfun-
damentalprinciplevasalvaysheteronomy,andthey cameinevitally
to empiricalconditionsforamorallav`.' Kantreversedtheproce-
dure, it is not the concept ofthe goodthatposits the lavlut the
morallavvhichdehnesgoodandevil.Theuniversalpreconditions
ofmoral action are discovered inthe free andrational action ofthe
autonomousagent,vhofollovsthelavofthecategoricalimperative
vithout any incentive, exceptfor apure sense ofduty and respect.
' ` iLid. , 66-y
o
iLid 66
THE lPEE AND SLBJ ECTED S LBJ ECT i V
'Act insuchavaythatthe maxim ofyour vill canalvays le valid
as theprinciple estallishinguniversallav`, ' 'inothervords, vhen-
ever you face a moral choice, act according to aprinciple vhich is
universallyapplicallevithout contradictionto allsimilar situations.
ltsChristiandelti sapparenti nanotherof itsmanyformulations. act
so thatyou treat humanity, vhetherinyourperson orinthat ofan
other, alvays as an end`.'
Thislavis rather strange. itis imperative act in such avay . . . )
lutits commandisto follovapure form, that oflegality the prin-
ciple ofthe actionshouldle alvays valid, intheform ofauniversal
norm) . The categoricalimperativeasksme to act as ifthemaxim of
myvillcanlecomeaprincipleofuniversallegislation. Thelavcom-
mands to follovapure form, that ofuniversality, declaredto le the
essenceofpracticalreason. Butvhilethelavforcesandolligatesthe
vill, itemanatesfromit. Themoralvillisfreelecauseithndsallits
determinationsinitself, thesulectlecomesthevillinglegislatorof
itsovnsulection. Butthemorallavhurts,follovingitsinunction
to universalise means alandoning individual feelings, passions and
desires andactingtotally disinterestedly, outofapure sense ofduty.
Kantian autonomy makes modern man the lav's su|c./in a doulle
sense. heisthelegislator,thesulectvhogivesthelavandthelegal
sul ect,sulectedto thelavonconditionthathehasparticipatedin
its legislation. And again as a quasi-lav ofnature, the moral lav
appears as loth regularity, the universal interconnection ofthings,
andas apurposefulorderinthetraditionofnaturallav.
Therecognitionofvill'sinvolvementinactionisatypicallymod-
ernmoveanddistinguishespurefrompracticalreason.Furthermore,
the pronouncement ofselfas loth lav-giver and sul ectmarks the
inauguration of the modern conception of autonomy or self-
determination, the otherside ofvill'senthronement. The morallav
givesthesulecthisfreedom.Themoralsulectisautonomousvhile
the non-moral, including the legal sulect, ly taking its lav from
outside, is heteronomous. Freedom as autonomyis the gift ofsul-
ectivityandthe essence ofmanistoleasul ectlothJcutcasthe
addresseeandrepresentative ofthenioral lav) andJc{c./o asitsleg-
islator).
VhenKantturnstothetheoryofstate,heseesthesocialcontract
notasahistoricalcovenantlutasthecauseandeffectofpurereason.
Allpreviousversionsofthecontracthadincludedreferencestothose
iLid j O .
s
iLid., |y.
i V+
3 LB}EC TLM AND 3 LBEC TL3.
cbaracteristics anddrives tbe tbeoristconsideredas naturalandnom
vbicbreasondrevitsprinciples. ForKant,ahsucbempiricalimpu-
ritiesmustleremovedasmetbodologicallyunacceptalleandmorally
vrong.Asaresult,tbe contractlecomesaregulativefiction,accord-
ing to vbicb tbe state sbouldle treatedas ifitvere itsproduct. lts
presidingprincipleistbat usticeistbelimitationoftbefreedomof
eacbpersonin sucbavaytbatitaccordsvitbtbatofeveryone else,
insofarastbis ispossilleaccordingtoauniversallav, andpulliclav
is tbe aggregate oftbe externallavs tbat make possille sucbatbor-
ougbgoing agreement`.' justice commands tbe legislator to intro-
duce lavs, as if tbey bad leen legislated ly tbe people and to
determinetbeircontentundertbeprinciple ofuniversality. But tbe
logicalprinciplesofnecessityandnon-contradictioncansupportany
content vbatsoever, as Hegel forcefully argued .oa|tc Kant. Tbe
logicalnecessityofapropositionsaysnotbingaloutitsempiricalsul-
stance ormoralvortb.
Autonomous morality and beteronomous legality vere initially
strictly separated. But tbe divisionvas soonveakenedaslotbvere
made to follovpure reason and vere simlarly unconcerned alout
tbeempiricalcbaracteristicsoftbepeopletbeyaresupposedtoguide.
Astrongsenseofdutyandrespectfortbelavlecameequallyimpor-
tantforlotbmorality andlegality, moral action follovstbe univer-
sallav ofreason, legality is oledience to tbe lavs oftbe state. But
onlytbosemaxims, rulesandnormstbatmeettbecriteriaofuniver-
salityare morally linding, since all otbers are contradictory. lature,
tbe conceptvbicbsince classical Greece actedas astandardofcri-
tique, dissolvedinto reasonanditsformal commands, andinto state
lav andits sanctions. But a moralvill, vbicb vas totally disassoci-
ated frompassions andlodily desires, couldnot motivate even tbe
piouslurgbersofKant'sPrussiaanditsrigourvasperforcedisplaced
ontolegality. TbelavsoftbeautocraticPrussianState, Kantargued,
meettbeformal criteria oflegality, vbile tberigbt topardonis tbe
mostolsceneofalllavslecauseiflegal usticeperisbes,tbenitisno
longervortbvbileformentolive oneartb` .lntbisvay,alsolute
moralautonomylecame tbemask oftotalbeteronomy andtbefree
vill oftbe sulectvas underpinnedly tbe gallovs. ' Formality, as
' Kant, Hotks I z vols) Fiankluit am Nain, Suhi!am, I yy) \I, j j z.
z0
Kant, iLid. \II, I O.
zi
"!vcn il a civil socicty vcic to dissolvc itscll Ly common agiccmcnt ol aIl its mcm-
Lcis . . thc last muidcici icmaining in ison must ui:t Lc cxccutcd, so that cvcionc viI!
1 . . . . ~ ~~ ~ ~~ - -~-~\ + Cr r!r t1r 1! d oi i l rcIthosc actions viII
THE FPEE AND S LBJ ECTED S LBJ E CT i V3
rule formalism or as proceduralism, vill lecome from nov on tbe
moral component ofpositive lav. / tbe main oppositions oftbe
urisprudence ofmodernity vere inauguratedly Kant. legality and
morality, form andsulstance, validityandvalue, normandfact.
TbeKantianrevolutiontransferredtbefoundationofmeaningand
tbe ground oflav from tbe divine and transcendent to tbe buman
andsocial. Morallavisgrantedtousleforevecanstartquestioning
itsnatureoroperationandlindsusimmediatelyandalsolutely. But
tbisradicalfirststep comesto an endintbeassertiontbatvelive in
a totalisalle community ofreason. Tbe command to follovprinci-
ples tbat vould le acceptalle and villed ly all rational people
assumes tbat tbe desires and actions oftbe selfare compatille and
coberentvitbtboseofallotbers.Kantianpracticalpbilosopbylrings
togetber reason, freedom and tbe lav on tbe lody oftbe modern
sulect, lut morality bas lecome exclusively oledience to tbe lav,
andtbe exclusionofpassionsanddesiresfromrule-follovingmakes
tbe reconciliation too perfectpbilosopbically and totally unrealistic
practically. Tbe moral) lav appeals forits operation to tbe borizon
ofauniversalcommunityvbicbsbouldactasaregulativeprinciple.
Butsucbcommunitydoesnotexistempiricallyanditsexcessivefor-
malism cannotmake itanormativevalueeitber. Tbelimiteduseful-
ness oftbe conceptbaslecomeapparent intbe internationalbuman
rigbtslav, vbere itacts as a rationalising and legitimising devicefor
statelavs largelydevoidofetbicalcontent.
Vecanconcludetbattbeessenceofsul ectivityisfreevill.Kant's
re-interpretationoftbeCartesianltbink`astbemorallvant`and
bis insistence on autonomy as self-legislation provided tbe pbilo-
sopbical andmoral lasis fortbe ascendancy ofrigbts and tbepullic
recognitionofindividualdesire.Attbesametime,tbeentbronement
oftbe sulect prepared tbe ground for tbeinfinite manipulation of
tbe natural, social and psycbic vorlds. Before modernity, vill vas
sulordinatedtotbeendsitvassupposedtopursuevitbintbeteleo-
logical scbeme oftbevorld. lnKant,practical reasonvills itselfas
freedom, reasonas pure vill is tbe completion oftbe leing ofvill
vbicb,unconditionedandalsolute,lecame avilltovill.
not Lc uxcd uon thc colc Lccausc thcy lailcd to insist on caiiying out thc unishmcnt,
loi il thcy lail to do so, thcy may Lc icgaidcd as accomlishcs ol this uLlic violation ol!cgaI
justicc' ILid . , I ,I .
V
3 LB}CTLA AND 3 LB} CTL3.
|. T|c ao|||aacss o|umcaac|utc
The philosophicalinventionofnatureinGre
`
evasanactofrelel-
lion against religion, customs and the traditi

n of the

ancestors.
Classicalphilosophydefinedthenatureofanentityaslothitsessence
anditsendand,inthissense, naturevasathick` concept. ltplaced
the entity on aclearlife tra ectory anddetermined

vh

t stepsvere
necessary for maturing into a perfectspecimen of
'
ts kin:. Muman
nature, too, vasteleologically determined andmultrform, itdiffered
frompersonto personacross socialhierarchies andro|es a
'
d slott
`
d
people into distinctpositions vhich endovedthemvithhigh|y dif-
ferentiated characteristics. free men and vomen, slaves, foreigners
and mc|o|/o|, philosophers, soldiers and colllers all

had different
aims duties and virtues. Early modern natural lav, inH uenced ly
Stoi.ism and Christian spiritual universalism, amended this highly
differentiatedontology and developedthe idea ofspe

cies exis
'
ence,
ofa common human nature that unites all people, irrespectrve of
theirindividualcharacteristics andculturalor social determinations.
lorHolles orLocke, Descartes orVoltaire, men share a common
humanityvhichgivesallempiricalmenthesamee

ssentialnee+sand
characteristics, eventhoughtheirspecificcontentdiffersaccord

ngto
thetheorist.Eachpersonisanindividualapplicationoftheuniversal
man humanessencecomeslefore existence.
T|e displacementoftraditional ontologyfrommanifoldends and
natures to a commonhumanityvas challengedand developedearly
onlyanascentphilosophical approach, vhich characterisedmoder-
nitylythepriorityoffreedomovernatur

andoflavoverfactand,
inthissense, vas aradicalversionofKantianmorality. Rousseau, for
example, lelievedthatafter the vithdraval ofclassicaltele
'
l
'
g, the
emergingnevmanvas defnedlythetendencytoperfectrlilityand
lyhisgroundlessfreedom,thecapacitytotearhimselfava
)
fromnat-
uralandhistoricaldeterminations , tomigrateandleavelehindhearth,
homeorc|t|c,andtodiscardthecallofnature.Asthecloseduniverse
ofthe ancientsretreatedlefore the openvorldofthe moderns, man
losthisassignedplaceandfunctionandhisnaturecouldnolongerdic-
tatehis mission. Atthatpoint, freedomvas enthronedas the master
andtormentor ofthe moderns. Rousseau foundfreedomat its most
imperious, vhenitactedagainstnatureandinstinct.
Jhc Lcastj chooscs or rcjccts Ly instinct and nanj L
)
an act
`
l lrcc-
don, so that a Lcast cannot dcviatc lron thc rulc that 1b rcscLcd to
THE FPEE AND SLBj ECTED S LBJ ECT V7
it cvcn vhcn it vould Lc advantagcous lor it to do so, and a nan dcvi-
atcs lron it oltcn to his dctrincnt. / igcon vould dic ol hungcr ncar
a Lasin lillcd vith thc Lcst ncats. /nd a cat uon hcas ol lruits or
grain, although cach could vcry vcll nourish itscll on thc lood it dis-
dains il it nadc u its nind to try sonc. Jhus dissolutc ncn aLandon
thcnsclvcs to cxccsscs vhich causc thcn lcvcr and dcath, Lccausc thc
nind dcravcs thc scnscs and Lccausc thc viJ still scaks vhcn thc
naturc is silcnt. ``
Moral anti-naturalismhasleenapersistentundercurrentofmod-
ern philosophy. lor Kant, moralattitudes and actions are disinter-
ested.Vhilelcanactinconformityvithheteronomousstatelavout
ofinterest,outoffearofsanctionsforexample, moralactionismoti-
vated exclusivelyly respect for the morallav vhichdemands that
needs,passionsandinterestsaresetaside. Goodvillismoralvilland
virtueisnottheperfectionofnaturaltalentslutastruggleagainstnat-
uralinclinations and sensualinterests. lreud, too, arguedthat civili-
sation is an attempt to negate sexual desires and drives andloth he
andhis follover Lacan found inKant'ssadisticrenunciation ofthe
H eshatypicalexpressionofmodernity.linally,inthejevishtradi-
tion, it is the lav that sustains the community, often against the
demands ofnature orreason. To leust, thejevmustoley thelav
vithout any reason orustifcation. lor Martin Buler, jevs act in
ordertounderstand,vhileEmmanuelLevinasdenouncestheGreek
orVestern temptationoftemptation` , thedemandto sulordinate
action to knovledge and thus overcome the purity` ofoledience
tothelav.'Asalileralphilosopherputit,manisindetermination
par excellence. he is so ollivious to nature it can cost him his life.
Man i s free enough to die offreedom a . . ||mc c|Jctc
!
Jc|ct|otc
scuot. Seeingthe lest,he can choosethe vorst. thisisthemotto of
theantinatural creature . . . His humanitas residesinhisfreedom in
thefactthatheisundefined,thathisnatureis. . . topossessthecap
'
ac-
ityto distancehimselffromanycodevithinvhichonemayseekto
imprisonhim` .
-- can-acqucs Housscau, T|c|r/ caJ Sc:caJ I|s:ourc H. and . Nastcis tians ) lcv
Yoik, St Naiin's Iicss, I6|) ,
-` acqucs Lacan, Kant avcc Sadc', , I :/o|ctVintci I S) , , ,-y, , Costas Oouzinas,
Lav's Uiih ^ntigonc's Ocath. on CntoIogJcaI and IsychoanaIyticaI !thics', I6 CctJo:o
Icu Fcv|cu, I z;-6z, I,, Oouzinas, OcathLound LcgaIity' in O. Nandcison cd.) ,
Coutt|a_Icc/| London, IIuto, I )
-' Oouzinas and VaiiJngton, usticc NiscaiiJcd, suia n. I z, Chatci |.
- Luc Fcii, Tc!cuI:c|o_|:c| tJct C. VoIk tians. ) Chicago, \nivcisity ol Chicago
Iicss, I z) ,
VO
3 LL}ECTLA AND 3 LL}ECTL3.
Froma differentperspective, lietzschedeclaredthatthesuperior
manishisovncreator,hefindsinhimselfthesourceofallmeaning,
truth and responsilility. Authentic creativity is achieved lyleaving
lehindsocialconstraints andmoraldeterminationsandlycreatinga
nev lav for oneself that derives from the impulse to oley, not
Godorany otherauthority lut, thehighestcommandment ofself-
afhrmingvillpositingits ovn lavs. But the irost striking contem-
porarypresentationofexistentialfreedomisfound

inthe

earl
`
vork
ofjean-Paul Sartre. Sartre identified humanismvith existentiah
'
m,
ina famous article, and throughouthisoeuvre reversed the philo-
sophical priority of essence over existence. ' Existence precedes
essence, ahumanperson starts as nothing, a degree zero, andcon-
structs himselfthrough his choices and actions. Man hrst exists and
acts onthevorldand only inasecond stage defines himselfandhis
nature. Against ontological essentialism, Sartre arguedthatthe main
characteristic ofhuman nature is not itshistorical, cultural or social
determinations, lut its alility to lreak avay fromanygiven codes,
traditionsandothersociallurdens. Thenature ofhumansisto have
nointrinsicnature,otherthanvhattheymakeofthemselves,human
essenceis nothingness,thealsenceofall essence.
Thisradicalemptinessmeansthatnoct|ot|valuesorconceptions
ofthe good can le found in history, religion or tradition. Vhen
Dostoievsky vrote, in ^o|cstom ||c |aJcttouaJ, that ifGod did
not exist, everything vould le permitted`, he predicted the value
system ofexistentialism. ' But according to Sartre, self-legislation,
although deprived ofthe unvorkalle Kantian self-discipline, does
notleadto nihilism.Manmustchoosehisovnvalues, heistheleg-
islator ofhis ovn morality and, in this sense, his responsilility is
extreme. leitherpastvalues norhopesofthefuture can explain or
excuseouractions. Veare leftalone, vithoutexcuse. Thatisvhat
l mean vhen l say that man is condemnedto le free. Condemned,
lecause he didnotcreate himself, yet is nevertheless at lilerty, and
fromthemomentthatheisthrovninthisvorldheisresponsillefor
everything he does `. lo moral rule can guide this choice and no
lavs can replace the responsilility ofdecisionvhichis at the same
time an invention ofself The ultimate criterion is vhether one's
udgmentsandactionspromotefreedomofchoiceandresponsilility
zo
can-!aul Sartic, I|s/ca/|c||sm caJ Humca|sm ! Naiict tians. ) London, Ncthucn,
I So) .
` iLid , j j .
z-
iLid. , j q
THE lPEE AND S LBJ ECTED S LBJ ECT VV
for oneselfandforothers. Manisalvays outside ofhimself itisin
proecting and losing himself leyond himself that he makes man
exist, and, ontheotherhand, itislypursuingtranscendentaimsthat
he himselfis alle to exist. Sincemanis thus self-surpassing, and can
grasp olects onlyin relationto his self-surpassing, he is himselfthe
heartand centre ofhistranscendence`. Thistranscendence, vhich
constitutes identity through its self-overtaking, is vhat Sartre cahs
existentialhumanism`. lntheHeideggerianidiom,existencecomes
fromek-sistence, itis the alility to lreakavay, to vrench oneself
freeofcodes `. `'
lfexistential freedom is the main human characteristic, human
nature cannot le reduced to its liological, psychological and social
determinations . Lndoultedly, environmentalconditionsandlimita-
tionscannotle totallydiscardedand existentialvill cannot overturn
or alolish them. But vhile such limitations may le ol ectively
given and unavoidalle, theyhave also a sul ective aspect. determi-
nations survive in people's lives and fate dictates only ifnot chal-
lenged. Oedipus couldhave chosen not to search for the murderer
ofLaius , lut once he chose to do so, he dehned himselffreely
according to destiny. To put it differently, vhile many environ-
mental factors dehne our existence, our ovn choice decides
vhether to live through them or re ect them. But certain choices
are inauthentic lecause they deny existential freedom. This is the
case vhen a partial characteristic, such as race, nation, gender or
trile, is defined as the essence oflelongingto humanity and privi-
leges thosevho possess it against others vho do not. ln this sense,
vhile one can choose to le racist, sexist, nationalist or trilal, ly
doing so he prioritises - a false - essence over existence and natu-
ralises lelonging over freedom.
Thisalsolutefreedomofself-creationshouldnotleadto individ-
ualismandselfishness. Sartreargued, againstDescartesandKant, that
thepersonvhorecognises herselfinthe.o||o, discoversinthesame
actthatallothersarethenecessarypreconditionofherexistence. The
other is a freedom confronting me and it is only through this
encounter that l achieve my ovn sul ectivity and self-knovledge.
Veopentothevorldoffreedomlyhndingourselvesinthe com-
panyofothersandtherealmoftheuniversal.Butthisuniversalisnot
thecategoricallavorcatholicreasonlutthefreedomofnothingness,
iLid .
`' Luc Fciiy and ^lain Hcnaut, Hc|Jc_ct caJ MoJcta|/y F !hiIi tians.) Chicago,
Lnivcisity oI Chicago !icss, I o) q
Z 3 LB}ECTLA AND 3 LBECTL3.
the Jq ctca||c sc.q.c, vhich enalles humanity to lreak nee from
conditions and limitations. Theonly universal experience istheact
ofdepartingfromtheknovnandconstrictingand, as such, itcanle
communicatedacrossculturalandhistoricaldivides. Existentialfree-
dom denies, resists and, only vhen defeated, accommodates envi-
ronmentallimitations and constraints. Vhile these constraints differ
intime andplace, the forceandviolence ofexternal determinations
is universally understood and lreaking free from them universally
valued. ln this sense, universality is not something given as fact or
lav, lutis continuouslymade, inthe actofchoosingoneselfandof
understanding others. The universality of nothingness ceaselessly
destroys the customary and traditional and opens nev horizons and
vistas in communication vith others. Breaking avay, the alility to
fashion oneselffreely and to understand the otheras equal freedom
arethetvoaspectsoftheuniversal.
Existentialism as a philosophical tradition lies lehind Hegel's
dialecticsandHeidegger's ontology. ltsemphasis onradicalfreedom
sounds at times naive and at others anarchic, and this has not
endearedittolegaltheoristsandurists .Yet,existentialismcouldhelp
us re-situate the appeal to human nature and universal principles of
human rights vithoutlosing the valualle critiques ofthe Kantian
alstractions , lythe likes ofBurke and Marx. Existential freedomis
thealilityofmodernmantotranscendtheconstraints ofnatureand
ofsecondnature. thosehistoricaland cultural determinationsvhich
often ossi( into nature-like external impositions. The groundless
freedomofthedeclarationspointsinthesamedirection,invhichthe
shapingofselfand thevorldhas priority overany essential, past or
estallished characteristics. Existentialism seems to capture an aspect
ofthehumanrightsdeclarationsforgottenlylileralphilosophyafter
itspoliticalvictory.ltretainsthecriticalusesofhumannatureagainst
authority,luttotally emptiesitofanyessential determinationexcept
foritsgroundlesslutpotentfreedom. Humanrightsdeclarationsrep-
resentthispoverofnothingness , ofanature.ca|tcnatureandauni-
versalism of detachment from historical constraints and cultural
encumlrances. ln this sense, humanrights lelongtothe radicaltra-
dition ofnatural lav, for vhich nature represented the relellion
against lav and tradition. As Ferry puts it, ifve did not have the
alilitytodetachourselvesfromthetraditionalculturethatisimposed
uponuslikeasecondnature,vevouldcontinue,likeallanimals , |o
|cocctacJ|yac|utc|.oJcs. . . Tradition, reducedtothepureandsim-
ple transmission ofthe past, vouldlemerelythe |as||a.|peculiar to
THE FPEE AND S LBjE CTED S LBj ECT Zi
the human species ,ustasprogrammatic asitisinthe otheranimal
species`. `'
Ve canconclude,thatthemanvithoutdeterminationisafiction,
aphilosophical trope, ustly attacked, lyBurke andMarx, vhen it
frst entered the vorld. Existential self-creationvas notpart ofthe
richphilosophicallanguageoftheeighteenthcentury.Vhilevecan
use it today to explain partially the pro ect ofself-foundation of
modernity,existentialism'senthusiasmsunderestimatethesocialcon-
straints, historical determinations and conscious and unconscious
structuresvhichhavesucceededclassical{ot|uacinshapingmodern
sul ectivity. Butthe negative universality ofthe degree-zero` man
carries apoverfulsenseofreformandrelellion,almosttotallylostin
theanaemicversionofthealstractman`oflileralphilosophy. One
ofthe tangille effects ofthe human rights declarationsvas to place
opennessattheheartofpoliticsandtoshatterthe corporealsymlol-
isation ofsociety. Therights ofman reduce righttoa lasis vhich,
despiteitsname,isvithoutshape, isgivenasinteriortoitselfand,for
thisreason, eludesallpovervhichvouldclaimtotakeholdofit`.`
lo formulation given to human rights , universal or particular,
KantianorBurkeancanlecome definitive andunquestionalle. But
this universalism has no relation vith that oflileral enthusiasts for
Vesternprinciplesandeuropeanhuman`values. ltsdefanceoftra-
dition and its negation ofreifed constraints applies equally to the
local cultures ofrelativists and to the univers

l lavs ofthe arrogant

orthodoxy ofglolalised humanity. The escapefrom either may le
impossilleperhaps, lcarusmayledeludedordoomed.Butitisonly
inplanningalineofHightanddreamingoftheleautyofthesunthat
he can understandtheleastlinessoftheMinotaur.
1 1 . 1 I111 b b b 11_ 1L . 11 11LL1V

b II1IL1 L11
LV 1 [11
MartinHeidegger, oneofthe mostpoverful existentialinterpreters
ofmodernity,acceptedtheaccuracyoftheKantiandescription. Ours
istheepochoftheautonomoussul ect, oftheselfemancipatedfrom
themedievalordertoremakethevorldinitsovnimage.Modernity
is marked ly ceaseless and even aimless self-assertion, its proect is
to increase infinitely the pover ofthe sul ect. Man lecomes the
`' Fcii, o cit , T|c!cuI:o|o_|:c| tJct, ln z; , I I .
` Lcloit, o. cit. , suia n y, z; S
ZZ
3 LB]ECTLA AND 3 LB]EC TL3.
grounding principle, master ofthe vorld and measure ofall things
loth in theo and inpracticallife. `` But this is not cause for cele-
lrationlecause the vill to vill ofmodernmanis not authentic. lt
conceals a deep existential insecurity, a desire to master Being as a
vhole andmake itpermanently and defnitelypresent. The sulec-
tiveturnofmodernitygivesHeideggertheopportunitytoreH ecton
thevayinvhichmetaphysicalthoughthasvaylaid humanityfrom
itsprimordialdestinyof caringforBeing`. Modernmegalomaniais
the sign ofanevepochinthe history ofmetaphysics. But vhat is
metaphysics?
Metaphysics mc|c|c|ys|.corleyondnature- isavayofthink-
ingaloutvhatliesleyondthesensilleandimmediateexperienceof
things. Metaphysicslelievesintheexistenceofanideal, transcendent
vorldoveragainstvhicheverydayrealitymustmeasureitself lnour
ordinarylives, veareimmersedinstreams ofunrelated,incoherent,
criss-crossingstreams ofpeople, eventsand emotionsvhich invade
our vorld in unpredictalle and uncontrollalle vays. Behindmeta-
physicsliesasimpleandurgentdesire. tomakesense ofthedisorder
thatsurroundsus, tomasterfnitude. Thefoundationofmetaphysics
vas laid in classical Greece. The great philosophers, from
Anaximander to Plato, claimed thatthevorld ofthesensesvasan
external only appearance, vhile the othervorld, vhich could le
reachedonly throughthemind, vas thetrueone. Plato completed
thereversalletveenthe sensille andtheintelligille. thephenome-
nalvorldisonlyaseriesofshadovsonthedarkvallofacave,vhile
thevorldofideas andformsisthe sunlitempire oftrue reality. The
supra-sensille domain, unlike chaotic nature, is united, harmonious
andcoherent.Phenomenaandappearancesaremany,lutthetruthis
oneandcanleapproachedthroughreasonor|oos,truth'scauseand
effect. Reasonis the origin ofcausationand, metaphysics theknov-
ledge offirst causes and the exploration ofessences. The philoso-
pher'stask,therefore, istoguideustothisidealvorld,invhichthe
reason ofthings that rule the vorld` resides Anaxagoras) . The
metaphysical urge creates ideal, unifed and logically harmonious
vorldsandcallsthemreality.
Properly metaphysical concepts do not have immediate purchase
uponthephenomenalvorld. Themaincharacteristicofmetaphysi-
cal systems, ofmaterialism or idealism, leing or nothingness, the
finiteandtheinfnite,isthattheyfollovtheirovninternallogicand
`` Iciiy and Hcnaut, o. cit suia n o, |z-
THE FPEE AND S LBjECTED SLBJ ECT Z
luildtheirpropositionsfromthepureandnecessaryinterconnections
letveentheirfoundingaxioms . Consider,forexample, theKantian
critical revolutionin ethics andthephilosophyofright. Kant alan-
doned the attempts ofearlier natural lavyers to derive right from
some empiricaly given datum, like theneedfor security Holles) ,
the urge to socialility Grotius) or individual freedom Rousseau) .
For Kant, human nature andfreedomare not empiricalrealitieslut
pure concepts , constructions of an empirically uncontaminated
thoughtand, omyas such cantheylecomethelasis forthe deriva-
tion ofright. This vay the social contractlosesits ratherprecarious
claim to historical reality and lecomes a regulative concept.
Everythingthathappensinthestatehappens,asifthestatevaslased
onasocialcontractandasifthelegislatoractedastherepresentative
ofallcitizens.Butvhilethisregulativeprinciplemaylesuffcientfor
invard-looking morality, legality needs an added external idea to
arlitrate over the vacuity oftheimperative. Thisisprovidedlythe
principle ofco-existence undervhich the freedomofeach is tole
limitedsoastoprovidethesamefreedomtoeveryone else, accord-
ingto universallav. Thispurelyformalimperative, evenvhencou-
pledviththeprincipleofnon-contradiction,cannotgivecontentto
lav.Ametaphysicalphilosophyofrightasmuchasethicsisemptyof
anysulstance anditsnormsarepurelyformalpropositions.
According to Heidegger, the main metaphysical urge is to ask
vhat`questions.vhatisanentiq,vhatisitsessence, vhatitmeans
for a leing to le such. Once this type ofquestion has lecome the
leading concern ofphilosophy, its strategy is to offer a numler of
determinations orthesesaloutthemeaningandtruthofBeingorof
theleing ofan entity, to pronounce a series ofvordsforleing`.
Themetaphysicaloperationthinksthroughprinciples, assertsthepri-
macy ofa value or origin, and then proceeds to arrange all entities
and experiences , according to their distance from that ct.|c. The
principleisassumedtoexistleyondlanguageandsignification,tole
immediate and immediately present to consciousness . This vay,
unity is privileged over plurality and sameness over difference.
Aristotle, an early metaphysician, called this ground |yo/c|mcaoa,
thatvhichlies under`. it is the sulstance oressence ofvhichall
otherentitiesarepredicatedlutvhichisitselfnotpredicatedofany-
thing else. ` The Latinsu|c.tum or sulstratum translated the Greek
` Simon Ciitchlcy, !ilcgomcna to any !ost-Occonstiucivc SuLjcctivity' and \tc
Cuzzoni, Oo vc still vant to Lc SuLjccts' in S. CiitchIcy and !. Ocvs cds), Ic:oas/tu:/|vc
Su|c:/|v|/|cs lcv Yoi!, S1T.Y. !icss, I 6) I -|6 and zoI-I6
Z+ 3 LB}EC TLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
|yo/c|mcaoaandlecamethevordforthefoundation,the ground-
ing principle. The sul ectum is the sulect ofpredication, that
vhichisthrovnunderandpersists throughtime, thematterorcon-
tentuponvhichformimposestype and change. lt has the qualities
ofstance and stalility, ofpermanentpresence and ofan unchanging
relation vith itself Many names have leengiven to this origin and
ultimate value in the history ofmetaphysics. essence, sulstance, the
good, God, lelatedlyMan,reason, truth. Theyaretheepochalnames
for Being, intangille ideas and lloodless principles, seen as alvays
presentin leings. Metaphysics has developedlyinventingand sys-
tematising these metaphors for presence and order. ln this process,
Being is reduced to a vord or meaning vhile temporal lecoming
turns into atemporal lut intangille presence. These characteristics
make metaphysics a type ofknovledge olsessedvith mastery and
control. Positing an ideal meta-leing and measuring everything
against its transcendent principles is an attempt to manipulate the
vorld.
Themodern epochvasannouncedlyDescartesvhose.c||o cqo
sum removed the metaphysical foundation or underlying ground
fromAristotelian) sulstance Platonic) form or Christian) God and
placeditonhumanityunderstoodassul ect. Metaphysicsvasalvays
attachedtothesu|c.|um, theultimatefoundationorBeingofleings.
AccordingtoHeidegger,itvasDescartesvhoturnedclassicalmeta-
physics into anthropology, ly hnally identi(ing the su|c.|um vith
the human sul ect, thefrst and only true su|c.|um', the original
and hnal point ofreference. The sul ect in its various forms and
guises, asself-identical,as ego orconsciousness, asthetcs.o||cas, the
leinglehindthinkingorthinkingthing, isnovtheultimate ground
ofallthatexists.
After the sulective turn, metaphysics lecame olsessed vith the
relationshipletveenthe empiricalindividualandtheuniversaltran-
scendental ground orprinciple vhich endovs humansvithidentity,
reason and morality. Kant's philosophical anthropologyvas ofsuch
greatsignificance precisely lecause his enthronementofman, as the
ground ofthought, action and history, did not privilege either the
individualastheagentofvilledchange,orhumanityastherepresen-
tativeoftheuniversal.ltsradicalinnovationvastopresentmanasthe
sul ectand therefore replace the fundamental pre-modern equation
letveenGodandBeingviththatletveensul ectandtheessenceof
`` ^r:stotIc, Mc/c|ys|:, I ozSLj j-Ioza_.
THE FPEE AND SLBjECTED S LBj ECT Z3
man. Theessenceofhumanity,ofleinga)human,vhichshouldle
presentlothintheuniversalityofthespeciesandinthesingularityof
theindividual, loth as arealityandasanormorapossilility, is su|-
c.||c||y'. Thisequationgavethesolutiontoallquestionsofessence,
lyinscrilingthenormativeformof theuniversalintheempiricalsin-
gularity ofthe individual. This vas the lasis ofmodern humanism.
\hentheBeingofleinghumanisexclusivelypresentedintermsof
the conscious sulect, vho sets the vorld forth and understands it
through :he reduction of leing to self) -representation, man
lecomestherelationalcentreofthatvhichisassuch`.'
lnHeidegger'sinterpretation, theenlightenmentquestforhuman
emancipationandhappinesshas goneterrillyvrongthroughacom-
lination ofarrogance andforgetfulness ofBeing. Afterthe destruc-
tion ofclassical teleology, reason lecame instrumental, a means to
ends set elsevhere. This malady ofmodern rationalism vas loth
unmasked and perpetuated ly lietzsche. lietzsche's vill to
pover`succeededinrevealingtheself-seekingactionofmodernvill
lut lietzsche'svill too is self-perpetuating. lt is avill that aims at
nothingleyonditselfavilltovillvhichglorihedvill'smastery.An
unconditionedvillnolongerhasanygivenaims. ltlecomesaquest
ofmastery for its ovn sake and realises the Cartesian pro ect of
alsolute ovnership and control lyturninghumanityitselfinto an
ol ectstandingagainst the sul ectlike all other ol ects. The meta-
physics ofsul ectivitykeeps olecti(ingvhateveris` lyasetting
lefore, a representation thataims atlringingeveryparticularleing
lefore itin such a vay thatmanvho calculates canle sure ofthat
leing`. The vih to mastery through truth has reached its most
extremeandself-destructivestageinmodernscienceandtechnology,
the latest turn in the metaphysical quest to name and interpret the
meaning ofBeing and impose its lav on the real. But this recent
developmentvasalreadypresentintheCartesianproectofsul ec-
tifcation` ofthevorldanditsKantiancompletion.
`' !ticnnc aIiLai, SuLj cction and SuLjcctivation`, inoan Coj cc cd.) , Suos|a_ /|c
Su|c:/London, Vciso, I |) |.
`' Nartin Icidcggci, Jhc ^gc ol thc VorId !ictuic` in T|c Que/|oa Coa:cta|a_
Tc:|ao|o_y caJ /|ctIsscys V. Lovitt tians ) lcv Yoik, Iaici and Hov, I yy) I j
` Jhc attacks on instiumcntaI icason` and tcchnoIogy Iink Icidcggci vith thc Iclt-
ving Fiankluit ciiticaI schooI ol ^doino, Ioikhcimci and Naicusc Jhcodoi ^domo and
Nax Ior!hcimci, I|c|c:/|:s Ia||_|/camca/ . Cumming tians ) London, Vciso, I y) ,
Jhcodoi ^domo, !c_c/|vc I|c|c:i|: !. ^shton tians ) London, HoutIcdgc. I o) ,
IciLcit Naicusc, Itos caJ C|v|||c/|oa oston, cacon !icss, I 66) .
` Icidcggci, suia n. jy, I zy.
Z 3 LBECJLA AND 3 LB}ECJL3.
ForHeidegger, the determinationofhumanityassul ect, cogito,
Spirit, transcendental ego orMan, is the culmination ofthe closure
ofmetaphysicsanditsforgetfulnessofBeing. Forgetfulnesstakestvo
forms. the failure to askthe question ofleing ofleing human, and
theaccompanyingdesignation ofthehumanassul ectorconscious-
ness , as an ever-present essence that determines the vorld. Man's
essence, onthe contrary, is to guard the truth ofBeingin orderfor
leings to appearin the light ofBeingas vhat they are. The various
leingsandentities, gods , heroes, animals ornaturecametopresence
anddepartedvithoutman'sinterventionordecision. Theiradventis
the destiny ofBeing, theyare vays invhich Being discloses itself
Beingissomethingotherthanthetotality ofleings , itgivesitselfto
leings and the humanvayofleingis ecstatic. manis throvn out
ofa past and 'pro ects' himselftovard a future lyvayofthe pre-
sent`. ''TheBeingofhumanityisthereforeitshistoricalexistenceor
Lcsc|a leing there) . Metaphysical humanity, on the other hand,
posits its essence as aperpetualpresencevhichhas freeditselffrom
the past and cleansed all traces ofthefuture asit stands falsely self-
containedandsatisfied.
Man'sresponsililityistofndinhimselfvhatleftsthedestinyof
guarding the truth ofBeing lecause, unlike ol ects, man is the
shepherdof Being`.''Beingisnearertomanthantoanyotherleing,
yet metaphysics keeps it farthest avay. Man's forgetfulness, aggra-
vated in modernity, makes him cling to things and think only of
leings andnot ofBeingandleads humanity to ol ectification and
homelessness. The only glimpses ofBeing remain inlanguage. Ve
aregiventolanguage,particularlypoeticlanguagevhichisthehouse
of Being.lnlanguage,manek-sistsintheproximityof Being.Ek-sis-
tence, like ek-stasis, is akeyterm. it signifiesa sul ectthatstands or
moves outofitselfinan existence oflecoming,invhichhumanity
achieves its destinylyalvays leavingthe familiarforthe unknovn,
lyleingitselfinthe actofdepartingfromcertaintyandstalility. ln
thisperspective, the essenceofmanisto lemorethanmerehuman,
ifhumanmeans ca|mc|tc||oac|c.Thismore`isvhatHeideggercalls,
dvellinginthenearnessofBeing`, man'shistorical essence andthe
onlyrealhumanism.
DifferentnamesveregiventoBeinginvariousepochs.theGreeks
sav the vorld as|ys|s, as Being that arises and opens itselfin the
'' Naitin Icidcggci, Lcttci on Iumanism', in cs|: Ht|/|a_s I F KicB cd.) Iaici,
San Fiancisco, I yy) zo|.
'' iLid. , zzI .
THE l PE AND S LBJ ECTED SLBjECT Z7
manifold ofleings , themedievals, as cas :tcc|um, as divine creation,
forthemoderns ,thevorldhasvithdravnandhaslecomeapicture,
somethingthat canle set forth, representedand graspedas avhole
ly man. The vithdraval ofthe vorld is the precondition ofits
lecoming a picture. The vorld is emptied ofmeaning, humanity
loses its organic place in it and lecomes its homeless master, for
vhomBeingis the ol ectivityandtruththe certainty ofrepresenta-
tion. Sul ectifcation` is therefore the specifcally modern type of
forgetfulness,itturns everythinginto arepresentationforthesul ect
andaffectshumanityasmuchasthevorld.Maninhisnarcissismfor-
gets thatBeingis somethingotherthan the totalityofleingsandthat
heisthrovnlyBeinginapositionofspecialresponsililityofcaring
forit.
The value systemis a goodexample ofthis sul ecti(ing attitude
vhichparadoxically transforms everyleing into an ol ect. Turning
an entity or activity into value, for example defning a person as
someonevith human dignity or, turning someone's acting tovards
anotherinto a case ofmoralrule-follovingor,presentingavorkas
an artistic ol ect, deprives those leings oftheirintrinsic vorth and
temporalityandturnstheminto ol ectsofvaluationandassessment.
Valuingreifiesleings andvalidates themonlyas olects ofitsactiv-
ity, their value vhatevervorth they get as a result oftheir quality
assessment. lt does not let leingsle, valualle in theirovn leing as
authentic disclosures ofBeing, lut values them only lecause they
haveleenevaluatedlythesul ect. Arguingagainstvalues, hovever,
doesnotmeanthatvhatisinterpretedasvalue, leitculture,art,dig-
nity, or God, isvalueless. ltistoinsistthatathinginitsleingisnot
exhausted ly leing a - valualle - olect. To call Godthe highest
value, forexample, is todegradeGod'sessence, asnegativetheology
vell understood. Thinking in values, concludes Heidegger, is the
greatestllasphemyagainstBeing. Byre ectingsuchthinkingleings
are notdevaluedlutare alloved tolring the lighting ofthe truth
ofBeinglefore thinking, as against sul ectivisingleings into mere
ol ects`. '
Thisis not theplacetodiscussHeidegger'sontologyindetail. His
diagnosisisthat,asaresultoftheforgetfulnessofBeing,atotallymis-
leading and catastrophic idea alout the centrality ofthe sul ect is
propagatedvhile, at the same time, thisapparenthumanismcreates
the necessary preconditionsfor turningman, theproclaimedcentre
'- iLid zzS
ZO
3 CB}ECTCA AND 3 CB}EC TC3.
andfoundationoftbevorld, intotbehnalol ectofbis ol ecti(ing
gaze. lndeed,tbeessenceofcontemporarymetapbysicsistecbnology.
Luttecbnologyis notaninstrumentormeans,itsaims,purposesand
metbods are not set outside itselfinpullic delate and moral argu-
ment, as tbe apologists ofscientific reasonclaim. Fromtbisperspec-
tive, tecbnologyisnottbe toolofscience orpolitics, its essence`is
not tecbnological. Tecbnology is tbe culmination oftbe modern
villtopover`vbicb, onceitturnsuponitself, lecomesaninfinite
and aimless villtovill.
lnlate modernity, self-assertion takes a furtber step into an alyss
fromvbicb bumanitymay not le alleto exitagain. ln Heidegger's
difhcult ontological terms, contemporary bumanity comes to tbe
verylrinkofaprecipitousfall`. Man
concs to thc oint vhcrc hc hinscIl viII havc to Lc takcn as stand-
ing-rcscrvc. NcanvhiIc nan, rcciscIy as thc onc so thrcatcncd, cxaIts
hinscIl to thc osturc ol thc Iord ol thc carth. In this vay thc inrcs-
sion concs to rcvaiI that cvcrything nan cncountcrs cxists onIy inso-
lar as it is his construct. Jhis iIIusion givcs risc in turn to onc unaI
dcIusion. It sccns as though nan cvcryvhcrc and aIvays onIy
cncountcrs hinscI In truth, hovcvcr, rcciscIy novhcrc docs nan
today any Iongcr cncountcr hinscIf i. c. his csscncc. `
Lotb bumanity andtbe vorld are nov standing-reserve` . tbey are
regulatedandorderedtostandly, toleatband,preparedforfurtber
regulating and ordering. Tbe vorld no longer stands opposite
bumanity as its olect, lut is placednext to us. Vbenbumanity as
mucb as tbevorld sulmits toaninescapalleregime ofordering and
regulation,andtbesulectacceptsitsfate astbemostimportantrav
material, tbe endless olectification ofmodernity reacbes an end.
Metapbysics finally triumpbs. it estallisbes a completely secure and
uncbangeallegroundandproclaimsman'sfreedomfromhnitude.A
completelybumanisedvorld isinfacttecbno-nibilistic`, a vorld
driven ly tbe demand for increased pover and orderalility`, in
vbicb glolal cycles ofproductionand consumption hx` man as a
lalouring and consuming animal. Max Veler's process of disen-
cbantmentvitbameaning-lessvorldcomestoitslogicalconclusion,
as tecbnology follovs tbe ceaseless demands ofsystematisation and
unihcationvitboutendorpurpose. Makingbumanshtfortecbno-
logicaltreatmentvasaneffectoftbetotal' tecbnologicalrevolution'
'` Naitin Icidcggci, Jhc ucstion Conccing JcchnoIogy`, in cs|: Hr|/|a_s, suia
n. |o, oS.
THE FPEE AND S LBj ECTED SLBj ECT ZV
inpositingandbandling 'nature' , luttbelattervouldnotlepossi-
lleveretbe 'bumanresources'notlileratedhrstforuseintbemas-
sive-scale, concentratedefforts to cburnouttbe excess ofresources
toolsandinstrumentsfeverisblysearcbingforendstbeymayserve`. '
,
Tbe evidence ofman's destructive mastery over nature and ofbis
ovn reihcation is everyvbere and tbere is no need to detail it.
Metapbysicalbumanismliesattbebeartofanunprecedentedcoloni-
sationofnatureinitsvariousmeanings, asterritoryandpbysicalland-
scape, as human oranimalnature or, as tbenatureoftbe naturals`
tbe indigenous people. Lut aren't buman rigbts a defensive sbiel.
againsttbeself-destructiveborrors ofmetapbysicalarrogance?
H aoa-mc|c|ys|.c||umca|sm?
Tbemoralityoftecbnologyisvalue-less, nibilistic.AsLouisDumont
putit, tbisvorlddevoidofvalues, tovbicbvaluesaresuperadded
lybumancboice, isasulbumanvorld,avorldofol ects , oftbings
. . . ltisavorldvitboutman, avorldfromvbicb manbas deliler-
ately ren.oved bimselfand on vbicb be is tbus alle to impose bis
vill`. ' Tbeonlyvaluesleftaretecbnology'sinexoralleprocessand
aggrandisementandman'sdesires.Humanity'sbigblydisciplinedand
ordered desires lecome tbe latest transient dehningcbaracteristic of
bumannature and inescapallypusb tolerecognisedas legalrigbts.
Tbesignificanceoftbiscritiqueforlegal)bumanismcannotleover-
estimated. Heidegger identified tbe metapbysics oftbe sulectvitb
bumanismandclaimedtbatvemustalandonbumanisminorderto
respecttbe buman.
Jhc highcst dctcrninations ol thc csscncc ol nan in hunanisn stiII
do not rcaIisc thc rocr dignity ol nan. Jo that cxtcnt thc thinking
in Bc/a_ aaJ T/mc is against hunanisn. !ut this oosition docs not
ncan that such thinking aIigns itscIl against thc hunanc and advocatcs
thc inhunan, that it ronotcs thc inhunanc and dcrccatcs thc dig-
nity ol nan. Iunanisn is ooscd Lccausc it docs not sct thc /nmaa-
//as ol nan high cnough. Cl coursc thc csscntiaI vorth ol nan docs
not consist in his Lcing thc suLstancc ol Lcings, as thc `SuLj cct
anong thcn, so that as thc tyrant ol !cing hc nay dcign to rcIcasc thc
Lcingncss ol Lcings into an aII too IoudIy Liuitcd `oLj cctivity. '
'' Zygmunt auman, os/moJcraI/||:Cxloid, lackvcIl, I ) I .
' Louis Oumont, Isscys oa aJ|v|Juc||sm: MoJcra Jco|o_y |a Ha/|roo|o_|:c| crsc:/|vc
Chicago, \nivcisity ol Chicago !icss, I S6) z6z.
"' Icidcggci, Lcttci on Iumanism`, suia n |o, z Io.
Zi 3 LB}ECTLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
These statements appeari nan essay attacking humanism, i npar-
ticuar Sartre's existentiaist humanism. '' They coud le accused as
paradoxica, ifnot hypocritica. Heidegger's coaloration vith the
lazisintheearythirties ,andhispersistentsienceontheHoocaust,
make his pronouncements on humanism highy prolematic and
havesparkedone ofthemostvociferousdelatesaloutthepoiticsof
phiosophy. ' This is not thepaceto reviev this conictvhich has
addressedimportantpoiticaandtheoreticaissues . Yet, Heidegger's
critique ofhumanism must le pacedvithin his vider phiosophy
vhich, despite his odious poitics, has profoundy inH uenced a
maor schoos of continenta thought. His concusions on the
predicament of contemporary cuture are shared ly most critica
thoughtofthe secondhafofthe century. The centra indictmentis
thathumanism,lydefiningtheessenceofmanonceandfora,turns
human existence from open possiliity' into a soidifed vaue
vhichfoovstheprescriptionsofthemetaphysicians. This degrad-
ing' question ies at the rootofa metaphysica attempts to 'ump
over ourovnshadovs'and deimithumanityfromaGod'seyeper-
spective. Metaphysica humanism presumes that existence must le
redeemedlyessence, thatthevordhasvaueonyinreationtothis
essence, andthathumaninessentiaityis equatonihiism'.'
Heideggerdidnotdeaextensivey vith normative questionsand,
in the Letter on Humanism', he famousy refused to deveop an
ethicstocompementontoogy. ForHeidegger,ethicsdoesnotequate
' Icidcggci accuscs Saitic that hc icvciscs only thc mctahysical i:oiity ol csscncc ovci
cxistcncc Lut Icavcs thc stiuctuic intact. Saitic had aigucd that altci thc dcath ol God, only
human Lcings and thcii liccdom cxist Jhc non mctahysical osition vould Lc that vc
aic icciscIy in a situation vhcic i:ncially thcic is cing', iLid , zi
' Jhc most icccnt iound ol thc Icidcggci allaii staitcd vith thc uLIication ol Victoi
Fai:as, Hc|Jc_ct caJ !c:|sm ] NaigoIis and J Hockmoic cds) !hiIadcIhia, Jcmlc
Lnivcisity !icss, i S) vhich dctaiIcd Icidcggci's cngagcmcnt vith thc lazis. ^ main
!uican hiIosohcis havc conti:Lutcd to thc dcLatc thus ioving thc ccntiaI innucncc ol
Icidcggci's thought. Somc of thc most imoitant contiiLutions to thc dcLatc includc
!hilic Lacouc-LaLaithc, Hc|Jc_ct, Ht/caJo||/|: C. Juinci tians) Cxlord, IackvclI,
i o) , can-Fianois Lyotaid, Hc|Jc_ct caJ /|c 'cu " A. NichcI and N. HoLcits tians)
NinncaoIis, Lnivcisity ol Ninncsota !icss, i o) , acqucs Ociiida, }S|t|/Hc|Jc_ctcaJ
/|c Qucs/|oa G. cnnington and RovILy tians. ) Chicago, Lnivcisity ol Chicago !icss,
i S) , Ficd OaIlmayi, T|c /|ctHc|Jc_ctIthaca, CoincIl Lnivcisity !icss, i ) . Ila tcn-
tativc conclusion can Lc diavn is that onc shouId not sto icading Icidcggci Lut stait
dcmythoIogising him. Cn thc ciitical sidc, scc ohn Cauto, Icmy/|o|o_|s|a_ Hc|Jc_ct
Ioomington, Indiana Lnivcisity !icss, i j) , Luc Fciiy and ^lain Hcnaut, Hc|Jc_ctcaJ
MoJcta|/y, o cit , suia n. o
'` Oana VilIa, HtcaJ/ caJHc|Jc_ct. T|c c/c o} /|c o||/|:c| !rinccton l|, !i:nccton
Lnivcisity !icss, i 6) i S .
THE FPEE AND S LBJ ECTED S LBJ ECT Zi i
vithmoraityandhasnothingtodovithcodesandcommands.Ethics
shoudledefnedaccordingtotheoriginaGreekmeaningofc||os, as
the thinkingaloutthe alodeofman' and asproximityto the truth
ofBeingastheprimordiaeementofman,asonevhoeksists'. 'This
primordiaethics isan integrapartofontoogyandhas nothingtodo
viththecircumocutionsofmoraphiosophy. ltispossile,hovever,
to use the attack onmetaphysicahumanism to deveop a critique of
its ega variety. Humanism, the sef-referentia concern that man
lecomes free for his humanity and finds his vorth excusivey in it,
meansthatthe |umca||cs of|omo|umcausis determinedvithregard
to an aready estalishedinterpretation ofnature, history, vorld, and
the ground ofthe vord, thatis, ofleings as avhoe'. ' By deaing
vith leings as a vhoe' , humanism forgets the difference letveen
Beinganditsappearanceinleings,takesthetransientandhistoricay
determinedsulectificationofthevordaseternaandstale,andpro-
caims its ovn defnition of humanity as unquestionaly true.
Furthermore, this metaphysica cosure is accompanied often ly the
excusion ofthose vho do not meet the requirements ofthe human
essence. Cassicahumanism,tovhichamodernversionsreturn,ux-
taposed,asvesav,the|umcaumtothe|ct|ctum.AsjoannaHodgeput
it,aversions ofhumanismare follovedlya doule marking, ofa
returntohaf-understoodGreekideasandagesture ofsettingonesef
apartfromsome perceivedlarlarism'.
The humanism ofrights, ike a humanism, is simiary lased on
thedefinitionofthe essenceofhumanityandadesireto go lackto
thecassicasourcesofthe|umcaum, evidentintheextravagantcaims
ofeary modern ega humanists and their contemporary folovers
thatGreeceandRomedeveopedfirsttheinstitutionofrights.Again,
egahumanismvasadiscourseofexcusion, notustofforeignlar-
larianslutasoofvomenandpeopeofcoour.Tolesure, thevar-
ious poitica andegaphiosophies differ in their defnitions ofthe
human essence. For ileras , ega humanism protects freedom and
dignity,foreftilerasandsociaists, itpromotesequaityandilerty
vhie, formuti-cuturaists, itsafeguardsamutipicityofvaues and
ife-pansdeterminedineachcommunitylyocaconditionsandhis-
torica traditions. ln a cases , hovever, individua and coective
humanpossiliities are demarcatedanddefnedinadvance, through
`' Icidcggci, Lcttci on Iumanism', suia n. o, z , . Scc also Oouzinas, OcathLound
Lcgality', suia n. z; .
` ' Icidcggci iLid zoi-z
- oanna Iodgc, Hc|Jc_ctcaJI/||:s London, Houtlcdgc, i ,) o
Zi Z 3 LB}EC TLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
the axiomatic determinationofvhati ti s tolehumanandthedog-
matic exclusionofotherpossililities.
Thesecriticisms are equally applicalle tothe concepts ofhuman-
ity that underpin the most heated delate in human rights , that
letveenuniversalism and cultural relativism. Both positions exem-
pli(,perhapsindifferentvays,thecontemporarymetaphysicalurge.
each side has made anaxiomatic decision as tovhat constitutes the
essence ofhumanity andfollovs it, likeallmetaphysicaldetermina-
tions, vithastullorn disregard ofopposingstrategies orarguments.
Theylothclaimtohavetheansvertothequestionvhatishuman
value`andtoitspremisevhatisa) human`,andtaketheiransvers
tolealsoluteandirrefutalle.Butinthismoodlothuniversalismand
localismareextensionsofthemetaphysicsofsulectivity. Theformer
haslecome, as ve have seenthroughout, an aggressive essentialism
vhich has glolalised nationalismand has turned the assertiveness of
nations into avorld system. Community, onthe otherhand, is the
condition ofhuman existence lut communitarianism has lecome
evenmorestiingthanuniversalism.
Theindividualismofuniversalprinciplesforgetsthateveryperson
isavorldandcomesintoexistenceincommonvithothers,thatve
areallin community. Beingin commonis an integralpart ofleing
self selfisexposedtotheother,itisposedinexteriority, theotheris
part ofthe intimacy ofself My face is alvays exposed to others,
alvaysturnedtovardanotherandfacedlyhimorherneverfacing
myself`. ` But leing in community vith others is the opposite of
common leing or oflelonging to an essential community. Most
communitarians, ontheotherhand,defnecommunitythroughthe
commonality oftradition, history andculture, thevariouspast crys-
tallisationsvhoseinescapalleveightdeterminespresentpossililities.
Theessenceofthecommunitariancommunityisoftentocompelor
allov`people tofndtheir essence`, itssuccessismeasuredlyits
contrilutionto the accomplishmentofacommonhumanity`. But
this immanence ofselfto itselfisnothingotherthanthepressureto
levhatthespiritofthenationorofthepeopleortheleaderdemands
or, to follov traditionalvaluesandhalits and exclude vhatis alien
and other. This type ofcommunitarianism destroys communityina
delirium of incarnated communion. The solid and unforgiving
essence ofnations, classes orcommunities turns the sul ectivity of
man into totality. lt completes sul ectivity's self assertion, vhich
`` can-Luc lancy, T|c aoctc/|vc Commua|/y Ninncaolis, \nivcisity ol Ninncsota
!icss, I I ) X iii
THE FPEE AND SLBJ ECTED S LB[ECT Zi
refusest oyield`.'Communityascommunionacceptshumanrights
onlytothe extentthattheyhelp sulmergethel intotheVe, allthe
vay tilldeath, the pointofalsolutecommunion` vith dead tradi-
tion.
The community ofleing together, onthe other hand, is vhat
takesplacealvays through others andforothers. ltisnotthespaceof
the egos- sul ectsandsulstancesthatareatlottomimmortal - lut
ofthe ls, vbo are alvays others or else nothing) . . . Community
thereforeoccupiesasingularplace. itassumesthe impossilility ofits
ovnimmanence. The impossililityofacommunitarianleinginthe
form ofa sul ect`. ln this sense, community represents transcen-
dence vithouta sacred meaning and resistance to immanence, to
the communion ofeveryone or to the exclusive passion ofone or
several. to allforms andallviolences ofsulectivity`. The modern
creation ofsociety, as aspace ofcompeting atoms, forces andsigns,
has leen commonly seen as the outcome ofcommunity's destruc-
tion.Butaccordingtojean-Luclancy,thehistoricalsequenceisdif-
ferent. societyemergednot outofdisappearingcommunitieslutout
ofdisintegratingempiresandtriles, vhichvereasunrelatedtocom-
munityasispostmodernsociety. ltisonlyafterthe disappearance of
the societyofatomistic sul ects thatthe non-immanent community
ofsingular leings-in-common vill have a historical chance. The
communityofnon-metaphysicalhumanityisstillto come.
The continuingpathosoftheuniversalism/relativismdelate, cou-
pled vith its repetitive and rather lanal nature, indicates that the
stakes are high. Postmodern mass societies and the glolalisation of
economics , politicsandcommunicationsincreaseexistentialanxiety,
and create unprecedented uncertainty and insecurity alout life
prospects. ln this climate, the desire for simple life instructions and
legalandmoralcodesvithclearly defnedrightsanddutieslecomes
paramount. Codificationtransferstheresponsililityofdecidingeth-
ically to nationalorinternationallegislators orto resurgentreligious
andnationalfundamentalisms, tofalseprophetsandfaketriles. lnan
over-legalisedvorld,rulesandnormsdiscouragepeoplefromthink-
ingindependentlyanddiscoveringtheir ovnrelationtothemselves,
to others, tolanguageandhistory. Theproliferationofhumanrights
treaties andthemushroomingoflegalregulationarepartofthesame
process , vhich aims to relieve the lurden ofethical life and the
`' Icidcggci, Lcttci on Iumanism' , suia n. qO, zzI .
` ` ]can-Luc lancy, o cit , suia n. , I .
`' iLid , ] .
Zi + 3 LBECTLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3
anxiety or,i nHeidegger's terms, the homelessness` ofpostmodern
humanity. lnternationalhumanrightslav promises to set allthat is
valuallyhumanonpaperandholditleforeusintriumph. themoral
vorld picture ofhumanityvill have leenfnally dravn and every-
one vill le free to follov his essence as defined ly vorld govern-
ments and realised ly technologies of dismemlering and
re-assemllingtheprosthetichuman.
Butarehumanrightsnotthevalueorprinciplevhichresiststhese
tendenciesandraiseshumanlife anddignityinto the endofcivilisa-
tion? lfthisisthe case, theyhavenotleensuccessfulinresistingthe
endless ol ectifcation ofhumanity. lt is argualle that humanrights
mayparticipateratherthanopposethe dismemleringandre-assem-
llingoperations oftechnologyandlav. lftechnologicalol ectif-
cation is the metaphysical urge of modernity, it could not le
othervise. But anotheraspectoftheir actionlecomesimportantin
thecontextofmodernvalue nihilism. lfthesatisfactionofendlessly
proliferatingdesireis the onlymoralityleftinadisenchantedvorld,
rights lecome thelasthumanvalue. Humanrightsare thevalues of
avaluelessvorld,luttheiractionisnotethicalintheGreeksenseor
moralin the Kantian. Vhentheymove fromtheiroriginal aim of
resistancetooppressionandrelellionagainstdomination, tothecon-
temporaryendoftotaldefinitionandorganisationofselfcommunity
and the vorld, according to the dictates of endless desire, they
lecomethe effectratherthantheresistance to nihilism. AsBauman
putsitvhenthe oloffragmentationisdone,vhatisleftarediverse
vants, each to le quelledly requisition ofgoods and services, and
diverseinternalorexternalconstraints , eachtole overcomeinturn,
one-constraint-at-a-time- sothatthis orthat unhappinessnovand
then can le turned dovn or removed` or turned into the next
humanrightscampaign.
lietszche, vhotaughtthe meaningofnihilism toHeidegger,had
realisedthemetaphysicallinkletveenthemodernindividualandthe
operation ofrights . ln fact itvas Christianity thatfrstinvitedthe
individualtoplaytheudgeofeverythingandeveryone, megaloma-
nia almost lecame duty. one has to enforce eternal rights against
everythingtemporalandconditioned`.lndividualismandegalitar-
ianism, the tvo apparently opposedgrounds ofhumanrights, are in
` Scc Chatci Iz Lclov
` auman, o cit. , suia n. ||, I y
` F.lictzschc, Tc H|||/oouctV Kaumann and R]. IoIlingdalc tians.) lcv Yoik,
Vintagc, I 68) y6, , III, |oI
THE FPEE AND S LBJ ECTED SLBj ECT Zi 3
realityallies, accordingt olietzsche,i navorldvheretheindividual
is the only valueless) value left. The modern Europeanis charac-
terised ly tvo apparently opposite traits. individualism and equal
rights ,thatlhaveatlastcometounderstand`
_ O
Vhileindividualism
claimstopromotedifferenceanduniqueness,itisonlyaformofegal-
itarianismvhichmakespeople,fearfulofanexistencevithoutmean-
ingandvalues, todemandthateveryone shouldcountastheirequal,
inothervordsthesame,inanendless questforpersonalgratifcation.
Butvhen individual desire is turnedinto the ultimate principle, its
protectivevalueisdevalued. Theindividualisanextremelyvulnera-
lle piece ofvanity, predicted lietzsche. His prophesy has lecome
thelittertruth ofour century.
But hov vould a non-metaphysical approach to human rights
look? Suchpredictionscannotescapethemetaphysicalhorizonand,
fromastrictHeideggerianposition,theconceptofrightsmayleirre-
deemallyassociatedvithmetaphysicalhumanism. Butlyvayofthe
c||c acc||cc, ve couldhazard some guesses alouthovitvouldnot
look. ltvouldre ecttheattempttointerpretallleingsasavhole`,
as ifsome common essential denominator lies under the historical
differencesandthe myriad ofgroups andindividuals. Akeyclaim of
lileralismisthatitdoesnotimposeaconceptionofthegoodlife, lut
allovspeopletodevelopandcarryouttheirovnlife-plans,through
the use ofrights . Andyetthis is deniedlytle urge to set forth the
essence` ofhumanityin a code ormirror, vhich canonly capture
andfreeze thefeatures ofits legislators andholders or, to defne this
essence as the fearful competition ofantagonistic interests. A non-
metaphysical humanism vould not treatpeople as synthetic entities
forvhichthe prosthetic operationoffragmentaryrightssatisfes dis-
connectedvants. Communityvould notle constructedlythefol-
loving ofthe past oroledience to tradition lut ly the exposure to
the otherperson, vhose trace creates self Finally, it vould reverse
the arrogance ofsul ectivity and assign rights, ifat all, lecause, as
humans,vehaveleen destinedtolenearBeingandtocareforthe
human as vell as the other entities in vhich Being discloses itself
Some human rights may le consistent vith non-metaphysical
humanism. But the overall form ofthe social lond vould change
fromrightsandprinciplestoleing-in-common, tothepullicrecog-
nition and protection of the lecoming-human vith others, a
dynamic process vhich resists all attempts to hold humanity to an
o0
iLid , y8 , III, |Io
Zi 3 LB}ECTLA AND 3 LB}E CTL3.
-..-..- !-..!-! |, :|- :-:-.-.:.:.v-. .i .-: 1. .... . :-:, :|..
..|! |- . :..-.. .i :.,|:.., ..! ..: . .-:.-. .i :.,|:. ..!, |.|-
:.:..,, .: ..|! .-. i-.., :. :|- .- ..! ..|... .. . ...!.-
:... .i .:. |....:, A: :|- .-.::- .i .:.:..-, .. :|.. .. .. .., .:|-:
|.|...|.-. - .|| -.....:-: .. ..: ] ..:.-,, |.-. . .:.... |.-
,.: !-...:, i.: . i.:.:- :|.: ., .-v-: ..-
1 1 1 . 1 b 11_ 1L11 b 11_1L. 1I1V 11 11 1
b 11_ 1L
| : . . .i:-. ...! :|.:, . . i:.:..., - |.v- ..|]-.:. |.: ..: ..:..-.. | .
:|.. ...:-x:, :|- ..|] -.: . . .--. .. :|- v..:. .i :|- !-..:.:..
!-i...: .i ..: ....:.:.:... 1|- i:.:..| ..|] -.: |.. .. :.,|:., .|- ..
..: .:: .i :|- ..v-:-.,. |.!, |.: ..|, :|- Q.--.. ..|] -.:, ..|.:-
:-! :. .:...- ....:.:.:....| ..! |-,.| :..-!.:-. C. :|- .:|-: |..!,
:|- ...::-:. .i :|- .- n... r.,|:. A.: :-|| .. :|.: .: .|| :.:.
.. ..:. ..:..-.. ..! ..|] -.:. .i :.,|:., -.] .,.., .|| :|- |-,.| :.:-.-
:.... ..! ,..:..:--. .i ..: A-:.... ....... ..! l.:.-.. .::.-:.
|: |..|. .. .i :|- .:! ..|] -.: ..ii-:. i:. ..|...|:-..., i:. ..
..::..... .|.,..:,, ..:.:-! .. :|- !..||- ,-..:.v- |.. ..|] -.:
1|- ..|] -.: .i |. .: su|c.|um.. :|- |.|!-: .i :.,|:. ..! :|- |-.:-:
.i !.:.-. ..! :-.....|.|.:.-. i.: .: :|- ..- :.-, :|- ..|] -.: .. su|-
c.|us.. ..|] -.:-! :. |., |:..,|: :. |.i- |, |.. :.:...|., .|.-! |,
|.. !-..!. ..! :-.:!. ..! ..||-! :. ......: |-i.:- |.. |.:
1|- .:.!.x...| !..||- !-:-:...:... .i .:-.:.: ..! .:-.:-!, i:--
..! ..-||-!, ..:.v- ..! ....v-, ....:-. ..! -:-.:-. :|- |.i- .i
:|- |-,.| ..|] -.:
|: .. :-.:|.||- :|.: |.|...|, ..! |..,..,- |.v- !-v-|.-! :|-
....-: .i :|- ..|] -.: .:...! :|- |.,i.| ...::..: ..! .:.!.x...|
..|...:... .i su|c.|um..! su|c.|us,:. -:,.|.,...||, :-|.:-! |.:
.-..:...||, ...-! :-:. 1|- i.:.. .:! su|c.|um ::...|.:-!, ..
- .., :|- G:--| |yo/c|mcaoa, :|- -:..-.: ..|.:...- .: ..|-
.::.:. |-.-.:| . |-..,. ..!.v.!..| :.-::.-., :|- ..!-:|,..,
-..-..- .i . :|.., v|-. :|.. su|c.|um .: ,:...! ....-! :|- i.:
.i :|- .!-:. ..|] -.:, .: |-..- :|- v-|..|- .i i:--!. ..! :|-
.,-.: .i .:.|.:, 1|.. :..-.. .. i...|.:.:-!, ....:!.., :.
n-.!-,,-:, |, :|- ..|] -.:.v- :.:. .i n-...::-. ..! k..: A...:!..,
:. k..: ..! :|- .-.-k..:...., -:....| ..:..., .. ..|.-v-!
:|:..,| :|- !....:-:-.:-! .|-!.-..- :. :|- .:.| |. ..!, .. :|..
.-..-, :|- ..|] -.: .. :|- .-.-...:, ...:: .i .:.| ....!. 1|-
THE FPEE AND S LBjE CTED S LBJ ECT Zi 7
..|] -.: . . |, !-:..:... ..:...... |, i.|l..., :|- .:.| |.,
|..| .|- |.:| :.!. .. |-:.-|i ..! |-,..|.:-., .|- .|-. .|...-.
...-! :. |-: -.:.... ..! .-!..:- ..:-:-.:. ..! |-..-. i:--
1|- ...-.:.| -:..., .. :|- .:|-: |..!, .. |-:-:...... , ..:
i.|l, . ..|] -.: |- ..|.:. :. ...:...:., ....... ..! ...|...:...., :. :|-
|:.:- i..:. .i ..:.:- ..! .i .:.:- |. :.:|-: :|.. :. i:--|, |-,..|.:-!
.:.|.:, 1|- -..-..- .i :|- ..|] -.: .. :. |- ..:......, ..||.., .
..|] -.: ..:...... .. :|-:-i.:- |-....:.., |.|- . |-:-:......
..|] -.: .. . .:.::.!..:... .. :-:.
Su|c.|us,.. :|- .:|-: |..!, :-i-:. :. ..|] -.:... ..! ..|...... |:
.. . .|.:...| ..! |-,.| :-: ..,..(.., :|.: ..-..- .. ..|] -.:-! :. :|-
.-: .: ....! .i . ..-:..:, . :.|-: .: ..v-:-.,. 1|- ..-
..!.., .-: ., |.v- !.ii-:-.: .:.,... ..! :.|- .., i.:. |.:,
.. .|| ...-. , :|- su|c.|us .|.-. |.-:.:.|, ..! !....:..., v..|-.:|,
...-! :|:..,| .: ..! ....-.: .: v.|..:.:.|, ...-:-! ..! |-,.:-
..:- 1|- |.|...|...| ..! |..,...:.. .:.!.x .. .::.|.., .!-:.
|.|...|, ..-. :|- ..- :-: :. ..,..( n-.!-,,-:. .:.,...:,
,:...! .i |-.., .. -|| .. ..|.:!...:..., ..|...... ..! v.|..:.:,
.: .:|-:..- |..:.:... .i i:--!. C.. - -x|... :|.. .::..,- .:.-
!.x ..! .:. .|...:.... i.: |.:
1|- i:-..| |.|...|-: l:.-..- i.|.|.: |.. .:,.-!, .. . ..|-:
.i -...,. , :|.: :|- .|.:...| |..:.:, .i :|- su|c.|us.|..|! :.|- :..:.:,
.v-: :|- |.|...|...| ::.] -.:.:, .i su|c.|um. '' i.|.|.: :.|-. ....-
.:| n-.!-,,-:. .:,.-.: :|.: :|- -:.|,.... .i ..|] -.:.v.:,
.:.::-! .:| n-...::-. 1|.. .....: |- :|- ...- .:,.-. i.|.|.:
|-....- n-...::-. .-v-: :-i-::-! :. :|- ..|] -.: ..
_
.:...... .-|i

..........-.. .: .. :|- :-a-x.v- .-.::- .i :|- .:|! C. :|- ...-
::.:,, n-...::-. ..-! :|- :-: .. . :.i...!|, |..:.:...| ..! .|.:...|
.-..-, :.:.||, ...-! .: ..!-:-.:..:-! |, n-.!-,,-: 1|- su|c.|us.i
n-...::-. .. . .,..., i.: :|- su|J||us.i -!.-v.| .|.:...| :|-.|.,,
.: :-i-:. :. :|- -:... ..|.::-! :. :|- J|||o.: ....! .i :|- ..v-
-:-.,. |..,, .. ..:|.:.:, -x:-..-! .. |.. .:!-:. ..! .:.-|i |-,.:.-
.:-! |, :|- v.:! .i ...:|-: .v-:-.,. ,:|- i.:! G.!, '` 1|-
..|] -.: |-..-. su|c.|um .: ,:...! .i -:.|,.... ..| |.:-:, ..
:|- .:| .i k..:, |. :.] -.:-! |.. ::....-.!-.:.| ..|] -.: |..| ..:.
'' !ticnnc UaliLar, Citizcn SuLj cct' in ! Cadava, !. Connor andL. lancy cds) Ho
Comcs ;jtct/|c Su|c:/ lcv Yoi!, Houtlcdgc, II) -,y, SuLj cction and SuLj cctiva-
tion', sura n. 6, I-I, `Jhc Hights ol Nan' and thc `Hights ol thc Citizcn' ' in Mcsscs,
C|csscs, Jccs CamLiJdgc, !olity, I ) -,.
' Citizcn SuLj cct', sura n. 6j , -o.
'` iLid. ,
Zi O
3 LB}I CTLA AND 3 LBEC TL3.
the Cartesian text. lt vas Kant's Ct|||ucs vhich raised the sul ect
into the common ground of consciousness and conscience and
turneditinto thefoundationandmeasure ofphilosophy.
Balilar's remarks alertusto the factthatthe sul ect, this centre of
knovledgeandfreevill, appearsfrst on the historicalstageassu|c.-
|us, as someone sul ected or sulmitted to external pover. From a
politicalperspective, thequestionofthesul ectvasalvaysinvolved
vith the conditions ofsul ection and lrought together the person
sulmittedtopoverandtheentityexercisingit. Theuridicalfigure
ofthesu|]c.|usunitesVesternhistoryfromRometothepresent.The
Greeks had no concept or vord for the sul ect or for rights. The
termsu|c.|us appearedfrstinRome. The su|c.||, the non-Romans
vho lenefited from theusca||um, did not lecome a collectivity
hoveverlecausetheyhadnostronglinkstoconnectthem. Asvith
manypoliticalandphilosophicalconcepts,itvasChristianitythatre-
defned the sul ect and gave it sulstance. The su|c.|us vas turned
intosu|J||us, someonevhoexistsinandthrougharelationofoledi-
ence to apoveroriginatingin God. This relationship ofoledience
connecteda ''u|||mus, ' chosen' to command, andsu|J|||, vhoturn
tovardshimtohearthelav'. 'Thefeudalhierarchicalchain, organ-
ised in apyramidal fashion, linkedits elements through the cement
ofoledience, vhich starting fromthe lottomvas turned upvards
andvas eventually directedtovards its transcendentapex. The su|-
c.|us villed his oledience, partly as secularloyalty to thekingand
partly as religious faith to God and his representative on earth. ln
oleyingtheking, heoleyedGod, fromvhomallpoveremanated
andfollovedalavthatcamefromleyondthetemporarylav-giver.
Spiritualandtemporallavsverehierarchically organisedandissued
from God, the ultimate .cusc .auscas. This pyramidal inter-depen-
dence turned, for the frst time, the su|J||| into a coherent lody
politic, united through their immortal soul vhich linked them vith
God.
Theclassicalmethodofsul ectionvaslasedonastrictontologi-
calhierarchy,vhichgradeddignityandhonourandentitledsometo
participateinpoliticallifevhileothers, vomen, children,foreigners
orslaves, vere alvays sulugatedto thosealove themonthe social
'' Citizcn SuLjcct`, suia n |I Foi a gcnciaI discussion, scc VaItci \IIman, T|c
aJ|v|Juc| caJ So:|c/y |a /|c M|JJ|c H_cs aItimoic, Jhc ohns Iokins \nivcisity Iicss,
I 66) and H H|s/oty jo||/|:c| T|ou_|/: T|c M|JJ|cH_cs London, Icnguin, I 6,) . Foi an
!ngIish ciscctivc, scc ohn Figgis, 1hc I|v|ac F|_|/ o}K|a_s iistoI, Jhocmmcs Iicss,
I |) orJginaI cd. I I|)
THE FPEE AND S LBjECTED S LBjE CT Zi V
ladder. Christianitycreatedanevandunifedcategoryof sulection.
avillingolediencevhichcamenominside. lntheintersticesofthe
confessionalandthe assizes, thelodylecameattachedto asouland
aplan ofsalvationand, anevinnersu|c.|us emerged. lnthis econ-
omy, thesurface- thelody- mustlepenetratedtogetatitssoul'
inordertogeneratelelief, oledience, loyalty,andlove, allofvhich
require the active movement and consequent involvement ofthe
soul'.' The soul, thisprisonofthelodylecame the addresseeand
vesselofiLelav, auridicalconstructvhich,lysul ectingthelody,
ledtothegenesisofthemodernsulect.Thelavvhichcommanded
the sul ectvas loth transcendent, spoke to him directly and called
himtoaccountforhisinfractionsand, temporal, alavofstrictrules
andharshudgments issuingfromsecularauthorities. Thisterri(ing
pover or Big Other, in Lacanian terms, vho called the sul ect to
accountoscillatedletveenvisille andinvisille, individual anduni-
versal,empiricalandmetaphysical.lordorsovereign,Godorthesul-
ect'sovnconscience, thevoicethatshoutsfromoutsideormurmurs
incessantlyfromvithinatthe dead ofthenighttookthe sameform,
thatofthelegalcommandment.Themechanismofsulectionofthe
inncr voicc . . . that ol a transccndcnt authority vhich cvcryonc is
Lound to oLcy, or vhich aIvays alrcady concIs cvcryonc to oLcy,
incIuding thc rcLcls thcy ccrtainIy do not cscac thc voicc ol thc
Iav, cvcn il thcy do not surrcndcr to it) - Lccausc thc loundation ol
authority is not locatcd outsidc thc individual, in sonc naturaI
incquaIity or dccndcncy, Lut vithin hin, in his vcry Lcing as crca-
turc ol thc vcrL, and as laithluI to it''
vasalvaysaccompaniedlytheexternalvoiceandforceofking,lord
orudgeandthetvotogether,instereophonicharmony,lroughtthe
sul ecttolife.
Thisnevtypeof sul ectionhadcertainadvantagesforitssulects.
The sul ectvhosesouloleyscannotlecomeaslave oranol ectof
the king's vhims. The oledient soul inserted the sul ect into the
divine orderandcreatedforthekingresponsililitiesas vellaspov-
ers and rights . '' But the rights and lilerties ofthe sul ect did not
precede oroverride the poverofthesovereign. lnstead, theyvere
'` J. Nuihy, 1hc |Jcs/So:|c|S:|ca:c?Coa{_um/|oasjIcucaJMoJcta|/yCxIoid,
CxIoid \nivcisity Iicss, I y) I I
'' SuLj cction and SuLjcctivation`, suia n 6j , IO
'' Jhc su|J|/usi s suLmittcd as a mcmLci oI an oidci oi a Lody that is iccogniscd as hav-
ing ccitain rghts and that conIcis a ccrtain status, a IicId oI initiativc on him`, Citizcn
SuLjcct`, suia n 6j , |j
ZZ
3 LB}ECTLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
presentedas hisunilateralgrants, evenvhentheyveretheou
'
come
ofsocial conict and monarchic compromise or defeat. Vithout
royalmagnanimityandconcessions, thesu| ectsaadnoright
'
vha
'
-
soever. This comlination ofloyalty andfaithunifedthe sulects in
oledience to the lav, lut the result vas intrinsically unstalle, open
to potential conicts and splits letveen its spiritual

and temp
'
ral
components. The same fragile economy charactersed the king,
vhose lody vas split letveen a physical and a mystical part and,
vhose right vas loth a grant of God and the prerogative ofhis
nature.
Alsolutismvas theperiodoftheking'sandsulect's doulle exis-
tence ctcx.c||ca.c. The alsolute kings pushed the aspirations for a
total coherent and illimitalle form ofself-founding pover to its
extr-me and, in doing so, they led the vhole edifice to its dovn-
fall. The king claimed to le the incarnation ofthe good and the
true, as a result, the sulects had no need or reason to understand
vhat vas prescriledto them. Therights respectedlythe monarch
vere saidlothto derivefromalonghistoryandtraditionandto le
the outcome of a limited pact letveen sovereign and sul ects.
Similarly, vhile Godvas the ultimate source ofright, these rights
vere said to constitute the essence ofkingdom and, in respecting
them, the king simply honoured his ovn nature. Thus, vhile the
kingappeareduridicallylound,hisactualpovervasunlimited.By

exaggerating inner tensions, concentrating pover, dissolving inter-

mediate centres of inuence and emphasising the unity of state,
alsolutismveakenedthedualconcept ofoledienceandsul ection.
Many ofits theorists presented the su|c.|| as free citizens , lut a
fault-linehadstarteddevelopingintheideaofafreeandlegallypro-
tectedsu|c.|us. Vhen kingandthe alsolute state ceasedleingthe
representatives ofthe divine order, the leliefthata sulect depen-
dent on the alsolute pover ofanother could at the same time le
free vas fatally undermined. At this point, the revolution entered
history and usheredinmodernity.
The splitletveenmanandcitizen, vhich canle seenas adevel-
opment of the su|c.|us/su|c.|um dyad, characterised the Frenc

h
Declarationanditspoliticsandlecamethetargetofthetvoearlycr-
tiques ofhuman rights ly Burke and Marx. But according to the
neo-Marxist Balilar, the most revolutionary consequence of the
Declarationvastoreversethemonarchicalsovereigntyofalsolutism
and create the concept ofcitizen sovereignty. The indivisille and
omnipotentco|aa|atc|creplacedtheunitaryandillimitallesover-
THE FPEE AND S LBj ECTED S LBj ECT ZZi
eigntyofLeviathaninahitsparticulars. Butthisnevlegislativesov-
ereign, despite the appearance ofindivisilility vas a composite. it
consistedofthe sumtotalofthevillsofcitizens. lnthissense, pop-
ularsovereigntyvaslotharevolutionaryandahighlyartifcialidea.
Monarchical sovereignty vas hierarchical, vith the king, as God's
disciple andservant atitsapex,receivingthefreely-givenandcom-
mandedoledienceofthesul ects. Thesovereigntyusheredinlythe
French Revolution, on the other hand, vas lased on the unprece-
dentedprincipleofcitizenequalityandfreedom.
Thecitizennovlecomesafreeman.Heen oyshisnaturalrights ,
as an equal vith all others except ofcourse for vomen and non-
vhites) . But, theprinciple ofequality, eveninits limitedform, is
highlyparadoxical. E] galitariansovereignty is]practicallyacontra-
dictioninterms ,luttheonlyvayradicallytoexpelalltranscendence
andtoinscrilethepoliticalandsocialorderintheelementofimma-
nence, theauto-constitutionofthepeople`. ''AccordingtoBalilar,
the noveltyofthe ideavas so great, logically andhistorically, thatit
ledtoasecondequallyhyperlolicinnovation. theclaimthatallmen
arelornfree, apalpallyuntruestatement,vhichvasusedtousti(
retrospectively the revolutionary assertion thatall citizens are equal.
ln this vay, the su|c.|us lecame citizen and started his ourney
tovards lecoming the free and autonomous modern sul ect. As
Balilar puts it, the idea ofthe rights ofthe citizen, at the very
momentofitsemergence, thusinstitutesanhistoricalfgurethatisno
longerthesu|c.|us,andnotyetsu|c.|um. Butfromtheleginning,in
thevayitisformulatedandputintopractice, this figure exceedsits
ovn institution`.'' After this lriefmoment ofcomlined freedom
andsul ection,equalityandlilertylecamethedefiningcharacteris-
ticofmoderndemocraciesandpoliticsandtheelementofsulection
receded.
ClaudeLefort, anotherformerMarxistphilosopher,adoptsasim-
ilarposition. Theideaofalodypolitic, ofanorganicentitysymlol-
ised ly the lody ofthe king, vas undermined ly the revolution,
vhichledtothe
o-
Naiccl Cauchct, LFevo|u/|oaJcsJto|/s Jc| `|ommc!aiis, Callimaid, IS) aigucs that
in oidci to justi[ dcmociatic icicscntation, thc Ficnch Hcvolution inauguiatcd a concct
ol aLsolutc national sovcicignty vhich vas thc mimctic invcision ol thc aLsolutist sovci-
cignty ol thc ancicn icgimc.
ov
Scc aLovc, Chatci ,
' `Jhc Hights ol Nan' and thc `Hights ol thc Citizcn' `, suia n. 6j , |j
'' Citizcn SuLjcct`, suia n 6j , |6.
ZZZ
3 LBECTLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
hcnoncnon ol disincororation ol ovcr and disincororation ol
right vhich acconanics thc disacarancc ol thc king`s Lody, in
vhich connunity vas cnLodicd and justicc ncdiatcd, and, Ly thc
sanc tokcn, it significs a hcnoncnon ol disincororation ol socicty
vhosc idcntity, though alrcady figurcd in thc nation, has not yct Lccn
scaratcd lron thc crson ol thc nonarch.`
After the revolution, the concept ofright vas deprived ofits hxed
point ofreferencein God orking. Povervas separatedfromri
-
ht,
indeed, pover lecame the ol ect of a uridical discourse vhich
placedhumanrights,viththefragileconceptofman,atitscentreand
accordingtovhichpovermustnovusti(itsexercise.
Theimmediate aimofLali larandLeforti stodefendtherevolu-
tionagainst revisionist historiansly emphasisingthepolit.calnat

re
ofhumanrights. Lalilar, inparticular, has shovnhovphilosophical
concepts andpolitical and legal constructions sometimes develop in
parallel and others in intertvined traectories. Vithout the help of
theuridical su|c.|us, the free sul ect, the metaphysical ground of
modernityvouldnothavecomeinto existence. Similarly, f

ee+o

m,
responsilility and equality, the key aspects ofmodern sul ectivity,
grev out of sul ection, oledience and the shared soul of the
Christiansul ect. Lnitingsulectionandfreedomstandsthelav. as
external,religious,royalordemocraticorasinternal,conscience, the
categoricalimperative orthe superego, the lav lrings the sulected
andfreesulecttolife.
Lut have human rights installed the free and equal citizen at the
centre ofthe constitution?Hasthe citizensupersededthesulect? lf
veturntojean-jacquesRousseau'sclassicSo.|c| Coa|tc.|,thelilleof
French repullicanism and a main source lehind radical democratic
politics,vehndamuchmorescepticalapproachtothepossililit
\
of
forging links letveen citizens, legislators and the sovereign.
Accordingtothisfoundationaltext,peopleagreed,inacontractvith
themselves, to surrender their person, povers and possession to a
commonpover.Ascompensation,theyreceivedaplaceinthelody
politicandlecameindivisilleparts ofthesovereign.As memlersof
the sovereign, they are the ultimate lavmakers, as recipients ofthe
sovereign'scommands,theyareitssul ects. lnaddressingthemselves,
in the initial contract or in their position as lav's sul ects , a
metaphoricalsplittakesplaceandthepeoplearedividedintvo. The
lavandthesociallondarelasedonthisradicalsplit,vhichdivides
Lcloit, o. cit , suia n y, z,,
THE FPEE AND S LBj ECTED S LBJ E CT ZZ
individualsandthecolectivelodyintosulectsandsulected. These
tvo sides, like the lips ofa vound come together in citizenship,
vhich precariouslystitches themandpromisesto healthe split. The
linevhich divides selfmakeshim also part ofthe indivisille sover-
eign. lnthis sense, thesocialcontractmanagesto create,rhetorically
atleast, anevgroundforauthority,vhilesafeguardingtheautonomy
ofthesul ect. TheSovereign,lyvirtueofvhatitis, isalvaysvhat
it ought to le`. Lut Rousseau fully appreciated that the splitting
andsuturingvhich allovedthe contractandthe sovereignto come
into existencearehctionalandtheirpromisefalse.
For a colc to arcciatc thc sound naxins ol olitics and to lollov
thc lundancntaI rulcs ol olitical rcason, cllcct should Lcconc causc,
and thc social sirit thc institutions arc to roducc should rcsidc ovcr
thcir claLoration. Ncn should Lc rior to lavs, vhat thcy arc to
Lcconc through thcn. '
Lnlike his modern follovers, Rousseau recognised that citizen
freedomandequality, uponvhichthevholecontractualandconsti-
tutionaledificeislased,mayleimpossille. lndeed,alargepartofthe
textual organisation ofthe So.|c| Coa|rc.| can le understood as a
response to the failure ofitspromise. The sovereignis alvays right,
ifit speaks through generallavs, validforall alike`. Lut hovvill
thegeneralvillexpressitselfln ||cC|c||S|c|c,entryinto thecon-
tractproduces a remarkalle change inthe individual . . . turning]
him froma limited and stupid animal into an intelligent leingand
Man`. ln ||c Lcus, hovever, the general vill seems strangely
muted and the citizens are presented as an ignorant crovd. Hov
couldallindmol,vhichoftendoesnotknovvhatitvantslecause
itrarelyknovsitsovngood, carryoutlyitselfashugeanddifhcult
an enterprise as thepromulgation ofasystemoflavs?`' To resolve
thedifhcultyRousseau repeatsthesplitvhich estallishedthesover-
eigninthecontract. thosesulecttothelavmustalsoleitsauthors.
The original divisionis novreproduced,inthepersonofthelegis-
lator,lutisequallydeceitful.
``. Housscau, T|cSo:|c|Coa/tc:/i n o||/|:c| Hr|/|a_sF. Vatkins cd.) London, lcIson,
I ,{) I
`' iLid. , ||. Foi a n anaIysis ol this assagc, scc Oouzinas and Vaiiington, !osting thc
Lav. Social Contiacts and thc !ostal HuIc's CiammatoIogy', I\/II a/ctac/|oac|ourac|/
/|c Scm|o/|: o}IcuI I ; I I) .
iLid. , zo
`' iLid. , |o.
ZZ+
5 LB}ECTLA AND 5 LBECTL5.
Thelegislatormustleagenius .Heneedle, ifhei s topresideover
theextraordinarytemporalandcausalreversalsnotedalove. hemust
makesurethatmenshouldlepriortolavsvhattheyaretolecome
through them. But thisissuchanimprolalle trickthatthel

gisl

tor
must attrilute his lavs to the gods . The legislator, lyputtinginto
the mouths ofthe immortals that sullime reasoning vhich is far
leyondthereachofpoormankind, vill, under the lanner ofdivine
authority, leadthosetovhom mere mortalprudencevould ev
'
rle
astumllingllock'.''Thus,thecontractisorganisedalongaseresof
splits and reversals . the sul ects are the sovereign, the lav-takers
shouldlethelav-makers,peopleshouldleleforethelavvhatthey
are to lecome through its operation, the lav performing all these
tricksshouldcomefromahumanlegislatorvhoshouldlepresented
hoveverasdivine. Rousseaueventuallyadmittedthatthelegislatoris
animpostor. Though the philosopher'spride, orllindparty spirit,
considersthemtolenomorethanluckyimpostors , thetruestudent
ofpoliticsadmiresintheirinstitutionsthatgreatandpoverfulgenius
vhichpresides overallduralleinstitutions' . '

CitizensovereigntyandequalitydisplaythesamestructureofspLt-
ting and suturing vhich ve olserved in the extraordinary su|
]
c.-
|um/su|c.|uscouple. Thecitizensare equalmemlersof
'
heso

vereign
lav-makerlut, itisthelegislatorandhiscommandsvhichvillmake
themvhattheyoughttolecome. Rousseau, vho theo
'
isedh
'
st
'
he
democratic revolution,vasmuchmore realistic aloutits egaLtaran
prospects than his contemporary follovers.

Mis rhetoric

l reversals
andtricks are arecognitionofthefactthatcitizensovereignty, even
in Rousseau's direct democracy, is an improlalle proposition. The
concentrationofeconomicandpoliticalpover,the disciplining role
ofthe parties and the directive inHuence ofthe media, last lut

not
least the glolalisation of culture and information, make the idea
totallyincredilleinacontemporary representative capitalistde

c-
racy, despitethehumanrights rhetoric. lfanything,fort|emaorty
ofhumanity,thepole ofsul ectionrepresentsdailyexperencemuch
morethanthatoffreedom.

lnconclusion, thesulect'ssul ectionrefers to adual,temporalana

religious , concept ofpover. This pover appoints the

sul
`
ctto his
place and endovs himvith certain rights andprotections inreturn
a/ctac/|oac|ounc|o} /|c Scm|o/|:s qIcuI i ; II) ||-,
' iLid |, .
THE FPEE AND SLBjECTED SLBj ECT ZZ3
forhisoledience. Thesulectistheendpointofthesetvoprocesses ,
vhichinvestedthelodyvithlimitedpoversandthesoulvithinh-
nitehopeandmeaningand ascriledto the personapositionvithin
thehierarchisedspaceofthepoliticallody. The sul ect'soledience,
lothextractedandfreelygiven, vascrucialfortheconstitutionofthe
individual. His unity dependedonlringing togetherthe tvo regis-
ters, lody and soul, matter and spirit or temporal and divine and
sul ectingthehrst to the second,aprocessvhich also sul ectedthe
persontothepoverofthestate.AsPeterGoodrichputit,theunity
ofthe divinity- theuniqueness ofthe one God, andthe correlative
singularityofthesovereign- vas mrroredlytheunitaryidentityof
the sul ectsoflav'.ln this sense, the original conceptofthe sul-
ectvasasmuchtheologicalaspoliticalandlegalandhisnaturesul-
ectedandoledientasvellasfreeandself-governing.Therevolution
lroughttogetherthehistoricalandphilosophicalconceptionsofsul-
ectivity. the su|c.|us ofthe pre-modern sulects sul ectedto God,
sovereign orthelavand,thesu|c.|um ofmetaphysics, the ground
and foundation ofall leing and concept, re-dehnedlyKant as the
free and autonomousperson endovedvithconsciousnessand con-
science. Butisthis notthe outlineand structure also ofthe contem-
porarysul ect?Onecouldarguethatpoliticaltheologymayhavelost
its empire, lut its creations persist in the democratic sul ect of
modernity.
Theparadoxicaltensionatthe heart ofthe sulect,recognisedly
Rousseau and emphasisedlyBalilar,retainsallitsforceinthemod-
ern institutional sul ect. The sul ect underpins all contemporary
institutions. Massdemocracycouldnotcomeinto existencevithout
political sul ects, free' electors vho choose amongst competing
parties, policiesandplatformsandvho,throughthe exercise oftheir
rights, linkindividualinterests , classpositionandthe conceptofthe
pullic good in a process vhich undervrites democracy lut also
stitches the political sul ect together and guarantees his existence.
Theformof thesul ecti sthenecessaryprerequisitetoofortheoper-
ation ofthe markets. Capitalist economies need atomised sulects,
vho treat theirlalourpoverasacommoditytolefreelyexchanged
inthelalourmarketfortheconsiderationofvages. Marxlrilliantly
exposedthe underlining dynamic oftheseforms andinsistedon the
discrepancy letveen free choice and individual self-determination
vhichunderpinrights-discourseand, the exploitation,sufferingand
' !ctci CoodrJch, SociaI Scicncc and thc OisIaccmcnt ol Lav', ]z/zIcucaJSo:|c/y
Fcv|cu|yj I 8) , |y6
ZZ 3 LB}EC TLA AND 3 LB}ECTL3.
inusticelroughtaloutlytheeconomicsystemvhichcreatedthese
conceptsandinstitutions. Psychoanalysisagain, atheoryandpractice
olsessedviththe sul ect, attrilutes its genesis to the infant's intro-
duction to the symlolic order, in other vords, to its sulection to
languageandlav.Vethinkofthesulectastheexclusivevehicleof
freedom,perhapslecausethesplitisnolongerfullyapparentasitvas
in pre-revolutionary urope, the su|c.|um/u|c.|us dyad has leen
fully internalised and the lav, self-given and externally imposed,
alreadyinhalitsandconcealsitselfintherecessesoftheself
ln the composite term human rights , humanity represents the
groundlessnessoffreedom,thepotentialofthefutureinthepresent,
freedomnotonlyasvillandchoicelutasthealilitytovrenchavay
from legal and historical determinations and open to the unknovn
or, in Heidegger's terms, care for Being. But the legal element of
rightsreturnsustosulection, externaldeterminationandconstraint.
Thelegal personarguesPierre Legendre, `literally derivesfromct-
soac vhichinitially means an actor'smask- andauthorises me to
translate the formula Jcutcctsoactumly ' ofthelav ofthe masks' .
l nallinstitutionalsystemsthepoliticalsul ecti s reproducedthrough
masks `. 'Behindallctsoacsormasksofthesulect, lav'soperation
remains central. the historical provenance ofthe sulectedlutfree
sulectislegalandmoralmorethanphilosophical.Themodernsul-
ectisthemoralgroundofautonomyandfreedomlut, heisalsosul-
ectedanditisonlythroughsul ectiontothelavthathecanacquire
his autonomy as Kant, Kafka,Althusser and Lacan recognised. The
sul ectislorntothelavandlelongsto lav.
Modernityistheepochofalegallyinducedsul ectivityand,tothis
extent, theexcessivelegalisation, lileralscomplainso much alout,is
perhaps the consequence of an inescapalle metaphysical urge.
Similarly, the centrality ofthe sulect in philosophy, morality and
aesthetics and the nomocentric organisation ofmodern society are
notunrelated.AsAlthusserargued, `the category ofthesulect . . .
appears . . . alove all viththe rise oflegal ideology . . . vhich lor-
roved the category ofthe ' sul ect in lav' to make an ideological
notion. manislynaturesul ect`. ' Thesul ectcametosuchpromi-
nence perhaps lecause ofthe metaphysical signincance oflegality,
vhich could not function vithout an active centre and addressee,
' !icrrc Lcgcndrc, IcIes|to||/|ucJcI|cu I/uJcssut|cs moa/c_cs Jc| `I/c/c/JuIto|/
!aris, Fayard, i 88) zz,-6
' Louis ^lthusscr, IdcologyandIdcological Statc ^aratuscs in Ica|a caJ |||oso|y
caJ o/|ctIscy rcvstcrtrans) London, \crso, i,i ) i z,-i 88, i 6o
THE FPEE AND S LBJ ECTED S LBj ECT ZZ7
vithouta legal) sul ect. Nothingescapesthe empire oflavvhich,
inorderto carry outits tasks , needsvehiclesto endovvithentitle-
ments and duties , competencies and lialilities. As the creation and
creator oflav, thesulectislav'sindispensallepartnerandservant.
ltshistoricalcontinuityandinstitutionalpermanenceindicatethatthe
lavisnotustthe creation ofpopularsovereignty, itisalso the car-
rierofthedictatesofsocialreproduction, thelegetterofsulectsand
thevehicleofviolence. Sul ectsandsul ected,exaltedandhumlled,
freeanddetermined,vetakeourmarchingordersunderthelanners
ofthelav.

V
Icu

s Su|c./s I|_|/s cac Ic_c| Iumca|sm

During the licentenary celelrations ofthe French Revolution and
Lc|ctc||oa in i ,,, Mrs Thatcher stated, to the great annoyance of
PresidentMitterand,thatasfarastheprotectionoffreedomandindi-
vidualrights vere concerned, the British hadnothingto learn from
the French. The claim that the common lav is radically different
from civil lav and much letter at protecting freedom is an old
rhetoricaltrope. ' MrsThatchermayhaveintendedtheremarkasan
insult to the French, lut she vas undoultedly on solid historical
ground. Shevas repeating, at the endofthe tventiethcentury, the
claims ve encountered in the vritings ofBurke, at the end ofthe
eighteenthandofDicey, atthe endofthe nineteenth, alleitinaless
eloquent manner. Legal exceptionalism has follovedvillage cricket
andvarmleer as a maj or symlol ofnglishidentity. MaxVeler,
FranzNeumannandjurgenHalermasamongstothershavefeltthat
thedifferencesvereseriousenoughtorequirecommentary. neof
the standard explanations on offer is that the common lav did not
adopt the conceptual logic ofrights ofRomanlav and the Code
Napoleon. nglishj udges concentrated, on the contrary, on solid
remediesandstrictproceduresandverenotseducedlythe alstract
normative logic ofthe civilians . Rights in this country, ifonevants
tousethe term,referto expectations andentitlements createdinter-
stitiallyatthemarginsofcourtordersandattheinterfaceoflegalpro-
cedures. Before the entry to theuropeanLnion, many textlooks
lluntly repeatedthatnglishlavyers do notunderstandthe foreign
' !ctcrCoodrich, Ica_uc_e Icu London, Vcidcnlcld and licolson, i j) , cJ|us
Ix crkclcy, Lnivcrsity olCaLloria!rcss, i ,) .
Nax Vcbcr discusscd nglish cxcctionalism i nI:oaomy caJSo:|c/y. Haou/||ac
a/cttc/c/|vcSo:|o|o_y C. RothandC Vittichcds) crkclcy,LnivcrsityolCaliloria!rcss,
i ,8) 8o ll, Franzlcumann, Jhc Concct ol!olitical Frccdom in T|cFu|c Icu
CaJctSicgc V. Schcucrman cd) crkclcy, LnivcrsityolCalilornia!rcss, i 6) i ,-zjo,
Ctto Kirchhcimcr, Jhc Fc:hss/cc/asNagic Vall ibid. , z|j-6| Foia commcntary, scc
V.J.Nurhy, 1hcSc:caJ|Jcs/tes|oaCxlord,CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss,i 8)Chatcr
j , , i-6
Z lAV ' S S LBjECTS .
ideaofrights and shadovedthe parochialismofthe intellectualtra-
dition, entreated famously ly dvard Thompson to keep French
theory,liketheralies, outofngland.
thatchangedvith the introduction ofthe HumanRights Act
i ,,, vhich incorporated into the common lav the uropean
ConventionofHumanRights. TheActhasledtoafield-dayforpul-
lications onhuman rights . The human rights record ofBritainover
thelasttventyyearshasleensoundistinguishedthatonlyasmalllut
vociferous numler of people dusted the old argument alout the
exceptionalism ofnglishlavand constitution, and insisted thatthe
nevrightsmentalityvouldgivelessprotectiontoindividualsthanthe
hallovedprocedures,remediesandprinciplesofthecommonlavissu-
ing, like mother'smilk,fromthe losom ofitsudges. 'Butthe many
treatises on the nev Act are not interestedin discussingthe theoryor
history ofrights andhave turnedhuman rights, thismostphilosophi-
cal andpolitical ofdiscourses , into ahavenfor doctrinal exegesis and
positivism. neparticularlyglaringomissionisthetotalneglectofthe
role ofthesul ect,thepersonorindividualvhoserightsandinterests
thenevlavis supposedtoprotect. Thelegal) sulect,associatedasit
is vith French metaphysics, has not entered legal scholarship. For
mainstreamscholarship, thenatureoftheindividualissoclearandhis
position in underpinning thelav so lasic and vell-understood that
thereisno needtoaddressit. Moresociallyavarescholarsarevorried
that a discussion ofthe sulect may lead to extreme sulectivism,
romanticism and the associated ills. Martin Loughlin has argued, for
instance thatthe realisation ofthecloselinkletveenfactsandvalues,
inthep.st-realistvorld,hasledsomelegaltheoriststomoveviolently
from dogmatic olectivism to radical sul ectivism. nthis occasion,
thehomeofthenevmaladyisnotFrance. `Therecentattachmentto
` ^mongstmany, scc Kcir Starmcr, IutoccaHumca Fg||s Icu London, L^C, i ) ,
[ Cocll, T|cHumcaF|_|/sH:/3 London,]ohnVilcy Sons, i ) ,^nthonyLcstcr
andLavid!annick, HumcaF|_||IcucaJrc:/|:c London,uttcrvorths, i )
' Lord ]ovitt, thc Lord Chanccllor at thc timc ol thc signing ol thc urocan
ConvcntionolMumanRights,dcnounccditas somchall-bakcdschcmctobcadmimstcrcd
by somc unknovn cour and so vaguc and vooIly that it may mcan almost anything,
quotcdinVilliamVadc,JhcLnitcdKingdom`sillolRightsin Con/|/u/|oac|Fqotm|a
/|c Ca|/cJK|a_Jom, CambridgcCcntrclor!ublicLav, i 8, 6 i . ForLordLcnningin i 8 ,
thccrilslromaillolRightscamclrmlitigantsnotjudgcs. Youarcgoingtohavcamyr-
iadolcascs byalotolcrackots and thcyvillhavc to bc turcd out sooncrorlatcr, |68
M.L.Lcb coI:,z i oLcccmbcr i 8,) , quotcdin Ccollrcy Narshall, !atratingRights -
VithRcscrvations,ibid , ,| Jhcargumcntaboutthcun-nglish charactcrolthcurocan
systcm olhuman rights vas rcdiscovcrcd and brought out, in thc latc cightics and carIy
ninctics, vhcncvcrthcLKvasloundbythcurocanCourtinbrcach olthcConvcntion.
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Zi
the cult ofsulectivity has leenmuch strongerinthe Lnited States,
vhere they tend not to do things ly half. But its perpetrators and
victims are again the contemporary heirs of the radical traditions
againstvhich the nglish estallishment set its `exceptionalist store.
`Radicalsulectivism| hasleenaprominent strandintheself-styled
Critical Legal Studies movement in America| vhere, through the
methodof' trashing',itformsadistinctiveurisprudenceofdrag.Ve
may le importing the un-nglish rights dragging our feet lut all
thoughton the sulectmust le nrmlykeptoutofthe country.
The comlination of intellectual isolationism, parochialism and
dreadofmetaphysicshas meant thatthis all-importantfoundationof
modernlav,civil,commonandnovinternational,hasleenscarcely
discussed in Anglo-American urisprudence and has leen only par-
tially addressedlycritics. But the question oflav's sul ects cannot
go avay. ThisChaptervillattempttoredressthe omission. Vevill
examine the nature ofthe sulectorpersonpresupposedlythelil-
eraltheory ofrights. Vhatis therelationshipletveenlegalsul ects
and real people: ls the modern sul ect, the pivot ofthe cognitive,
normativeandaestheticfaculties,relatedtothelegalsulect?lsthere
alinkletveen the `sulectification ofthevorldandtheintroduc-
tionofrightsasthemainluildingllockofmodernlav?
. V111b V1 Lb 11 b 11_ 1Lb
Accordingt ourisprudence, rightsaredeonticconcepts , theylelong
to the universe ofnorms andare couchedin the language ofrules.
The existence ofarightpresumesthe operationofanormative sys-
tem, ofaposited collection oflegalrules ora set ofmoralorother
normsvhichguideaction. Positivism, inparticular,defineslavas a
` Nartin Loughlin, u|||:IcucaJ o||/|:c| T|coty CxlordLnivcrsity!rcss, i z)

; j-|
' Scc, crard dclman, 1hc uacts|| o} /|c Imagc . Kingdom trans ) London,
Routlcdgc andKcgan!aul i ,) , !aulMirst, IcucaJIdco|o_y London,Nacmiuan, i 8,) ,
!ctcrCoodrch, Ica_uc_cs Icu London,Vcidcnlcldandlicolson, i o) , ^lanlorric,
Ct|mc, FccsoacaJH|s/oty,Aanlorrc, Ct|mc,FccsoacaJH|s/oqLondon,Vcidcnlcldand
licolson, i j ) , Rolando Cactc, HumcaF|_|| caJ/|cI|m|/s o}Ct|/|:c|Fccsoa ^ldcrshot,
Larmouth, i j) , CostasLouzinas, MumanRightsatthc ndolMistory, |/ i Ha_c|ck|,
i) , !icrrc Schlag, Jhc roblcm olthc Subjcct, 6 TccsIcuFcv|cu, i 6z, i i ) ,
V. J.Nurhy, 1hc|Jcs/So:|c|S:ica:c?Coa{_utc/|oasIcucaJMoJcta|/yCxtord,Cxlord
Lnivcrsity !rcss, i ,) For rcccnt cllorts, insircd mostly by sychoanalysis, scc !ctcr
Coodrich, cJ|us Ic, sura n i , ]cannc Shrocdcr and Lavid Carslon, Jhc Subj cctis
lothing, , Icu caJ Ct|/|uc, j i |) , Lavid Carlson, Lucllism in ^mcrican
]ursrudcncc, CctJo:oIcuFcv|cu, lorthcomingzooo
ZZ lAV ' S SLBJ ECTS .
ensemlleof rules,normsor normativestatementsvhichaimto reg-
ulatehumanconductandderivesallrightsfromthoserules. Forpos-
itivisturisprudence, in its various guises, the lav presupposes and
promotes individual rights , conversely, legal rights presuppose and
dependonanol ectivesystemofrules.Vevillfollovtheveakout-
line ofthelegalsul ectinthis imlricationofrulesandrights.
Vithin the lroad positivist framevork, the provenance ofrights
has leen attriluted to a numler of ideas or theories. Lnder the
contracttheory, arightexistsvhenaduty-leareroves anolligation
to the right-holderlecause ofa priorpromise. Lnder the so-called
povertheories, theright-holderhasaright,ifarulemakeshischoice
orvilldominantovertheactionsorvills ofothers. Typically, aright
existsiftheright-holderhasleengivenlylavthepovertodemand
that another personperforms an olligation or alstains fromcertain
activities, thus enalling the exercise ofthe right. Finally, under the
intereststheop,arightisaninterestprotectedlyaruleof lav,vhich
creates the necessary conditions for the en oyment ofthat interest.
Commontoalltheseapproachesistheclaimthatrightsarepersonal
capacities sanctionedlylav in orderto promote approvedindivid-
ualinterestsandtoservesociallydeterminedpolicyol ectives.Rights
are vays ofpursuingsocial choiceslyrecognisingindividual vants
and assigningthemto people.
lnmostinstances , the exerciseofarightdependson theprovision
of certain material preconditions and to that extent its effective
implementation is context-dependent. The Alortion Act i ,), for
example, created a legal right to alortion in certain circumstances .
Butthealilityofvomento carryoutaterminationvithintheterms
oftheAct dependslargelyontheprovisionandorganisationofmed-
ical and other suport services, on the availalility ofthe necessary
nnancial resources, nnally, on vomen's avareness ofexistingfacili-
ties. Havingarightinthealstractdoesnotmeanmuch,asBurkeand
Marx noted a long time ago, ifthe necessary material, institutional
andemotionalresourcesforitsrealisationare notavailalle.
Contemporary rights theories recognise the context-dependence
oftheeffectiveimplementationofrightsand,tothatextent,theyare
a clear improvement on earlier normative versions. These vere sat-
isnedtodeclarethedeonticnatureandlogicalnecessityofrightslut
remainedtotallyuninterestedintheirconditions ofimplementation,
insistingonthesteriledistinctionletveen `validity`and`effective-
ness`. But the `ontology` ofrights remains fully vedded to the
intrinsic connection letveen the concepts ofrule or norm, occa-
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z
sionally expanded to include `principles` and institutionally sanc-
tionedmoral expectations, andthat ofright. Rights are analytically
tiedtorule-governedlehaviour,rulescreaterightsandrightslelong
topeople, theyexistonlyviththesupportofasulect.
Thisinternallinkhasanumlerofimplications. First,therelation-
shipletveenlavandthesul ectiscircular.Thelavpresupposesthe
existence ofsul ects and its rules define their capacities , povers ,
immunities andduties, vithoutsulects rules vould makenosense.
Alegalsul ect, vhetherahumanleingoranartincialentityacom-
pany or association, the state or a municipality) , exists ifthe lav
recognisesitsalilitytolearrightsandduties. Thesul ectisacreation
ofthelav, an artincial entityvhich serves as thelogical support of
legalrelations.Rightandsul ectcomeintolifetogether.Butonthe
otherhand,thelavoperateseffectivelylecauselegalsul ectsaccept
itslegitimacy andrecognise itspover to create rights. There is no
sul ectandrightvithoutthelav, lutthelavcannotoperatevith-
out assuming legal sul ects. To le more precise, the relationship is
triangular.Rule, sulectandrightcometogetherandpresupposeone
another. the legal sul ectis the sul ectofrights throughthe opera-
tionofalegalnormvhichassignsrightsanddutiestosulects.
This is the approach ofthe greatestpositivisturist, Hans Kelsen.
Topuri( `legalscience`fullyandturnitintoamateriallyunconta-
minated science ofnorms and concepts , Kelsen had to deconstruct
thegrandioseclaimsoflegalhumanism. ForKelsen,thelegalsul ect,
ratherthan leingthecentre oflav, is asecondarylegal construct, a
logicalspace oro|a|Jc.cc|oavhich helps lringtogetherandcom-
line a numler ofnorms and rules oflehaviour. The sul ectis the
carrierofrightsandduties, apersonincationofnorms .AsKelsenput
it, the `legalpersonisnotahumanleing,lutthepersonalisedcom-
lination oflegal rules vhich impose olligations and give entitle-
mentstooneandthesameperson. ltisnotanaturalentitylutalegal
construct created lythe science oflav, anancillary conceptforthe
description and creation ofthe elements oflav`. ln this sense, the
Jhis aroachvas firstcmhasiscdbythc FrcnchjuristLconLuguitatthcbcginning
olthcccntur,. Scc Ttc|/eJcIto|/Coa/|/u/|oaac|,!aris i z i , \ol. i , zoo, i - z6, 6i ll Scc
also^. Nanitakis, T|c Su|c:/Coas/|/u/|oac|F|_||s ^thcns, i 8i ) |z-|6.
C. dc la !radcllc, I"Hommcut|J|uc !aris, Nascro, i ,) , vritcs that lc sujct dc
droitcstl`trcquclconquca quilcsnormcs j urdiqucs s` adrcsscntctquicst,arconscqucnt,
titulaircdcsrcrogativcs quc ccsnorucsinstitucntcndctcrminant,arcclascul,sacrson-
nalitc au scnsstrict, ,,-6.
Mans Kclscn, Ccactc| T|coq o}Lu caJ S/c/c Cambridgc Nass. , Marvard Lnivcrsity
!rcss, i |) .
Z+ lAV' S S LBJ ECTS .
natural legalpersonis more artificial than a corporation, lecause its
statusasahumanleingolscuresvhatisperfectlyvisilleinthecom-
pany. thefactthattheyarelothcreations ofthelav.
The legal sul ect is therefore a constructed su|c.|us a legal cre-
ation orfiction. lts nrstmanifestationsvere organised, accordingto
`thescripturaldefinitionsofkingandsul ect,ma estyandsul ection
. . . thefundamentalsulstrateofthesocialordervasalodyofreli-
gious andlegal| texts, andinconsequencethe sul ectlelongednrst
andmost directly to atextualorder. ltvasthetext, in othervords,
thatdennedsul ection, loththeidentityandthedutyofthesul ect,
anditvasvithin thetext that this legal fiction ofa personhadits
leing`. ' ' As ve sav, these early limited protections assumed that
human leings vere oledient and dutiful souls. But vhen modern
lavmaderightsitsluildingllocks,humanleingsverere-definedas
creaturesofvillanddesire. `The startingpointofthescienceoflav
isMan, as soonas manis constitutedinto alegal sul ect. Thepoint
ofarrival oflourgeois legal science is man. This science does not
move, itstartsvithmanandendsup rediscoveringthesul ect`.' '
Allhumanleingsarelegalsul ects ,constitutedlytheensemlleof
legal recognitions and uridical relations. An infant is lorn to his
motherand, forasecondtime,tothelav. Fromlirth,andinsome
instancesfromconception, thehumanleinglecomesmoreorlessof
alegalsul ect. Thenevly-lornisanalmostemptyground,alargely
undifferentiated sulstratum or vessel vhich, as life passes, vill le
gradually investedvith rights and duties , privileges and olligations
until death. Thisvould change radically, ifafederalBill lefore the
LS Congressinthe summerofi ,,, vere tolecomelav. ltrecog-
nises the foetus as a separate legal entity fromits future motherand
makesitacrimeforanyone, includingthe mother,toharmitinany
vay. Thisisadraconiananti-alortionmeasure,vhetheritentersthe
statute look or not, it is further evidence ofthe argument ofthis
lookthatlegal) sul ectivity,likehumanity,isanelasticcategorythat
canle extendedand contractedvithoutgreatdifficultyand that, in
doingso, thelavexercisesitsanthropogeneticpover.Thelegalsul-
ectisametaphoricalplacevherethevarious capacitiesandpovers
assigned lylavconverge, a canvas uponvhich the different legal
states and statusesvilllepaintedgivingthe person herlroad con-
tour and definition. Legal rules do not address themselves to real
' ' !ctcrCoodrich, Social Scicncc and thcLislaccmcntolLav, jz/zIcucaJSo:|c/y
Fcv|cu|,j i 8) , at|,,
'' dclman, IIto|/sc|s|ct|c|o/o_tc||c!ars,Nascro, i ,j) i oz
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z3
people, lutto the uridicalpersonalitycreatedlythelavto repre-
sent the human person. As Tim Muqhy puts it, `the legal sul ect
presents ' itself' to the lavas a face, ora sur-face, vhichis to saya
screenon to vhich variouspro ectionsvillle effected`. '
1 1 . 1 b 11_1L I 11 V1 Lb
nenotalle exceptiont othe urisprudentialalstinenceonthesul-
ectofthesul ectis CarlosNino, theArgentineanpoliticalphiloso-
pher, vho attempted to reconstruct the philosophy and ethics of
human rights inorderto refute thecritics oflileralism.'` Ninoput
forvardanimpressivetheoryonthesul ectofhumanrightsvhich,
heclaims ,vhileendovedvithalargenumlerofcharacteristics, has
nonethelessaconsistentandclearconstitution.
According to Nino, the uniting characteristic oflegal sul ects is
thattheyare`nottiedto anyend,they are anoriginatingsource of
validclaims,andtheyareresponsillefortheirends `. ' 'lnthisimpor-
tantformulation, vefindthemainelementsoflegalsul ectivity.The
sul ectis the product ofthe destruction ofthe teleologicalviev of
thevorld. Pre-modernvirtue andthedutiesaccompanyingit have
leen replacedly unencumleredpeople and free choices. The idea
ofthenaturallyrightisreplacedlymanyrights, thatofthe goodly
many incommensuralle values and principles held and denned ly
individuals, the classicalconceptof usticelyfreedomas autonomy,
invhichselfcu|os) givesitselfthelavaomos) . Freedomdennedasa
vill freedto `choose ends, adoptinterests,formdesires` is the ulti-
matevalueinavaluelessvorld. The sulect`originates`hisinterests
anddesiresin God-likefashionandthis electionmakes himrespon-
sille. The alility to chooseis the mostimportant characteristic and
`thepersonconstitutedlyit, ispriorto anyend,interestanddesire.
Thisimplies, thatvhenvereferto aninterestordesire,vepresup-
poseasulj ect, andthattheidentityofthatsul ect, themoralperson,
doesnotchangevithitsends, interests , ordesires`. '
' V J Nurhy, suran 6, i 6.
' ` Carlos lino, 1hc I/||: Humca F|_|/s Cxlord, Clarcndon, i j) . Intcrcstingly,
lino,unikchis^nglo-^mcricancollcagucs,vasactivcly involvcdinthclcgalrghtsmovc-
mcnt against thc ^rgcntincan hunta and vas a lcading adviscr olthc first dcmocratically
clcctcd!rcsidcnt.Scchis 1hcFcJ|:c|Iv||oaTt|c|lcvMavcn,YalcLnivcrsity!rcss, i 6) .
' ' ibid. , I1 .
' ` ibid.
Z lAV ' S SLBj ECTS .
Ninohassynthesisedintheseformulationsthemainclassicalcivil-
ianpositionsonthesulect. lndividualrights, theFrenchJro||su|]c.-
||cc, have leendefinedlyjellinek, `as that interestprotectedly the
recognitionofthe humanpovertovill`. ' Freedomofvill,thevill
to vill, to quote Heidegger, is the underlying and permanentforce
thatconstitutesthe sul ect. ltgives thesul ectitsunityandidentity
overtime, in classicalmetaphysicalterms the moral,legal) sul ectis
thesulstratumpresupposedandconstitutedlyfreevill.Arightraises
anindividualvillinto generalvill,inthe sense thatthestaterecog-
nises and enforces it, thus giving it `ol ective` existence. ' ' Rights
legaliseindividualvillandmaterialiseindividualdesire.Accordingto
aleadingRomanist, `manisthe sul ect ofrightslecause everypos-
silility ofdetermining himselfis accorded him, lecause he has a
vill`. ' ForHart too, rights give to people a kind of`sovereignty`
over their vorld and entitle them to impose duties on others. '
Values and lavs not freely adoptedly the sul ecthave no validity.
They are the legal form ofindividualism, in the same vay that the
marketisits economic andperspectivismitsartistic forms. AsBloch
putit, `thepersonvhoistoofreesaysthatallthatpleasesispermit-
ted.juridicallyspeakingthesamevievappears, notaslimited,lutas
lelongingtothe capacitytovill`.'
The separation letveen the villing sulect and his predicates or
choices ends , interests , desires) vhich can le realisedoutside ofthe
sulect, pits the sul ect against the vorld, vhich is revealed in its
ol ectivityreadyforolectificationandmastery. Therealis the rei-
hedmatterfromvhichthe sul ectvill carve out the ol ects ofhis
desires and interests. But the reification ofthe vorld leads to the
impoverishmentofthesul ect. Thelegalisthe thinnest ofthe `thin
conceptionsoftheperson`. ltrepresentsastateofpersonhoodvhich
notustdividesthesul ectfromitsdeterminations,lutalsoseparates
people into isolated monads. `Moral persons are also separate from
each other . . . collectivities arenotmoralpersons `. This thincon-
ceptionofthesul ectis `necessarilyassumedvhenveparticipatein
' ]cllinckquotcdinrstloch, !c/utc|IcucaJHumcaI|_a|/y L. Schmdttrans.)
Cambridgc, Nass. , NIJ!rcss, i 88) zi o
' Jhc so-callcd villthcory is onc olthcmostromincnt andcrmancnt thcorics ol
rights, according to vhich, somconc has a rght ilhc is in a osition to dctcrminc hov
anothcr crson shall act. HJ^ Mart, ^rc Jhcrc ^ny latuial Rights, 6| |||oso||:c|
Fcv|cu, i ,,- i , i ,8 , i 8 i i ,,)
uotcdi nloch suran. i 6, zi ,

` Mart, o. cit. , ln. i ,.

-
loch,o cit sura n. i 6, z io.
PI GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z7
thepracticeofmoraldiscourse`andisduetothe' ointoperationof
the formal features ofgenerality and universality ofmoral princi-
ples`. ' Finally it is `metaphysical in the sense ofleing oltained
throughsomesortof' transcendental'method`. Veshouldaddthat
itismetaphysicalinamuchdeepersense. ltturnsthesul ectintothe
measure ofallthatexistslyattrilutingtohimaninhnite andunreal
freedomtovilland,turnsthevorldintoinertmatteravailalletothe
sul ectfortherealisationofhis interests anddesires.
Letus!avea closerlook at the `thin` hctionalsul ectandcom-
pare itvith a real `fat`person. Peoplelelongto thevorld offacts
andcontingency, emotionsandpassion,consciousdesiresanduncon-
scious urges, voluntary actions, unknovn motives and unforeseen
consequences.Thesulect, ontheotherhand,lelongstothelav,his
personality constructed and regulated ly legal rules. Rules follov
logicandprecedent,themethodsoflegalreasoningandtheprotocols
oflegalvalidity. Asaresult,a degree ofsimplicityandrigourcharac-
terises the legal sul ectthat reminds ofthe sulmissive hero ofVon
Masoch's lcaus |aurs. `` There isaligdifference letveen thereal
personand thelegal sul ectrepresentingher, agap notdissimilarto
that letveen a richly coloured and hnely detailed portrait and an
outline draving ofthe sameperson. Thelegal sul ectis the carica-
ture oftherealperson, a cartoon-like figurevhich, asallcaricature,
exaggerates certain features and characteristics and totally misses
others.AsViningargues, legalindividualism`hasnothingtodovith
the concernforthe dignity, happiness orimportance ofthe individ-
ual. ltdehnesratheraparticularvayofpopulatingourthoughtvith
livingunits ofreference, nomore universal orlasicthanthevarious
personifications ofvindorvatervhichhave losttheirvividmean-

` ' ing .
Thegapletveenarealpersonandherlegalpersonatakestheform
oflothexcessandlack, andlecomesfully visille vhenpeople start
legalproceedings. xcess. thelav ascrilesto the sulecta surplus of
reason, an extreme rationalism, vhich portrays himas a calculating
machine. Thelegalsul ectasmuchasthe `economic`or`rational`
manofneo-lileralismare `alstractionsfromrealpeopleemphasising
one side ofhumanlife - thealilityto reason and calculate- atthe
-
linoo. cit. , suran. i j , i i z, i i j .
-- ibid , ii,
-` For thc contractual basis olmasochism and thc constitutional olsadism, scc Cillcs
Lclcuzc, ColdncssandCrucltyinMcso:||sm . Nclciltrans.) lcvYork, /oncooks,
i 8)
-' ]. \ining, Ic_c|IJca/|/y lcv Mavcn, Yalc Lnivcrsity!rcss, i ,8) z
ZO lAV ' S SLB] ECTS .
expense ofevery social circumstance that actually lrings individuals
to reasonand calculate inparticularvays`. Thisis the reasonvhy
the reasonalle man` is such akeyhgure inlegal reasoning. Vhen
feministsorcriticalscholarsattackthegenderorracialconstitutionof
this construct,theymissthelasicpointoftheClaphamomnilus `.
Thereasonallemani s notaconspiracylyconservative udges ,luta
cipher or symlol ofthe legal sulect vho cannot go cruising in
Clapham,sinceanythingtodoviththelodyorthesensesisnotpart
oftherealmofreasonandmustlelracketed orexcluded. Thelegal
sul ectisnot ustthinlutethereal,vhilerealpeoplearealvaysfat` ,
fullof veaknesses , inadequaciesanduncertainties.
lndeed, the relationship letveen sul ect and person is mainly
dehnedlyvhattheformerlacks, thealsenceofthosecharacteristics
vhichcreatehumanidentity. lnexistentialterms,thesul ectoflegal
andcontractualrightsandagreementsstandsatthe centreoftheuni-
verseandasks thelavto enforcehisentitlementsvithoutgreatcon-
cernforethical considerationsandvithoutempathyfortheother. lf
thelegalpersonisanisolatedandnarcissisticsulectthatperceivesthe
vorldasahostileplacetoleeitherusedorfendedagainstthroughthe
mediumofrightsand contracts, sheisalso disemlodied,genderless,a
strangely mutilated person. As Schlag puts it, this emancipation of
theselffromitscontexts. . . isvhatenallesittoleemancipatedfrom
allforcesandinHuencesotherthanlavitself`. lnthelegaluniverse,
loth l andthe other,aslegalsul ects , are rationalleingsvithrights,
entitlements and duties. Ve expect to le treated equally vith the
other and reciprocity ofentitlement and olligation is placed at the
lasis ofthelegalmentality. But this equalityis onlyformal. itneces-
sarilyignoresthespecihc history, motiveandneedthelitigantlrings
to thelav in order to administer the calculation ofthe rule and the
application ofthe measure. The alstract uridical sul ectis a meta-
physicalorcalculating, self-interestedleing, conceivedin an asocial
vayinavorldvhosesocialityvasnomorethanthecomingtogether
ofindividualsinasocialcontract . . . thelavknevnorealindividu-
als, only their mystical alstractions`. 'Betveen lack and excess, the
legalsul ectlecomesamalleallevehicle.
!y addrcssing thc consuncr as an cnty suLjcct, liLcral justilication
scduccs or shancs hcr into assuning this norc noLlc and norc cthi-
cally acaling vcrsion ol hcrscll, lurthcr causing hcr to ut asidc hcr
` ^lanlorrc, o. cit , suran. 6, z;
' !icrrc Schlag, T|cIa:|ca/mca/Tccsoa Lurham,LukcLnivcrsity !rcss, i pp3) i z,.
' ibid , ]i .
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M ZV
ovn articular tastcs, rclcrcnccs , idiosyncrasics, and othcr concrctc
asccts. !y addrcssing thc consuncr as a lull suLj cct, liLcral justilica-
tion uscs grccd and lcar to convincc thc consuncr that it is in hcr ovn
intcrcst - vithin hcr ovn articular tastcs, rclcrcnccs , and idiosyn-
crasics as a lull suLjcct - to acquicscc in thc rulcs laid dovn Ly thc
cnty suLjcct. `"
Vehave examinedelsevherethestrange amorality oflegalmen-
tality, vhich promises to replace ethical responsilility vith the
mechanical application ofpredetermined and morally neutral rules
and usticeviththeadministrationofustice. Analyticalmoralphi-
losophyvithits unlridledrationalismneeds and creates the gener-
alisedother`. Thelav,ontheotherhand,sharingthepreoccupation
to alstract and universalise, turns concrete people into generalised
legal sul ects. The difference letveen the fictional agents ofmoral
philosophyandthoseofthelav, isthatthelegalsul ectisapersona
ormaskputonrealpeoplevho,unlikethealstractionsofmoralphi-
losophy, hurt,feelpainandsufler.
Letusexamine,nnallyandlrieHy,someinstancesofthissuffering,
cases vhere the legal sulect undermines the real person. ne
instructive instance is the divisionletveenintentionand motive in
criminal lav. Motive refers to need, desire, purpose, individual and
social history, conscious and unconscious urges to action, in other
vords,tovhatmakespeoplereal. lntention, ontheotherhand,isan
artincialconstructionreferringtofault,theascriptionofresponsilil-
ityirrespective ofreasons ormotives foraction. Andyetintentionis
themainconceptin criminallav,vhilemotiveistotallyignoredin
thedeterminationofguiltandisintroducedinaperipheralvayatthe
stage ofsentencing or in certain exceptional defences, like duress.
AccordingtoAlanNorrie, thelavneglectsmotive]anormalmen-
talelementinhuman conduct` anddoesnotgo leyondthestand-
point ofthe small child`.`' As Anatole France putit, the lavin its
ma estypunishes equallyrichandpoorforstealinglreadorsleeping
under lridges . Norrie and other Marxist theoristshndthis state of
affairs irrational, theresult oflav'spoliticallias. Thismaylepartly
true, lutthe real reasonfor the choicelies elsevhere. the legalper-
sonisthe main cipherandmetaphysicalcompanionofthe sul ectof
!icrrc Schlag, Jhc mty Circlcs olLibcral]ustiucation, p6 M|:||_ca IcuFcv|cu I
ipp,) , ,,
Louzinas and Varrngton,u/|:cM|s:ctticJ dinburgh, dinburgh Lnivcrsity !rcss,
i pp|) Chatcr|
`' ibid , Chatcr andat |
Z+ lAV' S SLBJ ECTS .
modernity. ur vhole anthropocentric universe has leenluilt on
theassumptionthatthesulectismorallyresponsilleforhisfreedom
andlegallylialleforhisactions. Thelavmustdisregardmotivesand
circumstances , vhichintroduce externaldeterminations, inorderto
supportthefoundationstone ofourepoch, the claimthatfreevillis
thedominantprincipleandthe sul ectthemasterofhisfateandthe
vorld. lfmotive vere to replace intention in the determinationof
culpalility, the centralityofsul ectivityvouldcometoanend. This
does notappeartoleonthehistoricalagendaatthemoment.
Thesamestructureisevidentintheoperationoflegallysanctioned
freedoms. ltis the freedom to accede to the availalle repertoire of
legalformsandrights ,thefreedomtolevhatthelavhasordained,
accompaniedlythethreatthatoptingoutisnotpermitted,thatdis-
olediencetoalegalnormisdisolediencetotheruleoflav|ou|.out|
and that life outside the legal form ceases. Contract provides the
example here, vhile the contractingparties are usually unequal and
theconsumerorvorkerhasnoalternativeluttoentertheagreement
vith the retailer, the utilities provider or the employer, the lav
assumesthatthedealhasleenagreedafterfreenegotiationsletveen
lroadly equalpartners.Againthe facadeismoreimportantthanthe
content, the principle than the facts , the logical neatness than the
empirical experience ormoral rightness. The legal sul ect, the key
concept vithout vhich rights cannot exist, is ly dennition highly
alstract,aframe orskeletonthatvillle nlledinviththeveak esh
ofduties and the discolouredllood ofrights. Legal metaphysicshas
notimeforthepainofrealpeople.
1 1 1 . 11 L11 111 b 11 11 V1 Lb
CarlosNino,vhodidnotshyavayfromthephilosophicaltradition,
shovs clearly hov the ontology of human) rights follovs the
CartesianandKantianattitude tovards sulectand nature. Manhas
leenexpelledfromnature vhichlecomes estrangedand alien, and
the sulect as an isolated monad vith a solitary consciousness turns
onhimselfto createprogrammesoflegislationandlife-plans. Forthe
legal mentality, the leing ofleing human is present in the villing
unrestrained and solitary legal sul ect. The vorld is set against the
sul ect, as olectofrepresentationandintervention, ittakesits offi-
cial designation in the ol ective dennitions ofthe legal system and
acquiresitsmeaningandvaluelymeansofthesul ect'slegalchoices.
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z+i
The turning ofthe human leing into a legal sulect goes hand in
hand vith the creation ofan olective legal universe posited over
againstit. Jhe urisprudence ofrightsis the necessaryandinevitalle
dancingpartner oflegalpositivism, there can le no positivisedlav
vithout the concept ofthe sul ectas the learer ofrights and there
canlenoconceptionof rightsvithoutapositivesetof lavsandinsti-
tutions that lring the sul ectinto existence and endov it vith his
patrimonyofrights.
lt can beargued therefore that the concept ofrights is loth the
foundation and culmination ofthe philosophical, legal and moral
vorldviev ofmodernity. lt encompassesall aspects ofthe organisa-
tion ofself, community, state and the international vorld. ltis the
luilding llock oflav, the moral universe and freedom. A rights-
lased legal system, places the sulect at the centre and reects and
enforces his povers, faculties or desires . Right is a pullic capacity
givento theindividualto allovhimtoattainhis privates ol ects of
desire. Thesesul ective capacitieshavenoinherentlimitationandit
isonlyvhentheycomeacrossthesamerights ofothersthatlound-
aries are erected.Asaresult, asocialorderlased onrightscomprises
thesumtotaloflegalsul ectsandhaslittleorganicexistenceorstruc-
tural organisation, itsmoralandsocialprinciplesarethe outcome of
actsofvill,its udgments ofcalculationsaidedlylegalreason. Legal
rights , these Jto||s su|c.||ccs, have an internal link vith the meta-
physics ofsul ectivity, theyareitslegalvalidation. Thetvo entered
thehistoricalsceneatthesametimeandcomplementeachotherper-
fectly.
Classicalrightorusvasalimitationonindividualexcess, modern
rights have no inherent limit in them. they are the legalisation of
desireandassuchthesanctincationofindividuallimitlessness. Rights
do not derivefromol ectivenaturelutfromindividualdesire,they
follov Burke's `catechism ofpassions `. Sul ectivity founds rights ,
`sul ective rights express certain possililitiesthatareinherentinthe
|aJ|c|Juc|su|c.|'. ` ' The lav translates desire into right and turns it
into the cornerstone ofthesociallond. Desires arepositedlyindi-
vidualvills,rightsaretheirformalrecognitionandpre-conditionsof
humanity. themorerightsanindividualhas, themorehumanheis.
AsStraussput it, `rightsexpress, andaremeanttoexpress, something
thateveryone desires anyvay, theyhalloveveryone'sself-interestas
`' Luc Fcrry and ^Iain RcnauIt, tom /|c F|_|| oMca /o /|c Fcu|||:ca Icc Franklin
!hili trans) Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, i z) qO.
Z+Z lAV ' S S LB] E CTS .
everyone canlelroughtt oseeit`.` ` l fa nev ol ectofdesire gets
couchedinlegalterms, ifanevclaimcrossesthe threshold ofpopu-
laracceptalility,itsfulllegalrecognitionisamatteroftimeandlegal
recognitionturnsitinto another`essential`humancharacteristic. At
the limit, alldesiresvilllecome legalised, allinterests villgive rise
to enforcealle claims and full humanity vill le achieved, a state
vhich,Villey,StraussandLegendrelelieve, villleadtothetotaldis-
solution ofthe social lond andvill not le far removed from total
inhumanity.
Ve see this happening already in international relations afterthe
cohapse ofthe communist empires. very minority, trile or group
vhichinsistentlyclaimstopossess ethnic identityandculturaltradi-
tioneventuallylecomesanindependentstateorentityandproceeds
to oppress smaller minorities in it, as the treatment ofRussians in
nevly independent post-Soviet states and of Serls in post-var
Kosovo shovs. Vhen international politics are dominated ly the
rhetoric ofrights , no moral argument can resist the desire ofeven
smallgroupstoacquireautonomyandstatehood. Butthisdefianceof
historyly desire hasinevitallyled to greater conict andmisery. A
vorldmapintheformofamosaicofstateletsvillleanaturalexten-
sionofthe aggressivelogic ofrightslutat ahuge distancefromthe
cosmopolitanpeacevhichKanthopedrightsvouldleadto.
At the peak of the political and legal pyramid, the Sovereign
pover,itselfconstructedas alegalsul ect, issimiladyendovedvith
povers and freedoms. Natural and human rights acquired special
importance inearlymodernitylecausetheypromised to remove or
limitsomeoftheselegislativeoradministrativepoversthusprevent-
ing alsolutism. But the endless extension ofrights to match ever-
expandingdesirethreatenstheirprotectiverole. lnStrauss'terms `if
theultimatecriterionof usticelecomesthegeneralvill,i . e. thevill
ofafreesociety, cannilalism is asustas its opposite. very institu-
tionhallovedlyafolk-mindhastole regardedas sacred` Vhat
startedas themodernstandardofcritique ofthe real dissolvesvhen
rightsfollovfactualagreementsorimpositionsofpoverandnodis-
tinction is left letveen the real and the ideal. A rightthatlelongs
exclusively to the real is notfar removed, indeed it is synonymous
viththelegalpositivistconceptionoflav-createdrights, suchrights
canscarcelyact asthe standardofcritique ofvhat legally) exists.
` Lco Strauss, !ctutc| Lu caJ H|toty Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, i 6,)
i 8z-j .
`` Lco Strauss, U|ct!: o||t|:c||||oso|yChicago, LnivcrsityolChicago !rcss, i,) ,1
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z+
Legalhumanismpositedmanastheauthorandendof lavandcul-
minatedintheideaofhumanrights.Butvhenhumanrightsunder-
minethe distinctionletveentherealandtheideal, theylecomethe
foundation of modern historicism. Rather than leing a defence
against thestateandlegal positivism, theyendup the ledfellovs of
positivism, unalletoprovide astandard ofcritiqueandtotallyinad-
equate in their proclaimed task ofdefending the lonely individual
againstthedemands oftheall-poverful Sovereign,itselfpresentedin
theguiseofasuper-individualentityvithitsdesires, rightsandpov-
ers. Legalhumanism,vritesVilley, is the `tendencytopositmanas
theprincipleandendofeverything. . . fornearlyallmodernthinkers
aloutlavmanintheauthoroflav`.`Thisisnoalerrationofcivil-
ian metaphysicians , unknovn to the pragmatism ofcommon lav.
Reason and vill, the tvo facets oflegal humanism and rationalism
and voluntarism, theirtvo deformations, are perfectly encapsulated
intheperennialconundrumofBritishconstitutionalism. thecontra-
diction letveen the rule of lav and parliamentary sovereignty
vhich, the Human Rights Act, loyal to tradition, retained in all its
ma esty.
The sul ectoflav, as the doulle genitive indicates, is lothvhat
authors the lav andvhat is sulectedly it. verypositedrule pre-
supposes anauthor,alegislative sul ect. Parliamentforprimaryleg-
islation, aministerfor delegatedrules,udges for the common lav.
But this superior legislative sul ect is also the product ofrules, the
addressee ofnorms dehning its composition, procedures, and com-
petence. The constitution of modernity, vhich started vith the
humanistpremise ofsupportingthe natural freedomofthe individ-
ual, endsup coveredlya hyper-inHation ofnorms. sul ectslreathe
vhererules speak,therecanle norulevithoutsulectandno sul-
ectvithoutarule. uragesuffers fromvhatcouldlecalled`legal
techno-nihilism`. the more lav ve have the freerve are supposed
to le, themorelegal-technical relations define humanity, themore
ve shouldlealle to orderand control ourlives. Like technocratic
nihilism,metaphysicallegalismturnsagainsthumanityinthenameof
freedom. But the protests oflilerals against the over-legalisation of
latemodernityare asmisguidedas thoseoftheorthodoxMarxists.`
`' Nichcl\illcy, L`Mumanismc ctlcdroit, inSc|:ccssc|s Jc|||oo||c Ju Jto|t !aris,
Lalloz, i 6) 6o.
`` Jhc critiquc olovcr-lcgalisationand articularly ^mcrican) litigiousncss is as oldas
Jocqucvillc. It has bccnjoincd rcccntly by nco-libcrals vorrcd about ovcr-rcgulation,
communitariansvorricdaboutthc corrosivccllcctsolavonlocalcommuniticsandtradi-
tions and, intcrcstingly, anumbcrolLav!rolcssois vorricdaboutthc cllccts oltoo much
Z++ lAV' S S LBj ECTS
Theproliferationof rulesandtheregulatoryolsessionisnotanaler-
ration oflate modernity lut the logical end ofits strict operation,
vhich potentiallyvill translate all human relationsintolegal rights.
Forlegalhumanism,afullylegalisedvorldisahuman,alltoohuman
vorld. Thereisanolviouscontinuityletveenmetaphysicsandhis-
toricism andlegal humanism is part ofthe same process. ne must
often attack legal humanismin order to defend humans against the
demands oflegalised) pover.
Buthumanrightshailalsofromanothertradition, thatofcritique
ofpoverconventionandlavand,theyhavedevelopedintvodirec-
tions . Bloch arguedthat there are tvo sources and types ofrights.
Thenrstisassociatedvithpossessionandpropertyas Jom|a|um, legal
dominance over things and people. lts early formal development
aimed to protect the creditorfromthe deltor in cases ofnon pay-
mentofloans. The conceptofhumanrights emergedfromthis ear-
lierrighttopropertylutvas `adoptedinaquitedifferentvaylythe
exploitedandoppressed,thehumiliatedanddegraded. ltisprecisely
this that appears in its incomparalle second sense as the sulj ective
catchvordoftherevolutionarystruggleandactivelyasthesulj ective
factorofthis struggle`.`'
This statementremains true today. Rights are the luildingllocks
ofmodernlavandarethelegalexpressionofhumanismandsulj ec-
tivij. Humanrightsvere initiallylav's critiqueandmustledistin-
guished.Viththeextensivepositivisationofhumanrights,hovever,
the externaldivisionletveenlegalandhumanrightshasleenrepli-
catedinthelodyofhumanrightsthemselves. Vhenopposedtothe
stateanditslavs, theyactasastandardofcritique, dissentandrelel-
lion. Vhen conceived solely as the never-ending legalisations of
desireandthegrants oflegislativelargesse, theyjointhemetaphysics
ofsulj ectivityandaretvinnedvithlegalpositivism.
Ve can see this lifurcation in the history ofhuman rights. The
alsolute protection ofproperty led to the impoverishment ofthe
majority and the introduction of the second generation, and for
succcssonthc soul ofthcrolcssion Nary^nnClcndon,Fg|/s Tc|k T|cImovcr|s|mca/
o||/|:c| I|s:ourc lcv York, Frcc !rcss, i i ) , Nichacl Valtzcr, |c/ |/Mccas /o |c ca
Hmcti:ca lcv York, NarsiIlio, i z) , Solm Linovitz vith Nartin Naycr, T|c c/tcycJ
tc}css|oa altimorc,]ohns Mokins Lnivcrsity !rcss, i |) , !aul Camos, ur|smca|c. T|c
McJacss .mct|.ca Lu Cord, Cord Lnivcrsity!rcss, i 8)
`' Richard Juck too argucs, in his innucntial !c/urc| F|_|| T|cotics Cambridgc,
Cambrdgc Lnivcrsity !rcss, i ,) Chatcr i , that thc urst concction olsubj cctivc right
dcvclocd out olthc idca olJom|a|um ovcrrocrty.
`' loch, ocit. , sura n i6, zi ,
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z+3
lilerals second-rate, social and economic rights. The rights ofman
led to the lelated introduction ofchildren's and vomen's rights
vhich, in turn, led to calls for greater parents' rights and fears of
`male emasculation`.` The limitless freedomofaction led to mas-
tery over the vorld and control ofnature and to the call for nev
rightsprotectinganimalsandtheenvironment.Boundlessfreespeech
led to the right to privacy and the olsession vith pornography.
Freedom ofmovementand estallishment acrossurope for its citi-
zens , led to draconianrestrictions ofmovementforimmigrants and
refugees. Theoftenheard claimthat the exercise offreedomcarries
responsililitiesisapieceofunrealisticmoralism. Freedomandrights
carrynoinherentlimitationsormoralduties, theonlydefenceagainst
their side-effects isto create even more rights andlegalprotections ,
increasinglegalisationendlesslyandmakingconicttheendemicand
inescapalle condition ofthe social lond. Vhen rightsjusti( every
claimand sancti( everydesire nothinghasmuchvalue anylonger.
Despite the prollems, hovever, human rights are also the main
toolsvehaveagainstthecannilalismof pullicandprivatepoverand
thenarcissismofrights.Humanrightsaretheutopianelementlehind
legal rights. Rights are the luilding llock ofa lileral legal system.
Humanrightsareitsclaimtojusticeandassuchimpossilleandfuture
looking.Humanrightsareparasitesonthelodyofrights,judgingthe
host. Thereisapoetryinhumanrightsthatdefiestherationalismof
lav. vhen a lurnt child runs from the scene of an atrocity in
Vietnam, vhen a young man stands in front ofa tank in Beijing,
vhen an emaciated lody and dulled eyes face the camera from
lehindthe larledvireofa concentrationcamp inBosnia, a tragic
sense erupts and places me, the onlooker, face to face vith my
responsilility, a responsilility that does not come fromcodes, con-
ventions orrules lut fromasense ofpersonal guiltfor the suffering
inthevorld,ofolligationtosavehumanityinthefaceofthevictim.
1 N . 1 11 V Lb L111V1
Rightshaverecentlyacquiredanunrivalledprominencei nlegalphi-
losophy and political practice. After the collapse ofcommunism,
humanrightshavelecometheultimateexpressionofthemoralityof
` Jhomas Jaylor, a rccursor olthcmcn` smovcmcnt ubIishcdhis l|aJ|:c/|oa /|c
F|_|/s ru/cs in i ,z arguinglor luIlanimalcquality, as alamoomng rcsonsc to Nary
Vollstonccralt`sdclcnccolvomcn`s cquality vcryrightcrcatcslcarsandanti-rghts.
Z+ lAV' S S LBjECTS .
lav, governmental policy and international relations. Ve live in a
human rights culture. And as our epoch is the age ofthe end of
modernity, ofideology, ofhistory, ofutopia) , rightsaretheideology
ofthe end. But this end-ismdoesnot mean thatthe needandsearch
forthefoundationofrightshasleenforgotten, despitetheclaimsof
pragmatists, likeRichard Rorty, thatrights foundationalismis `out-
moded`. ` The universalising urge has increased, in our glolalised
vorld, andthesearchformoral certaintyandexistentialsecurityhas
lecome evenmore grandioseafterthe exhaustionofgrandtheories.
Admittedly, the oldgrounds, the good, God, transcendental man or
alstract humanity, no longercommand vide acceptance. The post-
modernconditionseeksfoundationsthatdonotlookfoundational.
Tvo such grounds have leen used ly contemporary urispru-
dence. Thenrstisaveaknaturalisttheory, undervhichafevmin-
imal truisms alout human nature have an almost universal validity
and can therefore explain the permanent features oflegal systems,
including rights. '' But the veakest ofnaturalisms is notpersuasive
againstthepragmatistclaimthathumannatureismallealle,theprod-
uctofhistoricallycontingentculturalfactorsandcannotprovideany
morally relevant knovledge. The last resort ofthe modestfounda-
tionalist is an institutional moral intuitionism. Vhen faced vith a
contested right, the most common urisprudential method ofargu-
mentationand ustincationistoexaminethedeepvalues, underlying
principles andinstitutional commitments ofsocietyinan attempt to
shov that they alreadyinclude the contestedright orthatlogic and
morality demand its incorporation. ln this approach, moral leliefs ,
valuesandrights arepartofthe universeveinhalit, auniverse cre-
atedthrougha process ofinstitutional and cultural accretion overa
periodoftime. Rights are not `ol ective` andhave noindependent
externalsource. Similarly, theyarenot`sul ective` , arlitraryinven-
tions of creative philosophers or crafty lavyers, lut explicit or
implicitlong-termcommunitycommitments.
Ve may call this approach, the principle of `structural imma-
nence`ofmoralityandrights. Rightsarecreationsoftheimaginative
interpretation ofa particularpolitical, legalandmoral history. They
exhilitcoherenceinstyle, consistencyinprincipleandstalilityover
time,andtheyareendovedvithacertainintellectualforceor`grav-
itationalpull`. Theyactasiftheyaretheunderlyinggrammarofthe
` RichardRorp, MumanRights,RationalityandScntimcntalityinStchcnShutcand
SusanMurlcy cds), aHumcaF|_||s lcvYor, asic ooks, i j) i i 6
'' HL^. Mart, 1hc Coa:c/LuCxlord, Clarcndon, i ,) ChatcrIX.
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z+7
sentencesoflavand,likeallgrammar, theyen oyadegreeofollig-
atoriness. This deep structure ofprinciples andvalues is saidto exist
lothinthe constitutional,legalandmoralcommitmentsofapartic-
ular society and in its vider cultural, literary and aesthetic values,
meaningsandunderstandings. To saythatBritainoughttorecognise
a right to privacy means, for example, that our udges should
acknovledgethedeepcommitmentsofourlegal,moralandpolitical
system to principles such as freedom, autonomy and the protection
ofprivatespheresofaction, andextractfromthosethealreadyimma-
nent right to privacy. ur society and lav should pullicly admit
leingvhattheyalreadyare. ''
Dvorkin's theory ofrights i s a good example. ' He argues that
rightsandprinciplesareasmuchpartofthelavasrulesandthatthe
institutional duty of udges is to present the lav in its lest possille
light. Nevdecisions mustfurtherinstitutionalhistoryandpresentit
as acoherentvhole, tovhichtheadditionfallsnaturally,likeanev
chapterinamulti-authorednovel. The`lest`interpretationoflegal
materialsandtherights)ansvertoa`hardcase`mustshovthepul-
lic standards ofthe community to leasingleandcoherentscheme,
animated ly the principles ofrespect and concern. Principles and
'' Jhc mostconciscrcscntationolthisvicvand cogcnt dclcnccollibcralrghtsagainst
thcir crtics is loundin]crcmy Valdron, lonscnsc uon Stilts - a rcly in]. Valdron
cd. ) , !oascascuoaS/|||s :ca/|cm, utkc caJMctoa/|cF|_|/so}Mca London,Ncthucn,
i 8,) i , i-zo.^variationolthc immancntstmcturc argumcntmorccvidcntinanalytical
moral hilosohy thanjurisrudcncc, argucs that human rights arc normativcly ncccssar,
bccausc cvcr, agcnt logically must hold oraccct that hc andall othcr agcnts havc thcsc
rightsbccausc thcir Cbjccts arc thc ncccssary conditions olhuman action, ^lanCcvirth,
Humca F|_||s Chicago, Lnivcrsity olChicago !rcss, i8z) zo. Ccvirthcalls his mcthod
dialcctically ncccssary. itbcginslromstatcmcntsrcscntcdasbcingmadcoraccctcdby
anagcnt,itrocccdslrmvithinhisurst-crsonconativcstandoint, anditcxamincsvhat
his statcmcntslogicallyimlyvithin this standoint . thc statcmcnts logically must bc
madcoraccctcdbycvcryagcntbccauscthcydcrvclromthcgcncriclcaturcsolurosivc
action Jhis mcthod is a rational ncccssity and rcj ccting its rincilc lcads to logical
inconsistcnsy, zi o-6. Jhcsclassurcdncssolcontcmorar,nco-Kantianismisinastound-
inglyrcvcrscrooriontothcmoralandoliticalunccrtaintythatcloudsthcucldolhuman
rightsandcanonlybc comarcd,intonc, viththcargumcntslromsclcvidcncc cvidcnt
inthcvrtingsol ]ohnFinnis Nostorhodoxjurisrudcnccsccmstoholdtoacombination
olthc immancntstructurc andthcimmancntmoralandlogical ncccssity argumcntslor
rights utcvcnvithinthctcrusolanalyticalhilosohy, thcargumcntisunconvincing. ^s
!hacdra, Socratcs, Kicrkcgaard, NcIntyrc and lagcl, amongst othcrs acknovlcdgcd, cvcn
thc cr1cctmoral thcor, has no guarantcc that moial actionvill lollov its rcscrtions. I
knovolmany rcasonsvhythcovcrlulviolatchumanrightsbutIknovolnocascvhcrc
violations stocd bccauscthcculrtlcltthathcvasmoraIyscll-contradictory.
' Ronald Lvorkin, Tck|a_ F|_||s Scnous|y London, Luckvorth, i ,,) , Lav as
Intcrrctation,inV . J. Nitchcll cd. ) Tco||/|:s o}Ia/cqtc/c/|oaChicago, Lnivcrsityol
Chicago !rcss, i 8j) , Lu'Im|tcLondon, Fontana, i86) .
Z+O lAV' S S LBj ECTS .
rightsare part ofthelav,lothlecausetheyhtpastlegal choicesand
decisions, and lecause theyusti( them Eom the point ofviev of
sulstantivepoliticalmorality. lfl ol ecttherefore toanactasavio-
lationofhumanrights althoughithas notleenlegallyrecognisedas
such, l must use a type ofargument vhich explains that the chal-
lenged act is inconsistentvith deep commitments orprinciples our
legal and political system values highly. lfl succeed in linking the
deepstructureviththe contestedcase, myinterlocutorvillhaveto
accept the conclusion out of moral and/or intellectual honesty.
morally,lecausehehimself, valuesthesameprinciplesandleliefs of
oursocietyandthereforevaluesalso,mct|u|, thecontestedrightor,
lecause, unlessheacceptsthatthecontestedrightisarealone, alarge
numler ofpositive commitments, principles andrightsin our com-
munityvouldmakenosense. Moregenerally, politicalphilosophers
vho follovthis approach, concludeatthe endoftheirdelilerations
thatVesternsocietiesarecommittedtotheprinciplesoffreevilland
autonomy,toformalequalityandlimitedmaterialequality. Theydis-
cover, inothervords, atthe endoftheir quest thelileralprinciples
theystartedvith.
Thereareanumlerofolviousprollemsvithallsuchimmanent
structure` theories. The hrst and most serious takes us lack to the
discussionofthe Kantian) autonomoussulectofrights. Autonomy
vas the resultofthe operationofmoralreason. thesul ectlecomes
freelyfollovingthemorallavhefinds inhimself Moral philoso-
phyhopedto cleansethevorldsofpreudiceandsuperstition. This
cleansingvouldpermitustorisealoveouranimalitylylecoming,
forthehrsttime,fullyrationalandthusfullyhuman`.'Statelav,on
the otherhand, is aheteronomous set ofrulesimposedonthe sul-
ectfromoutside,moralityandlegalityvereinitialystrictlyseparate.
But immanent structure` theories have overcome the divide
letveenlavandethics. Therationalityoflavvasneverindoultfor
itsapologists, novlavhaslecomefullymoral too. ln one sense, the
immanence ofrights is nothing more thanthe acknovledgementof
thecircularrelationship letveenpositive lavandrights . Butin the
hands ofanti-positivist` rights theorists, like Dvorkin, it lecomes
much more. The integration oflav and rights means thatlav has
leenfullymoralised,thatalltheresourcesforcritiquemustlesought
inside its lody and that the radical aspect ofhumanrights has leen
pushedout.
'` Rorty, o cit. , suran. , I Iz-
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z+V
dmundBurke arguedthatnglishlav needed no transcendent
principle ofustification, lecause a latent or immanent visdom of
rightvaspresentinit. Thereveremanyreasonsforthisoutlurstof
parochial megalomania, asve sav.Theyincludedthe conservative
fear ofthe FrenchRevolutionandofthe radical, evenrevolutionary
potentialoftheproclaimedrights. Natural rights vere an act ofvar
against tyrants` . '' Burke lelieved that the British constitution vas
theperfectveaponagainst tyranny, andhis denunciation ofhuman
rights and other principles of critique vas a logical conclusion.
nglishpoliticalandlegaltheoryfollovinghisleadlecamepreoccu-
piedvith theactual, vith the creations oflegalpractice, andalan-
doned the quest for the ideal. The reality, vhich disqualifies or
co-opts the ideal, may take an empiricist and positivist guise or,
assume the form ofidealised actuality. The hrst approach is that of
legalpositivism,thesecond,ofthevariousrightstheorists.Bothclaim
thatvhatisisvhat ought to le andloth are equallyhostileto crit-
icsvhouse externalstandards. RonaldDvorkin,forexample, claims
thatlav's empire mustle defendedfromits enemies, external scep-
ticism vhich does not use arguments ofthe sort the enterprise
requires`'andcriticallavyers,theenemiesvithinintheserviceof
undisclosedpoliticalgoals`. 'lnthepassagefromBurketoDvorkin,
acertainlossofstyleandloveringofvisionhasoccurred,lutthesen-
timentsexpressedandthetargetsattackedarethe same.
lmmanent structure theories turn history into historicism. The
ideal or, the rational identified vith the trueandthe good) is not
opposedto the real,lutis realisedlyitself`. ''As aresult, nothing
escapesthe empire ofthe existent. The fact/value distinctiondisap-
pears, rights theories lecome exclusively historical and| unalle to
grasp anythingeternal` , afakeantidotetolegalpositivism. 'Despite
protestations to the contrary, theself-satishedcertainty ofthese the-
ories is evidence oftheirmetaphysical nature. The identihcationof
rationalityviththemorallav vas the early metaphysical movect
cx.c||ca.c. State lav has nov lecome part ofthe equation and the
formoflegality, theultimateprincipleoflatemodernity.
Metaphysics remains the plaything ofthe poverful and lav, the
vill to eternalise momentary relations of pover. For those vho
'' SccChatcr, , abovc.
'` Lvorkin, IS6, Oj .
'' Lvorkin, zy,
'` FcrryandRcnaut, o.cit , suran. j i, o.
' IcoStrauss, !c/utc|F|_|/caJH|s/ory, Iz
Z3 lAV' S S LB] ECTS .
remainfaithful to radical naturallavand the aspirationandstruggle
forustice, on the other hand, acts ofpover cannot le successfully
criticisedthroughotheracts ofpover. Therecordoflilerallegalsys-
tems, vhenit comes toprotectingreal equalityandexistentialfree-
dom, is at lest mixed. To that extent, human rights areinpartthe
negation ofthe system oflegal rights and cannot le grounded ifa
groundis neededatall) inpastdecisions and commitments many of
vhicharethecause oftheprollemorlecomefullylegislated.Human
rightsaretheutopianfuturalaspectoflav. lntheirfield,immanence
trumpstranscendenceandhistorypreventsthethoughtofthefuture.
lnsipidhistoricismisnottheonlyprollemvithimmanentstruc-
ture` theories ofrights. Their excessive dependence on contingent
institutional choices, past preferences and historical commitments
meansthatarightprevails onlyifthevalue attached toitlythe rel-
evant professional or vider community is relatively high. Vhen
opinion changes, nothingguaranteesthis right. Dvorkinclaimsthat
rightsdemandopportunitiesorresourcestolegivenevenagainstthe
political and policypreferences ofthe moment. Rights are restraints
on social policies and political choices , they have a threshold
veight` in relation to collective goods against vhich they act as
trumps`. But their immersion in the history ofthe community
means that their alilityto restrictpoverisitselfrestricted. The his-
tory ofanti-terrorismlegislation in this country is a goodexample.
Time and again governments legislated drastic restrictions on long-
estallished civil lilerties in the aftermath ofterrorist outrages ly
exploiting the videspread revulsion against the perpetrators. The
trumpetedtrump-card`ofrightsisoflittlevalueinsituationsvhere
the alleged immanent structure ofrights comes into direct conHict
vithstrongsurfaceillileral emotion. Theseare the instancesvhere
theprotectivevalueofhumanrightsisatthehighestluttheireffec-
tivenessatthelovest.
Similarprollemsexistvhenvemovefromthenormative to the
cognitiveaspectsofimmanentstructuretheories. Amainintellectual
attraction ofrights discourse is its alilityto descrile complexsocial
andpoliticalsituations , and especially con icts, insimple normative
terms. But this isalsoitsmostseriousshortcoming. The claimthata
set ofsolid,generallyacceptalleandnon-controversialprincipleslies
lehind the complex and contradictory leliefs , value systems and
emotions ofa contemporary society or legal system, is empirically
unprovalle and theoretically alsurd. lt assumes that societies have
somehovacceptedlileralpriorities andare on thevayto a cultural
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl SM Z3i
and moral homogeneity. But sociologists, economists and cultural
historians tellusthatsocietiesarelecomingmore diverse, openand
con ictual.Thepoliticsofidentityandculturaldiversityoftheeight-
ies and nineties have, if anything, increased fragmentation and
polyphony. The leliefin underlying common values comes totally
unstuckincases ofpoliticalcon ict,vhere rights seemto evaporate
andto transformintointerests,villandpover. But evenvithinthe
moreserene confinesofprivatelav,theclaimthatrightsextendinto
nevareasthroughthecomlinationoftheinexorallelogicofunder-
lyingprinciplesvith consistencyandgoodfaith sounds extravagant.
Dvorkin implicitly recognises the empirical improlalility ofhis
theory, vhenhepresentshisidealudge asalatterdayHerculesand
places demands on him vhich, in their difnculty, are not unlike
Herculeanlalours.
Adomestic conHictsuchas the miners' strike inthemid-eighties,
couldle descriledas a con ictletveenthe right ofstrikingminers
to vithhold theirlalourand the right to vork ofvorkingminers.
Butsuchadescriptionvouldnothelpusunderstandthelackground,
issuesandinterestsinvolved.venvorse, thepresentationofconHict
intermsofrights doesnothelpandcouldevenretardits resolution.
Con ictinggroups andinterestsinsituationsofacute struggle share
fevvalues andleliefs . The con ictitselfis evidence ofthe alsence
orcollapseofanyimmanentorsharedvaluestructure.lnthealsence
ofa meta-principle external to the conHict vhich could act as an
arliter, theimportationofrights discourseislikelytostrengthenthe
resolveofthepartiesandmakethemlessamenalletonegotiationor
compromise, as it removes the nght from the terrain ofvarring
interests into that ofallegedly alsolute truths and uncompromising
entitlements. ln these instances, rights-claims appear to le at their
most compelling, lut the ustificatory pover ofimmanent struc-
ture`theoriesisatitsleastconvincing. Theuse ofrights discourseto
descrile normatively a con ictorasetofclaimsis alimitedvayof
narrativising the situation. lt is cognitively inaccurate and morally
impoverished. inaccurate lecause it presents a limited viev ofthe
vorldas complete, asifone ofCezanne'sdravings oftheMoa|c|ac
Sc|a|c l|.|o|tc vas the definite representation of the mount.
lmpoverished, lecause it assumes that the various claims, interests
andspecificitiesofthepartiescanletranslatedintoonecommonlan-
guage.
lmmanent value structures assume too much, loth in terms of
theirtheoryofargumentationandofthesocietytheytrytorepresent.
Z3Z lAV' S S LBj ECTS .
Theydemandanunrealisticconsistencyof principleinargumentand
theypresupposetheirconclusions,namelythatthevholesocietyand
its underlyingprinciples are committedlilerals. Theseprollems are
furtherexarcelatedlytheformalisticandindeterminatelanguage of
rights. ltisarguallethatthecontemporary appeal ofrights discourse
ispartlyduetoitslanguage,vhichhaslecomesovide,alstractand
all-encompassing, that it may le used in all kinds ofpolitical and
social conicts to provide moral legitimacy to every interest and
claim, fromthemostserioustothemosttrivial. Thisproliferationof
claimsandtheinationoflanguage,risksmakingthediscoursemean-
ingless. in potentially usti(ing everything, human rights end up
usti(ingnothing. But there ismore. itis one thing to acceptthata
particularright exists or ought to le recognisedand atotally differ-
ent to determine vhat that means inpractice, vhat concrete mea-
sures, including legal ones, should le taken to protect it. Arguing
rights in the alstract is the prerogative oflegal and moral philoso-
phers, Burke' s `metaphysical doctors `. But their practical value is
varialle andcontext-dependentlecausetheyareappliedlocallyand
address concrete situations and singular prollems. Vhile the lan-
guageoflileralurisprudenceisalstractandformalistic, theapplica-
tion of human rights depends on considerations, factors and
circumstancesunrelatedto thegrammarofrights. Theindividuation
ofa right moves from alstract and indeterminate language to the
specincs ofthe situation and is so elongated, complex and context-
specincthatidenticalpremisesmayusti(totallyopposedoutcomes.
ThesameprovisionoftheAmerican Constitution, for example, the
FourteenthAmendment equalprotectionoflavs clause, estallished
the principle of colour segregation and apartheid in |csscy v.
cqussoa andtheprinciple ofdesegregationandequalityinBtouav.
BoctJe ]IJu.c||oaoToc/c.'
The second consequence ofthe context-dependence ofrights is
that general statementsaloutthe state ofrights areusuallymeaning-
less. Ve cannot say, for instance, that free speech is generally pro-
tected or violated in America. Vhat ve can say vith a degree of
conndenceisthattherightsofanarcho-syndicalistsandsocialistsvere
violated in the tventies, the rights ofcommunists in the nfties and
' Lndcr thc |csscyv. cussoa scaratc but cqual doctrinc, cquality oltrcatmcntis
accordcdvhcnthc raccs arc rovidcdsubstantiallycquallacilitics, cvcnthough thcsclacil-
itics bc scaratc, i 6 L. S. , j , i 86) IntcuathcSurcmc Court rcvcrscd, statingthatin
thcficldolubliccducationthcdoctincol'scaratcbutcqual'hasno lacc. Scaratc cdu-
cationallaciliticsarcinhcrcntlyuncqual, j|,\ 5. |8 i|) .
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z3
those ofanti-Vietnamvarprotesters in the sixties. Similarly, using
thesameterm freedomofexpression) to descrilesuchdiversesitu-
ationsaspornography, theSalmanRushdieaffairandthemarches of
National Front supporters through ethnic minority communities,
helps only olscure the totally different considerations andconicts
involvedin each instance undertheformallyidenticallutmeaning-
lesslyvague term.
Finally,doveliveinahumanrightsculture?RichardRortyclaims
thatve Jo and that, ifve vere to forget the metaphysical urge to
nnd unitarygrounds, vevouldletterserve theirends. Thetask of
goodlilerals should le to educate the sentiments and emotions of
peoplesothattheyrespondvithsympathytohumanmiseryandsuf-
fering. Rortyargues correctly, llelieve,thatreasonalone canneither
giveuniversalansversto moralquestionsnorcanitmovepeopleto
act against their moral instincts. Sentimental education is olviously
animportanttoolinthe struggleforhumanrights. Buthisargument
against foundational moralisms vhich are lased on unprovalle
`claimstoknovledgealoutthenatureofhumanleings`, 'depends
on the arrogant assertion that our `urocentric human rights cul-
ture`isolviouslysuperiortothatofothers ,andourtaskofdirecting
their sentiments tovards Vestern moral intuitions is self-evidently
right. The experienceofthelastcenturytellsus, hovever,thatvhen
the human rights phenomenon lecomes a `fact ofthe vorld` , as
Rortyclaims, ' sympathyforthe sufferingothermaylosethe edge it
hadvhen itvas acryofprotestandrelellion. lfthatisthe case, ve
mayhavelecomearightsculturelut,againstRorty'shopes,vehave
veakenedthepassionforhumanrights.
N . 1 1I11 L b 1 L1 1 1V . 1 b 11 I1 Lb I
11 V1 Lb
c. L|au|s||.|t|./s
Rorty'svarningagainstthelileralmetaphysicsofthesul ectandrea-
sonisextremelytimely.Despitereservationsalouthis`anti-theory`
theoryanduncriticalcelelrationofpoliticallileralism,Rortyinvites
ustotreatrightsinanon-metaphysicalvay. assymlolicstrategiesof
linguistic andlegal communication vith important political effects.
`' Rorty, ocit , suran. j, i i ,
`' ibid , i j|.
Z3+ lAV' S S LB] ECTS .
Ve vill discuss later hov an ethical understandingofrights invests
themperhaps vith a `transcendence inimmanence`, vhich canle
used as a corrective against theirdominant voluntarism and histori-
cism. Similarly, some ofthe concepts used in this part, such as the
struggle for recognition and the psychoanalytical understanding of
desire,villlediscussedfullyinChaptersi c and i i . urpresenttask
is more limited and technical. Accepting thatrights are part ofour
legal andmoraluniverse andparticipateinthe construction oflegal
sul ects, vevilltrytounderstandthesemiotic, politicalandrhetor-
ical strategies involved in the use and extension ofrights to nev
claimants andareasofentitlement.
Froma semioticperspective,rightsarehighlyartificialconstructs,
a historical accident ofuropean intellectual and political history,
vhichvas takenup, simplinedandmoralisedinAmericaand, inits
nevform, lequeathedto the vorldin the i ,|osas the mainstay of
politicalmorality. The conceptofrightsisexilleratherthanstalle,
fragmentedratherthanunitaryandfuzzyratherthandeterminant.lt
lelongstothesymlolicorderoflanguageandlavvhichdetermines
thescopeandreachofrightsvithscantregardforontologicallysolid
categories. As symlolic constructs, rights do not refer to things or
othermaterialentitiesinthevorld. Rightsarepurecomlinationsof
legal and linguistic signs, and they refer to more signs, vords and
images, symlolsandfantasies. Noperson,thingorrelationisinprin-
cipleclosedtothelogicofrights,sincetheirsemioticorganisationhas
nosolidreferentinthevorld. Anyentityopen to semiotic sulstitu-
tion can lecome the sul ect or ol ect ofrights, any right can le
extended to nev areas and persons or conversely vithdravn from
existingones. Nothingintheontologyofpotentialsul ectsorinthe
nature ofol ects inherently stops themfromenteringthe halloved
space ofrights. The rhetorical elasticity oflanguage nnds no nxed
loundaries to its creativity and alility to colonise the vorld. The
onlylimitstotheexpansionorcontractionofrightsareconventional.
the success or othervise ofpolitical struggles, or the effects ofthe
limitedandlimitinglogicofthelav.Theceaselessexpansionofrights
is the main characteristic of their history. civil and political rights
haveleenextendedto socialandeconomicrightsandthentorights
in culture andthe environment. lndividualrights haveleensupple-
mentedlygroup, nationaloranimalrights. Therighttofreespeech
or to annual holidays canle accompanied ly theright to love, to
goodfoodortohavelackepisodesofS|ctTrc/shovndaily. lndeed,
thestatements `l have arighttox`or`thisismyright` expressthe
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Z33
postmodernpolitics ofidentity. `l have a right` is usedas synony-
mousto`l vant`or`l demand`andifenoughpressureisputlehind
thedemand,itlecomesalegalright.Thealandonedlover,theraver
vho demandstherighttopartyandthesackedvorkerareahunited
in asking for pullic recognition oftheirprivate desire. ln semiotic
terms,therighttovorkcannotledistinguishedeasilyfromtheright
toparty. lfsomethingcanle putintolanguage,itmayacquirerights
andcancertainlylecometheol ectofrights. Butvhatprocessesare
involvedinthis cndlessproliferation ofrights?
Vearguedalove, thatthemaincharacteristicofthe `nian` ofthe
Jro||s Jc /'|ommc is the total lack ofdetermnation ofhis sulstance
leyond the declaration- itselfempty ofcontent- ofhis free vill.
Similarly, humanity, `man's`successor,isanever-presentlutundif-
ferentiated attrilute of human identity that avaits to le assigned
predication, characteristics, a time and a place. Lsing the terminol-
ogyofsemiotics , onecanargue thatthe `man` oftherightsofman
or,the`human` ofhumanrights, functionsasaoatingsigniner. As
asI_DIHOr, itis ustavord, adiscursiveelementthatisnotautomat-
ically ornecessarilylinkedtoanyparticularsigninedorconcept. n
the contrary, the vord `human` is empty ofmeaning and can le
attachedtoaninfinitenumlerofsignifieds. Asaresult,i tcannotle
fully andnnallypinneddovnto anyparticularconception, lecause
ittranscends and overdetermines themall.Butthe `humanity` of
human rights is not ust an emptysigniner, it carrie

an enormous
symloliccapital,asurplusofvalueanddignityendovedlytherev-
olutions and the declarations andaugmentedlyeverynevstruggle
for the recognition and protection ofhuman rights. This symlolic
excess turns the signifier `human` into a HCatIn_ signiner, into
somethingthatcomlatantsinpolitical,socialandlegalstrugglesvant
to co-optto theircausein ordertolenentfromitssymloliccapital.
To have human rights, vhich in modernity is synonymous to
leinghuman,youmustclaimthem.Anevrightisrecognised,ifit
succeeds in nxing a - temporary orpartial - determination onthe
vord`human` , ifitmanages to arrestitsight. Thisprocessis car-
riedoutinpolitical,ideologicalandinstitutionalstruggles. Typically,
diversegroups, campaignsandindividualsnghtinanumlerofpolit-
ical, culturalandlegalarenasandthroughdivergentandinterlocking
practices, suchaspullicprotest,lollying,partypolitics ortest-cases,
` Forauscolthcsychoanalytical concctolovcrdctcrmination inoliticalthcory,
scc rncsto LacIau and ChantaI Noullc, Hc_cmoay caJ So:ic||t Sttctc_y London, \crso,
i 8, ) .
Z3 LAV ' S SLB] ECTS .
to have an existing right extendedor a nevtype ofright accepted.
Theseoccasionallydisparate effortsarelinkedto eachotherthrough
thesymlolic andlinguisticnature oftherightclaimed. The creative
potential oflanguage and ofrhetoric allovs the original rights of
`man` to lreak up andproliferate into the rights ofvarioustypesof
sulject, e. g. therights ofvorkers,vomen, children, refugeesorthe
rights ofapeopleto self-determination, oranimal andenvironmen-
talrights .
Themechanismofextensionisusuallythefolloving.theclaimants
assert loth their similarity and difference vith groups vhose claims
have already leen admitted. First, similarity. The afnnity letveen
human nature in general and the nature ofthe claimants grounds
theirclaimofequivalenceandtheirdemandforequalityoftreatment.
quality despitetheassertions ofdeclarationsandconstitutionsisnot
given orolvious. ltisthe outcome ofpoliticalstrugglesandasocial
construct, asHegelandMarxargued,typicallyexpressedthroughthe
lav, as Kant sav. ln this sense, equality lefore the lav acquires its
concretemeaning. ithasnothing `natural` alout it. lfanything, the
mainclaimofthelileral-democratictraditionisthatitcantranscend
social differencesandaccidents oflirth and construct equality.oa|tc
nature.Nevright-claimshavethereforetvoaspects. anappealtothe
universallutundeterminedcharacterofhumannatureand,secondly,
the assertion that the similarity letveen the claimants and human
nature |ou| .out|admits themto the surplus value oftheHoatingsig-
ninerandgroundstheirclaimto le treated onan equalfootingvith
thosealreadyadmitted.
Secondly, difference. Thedistanceletveenalstracthumannature
andtheconcretecharacteristicsoftheclaimantsjustinestheirdemand
for differential treatment vhich respects their specinc identity.
Concreteidentitiesareconstructedinpsychological,socialandpolit-
ical contexts, they are, inpsychoanalytical terms, the outcome ofa
situateddesire ofthe other. ln this sense, all claims todifferentiation
areinitiallyconstructedoutsideofthelavandits equalisingalilities.
lf equivalence and equality result from political and legal action
against alstract nature, the claim to difference reintroduces the
particularity of concrete nature, situated, localised and context-
dependent. Human rights-claims involve a paradoxical dialectic
letveen an impossille demand for universal equality, historically
identined vith the characteristics ofVestern man and, an equally
unrealisalle claim to alsolute difference. Because the nature of
Vestern, vhite, afuent man cannot sulsume under its universal
Pl GHTS AND LEGAL HLMANl S M Z37
aspirations the characteristics anddesires ofvorkers , vomen, racial
orethnicgroups , etc. , the claimtospecificvorkers, vomen oreth-
nicrights arises. Thus, universalitylecomesacontinuouslyreceding
horizonresultingfromtheexpansionofanindennitechainofpartic-
ulardemands.`
Theassertionofsimilarityanddifferenceletveentvo termsisthe
typical operation ofrhetoric. Claimingthattvoentitiesaresimilaror
differentdoesnotfollovtheir`natural`properties. Saying,forexam-
ple, that `vomen are not) like men` has little meaning in the
alstract. This kind ofessentialismhasplaguedfeministdiscussionson
rights. Vomen have leen invisille to human rights for too long,
either through a denial oftheir similarity vith theground symlolic
conceptorthroughadenialoftheirspecincityanddifferencefromit.
Theadmissionof vomentothestatusofhumanitytheactionofsim-
ilarity) vithout responding to the demands ofdifference is equally
prollematic. lt assumes that the lestoval ofthe rights ofthe repre-
sentativesofhumanityvhitevell-offmales) onvomenvouldauto-
matically enhance their freedom, equality and dignity. But as the
feminism ofdifference has cogently argued,the universalityofrights
necessarily neglects the specinc needs and experiences ofvomen.'
Domestic andinternationallavhas had greatprollems in accepting,
forexample, thespecialnatureofdomesticrapeorofrapeandsexual
aluseduringvar. lntherhetoricalgameofrights, similarity anddif-
ferenceontheirovncanle used topromotethe most contradictory
oljectives. Aclaimto differencevithoutsimilarity, can estallishthe
uniqueness ofa particular group andjusti( its demands for special
treatment lut, it can also rationalise its social or political inferiority.
Aristotlevrotethat`somemenarefreelynatureandsomeareslaves
. . . Fromtheirlirthsomearemarkedoutforsuljectionandothersfor
rule`. AGreekorRomanslavevasseenasanca|mc|co.c|c, avorker
inthenineteenthcenturyvastreatedasa`coginthemachine` ordis-
posallemerchandise, avifeuntilrelativelyrecentlyvasthehusland's
chattel. lnallthesecases,empiricaldifferenceestallishedandjustined
domination. More generally, theappearanceoflinguistic,racial, gen-
derandotherdifferencesvithoutanaccompanyingclaimtosimilarity
`` rncsto Laclau, Imca:|c/|oa() London,\crso, i 6) Chatcrz
`' Lucc Irgaray, T||ak|a_ /|cI ctca:c,K Nontintrans. ) lcvYork,Routlcdgc, i |) ,
HaI/||:soScxuc|I ctca:cCarolynurkcandCillianCilltrans.) London,^thlonc i j) ,
|occ/oyou^lisonNarintrans.) lcvYork, Routlcdgc i 6) Forancxccllcntrcscnta-
tion olthc varous ositions in lcminism, scc licola Laccy, Cascckc||c Su|c:| Cxlord,
Mar, i 8) assimandChatcry
`` ^ristotlc, o||/|: M. Rakham trans.) Cambridgc Nass. , Locb, i o) I I, 6.
Z3O lAV' S S LB] ECTS .
has leen used in most cases to estallish hierarchies and legitimise
poverimlalances.
The question therefore is vhen, hov and in relation to vhat
attrilutesare vomen not) likemen`?Mosthumanrightsstruggles
take theform ofthis type oftimely, historical andspecinc compari-
son. Theiraimistore-definethedominantvayofunderstandingthe
relations amongst classes, groups and individuals and, to this effect,
rhetorical tactics and discursive arguments are one oftheir main
veapons. The cultural aim ofanti-slavery, vorkers' and vomen's
strugglesvastore-articulatetherelationsletveenthefree, theprop-
erty ovners or men usually the three predicates coincided in the
sameperson) andthe slaves , thevorkersorvomen. The oldhege-
monicpositionclaimedthatthenrstgroupsrelatedtothesecondon
thelasis ofnaturaldifferences, thatinequalitiesverethelogicaland
necessaryoutcomeofdissimilarities. Therelelsandprotesters,onthe
otherhand,construedtherelationshipasnotoneofdifferencelutof
inequalityandillegitimate domination, ofanimmoraldenialofsim-
ilarities, vhichturns neutraldifferencesinto socialhierarchies.
Humanrights strugglesaresymlolicandpolitical. theirimmediate
lattlegroundisthemeaningofvords , such asdifference, equality or
similarityandfreedom,lut,ifsuccessful, theyhave ontologicalcon-
sequences, they change radically the constitution ofthelegal sulect
and affect peoples' lives. The imaginative use of rhetorical and,
specincally,metaphoricalandmetonymicaltransfersofmeaning,fur-
thersthe campaign. Metaphoroperatesvhenanevgrouphasestal-
lished in lav and fact its claims to equality and difference and has
appropriated the symlolic value ofthe Hoating signiner`. lt then
lecomesitselfthe ground`groupforfurtherproliferationofright-
claims andfor novel assertions ofsimilarityanddifference. Afterthe
recognitionofa generalrightto equalityforgays andleslians, for
example, more concreterightsvillle claimed. equal age ofconsent
to sexual intercourse, the right ofgay andleslian couples to marry,
toadoptchildrenandtoenoythe sametaxandsociallenentsashet-
erosexuals etc. Therhetoricaloperationofmetonymy, onthe other
hand,allovsthetransferofthepresumeddignityofhumannatureto
entities vhich, although not strictly analogous to people, are con-
tiguous or in some other vay related to them. The rights ofthe
environment,ofanimalsortheputativerightsofthefoetusareexam-
ples ofsuch metonymical` rights . lt should le added that for the
`' Jhis basic rccognition tyically hacns vhcn homoscxual rclations arc dccrimi-
naliscd. Scc IuJ_coav Ca|/cJK|a_Jom| JR.R. i| i 8 i ) .
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANI S M Z3V
Vestern philosophical tradition, animality has leen consistently
opposed to humanity and the claims to animal lileration or rights
cannot le lased on any ontological similarity.' But the rhetorical
characterofrights discourseallovsthecrossingofoneofthegreatest
metaphysical divides andpermits vhatis proper` tohumansto le
claimedforanimals ortheinanimate.
Thecommon aim ofhumanrights campaigns istolink the oat-
ingandsymbolicsigninertoaparticularsignined,toarrestitsconsti-
tutiveindeterminacyandtoachievethe- partial - londingofhuman
nature vith a regional conception ofhumanityvhich vill lestov
uponthelatterthesymlolicvalueofthecoreconcept,turningitinto
a valid instance of human nature. ln doing so, characteristics of
humanity,likeequalityandfreedom,aretransferredtothegroupthat
achievesrecognition. But at the same time, thispartiallinkinggives
content to the empty signiner and makes concrete the alstract and
formal claims to equality and freedom. very successful nxing ofa
partialsignifiedtothe oatingsigninervorks thereforeintvovays.
it endovs the nev claim or claimants vith the symlolic dignity of
humannatureandrightlut,secondly,itarreststemporarilytheight
ofmeaninglyfillingalstractrightvithempiricaldeterminationsand
historicalpredicates.
| . T|c oa|o|oy ot|||s
These lattles over meaning have important ontological effects. The
successful molilisation ofhuman nature for the claims ofvomen,
gays or children or its metonymic extension to animals or the
unlorn, isanimportantcomponentintheconstructionoftheiden-
tity ofvoman, childorthefoetus. lfveacceptthepsychoanalytical
insight thatpeople have no essentialidentities outside ofthosecon-
structedinsymlolicdiscoursesandpractices, akeyaimofpoliticsand
oflavisto nx meanings and to closeidentitieslymakingthe con-
tingent, historical linkings letveen signifiers and signifieds perma-
nent and necessary. But such attempts can only succeed partially
lecause identities are alvays open to nev symlolic appropriations
andarticulationsvithin differentdiscourses andpractices, andevery
` ]acqucs Lcrrida, atingVcllin. Cadava, !. Connorand ]. L lancy cds) , U|o
ComcsHtcr/|cSu|c:/ Routlcdgc, i ) i i i-i 6.
` SccrcstoLaclau, !cuFc:/|oas oa/|cFcco|u/|oa,j outT|mcLondon,\crso i o)
-8 ,
Z lAV' S S LB] E CTS .
- partially - fixed identity is alvays overdetermined ly the surplus
value oftheHoatingsignifier.
lfvenovturnfromtheoperationoflanguagetolav,rightsactto
formalise identities ly recognisingand enforcingonetype ofrecip-
rocal recognition. The lav uses the technical category ofthe legal
sulectanditsrepertoryofremedies ,proceduresandrightstomedi-
ateletveenthealstractandindeterminateconceptsofhumanityand
right and the concrete people vho claim its protection. The legal
sul ectisthemiddlepointletveenalstracthumannatureandcon-
creteselves . Thelegalvalidationofacontestedcategoryofrights,for
instancevomen'srights , acts as thepartialrecognitionofaparticular
type ofidentity linked to the relevant rights. Conversely, a person
recognisedaslegalsul ectinrelationtovomen'srights isacknovl-
edgedasthelearerofcertainattrilutesandtheleneficiaryofcertain
activities, lut at the same time as a person ofa particular identity
vhich partakes amongst others of the dignity of alstract human
nature. lt should be addedimmediatelythattheidentity ofapartic-
ular voman is not exhausted in her identincation as a sulect of
vomen'srights orinherrecognitionastheleneficiaryoftheequal-
ityandfreedomofhumannature. Shevillalsohavepoliticalrights
as a citizen, others that emanate from her position in the economy
rightsofvorkersandsocialrights) oras theinhalitantofaparticu-
lar environment, etc. Thelegalsul ectacts as the organising, medi-
ating and uni(ing concept and technique, through vhich the lav
assignscategories, fixesidentitiesandtriestostalilisetheproliferation
of social meaning. An individual is a human leing, a citizen, a
voman,avorkeretc. tothe extentthatsheisrecognisedasthelegal
sulectofthe respective rights , her legal identity is the sum total of
herlunchofrights. lftole outsidethelavyou mustlehonest,you
mustleinthelavtolehuman. lnmodernity, veknovonlyvhat
ve can make, the legalisation of desire means that ve can nov
make`ourselveslyinvestingdesirevithlegalsignincance. Veare
potentially entitled tolecomelegallyallvevanttole.
Legalpersonalityisthereforeakeystrategyofindividuation. Men
and vomen are no longer the material vessels ofthe soul or, the
externalforms ofauniversalsy.|c. Assentientleings, they acquire
theirpullic personathrough theirrecognisedlegal attrilutes vhich
allovthemto carry outsignincantacts to others. Legal sul ectivity
paradoxically represents loth the principle ofuniversalism and the
` Jhis vas thc main aim Lchind thc Iist hasc ol thc lcgal stigglcs foi vomcn's iights
and ol cvcr othci social movcmcnt.
Pl GHTS AND lEGAl HLMANl S M Zi
process throughvhichindividuationiscarriedoutinmodernity. ln
this sense, rights do notust lelong to humans, rather, they make
humanlylothrecognisingtheirlegislative,right-makingalilityand
free vill, and ly endoving them vith the concrete povers and
capacities throughvhich they canrealise theirfreevill. This is the
reasonvhyafulldennitionof rightsisimpossille, vhytheyareopen
to continuous expansionandproliferation. Humanrights cannever
reachastateofdenniteacceptance orfinaltriumphlecausethelogic
ofrightscannotleconstrainedtoanyparticularneldortypeofsul-
ect.Humanrightslaviscaughtinyetanotherparadox.aslav,itacts
as an agent ofstalilisation ofidentity and ofrationalisation ofstate
pover, as human rights it introduces into the state and into legal)
personality the openness ofsocial and cultural indeterminacy. The
alstract concept ofhuman nature vhich underpinned the revolu-
tionarydeclarationshasleenreplacedinpostmodernsocietieslythe
proliferating claims to nev and specialist rights. As a result, desire
itselfreplaces humannature as the groundconceptandlecomesthe
emptyandHoatingsignifiervhichcanleattachedeithertothelogic
ofpoverandthestate orto the logic of usticeandopenness.
Ve can concludethatthecommoncomplaintalouttheexcessive
legalisationofthevorldistheinevitalle outcome ofthelegalisation
ofdesire. Desire lecame theformal expressionofthe sul ect'srela-
tionship vith others and the polity and vas given, initially limited,
legalrecognition, throughout theVesternvorldlytheturn ofthis
century. nce that lasic fact vas estallished, the multiplication of
right-holders ,theproliferationofclaims andtheendlessmutationof
the ol ectsofrightvas amatteroftime, oflettinglanguage,politics
and desire do their vork. Rights are therefore extremely poverful
nctionsvhose effectuponpeopleandthingsisprofound. theymake
people sacrince theirlife orlilerty,theyleadpeopletokillormaim
intheirname, theyinspirepeopletoprotestandrelelandchangethe
vorld. Rights are linguistic fictions that vork andrecognitions ofa
desire thatneverends.
! U
Ic_c|

s Icu: I|_|/s cac Ic.._a|/|.a

Hegelvas unceremoniously excisedfromthe annals ofradical phi-
losophy in i ,,. He vas re-discovered in i ,,. ln i ,,, Louis
Athusser pullished the inuential ot Mctx, in vhich the French
philosopher, aprominentrepresentative ofthethendominantstruc-
turalistschoolofthought, announcedthattheMarxist`epistemolog-
ical revolution` started only after Marx ettisoned the idealistic
inuence ofHegel, vhich had marked his earlyvritings. ' But the
lurial vas premature. After the collapse of communism and the
attendant and often unfair llame placed onMarx for its ills, Hegel
returnedlike a ghostand `dialectics vithouthistoricism lecame a
ma or source ofinspiration for those vho did not accept the linear
logic oftriumphantcapitalism.
ln a different sense, hovever, Hegel neverleft the philosophical
scene. Thecolonialisingpoversofhissystemaresuchthatalmostall
philosophical positions can le presented as a partial account ofthe
spirit'sprogresstoself-consciousnessandeveryhistoricaleventcanle
easily co-optedinto the monumental edince. According tojacques
Derrida, modern philosophy is olsessed vith the Hegelian system
and, in the vake ofHegel's announcement ofphilosophy's closure,
isunsurealoutitsends. Yet, theinexorallepost-Varriseandeven-
tualdominationofstructuralisminthehumanitiesandsocialsciences
and ofpolitical lileralism, meant that the historicism ofHegel's
' Louis^lthusscr,otMct .rcvstcrtrans. ) London,AlcnLanc, i 6) . Intvoscm-
inalcssaysinthatvolumc, CnthcYoungNarxandNarxismandMumanism, ^lthusscr
claimcdthatNarxbrokcavaylromhumanismanddcf:ncdhumanismasidcology,in i 8|,,
zz,-zI . Jhis allovcd him to crcatc a non-humanist scicncc olhistoryvhichjoincd thc
othcrgrcatscicntific discovcrcs, Louis^lthusscr, Narx`sRclationto Mcgcl, ino||/|:caJ
H|/oq rcvstcrtrans. ) London, lcvLcltooks, i ,z) i 6-86
Jhisisamainointol ]acqucs Lcrrida`s, C|cs ]. LcavyandR. Randtrans. ) Lincoln,
Lnivcrsityollcbraska!rcss, i 86) vhichocnsitslcltcolumn, dcdicatcdtoMcgcl,aslol-
lovs. vhat altcrall, olthc rcmains), today, lor us, hcrc, ola Mcgcl: For us, hcrc, nov.
lromnov onthatisvhat oncvillnothavcbccn ablc to thinkvithout him. Forus, hcrc,
nov. thcscvordsarccitations, alrcady, alvays,vcvillhavclcarcdlromhim, at I .
Z+ HEGEl' S lAV.
systemanditsquestfortotalisationfelloutoffavour.Forgenerations,
radicalintellectuals filtered the study ofHegel through the attacks of
youngMarxonhisphilosophicalmentor. ltvasafterthefallofcom-
munism, aneventvhosehistoricalsignificancevilltake alongtime
tocomprehendfully,thatphilosophersreturnedtoHegelscasMarx.
The vastness and amlition ofthe Hegelian oeuvre has made nev-
comerslookfora guide orfoil, SorenKierkegaard, Derridahimself
orthe French psychoanalystjacques Lacan, to help them enter the
immensesystem.AminorHegelianstudiesindustryhasleencreated
andrecentlyits operationshaveleenextendedtolav .
This is a velcome and long overdue return. Hegel's dialectical
methodcanleusedtoexplaintheoperationoflileralrightslutalso
to criticiseandtranscendthelimitations ofrightstheory. Hegelused
lavandlegalforms extensivelylothasnecessarystepsinthehistor-
icalprocessandasillustrationsofthedialectic,theengineroomofhis
system. Lnlikemostmodernphilosophers, hevas stillpartofatra-
ditionvhich turnedtolavandethicsasthedeterminantsandperfect
illustrations ofthe social lond. From Plato to Kant andHegel, the
study oflav inits social settingvas , ifnot the royal road, at leasta
main route to the understanding of the vorld. jurisprudence, the
prudenceorvisdomoflavus, hasalvays leenloththe conscious-
ness , the study and understanding oflav, and its conscience, the
moral compass oflegal andly extension political andsocial opera-
tions and arrangements. This moral dimension oflegal studies vas
lostvith the rise ofpositivism andits olsessionvith apure science
oflav. Notonlydidpositivismalandonanyattemptto constructor
imagine theethical ends oflav, italso dovngradedthesignincance
of urisprudenceas contemplationonthe sociallondandas amoral
enterprise. Classicalphilosophyaccepted,toparaphraseamaxim,that
u|||||oso||c|||,ut|stuJca||c.Positivismfreedphilosophersfromthe
duty or need to knov the lav and turned urisprudence into a
parochialconcernviththe minutiae oflegal technique.
Accordingtorational natural lav, humanrights aimtoacknovl-
edgeandprotectthecentralandimmutalle characteristics ofhuman
nature. Thesedifferfromphilosophertophilosopher,fromtheneed
and desire ofself-preservation in Holles, to rational freedom and
` NichclRoscnlcld,McgclandthcLialccticsolContract, io CctJo:oIcuFcv|cui i
i 8) ,Lrucilla Corcll, NichclRoscnlcldandLavidCarIson, Hc_c|caJIc_c|T|cotylcv
York,Routlcdgc, i i ) , NargarctancRadin,Fc|atcttct|a_tccttyChicago,Lnivcrsityol
Chicago !rcss, i j ) , ^lan rudncr, T|c Ca|ty o} t|c Commoa Icu. StuJ|cs |a Hc_c||ca
ut|stuJca:ccrkclcy,LnivcrsityolCalilornia!rcss, i ) , canncShrocdcr, 1hc lstc|caJ
t|ccs:e crkclcy, LmvcrsityolCaliloria!rcss, i 8).
Pl GHTS AND PE CO GNl Tl ON Z3
moral responsilility in Kant. The allegedly uniform and alsolute
character ofthese attrilutes makes them universal, estallishes their
priority over duties and determines the content ofrights. ln this
sense, Holles and Kantvere the philosophical founders ofhuman
rights. But contemporaryconceptions ofsul ectivityandrightsove
more to Hegel's critique oftheKantianconceptionofmoralityand
ofthe person vith theirseparationfromothersandthevorld. This
ChaptervillpresentthemainHegelianthemesonrightsandsul ec-
tivity. ltstartsvitha conciseintroductionto some Hegelianthemes
oflegal significance. ltthen turns to tvo recent attempts to recon-
structHegeliantheory,AlexHonneth'ssociologicalHegelianismand
jeanneShroeder'spsychoanalytical theory ofproperty, inanattempt
to develop acontemporary Hegelian theory ofhumanrights.
1 . 1L11

b 11L11 _ I1V1`
Kant's Ct|||ucs gave philosophical expressiont othe modern olses-
sionviththeseparationletveensul ectandolectandletveenself
andthevorld. Hegel'smaintaskvastohealthis riftandtoreclaim
the unity ofexistence. The early German Romantics had tried to
overcometheseparationlysuccessivelyprioritisingone ortheother
pole. Hegel'sansvervasmoreradical. thesplitvasinternalisedand
historicisedandthefragmentationof modernityvasseennotasacat-
astrophe lut as a necessary stage in the odyssey ofspirit or reason
tovards its ovn self-consciousness. ForHegel, thought, conscious-
nessandthe spiritareactiveforces, caughtin acontinuous struggle,
in vhich the spirit nghts itsovn alienation inthe external vorld,
recognises olectined existence as its ovn partial realisation, and
returns to itselfthrough its negation, acknovledging history as the
process ofitsgradualrealisation.
People, institutions , art,vork, morals, religion andall aspects of
social existence follov a similar traectory. The struggle letveen
principles, forcesandforms oflifemoveshistoryforvard. lts dialec-
tical charactermeans thatin each ofits concentric stages, a force or
institution andits underlying principle is `sullated`, loth negated
andretainedlyits opponent. Theinstitutionoffamily, forexample,
and its central value ofcare forits memlers treatedas unique indi-
viduals, is transcended- loth preserved and overcome- lythat of
civilsocietyvithitsemphasis onformalrelations amongst legalper-
sons treatedas alstractright-holders. The dialecticalalsorptionand
Z HGEl' S lAV.
overcoming moves the historical process i n a spiral-like fashion
tovardsthehnalstage, thestateofethicallife orS|||||.|/c||. Thekey
oppositionsofmodernityarenotcatastrophicconicts,therefore, lut
dynamicexpressionsoftheongoingstrugglevhichdennesexistence,
determines human consciousness andmakes history theprocess in
vhichthespiritorreason) realisesitselfashistory'sunderlyingprin-
ciple. From the perspective ofthefinal stage, ofthe end ofhistory,
the spirit looks lack and sees history, not as a random sequence of
events, lutastheunfoldingofaprogressivetra ectoryleadingtothe
overcoming of conHict. Philosophy follovs a parallel tra ectory,
eventually mergingvith the hrst, vhich gradually comes to recog-
nise historyastheincarnationofreason.
VhenHegelturnstothenormativeheld,heargues, againstKant's
moralandlegalformalismandhisseparationofmoralityfromlegal-
ity,thatfreedomandethicallifeareintrinsicahylinked. lnethicallife,
the nnal stage vhich entered the historical scene vith the modern
state,moralityandlegalityarehnallyre-unitedintoanorganicvhole
andlecomethe state'sinstitutionalmanifestation. Allprevious nor-
mative systems, from the Greek city-states, vith its inequalities, to
the alsolutemonarchy,vithitslimitedlegal protections, verepar-
tial stations on the road to the final reconciliation ofethical life.
Sul ectivity too, Hegel lelieved, is created through a struggle
amongstpeopleforthereciprocal recognitionoftheiridentity. This
struggleledto social divisions andhierarchies, vhich culminatedin
the creationofaclass ofmastersandslavesand, onlyviththe mod-
ern overcoming ofthe master/slaverelationship does the complete
humanperson cometolife. Thedialecticalevolutionofthenorma-
tive domainand ofpersonality, are crucialforthe developmentofa
Hegeliancritiqueofrights anddeservesomedetailedexamination.
Hegel's|||oso|y,j R||presentsthemovementtothealsolute
spiritortoreason'shistoricalincarnationasatripartiteprogressvhich
assumesexplicitlylegalform. Alstract, formalright givesvayto the
morality ofKantianism Mom|||c|) , vhich is nnally transcended ly
ethical life. ln the hrst stage, rights have formal existence lut no
determinate content and, legal personality, the key organisingcon-
cept, exists onlyinthe alstract. Lavandmoralityexpresstheimme-
diateandundifferentiatedunityofuniversalprinciplesand,asaresult,
humanvillisfreelut,itsonlyactionistorelateselftoitselfandthus
createapersonvholacksconcretecharacteristicsanddoesnotrelate
' C V.F. McgcI, |||oo|y F|_|/ JN Knox trans. ) Cxlord, Cxlord Lnivcrsity
!rcss, i 6,) .
Pl GHTS AND PEC O GNl Tl ON Z7
to others . Thisalstractionisthelegalsul ect, apurelogical cipher,
vhose onlyroleis tolethealstractsupportofuniversalnormsand
onlyquality, topossesslegalrights andduties. Likethelovingmem-
lers ofa family vhose dealings vith each other are leyond legal
rules, thelegalsul ectpresupposedlyformalrightnevercomesinto
contactvith the real vorld. State lav does not address hctions nor
arealstractionsinvolvedinconicts. Vhilelegalpersonalityisindis-
pensalleforthe operationofthecategoriesofproperty, contractand
crime, it cannot create a fully recognised concrete individual onits
ovn. Thishrstmomentofthe spirit'slegalprogressionisexclusively
determinedlythe categories ofRoman lav. Manis alegal sul ect
lutthekernelonly ofanemlodiedhumanleing.
Thepassagefromformalrighttomoralityinvolvestheincomplete
differentiationandconcretisationofthealstractsul ect. Atthisstage,
thepersonstandsleforethevorldandlecomesavareofhisfreedom
and, gradually, the lare universality oflegal personality and formal
right develop into individual sulectivity. The person nov realises
thatnotonlyishefreetoactonthevorldthroughhisrightslut,that
freedomishisessence. Thisrecognitionemergesvhen,inrelatingto
himselfas the learer ofuniversalisalle rights, he discovers an inner
space offreedomandmoralresponsilility. Not ust external actions
lutintentions and purposes havemoralsignificance and areudged
accordingtotheprinciplesofuniversalmorality,themodernformof
the good. Butthe good, the universal end ofethics , cannot remain
internal to conscience, it must le realised in the vorld. Kantian
moralism hovever does not allov the inner life ofgoodintentions
andthevorldtocommunicate.
Themoralconscience, vithitsuniversalismandcrueldisregardfor
human emotions and needs and, universal freedom, the authentic
form ofthe good, face each other as tvo alien and unconnected
forces. Manmustactaccordingtouniversalmaximslutthecategor-
icalimperativecreatesanalstractmoralityvhichhasnocontentand
cannot provide concrete guidance. lts command is to follov and
apply the empty form ofthe universal. But, as the young Hegel
shoved, anymaximcanleuniversalisedvithout contradictionand
anything can leustinedinthe alstract. Lniversality is part ofthe
alsolutespiritvhichunfoldsinhistorylut,inKantianmorality,ithas
` ibid. j,-|o.
' C V .. McgcI, Sy/cm I/||:c|Ijj" ( 3e.-,) caJ ''Fr/ |||oo|y o]S|r|/" ( 3e,-)
M. S. Marris and J N. Knox trans.) ^bany, S !.l.Y !rcss, i ,,) and ^c/utc| Lu
,J N. Knoxtrans) !hiIadcIhia, Lnivcrsity ol!cnnsyIvania!rcss, i ,,)
ZO HEGEl' S lAV.
notyetlecome anintegralpartofthepersonality. Similarly, alstract
legal relations may create the conditions ofequality under the lav,
lutthey do not recognise orrespectthe needs , desires or history of
the concrete person. Formal lav treats the individual as an alstract
universal, vho is respectedforhis moral responsilility andfreedom
lutvho is insufhciently individuated. lfthe alstractlegalpersonis
thekernelofthe concretehuman, theKantiansulectisits external
onlyshell.Tomovefromthattotheuniqueindividual,the`concrete
universal` , legal mentality must le complemented vith emotional
care. Vithout it, Kantian autonomy follovs purely formal criteria
andleadstointernalmoralarlitrariness ,almosttoasadismaccording
toLacan, andtoacontinuouslyexpandingexternal-legalcoercion.
Formal rightandalstract morality are finally alsorled, cancelled
andtranscendedinthethirdmomentofS|||||.|/c||.Thealstractgood
and human conscience, vhichvere kept apart from the vorld ly
morality, novcome togetherandarerealisedinthe actions ofcon-
creteindividuals. LnlikethecoercivelavofKantianfreedom,ethi-
callife is thelivinggoodpracticedandexperiencedlyeachcitizen.
This living lav constrains `sul ective opinion and caprice` vith
minimumneedforexternalsanctions andmakesvirtue `re ectedin
the individual character`. Autonomy lecomesreal onlyvhenitis
emlodiedinpoliticalinstitutionsanduniversallavsvhichgivecon-
tenttoreason, shapeourpersonalityandgivesulstancetoourmoral
duties. Lnlike the alstract universality ofright and the formal sul-
ectivity ofmorality, inethicallife `rightanddutycoalesce, andly
leinginthe ethical order amanhas rights insofaras hehas duties,
anddutiesinsofarashehasrights` . ' 'Theuniversalityofthehistor-
icallyincarnatespiritisafarcryfromtheformalorderoflegalismand
the alien order ofnatural ol ects vhich `conceal their rationality
under the cloak ofcontingency and exhilit it only in their utterly
external and singularisedor disconnectedvay`. ' ' ln this hnal stage,
lavsandinstitutionsarenotthenecessarysupplementsofacrueland
ineffective conscience, lut the concrete emlodiments of living
morality. `This Spirit can le called the human lav, lecause it is
essentially in the form ofa realitythat is conscious ofitself ln the
' ]acqucsLacan,KantavccSadc, , i :/o|crVintcr i 8) , , ,-,, , CostasLouzinas,
^ntigonc`sLcathandLav`sirth onCntologicaland!sychoanalyticalthics, i ,) i 6
CctJo:oIcuFcv|cuj-|, i j z,
|||oso|y F|_|/, ocit , suran |, i c,
ibid, io,, i o
' ' ibid. , i o.

ibid., i o6.
Pl GHTS AND PEC O GNl Tl ON ZV
formofuniversalityitisthe/aoualav,andtheprevailingcustom`.' `
The Greek city-states, the historical prengurations ofethical life,
vere athornei ntheirvorld and understoodtheparticular, lutdid
notsee themselves asrepresentatives oftheuniversal.thicallife, on
the other hand, integrates the universal and the particular, makes
freedom concrete, unites sul ectand ol ect, is and ought, content
andform. This is then the movement ofthe spirit in history. from
righttomoralitytoethicallifeinthedomainofmoralsandfromfam-
ilytocivilsocietytostateininstitutions. Theprogressisfullofinter-
nal and external contradictions, ofcon icts, turns and trilulations,
vhich are gradually alsorled inthe inexoralle march ofthe spirit
tovardsitsovnself-consciousness .
Hegelfolloved a similar approach vhen he turned to the nature
ofthe sul ect. His aimvas to reconstructthe philosophicalpresup-
positions andthe necessary historical stagesthroughvhich modern
sul ectivityanditshistoricalandphilosophicalconsciousnesscameto
life. The dialecticalmovementis lackvards. vhathappens todayis
explainedthroughitsnecessityinalongandevolvinghistory.
Jhc ncccssity ol thc diaIcctic is rctroscctivc rathcr than roscctivc
- it Iooks Lackvard rathcr than lorvard. Jhc rctroactivity ol thc
diaIcctic is rch cctcd in IcgcI`s lanous nctahor in his rclacc to Thc
h||cschy c{I|_h/. `vhcn hiIosohy aints its grcy in grcy, a shac
olIilc has grovn oId and cannot Lc rcjuvcnatcd, Lut onIy rccogniscd,
Ly thc grcy in grcy ol hiIosohy, thc ovI ol Nincrva Lcgins its night
onIy vith thc onsct ol dusk. ' `
DescartesandKanthademphasisedthesolitaryconsciousnesslut,
Hegel's|caomcao|oy,jS|t||andthedialecticmoregenerallyinsist
on the reexive constitution ofselfand its radical dependence on
others. The starting point is that the ego as self-consciousness is a
creature of desire. Simple consciousness discovers, through sense-
perceptionand speech, the externalvorldvhich exists outsidethe
sul ect and is independent ofherknovledge. For the ego to rise,
hovever, this passive contemplation ofthe vorld must le comple-
mentedvithdesire. Desirelelongs toasul ect, itisexclusivelyand
radicallysulective, itismydesirevhichmakesmeavare ofmyself
and of my difference from the ol ect, the not-l . Desire reveals
andcreatesself-consciousnessinanattemptto negateandcancelthe
' C V.F.Mcgcl, |caomcao|o_y S|r|/^.\.Nillcrtrans. )Cxlord,CxlordLnivcrsity
!rcss, i ,,) z6,-8
' ` ]cannc Schrocdcr, T|c lcs/c|caJ /|ccs:cs . Py:|ocac|y/|:c| caJ|||oso||:c|crsc:/|vcs
oa/|ccm|a|accaJ rocr/y crkclcy, LnivcrsityolCaliloria!rcss, i 8) i j-|
Z7 HEGEl' S lAV.
othernessof theol ect. Thedesireforfood, forexample, negatesthe
otherness ofthe foodstuffand cancels its leing, as selfdevours it to
satiate its hunger. Selfassimilates and transforms the ol ectin order
to survive lut, at the same time, negates the ol ect' sindependence
and givenness in an attempt to heal the split letveen sul ect and
olect.Desirerevealsafundamentallackinthesul ect, anemptiness
in the selfthat must le nlled through the overcoming ofexternal
olects.
Butthis devouring negation alolishes the ol ect and throvs the
sul ectlack, his hunger and desire temporarily met, to his illusory
self-identityvhichdoesnotdifferentiatehumansfromanimals. Man
mustnegatetheol ectvithoutalolishingit,lecausethealolitionof
thevorldvouldlead to humanity's elimination. The fully human
desire is not addressed therefore tovards an ol ect or a leing, lut
tovards a non-ol ect, tovards another self-consciousness. lt is the
other's recognitionanddesirethatgivesrisetoself, vhoseeshimself
reHectedinanother, vhoseforeignnessmustle negated to give rise
tothe ego lut, vhoseexistenceand otherness survive.
In rccognition, thc scll ccascs to Lc this individual. It cxists Ly right in
rccognition, that is no longcr in its inncdiatc cxistcncc. Jhc onc
vho is rccogniscd is rccogniscd as inncdiatcly counting as such,
through his |c|a_-Lut this Lcing is itscll gcncratcd lron thc concct.
Nan is ncccssariIy rccogniscd and ncccssarily givcs rccognition . . . ^s
rccognising, nan is hinscll this novcncnt, and this novcncnt itscll
is vhat sucrscdcs his natural statc. hc is rccognition. '
Behind all types ofdesire a deep dialectic isatvork. emlodied
humanlifedependsforsurvivalontheexternalvorldand,asaresult,
partoftheselfisalvaysoutsideitselfandtheothernessofolecthood
isalreadylaunchedinselfTheaimofspirit'shistoricalmarchispre-
cisely to overcome this alienation and to unite man andthe vorld,
the nnite and the innnite, freedom and fate. Human history and
action move tovards a `total integrity` ,' in vhich the opposition
letveen selfand other vill have leen overcome and the external
reality, vhich determines us, vill contain nothing alien or hostile.
lntegrityvillleachievedonlyvhenourdependence ontheexter-
nalvorldis dialectically negated, in othervords, vhenhumanityis
athomeinitsenvironment.Butlileralphilosophy, initsattemptto
'' Hc_c|caJ/|cHumcaS|r|/.H Trcn|c/|oa/|c cacIc:/urcs oa/|c|||oso|y/|cS|r|/
( 3c;-) u|/| Commca/cry L. Rauch trans) Lctroit, Vaync Statc Lnivcrsity !rcss, i8j)
ii6
'` CharIcs Jaylor, Hc_c|CambridgcLnivcrsity!rcss, i ,,) i |8-,o.
Pl GHTS AND PECOGNl Tl ON Z7i
glori(theindividual,deniesourdependenceonthevorldand,vith
arrogant self-certainty, artincially erases the traces ofotherness and
imagines selfasidenticalvithitself
Nan achicvcs thc illusion ol scll-idcntity Ly dcfining hinscll as an
inncr siritual Lcing, Ly looling hinscll that hc coincidcs vith hin-
scll as a nind or sirit . . . thc crror cxrcsscd hcrc Lcing rcciscly thc
Lclicl in sinlc scll-coincidcncc . . . thc suLjcct is ncccssarily a Lcing
vho incororatcs his othcr his cnLodincnt) and `rcturns to hin-
scll through this othcr . . . to achicvc scll-coincidcncc as siritual
Lcings is thus ontoIogically inossiLlc . . . its achicvcncnts vould Lc
thc aLolition ol thc suLj cct. ' '
Thistypeofunre ectivecertainty,apparenti nreligiousleliefsandin
lileralontologies ,islothextremelyvainandutterlyfutile.Thedelu-
sionofself-identityisapalliativeonlyforthepainfullutinescapalle
recognitionthatvedependonthe otherandaredeterminedlythe
outsidevorld. Self-consciousness,ontheotherhand,isthe`unityof
oneselfinone' sother-leing`andisachievedlyseeingoneselfinthe
other and accepting selfas the `identity ofidentity and non-iden-
tity`.''Theself-conscioussulect,createdthroughtheother'sdesire,
retains the separationfromthe otheras one part ofhis identity, and
recognises himselfloth in the other and inhis difference fromher.
ln this sense, self-consciousness loth negates the split letveen self
andotherandpreserves it. As aresult, thesul ectcanneverleself-
identical. heisanamalgamofselfandotherness, ofsamenessanddif-
ference. As Zizek puts it `the picture ofthe Hegelian system as a
closedvhole vhich assignsitsproperplaceto everypartialmoment
istherefore deeplymisleading.verypartialmomentis, so to speak,
'truncatedfromvithin' , itcannoteverlecome fully 'itself' , itcan-
noteverreach ' its ovnplace' , itismarkedvithaninherentimped-
iment,anditisthisimpedimentvhich' setsinmotion'thedialectical
development`.'
Recognitionvorks ifitismutual. l must le recognisedlysome-
one l recognise as human, l must reciprocally knov myself in
another. l canonlylecomeacertaintype ofperson, ifl recognisein
the other the characteristics ofthat type, vhich are then re ected
lack onto me in her desire. But this full andmutualrecognitionis
achieved only vhen humanity reaches its nnal universal purpose.
' ' ibid , i,o.

|caomcao|o_y, suran. i z, i |o
-
Slavoj /izck, or /|cy kaou ao/ u|c/ /|cy Jo. Iaoymca/ c c Po||/|:c| c:/or London,
\crso, i i ) 68-.
Z7Z HEGEl' S lAV.
Beforethestageofethicallife, recognitionvasnotcompleteandrec-
iprocalandvhenselfdesiredathing,itdidnotdosoforitsovnsake
lutinordertomakeanotherselfrecognisehisrighttothatthingand
thereforehisexistenceandsuperiority. Butasamultiplicityofdesires
desiredto lesorecognised, their actionlecameavar ofallagainst
allandtheuniversalstruggleforrecognitionhadtostop,leforeitled
to glolalannihilation. Forthattohappen,Hegelassumesthatoneof
thecomlatantsmustlepreparedtonghttotheendandriskhislife.
At that point, the otheraccepts his superiority andsurrenders. He
vhoriskshislifeforprestigelecomesthemaster,theotherhisslave.
Theslavehassulordinatedhis desireforrecognitionto thatforsur-
vival.
Themaster'ssuperiorityvilllerealisedintheslave'svork,vhich
transforms nature in the service ofhis master, inreturn, the master
depends for his existence on slave lalour. Hegel lelieved that the
master-slave relationship is a necessary stage inhumanity'sascentto
itsself-recognitionastheuniversalvalue. Thisnnaltranscendenceis
triggeredlythefearofdeathandtheknovledgecreatedlylalour.
Preoccupiedvithdailymundanetasks,treatedasol ectsatthemercy
ofthemaster, theslaveslive alife ofparticularityseparatedfromthe
universal. But death, their `lord and master`,' puts themin touch
viththeuniversalandeventuallyfreesthemtonegatetheirnegation
andto eefromthelifeofparticularitytovardsfreedom. Theexpe-
rience ofvorkcontrilutesalsotothetranscendenceofslavery. The
farmer,theluilderandthelalourerfightdailytotransformnaturein
orderto createvaluefortheirmaster. Butnatureresiststheirefforts,
to tame it the slaves drav plans, develop technologies, invent vork
methods and soonrealise that their vork has humanised the envi-
ronment. They gradually realise the pover of thought vhich,
throughthecreationofuniversalconceptsandtheapplicationofthe
logic ofthe intellect, can master the vorld. Vhen this realisation
enters politics, the masters and slaves are nnally transcended and
replaced ly the universal citizen. At this point, the spirit lecomes
conscious ofitselfand recognises human history as the process of
gradualrealisationofreason.
Hegelianphilosophyseeshistoryasanunfoldingtotalityinvhich
knovledge, socialrelationsandthe structure ofsulectivityare, log-
icallyifnotempirically, determinedlythestruggleletveendesiring
selves , lyitsinevitallecorollaryinthemasterandslavedialecticand
' Mcgcl, |caomcao|o_y, suran i z, z,j
Pl GHTS AND PEC O GNI Tl ON
Z7
ly its eventual transcendence in the ethical state. History started
vhenmenopposedone anotherandvillendvhenthestrugglefin-
ishesintherealisationthatthehumanityistheuniversalprincipleand
reason,itsemlodiment,animatesthevorldandunderpinstheliving
value s
7
stem ofthe ethical state. Vhen the opposition letveen
humanityandthevorldistranscendedhistoryends.Masterandslave
are dialectically overcome, sullated in a nnal synthesis `that is the
vholeMan,theCitizenoftheuniversalandhomogeneousState`.
<
ForHegel,thePrussianStatehadreachedthisstage,forMarxandthe
LeftHegelians, theuniversalvillhavetovaitthefutureutopia.
After the defeat ofcommunism, such grandiose claims are made
onlyonlehalfoflileralcapitalism. ForFrancisFukuyama,the `uni-
versalhistoryofmankind movedinthe direction oflileraldemoc-
racy. lthasnovleen completedand`the struggle for recognition,
thevillingnesstoriskone'slifeforapurelyalstractgoal,thevorld-
vide ideologicalstruggle that calledforth daring, courage, imagina-
tion, and idealism vill le replaced ly economic calculation, the
endless solving oftechnical prollems, environmental concerns and
the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands`. ' For the
prophet ofthe end, `ve have troulle imagining a vorld that is
radicallyletterthanourovn,orafuturethatisnotessentiallydemo-
craticand capitalist . . . ve cannotpicture to ourselves avorld that
is essentially different from the present one, and at the same time
letter`
_ <<
1 1 . 11L11 V1LIL1 1 I 11 b IL1 11 11ILV1L`
jean-Franois Lyotard has famously definedthe postmodern condi-
tion, as the exhaustionandincredulity tovards grand narratives , of
vhichtheHegelianhistoricalnarrativeisthegrandestof all.`Butthe
Fukuyamadelateindicatesthatthe `vorld-videlileralrevolution`
hasclaimedthemantleoftheuniversalandannouncedautopialight,
illuminatedlyneonlights , pullicisedlySaatchi Saatchiandavail-
alle on the lnternet. ls the nev vorld order, Hegel's ethical state?
' ^lcxandrc Koj evc, IattcJu:t|oa to t|c FccJ|a_ o Hc_c| ^. M. lichols trans.) Ithaca,
CorncIlLnivcrsity Prcss, i8) ||.
' Francis Fukuyama, Hcvc uc tec:hcJ t|c IaJ o{ H/story? Santa Nonica, Ca. , Rand
Cororation, i 8) zz-j
FrancisFukuyama, T|cIaJH|storycaJt|cIcstMcaLondon, Pcnguin, i z) |6
` can-FranoisLyotard, T|costmoJcn CoaJ|t|oa.HaIsscyoaKaou|cJ_c Nanchcstcr,
NanchcstcrLnivcrsity Prcss, i 8|)
Z7+ HEGEl' S lAV.
Vas lileralcapitalismthedestinyofhistory?Ve villnotattemptan
ansverhere, excepttosaythatvhenHegelianismlecomesakindof
philosophical ournalism,itdevelopsaratherladtaste.Amore m

d-
estversionofHegeliantheory can le used,hovever, as acorrective
for the monological conception ofrights and the self-identical per-
sonalityofthelileraltradition.
FromaHegelianperspective,themainfunctionofrightsistohelp
estallish the recognitionnecessaryforthe constitution ofa fullper-
sonality. Sul ectivity passes through the mutual recognition ly the
otherandrightsareanecessaryintermediary,anindispensalletoolin
thisprocess. But ifrights help constitute the sul ectthrough other-
recognition,insteadofleingattrilutesofanatomicandisolatedexis-
tence, theyare deeplyintersulective. Asecond consequenceisthat
rights, vhethercivil, economicorcultural, are deeplypolitical. they
presuppose logically and construct politically a community. Rights
are not eternal, inalienalle or natural. Their function is to lestov
socialidentityandcommunitymemlershipontheirlearers. 'Letus
examine this idea, as expressed recently ly one of the heirs of
Halermas,AlexHonneth.
Honnetharguesthatthestruggleforrecognitionisthekeyethical
relationshiporthemainformofpracticalintersul ectivity,vhenthe
Hegeliansystemisvievedfromanormativeperspective.Moralcon-
Hicts ,personal disputesandsocialantagonismsare partial expressions
ofthisstruggle vhich creates the agreementsandreciprocity neces-
sary for the socialisation and the individuation ofthe sul ect. My
identity is the result of the recognition of my characteristics ly
another. This acknovledgement ofthe other'svital contrilution to
the constitutionofselfexposesselftotheactionoftheuniversaland
reconcileshimviththevorld.Atthesametime,theidentitycreated
andunderpinnedthroughtheother'srecognitionmakesmeavareof
myspecincity anddifference from all others. This consciousness of
uniqueness turns the sulect against the vorld and re-kindles the
antagonismviththeother.
Sincc, vithin thc lrancvork ol an cthically cstaLlishcd rclationshi ol
nutual rccognition, suLjccts arc alvays lcarning soncthing norc
aLout thcir articular idcntity, and sincc, in cach casc, it is a ncv
dincnsion to thcir sclvcs that thcy scc conlirncd thcrcLy, thcy nust
oncc again lcavc, Ly ncans ol conhict, thc cthical stagc thcy havc
rcachcd, in ordcr to achicvc thc rccognition ol a norc dcnanding
' ^xcl Monncth, T|c S/ru_|c}or Fc:o_a|/|oa ^ndcrson trans.) Cambridgc, Polity,
i ,) ] .
Pl GHTS AND PECOGNl Tl ON Z73
lorn ol thcir individuality . thc novcncnt ol rccognition that
lorns thc Lasis ol an cthical rclationshi Lctvccn suLj ccts consists in
a roccss ol altcrnating stagcs ol Loth rcconciliation and conhict `
But vhat is the contrilution oflav andrights to the struggle for
recognitionandtopersonalityformation?Follovingthe usual trini-
tarian dialectic, Honneth presents legal recognition as one ofthe
three main forms of mutual acknovledgement, the middle stage
letveenloveandsolidarity. / threeare ethicalvaysofrecognising
the other and creating self, they help constitute different types of
identity. First,love. ltsprimaryterrainisthefamily. Familymemlers
and lovers are in a state ofmutual dependency and affection and
recognise each other as a concrete person vith unique needs and
desires. The loveridentifies himselfthrough hislovedone'sparticu-
larities anddevelopsa sense ofindependence supportedlycare. But
thiscomlinationofautonomyandcommunitycanlesustainedonly
amongstthememlersofsmallandclosely-knitunits.
Legal recognition could notle more different. ltis the effect of
the operationofalegalsystemvhichenforcesequallytheuniversal-
isalle interests ofall. To understand ourselves as right-holders vith
enforcealle claims , in other vords, to recognise ourselves as legal
sul ects , asystemofgeneralnormsmustexistvhichplaces onusthe
dutiesnecessaryfortherecognitionofothersaslearersofrights. The
reciprocal recognition of legal rights involves the adoption of
thepositionofthegeneralisedother. Fromthatperspective,velearn
torespectothersasmuchas ourselvesasright-holders,vhoseclaims
villlemet.
Njan is rccogniscd and trcatcd as a ra||caa|Lcing, as lrcc, as a crson,
and thc individual, on his sidc, nakcs hinscll vorthy ol this rccogni-
tion Ly ovcrconing thc natural statc ol his scll-consciousncss and
oLcying a univcrsal, thc vill that is in csscncc actuality vill, thc |au,
hc Lchavcs, thcrclorc, tovards othcrs in a nanncr that is univcrsally
valid, rccognising thcn - as hc vishcs othcrs to rccognisc hin - as
lrcc, as crsons `'
Mutual recognition through lav has three components not dis-
similartothoseidentifiedlyKant. Legal relationspresupposeauni-
versalisticmoralityvhichformsthelackdropoflavandensuresthat
personsaretreatedas ends andnot means. Secondly, therecognition
ofthe other as legal person is the effect ofthe fact that he enoys
- ibid , I y
zo
McgclinIa:y:|occJ|cquotcdinMonncthibid. , IO.
Z7 HEGEl' S lAV.
moral autonomy and responsilility and possesses legal rights. This
type ofrecognition is typically called respect f) or human dignity.
Finally, legalrecognitionleads toself-respect. Self-respectisthe out-
comeoftherealisationthatltooamcapalleofmoralactionandthat,
like others , l am an endin myself Human dignity, self-respectand
respect for others are synonymousvith the alility to make moral
decisions and to raise legal claims. `lndeed respectfor persons . . .
maysimplylerespectfortheirrights, orthatthere cannotletheone
vithouttheother.Andvhatiscalled' humandignity'maysimplyle
therecognisallecapacityto assertclaims. `Havingrightsisnothing
more than the symlolic expression that one is equalin his freedom
vitheveryoneelseor,vhatamountstothesamething,thatoneisa
legalsul ect. lfaccordingtoBolDylan,tole outsidethelavyou
mustlehonest,accordingtoHegel, toleinthelav,toleasul ect,
youmusthaverights.
Recognition through legalrightsisidenticalviththemiddle stage
ofthelegalform,identifiedlyHegelasthatofKant ianmorality.But
vhatmovesthelavfromalstractrighttomoralityandeventuallyto
the ethicalstateandsolidarity? Hegel's ansveris extraordinary. the
legaldimensionofsocial relations moves forvard through the inter-
nal comlustion engine of crime. Legal dealings make property
ovners reciprocally recognise each other and contractual exchanges
estallish theminimumelement ofuniversality necessaryfor the full
andmutualrecognitionofidentity. Butthegeneralisedpersonvhich
lies lehindproperty and contractual dealsis too alstract andformal
an identityformanyandlegal recognition, aninsufncientacknovl-
ocIFcinbcrg,Fg||s, u/|:ccaJ/|clc|uco}I||ct/yPrinccton[,PrincctonLnivcrsity
Prcss, i 8o) i ,
From a naturaIist crscctivc,acqucs Naritain comcs to a simiIar concIusion. Jhc
|gnity olthc humancrson Jhc cxrcssionmcansnothingilitdocs notsigni[that, by
v:rtucofnaturaIIav, thchumancrsonhasthcrightstobcrcscctcd,isthcsubjcctolrights,
osscsscs rights, T|cF|_|/s Mca caJ^c/utc|LuD ^nsontrans) lcvYor, Charcs
Scrbncr`sSons, i , i ) 6,.
KarI Narxi nhis vondcrfuIIy ironic styIc both cndorscd and Iamooncd McgcI. ^
hiIosohcrroduccsidcas,aoctocms, acIcrgymanscrmons,arlcssorcomcndiaand
so on ^ criminaI roduccscrimcs thc crminaI morcovcr roduccs thc vhoIc olthc
oIicc andofcrmnaIjusticc, constabIcs,judgcs, hangmcn,jurcs, ctc , andaIIthcsc dilfcr-
cnt Iincs olbusincss, vhich lorujust as many catcgorics olthc sociaI division olIabour,
|cvcIo dillcrcntcaacitics olthc humanmind, crcatc ncvnccdsandncvvaysolsatis[-
mg thcm Jorurc aIonc has givcn risc to thc most ingcnious mcchanicaI invcntions, and
cmIoycd many honourabIc craltsmcnin thc roduction olinstrumcnts . . vouId Iocks
havc cvcrrcachcd thcirrcscnt dcgrcc olcxccIIcncc hadthcrc bccn nothicvcsVouIdthc
makingolbanknotcshavcrcachcditsrcscntcrlcctionhadthcrcbccnnolorgcrs T|cot|c
o}Sut|u lc|uc]. Cohcntrans) London, Lavrcncc andVishart, i ,z)
Pl GHTS AND PE C O GNl Tl ON Z77
edgementoftheirconcretehumanity. Theinadequacyoftherespect
generatedlylavleadsto crime. Letusexamine therespectiveposi-
tions ofthetvoprotagonists,the criminalandthevictim.
Jhc inncr sourcc ol crinc is thc cocrcivc lorcc ol thc Iav . . . crinc
as such is dircctcd against thc crson as such and his knovIcdgc ol it
lor thc crininaI is intcIIigcncc. Iis inncr justification is thc cocrcion,
thc oosition to his individuaI viII to ovcr, to counting as sonc-
thing, to Lc rccogniscd. Iikc Icrostratus, hc vants to Lc soncthing,
not cxactIy lanous, Lut that hc cxcrciscs his viII in dcfancc ol thc
univcrsaI viII. `'
Athiefmay lestealingto meetunfulhlledmaterialneeds. Butin
thegame ofrecognition,crimerepresents amuchliggerstake. The
`universalvill thelegalsystemvithitsalstractlegalrelationsand
rights) coerces the `individualvillto pover the particularity and
concreteness ofthe individual) vho uses the crime to lring forth
those parts ofhis personality not yet recognised ly the estallished
orderandlylegalrightsandduties. Therearemanyvays , invhich
thelavfails to considerthe uniqueness oftheindividual. Somemay
le offendedandturnto crimely the alstractionofthe legalruleand
the disinteresteduniformityinits application. To paraphrase Anatol
France, thelavinitsma estypunishesequallyrichandpoorforsteal-
inglread and sleeping underlridges lut the poorare likely to feel
thegreaterurgetolreakit. lnsultmayalsoletheresultoftheequal-
ityofrights, vhichishoveverpurelyformalvhenthematerialcon-
ditions for theirrealisationare not provided. ltnayle nneto fight
fortheuniversalrighttofreespeechandpress, lutforanilliterateand
starving farmerin adevelopingcountry the right to read T|c T|mcs
orto expressfreelyhisvievs is not likelytole consideredcentralto
hisfamily' svell-leing. Theessenceofcrimeisthecriminal' sdemand
tolerecognisedandto le respectedas a concrete and unique indi-
vidualagainsttheuniformcoercionofthelegalsystem.
nthe side ofthevictim,legal rightshavetvo kinds ofconcen-
tric effects. Generally speaking, rights create nrst avalidclaim to a
particularol ect, lenefitorpositionlut,atthesametime, theypre-
senttheright-holdertothevorldasasul ectvithcertaincharacter-
istics as aman ofproperty, sulstance andpropriety) vhich deserve
and demandthe correspondingrecognition. Theproperty ovneras
ovnerisalegal sul ectandlike allsulectsen oysmoralresponsilil-
ityandfreedom, deserves respectinhisdignityand, asacorollary, is
`' ]cacIc:tutc oa/|c|||oso|yj /|c S|t|/, ocit , suran. i, i jo.
Z7O HEGEl' S lAV.
entitledtoclaimprotectionand have his rights enforced. Thetheft
denies his specific legal entitlement to his property lut also negates
therecognitiongiventohimthroughhislegalpersonality. lfthevic-
tim defends himselfagainstthe thief, their con ictinvolvestvo dif-
ferent claims. the damage or loss in icted on the property-ovner
affectsinparthis specihc attrilutesandinparthisvholepersonality.
The thiefs desire for recognition, on the other hand, makes him
negate legal relationsaltogether.
Accordingto Honneth,this conictteaches thepartiesimportant
moral lessons vhich help the lav move forvards. The hrst type of
disrespect, vhich derives fromlav's alstractionandformalism, calls
for greater sensitivity to individual context, need and desire in the
applicationofthelav.Thesecond,vhichstemsfromlav'sprivileging
oftheformaloverthematerialconditionsofexistence, asksthelavto
movetovardsgreatersulstantiveequality.Atthesametime,thecrim-
inal's attack on legal relations and on the recognition they support
alerts people to their dependence on the community andits institu-
tions . Crimeandthe responsetoithelpthepersonalitydevelopatype
ofrecognitionvhichshouldleadlothtogreaterautonomyandtothe
more harmonious socialisation required ly the hnal historical stage,
thatofethicallife. Herealstractlegalrelationsareovertakenlyatype
ofrecognition in vhich individuals understand themselves as fully
dependent on one another and at the same time as fully unique and
concretepersons. lnHonneth'snarrative,lav'sformalismlecomesthe
ontological motive forits negationlythe criminal, lut in turn crime
contrilutestothe dialectical overcomingofformallegalism.
Sincc thc lav rcrcscnts a rclation ol nutuaI rccognition through
vhich cvcry crson, as Lcarcr ol thc sanc clains cxcricnccs cqual
rcscct, it rcciscly cannot scrvc as a ncdiun lor thc rcscct ol cvcry
individual`s articular lilc-history. Instcad, this to a ccrtain cxtcnt)
individualiscd lorn ol rccognition rcsuoscs, in addition to cogni-
tivc achicvcncnt, an clcncnt ol cnotional conccrn, vhich nakcs it
ossiLlc to cxcricncc thc Iilc ol thc othcr as a risky attcnt at indi-
vidual scIl-rcalisation. `'
AgainstHonneth'sexpectations,hovever,Hegeldidnottakethis
route. Althoughhecommendedthe ethical stateasaligadvanceon
legalKantianism,he didnotpresentitslegalrelationsaslessalstract
intheircontent orless formal in their application than those ofthe
Prussian State. Theformalismoflegalrecognitionremainedunmiti-
`' Monncth, o cit , suran z, ,6-,
Rl GHTS AND RECOGNl Tl ON Z7V
gated and, if anything, the relationship letveen state and citizen
lecameevenmoreimlalanced.Thestate,thehistoricalemlodiment
ofthe spirit in S|||||.|/c||, mediates the relations amongstlegal sul-
ects in a necessarily asymmetrical manner. Legal recognition and
personality donotseem to develop tovardssynthesisingthe charac-
teristics oflegal universalism and individual uniqueness. Honneth
lelievesthatthereasonforthisfailurevasmethodological. fromthe
|caomcao|oy onvards Hegel alandoned his earlier `recognition-
theoretical` structure in favour ofa more philosophically rigorous
`consciousness-theoretical` one vhich, driven ly the dialectic
letveenvholeandpartsorletveenthespiritanditsmanifestations,
lecame inevitally more hierarchicalandstate orientated.
Butthis is notconvincing. Theethicalapproachtolegalrecogni-
tion seems to fail at its most crucial moment, precisely vhen the
expectationhas leen created that the earlierpartial and formal con-
ceptions oflav andrights vould le transcendedlyamore inclusive
ethic ofcare. Vithoutthatmove, legalrelations andrightsremainat
theirKantianstage and formulationand are opento Hegel'sdevastat-
ingcritique. `Honnethadmitsasmuch. Hegel `construesthetransi-
tion to a state-lased legal system quite schematically, as Kant had
already done in his Rc.||s|c|tc'.`` To redress this prollem, Honneth
supplementsHegellyintroducingathirdtypeofrecognition,vhich
hecallssolidarity.Apersonalitylasedonsolidarityhasalltheelements
oflegalrecognition,lutitadditionally enoyssocialesteem,arecog-
nitionofitsparticularcharacteristicsandqualitiesdevelopedvithinits
groupandcommunity. Asocietylasedonsolidarityintroduceseco-
nomic andsocial rights intolav andattempts to mitigate legal for-
malismlyaddressingreal socialneedsandlilc-histories.
Honneth attempts to `save` Hegel ly turning the huge edihce
into arathermeekprehgurationoftheHalermasian ethics ofcom-
munication. Those aspects ofthe dialectical progress vhich do not
match the ethical drift ofthe argument are read out or forgotten.
Legal transgression, this all-important concept for Hegel, has leen
turned into a pedagogic moral con ict, the centrality ofdeath in
the struggle for recognition is neglected`' andthe specihcs oflegal
` Nargarct]anc Radin rcachcs thc samc conclusion in rclation to Mcgcl's aroach to
thc crson, vhich is thc samc as Kant`s - simlyan abstractautonomous cntity caablc of
holding rights, adcvicc lorabstractingunivcrsalrincilcs,andbydcfinition, dcvoid olindi-
viduatingcharactcristics, inFc|a/crrc/|a_tccr/y, ocit ,suran. j qq
`` Monncth, ocit , suran. z,
` ' ibid. , 6I -z
ZO
HEGEl' S lAV.
recognition are left unexplored. Hegel left the analysis of rights
largely at its Kantian stage. Did he think that rights vould vither
avay inthe ethicalstate, likeMarx, orthatnofurtherdevelopment
inthelegalformvaspossille?Honneth'sunderlyingargumentisthat
vhile thePrussianStatevas misdiagnosedly Hegelas the emlodi-
mentofthespirit, thecontemporarysocial-democraticstateismuch
closertothestageof`ethicallife`andcanachievethennalandcom-
pleterecognitionofpersonality. Social-democratichegelianismturns
outto le a rather tame affair vhich moves the equation ofrational
andrealforvard, fromthenineteenthto thelate tventieth century.
But the ideaofnev Lalour as the end point ofhistory is not con-
vincing. ForamorelegahyavareandradicalexplorationofHegelian
philosophyforrights, ve mustlookelsevhere.
. V1LIL I 11 1VI11V`
jeanne Shroeder's T|c lcs|c| caJ ||c cs.cs, ` i s an imaginative
attempttodevelopalegaltheoryvhichtakesseriouslyHegelianphi-
losophy and comlines itvith the insights ofLacanian psychoanaly-
sis. Shroeder, unlike Honneth, addresses explicitly lav and legal
concepts and develops an approach to legal recognition in vhich
property is the key category. Sul ectivity is created through the
struggleforrecognitionandpropertyisanindispensallemomentin
it. The possession and en oyment ofproperty enalles the alstract
personalitytoacquire specinc characteristics, tool ecti(itself
Jhc scIl as aLstract viII cIains to Lc csscntiaI rcaIity, Lut thc cxistcncc
ol cxtcrnaI things, that is, oLj ccts, and our dccndcncc on cxtcrnaI
rcaIity contradicts this. Jhc scIl, thcrclorc, nccds to aroriatc cxtcr-
naI oLjccts - it nust ovn rocrty. Jhc scIl Lcconcs articuIariscd
and concrctc, rathcr than aLstract, through ovncrshi. IotcntiaIity
Lcconcs actuaIity. `'
The main aim ofproperty therefore is to constitute `sul ectivity as
intersul ectivity through the mediation ofol ectivity`. Property is
indispensallefortheconstructionofidentityandinagoodHegelian
move the author claims that, ifproperty isinescapalle, it cannot le
anythinglut `aliveandvell, despitetheeffortstodeconstructitand
presentitasamyth . . . itiscoherentasa conceptandlogicallynec-
`` Shrocdcr, o.cit , suraI. I
`' ibid. , j q
Pl GHTS AND PECO GNl Tl ON ZOi
essary`.`'Thetroullevithpropertyisnotinits operationlutinits
theorisingvhichislesetvithtvoprollems.anavoidallemisunder-
standing and an inevitalle lut understandalle misrecognition.
Propertytheoryhasnotunderstoodthatthekeyfunctionof property
istoconstructthe legal) sul ect. Sul ectivityisachievedinadialec-
tical process in vhich an individual is recognised ly someone she
recognises as legal sul ect.` Property is a necessary momentinthis
struggleforrecognitionlecausethedesireforol ectsisoneaspectof
thedesircforothers.Thepossessionanden oymentofpropertyiden-
tifies sul ect and ol ect for another sul ect, vhile alienation, the
thirdelement, actualisesthefreevillofthealstractpersonandturns
her into a concrete individual through the recognition ofanother
alreadyrecognisedas sul ect.
Thepropertycontractsymlolisesthelirthofthesul ect. lncon-
veyancing, the contractors not only exchange ol ects , lut they also
recognise each other as separate and free and as possessors ofrights
andduties- inand through thecontracttheyconstitute one another
as sul ects. Vedesire ol ectsnotfortheirovnsakelutasmeansto
thedesireofotherpersons. Sul ectivityisthereforeconstructedsym-
lolicallyandthepropertycontracthasalittlelitofmagic. The con-
tractors get their ol ectofdesire lut on top theyreceive something
morethantheylargainedfor.theyleconierecognised,theyachieve
their true desire ofthe other. Thus, the lav ly recognising rights
gives thepersondignityandlyupholdingc

ntracts makes her free.

Thelover,too, islikeapropertyspeculator.heseesinhisloveol ect
morethansheis, andthatmakeshergiveinexchangevhatshedoes
not have. Legal theorists have misunderstood this role ofproperty
and present it either as exclusively possession and en oyment over
thingsasalundleofsticksorfasces)orasarelationshipletveensul-
ects as unloundseparate sticks tolepassed on) . As aresult, prop-
erty'scontrilutiontotheconstitutionofthesul ectisforgottenoris
exclusivelyassociatedvithamasculinephallicmetaphor.
Shroeder's main claim is that property lelongs to the symlolic
domain. its possessionhelps endov the alstractpersonvith recog-
nisalle characteristics, thus turning the indeterminate freevill, vith
vhich Hegelstarts, into a concreteperson. lts alienationisthenec-
essapadditional prerequisitevhichrealises theother'srecognition.
ForHegel,thecomingtogetherofthealstractsul ectvith external
ol ects is necessary lecause the alstract sul ect is defined in the
` ibid. , I I.
` ibid , 2 j .
ZOZ
HEGEl' S lAV.
ratherasceticKantianterms.hehasfreevill, legal capacityandi s an
end in itself, qualities vhich vill not take a real personfar. But the
olects thatmustle comlinedto create therealpersondo notrefer
exclusivelytoproperty. Theolectiseverythingthatisnotasul ect
orafreevill,lutgivesthesul ectitssulstance. l ectsincludetan-
gille andintangille possessionsandeverythingthatis not afreeand
alstractpersonality. verycharacteristic ortrait, such as `intellectual
accomplishments, sciences, arts, even religious olservances such as
sermons, masses, prayers, andllessings at consecrations) inventions,
andthelike`vhich,vhilenotapartofthealstractperson,aresuper-
added onto it and turn it into a concrete and singular individual,
lelong to the ol ectvorld. `Property over ol ects and the associ-
ated legal relations are not therefore an indispensalle aspect ofthe
logically necessary process ofol ectihcation ofthe alstract person.
Vhat is necessary is that the initial free vill lecomes concretised
throughproperties vhichattachto thepersonand give it empirical
solidity. Real property may have leen an important aspect ofthis
process in Hegel's time and in contemporaryAmerica, lut there is
nothinginevitalle orexclusivealoutitshumanisingalilities.
lndeed,Shroeder'sapproachtopropertyandher celelrationofits
creative, sul ect-making character has a missionary tone. `Property
ishealthyandfunctioning. . . alllegalrights mustlereinterpretedin
termsof property`.''Thesoundoftriumphalismisaudille. Viththe
collapse ofcommunism, the era ofproperrecognitionand oferoti-
cisationof propertyhasdavnedonthevorldstage.Vemaynothave
fully reachedthe `endofhistory` lutve are pretty close to raising
property toits universal status. Butthis islothlogicallyunnecessary
and historically misconceived. Vhatve needfor the legalrecogni-
tionofothersandofourselvesthroughtheireyesisnotpropertylut
properties. Vevantto le recognised as a person ofsuch and such
talents, skills, characteristics and achievements and notust as the
ovnerofaPorscheoraRolex, orindeedofnothinglutourragged
clothes, like the Rvandan or Kosovo refugees. '' The Hegelian re-
` McgclquotcdinShrocdcr, suran I , j6
'' ibid. , II.
'' ShrocdcrmakcsasimilarointinhcrcritiqucolRadin`s arovalolcrsonalrocrp,
vhichincludcsthosc objcctsvhich cstablishsocialstatusincaitalist)^mcrca,notablythc
big) housc, thc last) car, thc nashy) rng z8z ut Shrocdcr`sinsistcncc onrocrtylav
as thc modcl olm humanrccognitionmakcs hcr lacc an cvcn morc cxaggcratcdcmhasis
onallrocrtyandnotjustcrsonalobjccts.Jhisis clcarinhcrgrudgingaccctancc olthc
ossibilityolcollcctivcrocrtyandollimitationsonrocrtyrghts. Limitationsonro-
crty lor thc sakc olcommunity may bccomc aroriatc Vc rotcct rocrty rights
Pl GHTS AND PECO GNl Tl ON ZO
conceptualisationofrightsvhichexplainsandemphasisestheircen-
tralroleintheconstructionofsulectivityisanimportantcorrective
oflileral tbeory. But turningallrightsinto property does not help,
lecause most contemporary types ofproperty divide and atomise
people. nthecontrary,propertyshouldleveakenedandlecome
one aspectonly ofrights, associatedvith the equalitythe universal-
ismofrightsintroduces.
Thereasonsforthisarehistoricallyolvious.Veknovofapartic-
ularol ectandcontractvhichhasthe`magic`qualitiesattrilutedto
propertyingeneral. Theexchangeofthiscommodityyieldsmoreto
the luyer than he largained for. lt is the lalour pover and the
employmentcontract. Commoditiesareexchangedinthemarketfor
a price that lroadly represents the cost oftheir reproduction. But
lalourpover, vhen lought andput to vork, generates the vages
necessaryforthesurvivalandreproductionofthevorker,lutitalso
creates somethingmore.Marxcalledthismorethesurplusvalue, the
extrathat accrues to the luyer ofthe lalourpoveras a lonus and
ensures the economic, social and political domination ofcapitalists
over the vorking class and ofglolalised corporate capital over the
poor of the vorld. People misrecognise the function of this
exchange, theythinkthatthevorkergetsafairvageforafairday's
vork. ln goodHegelian fashion, Marx argues that this is loth true
andfalse. vorkersreceiveloththerightvalue normallyvagesarea
fair exchange for the vork) and less than the right value since the
surplus value addedontheproductis kept lythe employer) . Again,
individualvorkers enterthe lalourcontractfreely andmaychange
employment,lutthevorkingclassasavholehasnofreedomnotto
vorkforthecapitalistsandavoidleingexploited. Freecontractand
exchange,ratherthanupholding,destroyfreedom. Thegreatinsight
ofMarx vas to understand that the presumed freedom ofcontract
vas lased on the inescapalle `slavery` ofvorkers and the formal
equalityofthecontractorsonthehugeinequalityanddependenceof
thepoorontherich. lngooddialecticalfashion, freedomandequal-
itythroughtheiroperation turninto theiropposite. Misrecognition
isaprerequisiteforthesuccessoftheexchangerelationship. lfitvas
notthere, thecapitalisteconomyvouldnotvork.
ThelegalisationoftheHegelian-Lacanianconceptofdesireraises
the mediating ol ect into centre stage. lt is the ovnership ofthe
ol ectvhichallovsthesul ecttoconstituteitselfinitsrelationvith
bccausc thcyarc ncccssary lor thc cxistcncc olthc individual and thc statc . . . Procrty is
ncccssary lor humanlrccdomandintcrsubjcctivity, z8j , z8
ZO+ HEGEL' S LAV.
another desiring sul ect. This i s Hegel for late tventieth century
America and Lacan forpropertylayers. Shroeder's dialectic, as she
repeatsthroughout,isstrictlylogicalandscarcelyhistorical Thevar-
ious stages mentioned, that ofthe alstractperson, ofits ol ectifica-
tioninto external ol ects and ofproperty rights, mayle the logical
presuppositions ofcapitalistAmerica, lut no hint is given as to the
historicalstagesemlodyingtheirconcept. Vhatarethemotivesthat
lead each ofthe types ofrecognitionandpersonality to move onto
thenext?Vearenottold.Vhatothertypesofrecognitionarethere
except fromthe legalrecognition lased onproperty? Has contem-
poraryAmericareachedthestageoftheethicalstate?Therearehints
in this directionandthe logic ofthe argument certainly supports it.
lfthisis thedialectic, itisthedialecticoflogicandnotofhistory.
Historical `progress` vas , as ve sav, much more lrutal. The
desireforthe otherthroughthe ol ectleads to competitionandthe
fear of death, the `alsolute Master`, and the catastrophic conse-
quences could le stopped through the creation of masters and
slaves. ' Property crime is the necessary means for the conictual
development and concretisation oflegal recognition and the legal
sulect vas a station only on the vay to the complete personality.
Masters, slaves andtheftdo notsoundparticularlyvholesometoday,
soveareleftviththestruggleforpropertyvithoutitsconsequences
- theliteralslavesorthe`slaves`ofcapitalistsociety,fromthedisen-
franchisedvorkersofearlycapitalismtotheurlanunderclassofcon-
temporary America- in other vords, ve are left vith lav vithout
desire. TheAmerican version tells us that ovning, controlling and
alienating ol ects ansvers the prollem ofsul ectification. But as
Hegel, Marx and Lacan insisted, property is loth the cause ofdivi-
sion and hatred and one moment only in the struggle for mutual
recognition andacceptance. As Blochputit `if, inthe fourancient
lasicrightsa nevmeaningis giventoproperty- thatis, instead of
freedomtoattainit,itisdefinedasfreedomfromattainingit- then,
andonlythen, do lilertyandsecuritycometolife`. '
Approaching rights as tools of intersul ective recognition is a
maorimprovementonthe atomismofrights discourse. But con ict
isnotustethicalandpropertyisnotexclusivelylenign. Despitethe
sophistication, Honneth and Shroeder miss the pover imlalances
' Iacanalsoundcrstandsthcdcsirclorrccognitionaslcadingtoimaginar,violcnccthat
mustbcsublimatcdthrough sccch and thclav. Scc Chatcrs II and iz bclov.
'` mstloch, ^c/um|LucaJHumcaI|_a|/yL._|. Schmidttrans) Cambridgc,Nass. ,
NIJPrcss, i88) 6, .
Rl GHTS AND RECO GNl Tl ON ZO3
vhich conHictspresupposeandproperty creates. Poveristhecause
andeffect ofconHict, to understanditsimplications onrights-lased
recognition, veneedtoalandontheidealisedvorldofethicalcom-
munication and property rights. thervise, the neo-Hegelians are
condemned to repeat the critique ofKantianism, vhile accepting
loththeneo-Kantianconceptandtherecenttriumphalismofhuman
rights .
1 N. V1 L1 b , 1I1 11 I 11 I11V1b b 1 I
Ve examined alove recent attempts to salvage human rights for
Marxism. '' Let usturnlrieHy to thequasi-HegelianMarxism ofjay
Bernstein, vho makes citizenship the focus of his analysis.
Citizenship is defined as the exercise ofpolitical rights and active
memlership in community activities and is created through `the
mutualrecognitionofeachmemlerlyevery othermemlercs citi-
zen`. ' Theideaofrecognitioniscrucialhereandindicatesareturn
ofMarxistscholarshipto anumlerofHegelianthemes. Recognition
as citizen makes politics central and introduces community at the
heartofsul ectivity. ltisfromthisperspective,thatBernsteinclaims,
rather counterfactually, that `nothing in Marxist analysis speaks
againstrights` . 'Marxpredicted, accordingtoBernstein,thatsocial-
ism vould overcome the separation letveen state and civil society
andnotthat itvoulddestroyrights. ln thissocietyofthe future,the
individualvillalsorlthealstracthuman,theattrilutesofuniversal-
ityandofthe commongoodvillle extendedfromthestate to the
vholeofsociety,andhumanrightsvilllere-definedastherightsof
participationly everyone into allaspects ofsocialactivity. lnsocial-
ism, allrelationsvilllepolitical. ltis indeed true thatMarxdidnot
dismiss thepossilility ofasocialistsocietythatrespects certaintypes
ofrightsand,afterthecollapseofcommunism,thisisthetypeofsoci-
etythatsocialistslelievein. ButtheadoptionofpartoftheHegelian
logic ofrecognitionandpartofMarxisteconomics , doesnothelp us
understandthecontemporary operation ofrights .
'' Scc abovc, Chatcr .
'` ]ay crnstcin, Right, Rcvolution and Community. Narx`s ' Cn thc ]cvish
ucstion' in Pctcr Csbomc cd. ), So:|c||sm caJ /|c I|m|| o} I||cm||sm Iondon, \crso,
i i ) Ioz. SccChatcr , artIIIabovc.
'' ibid , i o
ZO HEGEl' S lAV
There i s much ve can learn hovever ly comlining Berstein's
MarxcccHegelstrategyvithHonneth'semphasisonthestrugglefor
recognition and Shroeder'sperspectives on property as the olectof
desire. First, the olddelate alout the priority ofindividual orcom-
munity in relation to rights can le concluded. Do rights lelong to
personsas arecognitionandprotectionoftheirinnatecharacteristics,
their consciousness, freedom, rationality or vhatever, or, are they
contingent creations oflav and tradition sul ect to state utilisation
and manipulation? The Hegelian-Marxist ansver is clear. human
rightsmaylepresentedasnaturalandeternalluttheyarehighlyhis-
toricalandcontingent.Theymayleassertedasalovepoliticslutthey
arethe construction ofpoliticalrelationsandofthe ongoingstruggle
for group, individual) recognition. Finally, theymay le proclaimed
as rationallutthey are partly the outcome ofan all-poverful desire
thatdeneslegalandlogicallimitsinits ceaselessattempttoattractthe
loveofthe ther.
Shroeder argues that the sul ectis createdthroughherdesire for
recognitionly the other, mediatedlythe ol ectofproperty. lfve
adoptthevidedennitionoftheol ectaseverytrait, characteristicor
possessionvhichis comlinedviththealstractpersontoturnitinto
a concreteindividual, ve canargue that rights are such `ol ective`
intermediaries,vhicharenecessaryfortheestallishmentofintersul-
ective recognition. ln this approach, to `have` or exercise a right
means toclaimaparticulartype ofrecognitionfromothers, toaskto
letreatedasaconcretetypeofperson. Tolerecognised,forexam-
ple, as someonevho can not only speak andcommunicate, lut can
also express aparticular controversial viev generally disapproved of
or, assomeonevhois not onlyrecognisedinhis sexual orientation,
lutvho canalso organise hisfamily andprofessional life around a
same-sexrelationship.
ForHegel, legalrecognitionoperatesundercertainpreconditions
and has a numler ofeffects . itpresupposesauniversalisticlegalsys-
temundervhichpeopleextendrespecttooneanotherlecausethey
arelegalsul ectsavareofthelavsandothernormsvhichcreateand
protectrights. Additionally, legal relations romote self-respect. the
recognition that selfis morally autonomous and has the alility to
acquirethesamerightsanddutiesasallothers.Thesepresuppositions
and effects oflegal recognition or ofright-holding exist only in a
communityvhich haslegislatedforall. ln the matterofrights,there
is no conictletveenindividualand community. Humanrights, as
aspecialtypeofthestruggleforrecognition, comeinto existenceand
Pl GHTS AND PEC O GNl Tl ON ZO7
canleexercisedonlyincommonvithothers. Thisisthecase, inthe
olvioussensethattheeffective exercise ofrightsinvolvescorrelative
dutieslyothers ortheactionofthelav.Butthelogic ofrecognition
goesmuchfurther.Rightsdo notnndtheirlimitinothersandcom-
munity, as lileral theory claims. n the contrary, ifthe function of
rights is to give rise to reciprocalrecognitions, theypresuppose the
existenceofothersandofcommunity, andtheyexpress theidentity-
formingcontrilutionofothers.Arightisaparticularvayofleingin
common. 1 demand for recognition ofan aspect ofthe claimant's
identitycouchedinrightstermsisalvays addressedatanotherandis
validated through the other's acknovledgement. The role oflegal
institutions, ontheotherhand,is to guaranteethat the other'srecog-
nitionisnotlefttohisarlitraryvhimandthat, ifvithheld,itvillle
pulliclysupportedand enforced.
But the recognition implied in human rights goes muchfurther
than the respect and self-respect involved in ordinary legal rights.
`Civil rights . . . are the legal-uridical expression ofthe mutual
recognitions that constitute individuals as citizens ofapoliticalstate
. . . Communityisformedthroughmutualrecognitions,recognitions
that typically take the form ofthe conferment onanindividual ofa
socialidentityexpressive ofmemlership`. ''Communityisloththe
lackground and the effect ofrecognitions. Nev rights create nev
vays ofleingin common and push the loundaries ofcommunity.
Politicalrightsinarticular expressthemutualrecognitionofcitizens
as citizens, they recognise the constitutive role ofrecognitionitself
lfpolitical community is the presupposition ofrights, participation
exhauststheirscope. ' lnthissense, allrightscanle seenaspolitical
rights, as anextensionofthelogicofparticipationtoareasofactivity
not hitherto pullic.
Humanrightsdonotustconfirmorenforcethereforecertainuni-
versalpersonality traits. The factthatrights are alvays extended to
nev groups andexpanded to novelareas ofactivity, indicates their
deeply agonistic character. The recognition lestoved ly human
rights does notextendusttoexternalol ects, suchas property and
contractual entitlements. lt goes to the heart ofexistence, addresses
thefundamentalother-appreciationandself-esteemoftheindividual
leyond respect, and touches the foundations ofher identity. This
'` ibid., I oz
' Jhc sychoanaIyticaI aroachacccts thc subjcct loruing roIc olthc othcr and of
rightsbutismuchmorcsccticaIaboutthccontributionolrightstothccrcationandcxan-
sionolcommunity. Scc bcIovChatcrs I I and i z
ZOO HEGEl' S lAV.
type of concrete recognition cannot le lased on the universal
characteristics oflav, lut on a continuous struggle for the other's
unique desire and concrete recognition. Human rights, like desire,
are a lattleheldvith an ethical dimension. Social conHict may le
occasionallydestructiveofthesociallond,lutitisnotnecessarilyso.
ltisalsoonestepinthedevelopmentofpoliticalandethicalformsof
community. very form ofhuman antagonism involves claims for
recognitionand, ifthatis understood, catastrophic forms ofcon ict
canle prevented. Accordingto this approach, allconict, eventhe
Hollesianvarofallagainstall,involvesmutualclaimsforrecogni-
tionamongstthepartiesandpresupposesanalreadyactive,alleitele-
mentary, form ofintersul ectivity. People enter the social contract
notexclusivelyoutofaconcernforself-preservationlutlecausethe
atomised and polemical relations ofthe state ofnature give inade-
quate recognition to the various aspects oftheiridentity,unlike the
civilstateanditsrights. Similarly,varinvolvesclaimsforrecognition
lystates, nations orideologies. Thelestvayofavoidingvarthere-
fore is for loth rivals to shov respect for the fragile or disputed
aspects ofthe other'sidentity.
Let us examine, hnally, hovthe logic ofrecognition can help us
understandtheoperationofhumanrights.Vestartviththeclassics.
Amainconsequenceoftheearly declarationsvas thatthey opened,
atleastintheory,politicaldecision-makingtotheequalparticipation
of citizens against a lackground of serious pover imlalances.
Citizensvererecognisedasequal,notonlyinformallegalrelations,
lut also as regards political pover, in Balilar's and Lefort's terms,
theylecame equalmemlersofthenev disicorporated` sovereign.
The mutualrecognition enoyed ly those endovedvith civil and
politicalrightsentailstvocharacteristicsthatalstractlegalsul ectsdo
notpossess. Theirparticipationindecision-makingaloutmatters of
pullicinterestreduces, andpotentiallyshouldeliminate, theirdepen-
denceonothersandonalieninstitutionalpoversvhichdictatelarge
parts oftheir life. Political rights acknovledge and sanction other-
dependence as mutual recognition and, consequently, reduce citi-
zens' other-dependence as OCnInatICn. Positively, theyintroduce a
claimtoself-determination, initiallyrestricted,astosul ect, tovhite
male property ovners and, as to scope, to pullic political life.
Secondly, equality i nparticipation entitles citizens tousetheir col-
lectivepoliticalandlegislativepoverto reduce, andintheory elim-
inate, the institutional, socialoreconomic constraints underpinning
orcontrilutingtotheirC
[[
rOssICnandintroduce, positively,aclaim
Pl GHTS AND PECOGNl Tl ON ZOV
tounhinderedself-development.FollovinglrisMarionYoung'sdef-
inition, oppression as a denial of self-development takes various
forms. the most olviousare economicexploitation, social marginal-
isation, cultural vorthlessness and violence. ' The mutual recogni-
tion of citizens as self-determining agents results from free
participation in democratic decision-making and its extensionfrom
politics to otherareas ofsocial life. Self-development, ontheother
hand, is the opposite of oppression. it requires the expansion of
the principle of equality, from legal decision-making to an ever-
increasing numler of areas ofsocial life, such as the vork-place,
domestic life, the environment, etc, and its transformation from a
formalto asulstantiveprinciple. Dominationcallsforgreaterpartic-
ipation, oppression for greater equality, the former attaches to the
enlightenment principle ofemancipation, the latter to that ofself-
fulhlment.
Vecanpursuethisanalysisinrelationtoallimportantinstitutional
andindividualdevelopmentsinhumanrights.Thestrugglesforpolit-
icalrightsandfortheintroductionoftheuniversalfranchiseaimedat
eliminating the domination ofvarious groups, such as the poor,
vomen or ethnic minorities, vho vere denied political self-
determination. These struggles vere formally, ifnot sulstantively,
concluded vhen political rights and self-determination vere
extended, inthe secondhalfofthetventiethcentury, to thevhole
adult population vith fev exceptions. Similarly, the right to self-
governance vhich characterised the decolonisation process ofthe
i ,,os and i ,6os and prefacedthe main humanrights documents of
the period, ' extended collective political recognition from the
excludedgroupsofthemetropolistovholenationsandethnicitiesin
the developing vorld. ln these instances, the groups of sul ects
enoyingpoliticalrights andclaimingthe correspondingrecognition
veresignincantlyenlarged.
lnothercases, itvasthescopeoftheapplicationofrightsthatvas
expanded to nev areas. Vorkers' rights extended the principle of
participationto the shop Hoorandtosomeaspectsofindustrialman-
agement. Privacy rights introduced the principle ofautonomy into
areasandactivities associatedvithsexuality andviththe control of
' IrisNarionoung, u/|:ccaJ/|co||/|: ,jTj[crca:cPrinccton,PrincctonLnivcrsity
Prcss, i o) O
`' ^Il colc havc thc rght olsclldctcrmination. yvirtuc olthat rght thcy lrccly
dctcruinc thcirolitical status and lrccly uisuc thcir cconomic, sociaI and cultural dcvcl-
omcnt. Jhis is thc first articlc olboth thc Civil and Political Rights and thc conomic,
SociaIandCulturalRights Covcnants adotcdbythcLnitcdlations in i 66
ZV HEGEl' S lAV.
one'slodyanddomestic environment, suchas alortionandcontra-
ception. Consumers' rights enlarged the decision-making lodies in
education, health and other pullic utilities . The principle lehind
these rights isthatpeople shouldle allovedto participate inpullic
discussion and the decision-making ofinstitutions to vhich they
contrilute or vhose activities affect their lives. ach extension
emargeseitherthenumlerofpeopleentitledtodecideissuesofpul-
lic concernortheissues opentothelogicofpullicdelilerationand
decisionand,tothatextent,sulectiontoinstitutionaldominationis
reducedandautonomyincreased. lntermsofrecognition, thehold-
ers ofthese extended political rights are given the formally equal
chanceto determineimportantaspectsoftheirlife.
The continuous extension of political rights-holders and the
expansionofthelogicofpullicandpoliticalparticipationtohitherto
private areas and activities , helps us understand the relationship
letveencitizenshipanduniversality. very extension orreduction)
ofpoliticalrights enlarges ordiminishes) theinstitutionaldehnition
ofaparticularpolity, itliterallymovestheloundaries ofsocietyfor-
vards or lackvards. The idea ofalody politic, ofan incorporated
social space symlolisedly God, king, sovereign orlav, is shattered
everytimealarger orsmallerthanleforegroup is admittedto nev
rightsandnevparticipatoryprocedures. lntheareaofpoliticalrights,
citizenship is the expression ofuniversality. political rights are the
resultofthe destructionoftraditionalcommunitiesandoftheunder-
mining ofthe pre-modern lody politic and, these rights, in turn,
acceleratedtheprocess. Mutualrecognitionhasmovedfromtherela-
tionsofmastershiploveandcarevhichpredominantlycharacterised
thepre-modernvorldtolegalrecognition, theconstructionofiden-
tities through rights . lfcitizenship is the essence ofuniversality, if
communityparticipationturnsthealstractlegalsulectintoasocially
recognisedperson, its essenceisnegative. The universality ofpoliti-
calrightsisthepointofexcessortranscendenceofpoliticalcommu-
nity vhich already exists vithin the community, loth inside its
loundaries andpointingto the outside. ltnegates the closingdovn
ofthe political space and `sustains the moment ofdisemlodiment,
the groundlessness and the dislocation of pover constitutive of
democratic practice`. ' The logic ofpolitical rights is that ofinde-
terminacy.rightsarevithinandvithoutthesocialspace. Theydrav
their pover from their institutional declarationlut their performa-
`' cmstcin, o cit , suraI |,, I I .
Pl GHTS AND PEC O GNl Tl ON ZVi
tiveforcedeniestheinstitutioneverytimetheirscopeisextendedto
nevareasorsulects. AndasMarxinsisted,politicalcommunityand
citizenshipareloth the recognition ofthe universality ofrightsand
oftheirdenial, sincerights supportandaresupportedinturnlythe
inequalitiesofeconomyandculture.
LsingYoung's terminology, ve canarguethatthe negative uni-
versality ofpoliticalrights addresses the prollem ofdominationlut
not ofoppression. ppression is notust economic, although the
exploitationanddegradationofmaterialdeprivationisitsmainform.
ppressiondeniespeople'salilitytodecidevhatisthelestlife-plan
forthemanddeprivesthemofthenecessarymeanstocarryitout. lt
does not allov its victims to live according to their desires and
develop theirpotential, itprevents thefulnlment oftheiraspirations
and capacities. conomic exploitation ofthe metropolitan poor
through unemployment, lreadline vages, poor health and casual
vork, orofthe developingvorld through unequal trade and crip-
plingdelt, underminesandeventuallydestroysthepossililityofself-
development. Vhen daily survival is the order of the day, all
aspirations for social improvement or cultural expression are extin-
guished. The proht-led national andinternationaldivision oflalour
creates the structural and institutional preconditions for material
deprivation andthatinturn leads to oppressedlives. The oppressed
cannotenoy orevenaspire totheAristoteliancu:c|a, thegoodand
completelifethatallovstheirpersonalityto ourish.
Therecognitiondeniedlyoppressionisnotthatofmutualrespect
or ofpoliticalparticipation. ppression denies the much more spe-
cificrecognitionenoyedlyapersoninhisuniquenessandintegrity,
theacknovledgementofhisspecihc capacitiesandaspirations, andof
hissingularneedsanddesires.Thistypeofrecognitionvouldlindthe
split letveen the extendille) politicalcommunity andits rights and
civil society vith its inequalities. Participation vould le extended
frompulliclifetoeveryaspectofsociallife, andtheindeterminacyof
society vould change from leingust a horizon into the reality of
everydayness. lnthispostmodernHegelianethicallife, the formality
ofdignityvouldmerge vith the varnth ofpersonal love andcom-
munal care. Thisutopianproectdoes notustnegatethe present, it
negatesalldominatedandoppressedindividualpresents,inthename
ofan openness vhich takes hold ofloth society and identity. ne
could not improve much its organising principle from the maxim
` Scc gcncraIy,AanCcvirh, Scjj-uq|mca/0rncctonl],PrincctonLmvcrsityPrcss,
i 8)
ZVZ
HEGEl' S lAV.
from each according to alility to each according t oneeds`. As a
soteriologicalpromise, itoinstheotherhistoricalendgames, suchas
Hegel's Prussian State, Marx's communism and Fukuyama's lileral
capitalism. Butallutopias,vhentheyarrive, turn outto le the nega-
tionoftheirpromise.Ltopia'svocationisnevertolecomea|ooslut
toactasanegativeprefigurationofthefuturevhichhelpsunderstand
andudge the infamies ofthe present. lnthis sense, humanrights as
utopianprinciplecanhelpidenti(andfightthedenialsofidentityand
lackofrecognitioncreatedlydomination andoppression.
Ve candevelop forthispurpose Hegel'sinsightthatcrime indi-
catesthefailingsofaparticulartypeoflegalrecognitionandexpresses
thepoliticalandmoralstruggletomovelavandidentitytoahigher
andmorenuancedplane. ForHegel, asvesav,crimeisareactionof
the individual against the alstract and formal character of lav.
Crimes| are tiedtothesocialpreconditionsoflegalrelations,inthe
sense that they stem directly from the indeterminacy ofa form of
individual freedom that is merely legal. ln a criminal act, sul ects
makedestructiveuseofthefact,thatasthelearerofrightstolilerty,
theyareintegratedonlynegativelyintothelifeofsociety`, `inother
vords, theirindividuality is restricted to re ectingcontractual offers
andtheirfreedomtosayingnoto theadvancesofothers. Crimeand
the reaction to it are social struggles vhich, although deviant, help
the lav develop tovards a more advanced stage and the people
tovards a n+ore positive and concrete identity. lnHonneth's inter-
pretation, the collective effectofcrime is to disrupt and negate old
and inadequate forms ofmutualrecognition and help the develop-
mentofnev. lfveettisontheteleologcalcharacterofthedialectic
retainedlyHonneth, thisapproachcanleprontallyusedto under-
standthehumanrightstra ectory.
ppression and domination are the crimes ofpullic or private
pover. The criminal here is oftenthe state, its officials and thelav.
Butthe other aspects oftheHegeliananalysisremainvalid. recogni-
tionoritsdenialisthestakelehindhumanrightsstrugglesandtheir
un) successfulconclusionmoves the community tovards neviden-
tities. verynevright-claimisafightingresponsetodominantsocial
andlegalrelations,ataparticularplaceandtime,astruggleagainstthe
inuries and harm theyinict, it aims to negate inadequate forms of
recognitionforindividualsandgroups andto create more complete
andnuancedtypes. Humanrightsclaimsare, negatively,areactionto
`` Monncth, o cit,suran. z|, zo.
Pl GHTS AND PE COGNl Tl ON ZV
the multiple offences and insults ofpover to an individual's or
group's sense ofidentityand,positively, anattempttohaveas many
aspectsofthatidentityaspossillerecognisedly others andthecom-
munity. The negative principle is stronger, hovever, the sense of
inustice much more tangille than the appeal to perfect ustice. ln
this,humanrightsstrugglesshareacommoncharacteristicvithmany
utopias. they negate the existent, they criticisepresentinusticesand
infamies in the name ofan unknovn and, even impossille, future.
Becausevehaveknovnhellvedreamofparadise.
xaminingtheharmthataviolationinictsoftengivesusthelest
insight alout the ends ofhuman rights. The torture ofpolitical
prisoners can illustrate the point. During the Greek dictatorship of
i ,6)-)|, many opponents ofthe regime vere sul ectedto extreme
physical and mental torture. The most dreadedplacevas the head-
quarters ofthemilitarypolicein Athens. lts ofncerslecaine notori-
ousfortheircrueltyandinventiveness. lnmanyinstances, hovever,
theextremepainin icteddidnotaimatextractingfromthevictims
secrets alout the resistance. The leatings, fake executions and rapes
vere often used to make the prisoners descrile acts orrevealnames
already knovn to the police. As the limls vere split apart and the
esh electrocuted and lurned, the questions vere oflittle practical
value to the torturers and the regime. This redundant interrogation
vas often accompanied ly the demand that prisoners sign a docu-
ment, declaring that they had seen the vrong of their vays and
acceptingfullythelegitimacyofthe colonels' hunta.
Theapparentfutility ofthese demands indicatesthenatureofthe
torturers' enterprise. The torturers vhip orthe{c|cac aimed at the
eshofthe victim as the outer shellofthe soul. The useless confes-
sion, thealreadyknovnactivities, thenamingofnamesvasthevay
ofdestroyingthevictim'ssenseofidentity. The eviloftortureisnot
restrictedto thevantonviolencein ictedonthelody.Manytypes
ofextremepainandphysicalsufferinginvar,religiousmartyrdomor
diseaseareenduredvithdignityandpatience. Theeviloftorturelies
elsevhere. itdeniesitsvictimtheminimumrecognitionofferedlya
lileralsocialandlegal system and, indoingso, itdestroystherespect
peopleroutinelyexpectfromothers . Moreimportantly, tortureaims
to undermine the vay the victim relates to his ovn self his self-
respect,andthus to dissolve the mainsprings ofhispersonality.
Aslaine Scarryputs it.
thc rcIation Lctvccn Lody and voicc that lor thc risoncr Lcgins in
oosition thc ain is so rcaI that thc qucstion is unrcaI, insigniucant)
ZV+
HEGEI' S lA\.
and that gocs on to Lcconc an idcntilication thc

qucs

tion, li|c thc

ain, is a vay ol vounding, thc

ain, likc
'
|c qucstion, is a vchiclc ol
scll-Lctrayal) ultinatcly cnds u in oosition o
'
cc
'
norc. For vhat
thc roccss ol torturc docs is to slit thc hunan Lcm
-
in tv
'
, to nakc
cnhatic thc cvcr rcscnt Lut, cxcct in thc cxtrcmity ol sickncss or
dcath, only latcnt distinction Lctvccn a scll and a Lody, Lctvccn a
`nc and `ny Lody. Jhc `scll or `nc vhich is cxcricnccd on
thc onc hand as norc rivatc, norc csscntially at thc ccntrc, and on
thc othcr hand as articiating across thc Lridgc ol tlc Lody in thc
vorld, is `cnLodicd in thc voicc, in languagc. Jhc goal ol thc tor-
turcr is to nakc thc onc, thc Lody, cnhatically and crushingly rcsca/
Ly dcstroying it, and to nakc thc othcr, thc voicc, a|sca/Ly dcstroy-
ing it.
Slaverysul ectsthe vholepersontothe dominationoftheother,
torturere ectstheunity oflodyandself ltdisassociatestheperson's
identityfromthelodyand,lycrushingthelody

in e
`
ernevand
imaginative vays, it denies the victim's sense ofinte

gnty an+ self-

control. Thephenomenologicalemleddednessofselfinlodyis
'
orn
apart and the dismemlering oflimls lecomes a tool

for the d
'
sas-
semlly ofthe person's identity. The futility ofthe interrogation,
alvays accompanied ly more ferocious leati

gs, can t|us

l
,
e
explained. The useless letrayal` is a further denial ofthe victims
identity, itunravels hisrelationto self, arelationthatpassesthrough
the mutual recognition ofthe other memlers ofthe group and the
pride en oyed in the solidarity ofthe common cause. The torture
vithdravs fromthe victimhis self-respectas an autonomousmoral
agent, andthe informationorthe signingofthe

declarationdestroys
hisself-esteemasavaluedmemlerofacomn.unityofcommongoals
andavorldofsharedvalues. ltisnosurprise, therefore, thatafterthe
fall ofdictatorial regimes, the desire ofpolitical lelonging, the par-
ticipationingroupactivitiesvithastrongidentity,increasesspectac-
ularly.

A similar operation ofidentity-denial characterises extreme racial
or homopholic hate speech. As critical race theorists have argued,
verlal racial attacks intend to provoke the victim to question her
identity andto acknovledgeherselfas inferior to the attacker. ln
hatespeech,onecharacteristicoftheperson, hercolour,raceorsex-
`' Iainc Scarr,, TccJy|ac|aCxlord, CxlordLnivcrsityPrcss, i 8,) 8-.
`` NariNatsuda,CharIcsIavrcncc III,RichardLclgadoandKimbcrIcyCrcnshavcds),
HcrJ /|c/ HcuaJ. Cr|/|:c| Fc:c Tccq, Hsscu|/|vc Scc:| caJ /|c|rs/HmcaJmca/ ouIdcr,
VcstvicvPrcss i ) .
Pl GHTS AND PE COGNl Tl ON ZV3
ual orientation, is picked, presented as determining the person's
overall value and denigrated. Racist or sexist speech, like torture,
emphasisesoneparticulartraitofthepersonanddeniesherintegrity.
Furthermore,lydevaluinganelementorcharacteristicvhichiscen-
tral to the identity ofa group, it aims tovithholdrecognition and
respectfromthe vhole group andfrom each ofits memlers , vith-
outconcernfortheindividual'sothercapacitiesanddesires. The ter-
rainofthe racistisidentityandhisveaponsare, first, thevithdraval
ofmoralrecognitionandlegalequality and, secondly, thevithhold-
ingofesteemfromthevholegroup. Thefrstdeniestherecognition
ofdignityandequalrespect,the secondaimsatunderminingesteem
andrespectamongstmemlersofthegroupandatdestroyingthepos-
itive evaluationofits sharedcharacterandhistory. Asimilaranalysis
helps explain vhy critical race theorists have distanced themselves
fromthecritiqueofrightsassociatedviththeAmericancriticallegal
movement.Racistoppressionanddominationdeniestheminimum
legal recognition of a lileral legal system, something taken for
grantedlythesuccessfulmemlersofthelegalacademy. Forthehis-
torically oppressedperson ofcolour, havingrights and scrupulously
follovinglegalproceduresoffersmuchmorethantheactualcontents
ofthese rights,itofferstherespectofothersandtheself-respectthat
legalrecognitionensureslutvhichhasleensystematicallyvithheld.
Beingadmittedtoright-holdingis a symlolic admissionto the dig-
nityofhumanityandaveryrealintroductiontothelegalrecognition
offormal) equality. This is the indispensalle precondition ofcri-
tique. KantmustleinplaceleforevemovetoHegel orMarx.
Vecanconclude that,fromaHegelianperspective, humanrights
areexpressionsofthestrugg!eforrecognitionamongstcitizensvhich
presupposes and constructs the political community. The idea of
mutual recognitionhas notleen entertainedin rights theory, lutit
isimplicitinthe operationofrights andinnevrights-claims. Many
aspectsofrecognitiontaketheformofrightsandallrightsareinthis
sense political. they extend the logic ofpullic access and decision-
makingto ever-increasingparts ofsociallife. Humanrights are not
the trump cards against collective goals, as lileral theoryhasit, lut
signs ofa communal acknovledgement ofthe openness ofsociety
and identity, the place vhere care, love and lav meet. SimIlarly,
rights to self-determinationininternationallav are an expressionof
`' RightsarcasymboltoodccIycnmcshcdinthcsychcolthcorcsscdtoIoscvith-
out trauma and much rcsistancc, Patricia ViIIiams, T|c H|:|cmy c} Fc:c caJ F|_|/s
CambridgcNa , MarvardLnivcrsityPrcss, i i ) i 6,
ZV HEGEl' S lAV.
the mutual recognitron of societies and nations emerging Eom
colonisation. Thus rights protectthe alility ofpeople to participate
in the life ofthe community as a vhole, and the struggle for nev
rights is a struggle for changing the meaning ofequal participation
andextendingitEompoliticallifetothevorkplace, totheenviron-
ment and to the private domain. lfthe life oflav is notlooks lut
experience, thelifeofrightsisnotintheisolatedindividuallutinthe
recognitionofleingvithothers.
! !
sy.|.cac|ys|s |c..mcs /|c Icu I|_|/s cac Lcs|tc
Psychoanalysis, the recent lonanza in social thought, is predomi-
nantlyatheoryofsulectivityandlegality. Thelavisthefoundation
ofthesul ectandthecementofsocialityand,aslothjacquesLacan
andhishereticalfolloverPierreLegendreinsist,individualsandsoci-
eties cannot escapeits empirevithimpunity. lfthe classicalmaxim
claimedthatu||so.|c|cs||| us,thepsychoanalyticalversionreversesit.
u||us, |||su|c.|um c|so.|c|cs. Psychoanalysis is a legal theory or at
leastatheoryinvhichlavplaysaformativerole. Forpsychoanalysis
the sul ect, rather than leing a pre-given sulstance or a fully con-
structed entity, is re ectively and intersul ectively constituted. But
thisisnotustHegelianismviththerapy.Theunconsciousanddesire
lothcreateanddisruptconsciousnessandsul ectivityand,asaresult,
human experience, action and meaning involves alvays `another
scene anddemandsa`deepinterpretationofthecausesandeffects
of`freevill.
Psychoanalysis and in particular its Lacanian revision are fast
lecomingthelatest great frontierforurisprudence too. ' The vork
of Pierre Legendre, Peter Goodrich, David Caudill, jeanne
' RcccntcxIoiations olthc rcIationshibctvccnIavandsychoanaIysisincIudcLavid
CaudilI, Ic:ca caJ /|c Su|c:/ Icu TcucrJ c Py:|ccac|y/|: Cr|/|:c|Ic_c| Thccq ^tIantic,
l. , MumaniticsPrcss, i ,) , ]cannc Shrocdcr, Tc lcs/c|caJ/|ccs:cs .Py:|ccac|y/|:c|caJ
|||csc||:c|crc:/|vcsca/|ccm|a|accaJrccr/y crkcIcy,LnivcrsityolCaIilomiaPrcss,
i ,) and Pctcr Coodrch's, cJ|us Ic Py:|ccac|ys|s, H|s/cry, Icu Lnivcrsity of
Calilomia Prcss i ,) SccaIsothcscciaIissuc ofthc CardozoLavRcvicv onLavand
thc Postmodcrn Nind \oI. i 6, los. j- i ,) and in aricuIar LruciIIa ComcI,
Rcthinking thc cyondolthc RcaI, i6 CcrJc:c IcuFcv|cu j-, ,z-,z i ,) . Fora
rcvicv ol rcccnt sychoanaIyticaI jursrudcncc, scc Costas Louzinas, PsychoanaIysis
ccomcsthcLav. lotcs onanncountcrFoictoId, i ,Ic_c|S/uJ|cscrumj zj
Picrrc Lcgcndrc, Ic Cr|mc Jc Ccrcrc|Icrt|c Paris, Fayard i 8) , I'HmcurJuCcascur
Paris, ScuiI i ,) , Jhc Cthcr Limcnsion olLav, I6 CcrJc:c IcuFcv|cu j-, j-6z
i ,) ^ Rcadcr ol Lcgcndrc`s vork vas rcccntIy ubIishcd in nglish. Icu caJ /|c
Ca:cas:|cusPctcrCoodrchcd London,NacmiIIan, i ,) .
` Pctcr Coodrich, Ica_uc_cs Icu uttcrvorhs, i j) , cJ|us Ic, o. cit. , sura n.
I , Icu |a/|c Ccur/s c{IcvcLondon,RoutIcdgc, i 6)
ZVO
P S YCHOANALYS l S BECOMES THE LAV.
ShroederoroftheSlovenianphilosophers, Slavo Zizek'andRenata
Salecl, hasalertedustothemanylinksletveenlavandthepsyche.
This Chapter vill introduce, nrst, those aspects ofpsychoanalytical
theory vhich have the greatest relevance for lav and vill examine
critically the contrilution psychoanalysis has made so far to our
understandingofrights. ltmaylethat,ifthelavexpressesthepover
andthe logic ofinstitution, tradition and reason, it is ourpersonal
experienceandhistoryvithitstraumas,desiresandsymptoms,vhich
determines the vay ve attach ourselves to the institution. ln this
sense, psychoanalyis could help explain the centrality ofrights in
modernlavin a concretevayvhichtakes accountofpersonal dif-
ferences . ly comlining institutional necessity and personal choice,
rightsrepresentthemostcharacteristiclegalexpressionoflothsocial
determinationandpersonaldesire.
i . V111 11 11 L11b b I 11
Psychoanalysispresents thelirthofthelavas a crime story. Freud's
`mythological theory ofinstincts`and oflav'screationstarts vith
the murderly his sons ofthe primordial fathervho had monopo-
lised the females ofthe group. Freud uses the trilal amlivalence
tovardstotemicmeals,invhichtheslaughteringoftheanimalleads
toritualmourningandlamentationfollovedlyfestiveandexcessive
reoicing, to argue that the totemic animal is a sulstitute for the
primal edipal father. At this point, Freud vonders vhether this
explanationcanleusedtoextrapolatethenrstformofhumanorgan-
isation. His eclectic hypothesis lrings together Darvin's `primal
horde` theories and early anthropological evidence, gives them a
psychoanalyticaltvistandcreatesamodern, `scientinc`mythofthe
origins oflavandsociety.
The primal horde, the nrst form ofhuman organisation, vas a
land ofrovingmales, ruledly aviolentandealousfathervho kept
allfemales for himselfand drove his sons avay. ne day, the sons,
vho hatedtheirfatherlecausehellockedaccesstopoverandsex-
' SIavoj /izck, T|c Su|||mc |c:/ o} IJco|o_y London, \crso i 8) , or/|cy Kaou ao/
u|c//|cyJoIaoymca/c co||/|:c|c:/orLondon,\crso, i i) , SucrcgobyLclauIt i 6
CcrJo:o IcuFcv|cuj-,z,-z i ,)
` Rcnata SalccI, T|c So||s rccJom London, RoutIcdgc i ,) , Rights in
!sychoanaIytic andFcminist!crscctivc, i6 CcrJo:oIcuFcv|cuj-, I I z i-i i j 8 i )
' Sigmund Frcud, |y Hcrin C|v|||c/|oa, So:|c/y caJFc||_|oa gamcs Strachcy cd. and
trans , !cnguin, i 8,) j i , j ,
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE ZVV
ual gratification, landed together and killed him. But after their
hatredvas satisned, asenseofremorse andguiltovertookthemand
ledtothe estallishmentofthetvolavsoftotemism,vhicheventu-
ahy founded all lav and sociality. the prohilitions ofmurder and
incest. lncest expresses the fundamental desire ofunion vith the
mother, thedesiredandforliddenlove olect. Thetotemicprohili-
tions turned the primalhorde into a fraternal clan vhich vas later
replacedlyorganisedcommunity. `Societyvasnovlasedoncom-
plicityinthecommoncrime,religionvaslasedonthesenseofguilt
and the remorse attachingto it, vhile morality vas lasedpartly on
theexigenciesofthissocietyandpartlyonthepenancedemandedly
the senseofguilt`.
Freudpresents his hypothesis as a `just-So Story`, a tale vhich
has `left indestructille traces upon the history ofhumandescent`.
Tvo elements emerge vhich vill determine the legal proclivity of
psychoanalysis . First, violence and crime lie at the leginning of
humankind. Crime comesleforethelavanddetermines the nature
ofthe lav and its response. Secondly, Freud's story oins the great
religious ,philosophicalandscientincattemptstogolacktoanot|o,
a time lefore history and memory at vhich human society vas
founded. For Freud, the lav lies at the leginning ofcivilisation.
Mythandlavhaveadoullefunction. Lavistheprogenitorandpro-
moterofcivilisationandvithoutithumanityvouldnothavecome
into existence. Butthe lav also founds psychoanalysis. The `primal
parricide`isthe mythical explanationandthediachronicstructureof
the edipal drama. Psychoanalysis is the science vhich examines
lav's action anditstransgression.
Freudlinksdirectlyhisanalyticaltheoryviththegenesisoflavin
hislate essays. ln Hy |ct?, hesets outtoexplainthecausesofvar-
fareinresponsetoaninvitationlyinstein. ' `The genealogyoflav
starts again vith the `primal horde`. Conicts vere resolved vio-
lently, andthemostpoverfulmemlerkilledorsul ugatedhisoppo-
nents through lrute force. / lavandright, Freudinsisted, come
fromviolence. Theroadfromthemightofthestrongesttothelegal
institution passes throughthe victor's realisationthat,ifthe defeated
andveakergroupmemlersvere to unite, theycouldchallenge his
` Sigmund Frcud, To/cm caJ Tc|oo in T|c ri_|as Fc||_|oa ]amcs Strachcy cd and
^bcrtLicksontrans , !cnguin i 8 ,) zo8.
Sigmund Frcud, Crou Py:|o|o_y caJ/|cHac|y| o}/|cI_oi nC|v|||c/|oa, So:|c/ycaJ
Fc||_|oasuraO. 6, i ,
ibid.
0
Sigmund Frcud, |y Hcr?, suran. 6
PS YCHOANALYS l S BECOMES THE LAV.
domination. Lavi s thereforethereplacementof individualviolence
ly the organisedviolence ofthe community andis directed against
thosevho resist it. The Hollesian undertones ofFreud's story are
striking. Freedom is not the gift of civilisation and it vas much
greater, alleit unenforcealle and impractical, lefore the lav inter-
vened. Thedesireforfreedomisasignofhumanity'snostalgiaforthis
original untamed personality, and mental illness the result ofthe
resentmentandhatredcreatedlyitssuppressionlycivilisation. Lav
is the nrst and most poverful veapon in civilisation's attempt to
restrain the satisfaction ofinstincts and desires . Freud goes on to
admit that the `first requisite ofcivilisation isustice - that is the
assurance that a lav once madevillnot le lroken infavour ofan
individual. But this is the positivist ustice oflegality, Freud adds.
`lt| impliesnothingastothe ethicalvalue ofsuchlav. ' '
Communities are held together ly shared emotional ties and ly
violence. Lav's inalility to resolve con ict in a community lacking
communal feelings and emotionalattachments leads to the extensive
useoflegalviolence. Thus,theforcevhichledtolav'sgenesisisalso
found at the heart ofits operations. A good example is the inter-
national community. it does not attract emotional ties ofany kind
I l ' and, asaresult,varlecomesthemainmeans orreso ving con ict.
Theantidotetoviolenceisnurturingthose `emotionalties. Theyare
oftvotypes, peoplemaysharefeelingsoflovetovardseachotherlut
thisis `more easilysaidthandone . Alternatively, theyshareimpor-
tantinterestsandconcernsvhichcandravthemcloserthroughtheir
identificationvith thelove olect. The olect Freud has in mind is
chillingly clear. The `innate and `ineradicalle inequality ofmen
separates them into leaders and follovers vho `stand in need ofan
authority vhich vill make decisions for them and to vhich for the
most part they offer an unqualified sulmission. This suggests that
more care shouldletakenthanhithertoto educate an upperstratum
ofmenvith independentminds . . . vhose lusiness it vould le to
g:vedirectionstothedependentmasses . ' Thefather-chief-leaderis
thelestsulstituteforviolenceandlav's closestally. lnthistransition
from anthropology and myth to social psychology, lav and politics
acquireamenacingtoneandatotalitarianpotential.
' ' SigmundFrcud, C|v|||c/|oacaJ|/sI|s:ca/ca/sin C|v|||sc/|oaSo:|c/ycaJFc||_|oasuran
6, z8
' Rcccnt controvcrsics ovcr ritain's osition in uroc and thc var in forucr
Yugoslavia havc madc Frcud'slcarsainluIly toicalandcontcmorar, again
' ` SigmundFrcud, Hy Hcr?, sura n 6, ],
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE
i
. 11L1 11 11 11 I 11 11
Freud's urisprudence has leen criticised on various grounds . lts
emphasis on caom|c, violence and thc role ofthe leaderhave leen
explained as expressions ofthe catastrophic mcc|s|tom ofinter-var
urope. Moreover, Freud'sprevarications as to the anthropological
ormythologicalstatusofhispoliticaltheoryareusually attrilutedto
the central conict in psychoanalysis as to its `scientinc or
hermeneuticalnature. Theanthropological evidence Freudusedvas
scantandis novconsideredunsound.Additionally,themythoflav's
genesishasleencriticisedforitslogicalavs. lflavandmoralityare
t|e outcome ofthe murder, the sense ofguilt experienced ly the
killer-sons cannot le explained. These inconsistencies made the
FrenchpsychoanalystandphilosopherjacquesLacan to turn Freud's
storyintoamythicalstructureandtoreadit,inavaysimilartoLevi-
Strauss 's explanation ofthe elementary structures ofkinship, as an
attempttogivenarrativeepicformtothestructureofsul ectivityand
the operation ofdesire. The `novelty ofvhat Freud lrings to the
domain ofethics, ' ' according to Lacan, vas the discovery ofthe
structuringprincipleofsul ectivityandthesociallond. Thisenalled
himtounderstandthereasonsvhytheeffortsofthennestmindsand
fieriestheartsoverthreemillenniahavefailedtoestallishasuccessful
moralcode oranacceptalleethicalpractice, tlusleavingcivilisation
drovninginitsdiscontent.
lnLacan'sreading,themurderedandcannilalisedprimalfatheris
asymlol ofthe suE ect'sinternalisationoflav. Theparricide andits
effectcannotle provenlut, ifveareto understandsul ectivityand
sexuality, its structure must le presupposed. Vhile Freud, in com-
mon vith allgreat systemluilders, andinparticularhis hero Moses,
narratedthecreationoflav, Lacanclosertotheconcernsofanthro-
pology,linguisticsandstructuralism,emphasiseslav'scontrilutionto
the constitution ofhumanidentity. Freudianpsychoanalysis triedto
explai
'
the lav as the necessary response ofsocialised personality
to

arous needs, desires and instincts. Lacanian theory explains the

desires, needs and identity ofthe sul ect through sul ection to the
lav.
According to Freud's edipal structure, the sul ect comes into
existence through the intervention ofthe father vho disrupts the
' ' ]acqucsLacan, ThcI/||:o{Py:|ocac|ys|s London, Routlcdgc, i z) zi 6.
Z
PS YCHOANAlYS l S BECOMES THE lAV.
mother-child dyadlyprohiliting the child's desire

fo

,
'
he

mot|e

r.
Lacan's returnto Freud` readsthis primalrepression inlinguistic
terms .Theprimalunionletveenmotherandchild.slrokenana the
sulectcomesintoexistencelyenteringthesymlolicorder,ty
l
ically
acomlinationoflanguageandlav. Thesymlolicseparatestheinfant
fromthematernallody, castrates` it, andthisdivisioninscrilesloss,
alsence and lack inthe midst ofself This lack ispartially addressed
through the infant's identification vith signifiers, vith vor+s and
images. ln the famous mirror stage`, th

fa

t letveen six and

eighteen months experiences a sense ofulilation vhen she hrst
recognisesherimageinthemirrororinthegazeofthe motherand,
throughthereH ection,comestoidenti(vithavh
'
leandcomplete
lody. Lutthis image is external to the lody and d
'
fferen
'
fro

the
child'ssensualexperienceofadis ointedlodyanddisoledient|imls.
Theliologicalreasonforthis disunctureisthatperc

eptualaptitudes
develop velllefore motility and othermotorfunctions. As aresult
ofthis stage, thehrstsense ofidentityis alreadyexternalto the ego,
an image ofthe ego, that lecomes availalle visually.

The e

o d

es
notprecedetheimagelutismadeint|eimageofth

eimage,itsunity
is imaginary, in the doulle sense ofvisual and

illus

onary, the result

ofa vholeness and anticipated completeness imagined through the
proectionoftheuncoordinatedlodyi
_
toanadora.le
'
isualother.'
Thelody'scoherencedependsonthe futureanterortyof thepro-
ection inthatvhathasyet to le is ima
-
ined as already given`. '
ldentity and lodily integrity are not given lut a
'
e

constructed
through a mirroring process and the repeatedrecognition ofsel. .y
theother,vho looks completeandlecomesthe causeoftheantici-
patedintegrity.

Theinfant's encountervithliguisticsignsvorksin asimilarvay.
As Hegel, vho strongly inHuenced Lacan, argued, language in its
arlitrary connections letveensignihers andsignifiedsandletveen
vords andthings destroys, killsreality. Say the vordlion`, v
'
ites
Hegel, andyoucreatethelioncx a||||o, lyalolishingthe tangille
thing`.'' Say the vord dogandyou kill

the r
`
al dog . . . the con

ceptualunderstandingofempiricalrealityisequivalenttoamurder
'` Scc my roooa caJHa/|roooa. ProIcgomcna lor a LcgaI IconoIogy in C,stas
Louzinas andLyndalcadcds. ) , IcucaJ/|cImc_c ThcHu/|or|/yHr/caJ/|cHc /|c/i:s o}
IcuChicago,LnivcrsityofChicago Prcss, I ) j 6-6,
' ' LruciIIa CorncII, T|cImc_|acry Iomc|a lcvYork,RoutIcdgc, I ,) j.
. .
' ' Hc_c|caJ/|cHumcaS|r|/:H Trca|c/|oa/|ccacIc:/urcoa/|ci|||o

|yo} /|cSm/
( 3e,-) u|/| Commca/cry L Rauch trans) Lctroit, Vaync StatcLmvcrsity Prcss, i 8j)
8-,
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE
agrees Ko eve. ' Say the vord elephants` adds Lacan and here
comes a herd ofelephants , present in its alsence andfu ing up the
room. The vord nihilates the thing lut creates the sul ect, vhose
unityis constructedlysignifiers , apropername, PhaedraorCostas.
l comeintoleinglyleingcalledCostasand,similarly,allotherenti-
ties must lecome vords and images to emerge into consciousness.
This is the meaning ofLacan's famous statements that the signifier
representsasul ect. . . notasignihed)- foranothersignihervhich
means not for another sul ect) `' and language lefore signi(ing
somethingsignihesforsomeone`. 'Thesul ectspeaksandcomesto
existence ly leing spoken in language, in other vords ly leing
alienatedonemoretimefromlodilyandsensoryexperienceintothe
coldvorldofthesign.
Lutanunsymlolisalleresidueoftheprimalunionviththemater-
nal lody, vhich Lacan called the Real, survives this entryinto the
vorld ofsigns and drives the sulect to go lack and lecome the
mother's presumed ol ectofdesire, thesymlolicphallus.Lecoming
the mother's phallus, hovever, going lack to the undifferentiated
vomloftheRealvouldlecatastrophic. Thelav'sfunctionisthere-
foreto separatethe childfromthemotherthrougharivalrousiden-
tificationviththefather. Thename ofthefather, thisrepresentative
ofthesymlolic, imposesadoulleprohilition.onincest- thusstop-
pingtheunionviththemother- andonparricide- thusleadingthe
malechildtoidenti(viththefather.Thelav,thevordofthefather,
confronts the omnipotence ofthe mother vith the pover ofthe
vord. 'Thisseparationfromthemotherandsul ectiontothelavis
Lacan's in)famous symlolic castration`. The phallus , elsevhere
calledthec|||o|]c|c thelittleotherolect) symlolisestheintegrity
or vholeness vhich has leen lost, loth impossille and prohilited
throughtheactionoflanguageandlav.Thislittleother,theremnant
ofthe Realafteritslanlythe symlolic, is theinnersecretorker-
nel` ofthe sul ect. it creates a ceaseless anddestructivepressure to
' ^Icxandrc Kojcvc, Ia/rcJu:/|oa /o /|c FccJ|a_ o} Hc_c|' |caomcao|o_y S|r|/"
^. M. lichoIs trans) Ithaca,ComclILnivcrsityPrcss, I 8) I o-i
' acqucs Lacan, Radiohonic z/j S:i||:c/, I ,o, 6,
z0
acqucsLacan,

ni/ Pars, ScuiI, I 66) 8z-j

z
acqucs Lacan, Jhc subvcrsion ol thc subj cct and thc diaIcctic ol dcsirc in thc
Frcudian Lnconscious in

:n| H Sc|c:/|oa ^an Shcridan trans. ) London, RoutIcdgc

I ,,) zz-jz,
zz
ForLacan, acccss to thc symboIic orucris much casicrlor thc girI-chiId vho, innot
having thc cnis, acccts vith Icss dilficuIty thc intcrdiction on bccoming thc mothcr`s
imaginar, hallus. In this scnsc, mcn vho harbour thc ridicuIous hoc that thc hysica
organisidcnticaIvith thc symboIicositionarc laiIcdvomcn
+ P S YCHOANAlYS l S BEC OMES THE lAV.
returnt otheprimalunion thedeathdrive) vhichatthesametime
givesriseto anavesome, olscene en oymentorou|ssca.c.
ln Lacan's version, therefore, the lav creates the ego. The sym-
lolic castration is a question oflav and legitimate possession at all
levels. Themotherdelivers the loyto the fatherthroughasymlolic
contract. The loy-child identines not vith a father presumed to
en oythemother,lutvithafathervhohaslegaltitletothephallus,
he identines vith the signiner of the phallus, the name ofthe
father`, or vith the prohilited ol ect ofdesire. The phallus, this
alsent, non-existent mastersigninerisalegalconstruct- Lacancalls
ita sceptre``- acquiredlythe fatherthroughhis ovncastration.
ltisinthename-of-the-Fatherthatvemustrecognisethesupport
ofthe symlolicfunctionvhich,fromthedavnofhistory, hasiden-
tified his personvithngure ofthe lav`.' The symlolic castration
represents the genealogical orderlyprohilitingimaginaryandpro-
motingsymlolic identincations. Vithout sulmission to its lav, the
childcannotle separatedfromthemotherandcannotleintroduced
tosul ectivity.Butlyseparatingthesulectfromtheloveolectand
introducinghimtolack,thelavisalso the creatorofdesire.
Forpsychoanalysis, therefore, thelasiclavorinterdictionvhich
createshumanityas aspeakingspeciesisthatofdivisionandsepara-
tion. Eomthematernallody,throughthe edipallavoftheFather,
fromone's ovnlody through the narcissistic identincationvith its
image,fromtheotherassulectandolectthroughtheirnegati

nor
nihilation in the sign. l must identi(vith my image in the mirror
and vith my name, those disemlodied entities, those instances of
otherness tolecome an ego. l mustacceptdivisionandnegativity, l
must acceptthat l amvhat l amnot,inRimlaud'sfelicitousphrase
that je estunautre`. The ego fromthestartisalter, an other, itis
lorninitsencounterviththeBigther,thelinguisticandlegaluni-
verse symlolised not ly the Father or the paternal function, as in
Freud, lutly a signvhich,Lacan calls, the master signiner orthe
Name ofthe Father.
Vhenve turn from the lav to |oos, from the father to the lin-
guistic revriting ofthe edipus drama, legal metaphors proliferate
` Ilthis cxchangcmustbc dcscrbcdas androccntric itis, N. Lcvi-Strauss tclls us,
bccausc olthcoccurcncc ololiticalovcrthatmakcthcmsclvcslcltinit,ovcrthatlalls
tomcn sic) to cxcrcisc. Itisthcrclorcbccauscitis also thc scctrc thatthclallusrc
`
ails -
inothcrvordsbccauscitbclongs to thcsymbolic ordcr. LacaninunublishcdScmnarX
quotcd by Nikkcl orch-|acobscn, Ic:ca. Tc H|sc|u/c Mcs/cr Louglas rick trans )
StanlordLnivcrsityPrcss, i i ) z i j
' Lacan,

:r|/s, suran z i , 6,.

Pl GHTS AND DES l PE
3
again. Languagelothinitsstructureandactionishomologousvith
thelav. No-oneis supposedto le ignorant ofthelav, this some-
vhathumorousformulatakenfromourCodeof justicenevertheless
expressesthetruthinvhichourexperienceisgrounded. . . Noman
isactuallyignorantofit, since thelavofmanhasleenthelavoflan-
gua

e since the nrst vords ofrecognition`. Again vhen glossing

Levi-Strauss' s structural interpretation of kinship and exchange,
Lacaninsists ontheprimacyofthelav-language order.
Jhc narriagc tic is govcrncd Ly an ordcr ol rclcrcncc vhosc lav
conccrning thc kinshi nancs is, likc languagc, incrativc lor thc
grou in its lorns, Lut unconscious in its structurc . . . Jhc rinor-
dial Iav is thcrclorc that vhich in rcgulating narriagc tics sucrin-
oscs thc kingdon ol culturc on that ol naturc aLandoncd to thc lav
ol nating . . . Jhis lav, thcn, is rcvcalcd clcarly cnough as idcntical
vith an ordcr ollanguagc. `'
Andiftheorderoflanguageisidenticalvith:heorderoflav, speech
ordiscourse acts likelav. ln Lacan'soracularaphorism.
Jhus it is lron soncvhcrc othcr than thc Rcality that it conccrns that
Jruth dcrivcs its guarantcc. it is lron Sccch. ust as it is lron Sccch
that Jruth rcccivcs thc nark that cstaLlishcs it in a uctional structurc.
1hc first vords sokcn |cJ//rcm/cr) stand as a dccrcc, a lav, an aho-
risn, an oraclc, thcy conlcr thcir oLscurc authority uon thc rcal
othcr. `
Reality, Speech, decree, the other. ln this olscure formulation ve
cantracealltheessentials oftheruleoflavaccordingto Lacan. Lav
does notustconstitute the sul ectlut has viderredemptive quali-
ties . Hegel's dialecticsofdesirecanle traced inLacan'slegalformu-
lations. Lnder the in uence of the dialectic, Lacan turns the
discontents ofcivilisation` into desiringsul ects vho fight for the
impossille love ol ect unto death. ln this dialectic ofdesire and
death,lavlecomesapartialcureforthetraumasofsociety,inafash-
ionnotdissimilartothatapplied toindividualsintherapy.
. 11 11 J11 1 111lJ lb I 11b V1
Hegellelievedthathistoryvill endvhenthe spiritrecognisesitself
in the vorld, andmasterandslaveare dialectically overcome inthe
` ibid , 6i
' ibid. , 66.
' ibid. , jc,-6
PS YCHOANAlYS l S BECOMES THE lAV.
vhole Man, the Citizcu ofthe universal andhomogeneous State.
Butforthenon-MarxistParisianintellectualsofthe inter-varperiod,
this promised reconciliationvasno longer hist

rically
'
re+i|le and
emphasis vas placed onthe agonistic aspect ofin:ersul ectivity

and
desire. Hegelian theory, steepedinstruggle, conHictand reconcilia-
tion, took a much darker inHection and inHuenced deeply the psy-
choanalyticalschoolofLacan.AkeystepinthetransitionfromHegel
toLacanistheinuentialinterpretationofthe|caomcao|oy ,jS|t||
ly the French philosopher Ko eve. Ko eve's in uence on Laca

n's
return to Freud` is vell-documented. Lacan used the Hegelian
dialecticextensivelytoshovhovthetherandreexivityconstruct
seltButvhiletheconHicts ,turnsandtrilulationsoftheHegelianself
lead to self-consciousness, Lacan's reformulationpresentedthe sul-
ectassplitanddecentred.
For Ko eve, Hegel' s aim vas to reconstruct the transcendental
presuppositionsandthe necessary historicalstagesvhichhaveledto
contemporarysul ectivityanditshistoricalandphilosophicalunder-
standing.Vhilethe other'srecognitionisessentialforthecreationof
sul ectivity, Ko eve insisted thatthis dependence revealed a funda-
mentallackat the heart ofselt The apparenttypes ofdesire for the
otherandforol ects canle mediated onlythrough another'sdesire.
lfdesireisdefinedas thedesireforthe other's desire, itamountsto
the desire to lerecognisedin one'sindividuality andis deeply nar-
cissistic.Desirerecognisesitselfinanotherdesire, lutvhatitdiscov-
ers thereisemptinessandlack, the essence ofalldesire. The mirror
reveals desire's ol ectto le nothingness , non-leing. Death, Hegel's
alsolutemaster`, is the truth` ofdesire and, as a result,historyis
competitive andviolent.`'
This analysis contains the mainsprings ofthe Lacanian theory of
desire.Lacanvascategoricalaloutdesire' sturntovardsthevoidof
death,the catastrophicRealvhichhasleen exiledlythesymlolic
lutlurksintheintenseen oymentolou|ssca.c.Desireasthedemand
for recognition is a persistent and insatialle erotic request to le
desiredasa sul ect. Theol ect ofdesire is a failed ol ect, the pure
]vc, suian i 8 ,
Sccamongstmany, \inccntIcscomLcs,McJctatca:| |||cc||cs I Scott-Foxand
] N. Jaidingtians ) CamLiidgc Lnivcisity Iicss, i8o) Cha
'
ciI , oi
`
ch-

acoLson, Ic:a
ocit . , suia n. zj , Intioduction,NichaclJayloi, H|/cr|/y Chicago Lmvcisity Iicss,

i 8,)
Chatcis I and,, Slavoj Zizck, T|c Su|||mc |c:/JJcc|c_y, o. cit , suia

n ,assim

`' CnJcgcl`s attitudc to dcath, thc aLsolutc mastci` scc Costas Iouzuas and Ronmc
airngton, ^ntigonc`s I|kc` inu/|:c M|.ctr|cJ IdinLuigh Lnivcisity Iicss, i )
Chatciz
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE
7
negativity ofasul ectvhodesiresherselfandcannotlesatisfiedly
ol ects, lecausetheyarevhatthesul ectisnotandvhatdesirelacks.
Desireasthedesireoftheotherisapuredesireofemptinessandlears
vitness to the sul ect's constitutivelack. Desire doesnotseek satis-
faction lut its ovn continuation, to go on desiring. But ifdesire
desires itselfas desire or as sul ect, it vants not to le an ol ect, it
vantsnotto le, itisadesirefordeath.
lnLacan'sinterpretation, theedipalsceneisanattempttoshield
the sulectfromthe realityofthis alysmal desire. The rivalry vith
thefatherlecomes thenarrovfootlridgethankstovhichthesul-
ect does not feel invaded, directly svalloved up ly the yavning
chasmthatopensitselfto himaspure andsimple confrontationvith
the anguish ofdeath . . . indeedve knov ofthatshieldofinterven-
tion, orsulstitution that the father forms| letveenthe sul ectand
thealsoluteMaster- thatisdeath`. `' ltispreferalletoidenti(sym-
lolicallyandrivalouslyviththethervholars en oymentthanle
handed over to the alyss ofradical alsence. Thus the non ol ectof
desire lecomesthe targetofrepression. Nonleingcannotlerepre-
sented, it is leyond presence and representation. But this desire of
nothing organises itselfin imaginary scenarios, it imagines andpic-
tures itselfin ol ects , Lacan's |||||c o|]c.| c, the cause and ol ect of
desire.
Thelittle ol ectisaremainderandreminderoftheprimalunion,
tovhichthesul ectclingsandcontinuouslyreturnsinordertofor-
gettheseparationandlack. Thisol ectmaytakedifferentforms. the
lostlreastofthe mother, a gaze, aparticularvoice are ol ectsvhich
lelongto the Real and cannotle symlolised orsulstitutedlylan-
guage. But the sul ectalso luilds imaginary scenaria vhich trigger
the return ofthe little ol ect. fetishistic attachments, a sports car, a
letter ol, gieater recognition ofthe academic ly the peer group.
The attainment ofthe fantasy does not satiate desire hovever, it
immediatelyattachesitselfto anevol ect, anevenfastercarorfur-
therpromotioncJ|aa||um. Thecauseofdesireisinterminalle,entry
to the Real is impossille and larred, the little ol ect is alvays
deferred, it has no name lecause it does not refer to some specific
needorrequestluttosomethingmore ordifferentfromthe ol ect.
the vish to lecome again complete or to le fully loved ly the
ther in a vay that vould nll the lack. But this is impossille. the
little ol ect as the remainder ofthe Real makes all fantasy scenaria
`' Iacan in unuLlishcd Scminai \I, quotcd Ly oich-acoLscn, Ic:ca ocit. suia n
z

; , .
O PS YCHOANAlYS l S BE COMES THE LAV.
necessarilyinadequatesulstitutes, alvaysinsearchofsomethingelse
ormoreorelsevhere.
Furthermore, the ther cannot offer vhat the sulect lacks,
lecause it isalsolacking. The sul ecttries unsuccesfully to identi(
the desire ofthe therandreplaceslackviththelittle ol ect. lnits
endlessproliferationanddiversincation, desire emerges as the excess
ofdemandoverneed, assomethingineverydemandthatcannotle
reducedtoaneed. AsLacanargues , desireisneithertheappetitefor
satisfactionnotthe demandforlove, lutthedifferencevhichresults
fromthe sultractionofthenrstfromthesecond,theveryphenom-
enon oftheir splitting`. Thelittle olect, the insatialle excess of
demand over need represents vhat the other lacks in order to le
alsolute, representsthelackitselfastheirreducilleremainderinany
signification`. Thusthelittleolectfills thelack,the splitthat:ra-
verses thesul ectaftercastration,lut, onthe otherhand, the o|c|a
preventsanyol ectfromreallynllingthelack`. 'Ih

erealol ectof
desire cannot le present. lt is alvays represented in inadequate and
failing identifications and imaginary constructions raised on the
ground ofrepressedouissance. The imaginary identifications vi

th
olectsandideals arefailingattempts to denydeath. T|eyloth

is-
recognisedesireanddefendtheselffromthespectreofitsmorlidity.
N. 1b `L1I11 `b b 1b _ 1V b 1V111L1
These imaginary identincations leadt ointense competition for the
love ol ectand cause hostility, aggressionandvar. Lacan's solution
lrings thelavlackagain. A contract lies lehind speech andallovs
the social lond to operate. This rivalrous, competitive lase at the
olect'sfoundationsispreciselyvhatissurmountedinspeech,inso-
farasitinterestsathirdparty. Speechisalvays apact,anagreement,
peopleunderstandeachother,theyagree- thisisyours ,th

tismine,
this is onething, that is another`. Tospeak to anotheris to deny
death, to delay and defer desire, to avoid addressing the alsolute
ther orMaster. Speaking leads to a truce, rivalry is alandonedin
ordertoparticipateindiscourseandshareourimaginaryscenariosor
`
:r||, o. cit, z8,
-
`` icc cnvcnuto and Rogcr Kcnncdy, T|c Hork c:ucs Ic:ca - Ha Ia/roJu:/ica
London, Frcc^ssociation ooks, i86) i ,6.
`' Rcnata Salccl, T|c So||s rccJom, o cit , suran , i z6
`` acqucsLacan, Scm|actlI: T|cPy:|oscs London, Routlcdgc i ) ,o
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE V
symlolicrepresentationsviththeother.Butspeechis alie, adeny-
ing, negating, deferringdisoursevhichplacesthelove-ol ect, death
anditsdesire, temporarily) inaleyance. Butthislieisalsothevhole
truth. lf, inLacan'sfamousformulation, the sul ectis asigniferfor
another signifier, ve reveal ourselves in speech as leings vhich
alvays addressan other. Theactofspeaking, theenunciationofdis-
course, isontologically ofgreaterimportancethanits contents.
Ict us sct out lron thc concction ol thc Cthcr as thc locus ol thc sig-
nilicr. ^ny statcncnt ol authority has no othcr guarantcc than its vcry
cnunciation, and it is ointlcss lor it to scck it in anothcr signiucr,
vhich could not acar outsidc this locus in any vay. Vhich is vhat
I ncan vhcn I say that no nctalanguagc can Lc sokcn, or, norc
ahoristically, that thcrc is no Cthcr ol thc Cthcr.`'
But vhy do people dovn arms and enter into delate? Ve must
assume the existence ofaninitialpact, ahypotheticalsocial contract
vhichsupports sulectivityandsociality. This contractisminimalin
sul ect matter lut far-reaching in consequences. The original pact
cannot le questioned or ustified, it must le assumedto le true, a
nctionrepeatedineveryact ofspeech. lts ol ectissimplythe agree-
mentto speak, to exchangespeechratherthanllovsandto conduct
the rituals and the struggle forrecognitionthroughdiscourse rather
than mortal lattle. All speech, speaking itselflefore any content of
the utterance orintentionto communicate, enacts the terms ofthis
contract.
Theimplications ofthistheoryfor urisprudencearemomentous.
Lavis the socialfaceoftheinter-sul ective contract ofspeech. ltis
notthelavthatneedslegitimacy,legitimacyistheproductofapri-
mordial legality. Themostimportantaspectofthelegalinstitutionis
toguaranteethecontractofspeech,toofferasymlolicsourceorori-
gin- theSovereign,theLegislator,theLav- vhichannouncesthat
lavandspeechhaveauthorityandmust le oleyed.
vcry lcgitinatc ovcr alvays rcsts, as docs any kind ol ovcr, on thc
synLol. ^nd thc olicc, likc all ovcrs, also rcsts on thc synLol. In
trouLlcd tincs, as you havc lound, you vould lct yoursclvcs Lc
arrcstcd likc shcc il sonc guy has said c||:cto you and shovn you a
card, othcrvisc you vould havc startcd Lcating hin u as soon as hc
laid a hand on you. `
`'
o| , o cit j io-i
` Lacan, T|c Scm|acrc:ucs Ic:ca, \ol i ohnForcstcrtrans. ) lorton, i 88)zoi
i P S YCHOANAlYS l S BECOMES THE lAV.
Veshouldaddparenthetically thatthepoliceare colloquially called
the Lav and that statements ly the police and judges are lav's
`vord`. Thatthelav existsandspeaksismoreimportantthanvhat
itis orsays . Thejudge, confrontedvith anolj ect- thelegal mate-
rials- oranother sulject- the litigant- has as his nrsttaskto assert
thecompletenessandgaplessnessofthelavthroughtheperformance
ofthe legal ritual. The sulj ect desires that the ther, the symlolic
order,isvhole, seamess,thatitspeaksandthatitcantellthesulject
vhat it desires ofher. The actualinterpretation ofthe lav, on the
otherhand, meetsthesecondarydesireto ascriledefinitelegalmean-
ingtotheolj ectthusturningitintoaguaranteeforthesulj ect'slack.
Theudge mustleseen to declareratherthanmake thelav, to le
the mouthpiece ofthe institution, lecause his declaration serves a
doulle function. the pronouncement ofthe vord, lav's signiner,
carrieslav'spover,lutthisdeclarationexpressesalsothelegalinten-
tiontoseizetheoljectofdispute) , togiveitmeaning,andthusmake
it vitness the unity and completeness ofthe lav and its sulj ects.
Dvorkin's `right ansver` may have little to do vith legal practice
lutitsproclamationprovides, despiteitsfalsity, anecessaryfunction
forthefearfuldesiringsulj ect.
TheFrenchlegalhistorian, PierreLegendre, turnedtheontologi-
cal pover ofthe Lacanian `lav-speech` into a completejuridical
anthropology. For Legendre, the legal system `instituteslife`, it
formsthe`atomiclond`vhichlindsthe `primarymaterialofman.
` Jhc vork olPicrrc Lcgcndrc is quitc unrcccdcntcd in Icgalhistorograhy. Inhis
manyublications suran z) hchasocncdancvficldollcgalvrtingO lcgalocticsin
vhichthclovc olthc tcxt olIav) andolmcdicvaIandatristic sourccsis accomanicdby
ahighlyIitcraryand aIIusivc- almost baroquc - stylc Mis gcncaIogyolmodcm lav andof
its malady oltcchnocratic rationaIism, Iinks thc rcvolution olthc intcrrctcrs in thc i zth
ccnturyviththcincororationolthckcythcmcs olcanonIavintocivillavandchalcngcs
many olthc assumtions oltraditionaI historiograhy Similary, Lcgcndrc`s historcaI and
thcorcticaIinsight thatthc lav caturcs thc souI andbyattaching bodyto sirit crcatcs thc
subjcct, ocns alargcvistalorjurisrudcnccandthisvritcrhasbccnconsidcrablyinnucnccd
byhiscativatingandscductivcthcoryandrosc utacriticaljurisrudcnccmustqucstion
thcconscrvativcrccrcussionsolhisjuridicalanthroology, asrcscntcdlorannglishrcad-
crshi in his CcrJo:o IcuFcv|cucssay, o.cit. , suran z In thcsc rcsccts, Lcgcndrcjoins
thccIimatc olthc rcactionary Catholic rcsonsctomodcmity. Jhc crtiquc olthis ascctis
indiscnsabIc lor thc dcvclomcnt ola crticalsychoanaIyticaIjurisrudcncc vhich viIl
rout grcatly lrom an cngagcmcnt vith Lcgcndrc's vork Cl sura n. j , ^nton Schutz,
Sons olVrt, Sons olVrath I6 CcrJo:o IcuFcv|cu j-, ,,-i oI z I,) , and Pctcr
Coodrch, Introduction. Psychoanalysis and Lav in Coodrich cd ) , Icu caJ /|c
Ca:oas:|ous H Ic_caJrc FccJcr NacmiIIan I ,) For a morc crticaI aroach scc ^Iain
Pottagc, Jhc Patcrnity olLav inLouzinas c/c|cds) , o||/|:, os/moJcra|/y, Cr|/|:c|Ic_c|
S/uJ|csRoutIcdgc, I ) .
` Lcgcndrc, Jhc Cthcr dimcnsion olLav, o.cit . , suran z, j
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE i i
liology, thesocial,theunconscious`. '' Thelegalinstitutioni s func-
tionally homologous to thelavofthefatheror, inanotherversion,
itinterpretsandappliestheoriginalinterdiction.lnthesamevaythat
thenameofthefatherintroducesthesuljectintoseparation, lackand
negativity,languageandtheinstitution`separatethesulj ectfromthe
fantasm ofleingvhole`. '' Butthisseparationneeds a guarantor, a
`sacred`inaccessilleplacevhichstagesthe originorthecauseofthe
sulj ect's leing. ln pre-modern societies this role vas played ly
totems ,religionsormythicalreferencestothedivineorjustfounda-
tions oflav. ln modernityitis `thestate vhich| is the sacred place
ofthe Totem, vherever it takes hold, vhatever its constitutional
formmayle, the religious ormythicalspace ofthe discourse called
upon to guarantee the foundations vithout vhich the lav vould
remainunthinkalle`. '
The lav stages the totem or the interdiction around the father,
more specincally around `theimage ofthe sulstance ofthe Father,
vhich is equivalent to the totemic principle in uropean civilisa-
tion`. ' The `juridical montages` of this image, God or Pope,
mperororKing,stateorlegislator,`giv e| consistencytothefound-
ing discourse ly representing the ther as a concept, in order to
spread the effects ofthe lnterdiction, that is to say, thejuridically
organised effects `. '' Again vhen Legendre turns to the mythical
contract ofspeech, heinterpretsitin alegalisticvay. The void that
guarantees the social order- vhat Legendre calls the Reference -
mustle transmittedandvalidatedlegally, throughpatrilineargeneal-
ogy, juridical emllems and the reason ofthe lav. This is the all
importantlutneglected `other dimension` oflav. `alody ofdis-
courses vhich, vithin any society, construct the founding image
vhichisthesulj ects' marchinglanner. . . These arevalorisedinsti-
tutionally,notaccordingtotheirexpresscontentvhichisafunction
ofthedeclaredintentionoftheauthor) ,lutthroughthefactofleing
symlolicallyaccordedaplacevithinsocietyasrepresentationsofthe
reference`. ' The `truth` and the function of the institution is,
therefore, produced ly ' uridical reason as communicator ofthis
non-juridicaldimensionoflav, andmanoeuvred throughafunction
'' ibid ,.
'' ibid. , ,z
' ibid.
'` ibid. , ,
'' ibid 6o.
'` Lcgcndrc quotcd in^lain Pottagc, o. cit . , sura n j 8 , I 6,
i Z
PS YCHOANALYS l S BECOME S THE LAV.
ofpaternity. 'Buthovdoespsychoanalysisunderstandrights?The
rest ofthe Chapterfocuses onthe insightthatanalytical theory can
lringtotheunderstandingofrights.
N. V1 L1b 1b 11 11 11 I1_ 1 L 1
The continuous expansion andcontraction) ofrightsindicatestheir
characteras anevolvingcomlinationoflanguageandlav. Language
facilitatesthe expansionvhilethelavorganisesanddelimitsit. Lav's
involvement makes the ther's presence in the operation ofrights
apparent. rights are sets ofsigns vhich help denne andunderpinthe
identityofsulectsintheirrelationshipviththevorld. Theyachieve
thislygivingformal shape topeople' sdesireforrecognitionly the
ther. loth the otherpersonand thelig ther, thelav, language,
thepoverstructures andinstitutions, ina vord, the symlolic order
ofthepolity. lnthissense, rightsareafunctionforthesul ect,avay
throughvhichpeople are given to the vorld and formally relate to
others. At the same time, the huge significance placed ly political
regimes ofall colours and ideologies on the protection ofhuman
rights and the increasingmolilisation ofinternational force intheir
nameindicates thattheyare also animportantfunctionofthe social
organisation.
First,rightsasafunctionforthesul ect.Vehavearguedthatrights
legalise desire, thatthey organise aneconomy ofvantsandfears and
give pullic recognition to the sul ect's vishes. Psychoanalysis, as a
theory ofdesire, can help explain the function ofrights inthepsy-
chic organisation ofthe sul ect and their linkvith the institution.
Ve vill proceedintvo directions. ve vill examine, first, thelink
letveendesire andrights and, inthe next Chapter, vevill turnto
thevayinvhichrights operateforthesulectandthesociallond.
According to RenataSalecl, one ofthe fev theorists to examine
human rights from a psychoanalytical perspective, rights serve the
samefunctionforsocietythatthelittleol ectaservesforthesul ect.
lnthissense, thesymlolicorganisationofmodernitypresupposesthe
conceptofrights. rightsallovusto express ourneedsinlanguagely
formulatingthem asademand. Follovingthe Lacaniandennitionof
desire,Saleclargues thatvhenvemake a demand, venotonly ask
theothertofulnllaneedlutalsotoofferushislove. Aninfant,vho
"' Lcgcndrc quotcdinAainPottagc, o. cit. , suran. j 8, i 6,
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE i
asksforhismother'slreast,needsfoodlutalso asksforthemother's
attentionand affection. Desire is alvays the desire ofthe otherand
signifies precisely the excess ofdemand over need. ach time my
needforanol ectenterslanguageandaddressesthe other,itlecomes
a request for recognition and love. Butthis demand for vholeness
and unreservedrecognition cannot lemet ly the other, either the
ligtherofthesymlolicorderlanguage,lav,thestate) orthecon-
creteotherperson. The ligtheristhecauseandsymloloflack,it
is symlolised ly the name ofthe father. And as no further master-
signinerexistsoutsidethesymlolictoturnitintoaunified,complete
and transparent order, the ther is alvays lacking. Similarly, the
otherperson, vhoselove ve crave, is sulectedto the same castra-
tionandlackasourselves. lnthisappealtotheother,veconfrontthe
lackin the other, a lack that can neitherlenllednorfully symlol-
ised. The little ol ecta represents the excess ofdemand overneed,
vhattheotherlackstolecomplete,lackitself
Salecl transfers the Lacaniananalysis ofcastration, lackand desire
tothesocialdomain. Thesulectofmoderndemocracies undergoes
a social symlolic castration similar to that ofthe edipal scene.
Beforemodernity,thisindispensallefunctionvascarried outimplic-
itly and silently lyinitiation rites. Afterthe invention ofdemoc-
racyandhumanrights,ithaslecomefullyvisille. Themodernsare
presentedforthefirsttimevithachoice. eitheracceptthesocialcon-
tract, sacrince vholeness andfreedom for security and enter com-
munity orle excludedfromsociety. Through a massive translation
oflileral political philosophyinto Lacanian terms, Salecl concludes
thatthis choiceis homologousto thatletveenenteringthesym-
lolic orderandlecominga speakingsulect or not andfallinginto
psychosis.Boththesechoicesareforced,andoneshouldaddthatthe
conceptofchoicehaslittle meaninghere. ltcertainly doesnotrefer
totheintentionalactionofmcastccrequiredlycriminalandtortlav,
lut to a retrospective responsililityimpliedlythe factthat one has
enteredthesocialsymlolicandhasaccepted,alleitunconsciously,its
terms.
Rightsarethesulstitutegiventothesul ect,thelittlepleasureleft
or the revard offeredforhis sulectionto the fundamentalprohi-
lition imposedly the social symlolic. lnthissense, rights actlike
thelittleol ecta. Astheremainderofaperceivedsocialintegrityand
peace and as sulstitutes for lack, they are the cause and ol ect of
desire lut, at the same time, theysigni( lackandprevent it from
leingnlled. Rights give theimpressionthatthesul ectandsociety
i + P S YCHOANAlYS l S BECOMES THE lAV
canlecomevhole. omyifalltheattrilutesandcharacteristicsof the
sul ectveretolegivenlegalrecognition, hevouldlehappy, only
if the demands of human dignity and equality vere to le fully
enforced ly the lav, the society vould le ust. But like the little
olect, rights loth displace and fill the lack and make the desired
vholeness impossille. The other's desire escapesthe sul ect, alvays
seekingsomethingelse, lutthe little that remains allovs the sulect
to exist as a desiring leing. Rights , like the little ol ect, lecome a
phantasmatic supplementthatarouses lut neversatiates the sulect's
desire. Rights alvays agitate for more rights. they create evernev
areas ofclaim and entitlement, lut theseprove vithout exception
insufficient.Vekeepdemandingandinventingnevrightsinanend-
lessattemptto fillthelack,lutthis onlydefers desire.
Jhc discoursc ol univcrsaI hunan rights thus rcscnts a lantasy scc-
nario in vhich socicty and thc individuaI arc crccivcd as vhoIc, as
non-sIit. In this lantasy, socicty is undcrstood as soncthing that can
Lc rationaIIy organiscd, as a connunity that can Lcconc non-
conhictuaI il onIy it rcsccts `hunan rights. `
The delate on the recently introduced Human Rights Act i ,,
canleusedas anexample. mostcommentatorsassumethatallBritain
needs for makinghumanrightsrealityis to codi( them inlav and
traintheudiciaryandthepolice. ' Thishopeislasedon theimag-
inary role ofrights discourseand cannotle realised, lecause codin-
cation does notresolvetheinherentvolatilityandendlesslydeferred
characterofrigLts. ThelomlingofformerYugoslaviaoffersanother
chilling example ofhov the operation ofhuman rights can occa-
sionally lecome literally murderous. The lomls, vhich causedthe
death and in ury of many civilians , including ournalists , foreign
nationals andeeingrefugees , veresupposedto restore andguaran-
teetherightsoftheKosovoAllanians.Aftereveryannouncementof
civilian deaths and the accompanying perfunctory apology, the
lomlingcampaignvasintensified.Theprincipleappearedtolethat
themorevelomlthequickervillhumanrightstriumph, themore
Salccl, ocit. , suran. , at i z,
' JhcMumanRights^ctmarsthcbcginningolancvcrainthcqucstt odcvcloand
rotcct human rghts in thcLK it rcrcscnts a ncvbcginning andalundamcntal shilt
to a right-bascdsystcm ollav, KcirStarmcr, Iurocca HumcaF|_|/Icu Iondon, I^C,
i ) I]ackStrav, thcMomcSccrctar,dcscrbcditas thcurstmajornonhumanrights
lor morc than joo ycars and as a kcy comoncnt olour drvc to modcnisc socicty and
rclrcshouidcmocracy MCLcbs, col ,6, ,8z-j , i 6 Fcbruar, i 8. Jhclullintroduction
olthc^ctvas dclaycduntil Cctobcr zoooto allovlorthctrainingollcgal olficials.
Rl GHTS AND DES l RE i 3
civiliansvekill theinevitalle `collateraldamage` ofthe campaign)
thelettervill therightto lifeleprotected. Andvhenthe rights of
Allaniansverennallyrestored,aftertheATvictory,theirunhin-
dered operation led to the murder, torture and cleansing ofethnic
Serls. Thesemayleextreme cases , luttheyshovtheviolencethat
underpins the desire ofrights . To paraphrase a classical maxim,us
ut|s|uus.'
Saleclisparticularlyhelpfulinexplainingtheendlessproliferation
ofrights-claims.
^though vc havc rights , a right that vouId cxrcss thc notion ol
rights docs not cxist. ^II vc can do, in this rcgard, is to invcnt ncv
rights crctuaIIy, scarching in vain lor a right that vouId alfirn us as
non-sIit suLj ccts . . . Iunan rights can ncvcr Lc luIIy dcscriLcd in
Ianguagc, as thcrc viII aIvays rcnain a Iack Lctvccn ositivc, vrittcn
rights and thc univcrsaI idca ol hunan rights. '
But the fruitful analogy letveenthec|||o|c|candrights lecomes
cloudedlyaratherunconvincingattempttocelelraterightsandly
a rather hasty dismissal ofthe many criticisms oftheir operation,
includingLacan's . ' TodevelopherinsightandrescuetheLacanian
analysisfromcollapsingintoaratherlanallileralism,forthedefence
ofvhich one does not need psychoanalytical concepts, ve must
introduce some important qualifications and necessary corrections .
To le sure, alileral apologiaforrights, from Lacanianperspective,
is a sissyphian undertaking and can le pursued convincingly only
through a very idiosyncratic and eclectic reading ofits theoretical
sources.
The nrst difficulty in Salecl's approach refers to the idea ofthe
`socialsymlolic castration` , vhichthe sul ectundergoes onenter-
ing modern society. The claim that societies go through processes
similar to those ofthe individual is a rather massive and unargued
assumption. Psychoanalysis is atheoryofthesulect. Anyextension
tosocialstructuresmustleonlylyanalogyand,asthe difncultiesof
pscychoanalyticalsocialtheoryshov,itcanonlyhavethetheoretical
persuasiveness ofanalogy. Vhat type ofprimal union exists, for
example, letveen the sul ect and society, vhat kind ofseparation
and alienation do people suffer vhen they enter social institutions?
Salecl slides letveen the analogical the sul ect acts as ifa social
' Jhcmaximis |omo|om|a|s|uus,manisavolltohisfcllovman
`' RcnataSalccl, Rightsin!sychoanalytic and Fcminist !crscctivcs', i6 CcrJo:o Icu
Fcc|cu, I I z i at II j | i ,)
`' SccChatcr i zbclov
i
PS YCHOANAlYS l S BECOMES THE lAV.
castrationhastakenplace) andtheliteral asocialcastrationnecessar-
ilytakesplace, itsformhasomy changedfrompre-moaernsocieti
'
s)
and, as a result, the exactness ofLacaniantheory, vhich marvels in
formulaic, mathematical and quasi-scientinc concepts, is lost. More
importantly, the necessary rhetorical andnarrative tropes andstrate-
giesthataccompany analogicalarguments are alsent.
This confusionis apparentin Sale'saimthat,lecause the sul-
ectchooses to entersociety, alleitforcilly, sheis `responsille` for
vordsanddeedsvhichviolatethesocialcontract. She dravsananal-
ogyvith Freud's analysante Doravho, althoughsul ecte

d to many
infamies in the hands of her immediate family and frends, vas
deared to le analytically `responsille` for her malady. `Psycho-
analysis has alvays heldthe sulectresponsille for his orherouis-
sance, leginningvithFreudvhospokeofone' s.|o|.cofneurosis. . .
AnalysisvouldleforeverllockedifthequestionofDora's ]0u|ssca.c
fromvictimhoodandresponsilility forit| vas neverposed, andthe
situation vould le simply incomprehensille`. This ascription of
responsilility may indeedle useful to the therapist in an

nalyti

cal
context. Saleconvenientlychooseshatespeechasanareainvhich
thistype ofstrictresponsilility shouldapply. `The sulect' chooses'
tospeak. Althoughthevordsmayescapethesulect'sintentions,and
he orshe says more in slips ofthe tongue orletveenthe lines, the
sulect cannot escape responsilility, even if this responsilility
accountsfornomorethatthemerefactthatheorsheisasulect`.
Butextendingthisprincipletothevhole oflav, asSale'sdiscussion
ofrights implies, vould le loth impossille and catastrophic. one
vouldleheld`responsille`tooforexpressing`seditious`or`dissi-
dent`vievssince, ly `accepting` the social symlolic castration, he
hasforcillychosenthedominantsocialcontractandisresponsillefor
anydeviationsfromit. Byelidingtherapeuticresponsililityandlegal
lialility, psychoanalysis sidesvith a type oflileralismvhich consis-
tently acts in the most intolerant vays tovards non-lilerals. This
rather quick comlination oftherapy and human rights is neither
therapeuticnorlileral.

This confusionmaylepartlyduetothealsenceofaeardistinc-
tion letveenlav andlanguage in Lacan' s theorisation ofthe sym-
lolic orderandhis lack ofinterestinpositive lav. Thisis not as lig
aprollemforthe analystas itisforthelegaltheorist. Psychoanalysis
can credilly explain the process offormation and the pathology of
` Salccl, T|cSo||s otccJom, suraH. , I 2 .
`` ibid. , I 2 j q
Pl GHTS AND DES l PE i 7
thepsyche, lutthetransferofitscontestedconceptsfromsulectto
societyhasnotleensuccessfullycarriedoutyet,andonecouldargue
isperhapsinappropriate.Butthisisnotaninsuperalleprolleminthe
contextofrights .Theprimalinterdictionagainstincestandparricide,
vhichformsthelegal componentofsymloliccastration, canle seen
as the `naturalist` kernel ofalllegality. Andas Legendrehas argued,
the indispensalle function oflegality, namely to separate andindi-
viduatethesul ectandreconcileitvithlack,iscarriedoutinmoder-
nitylypositive lav. ln this approach, lav andrights are afunction
forthe sul ect, theyhelp constituteitaslegalandthemassivetrans-
ferofpsychoanalyticalconcepts to societyis notnecessary.
ltvasarguedinChaptersand,, thatthehumansul ectisalvays
accompanied,and occasionally evenpreceded,lythelegalsul ect, a
constructionofthelavandits institutionallogic. Ve couldanalyti-
cally distinguish therefore letveen the sul ect, the speakingleing,
andthelegalsul ect, the institutionalleing. lfthe sul ectcomesto
life ly enteringthe symlolic orderlyacquiringlanguage, the legal
sulectislorn through entryto the lav. There isno need to argue,
therefore, foramassiveandtheoreticallyunsupported `socialcastra-
tion`. The sul ect, already constituted through the symlolic, is
introduced to legal sulectivity through a second sul ection to the
commands andprocedures ofpositivelav. The logic ofthe institu-
tion, vithits ever-proliferatingcommands andregulations, prohili-
tions and permissions, duties and responsililities , seizes and invests
the sul ect vith legal meaning. ne could argue, therefore, that a
`legal symlolic castration` complements theprimary castration and
introducesthesul ecttoasecondary,lav-inducedlackofvholeness
andalegal determinationofeventhemostintimate aspects oflife.
lnthiscontext,rights canleseenas acompensationforlegalsul-
ection, as theimaginaryconstructsvhichgive thesulectthesense
offreedom or integrity. As imaginary complements ofsulection,
theykeepdesiregoinglyactinginavayanalogoustothefetishistic
displacementsofthelittleol ecta. verysuccessinthesulect'snght
fornevrightsleadstonevandfurtherclaimsinaspiralofdesirethat
canneverle fulnlled. Rights maymeet realorimaginaryneeds and
may, in a Hegelian fashion, extend recognition to people. But for
psychoanalysis , theirmaintaskistokeep thelegalsulectintheposi-
tion ofdesiring, in othervords, to helpmaintain it as sul ect. The
sul ect'srelationtothelittleol ectaisamliguous .itisthecauseand
ol ectofthesul ect's desirelutitmustalsolekeptat adistance, it
mustnot gettoo closeortoo far. `Thesul ectcomesintoleingasa
O P SYCHOAlAlYS l S BECOMES THE lAV.
defenseagainstit,againsttheprimalexperienceofpleasure/painasso-
ciated vith it`.'ou|ssca.c, itssatisfaction, is thedesire ofdeath, it
vould return the sulect to psychosis or to the primal union and
death.
Similarlyvithrights. As the sul ects , follovingtheirdesire, fight
for more and more effective rights, political pover comes under
increasingpressure to acknovledge andcodi( them, andtheirpro-
tectionhaslecomethemark ofcivility ofasociety. Butthesuccess
villalvayslelimited. Asvevillexamineinmoredetailinthenext
Chapter, no right canearnme the full recognitionand love ofthe
otherandnoBillofRights cancompletethestrugglefora ustsoci-
ety. lndeedthemorerightsveintroduce,thegreaterthepressureto
legislate for evenmore, to enforce them letter, to turn theperson
into aninfinite collector ofrights , andhumanity into an endlessly
proliferatingmosaic oflavs. Asthelavcoloniseslifeandthe endless
spiral ofmore rights and possessions and acquisitions fuels the sul-
ect'simagination, thetheroflavdominateshersymlolicandthe
otherperson's recognition lecomes secondary. The ideological tri-
umph ofhumanrightsisparadoxically consistentvith the empirical
olservationthatourepochhasvitnessedtheirgreatestviolations .
Ve can conclude that psychoanalytical theory can offer many
insights into the centrality and operation ofhuman rights. But the
formalismoflileralLacanianismisnot sufficient. lfthelittle ol ecta
isthe differenceletveentheideaofhumanrightsandtheirpositive
formulation, vhilehumanrightspointtoafuturevhichisalvaysstill
tole foughtfor, theirlegalformulation, vhich can onlyle histori-
cal and context lound, re-introduces in them the violence ofthe
foundations oflav. For psychoanalysis, this gap creates the paradox
ofrights,vhichareatthesametimeforvardlookingandhostagesto
the past, theoint letveen the futural imaginary domain and the
lackvard leaning veight ofthe institution. Marking the point at
vhichtheimaginaryimpossillydefiesthesymlolic, humanrightsare
theproection ofthe `notyet` into the `alvays there`, anecessary
lutimpossillepromise.
`' rucc Fink, T|cIc:ca|caSu|c:/ !rnccton, !rncctonLnivcrsity!rcss, i ,)|
1 Z
T|c Imc_|acty L.mc|a cac /|c u/utc .}|/.|c
H mc,j||cuot|J||c|Jocs ao||a.|uJc l|o|c|sao|uot||ccca|ca.|a
c|, ot|||ccccsou|||coac.oua|ty c|u||.| |umca||y|s c|ucys |caJ|a.
scarVilde
I . 1Ib b 111 V L1b . 111 V L1b 11 _ I1 b b 1L1
Thetvinaimsof thenlightenmentproectvereemancipationand
self-realisation, domination and oppressionthe tvo evils itattacked.
Thestruggleagainsttyranny,dictatorshipandlackofeffectivepartic-
ipation in decision-making isstillthefirstpriorityinmanyparts of
thevorld.ButinVesternpostmodernsocieties , self-realisationand
self-fulnlmenthavelecome a central aspirationofselfandpolity. ln
asocietyvhereeverydesireisapotentialright,itisforliddentofor-
lid. Could this le the sulective expression ofthe end ofhistory?
Self-realisation has leen recently associated vith the Nev Age
movementandits euneideasofcommuningvithanineffalleinner
soul, orofunlurdeningthe `real` selfthatliesconcealedoroverlaid
lysocialconventionsandlavs . Moregenerally, hovever, the claims
toauthenticityrepresentedlylifestylemagazinesandhedonisticcon-
sumerism, the exhortationto `leyourself` , lefree, notgivein on
yourrights,desireetc.areinauthenticandnarcissistic. Theyhavecre-
atedanideologicalclimate, invhichallnon-individualisticpolicies,
fromtaxation to the regulationofthemarkets , are dehnedaslimita-
tions onfreedomandas restrictionsofrights, asthe oppressiverem-
nants ofmodernity.
Self-realisation is not merely lileration from external constraints
and impositions, as Foucault has shovn, and does not lead to the
attainmentofsome `essential`identity. Self-realisationisaprocessof
shapingthe self, anaesthetico|cs|sandcare, vhichcanonlylecar-
ried out in relations vith others and vithin a community. ther
Z THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOPl A
people, groups, andthelav are aspects ofouridentity, t|e s

pp

rts
and constraints ofourradical opennessto the vorld. Beingisleing
together, leing vith others. Vieved fromthis
l
ers
l
ective, hu

an
rightsacknovledgepolitically andlegallytheradicalinter

sul ectivity
ofhuman identity, they involve the other and the lav in
'
he con-
struction of self The Hegelian tradition explains hov rghts are
involvedinthestruggle forrecognitionandpsychoanalysis adds that
recognitionpassesthroughthedesire oftheO
'
her,assymlohcorder
orasotherperson.Thedesireforintegritypro ectstheOtherasnon-
lackinglutthisgesturemisfires, the otheris aslackingasself. Letus
examinethisdialectic oflackas expressedinrights.
Aright-claiminvolvestvodemandstotheother.aspecifcrequest
inrelationtooneaspectoftheclaimant'spersonality orstatus tole
left alone notto sufferinhislodily integrity, to letreatedequally)
lut, seco.dly, a much vider demand to have her

vhole ide
'
ity
recognised in its unique characteristics . ln dema

nding recognition
andlovefromthe otherperson, vealsoasktheBigOther,thesym-
lolic order, representedly the lav, to recognise us in our identity
throughtheother.Vhenapersonofcolourclaims,.orexample,that
thereectionofa ol application amountedtoadenialofherh

man
right to non-discrimination, she makes tvo related lut

relat
'
vely
independentclaims.thereectionamountsloth
'
oa

unfairdeni

lof
theapplicant's needfora ol, lutalsotothedenig
'
ationofherv
'
der
identityvithitsintegralracialcomponent.EveryrghtthereforeLnks
a needofapartofthe lody orpersonalityvithvhatexceedsneed,
the desire thatthe clain.ant is recognisedandlovedas avholeand
completeperson.

.
Human rights violations offer the lest illustration

ofth

mutual
implication ofpartial needs and identity. Th

reasonis olvious. the

non-recognition or violation ofa human

rght

puts o

sta

e and
emphasisesthediffcultiesofthealvaysfragilepro ectofidentityfor-
mation through other-recognition. Ve sav alove, h

ov torturers
make theirvictim letray` their comrades, thus severng the sym-
lolic link vith their community, vhich helps knot their identity
together. Vithhisimaginaryidentityunravelled,thevictimcan

then
leturned`,lecomeusefultothepolice, aninformantorpohtically
inactiveandharmless. The sameanalysis canhelp usunderstandvhy
SouthAfricanllacksreportedfeelings ofdeep personal hurt at even
minorincivilities orviolations offormal equalityperpetratedlythe
vhiteminorityduring apartheid. The smallest insult,
'
he mostsec-
ondaryinconvenience, madethevictimfeelvorthlessintheeyesof
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOPl A Zi
theBigOther.Everydenialof rightvasfurtherconfrmationthatthe
polity does not recognise the identityofthepersonas avhole and,
as a result, vlateverpartial compensations vere offered, such as a
higher standard oflivingthanthatofotherAfricanstates, theyvere
inadequate. But the attainment ofidentity through the desire and
recognition ofthe other fails in different vays, even in those cases
vhere human rights are successful on the surface and succeed in
legalisingdesire.
Human rights redirect desire fromits primary olect, the primal
union vith the m) other or the Real, into secondary and symlolic
sulstitutes. lndoingso, theylothmisrepresentthestructureofradi-
caldesire orou|ssca.candtheyshieldthesul ectfromitscatastrophic
consequences . To have arightis to lerecognisedin some aspect of
selfandthereforeto denydeath, to delay and deferradical desire, to
avoidspeakingaloutthealsolute Other. Vhenexercisingrights,ve
enterinto atrucevith others, ve alandonrivalryinorderto partic-
ipatein discourse andshareviththemimaginary scenarios andsym-
lolic representations . Butrightis also a lie, a denying, negatingand
deferring action vhich puts the ol ect of desire temporarily) in
aleyance. lf, in Lacan's famous formulation, the sulectis a signifer
for another signifier, in claiming and exercising ourrightsvereveal
ourselves as leings addressed to an other. Having rights, living
throughrights,isthereforeofgreaterontologicalimportancethanthe
contentsoftheserights.Rightsareourtruthfullie. Theireverexpand-
ing potential is an expression ofthe intersulective and insatialle
character ofdesire. The sul ect ofrights tries incessantly to fnd the
missingol ect thatvillfill herlackand turn herinto avholeleing
inthedesireoftheother.Butthisol ectdoesnotexisttheotherdoes
nothave` it,anditcannotlepossessed. Theimpossililityoffulfll-
ing desire leads into ever increasing demands for recognition, and
every acknovledgement ofright leads into a spiralling escalation of
further claims. ln this sense, the promise ofself-realisationlecomes
theimpossilledemandtolerecognisedlyothersasnon-lackingand
all human rights partial expressions ofthe unattainalle right to le
loved` . Right-claims proliferatelecauselegalised desireisinsatialle.
ltlooksasifthemorerightsandrecognitionveget, themore inthe
deepestrecessesofone'segocentricfortressavoicesoftlyluttirelessly
repeats ' our valls are made of plastic, our acropolis of papier-
m1che' `. '
Comclius Castoradis, Rccctions on Racism, j zTcs| I|cvca i z) ,
ZZ THE l MAGl NAPY D OMAl N AND THE lLTLPE O l LTOPl A
But the progressive legalisation ofexistence, i nvhich increasing
aspects oflife lecome rights, keeps, like technological intervention,
undermining the unity ofself Vhile metaphysical humanism nxes
the essence ofhumanity, the humanleing, turnedinto an ol ectof
technological and legal ordering, lecomes an artihcial totality.
Technology dissects people into functions and limls, factors and
organs eachsettinginmotionadifferenttechnique, eachtolehan-
dledseparatelyvhile otheraspectsaskept out oftheheldofvision`
and thenproceeds to reassemlle them into continuously changing
vholes. very human technique has its circumscriled sphere of
action, and none ofthem covers the vhole man`, vrites jacques
llul.` achtechniqueassertsinnocently thatit onlyvorks on one
partofthelodyandleaveshumanintegrityintact,effectsontherest
aredealtvithasside-issuesputasideforfurthertechnicalinterven-
tion. This leads to the convergence in man ofa plurality, not of
techniques, lutofsystems orcomplexes oftechniques. The resultis
operational totalitarianism, no longer is any part ofman free and
independentofthese techniques`. '
Thesamehappensvithrights. Thelavlreaksdovnthelodyinto
functionsandpartsandreplacesitsunityvithrights, vhichsymlol-
ically compensate for the denied and larred lodily vholeness.
ncounteringrights nihilates anddismemlers thelody. the rightto
privacy isolates the genital area and creates a zone ofprivacy`
aroundit,themouthisseveredandreappearsmetonymised`asfree
speechvhichprotectsitscommunicativelutnotitseatingfunction,
freemovementdoesthe samevithlegsandfeet,vhichare alloved
tomovefreelyinpullicspacesvhile thevholepersonisgivenlim-
ited rights ofalode and non-nationals none. Similarly, for Drucilla
Cornell, the denialoftherightto alortionshouldleunderstoodas
aserioussymlolicassaultonavoman'ssenseofselfpreciselylecause
it . . . placesthevoman'slody inthehandsandimaginings ofoth-
ersvhodenyhercoherencelyseparatinghervomlfromherself`.
/ygmunt auman, c/moJcra I/||: Cxlord, IackvcIl, i ) , i .
` |acqucs lluI, Thc Tc:|ao|o_|:c| So:ic/y ViIkinson trans .) lcv York, Random
Mousc, i 6|) , 88.
' ibid , i .
` ViLiam NaclciI, Lav`s Corus Ic||:/|. Jhc Fantasmatic ody olRights Liscoursc
IX/zIcucCr|/|uc, ,-,,, |,-6 i 8) VhiIclrccdomofmovcmcntandsccurtyolthc
crsonarctrcatcdascruciaIciviIIibcrics,nomajorhumanrights convcntion,incIudingthc
urocan, crcatcs a gcncraI right olrcsidcncc Somc incIudc no such right at a. Cthcrs
rcstrictitto statc nationaIs.
' LruciIIa Comcll, T|cImc_|acryIomc|a lcvYork, RoutIcdgc i ,) 8 .
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOPl A Z
lntheprocess ofconstructinglegalsul ects and ofmakinghumans,
rights split and re-lind lody and selfand lecome companions and
alliesofthemore olviousprocessesofliological,genetic, cylernetic
etc. manipulation oflodies and selves . ln his sense, the human can
never le an individual, an un-divided and indivisille leing.
lndividuals lecome exille and mallealle legal and technological
syntheses. Theself-identicalsul ectofmodernity, reectively trans-
parent to itself a hction according to most maor philosophical
schools , appears novasahighlyprecariousassemllyofdismemlered
lodiesandfragmentedexistences.
A main characteristic oftechnologicalinterventionis thatitdeals
vithparts and organs ofthe lody as iftheyvere isolatedand treats
anyadverseconsequencesonotherorgansorpeopleasside-effectsto
le dealtvithlyfurthercorrectiveintervention. Asaresult,thelody
islrokendovnandtreatedas acollectionofprocessesratherthanas
anorganicvhole. Rightsfollovasimilarstrategy.Anev rightaimed
atincreasingtheprotectionoffreespeech,foughtforlythemedia,
forexample,makesprivatelivesvulneralletounnecessarydisclosure.
This,unvelcometosome effect, isdennedasathreattoprivacyand
dealt through the creation ofnev rights for potential victims and
more regulatoiy codesfor the media. Again recent children legisla-
tionincreasedtherightsofnaturalparentsovertheirchildrenandin
orderto dealviththenumerous cases ofaluse, itcreatedhelp-lines
vherechildrencandenouncetheirparentsorgavechildrentheright
togotocourtandasktoleremovedfromparentalcustody. ltispart
oftheactionofrightstocreatecounter-demandsandtoleadtomore
legislation and nev rights in order to comlat their adverse conse-
quences. Rights oftencreateratherthanaddressconict.
Thepartial operation ofrights is evident everyvhere. A voman
vho is given civilandpoliticalrights , lut does nothavehergender
recognisedlythepredominantlymale dehnitionofhumanrights , is
not a complete person. An unemployed vorker vho vants to
molilisesupportagainstslumconditionsandpollutioninhiscouncil
estate, lut cannot do itlecause oflack ofmoney and access to the
media,feelsfrustratedinthemostimportantpro ectofhislife. Gays
orlesliansvho are dismissedlythemilitarylecause oftheirsexual
orientationfeelakey element oftheirpersonalitydenied. Arefugee
vho is turneddovninherapplicationforpoliticalasylum,lecause
the immigiation officer lelieves that she lies , is not fully human.
ln these and a million other cases, the in ury and insult caused ly
non-admissionto thestatus ofright-holder thepositionofthelegal
Z+ THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOP l A
sul ect) highlights the many vays invhichthe structures ofdomi-
nation and oppressionvithholdsocial recognition fromvhatreally
matters to people. Human rights societies, ly compartmentalising
groupcharacteristics, personaltraitsandindividual entitlements, split
the imaginary vholeness of self and lody. They recognise some
aspects ofselfformal equality and dignity) , vithhold recognition
from others the necessary material preconditions for the effective
enoyment ofdignity) , finally, devalue ordismiss still others sexual
orientationandidentityaprimeexample) .
At the same time, each nev and specialised right, the right to
same-sexmarriageforexample,exposestheartincialityoftheego,ly
increasingly colonisingits intimate parts. Nev rights remove activi-
ties and relations from their communal halitatandmake them cal-
culalle, exchangealle, cheap. Vhile rights are a compensation for
thelackofvholeness, themorerightslget,themore lneedtoclaim
and, paradoxically, the greater thesense ofdisointure ofself Rights
are self-devouring, the `rights culture` turns everything into alegal
claim and leaves nothing to its `natural` integrity. Desire and fear
increasingly dominate all relationships and the action ofcommunity
changes from leing-in-common into leings attacking others and
defendingthemselves. The conceptofdefensivemedicine ordefen-
sive education is indicative ofthisprocess. Medicine is supposedto
defend the patient from disease. Defensive medicine, on the other
hand,lynottakingrisks, defendsthedoctorfromanticipatedattacks
fromthepatientandhisrights. Thisexposes anothergreatparadoxat
theheartofrightsculture.themorerightslhave,thesmallermypro-
tectionfromharms, themorerights l have, thegreatermydesirefor
even more lut theveakerthepleasurethey offer.
This aggressive aspect ofrights vas recognisedly the classics of
psychoanalysis luthas leenforgottenlytheirlileralfollovers . For
Legendre, contemporary lav vithitsproliferatingrights forvarious
minoritieshasforgottenthatthecentraltaskofinstitutionsistoguar-
anteethegenealogicallindingorhliationofthesulect,andhasthus
alandoned the mainanthropologicalfunctionoflav. Courtsvhich
have legally recognised the nev gender ofsex change transsexuals
andarepreparedtohaveachildadoptedlyhishithertomothervho,
aftersurgicalintervention,lecame aman, sufferEomapeculiarcase
ofcatastrophicinstitutionalamnesia. 'Theyhavealandoned`think-
ingaloutthestructureofthelnterdiction. . . andgivenuponintro-
' Lcgcndrcrclcrs to a Canadian casc and oncinthc urocanCourtolMumanRights,
in Jhc CthcrLimcnsion olLav, I6 CcrJo:oIcuFcv|cu-|, |-6z i,) .
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE l LTLPE Ol LTOPl A Z3
ducingthesul ecttotheinstitutionofthelimt`. Thelav,luredly
the `propagandaofscience`and `ourdemocraticideals`alandons
itsroleand,lyattackingthe `montagesoflnterdiction`, lecomesan
accomplice to the destruction ofthe symlolic ordervhich hitherto
`supportedthelife ofthespecies`.
L
''
an, too, lemoaned the contemporary veakening ofthe lavs
t
'
aditionally

used to displace the violence ofimaginary identifica-

ti

ns. The

disencha
'
tmentvithcivilisationhas leen unleashedlya
`
piraloffailingnliat

ionsandtheprogressivealandonmentofspeech
infavourofsexualrvalryandviolentcompetition. `Veknovinfact
vh
'
t
'
avages afalsinedfiliationcanproduce, goingasfarasthedis-
sociation ofthe sul ect' spersonality`
_ 1|
Lacan, the man ofthe lav
r
`
p

e
'
te+ly diagnosed and castigated the various af ictions oflegai
civil
'
satio

n. al

rtedgenealogies, infelicitousfiliationsandincomplete
edipal identifications are important failures in our societies, lut
theyarenotalone. Theyareaccompaniedlytheveakeningofevery
legalsupportofsul ectivityandsociality,lyalonglistoflrokenlavs
andfrustratedpacts. Borch-jacolsenusefullycatalogues,
thc i
'
solvcncy and `narcissistic Lastardising ol thc lathcr ligurc, thc
grovmg indistinguishaLility ol thc atcrnal lunction lron thc `scc-
ular douLlc, thc `tangcntial novcncnt tovard inccst in our soci-
ctics and so on. In short, it is thc conctitivc, rivalrous vorld,
rcvcalcd as thc grcat traditional ordcring rincilcs rctrcat, a vorld ol
douLlcs all thc norc idcntical lor asscrting thcir autonony, all thc
norc rackcd Ly guilt lor dcclaring thcir cnanciation lron cvcry
lav.
1 1
1hisi

s adia
'
rile ag

instavorldcontaminatedlythe endlesslypro-
life
'
ating claims to rght andautonomy and amemorialforapastin
vhich thesymlolichadnot explodedinamyriad ofrights claims.
Jhc ocration ol thc lav through thc synLolic castration and thc
introduction into languagc thc nanc ol thc lathcr) is thcrclorc a uni-
vcrsal lunction vhich associatcs thc lathcr vith thc ligurc ol thc lav
. . . ^nd
`
hcn thc Icgislator hc vho clains to lay dovn thc Iav)
rcs

nts hinscll to lill thc ga, hc docs so as an inostor. !ut thcrc is

nothing lalsc aLout thc Iav itscll or aLout hin vho assuncs its
authority.
!2
ibid ,6.
ibid. , ,,
Lacan,

o|/s :H Sc|c:/|oa ^lan Shcridantrans ) London,RoutIcdgc I,,) 66-,

'
rsch-]acobscn, Ic:ca: Tc H|so|u/c Mcs/cr LougIas rck trans ) Stanlord
LmvcttyPrcss, I I ) iz
z
Lacan,
_
crits, suran. 1 i 1
Z THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE O l LTOPl A
l nLacan's vision, the proliferation ofhuman rights an+ its

chal-
lengetothepaternalfunctioncanle
'
atastrop|ic

ln+eed, inhisone
reference to human rights, Lacan gives an indication ofhov he
vouldhave explainedtheirnegative effec
'
s . l

n SenarXlV,Lacan
isexplainingtheideathatthe,ou|ssca.cvhichis
`
acrficedlythesul-
ectinsymloliccastrationdoesnotgetl

ostlutishandedovertothe
therandcirculatesoutsideoftheself, intherealmofthesymlolic.
Literature,vriting,sciencearefieldsinvhichthissacrinced,ou|ssca.c
is depositedandhelps create anddevel
'
p culture. Cultural artefac
'
s ,
Lacanargues, oftenacquirealifeoftheirovna

dvhenvecome

i n
contactviththem,vereceivelacksomeofthissullimatedcre

tive
surplus-pleasure. Theprincipleiscle

r. `itisonlyi
'
sofarasvealien-
ate ourselves in the ther and enlist ourselves in suppo

rt of
'
he
ther'sdiscoursethatvecansharesome ofthe,ou|ssca.ccirculatrng
inthe ther`. ' AtthispointLacanturnsto rights.
o ouissance is given to me or co
'
ld le ven to m
'
other than that
of my ovn lody. That is not clear immedi

tel
)
, lut is susp
`
cte!, and
people institute around this ouissance, vhich is go

d, vhich is thus
my only asset, the protective fence of a so-c

lled universal lav called

the rights of man. no one
`
tops

e |rom usin

g my lody as I see u
:
t

The result of the limit . . . is that ouissance dres up for everylody.
This passingremark, conveniently forgotten|y lileralLacanians , is
extremelyperceptive. Rightslreakup the
`
ar
'
ous
I
a
'
ts ofthelody
and separate the sul ectfromothers , proclaiminghis is

latedsover-
eigntyoverhislodypartsandexistence. B
'
t
`
henrel

tionsatrop|y
andvalls are luilt letveen selfand other,onssca.c dres up and, in
the Lacanian idiom, culture and civilisation, the deposito
'
and
vork-place ofsacrincedouissance, arethreatened.Lav'samligu

us
hostilitytovardsartandliteratureisvell-knovn. nutthe

cessrve
uridincationofsociallife doesnotaffectonlyartrstic cr
'
atrvrty. lna
fully legalised community, the numler and scope ofrghts vould
' ` ruccFink, 1hcIc:ca|ca Su|c:/Princcton, PrincctonLnivcrsityPrcss, : ,,,, ,,.
' ' LacanquotcdinFink, i oi .

.
' ` Costas Louzinas, Introduction and tcsooa andHa/:rosooa Pro)cgomcna

for a
Lcgal iconology, in C. Louzinas and L. lca|, L caJ
,
/|c Imc_c Chicag
,
Chicago
Lnivcrsity Prcss, : ,,,, Chatcr : , Costas Louzmas, La
`
s Fcar ofthc Imagc
.
: ,
/
, Hr/
H|s/ory, , , -,,, : ,, Itisarguablc,lorcxamlc, thatastrctlyd

un

dandaIicdnghtto
intcllcctualrocrty, vhich vould tum into thclt thc mcoror

ation m a

ork ofart ofaIl

styIisticinnucnccsandinnovationsint
'
o|uccdbyothcrs,vouldmcrcascthcmcomcolsomc
artistsbutvouldundcrminc thc crcativityolcvcr,onc clsc
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE l LTLPE Ol LTOPl A Z7
keepincreasinglutthestrictlydemarcatedpleasuretheyoffervould
dramaticallydecrease. '
Lacan and Legendre lelieve that the task ofpsychoanalysis is to
un1erpin thelavagain, to learvitness tothe `truth ofthe speaking
sulect and strengthen the position ofthe father. Lnlike their lileral
follovers, they adopted an authoritarian position and argued that ve
needanevsocialcontract,vhichvillopposeitsfictitioustruthtothe
lie oftheimaginaryandvill `install ,orreinstall) arule ofthe game in
the alsence ofany rule, at a time vhen truth, precisely, is no longer
'lelievalle' . Sucharuleinanagethatdoesnotlelieveintruthscan
only le acceptedpragmatically, lecause it is lacked ly force, ly gun
andmissile. lnthissense,thelomlingofYugoslaviais,indeed,thefirst
real humanitarian var in an age ofuncertainty. As ve vill see in the
nextpart, althoughthesovereignisnottheoriginofthelavlutafunc-
'
iono. thel

av'soperationonthepsyche,heisindispensalle. Theleg-
islatorisanimpostorlut,accordingtotheLacanianstory,thismakesit
evenmoreimperative thathisauthorityleassertedandthefalsetruth
of his lav proclaimed. For the Lacanian, the legislator, the Lnited
States, NAT, the NevVorld rder is the only hope vehave and
theirviolenceisthenecessaryresponsetothecatastrophicviolencecre-
ated ly the alsence oftruth and the failure ofthe sul ect's quest for
`
vho|e

ess.Vhenpsychoanalysisturnsfromdescriptiontoprescription
its crtrcalusesrun outveryquickly.Butthelleakimageitpresentsis
acorrectivetothe excessesofhumanrights rhetoric.
1 1 . 11

b 11b 1 V1. 1I 1 111 1 b IN1V11 L

Psychoanalytical theory i s olsessed vith the lav. lndividuals and
societies come into existence through prohilitions and commands,
through legal operations vhich create the vorld in the image ofa
non-existent lut indispensalle legislator. The struggle for recogni-
tion, the desire ofthe otherisnotaddressedsolelyto the otherper-
son lutalsotothe symlolic order, tolav. lndeed,the otheris onen
seen as the representative ofthe lav and his recognition as the
approval orlestoval ofidentitylythesocial order. Thedesire ofthe
' ' Vc can scc thishacninginthc rch mcn`sghcttos that sringinthcmctroolitan s
'
burbsolthcVcstcrnvorId Jhcsc sccurty-induccd cnclosurcs givc ostmodcmmllion- aircs aIl thctraingsolmatcralvcalthand thcluIIrotcctionolubliclavandrvatcly- ocratcd :crJoassca|/c|rebut,atthcsamc timc, tra thcminthcirvoluntarychoscnrisons, avay lromda

gcrandlromhumanintcractionandcnjoymcnt
' Lacan, L:r|/s, o. cit , suran. IO, : ,
ZO THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE O l LTOPl A
sulectis the desire oflav. the person takes his marching orders from
lavand,forthisoperationtosucceed,thelavmustleseenasnon-lack-
ing, as acompletevholevhichknovs,andhastheansvertoallprol-
lems ofconict. The desire ofthe Otheras complete and non-lacking
istherefore afunctionofthesulect. lneedthelavtolegapless,tole
Dvorkin'sseamlessvel, inorderto acceptmy sulection,lneedthe
otherpersonto levholeinorderto acceptthatmydesire and depen-
dence onherareindispensalleforachievingrecognitionandidentity.
Butthesymlolicorderandlavcannotlecomplete,Dvorkin'shope
is the greatest lileral illusion. lfve visualise the symlolic as a mathe-
maticalset,thelavcanleclosedandthesymlolic ordercompleteonly
ifafurther master signifier exists outside the set, leyond the Name of
the Father. Asignifiervhich, ly leing outside ofthe symlolic, canact
as the ultimate guarantee oflav's completeness andallov the neld to
close. ln psychoanalytical terms, such a transcendent signiher is called
theotheroftheOther,asuperormeta-mastersigniher, notincludedin
the Other ofthe lav and therefore alle to make it complete. But the
Nameofthe Fatherorthephallusare themselves signifiers,theylelong
to the symlolic field and cannot help it close around them, they are
unalletomake thelavcoherentandcomplete There isno realFather
lehindthename, no Godlehindthevord,no otherofthe Other.
The transcendent signiner or the sullime legislator is therefore
loth necessary andnon-existent, impossille. lts role has leentradi-
tionallyperformedlyGod,mperor, SovereignortheLav,various
patriarchal figures vhich, as Legendre has shovn, have unerringly
underpinned Vestern legality. The desire for an author standing
lehindtheinescapallesocialinstitutionsandlestovingauthorityon
themanimateslavandlegalscholarship. ltssignsare everyvhere. in
the olsession ofthe common lav vith its sources, in the inter-
minalle and scarcelyilluminatingAmerican delates alout the strict
or lileral construction ofthe Constitution and their pale nglish
re ectionintheso-calledliteral`rule ofinterpretation, intheend-
less process ofstandard-setting and treaty-making ofinternational
institutions , nnally, in the Hartian rule of recognition` , the
Kelsenian grundnorm and other similarurisprudential fictions. All
these are attempts at vhatmay le called retrospective legitimacy`.
vhilelavsandregulations,highnorms andpettydisciplinesprolifer-
ate, theneedtoattrilutethemlacktoanauthoritativepersonortext
attests to this desire for a Father or lav-maker vho is outside the
operationoflavandinfusesitvithitsma estyandusticeor, inpsy-
choanalyticalterms,vithits gaplessandclosedcharacter.
TH l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE l LTLPE Ol LTOPl A ZV
lninternational lav, the frenetic legislative activityindicates this
desire at its strongest. xcessive lav-making is a sulstitute for the
olvious lack ofa unitary legislator and credille implementation, a
rathertransparentattemptto claimthatanauthorexistslecauseoth-
ervise so many texts vould not have come into existence and so
muchprogenyvouldhaveleenorphaned. Thenegotiationsto end
the var in Yugoslavia vere a good example. NATO and its allies
imposedtheirtermsuponthe defeatedSerls, andlaterstartednego-
tiations vith tLird states, memlers ofthe Security Council, to have
the terms adopted ly the Council. Theforce ofvar dictated terms
tothedefeated,theirretrospectiveattrilutiontotheLnitedNations ,
served more to estallish the Council's position as the disinterested
sourceoflav,thanto convincethatithadmuchto doviththe ces-
sationoftheconict. VecannovunderstandalsovhytheLSclaim
that they cannot le sul ected fully to international lav, as Kosovo
andthevarcrimestrilunalepisodeshaveshovn,lfinternationallav
is to le seen as universal and international politics as ethical, one
povermustleexemptedfromitsoperationsand, throughitsforce-
ful intervention andsovereign interpretation ofthe lav, give it its
desiredseamlessness.
The lav needs a lav-maker, its inescapalle presence creates the
desire for avhole andundividedsource. The Legislator, the King,
the Sovereign, the Constitutional Court, the LS or the Security
Council are functions for the legal sulect, guarantees that his sul-
ection is not arlitrary, unnecessary, undesiralle. Pierre Legendre
argues that this functionis necessary, thatve need the montage or
image ofineffalle pover and sovereignty, fake as it is, in order to
domesticatethetotalothernessofdeathandaccepttheterri(ingfact
that there is nothing leyond thepover oflanguage andthe com-
mandsoflav.Ve canseethisclearlyincontemporary urisprudence,
stillolsessedvithsovereigntyandrights , olligationandprerogative.
The British constitutional delates aroundurope andfederalism or
aroundtheBill ofRights andparliamentary sovereignty arereplete
vith eighteenth century concerns and concepts. To paraphrase
Foucault,inconstitutionallavtheheadofthekinghasnotleensev-
eredyet. ToparaphraseLegendre, evenifsevered,vemustkeep the
headontheking'slodyandpretendheisstillalive,likethose experts
inthepoverofsymlols,theSoviets ,vhokeptPresidentBrezhnev's
lodylongafterhisdeathasifalive, to ensureasmoothtransitionor
to ensure, inpsychoanalyticalterms, that the master signinernever
dies.
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLP Ol LTOPl A
ButasLacaninsistedtimeandagain,therei s nootherof thether,
alltheselav-giversareimpostors,thereisnothingleyondlanguage,
itsstructuresandinterdictionandthelavasmuchasthelegislatorare
ust a series ofsignifers. There is not|ing le

hind signs vhi

ch can
guaranteetheircompletenessandnothinglehindthelavvhichcan
deliveritsustice. God and Kingare notthe cause lutthe effectof
lav. lt is not so much that religion is the opium ofthe people, as
Marx had it, lutthatreligion is the desire ofthe people. But the
paternalfunctionis comingunderattackinlatemodernity and can-
notfulfil its role any longer. As the fatherly ngures retreat, laughed
out ofcourt lyvomen, ethnics , gays , transsexuals and all kind of
minorities unvilling to accept the father's deceit, another signifier
mustoccupytheimpossillelutindispensallepositionoftheguaran-
torofthe completenessoflav.
ne suchisustice, the mostdiscussedtopicinVestern philoso-
phy,fromPlatoandtheSophiststoRavlsandcriticallegaltheory. ln
urisprudentialterms,usticeisasynonymforthevariousformsoftle
Good, the principle orvaluethatgivespositivelavitsmoral quahty
and makes it olligatory moto .oas.|ca||cc. lt has leen successively
denned as virtue Aristotle) , utility Bentham) , the lav Kant) . But
accordingtopsychoanalysis, thesociallondpassesthroughourtrau-
maticrelationviththe therandisdeterminednotlyprinciples or
simplepleasuresandpains,lutlyouruncannydependenceonou|s-
sca.c. ForLacan, one ofFreud'sgreatdiscoveriesvasthatthe Good
is not an arrangement ofvirtues in the right order ofreason, the
alsolute formal lav ofthe Kantians or the tvo Ravlsian principles
lexically ordered. Neither sulstance norform, neitherlogosnor|cx,
individual or universal, the Good is the M) other, the forlidden
olect ofdesire, and no other Good exists. / other

goods and
resources are distriluted, arranged and used according to the
demands ofthissupremelutunattainalle Good.
Legal and moral attempts to define the supreme Goodor achieve
usticefaillecausethelack,thegapopenedinthesul ectlythepri-
malseparation, the `symlolic castration` , canneverle filled. Freud
repeatedlyinsisted,againstthenaiveteof urisprudence,that`lavvas
originallylruteviolenceandthatevento-dayitcannotsurvivevith-
out the support ofviolence`. ' Lavis inextricallylinkedvithvio-
lence in a numler ofvays . Force stands at the origin oflav and
violenceislav's tool. To restrictviolenceanddestructive drives, the
' SigmundFrcud, Hy Hct, in C|v|||c/|oa, So:ic/ycaJFc||_|oa ]amcs Strachcy cd and
trans , !cnguin, i 8,) , ,
THE l MAGl NAPY D OMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOPl A i
lav incorporates loth. ' Asanexpression ofthe poverful, lav can
make no ethical claim otherthanthetotallyformal equalsul ection
ofall to the same rule. Finally, in its attempt to limit desire and
aggress.onvh.chare `quite anatural thing, tohave agoodliologi-
cal lasis and in practice to le scarcely avoidalle`, ' the lav acts
unnaturally andits successis inextricallyloundvithpersistentfail-
ure. By exchanging pre-social fragile happiness for a civilised lut
pleasureless security, lav contrilutes to the process ofdisenchant-
ment. `The price ve pay for our advance ofcivilisation is aloss of
happinessthroughtheheighteningofthesenseofguilt`. ' Vhatever
the type ofsocial organisation, psychoanalysis insists that there is a
residue, a `nonlinkedthing` orfaultline inevery community and
lav, leyondtheir control to vhich theyremainhostage. lt isanalo-
gous to an `unconscious affect`, encountered in the `sharp and
'
ag
'
efeehngthattheciviliansare notcivilisedandthat somethingis
ill-disposed tovards civility` vhich `letrays the recurrence ofthe
shameful sicknessvithinvhatpassesforhealthandletraysthe' pres-
ence' oftheunmanagealle`.`
Theonlyvayforcomlatingthisviolence, accordingtoFreud,isto
nurture `emotional ties` ofloveandidentification. People shouldle
encouraged to share important values and concerns and thus drav
closerthroughtheiridentincationviththesharedolect,leitaleader,
apartyorthecommunityof ustice. justicemakespeopleidenti(vith
the totality. `l canlehappy to le one ofVe, if

e areust,lecause
thenVevilltreatMe asvellas reasonallypossille, andVevillle
h

ppy to |ave Me as one ofLs, lecauseVe knovthat l leingust,

vill see things from urpoint ofviev, andvill not exclude vider
considerations frommy assessment ofthe situation` . lntheustsoci-
etythere is no s|c|s, no dissension . . . no conict`,'ustice, the
otherofLav, hasfinallyguaranteedandclosedlav'sempire.
Butnosuchsocietyexists, usticeis notfullyofthisvorld. lnpsy-
choanalyticalterms ,thismeansthatthereisnootherofthetherand
a proclaimedjustice is, like the Legislator, fraudulent. Postmodern
' VaItcrcnjamin, Jhc Critiquc ol \ioIcnccinFqc:t|oas .]chcotttrans. ) lcv
York, Schockcnooks, i ,8)z,,-ooand]acqucsLcrrda`sIongcommcntary JhcForcc
ofLav,Jhc 'NysticaIFoundationol^uthority` , i 1 CctJo:oIcuFcv|cui -i o|6i o) .
' SigmundFrcud, Hy Hct, suran. i 8 , 6o
' SigmundFrcud, C|v|||c/|oacaJ||I|:ca/ca/s,in C|v|||c/|oa,So:ic/ycaJFc||_|oa,sura
n i 8 , z,.
]. -F Lyotard, ^I Insy Lnbcknovnst) inNiamiJhcor,ColIcctivccd. Commua|/y
c/IooscIaJ NinncsotaLnivcrsity!rcss) |z-8, |6
` ibid ||,| .
' ] R. Lucas, au/|:c Cxlord, CIarcndon, i 8o) i 8-.
Z THE l MAGl NAPY D OMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOPl A
societylacksanultimate groundor unity and, as aresultofthe cen-
trality of human rights, theories of ustice lecome increasingly
extravagant and unrealistic. Their action gradually dissolves any
remainingmarkers ofcertainty and `inaugurates a history invhich
people undergo the experience ofa final indeterminacy as to .he
foundationofpover, lav, andknovledge,andas tothefoundatron
ofrelations |c|ucca sccaJ o||ct, at everylevelofsociallife`. The
feeling ofinustice, on the other hand, is the vay through vhich
people construct this sense oflack, incompleteness or disorder, the
name given to the symptoms of social exclusion, domination or
oppression. lnthis approach,usticeisvhatsocietylacksanddesires
and has no other definition, rather,ustice is the definition ofthe
indennalle, the unconscious ofthe lav, a trace thatsignifies a past
traumaorafutureunion, alvays deferredand different. Theories of
ustice are the fantastical screen or frame philosophers, poets and
lavyershaveerectedtoshieldourselvesandtoexplainavayou|ssca.c
theunknovndesire andfear oftheotherand oftheimpossille com-
munity. Theyansverthe symptomslynegatingtheircause, theyare
failingattemptstoforgetandexorcisetheterri(ingtraumaattheheart
ofthesocial.Buttheradicaldissymmetry,thealyssoftheother'sdesire
andoflackperceivedasinusticevillalvaysleavelehindaremainder
forvhichneitherthelavnorfantasycanfuhy account. Thus, vhilea
hugeamountofintellectuallalourhasleenputinto creatingtheories
of ustice, suchtheoriesarealvaysloundtofaillecauseusticeforgets,
itmustforget inustice. This is the reasonvhy thelavalvays creates
itscriticsandvhycritiquealvays feedsoffthelav.
Humanrights are the other olviousheirto the Father. Thelav and
polity that proclaims them appears united coherent and civil,ust and
vorthy of oledience. Governments, international and non-govern-
mentalorganisationsagreethathumanrightsarethelest,ifnottheonly,
vay left for promoting the intrinsic value of a legal order. For the
Vestern lileral, principles like nationalism or socialism, vhich have
leenusedinthevakeofreligiontoknottogethervariouslavsandpoli-
ties, areaggressive, exclusionapandleadinevitally to ethnic cleansing
andgenocide. Onlyalavimmersedinhumanrightsisalavvorthyof
its name and, as in Yugoslavia, a lav vorthy of killing for.
Psychoanalysis shovs, hovever, that the promise ofhuman rights to
make thelavvhole orust, like thatofreligion ornationalism, cannot
le delivered. The symlolic order and the lavareust that, a series of
` CIaudc Lclort, Icmo:tc:y caJ o||/|:c| Tcoq L Naccy trans) NinncaoIs,
LnivcrsityolNinncsotaPrcss, i 88) i .
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE l LTLPE Ol LTOPl A
signs opentonegotiation and re-interpretation. Like all signs, those of
religion or nationality are not intrinsically aggressive, and those of
human rights are not inherently lenign. This does not mean that a
Vesternhumanrightsstate is nottreatingits citizensletterthanafun-
damentalist theocratic one. ltmeans that this type ofcomparison, ifit
canlemadeatall,isamatterofdetailedolservationandunderstanding
ofthe different cultures and traditions and not ofan axiomatic aprior-
ism. Secondly, it means that Vestern human rights states can le as
aggressive,murderousand larlaric as anytype ofregime. Ourdesireis
lav's desire. lut the more our desire is achieved, the more the lav
appears closed,coherentandgaplessaroundagrandlegislatororprinci-
ple,themoreitlecomesaggressivetooutsidersanddemandsourunva-
veringandunreservedrespect. lnsuch acase,aporousnationalismmay
le more generous than aself-satishedly arrogant human rights culture.
Andinahcases, as Lacaninsists `thelegislatoris animpostor`, thelav
strives toleOne,fullyrational,a`seamlessvel`, lut cannotsucceed.
Vecanprovisionallyconcludethatvhilepsychoanalysisisapov-
erful hermeneutic tool for understandingthe persistence ofcritique
andthe emotionallife oflav,veneedtore-interpretLacan's ther
ethicahy in order to address the inadequacies ofthe institutionand
the traumas ofthe sociallond. Freud's story oflavstartsvithvio-
lence and Lacan's story ofthe sul ect legins in separation and lack
instituted ly the lav. But the persistent sense ofin ustice, and its
attendantandunceasingcritique, indicatesthatthereisathingvhich
predates thelav, an eros moreprimordialthanthethanatosthelav
institutesastheolect ofdesire. Feministpsychoanalysiscallsthislav
lefore the lav the `primal union vith the Mother` lrigaray) ' or
the `archaicmother` or`al ect` Kristeva) . 'lntheethicaltermsof
Levinas, thetrauma ofthesul ectiscreatedthroughitsexposureto
therness, invhich the origin oflav andlanguageare `constantly
sulmergedlypre-originalsulstance`. ln aparadoxicalsense, psy-
choanalyticalurisprudencecanlecriticisedfornotleingsufnciently
erotic, forleingunalle fully to understandthe nature ofthe `emo-
tional ties`itplacesatthecentre ofthesocialandlegallond.
' Lucc Irigaray, Sc:u|um}or cao/|cr Homca, Ha I/||: Scuc| I crca:c, CaroIyn
urkc and Cilian CiII trans. ) London, ^thIonc i ) , I|ovc /o you ^Iison Narin trans )
lcvYork, RoutIcdgc i 6)
]uIiaKrstcva, T|cH|c:/oucr o}HorrorLconRoudicztrans ) CoIumbiaLnivcrsity
Prcss, i 8z) ,ParII, Vomcn, PsychoanaIysisPoIiticsinT|cKr|s/cvcFccJcrJorlNoicd. )
Cxlord,IackvcII i 86) i ,- zo.
mmanucILcvinas, Humca|smcJc|`Hu/rcHommcNontcIIicr, i ,z) 68 SccChatcr
i , bcIov.
+ THE l MAGl NAP Y D OMAl N AND THE lLTLPE O l LTOPl A
Anethicalandcriticalfoundationalmythof lavvouldreinterpret
theprimalparricidelyemphasisingitseroticaspect. Thelrothersfe

lt
asense ofguiltleforelavand moralityhadarisen, lecause an et|i-
cal turning to the ther comes lefore the lav and le
'
o

es its
ground. lnthisinterpretation, themurderandtheeu
'
hars

ticn

eal
ofthedeadsymlolises not ustthenarcissistic edipalidentincation
viththeFather, lutthe originalincorporationofalterity- as Death
orthe ther- atthe heart ofsul ectivity. This love forthe deador
unknovalle therisvhatvillalvaysinfusethepassionfor ustice-
although not itstheory- andthevision ofutopia- although not its
practice. The most important ethical and political lessonofps
`
cho-
analysisvouldthereforele. resistall attempts to close
'
he

lavinthe
name ofhumanrights,ustice orany otherhaughtyprnciple,laugh
attheimlecility ofthepettylureaucrats andservants ofpovervho
tell us that they knov the right ofthe lav and the truth of ustice,
confrontmperor, Lav or Sovereign, likethetale's child, vith the
truthalouthisnevandmostancientclothes. theycoverhimandhis
symlolicmaestyonlylecauseofourovnimaginaryneeds andpro-
ections, andtheycandisintegrate,likeaspider'svel, inthelightest
lreezeoftherealorinachild'scry. urethicalolligationistovhat
inselfandsocietyis leyond the ego andthesociallody. Thisis the
utopian heartofhumanrights.
1 1 1 . 11 1 1L1 1V` 1I11
A central premise ofpsychoanalytical theory is, as vesav, that the
sulect comes into existence ly entering the symlolic realm a

d
encountering language andlav. Slavo Zizek explains the paradoxi-
cal operation oflanguage inthe process ofsul ectincation and sul-
ectionas follovs.
By means of the vord, the sul ect rinally unds himself . . . attains him-
self, posits himself as such. The price, hovever, is the irretrevalle |oss
of the sul ect's self-identity. the verlal sign that stands for the sul ect
- in vhich the sul ect posits himself as self-identical - lears the mark
of an irreducille dissonance, it never rits the sulect. This paradoxical
necessity on account of vhich the act of . . . nnding oneself . . .
assumes the form of its opposite, of the radical loss of one's self-
For an cIaboration on thcsc thcmcs scc Louzinas and Varrington, Jhc Forcc ol
usticc.^urisrudcnccol^Itcrp i |) j So:|c|caJIc_c|S/uJ|cs|c, and]u/|:cM|s:crr|cJ
dinburgh Lnivcrsity Prcss, i |) Chatcrs 2 and |
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE l LTLPE O l LTOPl A 3
identity displays the structure of vhat Lacan calls symlolic castra-
tion` . `'
Linguistic signification cuts the lody avay, symlolic castration
replaces it vith a name, prohilits theprimal union and creates the
`speakingsul ect`, asplitandlackingselfvho desirestheprohilited
Real.Vehavearguedalove, thatsomethingsimilartakesplaceper-
hapsviththeoperationofrights. lftheencountervithlanguageand
thelasicinterdictioncreatesthesul ect, theencountervithpositive
lav, lecoming a learer ofrights , creates the legal sul ect. ln this
sense, thefunctionofrightsinthe organisation ofthepsycheisasso-
ciatedvith the effects ofthesymlolic castration and, more specifi-
cally, vith vhat ve have called secondary or legal castration. This
secondorsocio-legallirthconnrmstherecognitionrightsgive lam
a free and morally responsille agentvith dignity and self-respect, l
amformally equal inrelationtolasic civilandpoliticalentitlements
etc. ) , introduces the person into adulthood and connects him vith
the representative ofsocial and political pover. The name ofthe
father of the Freudian family drama is replaced here ly vhat
LegendrecallstheReference. God, King,theLav,theSovereign,the
ultimatesource ofallright, thelocusfromvhichallsocialpoveris
assumedtoproceed.
Thesymloliccastrationandthemirrorstage thatfollovsitcreate
a proected sense oflodily integrity, an in:aginary completeness
vhich replaces the feeling offragmentation and lack ofliml co-
ordination. Let us turn nov to the second orlegal castration, the
result ofthe entryinto the legal symlolic. Becomingalegal sul ect
deniesinasimilarfashion, asvesav,thelodilyvholenessoftheper-
sonand replaces itvith partial recognitions and incomplete entitle-
ments. Rights ly theirnature cannot treat the vhole person, this is
the reasonvhynorightto rights exists. Such arightvouldle the
right ofapersonto le himselforherself, a unique human leing in
commonvithothers ,arightthatvoulddefeatthevholepurposeof
havingrights. lnlav, apersonis neveracompleteleinglutacom-
lination ofvariouspartialandoftenconHictingrights,thecontingent
holder oflegal entitlements that punctuate life. The sum total of
rights constructs the legal sul ect as a ratherimlalancedvehicle for
thedifferentialinvestmentsofthelav. lfveveretoimaginethepor-
traitofthelegalsulect, itvouldhaveapassingresemllancevithits
`' SIavoj /izck, T|c IaJ|v|s|||c Fcmc|aJct: Ha Isscy oa S:|c|||a_ caJ Fc|c/cJ Mc//cr
London,\crso, i 6) |6-,
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lL1LPE Ol LTOPl A
humansitterluti t vou!dalsolestrangely alien, as ifpaintedi nthe
style ofCulism. ahuge ear, aminuscule mouth, oneprotrudingand
aggressive eye, an elephantine nose plac
'
dvaere t|e mouthshould
le. ltvouldleaproectionofathree-dimensionalimagoontoaat
andattening canvas.

But the vholeness ofthe sul ectdeniedly thelav andits rghts
returns in the imaginary proection ofan ideal self Hov does this
pro ectionoperate? Drucilla Cornell's `imagina
'
domain` is us

eful
as the starting point. Cornell argues that conHicts alout alortion,
pornography orsexualharassment shouldle understoo: in

relati

n
to the imaginary domain ofvomen, the pro ectedl

dily ir

tegrty
andsexualimagothattheoperationofthemirrorstageinstallsineach
ofus early in life. `' For Cornell, the `imaginary domainrecognises
thatliteral space cannotle conHatedvithpsychic space andreveals
that our sense offreedom is intimately tied to the reneval ofthe
imaginationasvecometotermsvithvhoveareand
"
ho
`
evis|
to le as sexuate leings. Since, psychoanalytically, the imagrnary is
inseparalle from one's sexual imago, it demands that no o
'
e le
forcedto have another's imaginary imposeduponherselforhimself
in such avay as to rol him orher ofrespectforhis orhersexuate
leing`. ` Cornell's emphasis on the imaginary nature of lodily
integrity,vhichformstheindispensallelasisofidentityformation
'
t
the mirror stage and continues in adult life, is extremely useful in
developingaurisprudence ofsexual respectand integrity. No legal
interventionislegitimate, accordingto Cornell, ifitviolatesthepro-
ectedandanticipatedlodily integrity ofthe personc

oncerned.

But
asthesepro ectionsdifferfrompersontoperson,auniversalp

osrtron
onthese issuesis impossille and auniform responsetothe different
andconictingimaginaryproections ofvomenismorallyvrong. lf
thelavvere to adopt, for example, the same attitudetovardspro-
and anti-alortion vomen, or tovards an anti-porn feminist and a
vorkerinthe porn industry, itvouldnecessarily violate the imagi-
narydomainofatleast one ofthetvoparties.
urproectisviderhovever. lfthefutureanteriorityo

flodily
`
ex-
ual integrity stems fromthe constitutive actionofsymlolic castratron,
thesecondorlegalcastrationproectsacoherentimaginarysocialiden-
tity, invhichlodyandselfareintegratedandallaspects notustsex-
ual integrity) of a ourishing self are recognised ly others . The
imaginary domain ofhuman rights is that ofthe complete human,
`' ComcII, o ct, suran. 6, Chatcr I
` bd 8
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE l LTLPE Ol LTOPl A 7
rightsaresupportedlyafantasyofvholenessvhichre-uniteslodyand
person into an integrated selt Behind the dismemlered and legalised
lody

a
'
ts, st

nds theimageofacompletesulectandasuturedlody.
This imagrnary existential integrity, vhich supports the sense of
identity, is luilt onthe desire ofthe otherandis the opposite ofthe
individualism ofphoney `authenticity` . lt should le immediately
addedthattheanticipatedcompletenessoftheimaginarydomain,the
pro ected future integrity that underpins present identity is, nrst,
non-existent and impossille and, secondly, differs from person to
personandfromcommunitytocommunity. Butdespitetheinfinite
numlerofidealegos, theimaginaryseemstohave certainstructural
similarities. Vhatever type of social recognition ve may fantasise
alout,vhateverdreamofcompletenessgivesusoursenseofidentity,
theyallincludeaclaimtoexistentialintegrity.tothealilityofselfto
le vhat it is , unique unrepeatalle and different, an otherness as
r

gards everythingthatisnotitself, anentityunrestrainedlyneces-

sity, freeofdeterminationandalletoresistexternalimposition. The
proectionofexistentialintegrityexpressestheaspirationofleingand
ofleingperceivedasanother,freefromuniformity,commondeter-
minations and accepted or acceptalle dennitions. This imaginary
vholeness and existential uniquenessvhich dehnes our place inthe
vorld exists equallyinVesternindividualisticsocietiesandintradi-
tional communities and carries init , alleit in dilferent proportions ,
thehopesoffreedomandequality,thecentralvaluesofhumanrights.
But our imaginary constructs these values as integral aspects ofthe
uniqueness ofthepersonandnotasustsemiotic outcomes ofsimi-
lari
'
iesvith some and differences fromothers. To putitdifferently,
vhilethepostmodernsulecthasleenpronouncedsplit,decentred,
lackingandplural, itis stillheldtogetherthrough afantasy ofiden-
tityandapro ectionofcompletenessvhichcreatesfragile narratives
or liographical coherence out ofthe many `sul ect positions` and
disconnected fragments ofour existence. `` ur argument is that
humanrightsplay acentralrole in constructingthisfantasy.
Theimaginary domain ofhumanrightsisuncannilyclosetornst
Bloch's dennition ofutopiaand ofradical naturallav, invhichthe
present foreshadovs a future notyetand, one should add, notever
possille. Thefuturepro ectionofanorderinvhichmanisnolonger
a `degraded, enslaved, alandoned or, despisedleing`linksthelest
traditions ofthepastvith apoverful `reminiscence ofthefuture` .
`` mc

sto LacIau and ChantaI Noullc, Hc_cmoay caJ Sooc||s/ S/tc/c_y London, \crso,
I8 ,) cssim
O THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE O l LTOPl A
l t disturlsthelinearconceptof timeand,likepsychoanalysis,i t imag-
ines thepresentintheimage ofaprehguredleautifulfuturevhich,
hovever, vill never come to le. The anticipatedlodily complete-
ness ofLacan's imaginary dravs itsinspiration, likeBloch, fromthe
future anteriority ofthe human identity and the `not yet` ofthe
utopian chora. The imaginary domain is necessarily utopian, non-
existing. Asvithall utopias, vhentheimaginarylecomes real, the
effects are catastrophic. And yet, this non-place or nothingness
groundsoursenseofidentity, inthesamevaythatutopiahelps cre-
ateasenseofsocialidentity.
ne could argue, therefore, that vhile human rights replace the
lody vith linguistic and legal signs and split it into many discon-
nectedparts,theyalsointroducethesplitsulecttoautopianhuman-
ity, to an idealised self-image that lrings together the various parts
intoitsformalcontours.Humanrightsconstructlothadismemlered
self, dissolvedinapluralityofentitlements,andtheimagoofavhole
personvhich assumes `the recognition ofthe alterity ofthe future
fromvhich the selfhas leenconstituted, and, on vhich, througha
proection, it depends for its survival as a self`. ' The space ofthe
imaginary ofrights is precisely letveen the legal disassemlly ofself
andthefantasyscenarioofacompletehuman,vhichcomesfromthe
futurelutcoloursourpresentself-understanding. FortheLacanians,
thisimaginaryfutureanteriorrefersexclusivelytotheintegrityofthe
sexuatelody, fromourperspective,itinscrilestheutopianlutindis-
pensallepromise ofintegrity ontoselfandthelodypolitic.
Butrevivingtheutopianimaginaryandlinkingitvithhumanrights
is a difhculttask. Not only havehuman rights leenhiackedly gov-
ernments and international committees and their early connection
viththeutopianismofradicalnaturallavhasleensevered,lututopia
also is notdoingtoovell. ltvouldnotleinaccurate to saythatour
epoch has vitnessedthe demiseofutopianhopesandthat, addition-
ally, the utopian motifhas leen suspended even in critical thought.
Theconceptofutopiavasdealtthehrstdelilitatingllovinthehfties
andsixtiesvhenthe Sovietgulagsandmentalasylumslecamevidely
knovn. ltvas deletedfromthepolitical dictionary vith the collapse
ofcommunism. lnthisanti-utopianclimate,FrancisFukuyamaearned
vorld-videfamevhen he statedthat `today, vehavetroulle imag-
iningavorldthat is radically letterthan our ovn, orafuture that is
notessentiallydemocraticandcapitalist. . . Vecannotpictureto our-
`' ComcL, suran 6, |i .
THE l MAGl NAPY D OMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOPl A V
selves avorld that is cssca||c||y differentfrom the presentone, and at
the same time letter`. As the individual and his rights lecame the
universalreligion, collectiveimaginationseemsto have dried out,the
principle ofhope eitherrealisedinlileralcapitalismorextinguished.
Russell jacoly, in his aptly called ||c IaJ ,j l|o|c, addressed
recentlythelossofnerveontheLeftandconcludedthat`atlestrad-
icalsandleftists envisionamodihedsocietyvithliggerpiecesofpie
for more customers. They turn utilitarian, lileral and celelratory.
The left once dismissed the market as exploitative, it nov honours
the market as rational and humane`. ` The statementcharts accu-
ratelythevayfromClauseFourtonevLalour.Butitalsoalludesto
thevidercultural momentofthea-Jc-s|e.|c, sharedlythe Left, in
vhichgrandtheories andmeta-narrativeshaveleendiscreditedand
thepoliticsofmultiplicity,differenceandpluralismhavereplacedthe
promise ofaperfectfuture. The demise ofcommunismhas created
ontheLeftagrudgingrespectforlileralismanditsfailingattemptsto
create a rationalscheme for ustly negotiatinginteractions amongst
individualsvhosedesires andinterests areinevitallyinconHict.
Andyetno centuryhasleenmoremurderousandgenocidalthan
the tventieth, and the `end ofhistory` has not signalled the end of
genocide.jacquesDerridahashelpfullycataloguedthe limitations of
the`nevvorldorder`andofthe
discourse on human rights that vill remain inadcquate, sometimes
hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent vith itself as
long as the lav of the market, the foreign delt`, the inequality of
techno-scientiric, military and economic development maintain an
effective inequality as monstrous as that vhich prevails today, to a
greater extent than ever in the history of humanity. For it must le
cried out, at a time vhen some have the audacity to neo-evangelise in
the name of the ideal oflileral democracy that has unally realised itself
as the ideal of human history. never have violence, inequality, exclu-
sion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human
leings in the history of the earth and of humanity. `'
Asthemillenniumdravstoaclose, Fukuyama'scomplacencymakes
jacoly's diagnosis too painful for everyone vho vants to deny the
infamies ofthepresentinthename ofthefuture.
Does that meanthatve are left vith no hope, that ve are con-
demned loth individually and collectively to tinkering vith the
`` Francis Fukuyama, T|cIaJ ,jH| /oq caJ /|c Ic/Mca London,!cnguin, i z) |6.
`' RusscL]acoby, T|cIaJoC/o|clcvYork, asic ooks, i ) i o
` ]aqucs Lcrrda, Sc:/rcs ]orMcr !. Kamultrans. ) lcvYork, Routlcdgc, i |) 8.
+ THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE lLTLPE Ol LTOPl A
margins ofthe social system, private and privatised ly the forces of
glolalculture?Thisvasalvaystheadviceorthreatoftheapologistsof
poverandofthepragmatistsofthecommonsense, againstvhomnat-
urallav consistently relehed. The `end ofhistory thesis, the cele-
lrationofthepresentforitspresence,hasaccompaniedeveryhistorical
period, more as avarning ofimminentchangethanas celelrationof
stalility, surfacing usually at the point at vhich historyvas alout to
enter a radically nev phase. Vhat is interesting alout our present
prophesies of the `end is that, unlike previous periods, they are
accompanied ly the poverful utopian imagination ofhuman rights
vhich, the nev order has positivised, tamed and co-optedto alarge
extent, lut vhich retains a huge creative and explosive potential.
Vhile theories ofustice are the longest failure ofVestern thought,
symlolicattempts to appease the discontent ofcivilisation createdly
the symlolic order, the sense ofinusticeand the utopianhopesasso-
ciatedvith it, have alvays acted as a social imaginary domain, as if
societieshave animagination ofvholeness analogous to that ofindi-
viduals .
VesavhovrnstBlochllended together utopia andnaturallav.
ln amore melancholic mood, TheodorAdorno emphasisedthe cen-
tralparadoxofallutopianhope. ntheonehand, `theonlyphiloso-
phyvhich can le responsilly practicedinthe face ofdespairis the
attempt to contemplate all things as they vould present themselves
from the point ofredemption. Knovledge has no lightlutthat shed
on the vorld ly redemption. else is reconstruction, mere tech-
nique. nthe other, the utopiais `also anutterly impossillething,
lecauseitpresupposesastandpointremoved, eventhoughly ahair's
lreadth,fromthescopeofexistence. . . themorepassionatelythought
denies its conditionality for the sake ofthe unconditional, the more
unconsciously, and so calamitously, is delivered up to the vorld.
Ltopian thought is caught in a doulle lind. ly denying the deter-
mined character ofthought, `even ly a hair's lreadth, in order to
raiseitselfalovetheinfamiesofthepresentandopenacriticaldistance,
it risks forgetting the determinations ofthought orthe sul ection of
thesulectthuslettingtheimpositionsofpovervorkundetected.Ve
cannot stop criticising the present and ve cannot do that vithout
adopting the position of the future, lut, similarly, ve can never
remove ourselves sufhciently from our here and nov to adopt the
redemptiveposition. Ltopian hopeisnecessaryandimpossille,agen-
` Jhcodor ^domo, M|a|mc Morc||c Fc:/|oas}rom Icmc_cJ Ijjc chcott trans)
London, \crso, i i ) 2q
THE l MAGl NAPY DOMAl N AND THE l LTLPE Ol LTOPl A +
eralutopianplan,if imposedonpeople,riskslecomingallueprintfor
vorseoppressionanddomination.AsThomasNagelarguedinamore
prosaic style, the prollem vith utopia is that `itpresents an ideal of
cohectivelife, andittriesto shovpeopleonely one thattheyshould
vanttoliveunderit,thatitforcespeople tolefree.
ltisherethatBloch'scomlinationofnaturallavandsocialutopia
can le developed in a postmodern perspective. lf a fantasy of
integrity,supportedlythediscourseofhumanrights,helpsconstruct
ourradicallyinter-sul ective socialidentity, thisfantasyisinextrica-
llyloundviththedesireofthe other. xistentialcompleteness, the
negationofdominationandoppression, impossilleasitis, helpsluild
our sense ofuniqueness vhich can exist onlyin relation to unique
others. Similarly,ifallhumanactivityisrelational,ouractionsaddress
directly or indirectly another lefore lecoming ol ectified into
events, facts orrights. A ustrelationship does not attack the onto-
logical constitution or undermine the existential integrity of the
related entities. Theutopiapro ectedlythehumanrightsimaginary
vould le a social organisation vhich recognises and protects the
existential integrity ofpeople expressed in their imaginary domain.
The postmodern utopian hope has ontological importance. it pro-
tects the integrity ofunique leings intheirexistential otherness, ly
promotingthedynamicrealisationoffreedomvithothers.Vhilethe
individual imaginary helps luild an other-dependent identity, the
socialimaginarysupports asocial organisationinvhichhumanrela-
tionshipsvillrespectandpromotetheuniquenessoftheparticipants.
lnthesocialimaginary, memories offear, talesofpainandsuffer-
ing and the experience ofoppression have a key role. During the
Yugoslav vars, vhen people vere presented vith images vhich
lroughtto thesurfacethememoriesandemotions oftheNazicon-
centration camps, the reactionvas immense horror andvillingness
to act. Although most people today do not have first hand experi-
ence, theHolocausthasformedacentralpart ofourmoralimagina-
tion, andthese communalresourcescanlemolilisedlytheutopian
hope. Theimaginarydomainofeachsocietyispartly constructedas
a reaction to specific in ustices and multiple instances ofma or and
pettydominationsandoppressions ,itdravsitsforcefromthect|ot|
painofhumanlife. Vhenthestruggleagainstinusticetakestheform
ofhumanrights, they lecomeinvestedvith the energyand creativ-
ityofthis imagination.
` JhomaslagcI, Iuc||/ycaJcr/|c||/y lcvYork, CxlordLnivcrsityPrcss, ii) 2j .
+Z THE l MAGl NAPY D OMAl N AND THE l LTLPE O l LTOPl A
Thepostmodernlestpolityorthehumanrightsutopia- tocoin
tvoparadoxical phrases - promisesto shelter human relations from
reification, from leing turned into the non-relation ofsul ection,
dependenceandmasteryofoneoverothers. Sul ectionmakesarela-
tionshipunavoidalleandthereforedestroystheexistentialfreedomof
theparticipants,oflothmasterandsul ected.Theutopianhopepro-
motes socialrelationsin vhich the people experience their lives as if
theyverefreefromnecessity.Butunliketheoriesof ustice,vhichgo
forthehighgroundandfromtoptolottomreform, utopianthought
has alvays leen nlledvith suppressed popular images and reminis-
cences, untold dreams and stories, lovly memories and emotional
affectsproectedintoanadorallefuture. lnthissense, theutopianism
ofhumanrightsistheoppositeoftheclassicalutopiasvhichhopedto
create a nev man` to nt the collective plan. Like classical utopi-
anism, it is the prefiguration ofa future in vhich people are not
degraded,despisedoroppressed,theanticipationofacompletenessin
vhichthe desire ofthe othervouldleerotic andnotustcompeti-
tiveanddestructive.Andvhile, likeallutopias,itsrealisationisalvays
deferred, turninghumanrightsfromgovernmentaltriumphalismand
diplomatic somnolulism into utopian hope vould le the greatest
contrilutionofourpoliticalculture to thenevmillennium. Human
rights canfillthe non-place ofthepostmodernutopia. theygenerate
apoverfulpoliticalandmoralenergy,unlikeanyotherideology,they
dravtheirforcefrompastmemories andfuturehopes, theirpromise
exists hidden leyond conventions, treaties and lills in a variety of
inconspicuousculturalforms. Humanrights,lasedastheyareonthe
fragilesenseofpersonalidentityandthe- impossille- hope ofsocial
integrity, link integrally the individual and the communal. Like all
utopias,theydenythepresentinthename ofthefuture,vhichmeans
thattheyparadoxically denytherightsoflavs andstatesinthename
ofthepluralhumanitiesyetto come.
But Adorno'svarnings are ustified. The hopeofthe futuremust
notconcealtheinfamiesofthepresentandthedistancenecessaryfor
critique must not lecome the gap ofdetachment. The postmodern
principleofhope,asrepresentedlyhumanrights,isperhapsaporetic
ratherthanutopian. caughtletveenthedismemleringactionoflav
vhichsplitsthelodyphysicalandpolitic thevorkofthesymlolic) ,
and the redeeming future ofexistential integrity the vork ofthe
imaginary) , humanrights areloththe maladyandits cure, loththe
poisonanditsantidote, averitalleDerridean|ctmc/oa. '
'' acqucs Lcrrda, PIato`s Pharmacy in I|scm|ca/|oas . ohnson trans) London,
^thIoncPrcss, I 8I ) 6I-I,i
1 J
T|c Iumca I|_|/s /|c /|ct
Coa.ctau||||umcat|||s|sao|||c {ua.||oao{||cs|c|c.I||scaoa-s|c|c
|as|||u||oa|as|Jc ||cS|c|c caccc||o |umca||yu||.| ||cS|c|c.ca-
ao|cacm||s|.
mmanuel Levinas
As
"
earecomingtothe endofour ourneythroughthephilosophy
ofr
-
hts, tvo central arguments have emerged. Rightsexistonlyin
relationtooth
`
rrights,right-claimsinvolvetheacknovledgementof
o
'
|ersandtheirrghtsandoftrans-socialnetvorksofmutualrecog-

ition and arrangement. There can le no free-standing, alsolute

rght, .ecause such right vould violate the freedom ofeveryone
exceptits l

earer. Th

re canlenopositive right, lecause rights are

alvaysrelationalandinvolvetheirsulectsinrelationsofdependence
'
nothersandresponsililityto thelav.Rights areaformal recogni-
tionofthefactthatl

eforem
`
legal) sulectivityalvays andalready
aas come another. Linked vith that is the recognition that human
rghtshave
'
healilityto createnevvorlds,lycontinuouslypushing
andexp

nding
'
hel

undariesofsociety,identityandlav. Theykeep
transferrngt|eir

c|aims to nevdoinains, fields ofactivity and types

oflegal) sul ectivity, they construct ceaselessly nev meanings and
val
'
es , andtheylestovdignityandprotectiontonovelsul ects,sit-
uations

andpeople. Paradoxically,hovever,thisexpansionveakens
thesociallond. Humanrightscometoinstitutionalexistenceintheir
performative declaration, vhich declares vhat it creates and creates
the g
'
ound

uponvhichit stands. A humanrightssocietyturnsthis

experenc

e into a main principle oforganisation and legitimation. '

Human rghts are the recognition ofthe vorld-making pover of
-
roundl
'
ssn

ess vhich turns the experience ofontological freedom

intoaprnciple oflavandpolitics.
' Forthc Mcidcggcrian roots olthis argumcnt scc]can-Luc lancy, T|c Ixcr|ca:c ,j
tccJom NcLonaIdtrans) StanlordLnivcrsityPrcss, I )
++
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
Humanrightsdonot`lelong` onlyt othecitizensofstatesvhich
explicitly, evenifineffectively, recognisethem. Aftertheirideologi-
calandrhetoricaltriumph, postmodernhumanrightsdennetheHuid
relationletveenpoverllocsandthecontestedidentitiesofindivid-
uals andgroups. ln astrange almostmetaphysicalvay, humanrights
`exist`, even vhen they have not leen legislated. Vhen the
Americancivilrightsactivistsassertedtherighttoequality,vhentor-
ture victims all over the vorld claim the right to le free in their
integrity, vhengays and leslians in homopholic cultures proclaim
the dignity oftheiridentity or, vhen an alandoned lover demands
his `right to love`, they are acting strictly vithin the human rights
tradition,eventhoughnosuchlegalrightscurrentlyexistorarelikely
to le accepted. The dissident, the relel, the melancholic lover, the
green or the anti-corporations protester lelongto a long and hon-
ouralle lineage. the eighteenth century revolutionaries, the nine-
teenthcenturypoliticalreformersandthiscentury'seconomic, social
andculturalprotesters, sharethecommondetermnationtoproclaim
andthuslringintoleingnevtypesofentitlementandformsofexis-
tenceagainstreceivedvisdomandthelav. Thealsenceoflegislative
approval, oftenthelegislator's oppositionto the nev claims , is their
structural characteristic. ln this sense, human rights have a certain
independence in relation to the context oftheir appearance. Legal
procedures, political traditions and historical contingencies may le
part oftheir constitution,luthuman rights retaina critical distance
fromlavandstretchitsloundaries andlimits. lndeed, theirrhetori-
calnature,proclamatoryenunciationandregulardefianceofstatelav
are aspects oftheiralility to transcendandredefinetheircontextual
loundaries. Legal and social contexts are part ofthe dennition of
concreterights, lutitisalsointhe `essence` ofrighttosuspendany
referencetothevagaries oftime andthe exigenciesofplace.
Theapproachtothediscourseofrightsadoptedsofarhasleenres-
olutely anti-metaphysical. Vehave examinedvariousunsatisfactory
definitions ofhumanity and summarised Heidegger's critique of
metaphysical humanism. But the persistence ofthe gap letveen
humanity and legal) rights, or letveen the utopian moment in
human rights and lav, indicates that theirforce and relelliousness
maylerelatedto ametaphysicalorredemptiveurgevhichlaydor-
mantluthasacquiredrenevedsignincanceinpostmodernity.Atthe
endofthemostatrociouscentury,itistoolateinhistorytoreturnto
the concepts ofhuman nature and free vill ofclassical lileralism.
Marxistcritiquehasshovedhovthecommon`humannature`con-
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP +3
cealspolitical andsocial exclusions, andthe deconstruction ofsul-
ectivity has indicated the historical andparticular character ofthis
most poverful discourse ofthe universal. After Hegel, nature must
leseenashistoricalandintersul ectiveinsteadofeternalandsolitary.
ln the aftermath ofexistentialism, human essence cannotle perma-
nentandessentiallutHuidandlecoming.AfterFreudandLacan,the
humansul ectlacks anddesiresthether. lnthevakeofstructural-
ism, the sul ect must le theorised as context dependant, loth sul-
ectedandfree.
Vemolilisedthesephilosophiesofsuspiciontodeconstructtheuni-
versalismofrightsandthehistoricismofculturalrelativism. Theyloth
share a common characteristic vith Vestern philosophy and ethics.
theyreducethe distanceletveenselfandotherandreturnthediffer-
enttothe same. AsHeideggerargued,philosophyhasputthemeaning
ofBeing at the centre ofits concerns, since classical Greece, and has
claimedthatthequestionofBeingisgovernedlytheprotocolsofrea-
son.Lniversal |e_esreectsandrevealsthestructureofrealitysincethe
ontological realm follovs the demands oftheoretical necessity. The
tracesofthisontologicaltotalitarianismlitterthelodyofphilosophy. ln
its modern version, individual consciousness has lecome the starting
point ofallknovledgeand, as aresult, vhat differsfromtheself-same
has leen turnedinto acognitive question, into the explorationofthe
conditionsundervhichthe other's existence canleknovn

thisvay
the otherlecomesmy knovledge ofthe other.
'
J
The Cartesian and Kantian sulect constituted the other and the
vorld according to the sulect's ovn schemata and categoriesvith-
outvhich, theyclaimed,the other cannotlereached. Hegel'sstrug-
gle for recognition assumed that a symmetrical reciprocity exists
letveen the tvo parties and posited the end of dialectics as the
moment vhen the same lecomes the synthesis ofthe same and the
different. But the unique other cannotle sullated, otherness is not
ust amoment in the dialectic ofthe same and the differentlutthe
moment ofits transcendence, vhat the system cannot sullate. For
phenomenology, again, the ego acquires knovledge through the
intentionalityofconsciousnessanditsadequationviththephenome-
nalvorld.Hussedassertedtheprimacyofself-perceptionandclaimed
that the vorld discloses itselffully to consciousness. According to
ManfredFrank,`theleingthatstandsacrossmeinthecircleofre ec-
tionis myBeing`vhichhasleenmistakenforBeingassuch.
Nanlrcd Frank, Hc/| s^cos/ru:/utc||sm?S. ViIkc and R Cray trans) NinncaoIis,
LnivcrsityolNinncsotaPrcss, Prcss, i 8) z,
+ THE HLMAN Pl GHTS O F THE OTHEP
Heidegger,ontheotherhand, emphasisedthehistoricalandsocial
nature ofself Selfisnot constitutedleforeits implicationvith oth-
ers. `By' thers' ,vedonotonlymeaneveryoneelselutme- those
overagainstvhomthe ' l
,
standsout. . . lutthoseamongvhomone
is. . Thevorldisalvaysonel sharevithothers.` Thereisnolife
vhich isnotlifevith others. Selfdoes not postulate the otherinits
ovnimagelut,indiscoveringitself, itsimultaneouslyrecognisesthe
other. Heideggerianontology, hovever,lyprivilegingthe relation-
shipletveenleingsandBeingalandons ethicsinfavourofthepri-
mordialc||os. ForHeidegger, selfandtheotherareequalparticipants
inthe `ve throughvhichvesharethevorld. lnevitally,allspec-
ulationastothemeaningofBeingstartsfromtheexaminationofmy
ovn leingand returnsto ontology'spreoccupationvith self Sartre,
ontheotherhand,acceptedthatthe otherisasulectleforemelut
thoughtthattheseparationletveenselfandothersvassoradicalas
toprecludeanypossilility ofgenuineknovledge ofthe other. The
otherfixeshis gazeonme andturns meinto an ol ectlefore l can
estallishmyselfasagazing,ol ecti(ingsul ect. Theshameofleing
lookedatandudgedmakes mevantto ol ecti(the otherinturn,
andendslydiscoveringhellinthefaceofothers. The epistemology
ofmodernityhas follovedsuit. thevorld correspondsvith its rep-
resentations luilt ly the sulect and truth is the approximation
letveenprivatementalimagesandtheoriesandthevorld. Vhatall
thesetheorieshaveincommonisanexaggeratedleliefin theideaof
thesovereignselftheclaimthattheothernessofthevorldandofthe
otherpersoncanledomesticatedintheimmanence ofselftoitself
Vhen ontologicalphilosophy turns to ethics, itmustsupplement
Being vith the postulate ofa free vill, a faculty alsent from the
empireofpurereason. lnthisvay,theuniversal|oosvhichprovides
the criteria estallishingmoral validity lecomes loth necessary and
morally olligatory. ln Kantian moral philosophy, the sulectlegis-
lates thelavheoleys , lut, to do that, hemustpostulateauniversal
community ofleings vho are similar ifnot identical in reason and
inclinationviththeego. Themovefromontologyto ethicsandthe
passage from theoretical necessity to the realm of praxis passes
throughthefreedomoftheuniversalrationalityofform.Tooleythe
|oosistherefore toleautonomous. 'Reasonrevealsthestructure of
` NartinMcidcggcr, c|a_caJT|mc ]. Nacquarrcand. Robnsontrans) lcvYork,
Marcr Rov, i 6z) i ||-,
' Smon CritchIcy, T|c It||: Ic:oastru:t|oa. Icrr|Jc caJ Icv|acs Cxlord, IackvcL,
i z) .
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS O F THE OTHEP +7
reality and sulsumes individual cases and moral dilemmas to the
imperativeofuniversalityvhichnecessarilyreducesthesingularityof
the individual person. Butthe starting and concludingpoint ofthis
universalmorallavistheego,theknovingandvillingsul ect, vho
finds vithin himselfall the resources necessary in order to turn the
formal inunction to universalise into a concrete moral norm. ln
reducingtheothertothesame`manshutshimselfuplikeamonad.
ln the universal community ofreason, vhich acts as the horizon
fortherealisationofthelav,theother,thealien,thethirdandunrep-
resentalle is turnedinto the same, the critical distanceletveen self
andotherisreducedandtheexperienceofvalueofmoralconscience
isgroundedsolelyontherepresentationoftheotherlytheknoving
andvillingego. Thealternative is the other'sexclusion, lanningor
forgetting. Buttheothervhoapproachesmeissingularandunique,
she cannot le reduced to leing solely an instance ofthe universal
concept ofthe ego, nor can she le sulsumed as a case or example
undera general rule or norm. Thelav ofmodernity lased on selfs
rightandthesul ect'sempireisstrangelyimmoralasittriestoassim-
ilateandexcludetheother.Theothersideoftheuniversallegalsul-
ect, ofequalityandautonomy,oflav'sformalismanditsimperative
thecategoricalcommand) isthenecessaryinequalityandthelack of
autonomy ofthe alien and the enemy ofnation. The discourse of
universality is necessarily a vhite mythology. the enthronement of
free vill as the principle ofuniversal legislation is achieved only
throughtheexclusion,disfranchisementandsulectionvithoutfree
sul ectivity ofthe other. Communitarianismandculturalrelativism,
onthe otherhand, canoftenlecome`mythologiesofcolour. local
and usually much more aggressive re ections ofthe exclusions of
universalism. The essentialism ofindividualism, universal rights and
thepoverof`reason are not far removedfromthe essentialism of
community,thelocalismofdutiesandthepoveroftraditionandthe
past.
Andyetitisarguallethatanethicalresiduecanledetectedinthe
longhistoryofnaturallavandcanstillletracedinpopularattitudes
to human rights. The continuous ight ofmeaning vhich creates
ever-nevrightscouldperhapsleanchoredonanethics ,theground-
lessnessandvorld-makingpoveroffreedomonamoralfoundation.
lfmyrighthasmeaningonlyinrelationtoanother,vhoseactionor
entitlement are presupposed in the recognition or exercise ofmy
` mmanucILcvinas, Co||c:tcJ|||oso||:c|cct ^. Lingistrans.) JhcMaguc,lijhol(
i 8,) i ||
+O
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
right, the right ofthe otheralvays and already precedes mine. The
rightofthe) othercomeshrst, leforemyrightandleforemyiden-
tity as organised ly rights, comes my olligation, my radical turn
tovards the demandto respectthe existentialintegrity ofthe other.
The non-essential essence ofhuman rights, the eeting universal
involvedinallparticularright-claimscouldle therecognitionofthe
priorityofthe otherpersonvhose existence leforeminemakesme
ethically loundand opens to me the domainoflanguage, intersul-
ectivity andright. This othercannotletheuniversal`man` oflil-
eralismnorthealstractandformalistic `sul ect`oflav.Theotheris
alvays aunique, singularpersonvhohasplaceandtime, genderand
history, needs and desires. lfthere is somethingtruly `universal` in
the discourse ofhuman rights, ifa metaphysical trait survives their
deconstruction, thiscouldperhapsletherecognitionofthealsolute
uniquenessoftheotherpersonandofmymoraldutytosaveandpro-
tecther.
I . 11 111 Lb I 111V1 ` 11 111 V L1b
Thisnon-essentialessentialismi s associatedviththephenomenology
ofmmanuelLevinas,vhichhas challengedthe ontological, episte-
mologicalandmoralassumptions ofphilosophical modernity. ' The
`ethics ofalterity` starts vith the other and challenges the various
vaysinvhichtheotherhasleenreducedto thesame. ForLevinas,
the otheris not the self's extension orc||ctco. Noris the otherthe
negation ofselfin a dialectical relation vhich can le totalised in a
future synthesis. Heidegger correctly emphasised the historical and
socialnature ofself, luttheotheris not similarto self Selfandother
arenotequalpartnersinaHeideggerian`ve`invhichveshareour
vorld,noristheotherthethreateningexternalityandradicalalsence
ofSartreanexistentialismvhichturnsselfintoanol ect.
' JhisargumcntisursucdlurthcrbothinitscriticalandconstructivcascctsinLouzinas
andVarringtonus/|:cM|s:crticJ dinbuighLnivcrsity !rcss, i |)css|m.
mmanucI Lcvinas, To/c||/y caJ Ia{a|/y ^. Lingis trans) !ittsburgh, Luqucsnc
Lnivcrsity !rcss, i 6) , /|cra|sc /|ca c|a_ orcyoaJ Isca.c A Lingis trans.) Kluvcr,
i i ) For uscs olthc cthics olaItcrity in lav, scc Louzinas and Varrngton, ^ VcII-
Foundcd Fcar ol]usticc. thics and]usticc in!ostmodcrity, \oI II/z Lu caJ Cr|/|uc,
I ,-|, i i ) , Jhc Facc of]usticc.^]ursrudcncc ol^Itcrity, j So:ic|caJIc_c|S/uJ|cs,
|c,-z, i |) ,us/|:c M|s:crr|cJ dinburghLnivcrsity !rcss, i |) , Narinos Liamantidcs,
thicsinLav. LcathNarkson a ' Stil Lilc` , \I/z LucaJ Cr|/|uc, zo-z8 i ,)
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP +V
The othercomes hrst. S)he is thecondition ofexistence oflan-
guage, ofselfandofthelav. The other alvays surprisesme, opens a
lreachinmy vall, lefalls the ego. The otherprecedesme and calls
uponme.vheredoyoustand?Vhereareyounovandnotvhoyou
are. / `vho` questions have ended in the foundational moves of
de) ontology. Being, orthel oftheCartesian.oa||oandtheKantian
transcendentalsulect startvithselfand create the other as an |m||c-
||oco . lnthephilosophyofalterity,hovever,theothercanneverle
reducedto the selforthe differentto the same. Noris the otheran
instanceofothernessorofsomegeneral category,anol ecttoasul-
ectthatcanlecome amoveindialectics.
Thesignofanotheristheface. Thefaceisunique. ltisneitherthe
sumtotaloffacial characteristics, an empirical entity, northe repre-
sentation ofsomething hidden, soul, selfor sul ectivity. The face
doesnotrepresentanalsentpresence, andcannotthereforelecome
a cognitive datum. Noris thefacethe epiphany ofa visage, orthe
image of a sulstance. The face eludes every category. lt lrings
togetherspeechandglance, sayingandseeing,inaunitythatescapes
the con ict ofsensesandthe arrangement ofthe organs. Thought
livesinspeech,speechis in) theface, sayingisalvays addressedto a
face. Theotherisherface. `Alsolutelypresent,inhisface, thether
- vithoutanymetaphor- facesme`. lnitsuniqueness,thefacegets
holdofmevithan ethicalgrip`myselfleholdento, olligatedto, in
deltto, the otherperson, priortoanycontractsoragreementsalout
vhoovesvhattovhom`. lnmodernity,tocomprehendistomake
somethingmy ovn. But the face ofthe ther cannot le domesti-
cated or consumed. Alterity remains outside, quasi-transcendental,
unique, frail like the face ofa child thatdemandsthat l acceptmy
responsilility. Thefaceisafundamentalontologicalfactvhichhov-
ever cannot le systematised, in its orientation tovards me the face
turns intoanethicalfactlyaddressingme. lntheface-to-face, l am
fully,immediatelyandirrevocallyresponsillefortheothervhofaces
me. A facein sufferingissuesa command, a decreeofspecihc per-
formance. `Donotkillme`, `Velcomeme`, `GivemeSanctuary`,
`Feedme`. The onlypossilleansvertotheethicalimperativeis `an
immediaterespectforthe otherhimself . . . lecauseitdoesnotpass
throughtheneutralelementoftheuniversal,andthroughrespect,in
theKantiansenseforthelav`.
Lcvinas quotcdin]acqucsLcrrida, \ioIcncc andNctahysicsin Hr|/|a_caJI crca:c
Aasstrans) London, RoutIcdgc, i ,8) i oo
Lcrrda,ibid.,6.
3 THE HLMAN Pl GHTS O l THE OTHEP
The demand ofthe other and my olligation to respond are the
`essence` ofthe ethics ofalterity.Butthis `essence` is lased onthe
non-essenceofthe othervho cannotleturnedinto the instance of
aconcept,theapplicationofalavortheparticularisationoftheuni-
versalego. `Theotherarisesinmyfieldofperceptionviththetrap-
pings ofalsolutepoverty, vithoutattrilutes , the otherhasnoplace,
notime, noessence, the otheri s nothingluthis orherrequestand
my olligation`.''Asthefaceoftheotherturnsonme, shelecomes
myneighlour,lutnotthatoftheneighlourprincipleofnegligence
lav. My neighlour and proximate is , at the same time, the most
strange and foreign. lt is this situated encounter and unrepeatelle,
uniquedemandvhichassignsmetomoralityandmakesmealound
andethical sul ect. urrelationship is necessarily non-symmetrical
andnon-reciprocalasherunique demandisaddressedtomeandme
alone. quityis not equalitylutalsolute dissymmetry.
The other is incomparally unique, she is external to categories,
norms,principlesandrules,inherfacehumanityisannulledtoleave
herthe only one ofherkind, learer ofallthe dignityinthevorld,
the most equal amongst equals. `lt marks the alsoluteidentity ofa
person, a uniqueness leyondthe individuality ofmultiple individu-
als `. ' ' Butatthesametime, thetotaluniquenessofthe othercreates
my ovn identity, as the addressee, respondent and hostage to the
demand. lfmyidentityisintersul ective, itisnotas the outcome of
a struggle for recognition, ifl am sul ected to the ther, it is not
doneinitiallythroughlavsandstructures. l amuniquelecausel am
the only one asked ly the singular other to offer my response and
responsililityhere andnovto his demand. The appealofthe other
is direct, concrete and personal, it is addressed to me and l amthe
onlyonevho canansverit. Againstmoralphilosophy, the demand
doesnotdependonalsolute reasonoruniversallav,lutonthecon-
crete historical and empirical encounter vith the other. n this
ledrock oftotal uniqueness vhich has nothing to do vith the self-
ishness ofindividualism or the safety and certainty ofcommunity,
loth alstract universalism and particular relativism nnd their
inescapallelimit.
The ontology ofalterityis therefore lased on the alsolute prox-
imityofthe mostalien. Vhenselfcomes to constituteitself, itfaces
' ' can-Franois Lyotard, 1|c Ij[crcaJ C. \an Lcn ^bbccIc trans) ^anchcstcr,
^anchcstcrLnivcrsity!rcss, i 88) i i 1
' ' Lcvinas, Jhc Rights ol^an and thc Rights olthc Cthcr in uts|Jc t|c Su|c:t
^ Smith trans. ) London,^thIonc!rcss, i ) i i 6-z,
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS O l THE OTHEP 3 i
lefore the l , l' srelationship vith the other, the structure ofsul ec-
tivityistheoutcomeofthis opening,anopeningvhichisalsofully
historical.achtime l turn to the concreteother,myselftakesanev
direction, l lecome vho l am. Myt|a.||um |aJ|c|Juc||ca|s is my
unavoidalle call to responsilility. Myuniqueness is the result ofthe
directandpersonalappealtheothermakesonmeandofn+y sul ec-
tionnottothelavluttotheother. ltismethattheotheraddresses
and not a universal ego ora legalistic personhood, as Antigone dis-
covered. ' This radical passivity precedes my ontological freedom
andmakesitethical, the acceptance ofavocationtovhichl alone
can respondvhencalled. To lefreeis to dovhatnoneelse cando
inmyplace.
ln the ontology ofalterity the ego i selected, l amalvays perse-
cutedlytherefugeeandseekasylumfromtheexile,luts) healvays
comes lack, alvays lefore me, a step lehind or a step in front, the
notyetvhichisthealvayshasleen. Closerthantheairllreatheand
further avay than the starry sky, the other calls on me lut the
encountercanneverlefullyconsummated.Againsttheconceptsand
strategiesoftraditionalphilosophy,theotherisloththegroundvho,
lycallingmetomyuniqueresponsililityassignsmemysingularsul-
ectivity, lut also the conceptualitythat escapes allsystematicity. ln
thissense, theotherhasalvaysandalreadyleenvithinself, s) hedis-
possessesanddecentresself Thefaceisatraceofothernessinscriled
onthe`ground`ofselfAndifsuchisthecase, allreturntoselffrom
othernessis exposedtothisexteriorityvhichleavesitstracelutcan
never le fully internalised. Selfis alvays folloved ly the other's
demand,neveralletoreturnhomefully, alvays aninternalexile.
Theethics ofalterity isaspoverful a metaphysicsasany human-
ism. Butthisisahumanismofthe otherperson,unlikethe ontolog-
ical emphasis oflileralism and the alstract nature of the legal)
sulect, it carries the strongesthistorical commitment to the unique
needs ofthe concrete other. lfone vants to maintain the vorld-
shaping urge that animates the metaphysics ofsul ectivity, ifone
vantstofindan- admittedlycontested- lasisforthealsolute,non-
historical character claimed for human rights, onemustturn to the
other-dependent kernel ofindividuality. The most irreducille ele-
ment in sul ectivity is the non-coincidence ofself, its constitutive
openness to exteriority, Rimlaud'sc cs ua cu|tc. `The main task`,
vrites Levinas, `consists in thinking of the ther-in-the-Same
' Costas Louzinas, 'Lav' birh and ^ntigonc's Lcath. Cn CntoIogicaI and
!sychoanaIyticaIthics, i 6 CcrJo:oIcuFcc|cu, i z,-i 6z i ,)
3Z THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
vithoutthinkingofthetheras anotherSame . ' `/ humanityand
every right proceed Eom this primacy ofethics over leing and of
olligationoverneedorinterest. Such olligatoryturningavayfrom
selfisthesignofanincarnatetranscendence, ofafundamentalcutthe
otherimposes onme or, ifyouvill, ofthe fundamentaldutyupon
vhich all otherrights and duties depend. But this duty is also the
manifestation offreedom, in putting myselfin the service ofthe
other'sright,adutythatcannotletransferredordelegated, llecome
aunique, concreteunsulstitutalleleing.Atthatmoment,humanity
is eclipsed ly the face ofthe other vho lecomes its unique repre-
sentative. Humanrights aretherefore concretisations oftherightof
the other person and ofmy duty, my freedom, lefore lecoming
antagonistictothatofothers ,isthefreedomofresponsililityandfra-
ternity. ne could argue that the naturalist claim that right exists c
t|ot|
!
independentlyofanylegislativeconferralorstateauthorisation,
isperhapsanolliquerecognitionofthispriority oftheotherand of
theconsequentuniquenessofthecalleduponselfanethicalunique-
nessvhichdoesnotdependonsemioticsimilaritiesanddifferences.
Butvhile thefundamental duty ofselfand right oftheother are
the outcome ofthis original responsilility, a `third soon enters the
scene. lnthe social vorld, my neighlourisfacedlyhis ovn neigh-
lourvho isalso closeto me, the otherlecomes they, andalimit
to responsililitymust le introducedto take account ofthe conict-
ingdemands. The socialvorldisthatofegotism, citizenship, politi-
cal and legal order and humanrights. `ln the ethical position ' l ' is
distinctfromthe citizenandfromthatindividualvho, inhis natural
selnshness precedes all order, yet from vhom political philosophy,
fromHolleson, triestoderive- orderived- thesocialandpolitical
orderofthe City. Theconictingdemandsuponmelytheother
andthethirdrequirecomparison,calculationandlalancing,thepro-
cedures ofreasoning,ustification andthelav. The unique other is
turnedinto a citizen, sheisputon the scales of ustice, herdemands
aresynchronisedandthematisedunderthecategoriesoflavandcom-
paredviththoseofothers.verylalancing,lyreducinguniqueness,
is an act ofinustice, every comparison ofthe incalculalleisviolent.
lnustice isneverremovedfromthe operationofstatelavandfrom
the legal implementation of human rights. `justice says Levinas
' ` uotcdin^lainRcnaut, T|cItc/|cIaJ|v|Juc|N. Lccvoisc trans) !rnccton,
!rncctonLnivcrsity!rcss, i ,) i |;
' ' mmanucl Icvinas, L Soutca:c |au/||c, quotcd in /ygmunt auman, c/moJcta|ry
caJ|| I|s:oa/ca/s Cambridgc, !olity, i ,) |8
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP 3
`means constant revision ofustice, expectation ofa letterustice
andthesamecanleappliedtohumanrights.' Theparadoxofhuman
rights appears in a nevformulation. human rights are loth the cre-
ation ofthis hrst fundamental ethical duty and a distortion of the
moralimperative, anacknovledgementoftheuniquenessoftheother
vhichgivesvay hoveverto the need ofaccommodatingthemany.
ln this ethicalsense, rights can le seenasuniversalcompanionsof
humannaturelothindemocraticandintotalitarianregimes,lothin
sleepyhrstvorld states and in revolutionary orreactionary second
and third vorld ones. Social contracts, universal and local declara-
tions , legislation and case-lav, commissions and courts are ust
expressionsoftheirhistoricalcharacter. Theirforcedoesnotdepend
on their legislation and is not veakened ly historical deviation or
geographicalcontingencies. Rightrefers tovhatispropertohuman
leings on account not oftheir alstract humanity lut ofa concrete
dignity, openedthroughethicalsulmission. Rights, the mosttimely
ofhumaninventions ,paradoxicallypartakealsoofastrangetimeless-
nessandplacelessness, lothinandofhistoryandoutside orstanding
inudgmentofhistory.
Moralityisnotsynonymousthereforevithhumanrightsanddoes
not derive from them. thical responsilility precedes rights, gives
themtheirforceandlegitimacyandlecomes the udge oftheirand
ofstateaction. Humanrightsaretheinstrumentofethics. According
to this phenomenology, a human rights state has leen sul ected to
ethical considerations and has accepted limits and restrictions to its
politicalactionoutofethicalcare.Vhilethisisnotsufncientforcon-
structingageneralethicaltheoryofrights, ithelpsexplaininpartthe
recentethicalconcernfor the distant other, shovninpopularcam-
paigns and political pressurc to prevent and stop the human rights
violations ofpeoplefaravay. But the ethical stanceofVesternpul-
lic opinion, vhich responded vith outrage to the plight ofthe
KosovoAlanians ortheastTimorese, mustledistinguishedfrom
thatofgovernments.Thearguments canvassedaloveagainstthepro-
claimedmoralityofgovernmentalforeignandmilitarypolicyscarcely
applytoordinarypeople. Theirreactionindicatedthatthesufferingof
unknovnvictims has startedmolilisingthe sense ofmoralproximity
vhichhas underpinned recent humanrights avareness.
ne vay ofconceptualisingthis avarenessisto say thatin caring
forthestarving, the ethnically cleansed, therefugeeorthe tortured,
'` uotcdinauman,suran. i |, C.
3+ THE HLMAN PI GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
vhoarenotmyotheri naface-to- faceencounter,lutvhoseplight
enters my consciousness, ve concretise and to a certain extent
dilute) the ethical responsilility for the unique other into a vider
moral feelingofduty to alleviate thepain ofmanysufferingothers.
Thefundamentalmoralresponsililityremainsthegroundorhorizon
ofhumanrightsandistranslatedinpoliticsandlav,fromaninfinite
responsililityformyneighlourinto afinite olligationtosavemany
others vhoml haveneverfaced. Thescopeofthis dutyhaslecome
much vider thanmyresponsililitytomyneighlourlut its content
anddemandshavenarroved. lnthissense,humanrightslecomethe
postmodernversionoftheideaof usticeorratherthe expressionof
thesenseofipustice. lfrightderivesitsforcefromethics, postmod-
ernhumanrightsarelinkedvithanindividualandcollectivesenseof
vulneralility- myleinghostagetotheother,myopennessandsul-
ectiontothesocialandnatural environmentvithitsfearsanddan-
gers , my sense ofinterdependence in the vorld- for vhich l have
the duty, the moral and evenlegal olligation to respond. Solidarity,
according to Bauman, involves `the recognition ofother people's
miseryandsuffering as one's ovn responsilility, andthealleviation
and eventually the removal ofmisery as one's ovntask`. ' ln this
approach, human rights are not lased on the ct|ot|freevill ofthe
sul ect, lutonherct|ot|painandsufferingvhichmarkssul ectiv-
itynotasfearfulandantagonisticlutas ethical.
A paradoxical link exists therefore letveen freedom and ethics.
Kant's ethical universalism vas the nrst to propose theparadox of
ethicalolligationrealisedastheperformanceoffreedom.Buttheco-
ordination offree vills and sul ects in the Kantian `kingdom of
ends `, ofvhichthelavofhumanrightsis asecularapproximation,
often suppresses the ethical duty to the other. The human rights
mentality assumes a community ofantagonistic sul ects, rights are
necessary in order to organise a conictual economy ofneed and
desire,theymakepersonalitydependentonthealsenceoftheother.
lnthissense, theexpandingright-claimsexpressthehumanalilityto
transcendthe contextual- natural orsocial- limitsplaceduponthe
exercise ofinterestsandrightsand, secondly, thecapacityof|oos, as
language,reasonandlav,totransfermeaningandvaluefromknovn
tonevinstances andto re-denneits conceptsandloundaries. Butat
thesametime,rightexpressesandpresupposesacommunityofduties
toothersintheiralsolutesingularity. mleddedvithinthecommu-
io
uotcdinauman,suran I q , 6j
THE HLMAN PI GHTS Ol THE OTHEP 33
nityofexternalrelationsletveenegos ,oflimitsandloundaries,pro-
hilitions and restrictions placed around antagonistic sul ects exists
anothercommunity.acommunityofloveandproximity,vherelam
turned tovards the other, l am for the other, and my ovn self,
uniquenessandfreedomare the resultofmy ansveringthe demand
ofthe otherthatisonlyaddressedtome. Thecommunityofhuman
rightsisalso acommunityofhostagesto theother.
There is a goodness in peace, vhich is also the exercise of freedom,
and in vhich the scfrees itself from its return to self, ` from its auto-
afrrrmation, from its egotism . . . /c aasucr{cr //c c//cr, precisely to
defend the rights of the other man . . . My freedom and my rights,
lefore manifesting themselves in my opposition to the freedom and
rights of the other person, vill manifest themselves in the form of
responsilility, in human fraternity.

This `goodness` , unlikethecc||oaoftheclassicaltradition,doesnot
dependonandindeedreectsallideasofasharedhorizonof|c|o|and
virtues. Lnlike the modern tradition, itdoesnotustfollovthelav
andit does not turnthe otherintoaninstance ofgeneralisedhuman
nature or personhood. lt is a `goodness` that does not exclude any
other and does not try to impose the preferences ofselfupon the
stranger. Thisradicalsensitivityandresponsililityis thepostmodern
moralsulstance. Anon-essentialsulstance, alvaysonthemove,asit
follovstheshiftingloundariesofthesocialandansversthesingular
demands ofthesufferingother.
AfterthedeathofGod, transcendencemustlesituatedinhistory
lut must avoid the pitfalls of historicism. lnternational lav and
urisprudentialtheoriesofhumanrightscannotavoidtheprollem,as
they vacillate letveen ahistorical universalism and historicist local-
ism.Theexperienceofothernesscanperhapsprovidethishistorically
grounded transcendence. Ve discussedin the previous Chapter the
utopian elementthat humanrightsin ectinindividualfantasies and
thesocialimaginary.Vecannovtakethesameideafurtherinadif-
ferentdirection. ' The rightsofthe) otherarealreadyconstitutiveof
thel, exterioritylurksintheintimacyofself Theothervhodefines
me gives me also paradoxically a `gleam ofexteriority or oftran-
scendence`. `Adimension ofopennesstoanotherness- ineffect,a
dimension oftranscendence- must le recognised as constitutive of
' Lcvinas, JhcRights olNan,o cit. , suran. I I , I 2q .
i -
Jhc ossibIcIinksbctvccn thc radicaI concctions olthc othcr inLacanandLcvinas
havc bccn rcccntIy notcd in Sarah Mansym cd ), Icv|acs caJ Ic:ca: T|cM|scJIa:ouatcr
^Ibany, StatcLnivcrsityollcvYor!rcss, i 8) .
3 THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
the sulect, and| the self-sufficiency orindependence ofthe sul-
ect/monadturns outto leanillusion or, morepreciselyturns out
to le the prototype ofthe metaphysical illusion concerning the
Self) `. ' Radical otherness lies leyond totality and conditions it, it
takes totality to the point vhere is lreaks up. The other and the
other's trace in selfis an immanent principle of redemption, an
empirical and historical transcendence vhich marks lav and self
Rights ,lyreducingtheuniquenessoftheotherandturningherinto
thecase ofaruleortheinstanceofacategory,areunust. Butasthe
finite presentation oftheinnniteand as distortedapplications ofthe
fundamental right, they can lecome perhaps the lasis ofanother
udgmentvhich criticises orreplaces theudgments oflavand his-
tory,vhentheyforget othernessforthenormordestroysingularity
under the dictates ofthe universal reason. This vould le a utopian
udgementcarriedoutinthenameofredemptionvhich,despitethe
effortsofgovernments,lavyersandphilosophers , stilloperatesinthe
realmoffantasyandstillcomesfromtheplace oftheother.
Humanrights aretherefore aparadoxicaldoulle discoursevhich
recognisestvotypesofintersul ectivityandcommunity. Theyallov
the experience offreedomandthe openness oflanguage tolecome
a political strateg andoperate onthe social. But at thesame time,
theyinstitutionalise the ethics ofalterityandthe dutyto respectthe
singular and unique existence of the other. The experience of
groundlessnessandfreedommakesitimpossilletodenne,descrileor
delimit a human rights society. Such a society alvays looks to re-
dennitionsandre-conceptualisations,tonevpossililitiesandsul ec-
tivities. The time of such societies is the future lecause their
principle is alvays-still to le declared and met. But a society of
humanrightsoperatesalsoa- non-essential - theoryofthegood,and
lecomesacommunityofolligationtothesingular,uniqueotherand
herconcreteneeds.
1 1 . 11 V1 Lb , 1 V11L11 11 1 I1V
I| sccms ||c|c mca u|o |s ao|||a|u| c mca|cs |os|||c ccty uc||||cs
u||.|mc/c||oss|||coto||cts |o |tcc| ||m cs cc||oumca.
HannahArendt
' Rcnaut, Opcit , suraG. i , i |i
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP 37
Ve arguedinChapter i i , that forpsychoanalysis the selfissplit, that
thesulectcomestoexistencelyleingseparatedfromthemotherand
ly leing introduced to lack, to an otherness vhich marks a deep
trauma lut also founds sulectivity and desire. This constitutive and
catastrophictraumaisre ectedandprohilitedlutitdoesnotgo avay,
it lurks inus unleknovn and returns inviolentand repetitive symp-
toms,the cause ofvhichisforgottenlecausetheyneverenteredcon-
sciousness. Freud calls the dread created ly this return uncanny. This
al ect uncanny has leen compared to a stranger, vho leing already
inside the psyche, threatens their loundaries . Faced vith this
inscrutalle fear and desire, the sulecterects symlolic and imaginary
scenaria ofvholeness. Somethinganalogoushappensviththenation-
stateanditslav. Theoriginalseparationandexclusionofotherpeople
andnationsveexaminedinChapter, introducesalackattheheartof
thepolity, vhichcannotle fully representedormanagedandalvays
comes lack, in xenopholia and racism, in hatred and discrimination
andremains intractalle to politics, vhich keep inventing myths and
celelratinganctitiousunity. Vhateverthetype ofsocialorganisation,
thereisalvaysaresidue,afaultline,analogoustotheindividualuncon-
scious trauma and the recurring symptoms, leyond the control of
communityandlavtovhichhovevertheyremainhostage.
Aiensarethe otherofsul ectivity, thesymptomofthesul ectand
therefugeofthestate,vhatthestateneedsinorderto declareitssov-
ereignty and dignity. This analysisappliestoalla

iens. Vhatmakesit
specificto refugeesis thattheirarrivalatthelordersis experiencedas
thesymptomofthetrauma, asthereturnofthe repressed, thesign of
thelackin theheartofthe citizen. Theexclusionofforeigners is, ly
analogy,asmuchconstitutiveofnationalidentityasitisofhumansul-
ectivity. lnaskingtolerecognised,refugeeslringlacktheexclusion
andrepressionatlav'sfoundation,anddemandofustoacceptthedif-
ficultyve have to live vith the other in us, to live as an other. The
lav treats the refugee as a returning symptom and uses a numler of
strategies ofdisavovalanddenial in an attempttosheltersulectand
communityfromtherecognitionofitsconstitutive trauma.
Similar conclusions can le derived from the ethics of alterity.
Vhentheother,everyother,comestome, heapearsasaforeigner,
indeedasarefugeevho isnotautochthonous ,isuprooted,vithout
country, notaninhalitant,exposedtothevorldandtheheatofsea-
sons `. But the metaphor ofa homeless refugee captures also the
' mmanucl Icvinas, /|cru|sc/|ca c|a_orcyoa4Isca:c A Iingis trans) Kuvcr,
ii) 8 i .
3O
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
vayinvhichtheotherplacesanalsoluteolligationt oselfademand
vhichpersecutes the ego and threatens homely existence. Ve can-
notescapethe otherandridourselvesfromthestranger. Therefugee
is the representative oftotal otherness andthe symlol ofour ovn
exile, the sign thatego cannotnndpeace andsecurityinasecluded
andprotectedexistence. lnthissense, thereisnogreaterreminderof
thedemands ofethics thantherequestofasylumlythepersecuted,
and no stronger empirical incarnation ofthe other than the actual
refugee. This is the reasonvhythe refugee is seen as such a threat.
Her arrivalremindsus thatve too, inoursafe houses, are never at
home,thattheselfisneveridenticalvithitselflutcontainsthetrace
ofotherness andthat our complacent enjoyment ofrightsis predi-
catedonthe exclusionofothers.
Theforeigneris thepoliticalpre-condition ofthe nation-state and
the other the ethical pre-condition of identity. The refugee is the
alsolute other.Sherepresentsinanextremevaythetraumathatmarks
the genesisofstate andselfandputstothetesttheclaimsofuniversal-
isation ofhuman rights. There is agreatparadox therefore in asking
thelavtoprotecttherefugee.Thelavdividesinsidefromoutsideand
isthenaskedtohealthescarorlandageitly offeringlimitedprotec-
tion to its ovn creations. The strategies ofrejection adoptedly the
receivingcommunityofferavividcase-studyintotheconsequencesof
identi(ingsomeoneastheterri(ingalsolute,totalther,thesymlol
ofcontaminationthatothernessmaylringuponcommunityandiden-
tity.nglishlavandcourtsvhenconfrontedviththethreateningand
moving foreigner have used three strategies ofdenial and displace-
ment. First, the denial ofthe trauma ly making the symptom- the
refugee- anoljectofcognitionorinterpretation. Secondly,thedenial
ofthe trauma through the effacement ofthe face ofthe other and,
finally, the assertion ofthe vholeness andunity ofthe nation and its
lavorthedenialofsymloliccastration. lndevelopingthesedefensive
mechanisms , the lav is not necessarily in violation ofhuman rights,
indeed, courts have insistedthattheyscrupulouslyhonourthe olliga-
tions ofthe state, as expressed in international treaties and domestic
undertakings. At this point, the prollem vith historicism lecomes
apparent and it is here that the utopian trilunal that hails from the
placeofthe otherputsthelavtojudgment.
First,reincation. ThecaseofR. v. T|cSc.tc|ctyc]S|c|c{ot||cHomc
Lcct|mca|, cxct|c S|cc/umctca, `' involvedanumlerofTamilasy-
'
: ,ss[ I ^LR : ,, ML
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS O l THE OTHEP 3V
lum seekers eeing anoffensive ly the Sinhalese Government and
the lndianArmyagainsttheTamilareas ofSriLanka. Theirapplica-
tionshadleendeniedlytheHome fnce, andthe HouseofLords
vasaskedtodeterminethecircumstancesvhena`vell-foundedfear
ofpersecutionfor reasons ofrace, religion, nationality, memlership
ofaparticularsocialgroup orpoliticalopinion` exists, thenecessary
precondition underinternational and Britishlav for estallishingan
asylumclaim. The CourtofAppeal hadheldthatthe testfornnding
a`vell-foundedfear` shouldlelargelysuljective. ltvouldlesatis-
nedlyshovingthattherefugeehada) actualfearandl) goodrea-
son for this fear. Lnless an applicant's fear could le dismissed as
`paranoid` , `fearisclearly an entirely suljective state andshouldle
judgedaccordingly`. The House ofLords reversed. According to
theLords, a genuinefearofpersecutioncouldnotsuffice. Thefears
shouldhave an`oljectivelasis` vhich couldle `olj ectivelydeter-
mined` . justinedfear shouldle lased on`true` , `oljectivefacts`
vhich,assuch,couldle ascertainedlyanolj ectiveolserverlikethe
Home Secretary orthe immigration ofncers. The authorities vere
entitledto decide not only `onthe lasis ofthe facts knovn to the
applicant, or lelieved ly him to le true` lut also on `unknovn
facts` vhichvouldhelp assess vhether `sulj ective fear vas olj ec-
tivelyjustined` .'TheHomeSecretaryhadtakeninto accountvar-
ious reports from relevant sources the refugee unit ofthe Home
ffice, press articles, information supplied ly the Foreign fnce)
andhadconcludedthatvhilearmyactivities`amountedtocivilvar`
and`occurredprincipallyinareasinhalitedlyTamils` , theydidnot
`constitute evidence ofpersecution ofTamils as such . . . nor any
group ofTamils`. He vas thereforejustinedindismissingthe fear
ofpersecution and rej ecting the asylum application, lecause on the
lasis ofthe `olj ective` facts knovnto him, theapplicanthadleen
orvaslikelytolesuljectedtopersecution.
ln this encounter vith the refugee, the role ofthejudge orthe
administratorhas gradually changed. He startsas the recipientofthe
refugee's request lut, in stating the facts, he nov claims to le on
the same plane as the refugee, alle to understand his predicament.
ln other vords , the past pain ofthe refugee and his fear offuture
torture have leen translated into an interpretalle, understandalle
ibid. , : ,,
` ibid : ,
' ibid. , 2O2.
` ibid. , : ,,
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
reality that, like all reality, i s potentially shareallelyudge andvic-
tim. But ifinterpretationis the possilility ofconstructinginterper-
sonal realities in language, pain, death and their l.ar lring
interpretationstoanend. lntheidiomofcognition, feariseitherrea-
sonalle and canleunderstoodly theudge lut cannotlead to the
grantingofasylum,orisirrationalandthereforenon-existentasnon-
reason is the very thing the lav does not recognise. ln the first
instance, itis the excess ofknovledge andreasononthepart ofthe
udge that disqualifies the fear, in the second, itis the excess offear
that disqualifies itself But this translation of fear into knovledge
assumesthattheudgecanoccupytheplace oftherefugeeandshare
the pain. Fear, pain and death hovever are radically singular and
timely, they resist andatthelimit destroylanguage andits alilityto
constructshared vorlds. The refugee suffers fearandviolence, first,
inthehandsofthetorturerand,secondly,intheadministrative/udi-
cialclaimthathisintimatefearcanletranslatedintosharealleknov-
ledge. For the lav, this translation of the unique feelings into
knovalle realitiesisnecessary. ltrestores its alilitytopasssentence,
analilitytemporarilydisturledlytheencountervithreason'sother
feeling, pain, death) and cognition'sother the refugee) . Butatthe
sametimethistranslationol ectinesthe other. ltnegatesthetempo-
ralandsituatedcharacteroffearandturnsitstimelinessintoanother,
allochronic time, atime disqualifiedvhen comparedviththe tem-
poralstasisoftruthandthe timelessness ofthelav.
Asecondinstance ofreificationis apparentinthe amendments to
Social Security regulations introduced into lav in i ,,6. Lnder the
nevregulations, incomesupport,housinglenefitandmiscellaneous
other lenefits vere vithdravn retrospectively from those applying
for asylum after enteringBritain, thosevho lecome trappedinthis
country as a result ofa change ofconditionsin their home country,
and those appealing against refusal of their asylum application.
Accordingto refugee organisations, thesecategories coverthegreat
ma orityofallasylumseekersinthiscountry.TheCourtofAppeal
zo
Jhcj ustiucation givcn at thc timc, by !ctcr Lillcy, thc Social Sccurity Sccrctar,, lor
thcsc changcsvas quitc charactcristic. Jhc altcrcntr, cxcctionisj ustiucdbccauscsuch
alications havc lcss mcrit that thosc submittcd at a ort olcntry. ut in thc criod
bctvccn i z-,, ||, altcr cntry alicants vcrc allovcd to stay and only i j 8 , ort
alicants. Jhosctracdbccausc ola changc olcircumstanccs vouldbccxcmtcd lrom
bcncutvithdraval, ilthcSccrctar, ofStatc dcclarcsthatthcircountryhasundcrgoncalun-
damcntal changc but not as a rcsult ola changc in thcir individual circumstanccs Finally,
bcncuts vcrc vithdravnlromacllants againstrcjcction,bccausc onlyasmallcrccntagcol
rcjcctions arc ovcrurcd on acal Jhis may say somcthing about thc cllcctivcncss ol
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS O l THE OTHEP i
found these regulations less generous tovards foreigners than at
Napoleonic times`. The policy contemplated for these refugees , a
lifesodestitutethatnocivilisedcountrycantolerateit`. Theregula-
tions vere overturned on the procedural grounds that they vould
haveannulledtheintention ofParliamentto givereectedapplicants
a right ofappeal. Appellants vould le faced vith the intoleralle
dilemma`ofeitheralandoningtheirappealorhavingtostarvevhile
avaitingitsdetermination. Specificrights createdlystatute couldle
vithdravn constitutionally, and income support for refugees could
leremoved,onlylymeansofprimarylegislationratherthanminis-
terialdiktatpassedunderadifferentstatute. 'Butthisproceduralvic-
tory vas short-lived. The sovereign Parliamentimmediately rushed
throughlegislation, descriledas themostdraconianpiece oflegis-
lation this century`, overturned udicial generosity and retrospec-
tively vithdrev lenents from some i c, ccc applicants vho had
lenented from the earlierudgement. ln a related case, the High
Courtruledthatlocal authoritiesvere underadutyto grant emer-
gency aid to after entry` asylum seekers under the National
Assistance Act i ,|. l find it impossille`, argued theudge, that
Parliarnent intended that an asylum seeker lavfully here should le
left destitute, starving or at risk of grave illness and even death
lecausehe couldhndnone toprovidehimviththelarenecessities
oflife`.
Thesecasesexempli(thetvomostcommonvaysofol ecti(ing
theother. Therefugeeisturnedeitherintoafullytransparentol ect
ofknovledgeorintoaquasi-humanentitydeprivedofthemnimum
requirementsforsurvival, andalandonedtothediscretionsofpullic
lenevolence orprivatecharity. lnthenrstinstance, vhenthelavis
confrontedvithatraumatisedandtraumaproducingother,itadopts
a cognitive attitudeand tries tomakeherfully transparent, to deny
hertraumaandtranslateherintotheidiomofanol ectiveandman-
agealle truth, an instance ofpolitical mastery through the vill to
knovledge. For the knoving sul ect, knovledge and its ol ects
standinperfectharmony.Buttheother, theconcreteperson,cannot
le sulsumed touniversal essences nor canshesolelyle turnedinto
thcmcasurcsutintolaccto discouragcalicantslromacalingandrcduccthcnumbcr
olsucccsslul alications,butitdocsnothinglorthosccxcrcisingthcirlavlul cntitlcmcntto
acalandhavingtolivcanavcragcoltcnmonths- thctimc bctvccnrcj cctionolalica-
tionanddctcrnnationolacal- vithoutanymoncyatall
z
F. v. Sc:tctcty Stctc}otSo:|c|Sc:ut|tycxcttc ]. C. Hji ,] VLR z,,
z-
F. v Hcmmcrm|t| caJ u||cmICcxcttcM. caJF. , F. v Hcstm|astctC|ty Coua:||
ccttcH , 1|c1|mcs, Fcbruary i , i ,, i ,) ^dminLR ,o|.
Z THE HLMAN Rl GHTS O l THE OTHER
the instance ofa norm. The other, i nthe uniquenessofher dignity
and vulneralility, remains exterior to concept and essence. As
Levinas puts it, knovledge as complete comprehensionis `avay of
approachingtheknovnleingsuchthatitsalterityvithregardtothe
knovingleing vanishes . `` He adds that this is the foundation of
domination. `Thesurrenderofexteriorthings . . . doesnotmeanin
all innocence their comprehension, lut also their leing taken in
hand,theirdomestication,theirpossession.`'Butthisdomestication
has catastrophicresultsfortheknovingsul ecttoo. Byrefutingthe
exteriority ofthe alsolute other, the sul ectllocks the openness of
his ovndesiretovardsthe otherandtheforvardlookingcharacter
ofhisidentity.Hethusreturnstothemiseryoffearful existenceand
missesthevorldmakingandselfshapingpromiseofhumanrights.
ln the second instance, refugees are not treated as sul ects lut as
thesul ect'scontraryoropposite, eitherasnon-sul ectsorasol ects.
lftheyare olects, theyare not humanleingsthereforetheyarenot
entitled even to the minimum requirements oflife, such as food,
shelter,clothes ,arefuge. lftheyarenon-sulects ,theyhavenorights
or entitlements, the lav oves them nothing, their survival is at the
discretion ofstate lenevolence or private philanthropy. The `lare
necessities oflife offered reluctantly against the fear ofdestitution
and death are not a recognition oftheirhumanity lut anadvertise-
mentofthehumanenature ofthelavalvays lialle to cancellation.
Thesecondstrategy deniesthetraumalyeffacingthefaceofthe
other. urcaseinvolvedfourapplicantsvhovererefusedasylumly
theimmigrationauthorities andvantedto challenge that decision. '
LnderthelmmigrationAct i ,, I , illegal entrants,thosevithoutvisa
and those refusedrefugee status at a port ofentry, shouldleave the
country and appeal against the refusal from alroad. The Act's
remarkalleassumptionthatpeopleHeeingpersecutionvillnotexpe-
riencesomedifncultyinoltainingvisaspavedthevayforthecourts'
sulsequent actions. The refugees argued that under the LN
HandlookofRefugee-DeterminationProcedures, theyhada right
to appealagainsttherefusalofasylumandthattheir removalvould
frustratethatright. TheHouseofLordsrespondedlystatingthatthe
Handlookhad`nolindingforceineithermunicipalorinternational
lav. Theapplicantsvereillegalentrantsandto allovthemtostay,
vhileothervisitorsdeniedleavetoentercouldonlyappealafterleav-
Icvinas, Tctc||tycaJIa{a|ty,suran ,, |z.
`' Icvinas, Cc||c:tcJ|||csc||:c|ccrs, suran. , , ,o
`' uJ_cy.cyv .. Sc:rctcry c}Stctc]crt|cHcmcIccrtmcati p3,j i ^ Rp|o, ML
THE HLMAN Rl GHTS Ol THE OTHER
ing, vouldle `plainly untenalle. `Vhere the result ofaHaved
decisionmayimperillifeorlilertyasc.|c|tcsoas||||||y||csoa||c.out|
|a ||c cxcm|ac||oa ||c Jc.|s|oa-mc/|ato.css'. The dignityofthe
process should leprotectedat all costs. Here the traumatic otheris
usedtounderpinthe superiority ofthelavand) oflelonging. The
fairness, vorthandusticeofthelavisprovedandits attractiveness
`as a havenustified even vhen- especially vhen? - it turns the
refugeeavayandsendshimlacktohisfate.
This second strategy is associated vith the fact that the refugee
moves. He crosses lorders and territories, he has left home and he
doesnothavea home, hemayevennotvantahome otherthana
temporaryrefuge. But home and dvelling, thesafetyofcommunity
andtraditionisvhatshelters selfandcommunityfromthe`unspeak-
alle other. This otheris alvays elsevhere, notvhere l am, vhere
consciousness is and speaks. `Vhere itvas youvillleis the vay
Freuddennes the primary trauma. The refugee defies the propriety
andpropertyofself, hedenieshome,hearthandnationalterritoryly
havingnoshelterandanchor. Heisroaming,nomadic, deliriousand
threatening. By sending him avay, ve ensure that ve and the lav
vill not comefacetofacevith thetraumaandvillavoidtheface. A
faceinfear orpain comes, inits singularity, to haunt its neighlours
asmuchasitspersecutors.Thetraumamustledenied,itmustlesent
avaytoitsplacevhichisalsoanonplace, theunconscious. Theexe-
cutionercoverstheheadoftheexecutedasadefenceagainsttheface
uponvhichsuffering gets indelillyandindescrilally inscriledand
vhich, afterdisposalordeath, persecutesthepersecutor.To cometo
the lav, the refugee comes to the port ofentry, the physical and
metaphorical door ofthe lav. But tofacethelav, the refugee must
leave loth the country and its lav. The coming foreshadovs
the going, thelav is presentand makes its presencefelt only to the
alsent. The refugee is lrought to the lav ly leing removed, the
exclusionatthefoundationofthelavislothrepeatedandrepressed.
ur community andthe lav vill not come face to face vith our
in ustice.
Thennalstrategycanlecalledtheassertionofunityorthedenial
ofcastration. Thecase, Mv. Homc .c,`isoneofthemostfamous
refugee cases. ltsmostimportant elementis thatthe refugee, under
` ibid. , p|,.
`` ibid , p,1
`' i ppz zVIR, , C^ I pp| ^llR ,; ,, MI.
+ THE HLMAN Pl GHTS O l THE OTHEP
theinitialMformurder,`i s onlyapropi ntheproceedings, alsent,
silent,dead. MistheinitialforaZairianrefugeevho soughtasylum
in this country claiming that he had leen extensively tortured as a
result of anti-government and trade union activities. The Home
Secretary,lasedonhisol ectivereports , turned dovnhisapplica-
tion and ordered his removal to Zaire. As a result ofa last minute
applicationfor udicialreviev, a udge orderedastayofthedeporta-
tionuntilfurthermedicalreportsvereoltained. lnaseriesofevents
neverfully explained, theHome Secretary, KennethBaker, decided
to disoleythe courtorderlecausehethoughtthatinconstitutional
lav amandatory order against the Crovnvas leyond the urisdic-
tion of the court. M vas released from the British mlassy in
Kinshasaandvasneverheardofagain. Theissueleforethecourts,
in a sulsequent application for udicial reviev, vas vhether the
Home Secretary had actedin contempt ofcourtly disoleyingthe
courtorder.
ln this case more thananyother, lav's desire comes to the fore.
Facedviththealsent,silentprolally deadother,thelavcomesout
initsmostgrandioseandalsurd. Deathisthemostuncanny offears
andthestrongestdesire oftheunconscious. The death oftherefugee
mirrorsthisfearanddesireandindicatesinthestrongestpossillefash-
ionthe lack, the gap at theheartofthesulectandthe polity. The
courts denythe traumatic ol ectfacingthemlyofferingone ofthe
most elalorate defences ofthe spiritual unity ofthe Crovn and of
theeternalvalidityofthecommonlav.Theactionoftheminister,if
found in contempt, vould le a challenge against the fundamental
supremacy oflav. ` But the Home Secretary, as a Minister ofthe
Crovn and an integral part ofthe unvritten constitution, cannot
have offendedthesupremacyofthelavorthe dignityofitsadmin-
istration. The Crovn, this most nctitious ofentities , is the fount of
ustice, animage ofeternalunity, ofemotionallondsandimmemo-
rialtrust. ltcannotle in contempt ofits ovn creationandattrilute.
Lav's strategy is clear. the more threateningtheexclusionandthe
fear, the stronger does the court deny them ly proclaiming the
vholenessandtheintegrityofthepoliticalcommunity,andlyoffer-
inga paean to the supremacy ofthe lav, the residual trustletveen
governmentandthecourts,andtheunityofcrovnandthenationit
represents. The trauma is deniedthroughthe erection ofan imagi-
`` Scc !ctcr Coodrch`s insightlul rIctorical analysis ol thc casc in cJ|us L
Psy:|ocac|ys|s, H|s/oty, LuLnivcrsityolCalilomia!rcss, i ,) zi o-zzz.
`' Iz] z VLR ,, at8
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP 3
naryscenario ofacompletelavandaunifiedpolity. Thedesireisto
deny castration, to forget the violence and exclusion present at its
foundation and re-enactedvhen the refugee is sent to his death, to
presentthelodypoliticandthe.otusut|sasimmunefromotherness
andfear.
Ve can conclude that legal responses to the refugee indicate her
real nature. Lack ofcommunity and total alsence ofrights turn the
refugee into the alsolute, total threatening other. Beyond the
emlrace offamilyandgroup, andoutside theprotectionofthe lav,
the refugee is reducedto the status ofnaked, alstract humanity, an
exemplum of universal human nature lefore it lecomes concrete
through the individualising action of community and equalising
effectofthelav. Therefugeeissoradically differentfromusthatno
similaritycanlefoundorequivalenceconstructed. Sheisthesymlol
ofdifference as such, she represents nothinglutherovn alsolutely
uniqueindividuality,vhichdeprivedofallrecognitionorprotection
is as deadly as deathis totally singular. The refugee is a frightening
symlol ofthe totalisation ofdifference and ofthe denial ofaffinity
andpoints to thoserealms vhich civilisationcannot change andhas
atendencytodestroy.
Confronting the refugee raises the possilility that ve, too, are
refugees, vhichmeansthatlamaskednot usttoaccepttheotherlut
to accept that l am another, to extend the notion ofthe itinerant
foreigner to the foreignness that lies deep in me and the political
community. The refugee is vithin us. Vhen ve are fighting the
refugeeve are fighting ourunconscious , this improper place inthe
midst ofour ovn and proper. The refugee is the dark side ofour
identity.Vhenhearrives ourindividualandcollectiveconsciousness
experiences the uncanny. By sending him avay, ve think thatve
denythetrauma,thatveshieldourselvesfromthehorrillerecogni-
tionthat the other, the refugee is in us, and that ve cannot avoid
livingas others.
Freud teaches thatifve detect foreignness in ourselves, ve vill
not hound it outside ofus. The refugee is vithin me, ve are all
refugees from another place, the unconscious for psychoanalysis or
theotherforLevinas,vhichisnotac|t|c,theplaceofthefather,lut
a mc|t|c. ln a paradoxical sense, the lav ofasylum, so selectively
offered to refugees, attests to that. There has leen no convincing
normativeargumentinfavourofextendingasylumtorefugees. The
onlypossillemoralgroundforofferingrefugetosomeonevholands
inDover, althoughvehave no olligation to thesamepersonafev
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP
miles avayi nthe Channel,i s thati nlandingi nthe territory,i nfac-
ingusintheface, shehaslecomethesymlolofourovntherness
andthisproximityofpresenceopenstheethicalolligationthatexists
tovardsthefaceinpainandsufferingvhoisalso my ovn.
. 111 V L1b 11 11 _ 1b L1 I 11 11
Letus hnallyturnt otheplace andfunctionofhumanrightsi nlav,
fromtheperspectiveofthe`humanismoftheotherperson`. ltisnot
ustthetraceoftheotherthatdeterminesmyovnright,totheextent
thatrightisdefined, regulatedandrestrictedlypositivelav,thelav
islaunchedinme,moreaccurately,itisthelav'sregulatorypresence
or constitutive alsencethatshapesmyright and identity. But ifno
rightiseverpositive, itfollovs thatnofreedomis everalsolute and
noidentityclosed. ldentityismarkedlynegativity, lythe constitu-
tivealsenceoftheotherandofthelav.ldentityisthereforecontin-
gentandrelational,lasedonthevariousclaimsofothersonme,and,
secondly, on the determinations of the legal system, vhich may
appear nxed at first, lut vhich are also partly contingent. Human
rightsintroduceanelementofunhxityattheheartofthesulectand
do notpermitthefinalcompletionofthepro ectofsul ectihcation.
Tvo alsences, tvotypes ofnegativityarelaunchedatthecentre of
modern legal) identity, otherness, vhat is not self, andthe lav. lf
sul ectiontotheself-legislatedlavisthekeyelement ofautonomy
andidentity,asKantinsisted,itinvolves the recognitionofthe non-
essentialcharacterofhumannature,theindeterminacyattheheartof
thesul ectandthe opennessofthesocial.
Butthelavattemptsto fix, police andregulatetheparameters of
society, to hll andirrevocally dehne identity. The proclamation of
rights symlolisesthefreedomandgroundlessness ofmodernity, lut
theactionoflavinsanctioningandenforcingthemreturnsrightsto
|oos, not as language lut as the orderofpractical reasoning, argu-
mentationand ustihcation. Legal reasonas a rational order ofprin-
ciple and argument vhich determines the application of right,
distinguishesletveenustifiedandunacceptallerestrictionsandcon-
sistently controls the extension of right from knovn to nev
instances. The domainofpracticalreasonis vhere the legal sul ect
residesandtheconceptis sovereign. The expansionfromthegiven
to the nevvillfollovtheprotocols ofpure calculation, ofequiva-
lenceandaddition, ofnegationandcontradiction.
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP 7
There is no need to engage in an extensive critique oflegal argu-
mentation. The claim thatlegalreason can controlits ovn operation
hasleenextensivelyandconvincingly deconstructedlythelegalreal-
istsandtheirsuccessors. Sufhcetosay,follovingtheAmericancritical
legalscholars,thatthelegalprinciplesofhumanrightsadudicationare
leset ly squatting parasitic counter-principles for example, free
speech against national security or the protection ofprivacy).`` The
inherent reversilility ofthe opposed pairs undermines the hope of
rational reconciliation and no meta-principle exists to help rational
choice. Reason cannot create the common framevorkforarlitrating
letveenconictingclaimsandinterpretations ,lecauselegalprinciple
andreasonitselfare caughtinthe polysemies ofthevrittenarchiveas
muchasthesulstantivetextsoflavandareconstructsoflegalhistory,
traditionandpractice as muchas theclaimsthatcomeleforethelav.
There canleno clearandunamliguousprinciple ofinterpretationin
cases ofconict ofright. As Rolando Gaetehas argued, `man` is the
keyinterpretativevaluethatpermeates the discourse ofhumanrights .
`Man provides the Archimedean point, the decisive principle ofrea-
son that can checkthe excesses ofrhetoric and can correctpractices ,
grounding the distinctions and differences made vithin the human
rightsdiscourse, Manisthe ' unvrittenConstitution'vhichtakesmis-
readings and renders determinate the indeterminacy ofthe Bills of
Rights`.` But `man` cannotlecome the principle ofinterpretation
precisely lecause the discourse and practice ofhuman rights aims at
partiallyhxingthemeaningofthis emptysignifier.
Thetextsofhumanrightsaresupposedtocontroltheirovninter-
pretationsluttheever-expandingright-claimsleadtoanunstoppalle
villto interpret. Thequestforalegalhermeneutical grail duplicates
vithinthelav,lav'sattempttodisciplinethe openness ofthesocial.
The introduction of human rights inscriles their symlolic and
rhetorical characterinlavand opens itto its ovn continuous tran-
scendence. The limited pover ofreason is supplemented ly the
infinite possililities ofrhetoric. ` Practical reason is a limited and
`' Sccgcncraly^lIanMutchinsoncd.) , Ct|/|:c|Ic_c|S/uJ|e Jotoval]. , Rovmanand
LittIcficId, p3p) .
` RoIando Cactc, HumcaF|_|| caJ /|cI|m|| o Cr|/|:c| Fccsoa ^Idcrshot, Lartmouth,
pp) o
` Jhc|o:us:|cs |:uonthcrcIationshibctvccnIavandrhctoricis!ctcrCoodrich!. ,Ic_c|
I|s:ourc London, NacmilIan, p33) and cJ|eIc, o.cit. , suran j , vhichrcscnts thc
rhctorcaI constructionandanaIysisofthcIcgaI tcxtintcrms olasymtomatoIogyolthc insti-
tutionaI unconscious. Scc aIso Louzinas and Varrington vith NcVcigh os/moJcta
ur|ruJca:c, Chatcrq
O THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE O THEP
regionalonlypartofthefacultyof udgement,vhichFishhas called
lav's `rationalrhetoricism`. thepractice of`allovingan apparently
rational discourse to unfold vith no acknovledgement . . . ofthe
' non-rational'determinationsthatresideatitsheart`. ''Vhenhuman
rightslecome lav, thelav can no longer claim to le the exclusive
domain ofreason or to follov exclusively the protocols oflogic.
Loosasreasonisaccompaniedly|oosaslanguage, andtheirlinkage
lrings together loth the necessity ofthe concept and the contin-
gencyoffreedom.
Human rights find anuncomfortalleplaceinthetextofthelav,
national orinternational. To the extent thattheylecomepositivised
legaldiscourseand oinlav'scalculation,thematisationandsynchro-
nisation, theyshare the questfor sul ectingsociety to aunique and
dominantlogicvhichnecessarilyviolatesthedemandof ustice. But
atthesametime,theyarethepromiseofausticealvaysstilltocome.
theyarethefigure ofthenegativeandtheindeterminateintheper-
sonandthestate, andoftheproximityofselfandotheruponvhich
the universal and the alstractrise. The undecidalility letveen the
strict requirements oflegal |oos and the indeterminacy ofhuman
rights is loth a structural characteristic oflegal discourse and the
moral element in the operation ofthe legal system. Human rights
cannot lereducedto categorisation and classification, theircontent
isnotgiventocategoricalpresentation. Vehaveasenseof leingsur-
rounded ly inustice vithout knoving vhereustice lies. Human
rightsrepresentthisdenunciationofinusticeandtheyremainneces-
sarilyandradicallynegativelothintheiressenceandintheiraction.
For a polity that protects human rights, in ustice vould le the
attempttocrystalliseandnxindividualandgroupidentities ,toestal-
lishandpolicethe loundaries ofthe social, to make itco-extensive
and close it around some figure ofauthority orlav. For a lav that
protects human rights, inustice vould le to forget that humanity
exists in the face ofeach person, in her uniqueness andunrepeated
singularityandthathumannaturetheuniversal)isconstitutedinand
throughitstranscendencelythemostparticular.
Theustice ofhumanrights therefore does not offer a dennition
and description ofthe ustsociety oraprescription ofits conditions
ofexistence. This lack ofdennition vhich is also the dennition of
lackislogically necessary and ethically unavoidalle. Sloterdikcalls,
inareferencetothe dog-philosopherDiogenes, a `kynic` someone
'' S Fish, Lcnnis NartinczandthcLscsolJhcory, 6 Yc|c IcuFcv|cu i ,,-i 8oo
i 8,) at i ,8|.
THE HLMAN Pl GHTS Ol THE OTHEP V
vho adopts not the standpoint ofuniversal reason lut of

c t|ot|
pain` ,notthedetachedpositionofdisinterestednesslutthatofprox-
imity, closeness andconcernforthe other, notcoldironylutvarm
satirical laughter andthepoliticsofsensualityandthelody. '' ltisin
this `kynical` sense, thata societyofhuman rights accepts thatper-
son and rights are radically contingent and that this contingency
foundsastrongethicalolligation, thatthesul ectofrightsisinternal
to rights discourse and has no external determination or ground,
finally, that adefence ofrightsmustlelased onthe concrete needs
ofshe vho comes lefore the lav. Human rights have no proper
place, time or ideology, they cannot le assigned to any particular
epochorparty. They are opento applicationtonev areas andnelds
nov folloving the logic ofcontinuity and principled development
and nov the operations ofrhetorical play that allovs their unstop-
palle extension to contiguous nelds. This is the dynamism of|oos,
lutrights express also aprimordialpassivitytovards the demand of
theotherandtheproximityoftheoneforthe other.
Vhenthelavattemptstohalttheopennessofthesocialandtonx
identity, human rights denounceit forinustice. Vhenthelav for-
getsthe sufferingofthepersonvho comeslefore it, inthename of
reasonedconsistencyandformalequality,humanrightsdenounceits
immorality.justiceas humanrights is not criticalonly oftotalitarian
or dictatorial attempts to deny them, even more important is their
challengeandovertakingofthelimitsofselfandlav.Theirsymlolic
importanceisthattheyinscrilefuturityinlav. Theirethicalimpor-
tanceisthedemandthateachpersonletreatedas soleincarnationof
humanity and herneedas the responsilility ofmehrstand then of
thelav. Caughtletveenthesymlolicandthe ethical,paradoxically
ensnaredin the indeterminacy ofthe future and the concretenessof
thepresent,liesthepostmodernaporiaof ustice. Humanrights can
never triumph, they can suffer and even le temporarily destroyed.
Buttheirvictoryandtheirusticevillalvayslieinanopenfutureand
inaeeting,lutpressingpresent. ltisinthissense, thathumanrights
are our utopian principle. a negative principle vhich places the
energy offreedominthe service ofour ethical responsililityforthe
other.
'' !ctcrSIotcrdijk, Cti/|uco}Cya|:c|FccoaN Idrcdtrans.)London,\crso,i 88)X
and i oi -z8.
! +
T|c Inc Iumcn I|_|/s
]t|||sctcu|c|||s|ot|.c||ysu|uc|cJco|csmos|accJ t|||smcyc|so
|c oac ||c.tuc|cs| so.|c| o|c./s o{Jcs|tcJca|cJc|occ ||osc u|o |c./
||cm.
VendyBrovn
The historical, philosophical and psychoanalytical approaches to
humanrightsve examinedhavehelpedus to afullerunderstanding
ofthe operation ofrights and develop a numler ofcritiques ofthe
shortcomings oflileralrightstheory. Burke attackedthe alstraction
andrationalismofrights. FromMarxandtheMarxists,velearntthat
humanrights are political constructs vhichloth conceal important
vaysinvhichpoveris exercised and canalso le used to challenge
oppressionanddomination. Hegel argued.oa|tc Kantthatrightsare
institutional expressionsofthe struggleformutualrecognition, they
make an important contrilution to the creation ofidentity and are
radically intersul ective rather than individualistic. Psychoanalysis
taughtusthatthelavis deeplyimplicatedintheconstitutionofper-
sons,andrightsareonevaythroughvhichpeoplenegotiatethefun-
damentalprohilitions andrestrictionsvhichare theprice for entry
into language and society. The natural lavyers and the dissident
Marxistsarguedthatsocietiesvhichlose avisionofafuturevithout
exploitationandoppression, communitiesvithoututopias, havelost
theirdynamismandhave leenalandonedto the `grey ongrey` of
anovervhelmingpastandaconformistpresent.Velearntthatrights
are giounded on human discourse and nothing more solid, like
natureorhumanity.Theyarethereforeessentiallyunlimited,inother
vordsinessential, thedissolutionofallguaranteesofcertainty.
Human rights construct humans. l am human lecause the other
recognises me as human vhich, in institutional terms, means as a
learer ofhuman rights . Slaves or animals are not humans lecause
they have no human rights . Nothing in their essence either stops
7Z THE E ND O l HLMAN Pl GHTS
them fromhaving rights orguarantees them. Slaveryvas alolished
onlyvhenthedifferenceletveenfreeandslavesvasre-interpreted,
againsttheAristoteliantraditionandthroughlongpoliticalstruggles,
not as an instance ofnatural differenceletveenthe races lut as the
mostextreme case ofunacceptalledominationandoppression. The
campaigns ofexterminationandgenocideofthelasthftyyearsshov
thattheformaladmissionofhumanstothedignityofhumanityisnot
irreversille. The inmates ofthe German, Camlodian, Rvandan or
Serlian concentration camps vere constructed as non-human
vermin,as leingssoinferiorand dangerous to thefullyhumansthat
their extermination vas a natural necessity. lfve turn to animals,
their lack ofa developed language means that they are not socially
lorn through entry into the symlolic order. But vhile they cannot
lecome human sul ects, nothing stops them from lecoming legal
sulects, ifthey are given rights and legal protections, as environ-
mentalists andanimallilerationcampaignersargue.
Asvehavesadlylearntaftertheatrocitiesandgenocidesofthislast
and vorst century ofthe second millennium, the recognition of
humanityisneverfully guaranteedto all.Letusrepeatthatitisnot
so much that humans have rights lut that rights make human.
Humanity has many shades and types. The poor, vhose life
expectancyinsul-SaharanAfricaissome c yearsloverthanthatof
theaverageBriton,arelesserhumans.The , ,ccc lraqilaliesvho die
every month as a result ofthe Vestern emlargo and the African
lalies vho suffer frominfant mortality seventeen times more than
uropeans infants are an even lover part ofhumanity, larely at its
threshold. Thosevhoarepersecutedfortheirsexualorientationor
racearedefectivehumans ,sincealargepartoftheiridentityandself-
esteemis deletedorlecomesthe cause ofvictimisation. Sul ectivity
accordingtolavisafragileachievement,itcanle easilyundermined
and destroyed under physical and symlolic attack. Humanity is
therefore a graded and ranked status vith many shades and tiers
letveenthe`superhumanVestern,vhite,heterosexualmaleatthe
oneendandthenon-human,theconcentrationcampinmatesorthe
eeingrefugee, atthe other.Becomingmoreorlesshumanthrough
the policeddistrilution ofrights is the modernvay ofcreating the
sulect as social animal. Technological and genetic developments
accompanied ly the necessary institutional extensions and adust-
' In i o, lilc cxcctacyatbirthvas ,o insub-Saharan^lricaand ,, in thc LK Inlant
mortalityvas i 6crIooo livc birhsin^lricaand ,inthc LK T|c CucrJ|ca, i z]unc i ,
i 6.
THE END Ol HLMAN Pl GHTS 7
mentsmaystillremovethehumanperson'scentrality. lnsuchacase,
thereverseoftheslavesociety'sexclusionofsomeliologicalhumans
fromhumanityvill emerge. Cylorgs, clones and genetically modi-
hedhumansvillleaddedtothegroupofspeakingsulects, theyvill
legivenrightsandprotectionsvhichvillmakethemlegallyhuman.
Foucaultvas severely criticisedforarguingthatthefigureof`man
orofthe sulectmaylenearingthe endofits lriefsoourninhis-
tory,thatitmayle sveptavay like asand draving onaleachdis-
appearingas the tide comes in. Prophesy is alvays a riskylusiness.
Butlav'sparticipationinthemakingofthehumanishighlyvolatile.
legalsul ectivitycanlegivenandtakenavayandthere isno guar-
antee thatthe `natural andthelegalhumanvill coincide.
ln psychoanalyticalterms, the sul ect ofrights is asymlolic con-
struct, the result ofthe actionoflanguage andthe lav on the lody.
Thesul ectisalvayssplit, freeandsul ected,originanddetermined,
villing and oppressed, autonomous and heteronomous, the cos-
mopolitan representative ofthe species human andthe citizen ofa
state. Authorityandautonomyarelothpartofit, for evenifauton-
omyis sulectionto thelavand this sulugation is calledfreedom,
`itis attrilutedto mannottovoman, to human not to animal, to
adultnottochild.Thevirile strength oftheadultmale, father, hus-
lan

d or

lrother dominates the concept ofthe sulect.` The legal

sul ectis the creation ofpositive lav andthe accompaniment ofits
rules,thesovereignplaythinganditspotentialcritic, theautonomous
centreofthevorldasvellasthedissidentandrelel. ltsoutlinemay
'
hangeasaresultofpoliticalstruggle, elements ofdifferencemayle
introducedtothe deformeddraving,lutitsimaginaryintegrityvill
le guaranteed only in the future, alvays notustyet, even so, this
imaginaryfutureinscrilesitselfas the horizon ofthepersonandthe
polity,aprefigurationofastateofgracealvaysstillto comelutalso
already present as a trace in vhat passes. lnpsychoanalytical terms,
thisistheresultoflav's deceit, veseeitalso as the othersideofthe
desireforimpossilleintegrity,astheparadoxicalandutopianelement
ofhumanrights.

Lileralurisprudenceclaims thatrightsandhumanrightsare histori-

cally,structurallyandpoliticallyindistinguishalle. Mosthumanrights
textlooks introduce their topic ly presenting the standard lileral
]acqucs Lcrrida, atingVcll in Cadava, !. Connor and]-I lancy cds) , Ho
Comcs tcr/|cSu|c:/lcvYor,Routlcdgc, i i ) i i|.
7+
THE END Ol HLMAN Pl GHTS
theories ofrights, as ifthere is notheory ofhuman rights inde

en-
dent ofrights theories. Butve must resistthis equalisation ofrghts
theluildingllocksofeverypositivism) andhumanrights ,vhichare
the promises ofa future andthe critique ofallpositive lav and sys-
temofrights. ltisasignofthemoralpovertyofurisprudenc
`
andof
itsneglectoftheimaginarydomainthatthemostadvanceddiscourse
andpracticeoftranscendenceis approachedexclusively onthelasis
ofa lanal understanding ofthe existent. Legal thinking has alan-
doned transcendence, has condemned natural lav to the history of
ideas ,hastamedusticeandhaslecomeanaccountancyofrules .
Thepositivisationandglolalisationof humanrightsmarkstheend
ofpolitical modernity in the same vay that glolalised economy
marksthe endofLeviathan. Theirtriumphis therecognitionofthe
lackthatconstituteshumanidentity. Desireis movedlylack,lythe
desireandfearoftheother. lfforHolles,theunleashingofdesireto
organise modern society leads to the estallishment ofthe alsolutist
statemadeintheimageofthe emancipatedindividual, inLocke the
fearofdeathleadstoalimitlessendeavourtoaccumulateandtoshapc
the polity and the vorld according to the dictates oflottomless
desire. The Sovereign and human rights are the tvin causes and
ol ects oflegalised desire. The Sovereign, luilt onthe principle of
unlimitedindividualdesirelutassumingthemantle oftheparty, the
class orthe nation, can turn its desire into murderous rage and the
denialofallright. urcentury has repeatedly vitnessed this descent
ofgroup ornationalrightintotheaffirmationoftherightsofdeath.
FromtheHolocausttotheGulagsandfromHiroshimatothekilling
fields of Vietnam and Camlodia, from Bosnia to Rvanda and
Kosovo the rights ofalsolute desire have leen conlirmed time and
again.VhentheSovereignisdevisedaccordingtothecharacteristics
ofthe desiringself, ithas the alility, empirically deniedtoindividu-
als, to frustrate allhuman desireand surrenderpeople to thehorrors
itvasmadetoprotectthemfrom.
Theglolalisationoftheprincipleofsovereigntyandtheaggressive
legitimationofstatepoverlyreferencetomoralityandhumanrights
leaves no-one andnothinguntouched. Human rights have lecome
the tc|soa J'c|tc ofthe state system as its main constituents are chal-
lengedly economic, social and cultural trends. lt is no coincidence
thathumanrights `triumphed atapoint ofmaximumangstalout
life chances and malaise alout the collapse ofmoral certitudes and
politicalllueprints . The enormouspotentialfordiversityreleasedly
the demise ofCommunismvas accompaniedly an unprecedented
THE END OF HLMAN Pl GHTS
73
desire for unityandorder. lts signs are apparent all overthevorld.
They are expressed as despair alout the loss of state authority,
national virility and parental, specilicaly paternal and male, pover,
as grave concern alout the increase oflroken and non-standard
families, of`scroungers and `velfare mothers , as hatred against
`logusrefugeesandcriminal chidren, muggersand corruptpolice-
men, as fear alout nationalist varlords, ex-communist mafias and
uvenile thugs, or, as millenarianangst, identity crisis anda-Jc-s|e.|c
llues. lfmodernity created the moral panic, inpostmodernity it is
moral topanic. There are manypostmodernnightmares andvisions
ofhorror, luttheyare allare hauntedlytheidealofanev united,
homogeneous grouping, a nev Single genetically modined Pover
vhich vill molilise and unite the fragments again under a novel
i

imanent reason, deep structure or metaphysical principle. The

trle, the group, the lelievers , a re-packaged nation are asked to
replacestateandsocietyandto re-assertauthorityforfaketradition.

Asinstitutional practice, humanrights often expresstheimagina-

tionoftheoneandhomogeneousvorldsociety,invhichtheexten-
sion offormalequalityandnegativefreedomandtheglolalisationof
Vestern capitalism and consumerism vill equate society vith its
`idealpicturedravnlygovernmentsandinternationallavexperts.
lnstitutionalhumanrightsare molilisedin the name ofglolal cul-
ture, thevaluesandprinciplesofvhichareanattemptto closesoci-
eties and impose on them a unique logic. Vhether that logic is
v esterno
'
other
"
iseiss
`
condary,thepointisthatitfollovsaprin-
cipleofunityagainsttheideas ofsocialindeterminacyandexistential
self-creation promised ly the radical history ofnatural rights. But
human rights are also apoverful popularimaginaryopento diverse
identities, toheterogeneousandsuppressed traditions. Humanrights
asaprincipleofpopularpolitics expresstheindeterminacyandopen-
ness ofsociety andpolitics. They undermine the attempt to police
some social identities andsanction others and their indeterminacy
means thattheloundaries ofsocieqare alvays contested and never
coincidefullyvithvhatevercrystallisations ,poverandlegalentitle-
ment impose. Human rights enclose loth a principle ofunity and
homogeneity and its opposite, the former symlolised ly the legal
formthelatterlythe struggles ofpeople underthe ill-dennedlan-
nerofhumanity.

lnstitutionally, human rights are loth a principle ofstate aggran-

disementandaprotectiveprinciple againstthelottomlesspitofstate
desire. lndividually, theyare the mechanismforshapingidentityand
7
THE END Ol HLMAN Pl GHTS
life accordingt othe dictates ofdesire ofthe other) and the trauma
ofseparationandlack. Humanrightsaren

sured,
'
heylothofferh
'
-
ited protection against the society ofdesire, against the threatening
state andthefearsome other,luttheyalso expressthevayinvhich
identity is arranged in shifting relations offear, a|fecti

n a

d care
tovardstheother. Thereisnoguaranteethataffectionvillvinover
fear. xperiencetellsushoveverthatvhenthe

fe

ro. th

other,t|e
foreigner, the jev, the refugee, lecomes

their institutional logic,

humanrightslosetheirprotectivevalue againstthestate. Analterna-
tive, already visille in the politically lileral part of

ur

gl

lahsed
vorld, is thatthe devouringpotential offearsome desire initsleg
'
l
formvillgo on colonisingthe socialvorld. T|ennalo

tcome vill
le the fracturing ofcommunity and ofthe sociallondi

to amon-
adology, in vhich some peoplevill lealleto asserttheirhnal and
alsolutesovereigntyvhileothersvilllereducedtoth

st

s of
'
he
perpetuallyoppressedunderclass. Butafullysovereig

nindividualisa
delusionary and rather farcical simulacrum

ofLe
`
iathan. ln loth
instances , positivisedhumanrightsandlegaLsed desire, lased on
'
he
fear ofthe other, coincide and their vorld and the self-creating
potential ofexistentialfreedomisextinguished.

Vhatisthe end ofhumanrights?

The hrst part ofthis lookpresented an alternative history ofthe
ideaofnaturalrightandsketchedthecontinuitiesandlreaksletveen
classicalnaturallav,naturalrightsandhumanrightsinordertoresc

e
them fromtheir duliousrespectalility. Historiography cannot avoid
a degree oflackvards proection. The past is a foreign country, its
language dead.Vereadthepastfromou
'
positio

inthepre
`
entand
vevritehistory, consciouslyorunconsciously,vith

c
'
rrentinter
'
sts
andconcernsinmind.Anachronismis notadefect,itisanunavoid-
allevirtuevhichlecomesprollematic onlyvhenithideslehinda
smokescreenofolectivity and detachment.Ve vrite fora
l
urpose,
even ifthat is simply the pleasure ofvriting, vriting thehistory of
humanrights is doullyinvolvedintheduplicityofalackvardlook
thatisfirmlyestallishedinthepoliticsofthefuture. Natural|av, the
progenitorandcompanionofhumanrights,unlikeotherclassic

lthe-
oriesandpractices, doesnotlelongfullytoany one

epoch. ltviolat

s
the constraints oftime, not in the sense ofpreaching eternal lav in
placeofafallentemporalpositivity,lutof udgingthepresentaccord-
ingto the protocols ofthepastinthenameofthefuture.
THE END O l HLMAN Pl GHTS 77
Naturalrightinhalits theloundaries ofhistory,itisatrace ofthe
pastandaprefigurationofthefutureinthepresent. lthasoftenacted
as an imaginary revelry and vision, suspended letveen myth and
utopia,immemorialpastandunreachallefuture. Naturalrightlooks
lackvards to a golden age, a mythical state of alsolute freedom,
unrestrictedequalityandedeniclliss , andforvards to anagevhere
redemptionandpeacevillcome to thisvorld. Asmythandutopia,
itexpressesthepoverofimagination,thepoeticenergiesofsocieties
vherethepresentcannotgagthefuture andvhatexistsisudgedin
the court ofvhat vill never le. But natural lav isjanus-like in
anothervaytoo. atraditionthatopposes thepresentinthename of
thefuture,hasalsotriumphedmanytimes.Butinitstransitionfrom
dreamtorealityandfromimaginationtoinstitutionaldesign,thepre-
sentandexistenthasoftensilencedthefuturalandalsent,thesignof
thecross orthehammerandsicklehavemutatedfromvitnesses to
martyrdom, resistanceandredemptiontosymlolsofempire, oledi-
enceanddomination. Naturallavhaslothsulvertedandupheldthe
existingorder,itshistorycaughtletveen thelongpastandtheinn-
nitefuture,letveenthedreamanditsrealisation, vhichoftencoin-
cidesvithitsletrayal.Theunceasingquestfornaturalrightoffersthe
most consistent map ofthe human alility to disrupt the empirical
vorldandpassleyondthegiven,inthehopethatthepresentcanand
mustlepushedasideinordertolileratethefuture.ltsinevitallefail-
ure, the inescapalle letrayal ofutopia, shovs humanity to le an
incompletepro ectfired lytheinustices andinfamies ofthis vorld
lut unalle toreachthe state ofgrace.
Fornatural right, the future has a dynamic pull. Reality i snever
complete and all honestrealismincludes the notyet, the future or
utopia in its heart. `There is no realism vorthy ofthe name ifit
alstractsfromthestrongestelementinreality,anunfinishedreality`.`
lnthis,utopianthoughtmayle assistedlyHegelianandpsychoana-
lytical insights. Hegel opened the |||oso|y .]R|||vith theustly
infamous claim that `the rational is real, the real is rational `. lt has
leenrepeatedlyinterpreted,asvesav, asthe most telling symlol of
the historicism and conservatism of Hegelian philosophy. The
PrussianStatevas thefirsttoleidentinedviththevorldspiritand
its rationality. Butthisvas aratherlame affair and there vas much
mileage and millions ofdead stillleft in history. More recent pro-
nouncements ofthe endofallconHict, ofthennalvictoryoflileral
` mstloch, T|cr|ao|c o}Hoc Cxloru,lackvcll, I 86) 6z|.
7O
THE END Ol HLMAN Pl GHTS
capitalismandof thedeathof utopiaaremoreconvincing- andmore
menacing. Fromthe perspective ofthe victors ofthe ColdVar, all
critiqueisdismissedas irrationalandunreal.Ltopiahasleenlranded
intellectually lankrupt, a morally repugnant gloss ofcommunism.
From the perspective ofthe prophets ofthe end, free markets and
humanrights are the non-ideological ideologies left, nnalproofs of
the pragmatic lenevolence oftheAmericanvay. Yet, the Hegelian
realdoesnotcoincideviththeimmediatelygivenandthe dialectical
identincation ofrealityandrationalityisneitherpresentnorguaran-
teed lut a future-looking trend andpossilility. The rational-as-real
marks the unity ofessence and existence, ofessence that can le
realisedonly as historicallecoming, ofhistory thatudges the sedi-
mentationofreason. lnthissense, theidentificationdoesnotsigni(
anachievedorgivenstateofaffairslutanormativepostulate,accord-
ing to vhich the real must lecome rational and the essence of
historical movement must le united vith its empirical realisation.
ncethepetty accountancy oftrade agreementsandthenarcissistic
sycophancyofintellectualnouveaurichesandpoliticalarrivistessup-
ported ly lomlers have leen set aside, the Hegelian principle
appearsaspreciselytheoppositeofthatofthehistoriansofthe end`.
theonlyvayinvhichthefutureunionofrealandrationalcancome
togetherislyresistingtherealinthenameoftherational. Vhenve
comline this vith the post-Hegelian critique of rationalism, ve
couldformulate apostmodern dialecticalprinciple. resistthe real in
thename ofthemanyrationalitiesto come.
Derrida callsthedisturlanceofthepresentlythefuture, a mes-
sianismvithoutamessiah`. hedescrilesthemessianic experienceas
an apprehension, a straining forvard tovards the coming event
vhich is the most irreducilly heterogeneous otherness, an irre-
ducilleamalgamofdesireandanguish,afnrmationandfear,promise
andthreat. . . Messianicity mandatesthatveinterruptthe ordinary
course ofthings, time andhistory |ctc-aou, itis inseparalle froman
affirmation ofotherness andustice`. Derrida vants to distinguish
thejevishmessianichope, vhichheconsiderstoleauniversalstruc-
tureofexperienceindependentofanyreligiousmessianism,fromthe
Greekutopian tradition vithits expectation ofa perfect collective
future. HedisagreesvithFrederickjameson'svievthatthemessianic
is another name for his persistent utopianism` lut he accepts that
utopianism could not exist vithout the experience ofthe messianic
' ]acqucs Icrrda, Narx Sons in C|os/|y Icmct.c/|oas . H Symos|um oac:ues
Ictr|Jc' Sc:/re }otMcr" NichaclSrnklcrcd. ) Iondon, \crso, ippp) z|p.
THE END O l HLMAN Pl GHTS 7V
di
`
ru

tion. ur argument hasleen that the imaginary domain, ly

lrngingtogetherthefutureanteriorityofhumanidentityandofthe
humanrights society, links the structure ofsul ectivity vith that of
socialutopiaor,inDerrida's terms, makes utopiathesocial aspectof
the messianic experience.
Si

ii

larly,

i n psychoanalytical terms, the Real, threatening or

promising, Les unrecognised and yet all-poverful at the heart of
psychic reality.ou/ssca.c

the constitutive andcatastrophic force of

thereal, disturlsthelineartemporalityofdailyreality. Astheretro-
spe
'
tiveexplanationofpassionsandpathologies,itcreatesthepastin
'
heimag
`
ofthepresentandmakesitthepresent'scause. Asanimag-
inaryproectedleautifulform,itprefigures thefutureinthepresent.
lereagain,theidentificationof vhatexistsviththegoodorthetrue
'
sthello
'
kage, thedisease. But ifthefuturalaspectofhuman rights
istole
'
einforced, itmustleanchoredinan ethicalinterpretationof
the desire for the) other vhich the veak ethics ofpsychoanalysis
cannotsupport. Thisis hovtheutopianpresentsthepoverofnat-
uralright.
lt is rectirred - lut never refuted ly the mere pover of that vhich, at
any particular times, is. n the contrary it confutes and udges the
existent if it is failing and failing inhumanely, indeed rirst and foremost
it provides the s

tandard to measure such facticity precisely as depar-

ture from the Right, and alove all to measure it rmmanently. that is ,
ly ideas vhich have resounded and informed from time immemorial
lefore such a departure, and vhich are still displayed and proposed in
the face of it. '
Bloch ale

rts us to the links letveen natural lav and human rights.

Humanrghts descendfromthis tradition, theyare the utopian ele-
ment lehind legal rights Hovever unlike classical utopias, they do

otdravtheir force from a predicted and descriled future perfec-

tron, lutfromthepainandcontemptfeltlythecitizensofthestates
` Frcud

co
'
mcnts that thc Chrstian command to lovc thy ncighLour` is thc most
oLsccnc
I
incilc hc knovs Iacan lormulatcs thc cthical rincilc olsychoanalysis as
ncvcr givc u on your dcsirc hilc thcsc cthical` rncilcs may Lc olusc vhcn
addrcss
`
dtothcarticiantsolthcthcracutic cncountcr, thcyarccxrcssionsolascll~ccn-
tcrcd

icvotcthics
`
vhich, iIgcncralIyalicd, canhavccatastrohic conscqucnccs. Inthc
Iac

aman canon, actug lully on your dcsirc mcans lolloving thc dcath drivc ovcr crotic
+csirc Jhcmuidcrcusrcsults oIthc dcathdrivchavclittcrcdthc historyagcsolthctvcn-
ticthccn
'
urytoomanytimcs. SccCostasIouzinas, Iav`sirthand^ntigonc`sIcath. Cn
CntologicalandIsychoanalyticalIthics`, i 6 CcrJo:oIcuFcv|cu, i z;-6z, i pp,
' Imstloch, T|c|||oso|y/|cu/urc,] Cummingtrans ) lcvYork, Icrdcrand
Icrdcr, ip,o) p i .
O
THE END F HLMAN Rl GHTS
vhich have proclaimedtheirtriumph. Humanrights are the

neces-
sary andimpossille claim oflavtoustice. They drav their force
fromthesufferingofthepastandtheinusticesofthepresent

nd

act
asparasitesonthelody ofrights, consumingthehostandpro ecting
a future out ofaratherllandlegalhistory. Manyofthe authors ve
have examinedinsistonthe radicallreakletveennaturalrightand
human rights , and historiographymayle ontheir side. Butnatural
lavandhumanrightssharealsoacommontraditionofresi

stanceand
dissentfromexploitationanddegradationandaconcernvithapolit-
ical and ethical utopia, the epiphany ofvhichvill never occurlut
vhose principle can stand inudgement ofthe presentlav. Vhen
humanrightslosethatelement,theyremainaninstrumentforrefo

rm
and, occasionally, asophisticatedtoolforanalysislutthey stopleing
thetrilunalofhistory.
Thetriumph ofhuman rigLts and the accompanying `endofhis-
tory` mayconceal annal mutationin the long traectory ofnat
'
ral
lav in vhich the call ofnature has turned from a defence against
co.ventionalvisdomandinstitutionallethargyinto thelegitimating
device ofsome ofthe most scleroticregimesandpovers . As human
rightsstarveeringavayfrointheirinitialrevolutionaryanddissi

dent
purposes , as their endlecomes olscuredin eve
'
more declarations,
treatiesanddiplomaticlunches,vemayle enterngtaeepoch

fthe
endofhumanrightsandofthetriumph ofamonolithichumanity. lf
humanrightshavelecomethe `realisedmyth` ofpostmodernsoci-
eties, thisis amyth realisedonly inthe energies ofthosevho suffer
grave andpettyviolationsinthehands ofthepo
"
ers t|at|avepro-
claimedtheirtriumph. Humanrightsarethenegativeprncipleatthe
heart ofthesocialimaginary. The end ofhuman rights , like that of
naturallav, isthepromise ofthe`notyet`, ofthe indeterminacyof
existential self-creation against the fear ofuncertaintyandtheinau-
thenticcertaintiesofthepresent.Vhentheapologists ofpragmatism
pronounce the end ofideology, ofhistory or utopia, they do
'
ot
mark the triumph ofhuman rights, on the contrary, they lrng
humanrights to anend. The endofhumanrights comesvhenthey
losetheirutopianend.
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Dtittzt, Griits Coldness and Cruelty', in Masc:h|sm _. Mceil trans. )
ev York, Zone Books, i ,,)
Dtmos+ntts cr| S/c/ancn n the Crovn', C. Vince and ]. Vince
trans. ) London, Heinemann, i ,))
Dtnnrot, ]tcqtts Cramma/c|c_y G. Spivak trans. ) Baltimore, The
]ohns Hopkins Lniversity Press, i,))
- Violence and Metaphysics', in Hr|/|n_ anJIq crcn:c A. Bass trans. )
London, Routledge, i ,))
- Plato's Pharmacy' in I|sscm|na/|cns B. ]ohnson trans. ) London,
Athlone Press, i , i)
- C|as j. Leavy and R. Rand trans. ) Lincoln, Lniversity of elraska
Press , i ,6)
- S|r|/. Ic|Jc_cr anJ //c Qncs/|cn G. Bennington and R. Bovlly
trans. ) Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press, i ,,)
- Devant la Loi', in A. doff ed. ) Ka anJ //c Ccn/cmcrcry Cr|/|:a|
cqcrman:c. Ccn/cnary IcaJ|n_s Bloomington, lndiana Lniversity Press,
i ,,)
- The Force of Lav, The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority' ' i,,o)
1 1 CarJc.c LauIcc|cu, i ,
- ating Vell', in . Cadava, P. Connor and ]. L. ancy eds. ) Hc
CcmcsH{/cr//cSn|]c:/ ev York, Routledge, i ,,,)
- Sc:trcscrMarx P. Kamuf trans . ) London, Routledge, i ,,)
- Matx C Sons ', in C/cs/|y Icmar:a/|cns. H Symcs|nm cna:ncs
Icrr|Ja 's ''Sc:/rcs{cr Marx' Michael Sprinkler ed. ) London, Verso,
i ,,,)
Dts Foncts, Airso Lcacc^cnc /c /c|| //c S/cry Ccnc:|Jc |n IuanJa ev
York, Human Rights Vatch, i ,,,)
B l Bll O GRAPHY O3
Dtscomnts, Vrct+ McJcrn Ircn:/ /||csc/|cs L. Scott-Fox and ]. M.
Harding trans . ) Camlridge, Camlridge Lniversity Press, i ,o)
Drtmt+rots , Mtnros thics in Lav. Death Marks on a ' Still Life' '
i ,,,) Vl/: LauanJ Cr|/|nc :o,
Drctv, A. V. In/rcJn:/|cn/c//c S/nJyc//cLauc//c Ccns/|/n/|cn London,
i , , i oth edition, i ,,,)
Dotiiv, ]tcx ln|ccrsa| Inman I//s |n T/ccry anJ ra:/|:c lthaca,
Cornell Lniversity Press, i ,,)
Dotzrts, os+ts Antigone's Death and Lav's Birth. on ntological
and Psychoanalytical thics' i ,,,) i 6 CarJc.c LauIcc|cu i , :,
- Lav's Fear of the lmage', i ,,6, i ,/, Hr/I|s/cry, , ,,-6,
- Psychoanalysis Becomes the Lav. otes on an ncounter Foretold'
i ,,)) Lc_a|S/nJ|csIcrnm, :,
- ros and Jhanatos ', i n D. Manderson ed.) Ccnr/|n_Ica//London,
Pluto, i ,,,)
- Human Rights at the nd of History' i ,,,) /i Hn_c|ak|,,
- rcsccn anJHn/|rcsccn. Prolegomena for a Legal lconology', in
Costas Douzinas and Lynda ead eds. ) LauanJ//cIma_c. T/cHn//cr|/y
Hrt anJ //c Hcs//c/|:s cLau Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press,
i ,,,)
Dotzrts, Cos+ts C Vtnnrc+o, Rort Domination, exploitation
and suffering. Marxism and the opening of closed systems of thought'
i ,6) |]cnrna| //cHmcr|:an BarIcnnJa/|cnoi
- Posting the Lav. Social Contracts and the Postal Rule's
Grammatology' i ,, 1) lV / 1 1 In/crna/|cna|cnna|c//c Scm|c/|:s )/Lau
i i ,
- A Vell-Founded Fear of ]ustice. thics and ]ustice in
Postmodernity' i ,,i ) ll/: LauanJ Cr|/|nc i i ,
-ns/|:cM|s:arr|cJ dinlurgh, dinlurgh Lniversity Press , i ,,)
- The Face of ]ustice. A]urisprudence of Alterity' i ,,) , Sc:a|anJ
Lc_a|S/nJ|cso,
Dotzrts , Cos+ts and Vtnnrc+o, Rort vith McVtrcn, Sntt
cs/mcJcrn nr|srnJcn:c. T/c |au c /cx/ |n //c /cx/s |au London,
Routledge, i ,, i , i ,,,)
Dtctr+, Lto Tra|/cJcIrc|/ Ccns/|/n/|cnnc|Paris, i ,:i )
Dtmo+, Lotrs Issays cnInJ|c|Jna||sm. McJcrn IJcc|c_y | nHn//rcc|c_|:a|
crsc:/|cc Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press, i ,6)
Dtrnt, Lotrs assa_cs /c McJcrn|/y ev Haven, Yale Lniversity Press,
i ,,,)
Dvonxr, Rotio Tak|n_I//s Scr|cns|y London, Duckvorth, i ,)))
- Lav as lnterpretation', in V. ]. T. Mitchell ed.) T/c c||/|:s c
In/crrc/a/|cnChicago, Lniversity of Chicago, i ,, )
- Lau's Im|rc London, Fontana, i ,6)
otimt, Btntno Lc Irc|/sa|s|ar|a/c/c_rc/|c Paris, Maspero, i ,),)
O
B l BLl O GPAPHY
otimt, Btntno Tc uacrs/| c{ //c Ima_c . Kingdom trans . )
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, i ,),)
iiti, ]tcqtts T/c Tc:/ac|c_|:a| Sc:|c/y . Vilkinson trans. ) ev York,
Random House, i ,6)
vts , Tov ed. ) InmaaI|_//s . I}/y Ycats a Manchester, Manchester
Lniversity Press, i ,,)
Ftnrts, Vrc+on Ic|Jc_craaJ^a.|sm]. Margolis and T. Rockmore eds . )
Philadelphia, Temple Lniversity Press , i ,,)
Ftrntnc, ]oti I|_//s, ns/|:c aaJ //c la|nc c{ L||cr/y Princeton ],
Princeton Lniversity Press , i ,o)
Ftiomt, D tvro C|c|| L||cr/|cs aaJ Inmaa I|_//s |a Ia_|aaJ aaJ Ha|cs
xford, xford Lniversity Press i ,,,)
Ftnnv, Luc T/c ^cu I:c|c_|:a| rJcr Carol Volk trans . ) Chicago,
Lniversity of Chicago Press, i ,,: or i ,,,)
Ftnnv, Luc and Rttt+, Aitr Irom//cI|_//sc{Maa /c //cIcn|||:aaIJca
Franklin Philip trans. ) Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press , i ,,:)
Ic|Jc_cr aaJ McJcra|/y F. Philip trans. ) Chicago, Lniversity of
Chicago Press, i ,,o)
Frccrs, ]on T/c I|c|ac I|_// )j K|a_s Bristol, Thoemmes Press,
i ,,/i ,i
Frtn, S. , Bocoton, V. and Rtoot, B. Ccmar|a_Ccas/|/n/|casxford,
Clarendon, i ,,,)
Frx, Bntct T/c La:aa|aa Sn|]c:/ Princeton ], Princeton Lniversity
Press, i ,,,)
Frrs , ]on ^a/nra|LauaaJ^a/nrc|I|_//s xford, Clarendon, i ,o)
Frsn, S. Dennis Martinez and the Lses of Theoty` i ,)) ,6 Ya|c Lau
Icc|cu i )),
Fotctti+, Mrcnti, I|s:|||acaaJna|s/. T/c B|r// q//c r|sca London.
Penguin, i ,),)
Tvo Lectures. Lecture Tvo. i ]anuary i ,)6', in cucr/Kacu|cJ_c
C. Gordon ed. , K. Soper trans . ) ev York, Pantheon, i ,o)
I|s/cryc{Scxna||/y, lc|nmcI:HaIa/rcJn:/|caLondon, Penguin, i , i )
Fntx, Mtrnto Ha/ |s ^ccs/ru:/nra||sm` S. Vilke and R. Gray trans . )
Minneapolis , Lniversity of Minnesota Press , i ,,)
Fntto, Srcmto Hy Har`, Crcn sy:/c|c_y aaJ //cHaa|ys|s c{ //cI_c,
C|c|||sa/|ca aaJ |/s I|s:ca/ca/s, i n C|c|||sa/|ca, Sc:c/y aaJIc||_|ca]ames
Strachey ed. ) Allert Dickson trans. ) London, Penguin, i ,, )
Tc/cmaaJTa|cc,in T/c r|_|asTc||_|ca]ames Strachey ed. ) Allert
Dickson trans . ) London, Penguin, i , ,)
Ftxtvtmt, Fntcrs Iaccucrca:/cJ//cIaJ)jI|s/cry`Santa Monica Ca. ,
Rand Corporation, i ,,)
T/cIaJI|s/cry aaJ //cLas/Maa London, Penguin, i ,,:)
Gtotmtn, Hts-Gtonc Trn// aaJ Mc//cJ London, Sheen and Vard,
i ,),)
Bl BLl O GPAPHY O7
Gtt+t, Roitoo InmaaI|_//saaJ//cL|m|/s )jCr|/|:a|Icasca Aldershot,
Dartmouth, i ,,,)
Gttcnt+, Mtncti La Iccc|n/|ca Jcs Jrc|/s Jc | '/cmmc Paris, Gallimard,
i ,,)
Gtocntct, Vrct+ Iras/ B|c:/ London, Routledge, i ,,6)
Gtvrn+n, Ait IcascaaaJMcrc||/yChicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press,
i ,))
InmaaI|_//s Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press, i ,:)
- Sc|j-In|j|mca/Princeton ], Princeton Lniversity Press , i ,,)
Grtnxt, ++o ^a/nra| Lau aaJ //c T/ccry )jSc:|c/y rnest Baker trans . )
Camlridge, Camlridge Lniversity Press, i ,,)
Gitoo, Mtnv A I|_//s Ta|k. T/c Imcccr|s/mca/)jc||/|:a|I|s:cnrsc
ev York, Free Press, i ,,i )
Goiomt, Ltcrt T/c /||csc/y c{ //c Ia|//camca/ H. Maas trans. )
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, i ,),)
Gooonrcn, Pt+tn IcaJ|a_ //cLauxford, Blackvell, i ,)
- Lc_a|I|s:cntsc London, Macmillan, i , )
-- Laa_na_cs c{Lau London, Veidenfeld and icolson, i ,,o)
- cJ|ns Lcx. lsy:/caaa|ys|s, I|s/cry, Lau Berkeley, Lniversity of
California Press, i ,,,)
- Lau| a//c Ccnr/s )jIccLondon, Routledge, i ,,6)
- LauaaJ//c la:cas:|cns.HLc_caJrcIcaJcrLondon, Macmillan, i ,,))
Social Science and the Displacement of Lav` i ,,) , :/: Lau aaJ
Sc:|c/yIcc|cu),
Go+nntir, Ait Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality` i ,)6) , o
Icc|cuMc/a/ys|:s::6
Gntt, Kt+t and Lrm, Hriitnv Vhat is this Thing alout Female
Circumcision` i ,, , )/, Sc:|a|aaJLc_a|S/nJ|cs , 6,-)
Gno+rts Ic nrcBc||c/a:s L||rc Trcs Lav of Var and Peace`, F. Kelsey
trans. ) lndianapolis, Bolls-Merrill, i ,6:)
Gtzzor, L+t Do ve still Vant to le Sulects?`, in S. Critchley and
P. Devs eds . ) Ic:oas/rn:/|cc Sn|]c:/|c|/|cs ev York, S. L. .Y. Press,
i ,,6)
Htntnmts , ]tnct T/ccryaaJra:/|:c London, Heinemann, i ,))
Htsvm, Stntn ed. ) Lcc|aasaaJLa:aa.T/cM|sscJIa:ona/crAllany, State
Lniversity of ev York Press, i ,,?)
Htnort, V. F. R. Hr|s/c/|c `s I//|:a| T/ccry xford, xford Lniversity
Press, i ,o)
Htn+, H. L. A. T/c Cca:c/)j1au xford, Clarendon, i ,),)
- Are There Any atural Rights?` i ,, ,) 6 /||csc/|:a|Icc|cui ),
Htnvtv, Dtvro ns/|:c, ^a/nrc c //c Ccc_ra/y c{ Iq crca:c xford,
Blackvell, i ,,6)
Htvtx, F. A. Lau,Lc_|s|a/|ca, L||cr/yVol. : London, Routledge and Kegan
Paul, i,)6)
OO
B l Bll OGRAPHY
Htcti G. /||csc/y c{ I|_// T. M. Knox trans. ) xford, xford
Lniversity Press, i ,6))
^a/nra| Iau T. M. Knox trans. ) Philadelphia, Lniversity of
Pennsylvania Press , i ,),)
T/c /cacmcac|c_y c{ S|r|/ A. V. Miller trans. ) xford, xford
Lniversity Press, i ,)))
Sys/cm c{ I//|:a| Iqc (: e.-,) and I|ts/ /||csc/y c{ S|r|/ (: e,-)
H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox trans. and ed. ) Allany, S. L. . Y. Press,
i ,)))
Ic_c| aaJ //c Inmaa S|r|/ H Traas|a/|ca c{ //ccaa Ic:/nrcs ca //c
/||csc/y//cS|r|/ (: e,-) u|//Ccmmca/ary L. Rauch trans. and ed.)
Detroit, Vayne State Lniversity Press, i ,, )
Htrotcctn, Mnn+r Ha a/rcJn:/|ca /c Mc/a/ys|:s R. Mannheim trans. )
ev York, Doulleday Anchor, i ,6i )
Bc|a_ aaJ T|mc ]. Macquarrie and . Rolinson trans. ) ev York,
Harper and Rov, i ,6:)
The Anaximander Fragment`, in Iar|y Crcck T/|ak|a_ D. F. Crell
and F. Capuzzi trans. ) ev York, Harper and Rov, i ,),)
The Age of the Vorld Picture`, i n T/c Qncs/|ca Cca:cra|a_
Tc:/ac|c_y aaJ //cr Issays V. Lovitt trans. ) ev York, Harper and
Rov, i ,)))
-Letter on Humanism`, The Question Concerning Technology`,
in Bas|: Hr|/|a_s D. F. Krell ed.) HarperSan Francisco, i ,)))
Htiitn, Acts BcycaJns/|:c xford, Blackvell, i ,))
Htxr, Lotrs T/cH_cc{ I|_//s ev York, Columlia Lniversity Press,
i ,,o)
Htnmr++t, Mnnrt-Actit Le concept de diversite liologique et la crea-
tion d'un status de la nature`, in I'/cmmc, |a aa/nrc, |c Jrc|/ Paris,
Bourgeois, i , )
Hrns+, Pnti IauaaJJcc|c_y London, Macmillan, i , ,)
Honnts, Tnomns Icc|a//aa Richard Tuck ed.) Camlridge, Camlridge
Lniversity Press, i ,,6)
I|a|c_nc |c/ucca a /||csc/cr aaJ a S/nJca/ //c Ccmmca Iau
Ia_|aaJ, Crospey, ]. ed. ) Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press,
i ,,))
Hooct, ]onn Ic|Jc_craaJ I//|:s London, Routledge, i ,,,)
Horrmn, P. IaIcmmc Jaas |a casccJcs Inm|crcs Paris, rphys, i ,)))
Hot+n, Axti T/c S/rn_|c cr Ic:c_a|/|ca ]. Anderson trans. )
Camltdge, Polity, i ,,,)
Htmrnntv, ]on Inmaa I//s aaJ//c la|/cJ ^a/|cas pping Bovker,
i ,)
Ht+ , Lv ed. ) T/c Irca:/ Iccc|n/|ca aaJ Inmaa I|_//s . H Br|q
Ic:nmca/aqI|s/cq Boston, Bedford Books, i ,,6)
Htsstni, omto T/car|s Ic:/nrcs The Hague, i hoff i ,6)
Bl Bll OGRAPHY OV
Ht+cnrso, Aiin ed. ) Cr|/|:a|Ic_a|S/nJ|cs Totova j, Rovman and
Littleueld, i ,,)
lnrcnnn v, Ltct Sc:n|nm{cr aac//cr Hcmaa, Ha I//|:s Scxna| Iq crca:c
Carolyn Burke and Gillian Gill trans. ) London, Athlone, i,,,)
T/|ak|a_ //c Iq crca:c K. Montin trans . ) ev York, Routledge,
i ,,)
-|ccc /c ycn Alison Martin trans . ) ev York, Routledge, i ,,6)
]nconv, Rtsstii T/cIaJl/c|a ev York, Basic Books , i ,,,)
]nmts, C. L. R. T/cB|a:ka:c||as. Tcnssa|a/J' nccr/nrcaaJ//cSaaIcm|a_c
Iccc|n/|ca ev York, Vintage, i ,o)
]nv, Mnn+r Must ]ustice le Blind`, in Costas Douzinas and Lynda ead
eds. ) IauaaJ//cma_c Chicago , Lniversity of Chicago Press, i ,,,)
]tiirtx, Gtonc IaIc:|ara/|ca Jcs Jrc|/s Jc | '/cmmcc/Jn :|/cyca G. Fardis
trans . ) Paris , i ,o:)
Kn+, lmmntti Cr|/|ncrc:/|:a|IcascaLondon, Macmillan, i ,,6)
Kn+onovrcz, ns+ The Sovereignty of the Artist. A note on Legal
Maxims and Renaissance Theories of Art`, in Sc|c:/cJS/nJ|cs ev York,
]. ]. Augustin, i ,6,) , ,:-6
Kntrmn, Dnvro Thanks for the Memory. Bloch, Benjamin, and the
Philosophy of History`, in ]. . Daniel and T. Moylan eds. ) ^c/ Yc/.
Ic:oas|Jcr|a_Iras/B|c:/ London, Verso, i ,,))
Ktnnv, Rrcnnno T/c Hakcma_|aa/|ca London, Hutchinson, i ,)
Ktiiv, ]on Mntnrct H S/cr/ I|s/cry Hcs/cn Ic_a| T/ccry xord,
xford Lniversity Press, i ,,:)
Ktist, Hns The Metamorphoses of the ldea of ]ustice`, in P. Sayre
ed. ) a/crrc/a/|cas McJcra Ic_a| /||csc/|cs ev York, xford
Lniversity Press , i ,))
-Ccacra|T/ccq 1auaaJS/a/cCamlridge Mass. , Harvard Lniversity
Press, i ,,)
Krcoom, irznnt+n Gendering Rights `, in A-]. Atnaud and
. Kingdom Hcmca'sI|_//s aaJ//cI|_//s Mca Alerdeen, Alerdeen
Lniversity Press , i ,,o)
Krncnntrmtn, ++o The Ic:/ss/aa/ as Magic Vall`, in T/c In|c Iau
laJcr S|c_c V. Scheuerman ed. ) Berkeley, Lniversity of California
Press, i ,,6)
Kitctn, Rrcnnno S|m|cns/|:cLondon, Andre Deutsch, i ,)))
Ko;tvt, Aitxnont a/ron:/|ca/c //cIcaJ|a_c{Ic_c|A. H. ichols trans. )
lthaca, Cornell Lniversity Press , i ,,)
Knrs+tvn, ]tirn T/c H|]c:/ cuc: c{ Icrrcr Leon Roudiez trans. ) ev
Yotk, Columlia Lniversity Press , i ,:)
-Vomen, Psychoanalysis, Politics`, in T/cKr|s/cca IcaJcrToril Moi
ed.) xford, Blackvell, i ,6)
-S/rca_cr: /c nrsc|ccs Leon Roudiez trans. ) ev York, Columlia
Lniversity Press, i ,,i )
V
Bl Bll O GPAPHY
Knrs+tvt, ]tirt ^a/|cas u|//cn/ ^a/|caa||sm Leon Roudiez trans. ) ev
York, Columlia Lniversity Press, i ,,,)
Ltct, ]tcqtts

:r|/s Paris, Seuil, i ,66)

The sulversion of the sul ect and the dialectic of desire in the
Freudian Lnconscious' in

|/s H Sc|c:/|ca Alan Sheridan trans. )

London, Routledge, i ,)))
T/c Scm|aar a:ncs La:aa Vol l . ]ohn Forester trans. ) orton,
i ,)
T/cI//|:ssy:/caaa|ys|s London, Routledge, i ,,:)
Scm|aarIl. T/c ly:/cscs London, Routledge, i ,,)
Radiophonie' i ,)o) :/, S:|||:c/6,
Kant avec Sade' Vinter i,,) ,i :/c|cr,,
Ltctv, rcoit lascaka||cSn|c:/s xford, Hart, i ,,)
Ltcitt, nts+o ^cu Iqc:/|cas ca //c Icic|n/|ca cnr T|mc London,
Verso, i ,,o)
Imaa:|a/|ca(s) London, Verso, i ,,6)
Ltcitt, nts+o and Motrrt, Cnt+ti Ic_cmcay aaJ Sc:|a||s/ S/ra/c_y
London, Verso, i ,,)
Ltcott-Ltntn+nt, Pnrirrrt Ic|Jc_ct, Hr/ aaJ c||/|:s C. Turner trans. )
xford, Blackvell, i ,,o)
Ltnxs, S+trnt From the ' Single Confused Page' to the ' Decalogue for
Six Billion Persons' . The Roots of the Lniversal Declaration of Human
Rights in the French Revolution' i ,,) :o InmaaI|_//s Qnat/cr|y,,
Lttnt, P. G. cucr aaJ rcnJ|:c T/c c||/|:s aaJ I||cma:y c Ia:|a|
I|s:r|m|aa/|ca:nd edition xford, Vestviev Press , i ,,6)
Ltron+, Cittot T/cc||/|:a|Icrms McJcra Scoc/y]ohn Thompson ed. )
Camlridge, Polity, i ,6)
Icmc:ta:y aaJ c||/|:a| T/ccry D. Macey trans . ) Minneapolis,
Lniversity of Minnesota Press, i ,)
Ltctont Prtnnt L'HmcntJn Ccascnr Paris, Seuil, i ,))
Lc Dcs|rc||/|nc Jc I|cn

/nJcs snr |cs mca/a_cs Jc |

,

/a/ c/ Jn Irc|/
Paris, Fayard, i ,)
Lc Cr|mcJc Ccrcrc|Lcr/|c Paris, Fayard, i ,,)
The ther Dimension of Lav' i ,,,) i6 CarJc.cLauIci|cu,-,
,,
Lts+tn, A+nov and Ptrcx, Dtvro Inmaa I|_//s Lau aaJ ta:/|:c
London, Buttervorths , i ,,,)
Ltvrts, mmttti Tc/a||/y aaJ Ia{a|/y A. Lingis trans . ) Pittslurgh,
Duquesne Lniversity Press, i ,6,)
Inmaa|smcJc | 'Hn/rcIcmmcMontpellier, i ,):)
Cc||c:/cJ /||csc/|:a| acts A. Lingis trans. ) The Hague, ihoff,
i ,))
^|acTa|mnJ|:IcaJ|a_s Bloomington, lndiana Lniversity Press, i ,,o)
-//cru|sc//aaBc|a_crBcycaJIssca:cA. Lingis trans. ) Kluver, i ,,i )
Bl Bll O GPAPHY Vi
- The Rights of Man and the Rights of the ther', in n/s|Jc //c
Sn|]c:/ M. Smith trans . ) London, Athlone Press , i ,,,)
Ltvv, ns atural Lav i n Roman Thought' i ,,) i, S/nJ|ac/Icmca/a
I|s/cr|acc/ nr|s
Ltvrs, onmt Human rights, lav and democracy in an unfree vorld',
i n Tony vans ed. ) Inmaa I|_//s Iq/y \cars ca: H rcara|sa|
Manchester, Manchester Lniversity Press , i ,)
Lrovr+z, Soim and Mtvtn, Mtn+r T/c Bc/raycJ rcss|ca Baltimore,
]ohn Hopkins Lniversity Press, i ,,)
Lissxt, A+nov Hn|aas 's T/ccryc^a/nra|Lauxford, Clarendon, i ,,6)
Lrvrcs+ot, S+trnt and vt, Ji\ r|sca Lau xford, xford
Lniversity Press , i ,,,)
Locxt, ]on Sc:caJ Trca/|sc c Ccicramca/ P. Laslett ed.) Camlridge,
Camlridge Lniversity Press , i ,6o)
- Ha Issay Cca:cra|a_ Inmaa laJcts/aaJ|a_ P. H. idditch ed.)
xford, Clarendon, i ,),)
Lotcnir, Mtn+r n|||: Lau aaJ c||/|:a| T/ccry xford, xford
Lniversity Press , i ,,:)
Ltcts, ]. R. ans/|:c xford, Clarendon, i ,o)
Lvo+tno, ]tt-Fntcors T/ccs/mcJcra CcaJ|/|caHaIssaycaKacu|cJ_c
Manchester, Manchester Lniversity Press, i ,)
- T/c IqctcaJ G. Van den Alleele trans . ) Manchester, Manchester
Lniversity Press, i ,)
- Ic|Jc_cr aaJ //c ',cus ' A. Michel and M. Rolerts trans. )
Minneapolis, Lniversity of Minnesota Press, i ,,o)
- The ther's rights', in a InmaaI//s Stephen Shute and Susan
Hurley eds. ) ev York, Basic Books , i ,,,)
- A l'lnsy Lnleknovnst) ' in Miami Theory Collective ed.) Ccmmna|/y
a/IccscIaJsMinneapolis, Lniversity of Minnesota Press, i,,6)
Lvo+tno, tt-Fntcors and Tntntto, ]tt-Lour ns/ Cam|a_
V. Glodzich trans . ) Manchester, Manchester Lniversity Press , i , ,)
Mtctri, Vriirtm Lav's CcrnsIc||:/|. The Fantasmatic Body of Rights
Discoutse' i ,, lX/: Lau c Cr|/|nc , )
Mtr+txrs , A. T/cSn|c:/c{ Ccas/|/n/|caa|I//s Athens , Sakoulas, i , i )
Mtncti, Gtnnrti Crca/|ic I|Jc||/y R. Rosthal trans. ) ev York, Farrar,
Strauss C Co) , i ,6)
Mtnctst, Htnntn+ Ircs aaJC|i|||sa/|caBoston, Beacon Press, i ,66)
Mtnr+tr, ]tcqtts T/c I//scMaa aaJ^a/ntc| Lau D. Anson trans. )
ev York, Charles Scrilner's Sons , i ,, i )
Mtnsntii, Gtorrntv Patriating Rights - Vith Reservations', in
Ccas/|/n/|caa| Iqcrm |a //c la|/cJ K|a_Jcm Camlridge, Centre for
Pullic Lav, i ,,)
Mtn+rttt, Htnnrt+ ed. and trans . ) T/c cs|/|ic /||csc/y c Hn_ns/c
Ccm/cVol. :, , rd ed. London, i ,,)
VZ
Bl Bll O GPAPHY
Mnnx, Knni Tccr|cs c{Snr|ns lc|nc]. Cohen trans. ) London, Lavrence
and Vishart, i ,):)
n the ]evish Question' in Icr|y Tcx/s D. McLellan ed. and trans. )
xford, Blackvell, i ,)i ) ,-i i
Cr|/|nc Ic_c|'s /||csc/y c{I|_//i n Icr|y Tcx/s D. McLellan ed.
and trans. ) xford, Blackvell, i ,)i ) i i ,-:,
Critique of the Gotha Programme', in David McLellan ed.) Sc|c:/cJ
Hr|/|a_s xford, xford Lniversity Press, i ,)))
Mn+nitz, Aintn+ Lc Iccc|n/|ca c/ |cs c/rca_cis Paris, La Renaissance du
Livre, i ,:)
Mn+ston, Mnni, Lnvntct, Cnnnits lll, Dticnoo, Rrcnnno and
Cntsnnv, Krmntnitv eds. ) HcrJs //c/ HcnaJ Cr|/|:c| Ic:c T/ccry,
Hsscn|/|ccScc:/caJ//cI|rs/HmcaJmca/Boulder, Vestviev Press, i ,,,)
Mcltnv, Rnirn atural Lav and atural Rights', i n Hn|acscaInmca
H:/|ca Vashington D. C. , Catholic Lniversity of America Press, i ,,:)
Mclt+vnt, Ainsonrn H{/cr l|r/nc London, Duckvorth, i ,o)
Mtivtn, Lion Hov the system failed to save Rvanda' T/c CncrJ|ca )
Decemler i ,,) i o
Miiitn, Fnto ^c/nrc, (ns/|:c, caJI|_//| aHr|s/c/|c 's c||/|.s xford, xford
Lniversity Press, i ,,,)
Mr+cntii, V. ]. T. Icac|c_y Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press, i ,6)
Mtnrnv, V. T. T/c |Jcs/Sc:|c|S.ca:c`Cca{_nrc/|casLcucaJMcJcra|/y
xford, xford Lniversity Press, i ,,)
ncti, Tnomns Inc||/y caJ cr/|c||/y ev York, xford Lniversity
Press , i ,,i )
ncv, ]tn-Luc T/c Iaccrc/|cc Ccmmna/|y Minneapolis, Lniversity of
Minnesota Press, i ,, i)
T/cIxcr|ca:cc{IrccJcm Stanford, Stanford Lniversity Press, i ,,,)
nnncnr, nsn The Repullic's Citizens of Honour', i n I ;: HaIJcc
//c/ C/ca_cJ //c Hcr|J ]une i,,) T/c l^ISCCcnr|cri ,
ttmn, Fnnz The Concept of Political Freedom', in T/cIn|cLcu
laJcr S|c_c V. Scheuerman ed. ) Berkeley, Lniversity of California
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it+nnmmtn, L. cs//|s/c|rc. Ics I|s/cry Ccmc/ccaIaJ`London, Verso,
i ,,:)
rt+zscnt, Fnrtonrcn /||csc/y |a//cTrc_|:H_c //c Crccks M. Covan
trans. ) Chicago, Regnery, i ,6:)
T/c H||| /c cucrV. Kaufmann and R. ]. Hollingdale trans. ) ev
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io, Cnnios T/cI//|s InmcaI//s xford, Clarendon, i ,,,)
IcJ|:c|Ic||ca Tr|c|ev Haven, Yale Lniversity Press, i ,,6)
onnit, Ain Cr|mc, Iccsca caJ I|s/cry London, Veidenfeld and
icolson, i ,,, )
tssnntm, Mnn+nn The Betrayal of Convention. A reading of
Bl BLl O GPAPHY V
uripides' Ic:n|c, in T/cIrc_|||/y c{CccJacss Camlridge, Camlridge
Lniversity Press , i ,6)
Pnrt, Tnomns T/cI//sMca, Bc|a_caHasucr/cMr. Bnrkc `sH//c:k ca
//cIrca:/Iccc|n/|ca H. Collins ed. ) London, Penguin, i ,6,)
Ptnnv, Mrcnnti T/c IJcc InmcaI//s ev York, xford Lniversity
Press, i ,,)
Pt+tnso, V. S. and Srsso, Rvn, A. C|c|c| CcaJcr Issncs Boulder,
Vestviev Press, i ,,,)
Prictn, ]on Lnder the in uence' T/c CncrJ|ca :i Septemler i ,,,) i
Pin+o, Cc|cs V. Hamlton trans. ) London, Penguin, i ,6o)
- pistle Vll ', in /ccJrns caJ I|s/|cs lII caJ llI V. Hamilton
trans . ) London, Penguin, i ,),)
- Icn|||: D. Lee trans . ) London, Penguin, i ,))
T/cLcus T. ]. Saunders trans . ) London, Penguin, i , )
Po++nct, Aini The Paternity of Lav', in C. Douzinas et al eds. ) c||/|.s,
cs/mcJcra|/y, Cr|/|:c|Lc_c|S/nJ|cs London, Routledge, i ,,)
Potin+zns , icos S/c/c, cucr, Sc:|c||sm London, ev Left Books ,
i ,))
Rnor, Mnncnnt+ ]nt Ic|a/crrc/|a_ rccr/y Chicago, Lniversity of
Chicago Press, i ,,,)
Rnvis, ]on H T/ccry ns/|:c xford, xford Lniversity Press,
i ,):)
Rtnt+, Ainr T/c Irc //c IaJ|c|Jnc|. H Cca/r||n/|ca /c c I|s/cry
Sn

|]c:/|c|/y M. B. DeBeviose and F. Philip trans. ) Princeton ],

Prnceton Lniversity Press , i ,,))
Ronrso, Fron The limits of a rights-lased approach to international
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Manchester, Manchester Lniversity Press, i ,,)
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Houghton Mifin, i ,6)
Ron+v, Ricnnno Human Rights , Rationality and Sentimentality', in
Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley eds. ) a Inmca I|_//s ev York,
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Durham, Duke Lniversity Press, i ,,)
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- Hegel and the Dialectics of Contract' i ,,) i o CcrJc.cLcuIcc|cu
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Rotsstnt, ]tn]ncqtts T/cSc:|c|Cca/m:/,in c||/|:c| Hr|/|a_sF. Vatkins
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- T/cI|t:/caJSc:caJI|saniscR. and ]. Masters trans. ) ev York, St.
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- Im||ccrcaIJn:c/|ca A. Bloom trans. ) London, Penguin, i ,,i )
Snitci, Rtn+n T/c Sc||sc{IrccJcm London, Routledge, i ,,)
3
Bl BLl O GPAPHY
Snitci, Rtn+n Rights in Psychoanalytic and Feminist Perspective`
i ,,,) i 6 CcrJc.cLcuIcc|cu,-, i i : i
Snn+nt, ]tn-Pnti Ix|s/ca/|c||smcaJInmca|sm P. Mairet trans . ) London,
Methuen, i ,o)
Scnnnv, init T/c BcJy|ac|a xford, xford Lniversity Press , i ,,)
Scninc, Pitnnt T/c Ia:/ca/mca/ )/ Iccsca Rudham, Duke Lniversity
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The prollem of the Sulect` i ,,i ) 6, Tcxcs LcuIcc|cu i 6:)
The empty Circles of Lileral ]ustirrcation` i ,,)) ,6 M|:/|_ca Lcu
Icc|cu i
Scnvnn, Gnii and]tnttv, ]on eds . ) T/cIrca:/Iccc|n/|caI ; caJ
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Sco++, ]on a|y cmJcxcs /c cr: Irca:/ Icm|a|s/scaJ//cI|_//s cMca
Camlridge Mass . , Harvard Lniversity Press, i ,,6)
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Snxinn, ]toi+n T/c Ic:cs )/Ians/|:c ev Haven, Yale Lniversity Press,
i ,,o)
Snnototn, ]tnt T/c lcs/c|caJ//cIcs:cs: ly:/ccac|y/|:a|caJ/||csc/|:c|
ctsc:/|ccsca//cIcm|a|accaJrccr/yBerkeley, Lniversity of California
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Snnototn, ]tnt and Cnniso, Dnvio The Sul ect is orthing` i ,,)
, LcucaJCr|/|nc,,
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Sictn, Pt+tn and Cnvniitni, Pnoin eds . ) T/c Crcc/Hc rc]c:/:Inc||/y
|crcInmca|/y London, Fourth state, i ,,, )
Sio+tnoi]x, Pt+tn Cr|/|nc c Cya|:c| Iccsca M. ldred trans. ) London,
Verso, i ,)
Soinocits, Ha/cac in T/rcc T/c|ca |cys R. Fagles trans. ) London,
Penguin, i ,)
S+nnmtn, Ktin InrcccaInmca I|_//sLcu London, LAG, i ,,,)
S+titn, Htnv and Ais+o, Pniiii Ia/crac/|cac|InmcaI|_//s |a Cca/cx/
xford, Clarendon, i ,,6)
S+ot, Cnnis+ointn Should Trees have Standing? Tovards Legal Rights
for atural l ects` i ,):) Scn//cn Cc|j/cra|cLcuIcc|cu , , ,
S+nntss, Lto ^c/nrc| Lcu caJ I|s/cry Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago
Press , i ,6,)
Hc/ |s c||/|:c| /||csc/y Chicago, Lniversity of Chicago Press,
i , or i ,,,)
T nvion, Cnnnits Ic_c|Camlridge, Camlridge Lniversi( Press, i ,)))
Mn|/|:u|/nrc||sm: Ixcm|a|a_ //c c||/|:s c Ic:c_a|/|ca Princeton ],
Princeton Lniversity Press, i ,,)
Tnvion, Micnnti H|/cr|/y Chicago, Chicago Lniversity Press , i ,))
Titntv, Bnin T/cIJccc^c/nrc|I//s Atlanta GeorgIa, Scholars Press,
i ,,))
Bl BL l OGPAPHY V3
Tsni+otniots, Cnnis Leviathan-Moly Dick. The Physics of Space`
i ,,)) Vlll/: LcucaJ Cr|/|nc::,-,
Ttcx, Ricnnno ^c/nrc|I|_//s T/ccr|cs Camlridge, Camlridge Lniversity
Press, i ,),)
Ttiiv, S+tvt A vain Conceit? The Rome Stature of the l . C. C. and the
nforcement of Human Rights` i ,,,) i i H|_ c Cccc|i 6
Liimn, Vni+tn H I|s/cry cc||/|:a| T/cn_//: ThcM|JJ|cH_cs London,
Penguin, i ,6,)
T/c IaJ|c|Jnc| caJ Sc:|c/y | a //c M|JJ|c H_cs Baltimore, The ]ohn
Hopkins Lniversity Press , i ,66)
Lnmso, ]. . Hr|s/c/|c'sI//|: xford, Blackvell, i ,)
Vnnixns, . Droit naturel, nature feminine et egalite des sexes` i ,))
Iccnc Ia/crac/|cac|cJcs Ic:/cn/cs c/Jcs Sya//cscscaS:|ca:cs Sc:|c|cs ,
Vnn+itn, ]tn Lcs ro:cs Jcs ca|mcnx Jn Mcyca H_c u acs cnrs Paris,
Hachette, i ,)o)
Vn++imo, Gini T/c IaJ c McJcra|/y Camlridge, Camlridge
Lniversity Press, i , )
T/c Trcascrca/Sc:c/y Camlridge, Polity, i ,,:)
Vtnn+, ]. P. and Vioni-nqtt+, P. My// caJ Trc_cJy |aHa:|ca/ Ctcc:c
ev Yotk, Zone Books , i ,,o)
Viiin, Dnn HrcaJ/caJIc|Jc_ct: T/c Ic/c c //c c||/|:c| Princeton ],
Princeton Lniversity Press , i ,,6)
Viiitv, Micnti Lc:casJ'I|s/c|rcJc|c/||csc/|cJnIrc|/Paris , Dalloz, i,6:)
LcIcrmc/|caJc|ccasccnr|J|ncMcJcncParis, Montchretien, i ,6)
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-- Alrege du droit naturel classique` i ,6i ) 6 Hr:h|ccs Jc /||csc/|cJn
Irc|/:)
La philosophie du droit de Burke`, in Cr|/|nc Jc|ccasccnr|J|nc
mcJcnc Paris, Dalloz, i ,),)
Viic, ]. Lc_c|IJca/|/y ev Haven, Yale Lniversity Press, i ,))
Vnooic+o, C. H. T/cI//|:a|Ha|mc|London, Allen C Lnvin, i ,6o)
Vnot, Viiiinm The Lnited Kingdom's Bill of Rights`, in Ccas/|/n/|cac|
Icrm |a//c la|/cJK|a_JcmCamlridge Centre for Pullic Lav, i ,,)
Vniono, ]tntmv onsense upon Stilts? - a reply`, in ]. Valdron ed. )
^cascasc nca S/||/s : Bca//cm, Bnrkc caJ Mcrx ca //c I|_//s c Mca
London, Methuen, i ,))
Vniztn, Micnnti ns/ caJ lans/ Hcrs: H Mcrc| Hnmca/ u|// I|s/cr|:c|
I|ns/rc/|cas London, Penguin, i ,o)
- Hc/ |/Mccas /c |ccaHmcr|:ca ev York, Marsillio, i ,,:)
Vtntn, Mnx I:cacmy caJ Sc:|c/y: Ha cn/||ac c Ia/crrc/c/|cc Sc.c|c_y
G. Roth and C. Vittich eds. ) Berkeley, Lniversity of California Press,
i ,))
V
Bl Bll O GPAPHY
Vriirnms , Pn+nrcrn T/c H|:/cmy )jIa:c aaJ I|_//s Camlridge Mass. ,
Harvard Lniversity Press , i ,,i )
Yotc, lnrs Mnnro ns/|:c aaJ //c c||/|:s c{ Iq crca:c Princeton ],
Princeton Lniversity Press, i ,,o)
Zrztx, Sinvo] T/c Sn|||mc |c:/c{ Jcc|c_y London, Verso, i,,)
Icr //cy /acu ac/ u/a/ //cy Jc: Iacymca/as ac||/|:a|{a:/cr London,
Verso, i ,,i )
T/c aJ|c|s|||c Icma|aJcr: Ha Issay ca S:/c|||a_ aaJ Ic|a/cJ Ma//cts
London, Verso, i ,,6)
Superego ly Default` i ,,,) i6 CarJc.cIauIcc|cuj=
+
,:,
Iacc
^br+m, 2J
+bsolution, 220
^d+ms, 85
^dorno, 6, 7, 205, J40, J42
^lric+, J72
^lbright, J2
+licns, sccrclugccs
^lston, 2 , 26, J8
^lthusscr, 68, 87, 226, 26J
^mcric+nLccl+r+tion, J, 8, 85-6
+ndlrccdom, 92-5
Lccl+r+tionsol\irigini+, 87
historic+lcontcxt contr+stcdvith
Frcnch, 87-92
^mcric+ndrc+m, 90
^mncstyIntcrn+tion+l, 24
^n+x+gor+s, 202
^n+xim+ndcr, 24, J7, 202
+nim+ls ,ccc|o+cs) , J72
^nn+n, 40
^ntigonc, 8, 2J, 26, J9, 9 , J5
+cs, 85
+ori+, 2 , 94
ol justicc, J7, J69
olrc+son,J7
r+thcrth+nutoi+,J42
^quin+s, 8, 28-9, 47, 50, 57, 60- , 7
concctsol ] +nd |c, 59-60
contribution tojurisrudcncc, 57
justicc,56-7,59-60
rcl+tivc n+tur+ll+vof,58-60
^rcndt, 7, 69, , 5-6, 4-4, 48,
J56
^ristius,J0
^ristotlc, J, 5, 26, 28-9, JJ, 49-52, 54,
56-7, 59-60, 70- , 74, 00, 55-6,
87, 204, 257, 29 , JJ0, J72
lcg+ljusticc,J8-45
mct+hysicsol,20J
nco-^ristotcli+ns, 4
^rustrong, 48
^r+ud, 97-8
^r+ud-Luc, 97
+sylum-scckcrs, ccrclugccs
^thcni+n+trocitics, 29
^ugustinc, 56, 59
thcoryol justicc,54-6
^ustin, 0
+uthorit+ri+nism, 80- , J27
communit+ri+n +uthoriti+nism, J8
st+tc +uthorit+ri+nism, 6J
+utonomy, 7, 20, J8, 66, 9J, 95,
2 6-7, 248, 268, 278, 289, J47, J7J
+con, 79
+dintcr, 98
+gcshot, 5
+kcr, J64
+lib+r, 94, 68-75, 205, 27-22,225, 288
cqu+tionolcqu+lity+ndlrccdom, 72,
74
+rrct-Kricgcl, 28, 88
+um+n, J9-40, 45, 209, 24, J22,
J52-4
bcing-in-common, scccommunityofbcing
togcthcr
cnj+min, 60, 76, 80, JJ0
cnth+m, 9, , 67, 05, 09- 0, JJ0
cnvcnuto,J08
crgsmo, 2
crlinV+ll, 85
crnstcin, 06, 6 , 67, 69, 285-7, 290
igongi+ri, 55
l+ck, J
l+ckstonc, 8
l+ir, 27, 29, 48
loch, 5 , 27, J0, 43-4, 49, 58-6 , 66, 68,
90, 6J, 68, 76-8 , 2J6, 244, 284,
JJ7-8, J40- , J77, J79
obbio, 89, 5, 54
ogd+nor, 86
orch-]+cobscn,J04,J06-7, J25
osni+, 20
oulton, 50
ouigcois, 2, 28, 75
bouigcoislcg+lscicncc,2J4
bourgcoissocicty, 60
ourkc, 22
VO
l NDEX
rccht, J0
rczhncv, J29
ritain, J , JJ
cthical lorcignolicy, 26-7
rovn, 67, 69, 75, J7
rovnlic, 5, J5
rudncr, 264
ubcr, J7, 8, 97
uchan, J2
burcaucrats.
imbccility of, JJ4
urkc, 4, 78, 99-00, 06, 0- , J,
28, 4J, 64, 200- , 220, 229, 2J2,
24 , 249, 252, J7
asloundcrolcommunitarianism, 56
critiquc olrights, 47-57
hicrarchyolthcsublimc, 50-2
urct, 24
Cadava, 27, 259, J7J
Cacsar, 29
Callan, 22
Calliclcs, 27, J4
Camanclla, 79
caitalism, 67, 8J, 9 , 00, 59, 6-2,
72, 78, 225, 27J-4, 282-4, JJ8,
J75, J78
global caitalistvord, J9, 77
libcral caitalism, 292, JJ9
Cauto, 2 0
Carson, 2J , 264
Carcr, 9
Cartcsian, 2 8
Casscsc, 2J
Cassircr, 90, 88
Castoriadis, J2
Caudill, 297
Cavalicri, 85
Charcot, 97
Chilc, 44
China, 26, J
Chomsky, 24, 28
Chr,ssius, 49
Ciccro, 8, 9, 49-5J
Cioran, 4
citizcnshi, 20, 89, I0 , 0J-6, 72, 86,
9 , 220-4, 260, 285, 287-9, J52
as cxrcssionolunivcrsality, 290-
Claham omnibus, 2J8
Clarckson, 05
Clinton, 20, 27, J2
codilication, 8, 2J, 2 5
Cokc, 76
ColdVar, 24, 27, 65, 68, J78
commandthcor,ollav, J9, 77-8
commonlav, 76, 24J, J28, J64
contrastvithcivillav,229-J0
incororationolCMR, 2J0
commonscnsc, 4, 7, JJ, 44, 49, J40
communal carc, 29
communism, 62, 72, 79-80, 264, 27J,
292, JJ8, J74 J78
communitarianism, 48, 56, 64, 2 2
communityol bcingtogcthcr, 2 J, 2 5,
287, 296, J24
comanics, 85
Comtc, 2
connict, 6
Conlucius, 2J
Connor, 27, 259, J7J
conscrvativism, 64, 8
constitutionallav, J28-9
constitutionaltradition, 50-2, 56-7, 64,
24J
consumcrsocicty, 4, J75
contract, 240
Cook, 27, 29
Copj cc, 7J, 205
Cocll, 2J0
Corcll, 264, 297, J02, J22, JJ6
j urisrudcncc olscxualrcscct, JJ6
Cranston, 8, 4
Crcnshav, 294
Crtchlcy, 20J, J46
CriticalLcgalStudics, 69, 2J , 295, JJ0,
J67
criticalracc thcor,, 69,294
critiquc, J-4, 27, J2, 2 6, 295, JJ2, J78
olidcology, 2
olrcason, 2
quasi-transccndcntrincilc ol, J, 5
culturalrclativism, 2J, J6-9, 2 2
uscdin oositiont ohumanrights,
J7-8
cynicism, 6
as idcology, 2
Cynics, J0, JJ
Lallairc, J2
Lallmayr, 2 0
Lanicl, 76, 80
Larvin, 298
dcath, 75, 84, J4, 272, 279, 284, J04-7,
J8, J29, JJJ-4, J60- , J64, J74
dcath olman, 6-7
Lccaloguc, 5J, 57-8
dc Condorcct, 97
d`glantinc, 98
dcCougcs,2
dclaPradcLc, 2JJ
Lclcuzc, 2J7
Lclgado,294
dc^aistrc, 99, 54
dcmocracy, 7, J2, 69, 86, 04, 2J, JJ,
40, 67, 70- , 225, 27J, 289, J J,
JJ8
Lcnning,Lord,2J0
dc Romill,, 27
Lcrfda, 2, 5, 7, 9, 52, J5, 45, 48,
2 0, 259, 26J-4, JJ0, JJ9, J42, J49,
J7J, J78-9
LcRuggicro,89
Lcscarcs, 64, 7J, 8J, 89-90, 95-6,
99, 204, 2 6-8, 240, 269, J45, J49
subjcctiucation, 204-5
u|c:tus/u|J|tu, 2 7- 8
dcs Forgcs, JJ, J7
dcsirc, 72-5, 78, 8-2, 84, 06-7, 90,
95, 209, 24 , 26 , 269-70, J0 ,
J04-8, J 2-J, J7, J2 , JJ7, J4 ,
J74, J76, J79
cannibalismol, 84
Lcvs, 20J
dialcctic, 4 -2, 44, 67, 84, 58, 79, 200,
247, 256, 264-6, 269-70, 272, 278-9,
28J-4, 292, J05-6, J20, J78
Liamantidcs, 48, J48
Liccy, 0- , 5 , 229
Licls,25
Ligcst,47
J|kc|oa, 0, 26, J8-4 , 47-8, 52, 56-7, 59,
68,70
J|kc, 25-7, 54
Liogcncs, J0, J68
dilomats, 7-8,85, 2 , 28, 45, 5J,
J42
dilomaticlunchcs, J80
discourscthcor,, 68
domination, 288-9, 29-2, J 9, J4 , J72
Lonnclly, J-4, 5
Lostoicvsky, 98
Louzinas, 6, 25, 52, 60, 94, 48, 64, 68,
88, 9 , 97, 2 , 22J, 2J , 2J9,
268, 297, J02, J06, J 0, J26, JJ4,
J48, J5 , J67, J79
Luguit, 2JJ
Lumont,209
LunsScotus,6-2
Lurc, 27, 5J
l NDEX
Lurkhcim, 2
duty, 9J-4
Lvorkin, J, 85, 247-5 , J0, J28
gcatcstlibcralillusion, J28
Lylan, 276
astJimor, 40,J5J
CMR, 9, 25-6, 44, 2J0
cconomicrcductionism, 74
cconomics, 6
dclman, 2J , 2J4
dolf, 9
instcin, 299
llul, J22
nlghtcnmcnt, 2, 5, 8, 64, 66, 90, 28,
80, 86, 205, 289, J 9
ictctus, J
icurus, J0- , 64
VV
cquality, 8, 6 , 86, 9, 96, 02, 6, 60,
62, 65, 68-9, 72, 76, 78, 87,
22 , 224, 2J8, 245, 248, 256, 268,
28J, 289, 295, J47
socialcquality, 5 , 5J
r, J4
csscncc/cxistcncc, 98-9, 2 0
cthics, 2 , J46
cthicolcarc,279
cthic olcommunication, 279
cthicsofaltcrity, 48, J48-57
L, 25-6,229
Clarct-inchingcurocrats, 26
urocan Court olMumanRights, 20,
85
urocanLnivcrsityInstitutc, 25
vans, 2, 02, 7
vill, 72
cxistcntialism, 98-20 , J48
rovidinginsightonhumanrights,
200-
tcc, J49, J52, J54, J62-J, J66, J68
laith, J6
lamily, 275
Farias, 2 0
Fcinbcrg, 276
Fcldman, 84
lcminism sccc|ovomcn) , 48, 69
lcministsychoanalysis, JJJ
Fcrr,, , 5, 8, 28, J0, 62, 84, 97,
99-202, 2 0, 24 , 249
Figgis,2 8
Fincr, 86
Fink, J 8, J26
+
l NDEX
Finnis, J-4, 6 , 6J, 247
Fish, J68
Foucault, 6-7, 6, 0, 2, 68, 75, J9,
J29, J7J
involvcmcntvithhuman rghts, 7-8
Fouiicr, 79
Francc, 98-9, 277
lational^sscmbly, 0J-4
vomcn`s lranchisc, 98
Francc ^) , 2J9
Frank, J45
Franklurtschool, 6, 76
hccdom, 4, 0, 5-7, 20, 59, 6 , 86, 40,
48, 62, 69, 72, 9 , 95-7, 240,
267, J00, JJ6
groundlcss lrccdom, 92-5,226
indctcruinacyof, 77-8
inthc comanyolothcrs, 99
ncgativclrccdom, 02, 66
lrccdomolcxrcssion, , JJ, 70, 245,
252-J
aslundamcntalhuman rght, 74
lrccvill, 92, 0 , 0, 90- , 95, 225,
2J6, 240, 248, 26 , 297, J46-7
FrcnchLcclaration, J, 8, 85-6, 0 ,
42, 58, 69-7J, 220-
andlrccdom, 92-5
historicalcontcxtcontrastcdvith
^mcrcan, 87-92
rototycmancxcludingothcrraccs,
98-9, 0J-5
rototyc man cxcludingvomcn, 97-8
vicvolhumannaturc suorting,
97- 00
Frcud, 6, 75, 84, 2, 40, 97, J0-2,
J04, J06, J 6, JJ0- , JJJ, J45, J57,
J6J, J65, J79
andthcgcncsis ollav, 298-J00
Fukuyama, 5-6, 27J, 292, JJ8
comlaccncyof, JJ9
luturc.
rmiscolasrcmisc, 5
Cadamcr, 94
Cactc, 2, 4, J, 20, 2J , J67
Caius, 48
Catcs, 59
Cauchct, 22
gcnocidc, JJ, J9-40
Ccoghcgan, 76, 79
Ccrmany
naturalright lost undcr lazis,
Ccvirh, J, 247, 29
Cicrkc,
Cilson, 56
Clcndon, 244
globalisation, J9, 42, 77, 2 2-J, J40,
J75
globaliscd cconomy, J74
Coldmann, 90
good, J5-6, 40, 9
goodlilc, J0, 90, 29
goodolothcrs, J8, 4J
good socicty, 6
Coodall, 85
Coodrich, 8, 225, 229, 2J , 2J4, 297,
J0, J64, J67
Cordon, 7
Cothhclf, 29
Cramsci, 69
Cratian, 5J
Crcccc modcm), 44
Crcck dictatoishi, 29J
Crccks,24-45, 86, 202
and concctolrights,2 8
Crccn, J8
Crotius, 8, 4, 52, 6J, 20J
Cuzzoni,20J
Mabcrmas, 89, 229, 274, 279
Maiti, 5J
Mamilton, 05
Mansym, J55
haincss, 72, 8-4, 88, 90, 79, 205, 2J7
Mardic, J8
Mart 85, 2J6, 246, J28
Marvcy, 90
hatcsccch, 294-5,J 6
Maurou, 98
Mayck, 24, J4
Mcdonists, J0, JJ, 72
Mcgcl, 4-5, 0, 5 , 84, I2-J, J4-5,
57-8, 68-9, 89-90, 94, 200, 256,
266-7, 272-J, 280-J, 286, 292, 295,
J02, J05, J7, J20, J45, J7 , J77-8
andcrimc, 276-8, 292
crtiquc olKant, 265-8
critiqucolrghts,266-8
lorlatctvcnticthccntury^mcrca,284
inucnccof,26J-5
LcltMcgclianism, 27J
lcgalrccognition, 286-9
lcgalrccognitionthroughrocrty,
280-5
naturcolsuljcct, 269
ost-Mcgclianism, J78
rccognitionas citizcn, 285, 287
S|//||:hkc|/, 266,268,279
social-dcmocratic Mcgcliamsm, 280
sociologicalMcgclianism, 274
thcory olrights, 265, 274-80
unity olcxistcncc, 265
Mcidcggcr, 4, 6, 24-6, 28, 4, 8J,
88-9, 208-9, 2 , 2J- 7, 2J6,
J4J-6, J48
cing, 20J-7,226,J45-6
collaborationvithlazis,2 0
critiqucol humanism, 209- 2
cthics, 2 0-
lorgctlulncss olcing, 206-7
homclcssncssolostmodcmhumanity,
24
ontologicalcrtiquc,200-6
Mcllcr,J6, 88
Mcnkin, 4, 5
Mcraclcitos, 24-5
Mcrmittc, 85
Mcrostratus, 277
hctcrohobia, J9
Mirst, 2J
historicism, 9- 4, 45, 88, 47, 57, 6 ,
86, 24J-4, 249-50, 26J, 266, 268,
272-J, J58, J77
history, 2- 4, 4 , 67, J76, J78
cndol, 5, JJ8-40
historyolidcas, 70
hilosohyofhistory, 2-J
Mitlcr, 6, J6
Mobbcs,J, 4, 8-20, 52, 64-5, 7 , 7J,
75-6, 78, 80-2, 84, 06, 0, 96,
20J, 264-5, 288, J00, J52, J74
contributiontojurisrudcncc, 69-70
naturalrght, 69-8
Modgc, 2
Molman, 97
Moldcrln, 77
Mollovay, J2
Molocaust, 4, 6, J6, 74, 2 0, J4
Momcr, 25, 29, J4
Monncth, 265, 274-5, 278-80,284, 286,
292
horzon, 4J,45, 64, J, 40, 65, 9 ,
95, 200, 2 5, 257, 29 , J47, J54-5,
J7J
Morkhcimcr, 6, 205
humandignity, 5, 8, J , 5 , 5J, 8J,
90- , 96, 6- 8, J5, 40, 45, 64,
68, 78-9, 209, 24, 2J7, 276-7,
295, J72
l NDEX
conictingconcctions ol, 2J
gadcd, 2 8-9
humanidcntity.
lutuic antcrorityof, JJ8
+
humanism, 6-8, 64, 84, 45, 78, 87,
205-7, 24J, 26J, 27J, J5
as discourscolcxclusion, 2 -2
attackcdbyMcidcggcr, 209-U
idcntificd vith cxistcntialism, 98-9
lcgal humanism, 2JJ,24J-5
mctahysicalhumanism, J22
non-mctahysicalhumanism, 209- 6
humanity, 2 , 26, 226,245,255, 257,
J22, J72
assumingrolc olnaturc, 4-4
mcaningol, 84-8
univcrsalityolhumanity, 6-7
humannaturc, J, 9, JJ, 52, 7 -2, 78, 82,
84, 89, 96-00, 05-6, 6, 79,
85-6, 209, 246, 260, 264
nothingncssol, 96-20
tcnsionvithin, 90-
humanrights,84,222, 226, 264, J2-4,
JJ , J76, J79
abscnccolinMobbcs,80-
abuscsinurocanLnion, 25-6
abuscs in LS^, 24-5
acccssto ublic shcrc, 70-J
agonistic charactcr, 287-8
aorcticnaturcof 2
basislorncvvorldordcr, J0
bcdlcllovs olositivism, 24J
classintcrcsts, , 2
combincdtcrm, 8
concctol, 4, 244-5
crcationolmodcmity, 6J
critiqucs of, 220
culturc of, 245-6, 25J
distinctlromrghts, J74,J79
cmiricalunivcrsalityof, 7
cmty rhctoric of 7, 224, J27
lunctioninlav, J66-9
luturc looking, 45, 65, 8 , 250, J 8,
J56, J68-9, J79-80
gcncalogyof JJ, 6
gcncrations of, 244-5
govcmmcnts as cncmyof, 9, 28
idcology, 24-8, 6J
idcologicalvictor, of 2
imaginarydomainof, JJ6-7,J4-2
indctcrminacy of 26 , J56, J75, J80
institutionalcrscctivcson, 4
institutionsol, 8-22
+Z l NDEX
hunanrights ,:oa/ . ) .
intcrnationallavas sourcc of, 6- 9
intcrrctation ol, 94-5, 9-20, J67
inthcnarkct, 67
linkvithnaturallav, J-5, 9-20
nonoIithic hunanity, J80
nyth rcaliscd, 5-6, 8
naturcol,286-9, J4J-5, J48, J52-J
no gcncral thcory ol, 4
olthc othcr, J42-69
ontologicalrcsuositionso(
aradoxcs, 2
aradoxical doublc discoursc, J56
laccvhcrc carc,lovcandlavncct,
295
oliticalnaturcof,222
oliticalrights doninantovcrvcllarc
rights, 24, 66-7
rcscntlic, 97
roclanationof,9J-7
oliticalnovcncnts, 9
radicalroj cct, 07
radicalsidc of, 68, 07
rcason, 5-6
rcdclincd asrights olariciation, 285
rcdircctingdcsirc, J2
rclationvith non-nctahysical hunan-
isn, 2 5-6
rolci nconstructinglantasy, JJ7-8, J4
rolcinnodcrnity, 9-20
statchyocrsy, 22-8
Stoic inucncc on, 50, 5J
strugglcs, 258
suljcctivccrscctivcson, 4
subjcctol,2J5-40
takcnovcrbylavycrs, 9-2, 8-22,
75
thrcatcncdbyconlornisn, 80-
traditionol, 7-8
trajcctory,292
transitionlronnaturalrghts, 5
transitionlronnaturc to individualvill,
8- , 9-20
trcaticsand dcclarations, 44-5
tribunal olhistory, J80
triunhalisnol, 285
undclivcrcdronisc, JJ2
univcrsalisingidcaol, 65
usc ollorcc, 29-4
utoian clcncnt of J7J
utoianclcncntbchindlcgalrights, 245
utoianrncilc, 292-J, JJ4, J4-2
violationbydcnocracy, 5- 6
violations of, 2, 4, 6-7,68, 85, 4, J 8,
J2
vidc acalof,
MunanRights ^ct, 2J0, 24J, J 4
MunanRights Connittcc, 20
Munhrcy, 2J
Munt, 85-6, 88
Murlcy, 44, 7J-4, 246
Musscrl, 89, J45
Mutchinson, J67
idcology, 2-J, 6J, 67-9
inaginarydonain, JJ4-42, J74
inossibilityolunivcrsalosition, JJ6-7
incarnationolChrist, 62
Indcrlurth, JJ
individual
cncrgcncc olas sovcrcign, 6-8
Indoncsia, 27
Intcmational CrininalCourt, 2-2
oositionbyLS^, 2 -2, J , 40
intcrnationallav, 9- 0, 80, 9 , 0-2,
44, 55, 257, 295, J29, J55, J75
contradictoryrincilcs olhunanrights
andnationalsovcrcignty, 8
inadcquacicsol, 8-22
intcrational lavolhunan rights,
6-9, 95
intcmationallavycrs, 7-8, 5J
intcmationalolitics, 28
intcrrctativc aroach, 45, J60
Iraq, J -2, J72
Ircgaray, 98, 257, JJJ
irony, 2-J
]acobins, 05
]acoby, JJ9
]ancs,99
]ancson, J78
]ay, 60
]canncncy, 85
]cllcrson, 86
]cllinck, 87, 2J6
]cvishtradition,J7, 97
]cu|ssca:c, J06, J 6, J 8, J2 , J26, JJ0,
JJ2, J79
Lord]ovitt, 2J0
]udaco-Christianthinking, 27, J , J9,
52-4, 59, 7 , 86-7, 9J, 96-7, 2 8
judgcs.
dcnialolcastration, J6J-5
oliticalalliliation ol, 20
rolcol,J9-45, 57, 2J0,J 0-2
l NDEX +
jurisrudcncc, 8, 0, 9, 28, J , J8, 47-8,
56, 67, , 8J, 2J , 247, 264, JJ0,
J55
and abandonncnt oltransccndcncc,J74
andsychoanalysis, 297-8, J08-2
^nglo-^ncrcanjursrudcncc,2J
nglishlcgalthcoryabandoningqucst
loridcal, 249
contcnoraryjurisrudcncc, J29
historcaljurisrudcncc, 57
jursrudcntiallictions, J28
nornativcjurisrudcncc, 7
us, 0, 4-2, 47-50, 52-4, 56-7, 59-6 ,
68, 70, 76, 264, 297, J 5
novcncntto individualist concction,
6J
justicc, , 5, 69, 7 , 74-5, 84, 48, 94,
2J9, 242, 250, J00, JJ , JJ4, J52,
J68-80
abandonncnt olsubstantivc concctsol,
0
as obcdicnccto lav, 77
assignilicr, JJ0
inCrcckthought, 24-45
lossolcriticalotcntial, 60-
ncaningol, 68
oliticalandlcgal dincnsionso( JJ, 45
socialjusticc, 5, 6
thcorcsol justicc, JJ-2, J40,J42
Kalka, 226
Kant, J-5,5 , 7J, 79, 90, 0J, 7- 8,
28, 4 , 45, 8J, 89, 9 , 9J-4,
96-20 , 204-5, 24, 2 6-8, 225-6,
240, 242, 248, 256, 264-9, 275-6,
278-80, 282, 285, 295, JJ0, J45-6,
J49, J54, J66, J7
andthc autononous nodcr subjcct,
88-95
Kantiannctahysics, 20J
nco-Kantianisn, 2-J,2 6, 247, 285
racticalrcason, 9 -5
rncilc olacrcction, 89
Kantorovicz, 62
Karadjic, 20
Kaulnan, 80
Kcams, 67
Kcarny, 88
KclIy, 62
Kclscn, J6, 2JJ,J28
Kcnncdy, J08
Kicrkcgaard, 247,264
king,2 9-2 , 2J4, J29
Kingdon, 97-8
Kirchhcincr, 229
Klugcr,
Koj cvc,27J,J0J, J06
Kosovo, 27, 29, JJ-7, 4 , 242, J 4,
J5J
KrcIl, 206
Kristcva, 0J-5, 4J, JJJ
Labour.
ncvLabour, JJ9
as cndointolhistory, 280
Lacan, 4, 97, 2 9, 226, 264, 268, 280,
28J, 297, J05-8, J0, J2-J,
J 5-6, J 8, J25-7, J29, JJJ, JJ8,
J45, J55, J79
nanc olthclav, J0-5
non-libcral asccts of, J26-7
c/|/o|c:/0 J0J-4, J07-8, J 2-8
rocrtylavycrs, 284
signilicr, J02-4,J09- 0,J2
sccch, J08-U
synbolic castration, J0J-4, J08, J J,
J7, J26, JJ0, JJ5
unattainablc Cod, JJ0
Laccy, 98, 257
Laclau, 67, 7J, 255, 257, 259, JJ7-8
Lacouc-Labarthc,20
Lacrtius, 5
languagc, JJ4-5, J60
linguistic tricks, 25J-9
nothingbcyond, J29
ovcrol,J29
Laurcn, 9
lav, , 5, 7-8, 0, 8, 20, J2, J8, 44, 5J,
69,72-J, 75-6, 78, 04, 56, 62,
75, 94-6, 226-7, 2J , 24 , 260,
J04-5, J09
andviolcncc, JJ0-
anthroogcncticovcr,2J4
as connandncnt, J9, 77-8
as rulcs, 0, J9-4 , 48, 2J2-5, 2J7-9,
244
countcr-roductivcrolcof 75
dcsirc ollav, J27-J4
crotic ascctolloundationalnyth,
JJJ-4
hostilitytovardsar,J26
lavbchindlav, 6
lcgalisationoldcsirc, 20
lcgalisation ololitics, 20
lcgalluralisn, 64
novcncnt lronrcason to viII, 62
++
l NDEX
lav and cconomics, 78
Lavrcncc, 294
lavycrs ,sccc|ointcrnationallavycrs) , 45,
5J
Lclort, 99, 54, 67-72, 72, 74-5, 86,
20 , 22-2, 288, JJ2
Lclt
loss olncrvc, JJ9
lcgalositivism, 0- , 2 , 50, 5J, 6J, 69,
78, 07, 09- , 2J , 24-4, 249, 264
lcgal rcalism, J67
lcgalrcasoning, 2J7-8, J , J66-7
univcrsalistclaims ollcgalrcason, 75
lcgal thcory,scc jurisrudcncc
Lcgcndrc, 50, 52, 242, 297, J 0-2,
J7, J24, J27-9
lcgalcrson, 226
atriarchalrincilc, 52
thcRclcrcncc, JJ5
lcgislativc ovcr, 92, 95, 00-7, 0- ,
4, 8, 22J-4
lcgislator, J25, J27, J29, JJ , JJJ, J44
Lcibniz, 89
Lcnin, 9
Lcstcr, 2J0
Lcviathan, 20, 76-80, 02, 06, 0, 22 ,
J76
Lcvinas, 7, J7, J6, 48, 97, JJJ, J4J,
J47-52, J55, J57, J62, J65, J74
Lcvi-Strauss, J0 , J04-5
Lcvy, 50
Lcvis, 7- 9
|c, 59-60, 70, 75, JJ0
libcralism, J, 20, 69, 78, 8 , 5, 2J, 66,
226, 2J8-9, 24J, 248, 252-J, 292-J,
295, J 5-6, JJ2, JJ9, J5 , J77
claimingmantlc olthcunivcrsal, 4,
27J-4
libcraldcmocracy, 2
libcralhumanism, 6
libcraljurismdcnccol rights, J, 7, 9,
2, 7, 74, 2J , 24 , J7J
libcralhilosohy, J, 86, 200- , 270,
J J
libcralthcorsts, 57
nco-libcralism, 2J7
oliticallibcralism, J
libcrp, 60, 22
Liddcll, 26
Lillcy, J60
Lim, J8
Linovitz, 244
Lisska, 9, 29, 57
Livingstonc, 85
Lockc, 9, 4, 8, 64-5, 69, 8-J, 96, J74
andtransitionlromnaturallavtonatural
rights, 84
|o_os, 5-J, 202, J04, JJ0, J46, J54, J66,
J68-9
Loughlin,2J0-
lovc, 275, 28 , 286, 29 , J00, J04-5, J 2,
J 8, J20- , JJ , J55
Lucas, JJ
lunch
thc rccol, 25-6
Lyotard, 7, 4J, 9J, 0J, 44, 70, 7J-4,
2 0, 27J, JJ , J50
dillcrcnd, J0-
thc othcr, 7J-4
Nacchiavclli, 0, 78
NacIntyrc, 4
Naclcil, J22
Nac!hcrson, 4
Nadison, 05
Naimonidcs, 59
man, 89, 222, 2J4, 24J
abstract, 54, 59
abstract andconcrctc, 96-00, 65, 80
^rchimcdcanoint,J67
citizcn, 0
contrastvith citizcn, 05-7, 7, 42,
58-9, 62, 220
dcgrcc-zcroman, 98, 20
distinctlromanimals, 200- , 259, 270,
J7-2
csscnccolmodcrnman, 88
cmtysignincr, J67
noatingsignincr, 255
man`sinhumanitytoman, 28
ovncrolhumanrghts, 9J, 95-6
olitical animal, JJ, 99- 00
rccognition,270-2,274-6
souicc cftruth, 89, 98
subj cct,226-7
takingadoiationolCod, 64, 7J, 9J, 96,
86-7, 90, 204
Nanitakis, 2JJ
Narccl,2
Narcus ^urclius, J
Narcusc, 205
Nargolis, 20
Naritain, 276
markct, 67, 00, 78, 225, 2J6
lrccmarkct, 88, 9 , J78
markct cconomy, 57
l NDEX +3
Narks, 85, 2J, J7, J9, 62
Narshall, 2J0
Narx, 4-5, 5-6, 99- 00, 06, 0, 2,
45, 47, 54, 68-72 76 200-
220, 225, 2J2, 2J9, 25, 26-4, 27,
276, 280, 28J-4, 286, 29-2, 295,
JJ0, J7
distinctionbctvccnmanandcitizcn 77
rghts olman, 58-65

Narxism, 58, 6J, 74, 78, 80, 22 ,

24J, 26J, 285, J44, J7
human rghts, 65-75, 285
idcology, 2J
nco-Narxists, 220
ost-Narxists, 68-75
Nathicz, 05
Natsuda, 294
Naycr,244
NcCoubrcy, 8
NcIncry, J9
NcIntyrc, 247
Nc\cigh, 6, 52, 94, 88, J67
mclancholiclovcr.
asmcmbcrolhonouiablclincagc, J44
Nclvcr, JJ
mcssianic cxcricncc, J78-9
mctahysics,202-6,2 6-7, 222, 225-6,
2J0- , 2J6-7, 2J8, 24 , 24J-4, 249,
25J
lcgal mctahysics, 240
mctahysicalhumanism, 209-0, 2 5
mctahysicallcgalism, 24J
subjcctivctur, 204-5 , 2 2
tcchnologyas csscnccol contcmorary
mctahysics,208-9, 2 4
Nichclct,97
Nillcr, J
Niloccvic, 6, 20, 27, JJ
Ninoguc, 4
Nitchcll, 5, 247
Nittcrand, 229
Nladic, 20
modcrity, 2-J, 5, 2, 4, 8-20, 28, 40,
68, 7 , 7J, 78, 85, 90, 96, 02-J,
07, 0, 4, 4J, 6J, 7J-4, 76,
80, 8J, 86, 88, 96-7, 20 , 220,
225-6, 240- , 24J-4, 255, 260-,
265, J 2- J, J 7, J 9, J47, J74-5
crtics of, 6
cistcmology ol, J46
juiisrudcncco 56, 6 , 95
Nohamad, J7, J9
moncy, 67, 82-J
Nontcsquicu, 00
moralintuitionism, 246
Norc, 79
Noscs, J0
motivc, 2J9-40
Noullc, 67, 7J, 255, JJ7-8
Noylan, 76, 80
multi-culturalism, 64
multilicity.
dangcrolannihilation, 272
oliticsol,JJ9
rincilcs of, 2J5
rolilcration of, 65, 79, 88, 90, 95,
200- , 26 , J 5, J 8, J2 , J24-7,
J55-6, J7 , J78
Nuidoch, 59
Nurhy, 29, 229, 2J , 2J5
NyLaimassacrc, 22
myth, 5-6, 8, 0, 90, 04, 7, J47, J77,
J80
lagcl, 247, J4
lancy, 4, J8, 22-J, 2 7, 259, J4J, J7J
laolcon, 5, J, 58
laraghi, 05
nationalism, 0J, 09
globaliscd nationalism, 2 2
l^JC, 27, 29, JJ-4, 40, 65, J 5,
J27, J29
natuic, 62, 67, 7 , 4 , 76, 96, 240, 272
dcvaluationof,6J-4
dissolvcdinto statclav, 94
Crcck thought, 26-J2, J5, 44
mattcr, 84
ositivisationof,20
rcduccdtoincrmattcr, 90
statc olnaturc, 76, 80-2, 02, 288
natuiallav, 8-9, 9, 26, J0- , 8 , 7,
76, 79, 9J, 96, 264, J40, J76-7,
J79-80
abandoncd, 6J-4
classicalnaturallav, 68
contrastbctvccn Stoic andJhomist
ositions, 59-60
dclinitionsof, 2J
lollovingnaturalscicnccs, 66-7
idcntincdvithcivillav, 77
linkvith humanrghts, J- 5, 9-20
modcrnaturallav, 68
objcctivcordcrolnorms,24
radicalnatuiallav, 4, 6J, 78-9,
200, 250, JJ7
sourcco40
trajcctoryof, 4-5
+ l NDEX
naturaI rghts, I4, 20, J0, J2-J, J5, J7, 40,
4J, 50, 62, 68, 70, 79, 82, 89, 92,
I 00, I06, J76-7
charactcristics of, 44-5
critiqucs of, I I 0
dccIincol, I04-I 4
ossibIcconnictvithjusticc,4J
rcgardcd as idcoIogy, I I J
transitionto individuaI rights, 64, 80-I ,
84
lazis, I I I , IJ0
lcad, 60, J02, J26
ncighbour, J50, J52, J54
lcumann, 229
lcv^gc, JI 9
lcvton, 66
ncvvorIdordcr, I J0, J27
Iimtationsof,JJ9
lCCs, 9I , IJJ, I 40
licthammcr, 5
lictzchc, 6, 9, I 6, 24, J4, I I 6, I98, 205
onthcindividualandrights, 2I4-I5
villtoovcr, 205
nihiIism, 2I4
IcgaItcchno-nihiIism, 24J
lino, 2J5-7, 240
nominaIism, 62, 7I-2, 80
aomos,25-8, 42, 5I-2, 70
norm, 2J2-J,24J, 286
lorric, 2JI , 2J8-9
lurcmbcrg, I I 5, I2I
lussbaum, 27
objcctivism, 2J0
Cckham, I4
ontology, I 96, I98, 207, 2I0-I I , 254,
259-6I , 27I , J46
ontoIogyolaItcrity, J50-I
orcssion,289, 29I-2, JI 9, JJ9, J4I , J72
Csbomc, I6I, 285
othcr, IJ9, I42, 2I5, 25J, 270-I , 274-5,
278, 286-8, 292, 294, J04-I I ,
JI 2-IJ, JI 8, J20-I , J26-8, JJ0,
JJ2-4, JJ7, J4I , J4J-69, J76, J79
nccdto accommodatcthcmany, J52-J
obj ccti[ing thc othcr, J6I-2
Cvid, J4
Cvcn R) , I79
Cvcn J) , I85
!anc, 7, 66, 87, I05
!annick,2J0
!aoIucci, 55
!armcnidcs, 25
!asvoIsky, I I 7
!auI, 48
!auI St) , 5J, I86
coIc olthc vorId, I I 6-I7
!crry, I4
!ctcrson, I 02
!hacdra, 247
hiIosohy, 4, I 7-I9, J2, J4, J6-7, 4J-5,
69, 89-90, 96, I 8J, I 88-9, I 97,
26J-4, 266, 269, JJ0, J5I
anaIyticaI hiIosohy, 247
^ngIo-^mcricanhiIosohy, 4-5
contincntalhiIosohy, 4-5
mobiIity ol, J45
modcrnhiIosohy, I 90
moraIhiIosohy,72, 2J9, 247-8, J46
hiIosohcrs, I 49
hiIosohcrsolsusicion, I 6-I7, J45
hiIosohicaIanti-humanism, I 6-I 8
hiIosohicaIconccts, 222
oIiticaIhiIosohy, I0, I 8-I9, 28,
667, 74, 92, I02, I I I , I86, 248, JIJ,
J52
radicaIhiIosohy, I89
!iIgcr, I27
!inochct, I 2I , I44
!Iato, 27, JJ-4,J6, J9, 42-4, 50, 54-5,
69, 202, 204 264, JJ0
justicc, JJ-7
nco-!Iatonism, 6I
Icasurc, cchaincss
!ockock, 99
o||s, J0, JJ, J5, J7-8, 40, 44-5, 49, 54,
64, 74, 266, 269
oIiticaIscicncc, I I I
oIiticaIthcoIogy, 64, 249
oIitics, 72, 79, I 49, I 6J, I 74
!oI !ot, IJ6
olyhony, 25I
!omonius, 47
!ortaIis, 98
!osidonius, 49
ositivism sccc|soIcgalositivism) , J74
ostmodcrnity, 6, 8, I I-I2, I 7, I 42-J,
I 48, 246, 2IJ, 27J, 29I , JI 9, JJI ,
JJ7, J44, J54, J69, J75, J80
moraIsubstancc of, J55
ostmodcmdiaIccticrinciIc, J78
ostmodcrnlrccdom, I 74
ostmodcrnsocicty, 2J
ostmodcmutoia,J4I-2
satisficdmiddIccIasscs ol, I78
l NDEX +7
!ottagc, JI0-I2
!ouIantzas, I 67-8
ovcr, 7, I I , IJ, 20, J2, 54, 78-9, I 50,
I70-I , 2I6-I 7, 222, 242, 244, 249,
284-5, J29, J62
tcmoraIandrcIigious conccto( 224-5
racticaIrcasoning, J66-8
racticaIvisdom, 42, I 49
ragmatists, 246
rc-modcmity, I 5
!ricstlcy, I05
rsoncrs, I84
!russian Statc, 5, I I J, 27J, 278, 280, 292,
J77
sychoanaIyticaI aroach, 72, I 69, I 80,
226, 255, 259, 280-5, 287, 297-JI 8,
J20, J27, JJ0, JJ4, JJ6, J57, J7J,
J77, J79
othcrolthcCthcr,J28-JI
sychoanalyicaIjurisrudcncc, I 52, JJJ
taskolsychoanaIysis, J27
transccndcntsignificr, J28
ubIicshcrc, I 70-J
!ullcndorf, 52
ucbcc, J8
ucsnot, I JJ
raciaI discrimination, I24-5, J20
racism, 294-5, J57
Radamanthus, J4
Radin, 264, 279, 282
RavIs, J, 65, JJ0
Rcagan I2J, IJ5
rcaI, 5, I0, 5 I , I I J-I4, I89, 2J6, JJ4,
J77-8
distinctlromidcal, 242-J
rcason scc c|oIcgaI rcasoning, racticaI
rcasoning) , I-2, 5-9, I2, I 6, 27-8,
J2, J4-5, 49, 5I-J, 62-J, 7 I , 79, 8I ,
89-90, I0J, I 06, I JI , IJ6, I 52, I 64,
I 76, I 90, I95, 202, 205, 2J7-8, 25J,
266, 272, J46-7, J56, J66-8
csscncc olstatc, 66
instrumcntaIrcason, 7I-2
Iimits of, J4-7, 4J
oIiticaIrcason, I 50
rcason olcaital, I 6J
rcason onhorscback, I I J
rcbcIlion against thcocracy, 64
rcignolrcason, I 9I
rclugccs, I25-6, I42-4, J57-66, J76
absoIutc othcr, I 42, I 44
rclugcc vithinmc, J65-6
thrcatto nationalidcntity, I 42
rcIigion, JJ0
Rcnaissancc, I86
Rcnaut, I I , I 5, I7-I8, 28, J0, I 62, I 99,
202, 2I0, 24I , 249, J52, J56
rcvoIution, 66, 85-6, 89, 92, I00, I06,
I55, I58, I 6I , 220-2, 225, 244
FrcnchRcvoIution, I 04, I I J, I I 6, I47,
I 49, I58, I62, I77, 249
IibcraI rcvoIution, 27J
roIctarianrcvoIution, I 62
sociaI rcvoIution, I 59, I6I
rhctoric, I I 7, 224, 254-9, J27
richmcn`sghcttos, J27
Ricocur, I 6
rights, 67, 78, 89, 276, 284, JJ5
absolutism olcriticiscd, I 55-7
abstractnaturc criticiscd, I52-5
abstractrights, I54, 2J2, 252
aggrcssivc ascctolrghts, J24
bcarcrs olrights, I 84-5
bourgcoisrights, I 75
civiI rghts, 287
consumcrs

rights , 290
contcxt-dccndcnccof,252-J
critiquc olrights, 295
dccndcncconnationaIIav, I00-7
dialcctic oflack, 320
IcgaI castration, JJ5
hoatingsignificr, 25J-6I
loundationolrights, 246-7
lrccbomnglishman, I54, I57
lrccsccch, I70
lromasychoanaIyticalcrscctivc,
JI 2-I8
groundcdonhumandiscoursc, J7I
immancntstructurc thcorics of, 246-52
individiualrights, 5J-4, 6I-9, 72, 80-2,
I I 0, I I 2, 2J6
Icgalrights,96, 275, 282
mctahysicalabstraction, 99
naturcof,2JI-5, 24I-2, 244-5, 286-7,
J4J-5, J5J
ncgativc rights, I I 5
ontoIogy of, 259-6I
artialocrationof,J2J-4
oIiticaIrights, I05, I42, I 60, I 69, I 7J,
260, 287-9I
ositivcrights, I I 5
ovcrfuIfictions , 26I
rvacyrghts, 289
roIilcratingrights, J24-7
+O l NDEX
rights .c:|) .
rocrty rights, 76, 80-J, I 00, I6I-2,
I75-6, 276-7, 280-5
rhctorc ol, 254-9
rights olchiIdrcn, I 24
scIl-dctcrmination, 289
symLolic constructs, 254
truthluIlic,J2I
vomcn'srghts, 98, 260
vorkcrs rights, I7J, 289
rights discoursc
imovcrishcdusc of, 25I-2
rights thcorists
dcridcdasmctahysicaIrationaIists,
I 48-50, I 5J
RimLaud, J04,J5I
RoLinson F) , I 02
RoLinson j, 25
RoLinson N) , IJ4, IJ6
Rockmorc, 2I0
RodIcy, I 44
Romans, 24, I 86
concctolindividuaIright, 48-50,2I8
justicc, 47-50
naturaIIav,49-50
RomanIav,4I , 47-8, 267
Romc, 2I8
Rorty, I 28, 246, 248,25J
RoscnLcrg, 85
RoscnlcId,264
Roth, 229
Rousscau, I8, 6I , 64-5, 67, 69, 89, I04,
I28, I 5I , I76, I96-7, 20J, 222-5
Ruddcn, 86
ruIc, I0, J9-4I , 48, 2J2-5, 2J7-9, 244,
J27
mIc ol1av, 7, 9I , I 7I , 24J
Rvanda, I 2I , IJ2-J, I7, I 40
Ryan, I 02
Saatchi Saatchi, 27J
SaddamMusscin, I27, IJ2, IJ6
Sanc, I 24
Saint-ticnnc, 88
SaIccI, 95, 298, J08, JI2-I5
sociaIsymLoIic castration, JI-I7
Sarat, I 67
Sartrc, 4, I98-9, 2I0, J46, J48
Saudi^raLia, I 2J
Sayrc, J6
Scarry, 29J-4
Schcllcr, I 22
Schcucrman, 229
SchIag,2JI , 2J8-9
Schrocdcr,2JI , 269
Schutz,JI0
SchvaL, 85
scicncc, I8, 29
mcdicvaIscicncc,62
naturaIscicnccs, 2J-4, 66
roagandaof,J25
Scott, 2I , 26, 97, 99, I I 2
SccondVorIdVar, I 8
scIl-idcntity, JJ4-5
scIl-rcaIisation, JI 9
scmioticcrscctivc, 254
ScrLia, IJI
Scvc, I6
Shakcscarc, I 29-J0
Shairo, I 4
ShkIar, 55
Short, IJ5
Shrocdcr, I 27, 264-5, 280-2,284, 286,
297-8
Shutc, I 44, I7J-4, 246
Singcr, I85
sIavcry, 28, JI, 44-5, I 72, I 84, I87, 2I9,
257-8, 266, 272-J, 28J-4, 294,
J7I-2
in Francc, 98-9
SIotcrdijk, I2, J68-9
sociaI contract, 65-6,75-80, 82, I02, I 04,
I I 6, I 9J-4, 20J, 222-4, 2J8, 288,
J09, JIJ
sociaIism, 6I , 67, 285
sociaIthcory, I I 2
socicty
gainingriorityovcrindividuaI, I I 2
ostmodcmsocicty, 2I J
socioIogy, I I 2
Socratcs, 27,JJ-7, 247
soIidarity, 279, J54
SohocIcs, 26
Sohists,27, J0, JJ-4, 50, I76
sourccsol Iav
idcationaI sourccs, I 8-I9
institutionaIsourccs, I 8-I 9
South ^lrica, I2J, I44, J20
sovcrcign, 67, 7J, 75-8I , 84, I0I-7, I 09,
I I 2, I I 5, I I 8-20, I 40, I 42-J, I 5 I ,
I 60, I 70-J, I76, I 90, 2I9, 222-4,
242-J, 288, J09, J27-J5, J46, J57,
37J-4, J76
citizcnsovcrcignty, 220-I ,224
cgaIitaransovcrcignty, 22I
monarchiaIrcIaccdLyouIar, I 7I-J
l NDEX +V
arIiamcntarysovcrcignty, 24J,J29
ouIarsovcrcignty, 227
SovictLnion, I 2J, I25, I 67, 242, JJ8
SrnkIcr, J78
Stalin, I I 6, I 29, IJ6
Starmcr,2J0, JI4
Stcincr, I2I, IJ8
Stoics, 8, JI-J, 4J-4, 49-50, 56, 60, 6J-4,
7I , I I 4, I76, I 80, I 86, I96
naturaI rght, 50-J
naturc, 50-J
Stonc, I 85
Strauss, I0-I I , I 4-I 5, 25, 28, J5, J7,
42-J, 57, 75, 78-9, 8J, I I J-I 4, I49,
I5J, I 56-7, I85, 24I-2, 249
Strav, JI4
structuraIism, 26J
StSimon, I79
Suarcz, 6I, 6J
suLj cct, J-4, I 7, 50, 7I-2, 74, 85, 96,
I05-6, I42, I 52, I77, I 8J-227, JI2,
JJ4, J54
insychoanaIysis, 297, J0I-2
IcgaIsuLjcct, 226-7, 2J0-40, 24J,
260-I , 267-8, 275-6, 286, JI7, J2J,
JJ5-6, J7J
IcgaIsuLjcctdistinctlromrcaIcrson,
2J7-40
mctahysicsolsuLjcctivity, I 7
thcconccto(225
suLjcctivism, 2J0,24I , 266-7
throughrocrty, 280-5
u|c:/um/u|c:/us,2I 6-27
Suharto, I27
Jainc, I 54
JayIor C) , 90, 270
JayIor N) , J06
JayIor J) , 245
tcchnoIogy,208-9,2I4, J22-J
tcxt, 2J4,J67-8
Jhatchcr, 62, 229
JhcLaud, 4J
Jhcms, 4J
Jhomson ) , 2J0
Jhomson j, I86
Jhrasymachus, 27, J4
Jhucydidcs, I29
Jiananmcn Squarc, I 26
Jicrncy, IJ-I4, 2J, 49, 59, 6I
Jokyo JriaIs, I I 5, I2I
JoILcr, I2I
JoqucviIIc, I04
torturc, 29J-4
totaIitaranism, 8I
tradc dcaIs, I26, I28, J78
trccs, I85
truth, I89, 202, JI I
Jsaitouridcs, 7J-4
Juck, 48-9, 6I , 6J, 244
Jully, I 2I
Jurkcy, I27
Jurncr, I 59
LIman, 2I 8
LIian,48, 56
undcrcIass, J76
Lnitcdlations, 85, 9I , I02, I I 5, I I 8,
I2J-4, IJI-4, IJ9-40, I 44-5, I 66,
289, J29
MumanRights Commission, I 20
LnivcrsaI LccIaration, 9, IJ, 85, I 06, I I 5,
I I 8
as Icttcr to SantaCIaus, I2J
Lasis oldralting, I 2J
univcrsaIity, IJ6-40, I 64, I 9J, 2I2, 257,
260, 267, J47
olnothingncss, 200
Lruson, J8
LS^sccc|so^mcrican) , I2I-2, I24-5,
I JI , I JJ, I40, 28J-4, J27
Constitution, J28
cquivocationrcgardingunivcrsaIismol
rghts, I 22
lrccdomolsccchriorityovcr gcno-
cidc, IJJ
lrccsccch, I I I
racc rcIations, I I I
utiIitarianism, J4, 67, 72, I 07, I09
utoia, J, J5, J7, 44, 56, 64, 67-8,84,
I I 4, I 67, I 75-8I , 2I6, 250, 27J,
29I-2, JI9, JJ4, JJ7-8, J40-2, J55,
J69, J77-80
aradoxol, J40-I
utoianhoc,J4I-2
utoian triLunal, J58
\arikas, 97
\aricr, I 84
\attimo, 6
\cmant, I 90
\idal-laquct, I 90
\ilIa, 2I0
\illcy, 2, I I , I 4-I 5, J8-40, 4J-4, 47-5I ,
57-9, 6I-J, I 48, 242-J
\ining, 2J7
4I o
\oltairc, I6
\onNasoch,2J7
Vaddington, I J0-I
Vadc, I I I , 2J0
Valdron, I I , I0, 2
|
7
Valzcr, IJ0, 2
||
var
justvar, I2-J0, I J-
|
I
var crimcs, I2I-2
varcrmcstrbunal, sccIntcrnational
Criminal Court
Varrington, 6, 25, 52,
|
, I
|
8, I 6
|
, I 68,
I88, I I , I7, 22J, 2J, J06, JJ
|
,
J
|
8, J67
Vashington, I05
Vatkins, 223
Vcbcr, I I 2, 208, 22
Vhig,
Vilbcrforcc, I05
Vildc, JI
vill, I0, 226,2J6
gcncralvill, I 0I , I 0
|
, I76, 22J, 2
|
2
vill to vill, I 5, 202,205, 208,2J6
l NDEX
VilIiamol Cckham, 6I-J
Villiams, 25
Vittich, 22
Volf, 2J
Vollstonccralt,2
|
5
vomcn sccc|olcminism) , I 72, 2
|
5,
257-8
discrmination against vomcn, I24
lcmalcnaturc inFrcnchLcclaration,
7-8
imaginar,domainof, JJ6
vomcn`s rghts, 8, 260
vorId, I8, 207, 267
andhumanity, 27J
mastcr, olbyman, I8
VorIdank, IJ
Young, 28, 2I
Yugoslavia, I, I 20-I , IJ7, I 67, I7J, JI4,
J27, J2, JJ2, J
|
I
/izck, 27I , 28, J06, JJ
|
-5