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Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary
December 8, 1994

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, An Act Converting the
municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong.
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675, President Ramis signed it into
law.
Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. By virtue of these results, RA 7675
was deemed ratified in effect.
Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46
thereof, is unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the one subject one
bill rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects,
namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the
division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts.
Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum
population requirements.

Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative
may increase.
3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.

Ruling:
1. No.
The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not
less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the one city one
representative as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.
The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
but is a natural ang logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject
and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequence of the proposed law and its operation.

2. Yes.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The
present composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment.

3. No.
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular
candidate or party. It should be noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the assailed
law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamoras constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly
be considered as favorable to him.

Petition dismissed

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.

March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos
did not meet the residency requirement.

March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in
the COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first
certificate was the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.

April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a
Resolution that found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos
corrected certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.

May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution drafted on April 24.

May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos
proclamation to the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained
the highest number of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that
the proclamation would be suspended even if she did win.

May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the
winner of the said Congressional election.
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Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus
candidate, of the first district of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the
constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her
Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is
immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the
residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections.
This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after marrying
her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only actual
residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to change
residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations. When she got
married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in Article
1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to wherever
he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend to
lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of
domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman
seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in
Olot, Leyte.

(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78
of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to
the House of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event,
Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and
Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over
the question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.

Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former
dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it
was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has
lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional
District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban
since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the
First Congressional District of Leyte.

Romero, J. (Separate):
Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is evident in this
case. Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement.

Vitug, J. (Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified.
The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority
by the Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are
explicitly within their exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.

Mendoza, J. (Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on
the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It
has none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event
they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an
appropriate forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).

Padilla, J. (Dissenting):
Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be
blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all
situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted.

Regalado, J. (Dissenting):
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her
husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory
is not stated in any of the provisions of law.

Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs resolutions are within the
scope and jurisdiction of this particular agencys powers. In agreement with
Regalado, re: womans domicile.
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BANAT v. COMELEC August 7, 2009
Facts: This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List
(petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)and
enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the
statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed
by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19
December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007
local elections.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this
petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution. Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and
43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable
application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the
Constitution.
Petitioner argues the following:
1. the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but
contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43are neither embraced
in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
2. Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET).According to petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President
(Congress), and the COMELECen banc as the National Board of Canvassers
(COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain pre-
proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators.
Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the
COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction
of the PET and the SET.
3. Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the
government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute
election offenses.
4. Section 34 which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and
dominant minority parties at Pon election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the
freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the
contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely
private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
Issue/s:
Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional.
-Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution;
-Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
-Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
Ruling: The petition is denied. RA 9369 is constitutional.
1. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436,
Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated
Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent
National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility,
Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes. Clearly, the subject matter of RA
9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP
881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other related election laws to achieve its
purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the
elections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to
specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38
amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and(2) Section 43 of RA
9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane
to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among
others.
2. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain
only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation
controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in
the certificates of canvass. The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide
that Congress and the COMELEC en banc may now entertain pre-proclamation
cases for national elective posts.
3. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and
prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and
explained.
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4. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause
because this only applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no
perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be impaired. Both the COMELEC
and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will
prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an
ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of
votes. The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated
by Congress in the exercise of its police power. The OSG further argues that the
assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation
promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a reasonable
regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a
copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the
polling precincts.
Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC
GR. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
Facts: On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the COMELEC
a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from
the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions
Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said
certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes
cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's
nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-
Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against
some of herein respondents.

On April 18, 2001, the COMELEC required the respondents in the two
disqualification cases to file Comments within three days from notice. It also set the
date for hearing on April 26, 2001, but subsequently reset it to May 3, 2001. During
the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the COMELEC, Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party filed a Petition before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In
its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court directed respondents to comment on
the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
docketed as GR No. 147613, also challenging COMELEC Omnibus Resolution No.
3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of
the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition to
file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the
parties to an Oral Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the COMELEC may
proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes cast for the party-list
elections,but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders
of the Court.


Issues: During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to
address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More
specifically, is there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and
underrepresented' sectors and organizations.
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785."


Held: WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the COMELEC, which is
hereby DIRECTED to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the
qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the guidelines
enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the
winners in the last party-list elections, the COMELEC is directed to begin its hearings
for the parties and organizations that appear to have garnered such number of votes
as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The COMELEC is further
DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice
hereof.

The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the COMELEC "to
refrain from proclaiming any winner" during the last party-list election, shall
remain in force until after the COMELEC itself will have complied and reported its
compliance with the foregoing disposition.

This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections'
receipt thereof. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.


In view of standing on COMELEC OR 3785
Petitioners attack the validity of COMELEC Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to
participate in the party-list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and
the Rules of Court, such challenge may be brought before this Court in a verified
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent
Commission en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it
being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the COMELEC
a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents. The COMELEC, however, did not act on that Petition.

In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor
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from this Court, for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent
events have proven the urgency of petitioner's action; to this date, the COMELEC
has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just be a
formality because the COMELEC, through theOffice of the Solicitor General, has
made its position on the matter quite clear.

In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie
only in the absence of any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It has
been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the presence of other
remedies, "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is
involved, and in case of urgency." Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with
public interest and with extreme urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of
20 percent of the House of Representatives.

Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-
list system, which this Court must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to
"formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules."

Finally, when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for
relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available."


In view of the participation of political parties
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion
of political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the
questioned Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the
participation of "major political parties."

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof, . . .." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or
a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office."


In view of terms marginalized and underrepresented
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party or any organization or group for that matter
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must
be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941.



"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it
allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to
the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the
enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor,peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to
feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must
be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."

Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of
government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with
the "marginalized or underrepresented."

In the end, the role of the COMELEC is to see to it that only those Filipinos who
are "marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the
party-list system, Filipino-style.

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not
exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be
represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and
their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be
limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.


In view of OSG contention
Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor
General contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6 of
RA 7941 may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral
Argument that even an organization representing the super rich of Forbes Park or
Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections.

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position
to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense.

It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the
party-list system was enacted to give them not only genuine hope, but genuine
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power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress
and in the larger affairs of the State.


In view of COMELECs grave abuse of discretion
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections,
violates or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this
Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the function of all judicial
and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent
or second-guess it.


In view of the Courts assistance
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the COMELEC for
the latter to determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties
and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply with the
requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the
COMELEC in its work.


In view of the 2 systems of representation (Mendoza, J.)
Indeed, the two systems of representation are not identical. Party list
representation is a type of proportional representation designed to give those
who otherwise cannot win a seat in the House of Representatives in district
elections a chance to win if they have sufficient strength on a nationwide
basis. (In this sense, these groups are considered "marginalized and
underrepresented.") Under the party-list system, representatives are elected from
multi-seat districts in proportion to the number of votes received in contrast to the
"winner-take-all" single-seat district in which, even if a candidate garners 49.9%
of the votes, he gets no seat.

Thus, under the party-list system, a party or candidate need not come in first
in order to win seats in the legislature. On the other hand, in the "winner-take-all"
single-seat district, the votes cast for a losing candidate are wasted as only those
who vote for the winner are represented.

What the advocates of sectoral representation wanted was permanent reserved
seats for "marginalized sectors" by which they mean the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors. Under Art. VI, 5(2),
these sectors were given only one-half of the seats in the House of Representatives
and only for three terms. On the other hand, the "third or fourth placers" in district
elections, for whom the party-list system was intended, refer to those who may not
win seats in the districts but nationwide may be sufficiently strong to enable them to
be represented in the House. They may include Villacorta's "marginalized" or
"underprivileged" sectors, but they are not limited to them. There would have been
no need to give the "marginalized sectors" one-half of the seats for the party-list
system for three terms if the two systems are identical.

In sum, a problem was placed before the Constitutional Commission that the
existing "winner-take-all" one-seat district system of election leaves blocks of voters
underrepresented. To this problem of underrepresentation two solutions were
proposed: sectoral representation and party-list system or proportional
representation. The Constitutional Commission chose the party-list system.

Thus, neither textual nor historical consideration yields support for the view that
the party-list system is designed exclusively for labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, and youth sectors.

For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a
basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of
proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all"
district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the
sectors mentioned in 5, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other
sectors.
Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC


Background of the case
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the
Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission
on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The
Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of
2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not
come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to
represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
some of the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the existing
accreditation of the rest. They also lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them
due process in the evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio
was tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the
status quo prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52
petitioners or only 41 petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing
the Comelec to include their names in the printing of official ballots.
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7 SALTING-DEONA

THE RULING
In a Decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, the high court, through Carpios
ponencia, ruled in favor of the 54 petitions and remanded these petitions to the
Comelec. The party-list groups and organizations covered by the 41 petitions that
obtained mandatory injunction orders from the high court still stand a chance to
make it to the 2013 party-list race as the high court ordered the poll body to
determine whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system
and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
set forth in the Decision. The rest, meaning, the 13 other petitions, were remanded to
the poll body merely for purposes of determining whether they may be granted
accreditation under the new parameters but may not participate in the May 2013
elections.
The Decision, however, clarified that the poll body may not be faulted for acting on
the basis of previous rulings (Ang Bagong Bayani, BANAT) of the high court
regarding the party-list system. These earlier rulings enumerated guidelines on who
may participate in the party-list system.
New parameters set forth in the Decision on who may participate in the May
2013 party-list race and subsequent party-list elections
The Decision identified three groups that may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations.
On the part of national parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations
which intend to participate in the party-list race, the new guidelines state that these
parties do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any marginalized or underrepresented sector.'
As for political parties, they may participate in the party-list race by registering under
the party-list system and no longer field congressional candidates. These parties, if
they field congressional candidates, however, are not barred from participating in the
party-list elections; what they need to do is register their sectoral wing or party under
the party-list system. This sectoral wing shall be considered an independent
sectoral party linked to a political party through a coalition.
The question is: where does representation of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors come in?
The answer: on the sectoral parties or organizations that intend to participate in the
party-list system.
The high court held that purely sectoral parties or organizations may either represent
marginalized and underrepresented constituencies or those lacking well-defined
political constituencies. The high court went on to enumerate marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, as follows: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.
The rule on nominees and members coming from the sector they intend to represent
also applies only to the sectoral parties or organizations. The high court ruled that it
is enough that [a] majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.' The
same is true for those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
As for the nominees of these sectoral parties and organizations, the new guidelines
provide that they must either be members of the sector or have a track record of
advocacy for their sector.
Should some of the nominees of these national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations be disqualified, the party or organization itself will not be disqualified
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The party-list system, according to the Decision
Quoting Christian Monsod, the main proponent of the party-list system, the high
court stated that it is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation. The
high court stressed that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to leave
out non-sectoral parties in the party-list system and exclusively limit it to sectoral
groups.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of
the party-list system In fact, the framers voted down , 19-22, a proposal to reserve
the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties.
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral
parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both
sectoral and non-sectoral parties, the Decision read.
To amplify its position, the high court pointed out Sec. 5(1), Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution, which states:
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8 SALTING-DEONA

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Decision also pointed out pertinent provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941,
also known as the Party-list System Act, specifically from Sec. 3 (Definition of
Terms):
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as
the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector
Again, the high court noted that defining these parties or groups, one from the
others, could only mean that they are not one and the same.

Previous rulings reversed by Atong Paglaum
As earlier stated, there are previous rulings on the party-list system in the case of
Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec and BANAT v. Comelec
In Ang Bagong Bayanis parameters for the party-list system, guideline 2 states that
while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the
declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of Representatives.'
However, in its latest Decision, in Atong Paglaum, the high court pointed out that
there was an inherent inconsistency in the Ang Bagong Bayani guidelines since the
requirement that the major political parties should represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors essentially automatically disqualified these major parties
from the party-list system.
As for BANAT, incidentally also penned by Carpio, the high court said that the
guidelines in this ruling merely formalized the prevailing practice when it prohibited
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections even if through their
allied sectoral organizations.
My 2-cents
Flip-flopped as it may have in the case of Atong Paglaum, I agree with the Supreme
Court in this Decision. No less than the Constitution provides in Sec. 5(1), Art. VI that
national, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations may participate in the
party-list system a fact that may not be denied in spite of where public discourse
and sentiment tend to sway in as far as the party-list system is concerned.
If we want the party-list system to truly represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and party-list groups to come from the non-traditional
political parties, then what needs to be done is amend the law. The Supreme Court
cannot go beyond its duty of interpreting the law and may not perform a
constitutional function and mandate which is solely that of the legislative branch.
Doing so would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
I totally agree that allowing national and major political parties to participate in the
party-list elections does not make any sense if there were no distinction or
requirement that the marginalized and underrepresented should be the
constituency. Why then create a separate system if it is, in fact, free for all?
But this is an issue best left to Congress to resolve, heart-wrenching as this may
sound to those whose desire is to provide a platform for a truly non-traditional mode
of politics. For now, let us accept that we cannot go beyond what the law provides.
Ligot vs. Mathay
56 SCRA 823
FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress
of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span
from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office
(1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government was enacted into law and under section 7
thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators
and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per
annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired on
December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any
official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in
case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials
on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco,
the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General
then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim
for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his
incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress
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9 SALTING-DEONA

elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members
of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00
per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00
per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of
office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim
cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated
whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the
purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other
emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to
members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the
basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited
by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them
prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they
were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed
by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague,
ex-Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it
would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do
indirectly what cannot be done directly.





Sampayan vs Daza : 103903 : September 11, 1992 : J. Romero : En Banc :
Resolution

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992]

MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN, DIEGO L. TURLA, JR., and LEONARDO G. TIOZON,
petitioners, vs. RAUL A. DAZA, HON. CAMILO SABIO, as Secretary of the House of
Representatives, MR. JOSE MARIA TUANO, as Officer-in-Charge, Gen. Services
Division of the House of Representatives, MRS. ROSALINDA G. MEDINA, as Chief
Accountant of the House of Representatives, and the HON. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J.:

On February 18, 1992, petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of
Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify
respondent RaulDaza, then incumbent congressman of the same congressional
district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the
latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States
since October 16, 1974.

Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his
status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution.

On February 25, 1992, we required respondents to comment. On March 13, 1992,
respondents, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion for extension of time to file
their comment for a period of thirty days or until April 12, 1992. Reacting to the said
motion, petitioners on March 30, 1992, manifested their opposition to the 30-day
extension of time stating that such extension was excessive and prayed that
respondent instead be granted only 10 days to file their comment. On May 5, 1992,
the Court noted the manifestation and opposition.

On April 7, 1992, petitioners manifested before us that on April 2, 1992, they filed a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the
recent May 11, 1992 elections on the basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code (SPC 92-084) and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.[1]

On April 10, 1992, respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the
fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was
accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter
order of the District Director, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los
Angeles, U.S.A.,[2] he had long waived his status when he returned to the
Philippines on August 12, 1985.[3]

On April 13, 1992, public respondent Camilo Sabio, Secretary General of the House
of Representatives, Mr. Jose Mari Tuao, as OIC of the General Services Division,
Mrs. Rosalinda G. Medina, as Chief Accountant of the House of Representatives and
Commission on Audit, filed their comment. They contend that if indeed
Congressman Daza is a greencard holder and a permanent resident of the United
States of America, then he should be removed from his position as Congressman.
However, they opined that only Congressman Daza can best explain his true and
correct status as a greencard holder. Until he files his comment to the petition,
petitioners prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
should not be granted.[4]

Eight (8) days later, respondent Daza, reacting to the petition before the COMELEC
(SPC 92-084) and hypothesizing that the case before the COMELEC would become
moot should this Court find that his permanent resident status ceased when he was
granted a US non-immigrant visa, asked this Court to direct the COMELEC to
dismiss SPC No. 92-084.[5]
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10 SALTING-DEONA


On May 5, 1992, petitioners filed their reply. On May 21, 1992, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda.

The central issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not respondent Daza
should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Petitioners insist that Congressman Daza should be disqualified from exercising the
functions of his office being a permanent resident alien of the United States at the
time when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1987 Elections. To
buttress their contention, petitioners cite the recent case of Caasi v. Court of
Appeals.[6]

In support of their charge that respondent Daza is a greencard holder, petitioners
presented to us a letter from the United States Department of Justice, Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) which reads:[7]

File No. A20 968 618

Date: Nov 5, 1991

LOS914732

Geraghty, O'Loughlin and Kenney

Attn: David C. Hutchinson

386 N. Wasbasha Street

St. Paul, Minn. 55102-1308

SUBJECT:

Daza, Raul A.

Your request was received in this office on ____________; please note the
paragraph(s) checked below:

xxx xxx xxx

10. [XX] Other remarks:

Service File A20 968 619 relating to Raul Daza reflects: subject became a Lawful
Permanent Resident on Oct. 16, 1974. As far as we know subject (sic) still has his
greencard. No he has not applied for citizenship.

Sinerely, (sic)

Sgd.

District Director

Form G-343 (Rev. 8-20-82)N

We vote to dismiss the instant prohibition case. First, this case is already moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6,
1992[8] that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for
the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30,
1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral
Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the
qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to
file a petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the
election[9] or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10)
days after Daza's proclamation.[10] Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be
issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is
not intended to provide for acts already consummated.[11] Fourth, as a de facto
public officer,[12] respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during
his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer.
Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.[13]

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for being
MOOT and ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.


Sarmiento III vs. Mison

Facts: Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from performing the functions of
the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as
Secretary of the Dept of Budget from disbursing payments for Misons salaries and
emoluments on the ground that Misons appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the
constitutionality of Misons appointment without the confirmation of the (CA). It is
apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that there are four groups of officers
whom the president shall appoint.

(1) the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution,

(2) all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law,
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11 SALTING-DEONA


(3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint and

(4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The 1st group is clearly appointed with the consent of the CA. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th
groups are the present bone of contention.

Issue: Whether or not the 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups should be appointed by the
president with or without the consent/confirmation of the CA

Held: The fundamental principle of Constitutional construction is to give effect to the
intent of the framers of the organic law and the people adopting it. The Court will
thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions not in accordance with how the
executive or the legislative may want them construed, but in accordance with what
they say and provide. The 1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the CA of all
presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and similar
malpractices. Under the 1973 Constitution, the president has the absolute power of
appointment with hardly any check on the legislature. Given these two extremes, the
1987 Constitution struck a middle-ground by requiring the consent of the CA for the
1st group of appointments and leaving to the President without such confirmation the
appointments of the other officers. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation on
the CA except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of
the Bureau of Customs by the CA is not required.

The appointment of Mison without submitting his nomination the CA is within the
constitutional authority of the President.


G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President,
BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M.
UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C.
FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon
City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL
TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE
PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and
in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity
as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of
Sec 35 of RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing
the franking privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President,
the VP, members of Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National
Census and Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as
the franking privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education,
the Institute of National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the
AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the
Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the
Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.
The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as
to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices
from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of
the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking
privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be
similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege
was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a
waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a
smoother flow of communication between the government and the people. If the
problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government,
including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which
definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.


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12 SALTING-DEONA


G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of
Camarines Norte, petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS: Republic Act No. 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the
Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui,
San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and
Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province. Pursuant to said law, the
COMELEC issued a resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite. The said resolution
provides that the plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units affected, namely the
barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining
areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In the plebiscite held
throughout the Municipality of Labo, majority of the votes cast were against the
creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.Thus, petitioner as Governor of
Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted throughout the
Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken. It is the
contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results
obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC,
should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected,i.e. the
12barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-
Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have
included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo,
Camarines Norte. In support of his stand, petitioner argues that where a local unit is
to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segregated
should be included in the plebiscite.

Was the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo valid?

Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units
directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be
economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof havea right to vote in
said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly
affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in
the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was concluded that
respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the
resolution.

Bengzon, Jr. vs, The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
G.R. No. 89914

Facts:
A civil case was filed by the Republic of the Philippines represented by PCGG
against Benjamin Romualdez. The complaint alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez, taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence
and connection with the spouses, Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos engaged
in schemes for their self-aggrandizement at the expense of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Filipino people.

One newspapers reported that after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the companies of
Romualdez were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company
controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the Presidents brother-in-law, had
effectively taken over the firm.

The Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Enrile, delivered a speech on the alleged
take over-personal privilege by Lopa of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the
First Manila Management of Companies owned by Romualdez. Senator Enrile also
called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law, particularly with
regard to RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The matter was
referred by the Senate to the Blue Ribbon Committee.


Issue:
Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has valid legislative
purpose as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 21


Held:
The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both Houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. But the power of both Houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. As provided under
Art. VI, Sec. 21, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided in the
Senate Rules of Procedure. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested
by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The purpose of the inquiry was to find out whether or not
the relatives of President Marcos, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in
connection with the alleged sale of 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez to
the Lopa group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
This matter appears to be more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature.