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Criminal Law A branch of municipal law which defines crimes, treats of their nature and provides for their

r punishment.
Limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws (ON)
1. Must be general in application.
2. Must not partake of the nature of an ex post facto law.
3. Must not partake of the nature of a bill of attainder.
. Must not impose cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines.
!haracteristics of !riminal "aw#
$eneral the law is binding to all persons who reside in the %hilippines
&erritorial the law is binding to all crimes committed within the 'ational &erritor( of the %hilippines
)xception to &erritorial Application# *nstances enumerated under Article 2.
3. %rospective the law does not have an( retroactive effect.
)xception to %rospective Application# when new statute is favorable to the accused.
)ffect of repeal of penal law to liabilit( of offender
&otal or absolute, or partial or relative repeal. + As to the effect of repeal of penal law to the liabilit( of offender, ,ualif(
(our answer b( sa(ing whether the repeal is absolute or total or whether the repeal is partial or relative onl(.
A repeal is absolute or total when the crime punished under the repealed law has been decriminali-ed b( the repeal.
.ecause of the repeal, the act or omission which used to be a crime is no longer a crime. An example is /epublic Act 'o.
0313, which decriminali-ed subversion.
A repeal is partial or relative when the crime punished under the repealed law continues to be a crime inspite of the
repeal. &his means that the repeal merel( modified the conditions affecting the crime under the repealed law. &he
modification ma( be pre2udicial or beneficial to the offender. 3ence, the following rule#
!onse,uences if repeal of penal law is total or absolute
415 *f a case is pending in court involving the violation of the repealed law, the same shall be dismissed, even
though the accused ma( be a habitual delin,uent.
425 *f a case is alread( decided and the accused is alread( serving sentence b( final 2udgment, if the convict is not a
habitual delin,uent, then he will be entitled to a release unless there is a reservation clause in the penal law that it will not
appl( to those serving sentence at the time of the repeal. .ut if there is no reservation, those who are not habitual
delin,uents even if the( are alread( serving their sentence will receive the benefit of the repealing law. &he( are entitled
to release.
*f the( are not discharged from confinement, a petition for habeas corpus should be filed to test the legalit( of their
continued confinement in 2ail.
*f the convict, on the other hand, is a habitual delin,uent, he will continue serving the sentence in spite of the fact that the
law under which he was convicted has alread( been absolutel( repealed. &his is so because penal laws should be given
retroactive application to favor onl( those who are not habitual delin,uents.
!onse,uences if repeal of penal law is partial or relative
415 *f a case is pending in court involving the violation of the repealed law, and the repealing law is more favorable
to the accused, it shall be the one applied to him. 6o whether he is a habitual delin,uent or not, if the case is still pending
in court, the repealing law will be the one to appl( unless there is a saving clause in the repealing law that it shall not
appl( to pending causes of action.
425 *f a case is alread( decided and the accused is alread( serving sentence b( final 2udgment,even if the repealing
law is partial or relative, the crime still remains to be a crime. &hose who are not habitual delin,uents will benefit on the
effect of that repeal, so that if the repeal is more lenient to them, it will be the repealing law that will henceforth appl( to
them.
7nder Article 22, even if the offender is alread( convicted and serving sentence, a law which is beneficial shall be applied
to him unless he is a habitual delin,uent in accordance with /ule 8 of Article 12.
!onse,uences if repeal of penal law is express or implied
415 *f a penal law is impliedl( repealed, the subse,uent repeal of the repealing law will revive the original law. 6o
the act or omission which was punished as a crime under the original law will be revived and the same shall again be
crimes although during the implied repeal the( ma( not be punishable.
425 *f the repeal is express, the repeal of the repealing law will not revive the first law, so the act or omission will no
longer be penali-ed.
&hese effects of repeal do not appl( to self9repealing laws or those which have automatic termination. An example is the
/ent !ontrol "aw which is revived b( !ongress ever( two (ears.
&heories of !riminal "aw
!lassical &heor( Man is essentiall( a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between good and evil and
therefore more stress is placed upon the result of the felonious act than upon the criminal himself.
%ositivist &heor( Man is subdued occasionall( b( a strange and morbid phenomenon which conditions him to do wrong
in spite of or contrar( to his volition.
)clectic or Mixed %hilosoph(
&his combines both positivist and classical thinking. !rimes that are economic and social and nature should be dealt with
in a positivist manner: thus, the law is more compassionate. 3einous crimes should be dealt with in a classical manner:
thus, capital punishmen

BASIC MAXIMS IN CRIMINAL LAW
octrine of !ro Reo
;henever a penal law is to be construed or applied and the law admits of two interpretations one lenient to the offender
and one strict to the offender that interpretation which is lenient or favorable to the offender will be adopted.
N"ll"m crimen# n"lla poena sine lege
&here is no crime when there is no law punishing the same. &his is true to civil law countries, but not to common law
countries.
.ecause of this maxim, there is no common law crime in the %hilippines. 'o matter how wrongful, evil or bad the act is,
if there is no law defining the act, the same is not considered a crime.
Act"s non facit re"m# nisi mens sit rea
&he act cannot be criminal where the mind is not criminal. &his is true to a felon( characteri-ed b( dolo, but not a felon(
resulting from culpa. &his maxim is not an absolute one because it is not applied to culpable felonies, or those that result
from negligence.
$tilitarian %heor& or !rotecti'e %heor&
&he primar( purpose of the punishment under criminal law is the protection of societ( from actual and potential
wrongdoers. &he courts, therefore, in exacting retribution for the wronged societ(, should direct the punishment to
potential or actual wrongdoers, since criminal law is directed against acts and omissions which the societ( does not
approve. !onsistent with this theor(, the mala prohibita principle which punishes an offense regardless of malice or
criminal intent, should not be utili-ed to appl( the full harshness of the special law.
So"rces of Criminal Law
%he Re'ise( !enal Co(e
Special !enal Laws Acts enacted of the %hilippine "egislature punishing offenses or omissions.
!onstruction of %enal "aws
!riminal 6tatutes are liberall( construed in favor of the offender. &his means that no person shall be brought within their
terms who is not clearl( within them, nor should an( act be pronounced criminal which is not clearl( made so b( statute.
&he original text in which a penal law is approved in case of a conflict with an official translation.
*nterpretation b( analog( has no place in criminal law
MALA IN S) AN MALA !RO*IBI%A
<iolations of the /evised %enal !ode are referred to as malum in se, which literall( means, that the act is inherentl( evil
or bad or per se wrongful. =n the other hand, violations of special laws are generall( referred to as malum prohibitum.
'ote, however, that not all violations of special laws are mala prohibita. ;hile intentional felonies are alwa(s mala in se,
it does not follow that prohibited acts done in violation of special laws are alwa(s mala prohibita. )ven if the crime is
punished under a special law, if the act punished is one which is inherentl( wrong, the same is malum in se, and, therefore,
good faith and the lack of criminal intent is a valid defense: unless it is the product of criminal negligence or culpa.
"ikewise when the special laws re,uires that the punished act be committed knowingl( and willfull(, criminal intent is
re,uired to be proved before criminal liabilit( ma( arise.
;hen the act penali-ed is not inherentl( wrong, it is wrong onl( because a law punishes the same.
>istinction between crimes punished under the /evised %enal !ode and crimes punished under special laws
1. As to moral trait of the offender
*n crimes punished under the /evised %enal !ode, the moral trait of the offender is considered. &his is wh( liabilit( would
onl( arise when there is dolo or culpa in the commission of the punishable act.
*n crimes punished under special laws, the moral trait of the offender is not considered: it is enough that the prohibited act
was voluntaril( done.
2. As to use of good faith as defense
*n crimes punished under the /evised %enal !ode, good faith or lack of criminal intent is a valid defense: unless the crime
is the result of culpa
*n crimes punished under special laws, good faith is not a defense
3. As to degree of accomplishment of the crime
*n crimes punished under the /evised %enal !ode, the degree of accomplishment of the crime is taken into account in
punishing the offender: thus, there are attempted, frustrated, and consummated stages in the commission of the crime.
*n crimes punished under special laws, the act gives rise to a crime onl( when it is consummated: there are no attempted
or frustrated stages, unless the special law expressl( penali-e the mere attempt or frustration of the crime.
. As to mitigating and aggravating circumstances
*n crimes punished under the /evised %enal !ode, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are taken into account in
imposing the penalt( since the moral trait of the offender is considered.
*n crimes punished under special laws, mitigating and aggravating circumstances are not taken into account in imposing
the penalt(.
8. As to degree of participation
*n crimes punished under the /evised %enal !ode, when there is more than one offender, the degree of participation of
each in the commission of the crime is taken into account in imposing the penalt(: thus, offenders are classified as
principal, accomplice and accessor(.
*n crimes punished under special laws, the degree of participation of the offenders is not considered. All who perpetrated
the prohibited act are penali-ed to the same extent. &here is no principal or accomplice or accessor( to consider.
&est to determine if violation of special law is malum prohibitum or malum in se
Anal(-e the violation# *s it wrong because there is a law prohibiting it or punishing it as such? *f (ou remove the law,
will the act still be wrong?
*f the wording of the law punishing the crime uses the word @willfull(A, then malice must be proven. ;here malice is a
factor, good faith is a defense.
*n violation of special law, the act constituting the crime is a prohibited act. &herefore culpa is not a basis of liabilit(,
unless the special law punishes an omission.
;hen given a problem, take note if the crime is a violation of the /evised %enal !ode or a special law.
Art. 1. &his !ode shall take effect on Banuar( 1, 1C32.
Art. 2. )xcept as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this !ode shall be
enforced not onl( within the %hilippine Archipelago including its atmosphere, its interior waters and Maritime -one, but
also outside of its 2urisdiction, against those who#
1. 6hould commit an offense while on a %hilippine ship or airship:
2. 6hould forge or counterfeit an( coin or currenc( note of the %hilippine *slands or obligations and securities issued b(
the $overnment of the %hilippine *slands:
3. 6hould be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned
in the preceding number:
. ;hile being public officers or emplo(ees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions: or 46ome of
these crimes are briber(, fraud against national treasur(, malversation of public funds or propert(, and illegal use of public
funds: e.g., A 2udge who accepts a bribe while in Bapan.5
8. 6hould commit an( crimes against the national securit( and the law of nations, defined in &itle =ne of .ook &wo of
this !ode. 4&hese crimes include treason, espionage, pirac(, mutin(, and violation of neutralit(5
R"les as to crimes committe( a+oar( foreign merchant 'essels,
-rench R"le 6uch crimes are not triable in the courts of that countr(, unless their commission affects the peace and
securit( of the territor( or the safet( of the state is endangered.
)nglish R"le 6uch crimes are triable in that countr(, unless the( merel( affect things within the vessel or the( refer to
the internal management thereof. 4&his is applicable in the %hilippines5
two situations where the foreign countr( ma( not appl( its criminal law even if a crime was committed on board a vessel
within its territorial waters and these are#
415 ;hen the crime is committed in a war vessel of a foreign countr(, because war vessels are part of the
sovereignt( of the countr( to whose naval force the( belong:
425 ;hen the foreign countr( in whose territorial waters the crime was committed adopts the Drench /ule, which
applies onl( to merchant vessels, except when the crime committed affects the national securit( or public order of such
foreign countr(.
Re."irements of /an offense committe( while on a !hilippine Ship or Airship0
/egistered with the %hilippine .ureau of !ustoms
6hip must be in the high seas or the airship must be in international airspace.
7nder international law rule, a vessel which is not registered in accordance with the laws of an( countr( is considered a
pirate vessel and pirac( is a crime against humanit( in general, such that wherever the pirates ma( go, the( can be
prosecuted.
$S '1 B"ll
A crime which occurred on board of a foreign vessel, which began when the ship was in a foreign territor( and continued
when it entered into %hilippine waters, is considered a continuing crime. 3ence within the 2urisdiction of the local courts.
As a general rule, the /evised %enal !ode governs onl( when the crime committed pertains to the exercise of the public
officialEs functions, those having to do with the discharge of their duties in a foreign countr(. &he functions contemplated
are those, which are, under the law, to be performed b( the public officer in the Doreign 6ervice of the %hilippine
government in a foreign countr(.

)xception# &he /evised %enal !ode governs if the crime was committed within the %hilippine )mbass( or within the
embass( grounds in a foreign countr(. &his is because embass( grounds are considered an extension of sovereignt(.
%aragraph 8 of Article 2, use the phrase @as defined in &itle =ne of .ook &wo of this !ode.A
&his is a ver( important part of the exception, because &itle * of .ook 2 4crimes against national securit(5 does not include
rebellion.
Art 21 Acts an( omissions p"nisha+le +& law are felonies1
Acts an overt or external act
Omission failure to perform a dut( re,uired b( law. )xample of an omission# failure to render assistance to an(one who
is in danger of d(ing or is in an uninhabited place or is wounded abandonment.
-elonies acts and omissions punishable b( the /evised %enal !ode
Crime 9 acts and omissions punishable b( an( law
;hat re,uisites must concur before a felon( ma( be committed?
&here must be 435 an act or omission: 445 punishable b( the /evised %enal !ode: and 425 the act is performed or the
omission incurred b( means of dolo or culpa.
3ow felonies are committed#
b( means of deceit 4dolo5 &here is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Re."isites,
freedom
intelligence
intent
)xamples# murder, treason, and robber(
Criminal intent is not necessar& in these cases,
415 ;hen the crime is the product of culpa or negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill:
425 ;hen the crime is a prohibited act under a special law or what is called malum prohibitum.
*n criminal law, intent is categori-ed into two#
415 $eneral criminal intent: and
425 6pecific criminal intent.
$eneral criminal intent is presumed from the mere doing of a wrong act. &his does not re,uire proof. &he burden is upon
the wrong doer to prove that he acted without such criminal intent.
6pecific criminal intent is not presumed because it is an ingredient or element of a crime, like intent to kill in the crimes of
attempted or frustrated homicideFparricideFmurder. &he prosecution has the burden of proving the same.
>istinction between intent and discernment
*ntent is the determination to do a certain thing, an aim or purpose of the mind. *t is the design to resolve or determination
b( which a person acts.
=n the other hand, discernment is the mental capacit( to tell right from wrong. *t relates to the moral significance that a
person ascribes to his act and relates to the intelligence as an element of dolo, distinct from intent.
>istinction between intent and motive
*ntent is demonstrated b( the use of a particular means to bring about a desired result it is not a state of mind or a reason
for committing a crime.
=n the other hand, motive implies motion. *t is the moving power which impels one to do an act. ;hen there is motive
in the commission of a crime, it alwa(s comes before the intent. .ut a crime ma( be committed without motive.
*f the crime is intentional, it cannot be committed without intent. *ntent is manifested b( the instrument used b( the
offender. &he specific criminal intent becomes material if the crime is to be distinguished from the attempted or frustrated
stage.
b( means of fault 4culpa5 &here is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
*mprudence deficienc( of action: e.g. A was driving a truck along a road. 3e hit . because it was raining reckless
imprudence.
'egligence 9 deficienc( of perception: failure to foresee impending danger, usuall( involves lack of foresight
c. /e,uisites#
Dreedom
*ntelligence
*mprudence, negligence, lack of skill or foresight
"ack of intent
&he concept of criminal negligence is the inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform an act. *f the danger impending from that situation is clearl( manifest, (ou have a case of reckless imprudence.
.ut if the danger that would result from such imprudence is not clear, not manifest nor immediate (ou have onl( a case
of simple negligence.
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of fact on the part of the person who caused in2ur( to another. 3e is not criminall(
liable.
a. /e,uisites#
that the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be:
intention of the accused is lawful:
mistake must be without fault of carelessness.
)xample# 7nited 6tates v. Ah !hong.
Ah !hong being afraid of bad elements, locked himself in his room b( placing a chair against the door. After having gone
to bed, he was awakened b( somebod( who was tr(ing to open the door. 3e asked the identit( of the person, but he did
not receive a response. Dearing that this intruder was a robber, he leaped out of bed and said that he will kill the intruder
should he attempt to enter. At that moment, the chair struck him. .elieving that he was attacked, he sei-ed a knife and
fatall( wounded the intruder.
Mistake of fact would be relevant onl( when the felon( would have been intentional or through dolo, but not when the
felon( is a result of culpa. ;hen the felon( is a product of culpa, do not discuss mistake of fact.
Art1 51 Criminal lia+ilit& shall +e inc"rre(,
1. .( an( person committing a felon(, although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Article , paragraph 1 presupposes that the act done is the proximate cause of the resulting felon(. *t must be the direct,
natural, and logical conse,uence of the felonious act.
!auses which produce a different result#
Mistake in identit( of the victim in2uring one person who is mistaken for another 4this is a complex crime under Art. G5
e.g., A intended to shoot ., but he instead shot ! because he 4A5 mistook ! for ..
*n error in personae, the intended victim was not at the scene of the crime. *t was the actual victim upon whom the
blow was directed, but he was not reall( the intended victim.
3ow does error in personae affect criminal liabilit( of the offender?
)rror in personae is mitigating if the crime committed is different from that which was intended. *f the crime committed
is the same as that which was intended, error in personae does not affect the criminal liabilit( of the offender.
*n mistake of identit(, if the crime committed was the same as the crime intended, but on a different victim, error in
persona does not affect the criminal liabilit( of the offender. .ut if the crime committed was different from the crime
intended, Article C will appl( and the penalt( for the lesser crime will be applied. *n a wa(, mistake in identit( is a
mitigating circumstance where Article C applies. ;here the crime intended is more serious than the crime committed,
the error in persona is not a mitigating circumstance
Mista6e in +low hitting somebod( other than the target due to lack of skill or fortuitous instances 4this is a complex
crime under Art. G5 e.g., . and ! were walking together. A wanted to shoot ., but he instead in2ured !.
*n aberratio ictus, a person directed the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on
somebod( else. *n aberratio ictus, the intended victim as well as the actual victim are both at the scene of the crime.
aberratio ictus, generall( gives rise to a complex crime. &his being so, the penalt( for the more serious crime is
imposed in the maximum period.
*n2urious result is greater than that intended causing in2ur( graver than intended or expected 4this is a mitigating
circumstance due to lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Art. 135 e.g., A wanted to in2ure .. 3owever, . died.
praeter intentionem is mitigating, particularl( covered b( paragraph 3 of Article 13. *n order however, that the
situation ma( ,ualif( as praeter intentionem, there must be a notable disparit( between the means emplo(ed and the
resulting felon(
*n all these instances the offender can still be held criminall( liable, since he is motivated b( criminal intent.
Re."isites,
the felon( was intentionall( committed
the felon( is the proximate cause of the wrong done
octrine of !ro7imate Ca"se such ade,uate and efficient cause as, in the natural order of events, and under the
particular circumstances surrounding the case, which would necessaril( produce the event.
Re."isites,
the direct, natural, and logical cause
produces the in2ur( or damage
unbroken b( an( sufficient intervening cause
without which the result would not have occurred
!ro7imate Ca"se is negate( +&,
Active force, distinct act, or fact absolutel( foreign from the felonious act of the accused, which serves as a sufficient
intervening cause.
Res"lting in8"r& or (amage is ("e to the intentional act of the 'ictim1
proximate cause does not re,uire that the offender needs to actuall( touch the bod( of the offended part(. *t is enough
that the offender generated in the mind of the offended part( the belief that made him risk himself.
Re."isite for !res"mption +low was ca"se of the (eath ;here there has been an in2ur( inflicted sufficient to produce
death followed b( the demise of the person, the presumption arises that the in2ur( was the cause of the death. %rovided#
victim was in normal health
death ensued within a reasonable time
1. &he one who caused the proximate cause is the one liable. &he one who caused the immediate cause is also liable, but
merel( contributor( or sometimes totall( not liable.
2. .( an( person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or propert(, were it not for the inherent
impossibilit( of its accomplishment or on account of the emplo(ment of inade,uate or ineffectual means.
Re."isites, (IM!OSSIBL) CRIM))
Act would have been an offense against persons or propert(
Act is not an actual violation of another provision of the !ode or of a special penal law
&here was criminal intent
Accomplishment was inherentl( impossible: or inade,uate or ineffectual means were emplo(ed.
'otes#
=ffender must believe that he can consummate the intended crime, a man stabbing another who he knew was alread( dead
cannot be liable for an impossible crime.
&he law intends to punish the criminal intent.
&here is no attempted or frustrated impossible crime.
Delonies against persons# parricide, murder, homicide, infanticide, ph(sical in2uries, etc.
Delonies against propert(# robber(, theft, usurpation, swindling, etc.
*nherent impossibilit(# A thought that . was 2ust sleeping. . was alread( dead. A shot .. A is liable. *f A knew that . is
dead and he still shot him, then A is not liable.
;hen we sa( inherent impossibilit(, this means that under an( and all circumstances, the crime could not have
materiali-ed. *f the crime could have materiali-ed under a different set of facts, emplo(ing the same mean or the same
act, it is not an impossible crime: it would be an attempted felon(.
)mplo(ment of inade,uate means# A used poison to kill .. 3owever, . survived because A used small ,uantities of
poison frustrated murder.
*neffectual means# A aimed his gun at .. ;hen he fired the gun, no bullet came out because the gun was empt(. A is
liable.
;henever (ou are confronted with a problem where the facts suggest that an impossible crime was committed, be
careful about the ,uestion asked. *f the ,uestion asked is# @*s an impossible crime committed?A, then (ou 2udge that
,uestion on the basis of the facts. *f reall( the facts constitute an impossible crime, then (ou suggest than an impossible
crime is committed, then (ou state the reason for the inherent impossibilit(.
*f the ,uestion asked is @*s he liable for an impossible crime?A, this is a catching ,uestion. )ven though the facts
constitute an impossible crime, if the act done b( the offender constitutes some other crimes under the /evised %enal
!ode, he will not be liable for an impossible crime. 3e will be prosecuted for the crime constituted so far b( the act done
b( him.
this idea of an impossible crime is a one of last resort, 2ust to teach the offender a lesson because of his criminal
perversit(. *f he could be taught of the same lesson b( charging him with some other crime constituted b( his act, then
that will be the proper wa(. *f (ou want to pla( safe, (ou state there that although an impossible crime is constituted, (et
it is a principle of criminal law that he will onl( be penali-ed for an impossible crime if he cannot be punished under some
other provision of the /evised %enal !ode.
Art 8. ;henever a court has knowledge of an( act which it ma( deem proper to repress and which is not punishable b(
law, it shall render the proper decision and shall report to the !hief )xecutive, through the >epartment of Bustice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made sub2ect of legislation.
*n the same wa( the court shall submit to the !hief )xecutive, through the >epartment of Bustice, such statement as ma(
be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
!ode would result in the imposition of a clearl( excessive penalt(, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
in2ur( caused b( the offense.
;hen a person is charged in court, and the court finds that there is no law applicable, the court will ac,uit the
accused and the 2udge will give his opinion that the said act should be punished.
%aragraph 2 does not appl( to crimes punishable b( special law, including profiteering, and illegal possession of firearms
or drugs. &here can be no executive clemenc( for these crimes.
Art. 1. !onsummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felon& is consummated when all the elements necessar( for its execution and accomplishment are present: and it is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felon( as a conse,uence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it b( reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
&here is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felon( directl( b( overt acts, and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felon( b( reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
>evelopment of a crime
Internal acts intent and plans: usuall( not punishable
)7ternal acts
!reparator& Acts acts tending toward the crime
Acts of )7ec"tion acts directl( connected the crime
Stages of Commission of a Crime
Attempt Drustrated !onsummated
=vert acts of execution are started
'ot all acts of execution are present
>ue to reasons other than the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator
All acts of execution are present
!rime sought to be committed is not achieved
>ue to intervening causes independent of the will of the perpetrator
All the acts of execution are present
&he result sought is achieved
Stages of a Crime (oes not appl& in,
=ffenses punishable b( 6pecial %enal "aws, unless the otherwise is provided for.
Dormal crimes 4e.g., slander, adulter(, etc.5
Impossi+le Crimes
!rimes consummated b( mere attempt. )xamples# attempt to flee to an enem( countr(, treason, corruption of minors.
-elonies +& omission
!rimes committed b( mere agreement. )xamples# betting in sports 4endings in basketball5, corruption of public
officers.
esistance
>esistance on the part of the offender negates criminal liabilit( in the attempted stage. >esistance is true onl( in the
attempted stage of the felon(. *f under the definition of the felon(, the act done is alread( in the frustrated stage, no
amount of desistance will negate criminal liabilit(.
&he spontaneous desistance of the offender negates onl( the attempted stage but not necessaril( all criminal
liabilit(. )ven though there was desistance on the part of the offender, if the desistance was made when acts done b( him
alread( resulted to a felon(, that offender will still be criminall( liable for the felon( brought about his act
*n deciding whether a felon( is attempted or frustrated or consummated, there are three criteria involved#
415 &he manner of committing the crime:
425 &he elements of the crime: and
435 &he nature of the crime itself.
Applications#
A put poison in .Es food. . threw awa( his food. A is liable attempted murder.
A stole .Es car, but he returned it. A is liable 4consummated5 theft.
A aimed his gun at .. ! held AEs hand and prevented him from shooting . attempted murder.
A inflicted a mortal wound on .. . managed to survive frustrated murder.
A intended to kill . b( shooting him. A missed attempted murder.
A doused .Es house with kerosene. .ut before he could light the match, he was caught attempted arson.
A cause a bla-e, but did not burn the house of . frustrated arson.
.Es house was set on fire b( A 4consummated5 arson.
A tried to rape .. . managed to escape. &here was no penetration attempted rape.
A got hold of .Es painting. A was caught before he could leave .Es house frustrated robber(.
&he attempted stage is said to be within the sub2ective phase of execution of a felon(. =n the sub2ective phase, it is
that point in time when the offender begins the commission of an overt act until that point where he loses control of the
commission of the crime alread(. *f he has reached that point where he can no longer control the ensuing conse,uence,
the crime has alread( passed the sub2ective phase and, therefore, it is no longer attempted. &he moment the execution of
the crime has alread( gone to that point where the felon( should follow as a conse,uence, it is either alread( frustrated or
consummated. *f the felon( does not follow as a conse,uence, it is alread( frustrated. *f the felon( follows as a
conse,uence, it is consummated.
although the offender ma( not have done the act to bring about the felon( as a conse,uence, if he could have
continued committing those acts but he himself did not proceed because he believed that he had done enough to
consummate the crime, 6upreme !ourt said the sub2ective phase has passed
NO%)S ON ARSON9
&he weight of the authorit( is that the crime of arson cannot be committed in the frustrated stage. &he reason is
because we can hardl( determine whether the offender has performed all the acts of execution that would result in arson,
as a conse,uence, unless a part of the premises has started to burn. =n the other hand, the moment a particle or a
molecule of the premises has blackened, in law, arson is consummated. &his is because consummated arson does not
re,uire that the whole of the premises be burned. *t is enough that an( part of the premises, no matter how small, has
begun to burn.
)S%A-A :S1 %*)-%
*n estafa, the offender receives the propert(: he does not take it. .ut in receiving the propert(, the recipient ma( be
committing theft, not estafa, if what was transferred to him was onl( the ph(sical or material possession of the ob2ect. *t
can onl( be estafa if what was transferred to him is not onl( material or ph(sical possession but 2uridical possession as
well.
;hen (ou are discussing estafa, do not talk about intent to gain. *n the same manner that when (ou are discussing
the crime of theft, do not talk of damage.
'ature of the crime itself
*n crimes involving the taking of human life parricide, homicide, and murder in the definition of the frustrated
stage, it is indispensable that the victim be mortall( wounded. 7nder the definition of the frustrated stage, to consider the
offender as having performed all the acts of execution, the acts alread( done b( him must produce or be capable of
producing a felon( as a conse,uence. &he general rule is that there must be a fatal in2ur( inflicted, because it is onl( then
that death will follow.
*f the wound is not mortal, the crime is onl( attempted. &he reason is that the wound inflicted is not capable of
bringing about the desired felon( of parricide, murder or homicide as a conse,uence: it cannot be said that the offender
has performed all the acts of execution which would produce parricide, homicide or murder as a result.
An exception to the general rule is the so9called sub2ective phase. &he 6upreme !ourt has decided cases which
applied the sub2ective standard that when the offender himself believed that he had performed all the acts of execution,
even though no mortal wound was inflicted, the act is alread( in the frustrated stage.
&he common notion is that when there is conspirac( involved, the participants are punished as principals. &his
notion is no longer absolute. *n the case of %eople v. 'ierra, the 6upreme !ourt ruled that even though there was
conspirac(, if a co9conspirator merel( cooperated in the commission of the crime with insignificant or minimal acts, such
that even without his cooperation, the crime could be carried out as well, such co9conspirator should be punished as an
accomplice onl(.
Art1 ;1 "ight felonies are punishable onl( when the( have been consummated with the exception of those committed
against persons or propert(.
)xamples of light felonies# slight ph(sical in2uries: theft: alteration of boundar( marks: malicious mischief: and
intriguing against honor.
*n commission of crimes against properties and persons, ever( stage of execution is punishable but onl( the principals and
accomplices are liable for light felonies, accessories are not.
Art1 <1 !onspirac( and proposal to commit felon( are punishable onl( in the cases in which the law speciall( provides a
penalt( therefore.
A conspirac( exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felon( and decide
to commit it.
&here is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felon( proposes its execution to some other person or
persons.
!onspirac( is punishable in the following cases# treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition, and monopolies and
combinations in restraint of trade.
!onspirac( to commit a crime is not to be confused with conspirac( as a means of committing a crime. *n both cases there
is an agreement but mere conspirac( to commit a crime is not punished )H!)%& in treason, rebellion, or sedition. )ven
then, if the treason is actuall( committed, the conspirac( will be considered as a means of committing it and the accused
will all be charged for treason and not for conspirac( to commit treason.
!onspirac( and %roposal to !ommit a !rime
!onspirac( %roposal
)lements
Agreement among 2 or more persons to
commit a crime
&he( decide to commit it
A person has decided to commit a crime
3e proposes its commission to another
!rimes
!onspirac( to commit sedition
!onspirac( to commit rebellion
!onspirac( to commit treason
%roposal to commit treason
%roposal to commit rebellion
Mere conspirac( in combination in restraint of trade 4Art. 1G15, and brigandage 4Art. 3I15.
&wo wa(s for conspirac( to exist#
415 &here is an agreement.
425 &he participants acted in concert or simultaneousl( which is indicative of a meeting of the minds towards a
common criminal goal or criminal ob2ective. ;hen several offenders act in a s(nchroni-ed, coordinated manner, the fact
that their acts complimented each other is indicative of the meeting of the minds. &here is an implied agreement.
&wo kinds of conspirac(#
415 !onspirac( as a crime: and
425 !onspirac( as a manner of incurring criminal liabilit(
;hen conspirac( itself is a crime, no overt act is necessar( to bring about the criminal liabilit(. &he mere
conspirac( is the crime itself. &his is onl( true when the law expressl( punishes the mere conspirac(: otherwise, the
conspirac( does not bring about the commission of the crime because conspirac( is not an overt act but a mere
preparator( act. &reason, rebellion, sedition, and coup dEetat are the onl( crimes where the conspirac( and proposal to
commit to them are punishable.
;hen the conspirac( is onl( a basis of incurring criminal liabilit(, there must be an overt act done before the co9
conspirators become criminall( liable. Dor as long as none of the conspirators has committed an overt act, there is no
crime (et. .ut when one of them commits an( overt act, all of them shall be held liable, unless a co9conspirator was
absent from the scene of the crime or he showed up, but he tried to prevent the commission of the crime.
As a general rule, if there has been a conspirac( to commit a crime in a particular place, an(one who did not appear
shall be presumed to have desisted. &he exception to this is if such person who did not appear was the mastermind.
Dor as long as none of the conspirators has committed an overt act, there is no crime (et. .ut when one of them
commits an( overt act, all of them shall be held liable, unless a co9conspirator was absent from the scene of the crime or
he showed up, but he tried to prevent the commission of the crime
As a general rule, if there has been a conspirac( to commit a crime in a particular place, an(one who did not appear
shall be presumed to have desisted. &he exception to this is if such person who did not appear was the mastermind.
;hen the conspirac( itself is a crime, this cannot be inferred or deduced because there is no overt act. All that there
is the agreement. =n the other hand, if the co9conspirator or an( of them would execute an overt act, the crime would no
longer be the conspirac( but the overt act itself.
conspirac( as a crime, must have a clear and convincing evidence of its existence. )ver( crime must be proved
be(ond reasonable doubt. it must be established b( positive and conclusive evidence, not b( con2ectures or speculations.
;hen the conspirac( is 2ust a basis of incurring criminal liabilit(, however, the same ma( be deduced or inferred from
the acts of several offenders in carr(ing out the commission of the crime. &he existence of a conspirac( ma( be
reasonabl( inferred from the acts of the offenders when such acts disclose or show a common pursuit of the criminal
ob2ective.
mere knowledge, ac,uiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or at least, agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to constitute a conspirac(. &here must be an intentional participation in the crime with a view to further the
common felonious ob2ective.
;hen several persons who do not know each other simultaneousl( attack the victim, the act of one is the act of all,
regardless of the degree of in2ur( inflicted b( an( one of them. All will be liable for the conse,uences. A conspirac( is
possible even when participants are not known to each other. >o not think that participants are alwa(s known to each
other.
!onspirac( is a matter of substance which must be alleged in the information, otherwise, the court will not consider
the same.
%roposal is true onl( up to the point where the part( to whom the proposal was made has not (et accepted the
proposal. =nce the proposal was accepted, a conspirac( arises. %roposal is unilateral, one part( makes a proposition to
the other: conspirac( is bilateral, it re,uires two parties.
6)>*&*=':
%roposal to commit sedition is not a crime. .ut if 7nion . accepts the proposal, there will be conspirac( to commit
sedition which is a crime under the /evised %enal !ode.
!omposite crimes
!omposite crimes are crimes which, in substance, consist of more than one crime but in the e(es of the law, there is
onl( one crime. Dor example, the crimes of robber( with homicide, robber( with rape, robber( with ph(sical in2uries.
*n case the crime committed is a composite crime, the conspirator will be liable for all the acts committed during the
commission of the crime agreed upon. &his is because, in the e(es of the law, all those acts done in pursuance of the
crime agreed upon are acts which constitute a single crime.
As a general rule, when there is conspirac(, the rule is that the act of one is the act of all. &his principle applies onl(
to the crime agreed upon.
&he exception is if an( of the co9conspirator would commit a crime not agreed upon. &his happens when the crime
agreed upon and the crime committed b( one of the co9conspirators are distinct crimes.
)xception to the exception# *n acts constituting a single indivisible offense, even though the co9conspirator
performed different acts bringing about the composite crime, all will be liable for such crime. &he( can onl( evade
responsibilit( for an( other crime outside of that agreed upon if it is proved that the particular conspirator had tried to
prevent the commission of such other act.
Art. C. $rave felonies are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in an( of their are
afflictive, in accordance with Article 28 of this !ode.
"ess grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in
accordance with the above9mentioned article.
"ight felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which he penalt( of arresto ma(oror a fine not exceeding
2II pesos, or both is provided.
!apital punishment death penalt(.
%enalties 4imprisonment5# $rave six (ears and one da( to reclusion perpetua 4life5: "ess grave one month and one da(
to six (ears: "ight arresto menor 4one da( to 3I da(s5.
CLASSI-ICA%ION O- -)LONI)S
&his ,uestion was asked in the bar examination# 3ow do (ou classif( felonies or how are felonies classified?
;hat the examiner had in mind was Articles 3, 1 and C. >o not write the classification of felonies under .ook 2 of the
/evised %enal !ode. &hat was not what the examiner had in mind because the ,uestion does not re,uire the candidate to
classif( but also to define. &herefore, the examiner was after the classifications under Articles 3, 1 and C.
Delonies are classified as follows#
415 Accor(ing to the manner of their commission
7nder Article 3, the( are classified as, intentional felonies or those committed with deliberate intent: and culpable felonies
or those resulting from negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
425 Accor(ing to the stages of their e7ec"tion
7nder Article 1., felonies are classified as attempted felon( when the offender commences the commission of a felon(
directl( b( overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felon( b( reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance: frustrated felon( when the offender commences the
commission of a felon( as a conse,uence but which would produce the felon( as a conse,uence but which nevertheless do
not produce the felon( b( reason of causes independent of the perpetrator: and, consummated felon( when all the
elements necessar( for its execution are present.
435 Accor(ing to their gra'it&
7nder Article C, felonies are classified as grave felonies or those to which attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in
an( of their periods are afflictive: less grave felonies or those to which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum
period was correccional: and light felonies or those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalt( is arresto menor.
;h( is it necessar( to determine whether the crime is grave, less grave or light?
&o determine whether these felonies can be complexed or not, and to determine the prescription of the crime and the
prescription of the penalt(. *n other words, these are felonies classified according to their gravit(, stages and the penalt(
attached to them. &ake note that when the /evised %enal !ode speaks of grave and less grave felonies, the definition
makes a reference specificall( to Article 28 of the /evised %enal !ode. >o not omit the phrase @*n accordance with
Article 28A because there is also a classification of penalties under Article 21 that was not applied.
*f the penalt( is fine and exactl( %2II.II, it is onl( considered a light felon( under Article C.
*f the fine is imposed as an alternative penalt( or as a single penalt(, the fine of %2II.II is considered a correctional
penalt( under Article 21.
*f the penalt( is exactl( %2II.II, appl( Article 21. *t is considered as correctional penalt( and it prescribes in 1I (ears. *f
the offender is apprehended at an( time within ten (ears, he can be made to suffer the fine.
&his classification of felon( according to gravit( is important with respect to the ,uestion of prescription of crimes.
*n the case of light felonies, crimes prescribe in two months. *f the crime is correctional, it prescribes in ten (ears, except
arresto ma(or, which prescribes in five (ears.
Art1 3=1 =ffenses which are or in the future ma( be punishable under special laws are not sub2ect to the provisions of this
!ode. &his !ode shall be supplementar( to such laws, unless the latter should speciall( provide the contrar(.
Dor 6pecial "aws# %enalties should be imprisonment, and not reclusion perpetua, etc.
=ffenses that are attempted or frustrated are not punishable, unless otherwise stated.
%lea of guilt( is not mitigating for offenses punishable b( special laws.
'o minimum, medium, and maximum periods for penalties.
'o penalt( for an accessor( or accomplice, unless otherwise stated.

%rovisions of /%! applicable to special laws#
Art1 3> %articipation of Accomplices
Art1 44 /etroactivit( of %enal laws if favorable to the accused
Art1 5? !onfiscation of instruments used in the crime
67%%")&=/J A%%"*!A&*=' =D &3) /)<*6)> %)'A" !=>)
*n Article 1I, there is a reservation @provision of the /evised %enal !ode ma( be applied suppletoril( to special lawsA.
Jou will onl( appl( the provisions of the /evised %enal !ode as a supplement to the special law, or simpl( correlate the
violated special law, if needed to avoid an in2ustice. *f no 2ustice would result, do not give suppletoril( application of the
/evised %enal !ode to that of special law.
Dor example, a special law punishes a certain act as a crime. &he special law is silent as to the civil liabilit( of one who
violates the same. 3ere is a person who violated the special law and he was prosecuted. 3is violation caused damage or
in2ur( to a private part(. Ma( the court pronounce that he is civill( liable to the offended part(, considering that the
special law is silent on this point? Jes, because Article 1II of the /evised %enal !ode ma( be given suppletor(
application to prevent an in2ustice from being done to the offended part(. Article 1II states that ever( person criminall(
liable for a felon( is also civill( liable. &hat article shall be applied suppletor( to avoid an in2ustice that would be caused
to the private offended part(, if he would not be indemnified for the damages or in2uries sustained b( him.
*n %eople v. /odrigue-, it was held that the use of arms is an element of rebellion, so a rebel cannot be further prosecuted
for possession of firearms. A violation of a special law can never absorb a crime punishable under the /evised %enal
!ode, because violations of the /evised %enal !ode are more serious than a violation of a special law. .ut a crime in the
/evised %enal !ode can absorb a crime punishable b( a special law if it is a necessar( ingredient of the crime in the
/evised %enal !ode
*n the crime of sedition, the use of firearms is not an ingredient of the crime. 3ence, two prosecutions can be had# 415
sedition: and 425 illegal possession of firearms.
.ut do not think that when a crime is punished outside of the /evised %enal !ode, it is alread( a special law. Dor
example, the crime of cattle9rustling is not a mala prohibitum but a modification of the crime theft of large cattle. 6o
%residential >ecree 'o. 833, punishing cattle9rustling, is not a special law. *t can absorb the crime of murder. *f in the
course of cattle rustling, murder was committed, the offender cannot be prosecuted for murder. Murder would be a
,ualif(ing circumstance in the crime of ,ualified cattle rustling. &his was the ruling in%eople v. Martinada.
&he amendments of %residential >ecree 'o. 128 4&he >angerous >rugs Act of 1C025 b( /epublic Act 'o. 018C, which
adopted the scale of penalties in the /evised %enal !ode, means that mitigating and aggravating circumstances can now
be considered in imposing penalties. %residential >ecree 'o. 128 does not expressl( prohibit the suppletor( application
of the /evised %enal !ode. &he stages of the commission of felonies will also appl( since suppletor( application is now
allowed.
Circ"mstances affecting criminal lia+ilit&
&here are five circumstances affecting criminal liabilit(#
415 Bustif(ing circumstances:
425 )xempting circumstances:
435 Mitigating circumstances:
45 Aggravating circumstances: and
485 Alternative circumstances.
%here are two others which are fo"n( elsewhere in the pro'isions of the Re'ise( !enal Co(e,
415 Absolutor( cause: and
425 )xtenuating circumstances.
*n 2ustif(ing and exempting circumstances, there is no criminal liabilit(. ;hen an accused invokes them, he in effect
admits the commission of a crime but tries to avoid the liabilit( thereof. &he burden is upon him to establish be(ond
reasonable doubt the re,uired conditions to 2ustif( or exempt his acts from criminal liabilit(. ;hat is shifted is onl( the
burden of evidence, not the burden of proof.
Bustif(ing circumstances contemplate intentional acts and, hence, are incompatible with dolo. )xempting circumstances
ma( be invoked in culpable felonies.
Absolutor( cause
&he effect of this is to absolve the offender from criminal liabilit(, although not from civil liabilit(. *t has the same effect
as an exempting circumstance, but (ou do not call it as such in order not to confuse it with the circumstances under Article
12.
Article 4= provides that the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives b(
affinit( within the same degrees with the exception of accessories who profited themselves or assisting the offender to
profit b( the effects of the crime.
&hen, Article <@ provides how criminal liabilit( is extinguished#
>eath of the convict as to the personal penalties, and as to pecuniar( penalties, liabilit( therefor is extinguished if death
occurs before final 2udgment:
Ser'ice of the sentence9
Amnest(:
Absolute pardon:
%rescription of the crime:
%rescription of the penalt(: and
Marriage of the offended woman as provided in Article 3.

7nder Article 20, a legall( married person who kills or inflicts ph(sical in2uries upon his or her spouse whom he
surprised having sexual intercourse with his or her paramour or mistress in not criminall( liable.
7nder Article 21C, discovering secrets through sei-ure of correspondence of the ward b( their guardian is not penali-ed.
7nder Article 332, in the case of theft, swindling and malicious mischief, there is no criminal liabilit( but onl( civil
liabilit(, when the offender and the offended part( are related as spouse, ascendant, descendant, brother and sister9in9law
living together or where in case the widowed spouse and the propert( involved is that of the deceased spouse, before such
propert( had passed on to the possession of third parties.
7nder Article 3, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the offended part(
shall extinguish the criminal action.
Absolutor( cause has the effect of an exempting circumstance and the( are predicated on lack of voluntariness like
instigation. *nstigation is associated with criminal intent. >o not consider culpa in connection with instigation. *f the
crime is culpable, do not talk of instigation. *n instigation, the crime is committed with dolo. *t is confused with
entrapment.
)ntrapment is not an absolutor( cause. )ntrapment does not exempt the offender or mitigate his criminal liabilit(. .ut
instigation absolves the offender from criminal liabilit( because in instigation, the offender simpl( acts as a tool of the law
enforcers and, therefore, he is acting without criminal intent because without the instigation, he would not have done the
criminal act which he did upon instigation of the law enforcers.
>ifference between instigation and entrapment
*n instigation, the criminal plan or design exists in the mind of the law enforcer with whom the person instigated
cooperated so it is said that the person instigated is acting onl( as a mere instrument or tool of the law enforcer in the
performance of his duties.
=n the other hand, in entrapment, a criminal design is alread( in the mind of the person entrapped. *t did not emanate
from the mind of the law enforcer entrapping him. )ntrapment involves onl( wa(s and means which are laid down or
resorted to facilitate the apprehension of the culprit.
&he element which makes instigation an absolutor( cause is the lack of criminal intent as an element of voluntariness.
*f the instigator is a law enforcer, the person instigated cannot be criminall( liable, because it is the law enforcer who
planted that criminal mind in him to commit the crime, without which he would not have been a criminal. *f the instigator
is not a law enforcer, both will be criminall( liable, (ou cannot have a case of instigation. *n instigation, the private
citi-en onl( cooperates with the law enforcer to a point when the private citi-en upon instigation of the law enforcer
incriminates himself. *t would be contrar( to public polic( to prosecute a citi-en who onl( cooperated with the law
enforcer. &he private citi-en believes that he is a law enforcer and that is wh( when the law enforcer tells him, he believes
that it is a civil dut( to cooperate.
*f the person instigated does not know that the person is instigating him is a law enforcer or he knows him to be not a law
enforcer, this is not a case of instigation. &his is a case of inducement, both will be criminall( liable.
*n entrapment, the person entrapped should not know that the person tr(ing to entrap him was a law enforcer. &he idea is
incompatible with each other because in entrapment, the person entrapped is actuall( committing a crime. &he officer
who entrapped him onl( la(s down wa(s and means to have evidence of the commission of the crime, but even without
those wa(s and means, the person entrapped is actuall( engaged in a violation of the law.
*nstigation absolves the person instigated from criminal liabilit(. &his is based on the rule that a person cannot be a
criminal if his mind is not criminal. =n the other hand, entrapment is not an absolutor( cause. *t is not even mitigating.
*n case of somnambulism or one who acts while sleeping, the person involved is definitel( acting without freedom and
without sufficient intelligence, because he is asleep. 3e is moving like a robot, unaware of what he is doing. 6o the
element of voluntariness which is necessar( in dolo and culpa is not present. 6omnambulism is an absolutor( cause. *f
element of voluntariness is absent, there is no criminal liabilit(, although there is civil liabilit(, and if the circumstance is
not among those enumerated in Article 12, refer to the circumstance as an absolutor( cause.
Mista6e of fact is an a+sol"tor& ca"se1 &he offender is acting without criminal intent. 6o in mistake of fact, it is
necessar( that had the facts been true as the accused believed them to be, this act is 2ustified. *f not, there is criminal
liabilit(, because there is no mistake of fact an(more. &he offender must believe he is performing a lawful act.

)7ten"ating circ"mstances
&he effect of this is to mitigate the criminal liabilit( of the offender. *n other words, this has the same effect as mitigating
circumstances, onl( (ou do not call it mitigating because this is not found in Article 13.

Ill"strations,
An unwed mother killed her child in order to conceal a dishonor. &he concealment of dishonor is an extenuating
circumstance insofar as the unwed mother or the maternal grandparents is concerned, but not insofar as the father of the
child is concerned. Mother killing her new born child to conceal her dishonor, penalt( is lowered b( two degrees. 6ince
there is a material lowering of the penalt( or mitigating the penalt(, this is an extenuating circumstance.
&he concealment of honor b( mother in the crime of infanticide is an extenuating circumstance but not in the case of
parricide when the age of the victim is three da(s old and above.
*n the crime of adulter( on the part of a married woman abandoned b( her husband, at the time she was abandoned b( her
husband, is it necessar( for her to seek the compan( of another man. Abandonment b( the husband does not 2ustif( the
act of the woman. *t onl( extenuates or reduces criminal liabilit(. ;hen the effect of the circumstance is to lower the
penalt( there is an extenuating circumstance.
A 6leptomaniac is one who cannot resist the temptation of stealing things which appeal to his desire. &his is not
exempting. =ne who is a kleptomaniac and who would steal ob2ects of his desire is criminall( liable. .ut he would be
given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance analogous to paragraph C of Article 13, that of suffering from an illness
which diminishes the exercise of his will power without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his act. 6o this
is an extenuating circumstance. &he effect is to mitigate the criminal liabilit(.
>istinctions between 2ustif(ing circumstances and exempting circumstances
*n 2ustif(ing circumstances
415 &he circumstance affects the act, not the actor:
425 &he act complained of is considered to have been done within the bounds of law: hence, it is legitimate and
lawful in the e(es of the law:
435 6ince the act is considered lawful, there is no crime, and because there is no crime, there is no criminal:
45 6ince there is no crime or criminal, there is no criminal liabilit( as well as civil liabilit(.
*n exempting circumstances
415 &he circumstances affect the actor, not the act:
425 &he act complained of is actuall( wrongful, but the actor acted without voluntariness. 3e is a mere tool or
instrument of the crime:
435 6ince the act complained of is actuall( wrongful, there is a crime. .ut because the actor acted without
voluntariness, there is absence of dolo or culpa. &here is no criminal:
45 6ince there is a crime committed but there is no criminal, there is civil liabilit( for the wrong done. .ut
there is no criminal liabilit(. 3owever, in paragraphs and 0 of Article 12, there is neither criminal nor civil liabilit(.
;hen (ou appl( for 2ustif(ing or exempting circumstances, it is confession and avoidance and burden of proof shifts to
the accused and he can no longer rel( on weakness of prosecutionEs evidence.