ALBENSON vs.

COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking
Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later
dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Company traced source of check and later discovered
that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon
Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a
complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had
son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from
the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages
against Albenson.
ISSUE:
Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.

RULING:
Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to cause damage to the
respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of
right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22.

Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff
inquiries:
SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
Bank said signature belonged to EB
EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
that damages was initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were
false and groundless

Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1. there is a legal right or duty
2. exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1. there is an act which is legal
2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. it is done with intent to injure

A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the
debtor to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the
amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages
cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V.
No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent
Baltao.
VELAYO VS SHELL

100 Phil 168 Civil Law - Torts and Damages Obligations arising from human relations
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CAL offered its
C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time
declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going
bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed
to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to
how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve
that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell
Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the
working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be divided amongst the creditors
but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter
that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively
collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of
the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California
court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.

Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell
Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine
Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This
prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI
then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached.
Alfredo Velayos appointment as CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding.
In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell
Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in
the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-
54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages
because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a
common practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which
states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not
constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages (Art.
2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for damages arises from a willful or
negligent act contrary to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.



Barons Marketing Corp. vs. CA
G.R. No. 126486 , February 9, 1998

Facts: On August 31, 1973, plaintiff [Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. private respondent herein]
appointed defendant [petitioner Barons Marketing, Corporation] as one of its dealers of electrical
wires and cables effective September 1, 1973. Defendant was given by plaintiff 60 days credit for its
purchases of plaintiff's electrical products. During the period covering December 1986 to August 17,
1987, defendant purchased, on credit, from plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the total
amount of P4,102,438.30 and were sold to MERALCO. Under the sales invoices, it is stipulated that
interest at 12% on the amount due for attorney's fees and collection defendant paid plaintiff the
amount of P300,000.00 out of its total purchases leaving an unpaid amount of P3,802,478.20.
plaintiff wrote defendant demanding payment. Defendant wrote plaintiff on October 5, 1987
requesting the latter if it could pay its outstanding account in monthly installments of P500,000.00
plus 1% interest per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment. Plaintiff, however,
rejected defendant's offer. private respondent Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc. filed a complaint before the
Pasig Regional Trial Court against petitioner Barons Marketing Corporation for the recovery of
P3,802,478.20. Petitioner, in its answer, admitted purchasing the wires and cables from private
respondent but disputed the amount claimed by the latter. Petitioner likewise interposed a
counterclaim against private respondent, alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due to Phelps
Dodge's acts. Such acts were purportedly calculated to humiliate petitioner and constituted an abuse
of rights. The trial court ordered Barons Marketing, Inc. to pay Phelps Dodge in the amount of
P3,108,000.00. Both parties appealed. Private respondent contends that the amount should be
P3,802,478.20 and that there has been a clear typographical error in the decision. The Court of
appeals modified the decision ruling in favour of private respondent. Thus, this appeal. Petitioner
now alleges that its rights guaranteed by Arts. 19 and 20 of the Civil Code have been abused.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected
petitioner's offer and filed the action for collection.

Held: We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed
and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. 12 In the case at
bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of private respondent. Petitioner's allegation
that private respondent was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with petitioner
so that private respondent itself may deal directly with Meralco is simply not supported by the
evidence. At most, such supposition is merely speculative.

Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very legitimate reasons for rejecting
petitioner's offer and instituting the action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by
private respondent, the corporation had its own "cash position to protect in order for it to pay its own
obligations." This is not such "a lame and poor rationalization" as petitioner purports it to be. For if
private respondent were to be required to accept petitioner's offer, there would be no reason for the
latter to reject similar offers from its other debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of
any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private respondent. It is plain to see that what we
have here is a mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof Under these circumstances, we do not
deem private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy as to violate the provisions of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS
GR # 138964 Aug 9, 2001

FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a panel of land owned by Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St.,
Malate, Manila. After the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her son, inherited the land. Victor informed
the respondents that they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land. In 1989, without the
knowledge of respondents, the land was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately
secure title to the property in her name.
On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for condemnation of the structures on the land. The
office of building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the houses of respondents on
November 27, 1989. Copies were received by respondents on December 7, 1989 and on December
12, the day respondents filed an appeal contesting the order, petitioners proceeded with the
demolition of the house.
Respondents filed case before Manila RTC which was dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the
decision and ordered petitioners to pay respondents for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA ruling in favor of respondents tenable.

RULING:
The court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.
A right to power, privilege or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law or
recognized as a result of long usage constitute of a legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.
The decision of CA was MODIFIED by reducing the awards for exemplary and moral damages to
P20,000 to each respondent. The decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

Heirs of Purisima Nala vs Artemio Cabansag
G.R. No.161188 13 June 2008

FACTS
Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case for damages in October 1991. According to
respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and
Felisa Duyan Gomez on July 23, 1990.
Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez
spouses. In October 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado
(Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from
1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which
criminal and civil actions will be filed against him.
Another demand letter was sent on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent
suffered damages and was constrained to file the case against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.
Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely
acting in behalf of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership.
Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square meter property owned by her late
husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The 400-square
meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the
agreement that it will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children.
Said property is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of
spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the property which he
occupies.
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994,
in favor of respondent. Nala and Atty. Del Prado appealed to the CA.
In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA took note of the Decision rendered by the RTC of
Quezon City, dismissing Civil Case action for reconveyance of real property and
cancellation of TCT with damages, filed by Nala against spouses Gomez.

ISSUES: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees without any
basis.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Yes. Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the
particular provision of law under which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on
the allegations in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages
is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith
is presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other
hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. In the present case,
there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in bad
faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for
Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and
that respondent was illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez
violated the trust imposed on them by Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to
respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case for damages against Nala that she learned of
such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the property does not give rise to
the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith. Absent any
evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to petitioner since
Nala was only trying to protect their interests over the property.

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites
must concur:
o (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
o (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and
o (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne
by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the
demand letters. She had to take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable
rights over the property occupied by respondent. One who makes use of his own legal right
does no injury. Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent should be borne solely
by him.

AKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 97336 February 19, 1993



FACTS:

Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen, exchange student taking a
medical course in Dagupan City, who courted private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to
marry her. On the condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his love. They then set
the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited Marilous parents to secure their
approval of marriage. In August 1987, he forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his
attitude toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and even threatened to kill her, from
which she sustained injuries. Upon confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their
marriage agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living in Bacolod.

Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the accusations but
asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he discovered her stealing his money and
passport. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:

Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.
Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to this case.
Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.
HELD:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdictions by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).

It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not sarcastic regard for the private
respondent on account of the latters ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as
perceived by him, dishonorable employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were
empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was nothing but
pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer
of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his right and in the
performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means in equal fault. At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interfered for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression
has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the
original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud.



Carpio v. Valmonte
G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004

FACTS
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon
Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. On that day, Valmonte went to the
Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at the Suite,
several persons were already there including the bride. Among those present was petitioner
Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the
wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila
Restaurant where the reception was to be held.
She went back to the suite after, and found several people lstaring at her when she
entered.It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka
pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one
of the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to
attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside
the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. Hotel Security was later called.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal
letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and guests to
redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioners imputations against her. Petitioner
did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20 February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages
against petitioner.

ISSUE: W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Valmonte is entitled to damages.
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.
In the our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the
damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity
but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human
conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as abuse of
rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following
elements must be present:
o (1) there is a legal right or duty;
o (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
o (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. When a right is exercised in a
manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is
committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
The following provisions Complement the abuse of right principle:
o Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
o Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals or good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who
suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act
which though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain
rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry
inside the paper bag. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to
malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an
act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury
to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with
justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent.
Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she
should be held accountable.

Tenchavez vs. Ecano
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965| 15 SCRA 355


FACTS

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, all surnamed "Escao," respectively
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos,
Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock,
without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the
house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous
love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Her parents were disgusted when they found out about the marriage and considered a Re-
celebration of the marriage as they believed it to be invalid. The re-celebration never took
place.
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, Vicenta applied for a passport, indicating
in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled
in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved,
and she left for the United States.
On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the
Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on
the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree
of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul
their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal
dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She
now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao,
her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta
claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband,
Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages. The appealed judgment did not
decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and
Mena Escao for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-
appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.


ISSUES: W/N Vicentas parents are liable for damages

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and
abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and
ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged
with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not
been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably
caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts
and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or
spleen.
244 Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964 |

FACTS
Velez and Wassmer decided to get married and set the wedding day for September 4, 1954.
On September 2, 1954, Velez left a note for Wassmer stating that the wedding would have to
be postponed because his mother opposes it, and that he was leaving for his hometown.
The next day, however, he sent her a telegram stating that nothing changed and that he
would be returning very soon. But then, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Wassmer sued him, and he was declared in default. Judgment was rendered ordering Velez
to pay actual damages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Velez filed a petition for relief from judgment and motion for new trial and reconsideration.
Since he still failed to appear during the hearings set by the lower court, and because his
counsel had declared that there was no possibility for an amicable settlement between the
parties, the court issued an order denying his petition. Hence this appeal. Dante Capuno was
a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School. He attended a parade in honor of Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city schools
supervisor. He boarded a jeep, took hold of the wheel and drove it.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Velez is liable to pay damages to Wassmer.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

VELEZ LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES.
In support of his motion for new trial and reconsideration, Velez asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law because there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for
breach of a promise to marry. Moreover, the same thing was declared by this court in the
cases of Hermosisima and Estopa.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the NCC provides that any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Here, the invitations had already been printed out and distributed, and numerous things had
been purchased for the bride and for wedding. Bridal showers were given and gifts had been
received. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it at the last
minute, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable for damages.

Petition DENIED. Lower courts decision AFFIRMED

Pe vs. Pe
SCRA 200


FACTS:

Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the
petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their
house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to teach
him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.

Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately
and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.


ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of moral, good
custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.


HELD:

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage
of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with
Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and
expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

APOLONIO TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS & ARACELI


FACTS:
Apolonio Tanjanco courted the plaintiff Araceli Santos BOTH BEING OF ADULT AGE: that
the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also
in due time reciprocated the tender feelings: that in consideration of the defendants
PROMISE OF MARRIAGE plaintiff consented and acceded to defendants pleas for carnal
knowledge(sexual intercourse) which later Araceli Santos conceived a child. Apolonio
REFUSED TO MARRY Araceli as promised and refrained from seeing the plaintiff which led
to her suffering from mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock
and social humiliation. The plaintiff asked that the defendant recognize the child she was
bearing; to pay her not less than P430 a month for her support plus P100,000 in moral and
exemplary damages plus 10,000 attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a breach of promise of marriage can bring any action for damages in court.
Whether or not seduction has been an element in the relationship between Apolonio and
Arceli

RULING: NO case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse. Such is
not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion:
for had the appellant been deceived she would not have again yielded to his embraces much
less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she
would have cut all relationship upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.


Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest
L-69866 April 15, 1988

FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights
and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT
plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said
order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued
judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and
counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of
violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish
them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan
to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass
and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view
that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the
performance of official duties or function

ISSUE:
whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can
be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors
as well.

RATIO DICIDENDI:
SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the
performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were
merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection,
rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite
the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-
emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to
disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and
protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all
officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded
from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of
the Penal Code or other penal statute.

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for
illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does
not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of
alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable
the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and
liberties enumerated therein, among others

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how
plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and
impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search
warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and
confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other
items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest
and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances;
detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept
incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading
and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a
detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should
be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the
complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the
complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.






Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
Gr No. 107383, February 20, 1996

FACTS: Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. That
petitioner accused her husband of infidelity. That on March 26, 1982, petitioner went to the clinic of
private respondent, who is a doctor of medicine, without the consent of the latter. That on the same
date mentioned, petitioner opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157 documents
and papers consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours.
The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as evidence in a case for legal separation
filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against petitioner. The RTC, decided in favor of private respondent, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of properties described and ordering petitioner to return the properties to Dr.
Martin and pay him nominal and moral damages and attorneys fees, and cost of the suit.
Furthermore, petitioner and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined fromusing or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision made by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if
there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provide
bylaw. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art.III,1987 Constitution)A
person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law ensures absolute freedom
of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
for or against the other without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,
Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) PETITION DENIED




Beltran vs. People ,
G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at
the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named
Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage 5 under
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest,
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order 7 dated August 31,
1998. Then, petitioner filed the instant petition for review in the Supreme Court.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result
from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the
civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the
evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner
submits that the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be
avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of
marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity
then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never
existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because
he was never before a married man.

ISSUE: Whether or not Beltran is correct in with his contentions?

HOLDING & RATION DECIDENCI: NO.

1. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements:
A. the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
B. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case.

For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.

The import of Article 40 of the Family Code, as explained in the case of Domingo vs. CA, is that for
purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an
absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of
other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.

2. With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense. Thus, in the
case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents
and purposes.


LANDICHO V. RELOVA

Facts:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged
in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage
has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking
to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous
character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint,
against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party defendant be
declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled
him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:
Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the
second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation,
and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the first wife, the civil cases
are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent
to the second marriage is not in issue. "The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages
entered into by accused in a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that
the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage
must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was indicted
for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable.
And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action,
filed a third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be
declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome
of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent court and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."


People vs Aragon

February 28, 1957
G.R. No. L-10016

FACTS:

Herein accused under the name Proceso Rosima contracted a marriage to one Maria Gorrea in the
Philippine Independent Church in Cebu while he is still married to Maria Gorrea. Yet again, the
accused now under the name of Proceso Aragon contracted another a canonical marriage with
Maria Faicol.

This was put into possibility because the accused was then a traveling sales man. When Maria
Gorrea died, and seeing that the coast was dear in Cebu, Aragon brought Faicol to Cebu from Iloilo,
where she became a teacher-nurse. Maria Faicol however, suffered injuries to her eyes because of
physical maltreatment brought to her by Aragon. Due to the injuries she was sent to Iloilo to undergo
treatment, in her absence the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang.

He then categorically denied in the court his marriage to Maria Faicol but affirmed his marriage to
Maglasang.

The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No.
3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio,
defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of
his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the
nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter.

ISSUE:
Whethe or not accused is guilty of bigamy?

HELD:

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage
with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was
entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting
this marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted
the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

AZNAR VS. CITIBANK
Facts: The herein petitioner, Emmanuel B. Aznar, is a prominent businessman and entrepreneur in
Cebu. He decided to treat his wife together with their grandchildren for an Asian Tour using his
Citibank credit card. He deposited P485,000 to his account to increase his ordinary credit limit from
P150,000 to P635,000. He bought tickets to Kuala Lumpur amounting to P235,000. When they
were in Kuala Lumpur, they decided to purchases things to which the credit card was dishonoured
for over the limit. Eventually the agency further dishonoured the card and even mentioned that the
petitioner be a swindler. In that note, they decided to go back Philippines and instantly filed a
complaint for damages. The lower court initially dismissed the complaint on the ground that their
was no proper authentication as to the print out of the computer generated document presented as
evidence before the court. The petitioner filed a motion for the re-raffle of the case, raising the
contention that the judge was also a holder of Citibank credit card. The judge later acceded with the
contention of petitioner and ordered for the company to pay enormous amount of damages to the
plaintiff. When the case was elevated before the CA the latter denied such.

Issue: Whether or not the print out of the computer generated document was properly authenticated
to be admissible before the court?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be excluded as it qualifies as electronic
evidence following the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides that print-outs are also originals
for purposes of the Best Evidence Rule;

Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered
as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a)
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.

Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic document
in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document;
or
(c) By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

Indeed there was no proper authentication of the electronic evidence presented by the petitioner
before the court which is the print out of the computer generated document where on it printed that
the card was over the limit. During the trial the petitioner mentioned that desk officer phoned
someone and eventually the hard copy was given to him signed by one named Nubi, however such
was not witnessed by the petitioner or he does not have personal knowledge of such authentication.
The high court denied the petition.