1.

POSADAS VS CA
FACTS:
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned
w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St., Davao City. While
they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri"
bag & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified
themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. They then
checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1 caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2
rounds of live ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke grenade, & 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun.
Petitioner was brought to the police station for further investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and
trial on the merits, a decision was rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed
decision in toto. Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful
arrest or search and seizure, the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence against him. The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of ROC, a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a
commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace officer
or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, or when an offense has in fact, just been
committed, & he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.
At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he
attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense.
They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant. However, there are
many instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, foremost of w/c is the ''stop & search'' w/o a SW at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. de Villa. As bet. a warrantless
search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereof in the
case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that, unlike in
the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a probable cause that
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)




















2. PEOPLE VS COURT OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
FACTS:
One week before February 9, 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was
informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to
Manila from Angeles City on a blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur Manuel and
Macario Sabado, on the aforesaid date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and Operations
Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the vicinity of the toll gate of the
North Diversion Road at Balintawak, Quezon City.
At about 6:45 A.M. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was
accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away
towards Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent Sabado blew his
whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the
North Diversion Road, but he could not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point,
the agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado who were
in civilian clothes showed their Identification cards to respondents and introduced themselves as RASAC
agents.
The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and they learned from the
respondent that it was to be brought to Tropical Hut. So the agents boarded the Dodge car and they
went to Tropical Hut. However, the man who was supposed to receive the boxes did not arrive so the
mission was called off. They brought the respondents to Camp Aguinaldo and upon inspection of the
car, they found out 11 sealed boxes. The boxes were opened in the presence of the respondents,
representatives of the BIR, BOC, PC, COSAC and photographers of the DND. It contained thousands of
wrist watches and watch bands, supposedly untaxed. A warrant of seizure and detention was issued by
the BOC over the boxes and the car. But they admitted that when they seized the articles and brought it
to Aguinaldo, they were not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure. Seizure proceedings ensued.
The BOC declared that the seized articles including the car are not subject of forfeiture. The
respondents disclaimed ownership over the same and instead a certain Anton del Rosario claimed that it
purchased the articles from Buenafe Trading and was about to sell it at Angeles but since the sale did
not materialize it paid the respondents to transport the same to Manila.
The fiscal filed a criminal case against the respondents. It was dismissed and the court
declared that the evidence obtained was inadmissible as evidence. Hence the present petition.

ISSUE: WON the seizure of the merchandise in a moving vehicle by authorized agents
commissioned to enforce customs laws without warrant of seizure breaches the constitutional immunity
against unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, such merchandise are inadmissible in evidence.
Corollary to the issue is, has the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding the affirmative?
RULING:
No, the search and seizure does not in any way violate the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizure at least with respect to customs searches and
moving vehicles. It is well settled in our jurisprudence and under the Code, that except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may
effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. In customs
searches, there is no need to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. The legality of the seizure will
now be based on "that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that
the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally
transported. "
On the contention that the information from the informer was received a week before and that
a warrant could have been secured is misplaced. During the same period, a warrant could not be
secured because the records hardly reveal anything certain and confirmatory of the report except the
general knowledge that some highly dutiable goods would be transported from Angeles to Manila. Not
even the trial court has made any findings that ASAC has established with exactitude the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized. Lacking this essential determination, the agents could not
have possibly secured a valid warrant even if they had foreseen its compelling necessity. For one thing,
the information could have been just another false alarm. But things changed when on February 9, they
saw a blue Dodge car which was similar to the information they received from the informer. Clearly
therefore, the agents acted not on the basis of
a mere hearsay but on a confirmed information worthy of belief and probable cause enough for them to
adopt measures to freeze the fleeting event.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case is ordered remanded for
further trial and reception of evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or for such
action as the prosecution may take after the re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as
hereinabove directed.




















3. People vs Efren Asio Molintas

FACTS:
Efren Asio Molintas was charged and convicted with violation of Section 21B of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. An informant notified the First Narcotics Regional Unit of Bagio
City that the selling of marijuana was rampant in Wright Park, Baguio City and that the
appellant was involved. Acting upon such information, they conducted a buy bust operation.
They reached Wright Park at 3 o clock in the afternoon and they saw the appellant conversing
with somebody. Cartel, acting as poseur buyer and the informant approached the appellant
and they conversed. The appellant left and when It returned he was carrying 2 small sacks.
Upon his arrival, the other agents walked in and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents,
confiscated the 2 bags and arrested the appellant. He was brought to the police station where
he was investigated.
The bags were endorsed to the Chief of the Narcotics Division, who then sent the same
to the PC INP Crime Laboratory Service for testing. It was found out that the 2 bags contained
marijuana.
The appellant appealed his conviction before the SC.
ISSUES: WON the arrest of the appellant was instigation and whether or not the evidence
obtained should be inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule?
RULING:
The SC said, the operation conducted was clearly one of entrapment. Well settled in our
jurisprudence that "In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the law breakers in the execution of their criminal plan; whereas in instigation, the instigator
practically induces the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and he himself becomes
a co- principal." From the facts of the case it was clear that there was a rampant drug trafficking at the
Wright Park where the buy bust operation was conducted. The accused appellant had a ready supply of
marijuana to meet the buyers demands. He might not have had it at the time the initial transaction took
place but he was readily able to produce the desired quantity. In fact, it took him only a few minutes to
produce the marijuana. If it were really true that he was induced into looking for marijuana, it would
have taken him a considerable length of time to look for a source. The fact that he returned shortly after
the transaction shows that he already had contacts from whom he could readily get the marijuana.
On the issue that the evidence obtained are inadmissible as evidenced because it was
obtained without a valid search warrant, the court said that the rule that a search and seizure
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. There are recognized exceptions to
the rule among them, 1) a search incidental to an arrest; 2) a search of a moving vehicle; and 3) the
seizure of evidence in plain view. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant arrest a
person:
a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an
offense in his presence
xxx xxx xxx
A search and seizure without a warrant is allowed in buy-bust operations, the circumstances being
among those which can be considered exceptional.
The accused, in this case, was caught red-handed while pushing marijuana. Hence, he could be
lawfully arrested and searched.
























4. RICARDO PAPA VS MAGO
FACTS:
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department,
acting upon a reliable information received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment
of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from
the customs zone of the port of Manila and upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the
customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4, 1966,
elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina
Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks,
were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and
detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction
claiming among others that the search and seizure was illegally done. The respondent Judge
issued an order releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon her filing of a bond in
the amount of P40,000.00, and on March 13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
A motion for reconsideration was filed. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, herein petitioners filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary
injunction before this Court.

ISSUE: whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order of
March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question?
WON the goods in question could not be seized without a search warrant?
RULING:
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and
collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to prevent and suppress smuggling and
other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. 1 The goods in question
were imported from Hongkong. From the facts it can be seen that the goods contained in the 9 bales
in question were the subject of forfeiture and that its importation is effected contrary to law. As
long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the duties,
taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal
permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 3 The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other
charges must be in full. Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been
brought out of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same,
nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4, 1966 by
members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders of their Chief,
Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of
Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the goods. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure and
detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet been
issued by the Collector of Customs. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7,
1967 releasing said goods.
On the contention that the goods could be seized without a search warrant, the court said the
contention could not be sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa,
having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests,11 and it was his
duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the
same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. 12 He
could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when
he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. The Tariff and Customs Code
authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the
latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. 14 This was what happened precisely in the case of
Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the
nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to
make the interception of the cargo.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building,
not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered
view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

5. PEOPLE VS RAMOS
FACTS:
Two incidents of robbery has occurred in the City of Kalookan; one involving the house of
Leoncio Flores and another one, merely 8 days apart the house of Reynaldo Punzalan. Following a tip
from an informer, the police reconnoitered Miranda Subdvision for a possible engagement with the
suspects. Accompanied by Reynaldo Punzalan, the lawmen chanced upon Felimon Ramos, who
was then pointed to by Reynaldo as one of the five (5) armed men whom he encountered during the
robbery. When accosted and frisked by the lawmen, Ramos yielded in his waistline a .38 cal. snub
nosed "paltik" revolver loaded with two (2) live bullets. At the police headquarters where he was
brought for interrogation, Ramos admitted involvement in the aforementioned incidents and identified
all his cohorts, one of whom is Antonio Contreras. They subsequently arrested Contreras. Four
informations were filed with the RTC against the respondents. Ramos and Contreras were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The case was appealed, hence the present
petition, contending among others that Ramos was searched and arrested without a search warrant
and warrant of arrest.
ISSUE: WON the gun obtained from Ramos is admissible in evidence since the search was effected
without a valid search warrant?
RULING:
The Court held that the gun obtained from the frisking is admissible in evidence. The rule is
that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly
issued by a judge. This is enshrined in the Bill of Rights.
48
Such a rule, however, is not without
exceptions.
49
For instance, a warrantless search made be validly made as an incident to a lawful
arrest
50
or in stop and search situations.
51
Another recognized exception is when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable search and seizure.
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person
or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th Ed., vol. I, page 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly discloses that accused Ramos voluntarily allowed himself to
be frisked and that he gave the gun to Pat. Alfredo Rodillas. This evidence remained unrebutted by
Ramos because his testimony on cross-examination was, as earlier noted, stricken off from the
records. Moreover, his counsel did not object to any of the questions asked during the direct
examination of witness Lardizabal concerning the frisking of Ramos and the recovery from him of the
gun.
53
On cross-examination, counsel for Ramos did not suggest or insinuate, even obliquely, that
Ramos did not voluntarily allow himself either to be frisked or dispossessed of the gun by Pat. Rodillas.
However, the court agreed with Ramos that the prosecution failed to prove that he has no
license or permit to possess the firearm subject thereof. The information therein specifically alleges
that the said accused:
. . . without any lawful authority did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control one (1) .38 caliber Revolver marked S &
W without Serial Number, (Paltik), 5 Shooters, Snub Nose, with two (2) live
cartridges in its cylinder, without first securing the necessary license or permit, to
possess the same.
Yet, the prosecution presented no evidence, oral or documentary, that Ramos had no license or
permit to possess the subject firearm.
Hence, there being no proof that Ramos did not have a license or permit to possess the firearm in question, he
could not be convicted of illegal possession of a firearm.
We do not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun, is illegally
manufactured as recognized in People vs. Fajardo,
59
and cannot be issued a license or permit, it is no
longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This appears to be, at first blush, a very logical
proposition. We cannot, however, yield to it because Fajardo did not say that paltiks can in no case be
issued a license or a permit, and that proof that a firearm is a paltik dispenses with proof that it is
unlicensed.


















6. MANDAR VS CA
FACTS:
Rodolfo Yu of the WPD Police Force of the Integrated National Police was on foort patrol with
three other patrol officers along Quezon Boulevard in Manila at Plaza Miranda as a response to bomb
threats reported earlier. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group,
comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]their eyes. . . moving very fast."
They observed the groups for about 30 minutes then they approached one group of men, who
then fled in different directions. They chased them and caught petitioner Malacat. Upon searching the
petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioners front waist line. The other police
officer recovered a revolver from another member of the group. They were brought to the Police
Station. Yu didnt issue a receipt of the grenade recovered. An information has been filed against the
petitioner for willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep or possess a hand grenade without securing the
necessary license or permit as punished under PD 1866. During the pre-trial, the prosecution admitted
that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they
were arrested. During the trial, police officer Yu admitted that he recognized the petitioner as he saw
him the week before and that he attempted to detonate a grenade at Plaza Miranda but it was aborted
when Yu chased him but he was able to flee.
The trial court found the petitioner guilty of illegal possession of explosives and noted that the
warrantless search and seizure was akin to stop and frisk and that the seizure of the seizure of the
grenade was incidental to a lawful arrest. The petitioner appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure made on the petitioner was valid?
RULING:
The search and seizure made on the petitioner was invalid. The general rule as regards arrests,
searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. 31 The
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests,
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot
pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a search
incidental to a lawful arrest; 34and (6) a "stop and frisk." 35
The trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach
for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. 38
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the
search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.
For stop and frisk to be valid, probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," 40it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons
why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, there are grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or
record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which
leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30
p.m., thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were
not creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"
"inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat's rights solemnly guaranteed
inspections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.


7. People vs Degracia
FACTS:
A coup d etat was staged on December 1989 by the RAM (Reform the Armed Forces
Movement) against the government. Varios governmenat establishments and vital installations were
bombarded by the rightists group. A surveillance by the police force was conducted at Eurocar Building
pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied
by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. The team parked their car at the
Eurocar Sales Office. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the
crowd and walked towards the car of the surveillance team. The group fired at the car of the
surveillance team which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the
surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were afraid
that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, a searching team raided
the Eurocar Bldg. They were able to recover ammunitions, dynamites, shells of different calibers and
Molotov bombs. One of the officers saw the appellant De Gracia inside the office, holding a dynamite
and suspiciously looking through a door. He was arrested together with the janitors. They were then
made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the
raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because, according to them, at that
time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by
the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from
the fact that the courts were consequently closed. They were charged of illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion and for attempted homicide. The trial court
acquitted De Gracia of attempted homicide but found him guilty of the offense of illegal possession of
firearms in furtherance of rebellion. Hence the present petition.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid search and seizure?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that indeed there was a valid search and seizure. Under the rules,
warrantless arrest may be effected under three circumstances and one of which is when a crime is being
committed, has just been committed or is about to be committed. In the first place, the military
operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was being committed. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant
their action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that on
December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. 19 Under such urgency and
exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. 16 Prior to the raid, there was surveillance conducted on the premises
wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When
the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite
requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. 17 The Eurocar Sales
Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenals which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time
because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp
Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. 18 The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.


8. People vs Ca
FACTS: On December 1995, Quezon City PNP applied for a search warrant before the QC RTC
against Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail
Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. A warrant was issued the next day by Judge Bacalla not at AVS but at AVS, Apt. 1 Area F,
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan Apt 1 is immediately
adjacent to AVS. The PNP then proceeded to search the said apartment where they seized money,
some clothings, 4 Pakistani nationals including Hussain and some explosives. The Pakistanis
petitioned before J Casanova that the search warrant is invalid for there is a discrepancy in the place
described and place indicated in the warrant. AVS is not in any way the same as Apt 1 for Apt 1 is
totally separate. J Casanova quashed the search warrant and ordered the return of the things seized
and at the same time ordered the seized things to be inadmissible as evidence. Prosecutor Chiong
moved that the decision be reversed. The CA affirmed the decision of J Casanova. Chiong averred
that the policemen who did the search has acted on their knowledge. The PNP actually knew that
the Pakistanis are indeed residing in Apt 1 and not in the AVS.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant,
cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed
by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to
be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the
power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would
open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant
that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.



5. PEOPLE VS RAMOS
FACTS: