G.R. No.

196383 October 15, 2012

ROBERT PASCUA, doi! b"#ie## "der t$e %&e %d #t'(e TR)*+EB
CONSTRUCT)ON, Petitioer,
,#. G - G REA. T/ CORPORAT)ON, Re#0odet.
1ACTS2
In October, 1999, G&G was to construct 2 buildings with Pascua providing the
materials and labor for P11.1. G&G changed the original wor! agreement which resulted in
the temporar" stoppage on the construction of 1 building. #he 2 buildings were $nished in
2%%% but were overdue. G&G refused to pa" Pascua as!ing P&' per da" of dela"( this led to
a case for damages b" Pascua. #he trial court found the dela" reasonable and awarded ruled
in favor of Pascua. #he )* a+rmed the decision but reversed itself on motion for
reconsideration citing the dela" to be due to Pascua,s ta!ing on 2 other wor!s.
)SSUE2
-hether or not petitioner is entitled to the pa"ment of the outstanding balance of the
contract price.
RU.)NG2
#he trial court correctl" found that respondent,s additional wor!s and change order
wor!s caused the dela" in the construction of the sub.ect pro.ect based on testimonial and
documentar" evidence gathered b" the trial court.
#ime and again, this )ourt has also ruled that factual $ndings of trial courts are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, especiall" when established b" unrebutted
testimonial and documentar" evidence.
-ithal, there is no more need for the appellate court to deviate from its original
decision as its factual $ndings were alread" supported b" testimonies and evidence on
record. *s stated in its original decision, it held that the evidence on record categoricall"
showed that the alluded dela" in the completion of the sub.ect pro.ect were traceable to the
series of additional wor!s and change order wor!s re/uired b" respondent which were not
part of the original agreement. 0ence, in reversing its own decision, the appellate court
completel" disregarded the testimonial and documentar" evidence adduced below, and
engaged in piecemeal evaluation of the case b" arriving at a decision which is supported b"
hearsa" evidence.
*ll told, we are not persuaded with respondent,s bare claim that petitioner caused
the dela" in the completion of the pro.ect. On the contrar", testimonial and documentar"
proof strongl" show that the dela" was caused b" the additional wor!s and change order
wor!s re/uired b" respondent which were not part of the original *greement.
1ieparine, 2r. v. )ourt of *ppeals states that 3a construction contract necessaril"
involves reciprocal obligations, as it imposes upon the contractor the obligation to build the
structure sub.ect of the contract, and upon the owner the obligation to pa" for the pro.ect
upon its completion.
-hat4s more, in 0eirs of 5amon Gaite v. #he Pla6a, Inc., this )ourt held that 3"der
t$e 0rici0(e o4 5"%t"& &er"it, % cotr%ctor i# %((o6ed to reco,er t$e re%#o%b(e
,%("e o4 t$e t$i! or #er,ice redered i order to %,oid "7"#t eric$&et.
8"%t"& &er"it &e%# t$%t i % %ctio 4or 6or9 %d (%bor, 0%'&et #$%(( be
&%de i #"c$ %&o"t %# t$e 0(%iti: re%#o%b(' de#er,e#. To de' 0%'&et 4or %
b"i(di! %(&o#t co&0(eted %d %(re%d' occ"0ied 6o"(d be to 0er&it "7"#t
eric$&et %t t$e e;0e#e o4 t$e cotr%ctor.3
*s in this case, petitioner alread" completed the construction of the pro.ect. 0ence, it
would be the height of in.ustice to allow respondent to en.o" the fruits of petitioner4s labor
without pa"ing the contract price.
G.R. No. 181052 No,e&ber 1<, 2012
RO=O.1O BE.B)S, >R. ' CO?PETENTE %d A.BERTO BRUCA.ES, Petitioer#,
,#. PEOP.E O1 T@E P@).)PP)NES, Re#0odet.
1ACTS2
2ose, a tanod left his house at 9pm to go to his assignment. *t 1%pm, 7eronica, 2ose,s
live8in partner, heard 2ose shouting her name. -hen she went to see 2ose, she saw blood at
his bac! and shorts. 2ose told her that 9obo" :5odolfo; held him while Paul :*lberto; stabbed
him. 2ose was con$ned for < da"s. 0e didn,t go for a follow8up chec!8up due to mone"
problems but 7eronica was forced to bring him bac! when 2ose reported of urinar" retention
and lumbar pains. *fter treatments in and out of hospitals, 2ose died due to !idne" failure
from septicemia. 9obo" and Paul were then charged with homicide. #he two claimed self8
defense and that mitigated the penalt" since the self8defense was incomplete. * motion for
reconsideration was denied so the" went to the )*. #he )* a+rmed the decision but
removed the mitigating circumstance. #heir 5 was denied.
)SSUES2
1. 1"ing declaration
2. )laim of self8defense
=. Pro>imate cause
?. 7oluntar" surrender
RU.)NG2
In a criminal case, factual $ndings of the trial court are generall" accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, especiall" when such $ndings are supported b" substantial
evidence on record. #his rule, however, is not without e>ceptions, one of which is when there
is a con@ict between the factual $ndings of the )ourt of *ppeals and the trial court which
necessitates a review of such factual $ndings.
1. Ao. * d"ing declaration is a statement made b" the victim of homicide, referring to
the material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the !illing and
which is uttered under a $>ed belief that death is impending and is certain to follow
immediatel", or in a ver" short time, without an opportunit" of retraction and in the
absence of all hopes of recover". In other words, it is a statement made b" a person
after a mortal wound has been in@icted, under a belief that death is certain, stating
the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding hisBher death.
*s an e>ception to the hearsa" rule, the re/uisites for its admissibilit" are as followsC
:1; the declaration is made b" the deceased under the consciousness of his
impending death( :2; the deceased was at the time competent as a witness( :=; the
declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant,s
death( and :?; the declaration is oDered in a criminal case wherein the declarant,s
death is the sub.ect of in/uir".
#he fact that the victim was stabbed on 1ecember 9, 199E and died onl" on 2anuar"
F, 199F does not prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under the
consciousness of an impending death. #he rule is that, in order to ma!e a d"ing
declaration admissible, a $>ed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be
entered b" the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid
succession of death in point of fact that renders the d"ing declaration admissible. It is
not necessar" that the approaching death be presaged b" the personal feelings of
the deceased. #he test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival
and loo!ed on death as certainl" impending. *s such, the )* incorrectl" ruled that
there were d"ing declarations.
#he )* should have admitted the statement made b" the victim to 7eronica 1acir
right after he was stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a d"ing declaration.
Gection ?2 of 5ule 1=% of the 5ules of )ourt.
*ll that is re/uired for the admissibilit" of a given statement as part of the res
gestae, is that it be made under the in@uence of a startling event witnessed b" the
person who made the declaration before he had time to thin! and ma!e up a stor", or
to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without an" undue
in@uence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in /uestion or its
immediate attending circumstances. In sum, there are three re/uisites to admit
evidence as part of the res gestaeC :1; that the principal act, the res gestae, be a
startling occurrence( :2; the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood( and :=; that the statements must concern the
occurrence in /uestion and its immediate attending circumstances.
It goes without sa"ing that the element of spontaneit" is critical. #he following factors
are then considered in determining whether statements oDered in evidence as part of
the res gestae have been made spontaneousl", vi6., :1; the time that lapsed between
the occurrence of the act or transaction and the ma!ing of the statement( :2; the
place where the statement was made( :=; the condition of the declarant when he
made the statement( :?; the presence or absence of intervening events between the
occurrence and the statement relative thereto( and :&; the nature and circumstances
of the statement itself.
2. It is settled that when an accused admits !illing the victim but invo!es self8defense to
escape criminal liabilit", the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea b"
credible, clear and convincing evidence( otherwise, conviction would follow from his
admission that he !illed the victim. Gelf8defense cannot be .usti$abl" appreciated
when uncorroborated b" independent and competent evidence or when it is
e>tremel" doubtful b" itself. Indeed, in invo!ing self8defense, the burden of evidence
is shifted and the accused claiming self8defense must rel" on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the wea!ness of the prosecution.
#he essential re/uisites of self8defense are the followingC :1; unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim( :2; reasonable necessit" of the means emplo"ed to prevent or
repel such aggression( and :=; lac! of su+cient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self8defense.1F 7eril", to invo!e self8defense successfull", there must
have been an unlawful and unprovo!ed attac! that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to in@ict severe wounds upon the assailant b"
emplo"ing reasonable means to resist the attac!.
:additional factsC there was an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
but it ceased when petitioner 5odolfo was able to get hold of the bladed
weapon. *lthough there was still some struggle involved between the victim
and petitioner 5odolfo, there is no doubt that the latter, who was in
possession of the same weapon, alread" became the unlawful aggressor.
5etaliation is not the same as self8defense. In retaliation, the aggression that
was begun b" the in.ured part" alread" ceased when the accused attac!ed
him, while in self8defense the aggression still e>isted when the aggressor was
in.ured b" the accused. Guch an aggression can also be surmised on the four
stab wounds sustained b" the victim on his bac!. It is hard to believe based on
the location of the stab wounds, all at the bac! portion of the bod" :right
lumbar area, left lumbar area, left buttoc!, medial aspect and left buttoc!,
lateral aspect;, that petitioner 5odolfo was defending himself. It would have
been diDerent if the wounds in@icted were located in the front portion of the
victim4s bod". #he )* is, therefore, correct in agreeing with the observation of
the 5#).
#he means emplo"ed b" a person claiming self8defense must be commensurate to
the nature and the e>tent of the attac! sought to be averted, and must be rationall"
necessar" to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In connection therewith, having
established that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he
was stabbed, petitioners cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self8defense.
=. Pro>imate cause has been de$ned as 3that cause, which, in natural and continuous
se/uence, unbro!en b" an" e+cient intervening cause, produces the in.ur", and
without which the result would not have occurred.3 #he autops" report indicated that
the cause of the victim4s death is multiple organ failure.
#hus, it can be concluded that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have
been aHicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that
caused his death. #he oDender is criminall" liable for the death of the victim if his
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.
?. *s to the claim of petitioners that the" are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntar" surrender, the same does not deserve merit. Ior voluntar" surrender to be
appreciated, the following re/uisites should be presentC :1; the oDender has not been
actuall" arrested( :2; the oDender surrendered himself to a person in authorit" or the
latter4s agent( and :=; the surrender was voluntar". #he essence of voluntar"
surrender is spontaneit" and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit
himself to the authorities either because he ac!nowledges his guilt or he wishes to
save the authorities the trouble and e>pense that ma" be incurred for his search and
capture. -ithout these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed
surrender are the inevitabilit" of arrest and the need to ensure his safet", the
surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characteri6ed as 3voluntar"
surrender3 to serve as a mitigating circumstance. In the present case, when the
petitioners reported the incident and allegedl" surrendered the bladed weapon used
in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as voluntar" surrender within the
contemplation of the law. 9esides, there was no spontaneit", because the" onl"
surrendered after a warrant of their arrest had alread" been issued.
#he )*,s ruling is a+rmed. Ao mitigating circumstances of incomplete self8defense or
voluntar" surrender.
G.R. No. 185128 >%"%r' 30, 2012
A1or&er(' U=B No. 13980C
RUBEN =E. CAST)..O D BOE CAST)..O, Petitioer,
,#. PEOP.E O1 T@E P@).)PP)NES, Re#0odet.
1ACTS2
Police O+cers headed b" GPO= 9ienvenido asna"on went to serve a search warrant
from the 5egional #rial )ourt :5#); to Petitioner 5uben 1el )astillo in search of illegal drugs.
Jpon arrival, somebod" shouted KraidL which prompted the police o+cers to immediatel"
disembar! from the .eep the" were riding and go directl" to 1el )astillo,s house and
cordoned it oD. Police men found nothing incriminating in 1el )astillo,s residence, but one of
the baranga" tanods was able to con$scate from the hut several articles including four :?;
plastic pac!s of methamphetamine h"drochloride, or shabu.
*n Information was $led before 5#) against 1el )astillo, charging him with violation
of Gection 1<, *rticle III of 5.*. <?2& :#he 1angerous 1rugs *ct of 19E2;. 1uring the
arraignment, 1el )astillo pleaded not guilt". #he 5#) found 1el )astillo guilt" be"ond
reasonable of the charge against him in the information. #he )ourt of *ppeals :)*; a+rmed
the decision.
1el )astillo appealed his case to the )*, insisting that there was a violation of his
constitutional guarant" against unreasonable searches and sei6ure. On the contrar", the
O+ce of the Golicitor General argued that the constitutional guarant" against unreasonable
searches and sei6ure is applicable onl" against government authorities. 0ence, assuming
that the items sei6ed were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the
same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them
was a baranga" tanod who is a private individual.
)SSUE2
-hether or not there was a violation of 1el )astillo,s right against unreasonable
searches and sei6ure
RU.)NG2
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularl" describe the place
to be searched and persons or things to be sei6ed in order for it to be valid. * designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the e>clusion of all others, and on
in/uir" unerringl" leads the peace o+cers to it, satis$es the constitutional re/uirement of
de$niteness.
In the present case, the search warrant speci$call" designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentall", the items were sei6ed
b" a baranga" tanod in a nipa hut, 2% meters awa" from the residence of the 1el )astillo.
#he con$scated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the
search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of 1el )astillo,s constitutional guarant"
against unreasonable searches and sei6ure.
#he OGG argued that, assuming that the items sei6ed were found in another place
not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence
because the one who discovered them was a baranga" tanod who is a private individual, the
constitutional guarant" against unreasonable searches and sei6ure being applicable onl"
against government authorities. #he contention is devoid of merit. It was testi$ed to during
trial b" the police o+cers who eDected the search warrant that the" as!ed the assistance of
the baranga" tanods. 0aving been established that the assistance of the baranga" tanods
was sought b" the police authorities who eDected the search warrant, the same baranga"
tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authorit". *rticle 1&2 of the 5evised Penal
)ode de$nes persons in authorit" and agents of persons in authorit" as Kan" person directl"
vested with .urisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authorit". *
baranga" captain and a baranga" chairman shall also be deemed a person in authorit". *
person who, b" direct provision of law or b" election or b" appointment b" competent
authorit", is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and securit" of
life and propert", such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and baranga" leader, and an"
person who comes to the aid of persons in authorit", shall be deemed an agent of a person
in authorit".L
#he Mocal Government )ode also contains a provision which describes the function of
a baranga" tanod as an agent of persons in authorit". Gection =FF of the Mocal Government
)ode readsC KIor purposes of the 5evised Penal )ode, the punong baranga", sangguniang
baranga" members, and members of the lupong tagapama"apa in each baranga" shall be
deemed as persons in authorit" in their .urisdictions, while other baranga" o+cials and
members who ma" be designated b" law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of
public order, protection and securit" of life and propert", or the maintenance of a desirable
and balanced environment, and an" baranga" member who comes to the aid of persons in
authorit", shall be deemed agents of persons in authorit".
9" virtue of the above provisions, the police o+cers, as well as the baranga" tanods
were acting as agents of a person in authorit" during the conduct of the search. #hus, the
search conducted was unreasonable and the con$scated items are inadmissible in evidence.