Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMSSON, PE!RO "NSUA, MGUEL CASTLLO, #$% !ONSO C.
MA"OR,respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, ose A. Angara, for the issuance of
a !rit of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Co""ission, one of the respondents, fro"
ta#ing further cogni$ance of the protest filed by Pedro %nsua, another respondent, against the
election of said petitioner as "e"ber of the National Asse"bly for the first asse"bly district of the
Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as ad"itted by the respondents are as
follo!s&
'() That in the elections of *epte"ber (+, (,-., the petitioner, ose A. Angara, and the
respondents, Pedro %nsua, Miguel Castillo and /ionisio Mayor, !ere candidates voted for
the position of "e"ber of the National Asse"bly for the first district of the Province of
Tayabas0
'1) That on 2ctober +, (,-., the provincial board of canvassers, proclai"ed the petitioner as
"e"ber3elect of the National Asse"bly for the said district, for having received the "ost
nu"ber of votes0
'-) That on Nove"ber (., (,-., the petitioner too# his oath of office0
'4) That on /ece"ber -, (,-., the National Asse"bly in session asse"bled, passed the
follo!ing resolution&
5No. 67
RE*289C:2N C2N;:RMAN/2 8A* ACTA* /E A<9E882* /:P9TA/2*
C2NTRA <9:ENE* N2 *E =A PRE*ENTA/2 PR2TE*TA.
Se resuele! <ue las actas de eleccion de los /iputados contra >uienes no
se hubiere presentado debida"ente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la
presente resolucion sean, co"o por la presente, son aprobadas y
confir"adas.
Adoptada, - de dicie"bre, (,-..
'.) That on /ece"ber 6, (,-., the herein respondent Pedro %nsua filed before the Electoral
Co""ission a ?Motion of Protest? against the election of the herein petitioner, ose A.
Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 6 afore>uoted, and
praying, a"ong other3things, that said respondent be declared elected "e"ber of the
National Asse"bly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified0
'@) That on /ece"ber ,, (,-., the Electoral Co""ission adopted a resolution, paragraph @
of !hich provides&
@. 8a Co"ision no considerara ninguna protesta >ue no se haya presentado en o
antes de este dia.
'+) That on /ece"ber 1A, (,-., the herein petitioner, ose A. Angara, one of the
respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Co""ission a ?Motion to
/is"iss the Protest?, alleging 'a) that Resolution No. 6 of /is"iss the Protest?, alleging 'a)
that Resolution No. 6 of the National Asse"bly !as adopted in the legiti"ate eBercise of its
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during !hich protests against the election of
its "e"bers should be presented0 'b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its obCect, and is
the accepted for"ula for, the li"itation of said period0 and 'c) that the protest in >uestion !as
filed out of the prescribed period0
'6) That on /ece"ber 1+, (,-., the herein respondent, Pedro %nsua, filed an ?Ans!er to the
Motion of /is"issal? alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the
presentation of a protest against the election of a "e"ber of the National Asse"bly after
confir"ation0
',) That on /ece"ber -(, (,-., the herein petitioner, ose A. Angara, filed a ?Reply? to the
aforesaid ?Ans!er to the Motion of /is"issal?0
'(A) That the case being sub"itted for decision, the Electoral Co""ission pro"ulgated a
resolution on anuary 1-, (,-@, denying herein petitionerDs ?Motion to /is"iss the Protest.?
The application of the petitioner sets forth the follo!ing grounds for the issuance of the !rit prayed
for&
'a) That the Constitution confers eBclusive Curisdiction upon the electoral Co""ission solely
as regards the "erits of contested elections to the National Asse"bly0
'b) That the Constitution eBcludes fro" said Curisdiction the po!er to regulate the
proceedings of said election contests, !hich po!er has been reserved to the 8egislative
/epart"ent of the Eovern"ent or the National Asse"bly0
'c) That li#e the *upre"e Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution,
!hose eBclusive Curisdiction relates solely to deciding the "erits of controversies sub"itted
to the" for decision and to "atters involving their internal organi$ation, the Electoral
Co""ission can regulate its proceedings only if the National Asse"bly has not availed of its
pri"ary po!er to so regulate such proceedings0
'd) That Resolution No. 6 of the National Asse"bly is, therefore, valid and should be
respected and obeyed0
'e) That under paragraph (- of section ( of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and
paragraph @ of article + of the Tydings3Mc/uffie 8a! 'No. (1+ of the +-rd Congress of the
9nited *tates) as !ell as under section ( and - 'should be sections ( and 1) of article F::: of
the Constitution, this *upre"e Court has Curisdiction to pass upon the funda"ental >uestion
herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines.
2n ;ebruary 1., (,-@, the *olicitor3Eeneral appeared and filed an ans!er in behalf of the
respondent Electoral Co""ission interposing the follo!ing special defenses&
'a) That the Electoral Co""ission has been created by the Constitution as an instru"entality
of the 8egislative /epart"ent invested !ith the Curisdiction to decide ?all contests relating to
the election, returns, and >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly?0 that in
adopting its resolution of /ece"ber ,, (,-., fiBing this date as the last day for the
presentation of protests against the election of any "e"ber of the National Asse"bly, it
acted !ithin its Curisdiction and in the legiti"ate eBercise of the i"plied po!ers granted it by
the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the po!er and
functions conferred upon the sa"e by the funda"ental la!0 that in adopting its resolution of
anuary 1-, (,-@, overruling the "otion of the petitioner to dis"iss the election protest in
>uestion, and declaring itself !ith Curisdiction to ta#e cogni$ance of said protest, it acted in
the legiti"ate eBercise of its >uasi3Cudicial functions a an instru"entality of the 8egislative
/epart"ent of the Co""on!ealth Eovern"ent, and hence said act is beyond the Cudicial
cogni$ance or control of the *upre"e Court0
'b) That the resolution of the National Asse"bly of /ece"ber -, (,-., confir"ing the
election of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly against !ho" no protest had thus far
been filed, could not and did not deprive the electoral Co""ission of its Curisdiction to ta#e
cogni$ance of election protests filed !ithin the ti"e that "ight be set by its o!n rules&
'c) That the Electoral Co""ission is a body invested !ith >uasi3Cudicial functions, created by
the Constitution as an instru"entality of the 8egislative /epart"ent, and is not an ?inferior
tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person? !ithin the purvie! of section 11@ and .(@ of the
Code of Civil Procedure, against !hich prohibition !ould lie.
The respondent Pedro %nsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an ans!er in his o!n behalf on March
1, (,-@, setting forth the follo!ing as his special defense&
'a) That at the ti"e of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Co""ission on /ece"ber ,,
(,-., there !as no eBisting la! fiBing the period !ithin !hich protests against the election of
"e"bers of the National Asse"bly should be filed0 that in fiBing /ece"ber ,, (,-., as the
last day for the filing of protests against the election of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly,
the Electoral Co""ission !as eBercising a po!er i"pliedly conferred upon it by the
Constitution, by reason of its >uasi3Cudicial attributes0
'b) That said respondent presented his "otion of protest before the Electoral Co""ission on
/ece"ber ,, (,-., the last day fiBed by paragraph @ of the rules of the said Electoral
Co""ission0
'c) That therefore the Electoral Co""ission ac>uired Curisdiction over the protest filed by
said respondent and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Co""ission
of anuary 1-, (,-@, denying petitionerDs "otion to dis"iss said protest !as an act !ithin the
Curisdiction of the said co""ission, and is not revie!able by "eans of a !rit of prohibition0
'd) That neither the la! nor the Constitution re>uires confir"ation by the National Asse"bly
of the election of its "e"bers, and that such confir"ation does not operate to li"it the period
!ithin !hich protests should be filed as to deprive the Electoral Co""ission of Curisdiction
over protest filed subse>uent thereto0
'e) That the Electoral Co""ission is an independent entity created by the Constitution,
endo!ed !ith >uasi3Cudicial functions, !hose decision are final and unappealable0
' f ) That the electoral Co""ission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, !ithin the ter"s of sections 11@ and .(@ of the Code of Civil
Procedure0 and that neither under the provisions of sections ( and 1 of article :: 'should be
article F:::) of the Constitution and paragraph (- of section ( of the 2rdinance appended
thereto could it be subCect in the eBercise of its >uasi3Cudicial functions to a !rit of prohibition
fro" the *upre"e Court0
'") That paragraph @ of article + of the Tydings3Mc/uffie 8a! 'No. (1+ of the +-rd Congress
of the united *tates) has no application to the case at bar.
The case !as argued before us on March (-, (,-@. Before it !as sub"itted for decision, the
petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preli"inary !rit of inCunction against the respondent Electoral
Co""ission !hich petition !as denied ?!ithout passing upon the "erits of the case? by resolution of
this court of March 1(, (,-@.
There !as no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar "ay be reduced to the follo!ing t!o principal
propositions&
(. =as the *upre"e Court Curisdiction over the Electoral Co""ission and the subCect "atter
of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affir"ative,
1. =as the said Electoral Co""ission acted !ithout or in eBcess of its Curisdiction in
assu"ing to the cogni$ance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
not!ithstanding the previous confir"ation of such election by resolution of the National
Asse"blyG
He could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the "erits of the controversy.
=o!ever, the >uestion of Curisdiction having been presented, !e do not feel Custified in evading the
issue. Being a case prim# impressionis, it !ould hardly be consistent !ith our sense of duty to
overloo# the broader aspect of the >uestion and leave it undecided. Neither !ould !e be doing
Custice to the industry and vehe"ence of counsel !ere !e not to pass upon the >uestion of
Curisdiction s>uarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of po!ers is a funda"ental principle in our syste" of govern"ent. :t obtains not
through eBpress provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each depart"ent of the
govern"ent has eBclusive cogni$ance of "atters !ithin its Curisdiction, and is supre"e !ithin its o!n
sphere. But it does not follo! fro" the fact that the three po!ers are to be #ept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended the" to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate syste" of chec#s and balances to secure
coordination in the !or#ings of the various depart"ents of the govern"ent. ;or eBa"ple, the Chief
EBecutive under our Constitution is so far "ade a chec# on the legislative po!er that this assent is
re>uired in the enact"ent of la!s. This, ho!ever, is subCect to the further chec# that a bill "ay
beco"e a la! not!ithstanding the refusal of the President to approve it, by a vote of t!o3thirds or
three3fourths, as the case "ay be, of the National Asse"bly. The President has also the right to
convene the Asse"bly in special session !henever he chooses. 2n the other hand, the National
Asse"bly operates as a chec# on the EBecutive in the sense that its consent through its
Co""ission on Appoint"ents is necessary in the appoint"ents of certain officers0 and the
concurrence of a "aCority of all its "e"bers is essential to the conclusion of treaties. ;urther"ore, in
its po!er to deter"ine !hat courts other than the *upre"e Court shall be established, to define their
Curisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Asse"bly controls the Cudicial
depart"ent to a certain eBtent. The Asse"bly also eBercises the Cudicial po!er of trying
i"peach"ents. And the Cudiciary in turn, !ith the *upre"e Court as the final arbiter, effectively
chec#s the other depart"ents in the eBercise of its po!er to deter"ine the la!, and hence to declare
eBecutive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the "ain, the Constitution has bloc#ed out !ith deft stro#es and in bold lines, allot"ent of
po!er to the eBecutive, the legislative and the Cudicial depart"ents of the govern"ent. The
overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties bet!een the several depart"ents, ho!ever,
so"eti"es "a#es it hard to say Cust !here the one leaves off and the other begins. :n ti"es of social
dis>uietude or political eBcite"ent, the great land"ar#s of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
"arred, if not entirely obliterated. :n cases of conflict, the Cudicial depart"ent is the only
constitutional organ !hich can be called upon to deter"ine the proper allocation of po!ers bet!een
the several depart"ents and a"ong the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any hu"an production, our Constitution is of course lac#ing perfection and perfectibility, but as
"uch as it !as !ithin the po!er of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instru"ent !hich is the eBpression of their sovereignty ho!ever li"ited, has established a republican
govern"ent intended to operate and function as a har"onious !hole, under a syste" of chec#s and
balances, and subCect to specific li"itations and restrictions provided in the said instru"ent. The
Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and li"itations upon govern"ental
po!ers and agencies. :f these restrictions and li"itations are transcended it !ould be inconceivable
if the Constitution had not provided for a "echanis" by !hich to direct the course of govern"ent
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of po!ers !ould be "ere verbiage, the bill of
rights "ere eBpressions of senti"ent, and the principles of good govern"ent "ere political
apotheg"s. Certainly, the li"itation and restrictions e"bodied in our Constitution are real as they
should be in any living constitution. :n the 9nited *tates !here no eBpress constitutional grant is
found in their constitution, the possession of this "oderating po!er of the courts, not to spea# of its
historical origin and develop"ent there, has been set at rest by popular ac>uiescence for a period of
"ore than one and a half centuries. :n our case, this "oderating po!er is granted, if not eBpressly,
by clear i"plication fro" section 1 of article F::: of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the po!ers of govern"ent. Hho is to deter"ine the nature, scope
and eBtent of such po!ersG The Constitution itself has provided for the instru"entality of the
Cudiciary as the rational !ay. And !hen the Cudiciary "ediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other depart"ents0 it does not in reality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the sole"n and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to deter"ine conflicting clai"s of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights !hich that instru"ent secures and guarantees to the".
This is in truth all that is involved in !hat is ter"ed ?Cudicial supre"acy? !hich properly is the po!er
of Cudicial revie! under the Constitution. Even then, this po!er of Cudicial revie! is li"ited to actual
cases and controversies to be eBercised after full opportunity of argu"ent by the parties, and li"ited
further to the constitutional >uestion raised or the very lis mota presented. Any atte"pt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal >uestions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narro!ed as its function is in this "anner, the Cudiciary does not pass upon >uestions of
!isdo", Custice or eBpediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presu"ption of
constitutionality to legislative enact"ents, not only because the legislature is presu"ed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the Cudiciary in the deter"ination of actual cases and
controversies "ust reflect the !isdo" and Custice of the people as eBpressed through their
representatives in the eBecutive and legislative depart"ents of the govern"ents of the govern"ent.
But "uch as !e "ight postulate on the internal chec#s of po!er provided in our Constitution, it
ought not the less to be re"e"bered that, in the language of a"es Madison, the syste" itself is not
?the chief palladiu" of constitutional liberty . . . the people !ho are authors of this blessing "ust also
be its guardians . . . their eyes "ust be ever ready to "ar#, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression
on the authority of their constitution.? :n the 8ast and ulti"ate analysis, then, "ust the success of our
govern"ent in the unfolding years to co"e be tested in the crucible of ;ilipino "inds and hearts than
in consultation roo"s and court cha"bers.
:n the case at bar, the national Asse"bly has by resolution 'No. 6) of /ece"ber -, (,-., confir"ed
the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. 2n the other hand, the Electoral Co""ission
has by resolution adopted on /ece"ber ,, (,-., fiBed said date as the last day for the filing of
protests against the election, returns and >ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly,
not!ithstanding the previous confir"ation "ade by the National Asse"bly as aforesaid. :f, as
contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Asse"bly has the effect of cutting off the
po!er of the Electoral Co""ission to entertain protests against the election, returns and
>ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, sub"itted after /ece"ber -, (,-., then the
resolution of the Electoral Co""ission of /ece"ber ,, (,-., is "ere surplusage and had no effect.
But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral Co""ission has the sole po!er of regulating
its proceedings to the eBclusion of the National Asse"bly, then the resolution of /ece"ber ,, (,-.,
by !hich the Electoral Co""ission fiBed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
election, returns and >ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, should be upheld.
=ere is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature bet!een the National Asse"bly on the one hand, and the Electoral Co""ission on the other.
;ro" the very nature of the republican govern"ent established in our country in the light of
A"erican eBperience and of our o!n, upon the Cudicial depart"ent is thro!n the sole"n and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The
Electoral Co""ission, as !e shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created
for a specific purpose, na"ely to deter"ine all contests relating to the election, returns and
>ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly. Although the Electoral Co""ission "ay not
be interfered !ith, !hen and !hile acting !ithin the li"its of its authority, it does not follo! that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional "echanis" adopted by the people and that it is not subCect to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Co""ission is not a separate depart"ent of the
govern"ent, and even if it !ere, conflicting clai"s of authority under the funda"ental la! bet!een
depart"ent po!ers and agencies of the govern"ent are necessarily deter"ined by the Cudiciary in
Custifiable and appropriate cases. /iscarding the English type and other European types of
constitutional govern"ent, the fra"ers of our constitution adopted the A"erican type !here the
!ritten constitution is interpreted and given effect by the Cudicial depart"ent. :n so"e countries
!hich have declined to follo! the A"erican eBa"ple, provisions have been inserted in their
constitutions prohibiting the courts fro" eBercising the po!er to interpret the funda"ental la!. This is
ta#en as a recognition of !hat other!ise !ould be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition
courts are bound to assu"e !hat is logically their function. ;or instance, the Constitution of Poland
of (,1(, eBpressly provides that courts shall have no po!er to eBa"ine the validity of statutes 'art.
6(, chap. :F). The for"er Austrian Constitution contained a si"ilar declaration. :n countries !hose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assu"ed this po!er. This is true in Nor!ay,
Ereece, Australia and *outh Africa. Hhereas, in C$echoslova#ia 'arts. 1 and -, Preli"inary 8a! to
constitutional Charter of the C$echoslova# Republic, ;ebruary 1,, (,1A) and *pain 'arts. (1(3(1-,
Title :I, Constitutional of the Republic of (,-() especial constitutional courts are established to pass
upon the validity of ordinary la!s. :n our case, the nature of the present controversy sho!s the
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to deter"ine the conflict of authority bet!een t!o agencies
created by the Constitution. Here !e to decline to ta#e cogni$ance of the controversy, !ho !ill
deter"ine the conflictG And if the conflict !ere left undecided and undeter"ined, !ould not a void be
thus created in our constitutional syste" !hich "ay be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
fra"e!or#G To as# these >uestions is to ans!er the". Natura acuum abhorret, so "ust !e avoid
eBhaustion in our constitutional syste". 9pon principle, reason and authority, !e are clearly of the
opinion that upon the ad"itted facts of the present case, this court has Curisdiction over the Electoral
Co""ission and the subCect "ater of the present controversy for the purpose of deter"ining the
character, scope and eBtent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Co""ission as ?the sole
Cudge of all contests relating to the election, returns and >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National
Asse"bly.?
=aving disposed of the >uestion of Curisdiction, !e shall no! proceed to pass upon the second
proposition and deter"ine !hether the Electoral Co""ission has acted !ithout or in eBcess of its
Curisdiction in adopting its resolution of /ece"ber ,, (,-., and in assu"ing to ta#e cogni$ance of
the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner not!ithstanding the previous
confir"ation thereof by the National Asse"bly on /ece"ber -, (,-.. As able counsel for the
petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article F: of the
Constitution !hich provides&
?*EC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Co""ission co"posed of three ustice of the *upre"e Court
designated by the Chief ustice, and of siB Me"bers chosen by the National Asse"bly, three of
!ho" shall be no"inated by the party having the largest nu"ber of votes, and three by the party
having the second largest nu"ber of votes therein. The senior ustice in the Co""ission shall be its
Chair"an. The Electoral Co""ission shall be the sole Cudge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly.? :t is i"perative, therefore, that
!e delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and in>uire into the intention of its
fra"ers and the people !ho adopted it so that !e "ay properly appreciate its full "eaning, i"port
and significance.
The original provision regarding this subCect in the Act of Congress of uly (, (,A1 'sec. +, par. .)
laying do!n the rule that ?the asse"bly shall be the Cudge of the elections, returns, and >ualifications
of its "e"bers?, !as ta#en fro" clause ( of section ., Article : of the Constitution of the 9nited
*tates providing that ?Each =ouse shall be the udge of the Elections, Returns, and <ualifications of
its o!n Me"bers, . . . .? The Act of Congress of August 1,, (,(@ 'sec. (6, par. () "odified this
provision by the insertion of the !ord ?sole? as follo!s& ?That the *enate and =ouse of
Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole Cudges of the elections, returns, and >ualifications of
their elective "e"bers . . .? apparently in order to e"phasi$e the eBclusive the 8egislative over the
particular case s therein specified. This court has had occasion to characteri$e this grant of po!er to
the Philippine *enate and =ouse of Representatives, respectively, as ?full, clear and co"plete?
'Feloso s. Boards of Canvassers of 8eyte and *a"ar 5(,(,7, -, Phil., 66@, 666.)
The first step to!ards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested
elections to the legislature !as ta#en by the sub3co""ittee of five appointed by the Co""ittee on
Constitutional Euarantees of the Constitutional Convention, !hich sub3co""ittee sub"itted a report
on August -A, (,-4, reco""ending the creation of a Tribunal of Constitutional *ecurity e"po!ered
to hear legislature but also against the election of eBecutive officers for !hose election the vote of
the !hole nation is re>uired, as !ell as to initiate i"peach"ent proceedings against specified
eBecutive and Cudicial officer. ;or the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal !as to be
co"posed of three Custices designated by the *upre"e Court and siB "e"bers of the house of the
legislature to !hich the contest corresponds, three "e"bers to be designed by the "aCority party
and three by the "inority, to be presided over by the *enior ustice unless the Chief ustice is also a
"e"ber in !hich case the latter shall preside. The foregoing proposal !as sub"itted by the
Co""ittee on Constitutional Euarantees to the Convention on *epte"ber (., (,-4, !ith slight
"odifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four "e"bers, that is,
t!o senators to be designated one each fro" the t!o "aCor parties in the *enate and t!o
representatives to be designated one each fro" the t!o "aCor parties in the =ouse of
Representatives, and in a!arding representation to the eBecutive depart"ent in the persons of t!o
representatives to be designated by the President.
Mean!hile, the Co""ittee on 8egislative Po!er !as also preparing its report. As sub"itted to the
Convention on *epte"ber 14, (,-4 subsection ., section ., of the proposed Article on the
8egislative /epart"ent, reads as follo!s&
The elections, returns and >ualifications of the "e"bers of either house and all cases
contesting the election of any of their "e"bers shall be Cudged by an Electoral Co""ission,
constituted, as to each =ouse, by three "e"bers elected by the "e"bers of the party
having the largest nu"ber of votes therein, three elected by the "e"bers of the party having
the second largest nu"ber of votes, and as to its Chair"an, one ustice of the *upre"e
Court designated by the Chief ustice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional *ecurity !ith co"prehensive Curisdiction as
proposed by the Co""ittee on Constitutional Euarantees !hich !as probably inspired by the
*panish plan 'art. (1(, Constitution of the *panish Republic of (,-(), !as soon abandoned in favor
of the proposition of the Co""ittee on 8egislative Po!er to create a si"ilar body !ith reduced
po!ers and !ith specific and li"ited Curisdiction, to be designated as a Electoral Co""ission. The
*ponsorship Co""ittee "odified the proposal of the Co""ittee on 8egislative Po!er !ith respect
to the co"position of the Electoral Co""ission and "ade further changes in phraseology to suit the
proCect of adopting a unica"eral instead of a bica"eral legislature. The draft as finally sub"itted to
the Convention on 2ctober 1@, (,-4, reads as follo!s&
'@) The elections, returns and >ualifications of the Me"bers of the National Asse"bly and all
cases contesting the election of any of its Me"bers shall be Cudged by an Electoral
Co""ission, co"posed of three "e"bers elected by the party having the largest nu"ber of
votes in the National Asse"bly, three elected by the "e"bers of the party having the second
largest nu"ber of votes, and three Custices of the *upre"e Court designated by the Chief
ustice, the Co""ission to be presided over by one of said Custices.
/uring the discussion of the a"end"ent introduced by /elegates 8abrador, Abordo, and others,
proposing to stri#e out the !hole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the
follo!ing& ?The National Asse"bly shall be the soled and eBclusive Cudge of the elections, returns,
and >ualifications of the Me"bers?, the follo!ing illu"inating re"ar#s !ere "ade on the floor of the
Convention in its session of /ece"ber 4, (,-4, as to the scope of the said draft&
B B B B B B B B B
Mr. FENT9RA. Mr. President, !e have a doubt here as to the scope of the "eaning of the
first four lines, paragraph @, page (( of the draft, reading& ?The elections, returns and
>ualifications of the Me"bers of the National Asse"bly and all cases contesting the election
of any of its Me"bers shall be Cudged by an Electoral Co""ission, . . .? : should li#e to as#
fro" the gentle"an fro" Capi$ !hether the election and >ualification of the "e"ber !hose
elections is not contested shall also be Cudged by the Electoral Co""ission.
Mr. R2IA*. :f there is no >uestion about the election of the "e"bers, there is nothing to be
Cudged0 that is !hy the !ord ?Cudge? is used to indicate a controversy. :f there is no >uestion
about the election of a "e"ber, there is nothing to be sub"itted to the Electoral Co""ission
and there is nothing to be deter"ined.
Mr. FENT9RA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Co""ission shall confir"
also the election of those !hose election is not contestedG
Mr. R2IA*. There is no need of confir"ation. As the gentle"an #no!s, the action of the
=ouse of Representatives confir"ing the election of its "e"bers is Cust a "atter of the rules
of the asse"bly. :t is not constitutional. :t is not necessary. After a "an files his credentials
that he has been elected, that is sufficient, unless his election is contested.
Mr. FENT9RA. But : do not believe that that is sufficient, as !e have observed that for
purposes of the auditor, in the "atter of election of a "e"ber to a legislative body, because
he !ill not authori$e his pay.
Mr. R2IA*. Hell, !hat is the case !ith regards to the "unicipal president !ho is electedG
Hhat happens !ith regards to the councilors of a "unicipalityG /oes anybody confir" their
electionG The "unicipal council does this& it "a#es a canvass and proclai"s J in this case
the "unicipal council proclai"s !ho has been elected, and it ends there, unless there is a
contest. :t is the sa"e case0 there is no need on the part of the Electoral Co""ission unless
there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the gentle"an fro"
Cavite !here one person tries to be elected in place of another !ho !as declared elected.
;ro" eBa"ple, in a case !hen the residence of the "an !ho has been elected is in
>uestion, or in case the citi$enship of the "an !ho has been elected is in >uestion.
=o!ever, if the asse"bly desires to annul the po!er of the co""ission, it "ay do so by
certain "aneuvers upon its first "eeting !hen the returns are sub"itted to the
asse"bly. $he purpose is to "ie to the Electoral Commission all the powers e%ercised by
the assembly referrin" to the elections& returns and 'ualifications of the members. Hhen
there is no contest, there is nothing to be Cudged.
Mr. FENT9RA. Then it should be eli"inated.
Mr. R2IA*. But that is a different "atter, : thin# Mr. /elegate.
Mr. C:NC2. Mr. President, : have a si"ilar >uestion as that propounded by the gentle"an
fro" :locos Norte !hen : arose a !hile ago. =o!ever : !ant to as# "ore >uestions fro" the
delegate fro" Capi$. This paragraph @ on page (( of the draft cites cases contesting the
election as separate fro" the first part of the sections !hich refers to elections, returns and
>ualifications.
Mr. R2IA*. $hat is merely for the sa(e of clarity. )n fact the cases of contested elections are
already included in the phrase *the elections& returns and 'ualifications.* $his phrase *and
contested elections* was inserted merely for the sa(e of clarity.
Mr. C:NC2. 9nder this paragraph, "ay not the Electoral Co""ission, at its o!n instance,
refuse to confir" the elections of the "e"bers.?
Mr. R2IA*. : do not thin# so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. 8ABRA/2R. Mr. President, !ill the gentle"an yieldG
T=E PRE*:/ENT. The gentle"an "ay yield, if he so desires.
Mr. R2IA*. Hillingly.
Mr. 8ABRA/2R. /oes not the gentle"an fro" Capi$ believe that unless this po!er is
granted to the asse"bly, the asse"bly on its o!n "otion does not have the right to contest
the election and >ualification of its "e"bersG
Mr. R2IA*. : have no doubt but that the gentle"an is right. :f this draft is retained as it is,
even if t!o3thirds of the asse"bly believe that a "e"ber has not the >ualifications provided
by la!, they cannot re"ove hi" for that reason.
Mr. 8ABRA/2R. *o that the right to re"ove shall only be retained by the Electoral
Co""ission.
Mr. R2IA*. By the asse"bly for "isconduct.
Mr. 8ABRA/2R. : "ean !ith respect to the >ualifications of the "e"bers.
Mr. R2IA*. %es, by the Electoral Co""ission.
Mr. 8ABRA/2R. *o that under this draft, no "e"ber of the asse"bly has the right to
>uestion the eligibility of its "e"bersG
Mr. R2IA*. Before a "e"ber can >uestion the eligibility, he "ust go to the Electoral
Co""ission and "a#e the >uestion before the Electoral Co""ission.
Mr. 8ABRA/2R. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is
contested or not contested.
Mr. R2IA*. Yes& sir! that is the purpose.
Mr. PE8A%2. Mr. President, : !ould li#e to be infor"ed if the Electoral Co""ission has
po!er and authority to pass upon the >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly
even though that >uestion has not been raised.
Mr. R2IA*. : have Cust said that they have no po!er, because they can only Cudge.
:n the sa"e session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading ?The election, returns and
>ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly and? !as eli"inated by the *ponsorship
Co""ittee in response to an a"end"ent introduced by /elegates ;rancisco, Fentura, Fin$ons,
Rafols, 8i", Mu"ar and others. :n eBplaining the difference bet!een the original draft and the draft
as a"ended, /elegate RoBas spea#ing for the *ponsorship Co""ittee said&
B B B B B B B B B
*r. R2IA*. 8a diferencia, seKor Presidente, consiste sola"ente en obviar la obCecion
apuntada por varios /elegados al efecto de >ue la pri"era clausula del draft >ue dice& ?The
elections, returns and >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly? parece >ue
da a la Co"ision Electoral la facultad de deter"inar ta"bien la eleccion de los "ie"bros
>ue no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, cree"os >ue la en"ienda tien ra$on
en ese sentido, si en"enda"os el draft, de tal "odo >ue se lea co"o sigue& ?All cases
contesting the election?, de "odo >ue los Cueces de la Co"ision Electoral se li"itaran
sola"ente a los casos en >ue haya habido protesta contra las actas.? Before the
a"end"ent of /elegate 8abrador !as voted upon the follo!ing interpellation also too#
place&
El *r. C2NEER2. Antes de votarse la en"ienda, >uisiera
El *r. PRE*:/ENTE. L<ue dice el Co"iteG
El *r. R2IA*. Con "ucho gusto.
El *r. C2NEER2. Tal co"o esta el draft, dando tres "ie"bros a la "ayoria, y otros tres a
la "inoria y tres a la Corte *upre"a, Lno cree *u *eKoria >ue esto e>uivale practica"ente
a deCar el asunto a los "ie"bros del Tribunal *upre"oG
El *r. R2IA*. *i y no. Cree"os >ue si el tribunal o la Co""ission esta constituido en esa
for"a, tanto los "ie"bros de la "ayoria co"o los de la "inoria asi co"o los "ie"bros de la
Corte *upre"a consideraran la cuestion sobre la base de sus "eritos, sabiendo >ue el
partidis"o no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El *r. C2NEER2. LCree *u *eKoria >ue en un caso co"o ese, podria"os hacer >ue tanto
los de la "ayoria co"o los de la "inoria prescindieran del partidis"oG
El *r. R2IA*. Creo >ue si, por>ue el partidis"o no les daria el triunfo.
B B B B B B B B B
The a"end"ent introduced by /elegates 8abrador, Abordo and others see#ing to restore the po!er
to decide contests relating to the election, returns and >ualifications of "e"bers of the National
Asse"bly to the National Asse"bly itself, !as defeated by a vote of ninety3eight ',6) against fifty3siB
'.@).
:n the sa"e session of /ece"ber 4, (,-4, /elegate Cru$ 'C.) sought to a"end the draft by reducing
the representation of the "inority party and the *upre"e Court in the Electoral Co""ission to t!o
"e"bers each, so as to accord "ore representation to the "aCority party. The Convention reCected
this a"end"ent by a vote of seventy3siB '+@) against forty3siB '4@), thus "aintaining the non3
partisan character of the co""ission.
As approved on anuary -(, (,-., the draft !as "ade to read as follo!s&
'@) All cases contesting the elections, returns and >ualifications of the Me"bers of the
National Asse"bly shall be Cudged by an Electoral Co""ission, co"posed of three
"e"bers elected by the party having the largest nu"ber of votes in the National Asse"bly,
three elected by the "e"bers of the party having the second largest nu"ber of votes, and
three Custices of the *upre"e Court designated by the Chief ustice, the Co""ission to be
presided over by one of said Custices.
The *tyle Co""ittee to !hich the draft !as sub"itted revised it as follo!s&
*EC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Co""ission co"posed of three ustices of the *upre"e
Court designated by the Chief ustice, and of siB Me"bers chosen by the National Asse"bly,
three of !ho" shall be no"inated by the party having the largest nu"ber of votes, and three
by the party having the second largest nu"ber of votes therein. The senior ustice in the
Co""ission shall be its chair"an. The Electoral Co""ission shall be the sole Cudge of the
election, returns, and >ualifications of the Me"bers of the National Asse"bly.
Hhen the foregoing draft !as sub"itted for approval on ;ebruary 6, (,-., the *tyle Co""ittee,
through President Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the
phrase ?All contests relating to? bet!een the phrase ?Cudge of? and the !ords ?the elections?, !hich
!as accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the po!er of deter"ining the election, returns and >ualifications of the "e"bers of
the legislature long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, i"partial and non3partisan
tribunal, is by no "eans a "ere eBperi"ent in the science of govern"ent.
Cushing, in his 8a! and Practice of 8egislative Asse"blies 'ninth edition, chapter F:, pages .+, .6),
gives a vivid account of the ?scandalously notorious? canvassing of votes by political parties in the
disposition of contests by the =ouse of Co""ons in the follo!ing passages !hich are partly >uoted
by the petitioner in his printed "e"orandu" of March (4, (,-@&
(.-. ;ro" the ti"e !hen the co""ons established their right to be the eBclusive Cudges of
the elections, returns, and >ualifications of their "e"bers, until the year (++A, t!o "odes of
proceeding prevailed, in the deter"ination of controverted elections, and rights of
"e"bership. 2ne of the standing co""ittees appointed at the co""ence"ent of each
session, !as deno"inated the co""ittee of privileges and elections, !hose functions !as to
hear and investigate all >uestions of this description !hich "ight be referred to the", and to
report their proceedings, !ith their opinion thereupon, to the house, fro" ti"e to ti"e. Hhen
an election petition !as referred to this co""ittee they heard the parties and their !itnesses
and other evidence, and "ade a report of all the evidence, together !ith their opinion
thereupon, in the for" of resolutions, !hich !ere considered and agreed or disagreed to by
the house. The other "ode of proceeding !as by a hearing at the bar of the house itself.
Hhen this court !as adopted, the case !as heard and decided by the house, in substantially
the sa"e "anner as by a co""ittee. The co""ittee of privileges and elections although a
select co""ittee. The co""ittee of privileges and elections although a select co""ittee
!as usually !hat is called an open one0 that is to say, in order to constitute the co""ittee, a
>uoru" of the "e"bers na"ed !as re>uired to be present, but all the "e"bers of the
house !ere at liberty to attend the co""ittee and vote if they pleased.
(.4. Hith the gro!th of political parties in parlia"ent >uestions relating to the right of
"e"bership gradually assu"ed a political character0 so that for "any years previous to the
year (++A, controverted elections had been tried and deter"ined by the house of co""ons,
as "ere party >uestions, upon !hich the strength of contending factions "ight be tested.
Thus, for EBa"ple, in (+4(, *ir Robert Halpole, after repeated attac#s upon his govern"ent,
resigned his office in conse>uence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenha" election. Mr.
=atsell re"ar#s, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this syste", that ?Every
principle of decency and Custice !ere notoriously and openly prostituted, fro" !hence the
younger part of the house !ere insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the sa"e
licentious conduct in "ore serious "atters, and in >uestions of higher i"portance to the
public !elfare.? Mr. Eeorge Erenville, a distinguished "e"ber of the house of co""ons,
undertoo# to propose a re"edy for the evil, and, on the +th of March, (++A, obtained the
unani"ous leave of the house to bring in a bill, ?to regulate the trial of controverted elections,
or returns of "e"bers to serve in parlia"ent.? :n his speech to eBplain his plan, on the
"otion for leave, Mr. Erenville alluded to the eBisting practice in the follo!ing ter"s& ?:nstead
of trusting to the "erits of their respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties
is their private interest a"ong us0 and it is scandalously notorious that !e are as earnestly
canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if !e !ere !holly self3elective, and not
bound to act by the principles of Custice, but by the discretionary i"pulse of our o!n
inclinations0 nay, it is !ell #no!n, that in every contested election, "any "e"bers of this
house, !ho are ulti"ately to Cudge in a #ind of Cudicial capacity bet!een the co"petitors,
enlist the"selves as parties in the contention, and ta#e upon the"selves the partial
"anage"ent of the very business, upon !hich they should deter"ine !ith the strictest
i"partiality.?
(... :t !as to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Erenville brought in a bill
!hich "et !ith the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the (1th of
April, (++A. This !as the celebrated la! since #no!n by the na"e of the Erenville Act0 of
!hich Mr. =atsell declares, that it ?!as one of the nobles !or#s, for the honor of the house of
co""ons, and the security of the constitution, that !as ever devised by any "inister or
states"an.? :t is probable, that the "agnitude of the evil, or the apparent success of the
re"edy, "ay have led "any of the conte"poraries of the "easure to the infor"ation of a
Cudge"ent, !hich !as not ac>uiesced in by so"e of the leading states"en of the day, and
has not been entirely confir"ed by subse>uent eBperience. The bill !as obCected to by 8ord
North, Mr. /e Erey, after!ards chief Custice of the co""on pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. /yson, !ho
had been cler# of the house, and Mr. Charles a"es ;oB, chiefly on the ground, that the
introduction of the ne! syste" !as an essential alteration of the constitution of parlia"ent,
and a total abrogation of one of the "ost i"portant rights and Curisdictions of the house of
co""ons.
As early as (6@6, the =ouse of Co""ons in England solved the proble" of insuring the non3
partisan settle"ent of the controverted elections of its "e"bers by abdicating its prerogative to t!o
Cudges of the MingDs Bench of the =igh Court of ustice selected fro" a rota in accordance !ith rules
of court "ade for the purpose. =aving proved successful, the practice has beco"e i"bedded in
English Curisprudence 'Parlia"entary Elections Act, (6@6 5-( N -1 Fict. c. (1.7 as a"ended by
Parlia"entary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. (6+, 541 N 4- Fict. c. +.7, s. 10 Corrupt and
:llegal Practices Preventions Act, (66- 54@ N 4+ Fict. c. .(0, s. +A0 EBpiring 8a!s Continuance Act,
(,(( 5( N 1 Eeo. ., c. 1170 8a!s of England, vol. I::, p. 4A6, vol. II:, p. +6+). :n the /o"inion of
Canada, election contests !hich !ere originally heard by the Co""ittee of the =ouse of Co""ons,
are since (,11 tried in the courts. 8i#e!ise, in the Co""on!ealth of Australia, election contests
!hich !ere originally deter"ined by each house, are since (,11 tried in the =igh Court. :n =ungary,
the organic la! provides that all protests against the election of "e"bers of the 9pper =ouse of the
/iet are to be resolved by the *upre"e Ad"inistrative Court '8a! 11 of (,(@, chap. 1, art. -+, par.
@). The Constitution of Poland of March (+, (,1( 'art. (,) and the Constitution of the ;ree City of
/an$ig of May (-, (,11 'art. (A) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the /iet or
National Asse"bly in the *upre"e Court. ;or the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the
Constitution of the Eer"an Reich of uly (, (,(, 'art. -(), the Constitution of the C$echoslova#
Republic of ;ebruary 1,, (,1A 'art. (,) and the Constitution of the Erecian Republic of une 1, (,1+
'art. 4-), all provide for an Electoral Co""ission.
The creation of an Electoral Co""ission !hose "e"bership is recruited both fro" the legislature
and the Cudiciary is by no "eans un#no!n in the 9nited *tates. :n the presidential elections of (6+@
there !as a dispute as to the nu"ber of electoral votes received by each of the t!o opposing
candidates. As the Constitution "ade no ade>uate provision for such a contingency, Congress
passed a la! on anuary 1,, (6++ '9nited *tates *tatutes at 8arge, vol. (,, chap. -+, pp. 11+311,),
creating a special Electoral Co""ission co"posed of five "e"bers elected by the *enate, five
"e"bers elected by the =ouse of Representatives, and five Custices of the *upre"e Court, the fifth
Custice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the co""ission !as to be
binding unless reCected by the t!o houses voting separately. Although there is not "uch of a "oral
lesson to be derived fro" the eBperience of A"erica in this regard, Cudging fro" the observations of
ustice ;ield, !ho !as a "e"ber of that body on the part of the *upre"e Court 'Country"an, the
*upre"e Court of the 9nited *tates and its Appellate Po!er under the Constitution 5Albany, (,(-7 J
Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Co""ission, p. 1. et se'.), the eBperi"ent has at least abiding
historical interest.
The "e"bers of the Constitutional Convention !ho fra"ed our funda"ental la! !ere in their
"aCority "en "ature in years and eBperience. To be sure, "any of the" !ere fa"iliar !ith the
history and political develop"ent of other countries of the !orld. Hhen , therefore, they dee"ed it
!ise to create an Electoral Co""ission as a constitutional organ and invested it !ith the eBclusive
function of passing upon and deter"ining the election, returns and >ualifications of the "e"bers of
the National Asse"bly, they "ust have done so not only in the light of their o!n eBperience but also
having in vie! the eBperience of other enlightened peoples of the !orld. The creation of the Electoral
Co""ission !as designed to re"edy certain evils of !hich the fra"ers of our Constitution !ere
cogni$ant. Not!ithstanding the vigorous opposition of so"e "e"bers of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, !as approved by that body by a vote of ,6 against .6. All
that can be said no! is that, upon the approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral
Co""ission is the eBpression of the !isdo" and ?ulti"ate Custice of the people?. 'Abraha" 8incoln,
;irst :naugural Address, March 4, (6@(.)
;ro" the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose !as to transfer
in its totality all the po!ers previously eBercised by the legislature in "atters pertaining to contested
elections of its "e"bers, to an independent and i"partial tribunal. :t !as not so "uch the #no!ledge
and appreciation of conte"porary constitutional precedents, ho!ever, as the long3felt need of
deter"ining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations !hich pro"pted the people, acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body #no!n as the Electoral
Co""ission. Hith this end in vie!, a co"posite body in !hich both the "aCority and "inority parties
are e>ually represented to off3set partisan influence in its deliberations !as created, and further
endo!ed !ith Cudicial te"per by including in its "e"bership three Custices of the *upre"e Court.
The Electoral Co""ission is a constitutional creation, invested !ith the necessary authority in the
perfor"ance and eBecution of the li"ited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution.
Although it is not a po!er in our tripartite sche"e of govern"ent, it is, to all intents and purposes,
!hen acting !ithin the li"its of its authority, an independent organ. :t is, to be sure, closer to the
legislative depart"ent than to any other. The location of the provision 'section 4) creating the
Electoral Co""ission under Article F: entitled ?8egislative /epart"ent? of our Constitution is very
indicative. :ts co"positions is also significant in that it is constituted by a "aCority of "e"bers of the
legislature. But it is a body separate fro" and independent of the legislature.
The grant of po!er to the Electoral Co""ission to Cudge all contests relating to the election, returns
and >ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, is intended to be as co"plete and
uni"paired as if it had re"ained originally in the legislature. The eBpress lodging of that po!er in the
Electoral Co""ission is an i"plied denial of the eBercise of that po!er by the National Asse"bly.
And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative po!er as an eBpress prohibition in the
Constitution 'E% parte 8e!is, 4. TeB. Cri". Rep., (0 *tate s.Hhis"an, -@ *./., 1@A0 8.R.A., (,(+B,
(). :f !e concede the po!er clai"ed in behalf of the National Asse"bly that said body "ay regulate
the proceedings of the Electoral Co""ission and cut off the po!er of the co""ission to lay do!n
the period !ithin !hich protests should be filed, the grant of po!er to the co""ission !ould be
ineffective. The Electoral Co""ission in such case !ould be invested !ith the po!er to deter"ine
contested cases involving the election, returns and >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National
Asse"bly but subCect at all ti"es to the regulative po!er of the National Asse"bly. Not only !ould
the purpose of the fra"ers of our Constitution of totally transferring this authority fro" the legislative
body be frustrated, but a dual authority !ould be created !ith the resultant inevitable clash of
po!ers fro" ti"e to ti"e. A sad spectacle !ould then be presented of the Electoral Co""ission
retaining the bare authority of ta#ing cogni$ance of cases referred to, but in reality !ithout the
necessary "eans to render that authority effective !henever and !henever the National Asse"bly
has chosen to act, a situation !orse than that intended to be re"edied by the fra"ers of our
Constitution. The po!er to regulate on the part of the National Asse"bly in procedural "atters !ill
inevitably lead to the ulti"ate control by the Asse"bly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral
Co""ission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. :t is obvious that
this result should not be per"itted.
He are not insensible to the i"passioned argu"ent or the learned counsel for the petitioner
regarding the i"portance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national
Asse"bly as a coordinate depart"ent of the govern"ent and of according validity to its acts, to
avoid !hat he characteri$ed !ould be practically an unli"ited po!er of the co""ission in the
ad"ission of protests against "e"bers of the National Asse"bly. But as !e have pointed out
hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Co""ission carried !ith it e% necesitate rei the po!er
regulative in character to li"it the ti"e !ith !hich protests intrusted to its cogni$ance should be filed.
:t is a settled rule of construction that !here a general po!er is conferred or duty enCoined, every
particular po!er necessary for the eBercise of the one or the perfor"ance of the other is also
conferred 'Cooley, Constitutional 8i"itations, eight ed., vol. :, pp. (-6, (-,). :n the absence of any
further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be follo!ed in filing protests before the
Electoral Co""ission, therefore, the incidental po!er to pro"ulgate such rules necessary for the
proper eBercise of its eBclusive po!er to Cudge all contests relating to the election, returns and
>ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, "ust be dee"ed by necessary i"plication to
have been lodged also in the Electoral Co""ission.
:t is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Co""ission "ay
abuse its regulative authority by ad"itting protests beyond any reasonable ti"e, to the disturbance
of the tran>uillity and peace of "ind of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly. But the possibility of
abuse is not argu"ent against the concession of the po!er as there is no po!er that is not
susceptible of abuse. :n the second place, if any "ista#e has been co""itted in the creation of an
Electoral Co""ission and in investing it !ith eBclusive Curisdiction in all cases relating to the
election, returns, and >ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, the re"edy is political, not
Cudicial, and "ust be sought through the ordinary processes of de"ocracy. All the possible abuses of
the govern"ent are not intended to be corrected by the Cudiciary. He believe, ho!ever, that the
people in creating the Electoral Co""ission reposed as "uch confidence in this body in the
eBclusive deter"ination of the specified cases assigned to it, as they have given to the *upre"e
Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the govern"ent !ere
designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional organ !or#ing
!ithin its o!n particular sphere of discretionary action "ust be dee"ed to be ani"ated !ith the
sa"e $eal and honesty in acco"plishing the great ends for !hich they !ere created by the
sovereign !ill. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies "ight leave "uch to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the perfection of hu"an institutions. :n the third place, fro" the fact
that the Electoral Co""ission "ay not be interfered !ith in the eBercise of its legiti"ate po!er, it
does not follo! that its acts, ho!ever illegal or unconstitutional, "ay not be challenge in appropriate
cases over !hich the courts "ay eBercise Curisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are
considerations of e>uitable character that should not be overloo#ed in the appreciation of the
intrinsic "erits of the controversy. The Co""on!ealth Eovern"ent !as inaugurated on Nove"ber
(., (,-., on !hich date the Constitution, eBcept as to the provisions "entioned in section @ of
Article IF thereof, !ent into effect. The ne! National Asse"bly convened on Nove"ber 1.th of that
year, and the resolution confir"ing the election of the petitioner, ose A. Angara !as approved by
that body on /ece"ber -, (,-.. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro %nsua against the
election of the petitioner !as filed on /ece"ber , of the sa"e year. The pleadings do not sho!
!hen the Electoral Co""ission !as for"ally organi$ed but it does appear that on /ece"ber ,,
(,-., the Electoral Co""ission "et for the first ti"e and approved a resolution fiBing said date as
the last day for the filing of election protest. Hhen, therefore, the National Asse"bly passed its
resolution of /ece"ber -, (,-., confir"ing the election of the petitioner to the National Asse"bly,
the Electoral Co""ission had not yet "et0 neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organi$ed. As a "ater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives
division of the National Asse"bly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the
petitioner, the three Custices of the *upre"e Court the siB "e"bers of the National Asse"bly
constituting the Electoral Co""ission !ere respectively designated only on /ece"ber 4 and @,
(,-.. :f Resolution No. 6 of the National Asse"bly confir"ing non3protested elections of "e"bers of
the National Asse"bly had the effect of li"iting or tolling the ti"e for the presentation of protests, the
result !ould be that the National Asse"bly J on the hypothesis that it still retained the incidental
po!er of regulation in such cases J had already barred the presentation of protests before the
Electoral Co""ission had had ti"e to organi$e itself and deliberate on the "ode and "ethod to be
follo!ed in a "atter entrusted to its eBclusive Curisdiction by the Constitution. This result !as not and
could not have been conte"plated, and should be avoided.
;ro" another angle, Resolution No. 6 of the National Asse"bly confir"ing the election of "e"bers
against !ho" no protests had been filed at the ti"e of its passage on /ece"ber -, (,-., can not be
construed as a li"itation upon the ti"e for the initiation of election contests. Hhile there "ight have
been good reason for the legislative practice of confir"ation of the election of "e"bers of the
legislature at the ti"e !hen the po!er to decide election contests !as still lodged in the legislature,
confir"ation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Co""ission of
the authority incidental to its constitutional po!er to be ?the sole Cudge of all contest relating to the
election, returns, and >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly?, to fiB the ti"e for the
filing of said election protests. Confir"ation by the National Asse"bly of the returns of its "e"bers
against !hose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As
contended by the Electoral Co""ission in its resolution of anuary 1-, (,-@, overruling the "otion
of the herein petitioner to dis"iss the protest filed by the respondent Pedro %nsua, confir"ation of
the election of any "e"ber is not re>uired by the Constitution before he can discharge his duties as
such "e"ber. As a "atter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers is
sufficient to entitle a "e"ber3elect to a seat in the national Asse"bly and to render hi" eligible to
any office in said body 'No. (, par. (, Rules of the National Asse"bly, adopted /ece"ber @, (,-.).
9nder the practice prevailing both in the English =ouse of Co""ons and in the Congress of the
9nited *tates, confir"ation is neither necessary in order to entitle a "e"ber3elect to ta#e his seat.
The return of the proper election officers is sufficient, and the "e"ber3elect presenting such return
begins to enCoy the privileges of a "e"ber fro" the ti"e that he ta#es his oath of office '8a!s of
England, vol. (1, pp. --(. --10 vol. 1(, pp. @,4, @,.0 9. *. C. A., Title 1, secs. 1(, 1., 1@).
Confir"ation is in order only in cases of contested elections !here the decision is adverse to the
clai"s of the protestant. :n England, the CudgesD decision or report in controverted elections is
certified to the *pea#er of the =ouse of Co""ons, and the =ouse, upon being infor"ed of such
certificate or report by the *pea#er, is re>uired to enter the sa"e upon the ournals, and to give
such directions for confir"ing or altering the return, or for the issue of a !rit for a ne! election, or for
carrying into eBecution the deter"ination as circu"stances "ay re>uire '-( N -1 Fict., c. (1., sec.
(-). :n the 9nited *tates, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular house itself is generally
regarded as sufficient, !ithout any actual alternation or a"end"ent of the return 'Cushing, 8a! and
Practice of 8egislative Asse"blies, ,th ed., sec. (@@).
9nder the practice prevailing !hen the ones 8a! !as still in force, each house of the Philippine
8egislature fiBed the ti"e !hen protests against the election of any of its "e"bers should be filed.
This !as eBpressly authori$ed by section (6 of the ones 8a! "a#ing each house the sole Cudge of
the election, return and >ualifications of its "e"bers, as !ell as by a la! 'sec. 4+6, Act No. --6+)
e"po!ering each house to respectively prescribe by resolution the ti"e and "anner of filing contest
in the election of "e"ber of said bodies. As a "atter of for"ality, after the ti"e fiBed by its rules for
the filing of protests had already eBpired, each house passed a resolution confir"ing or approving
the returns of such "e"bers against !hose election no protests had been filed !ithin the prescribed
ti"e. This !as interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
"e"bers not theretofore contested 'A"istad vs. Claravall 5:sabela7, *econd Philippine 8egislature,
Record J ;irst Period, p. 6,0 9rguello s. Ra"a 5Third /istrict, Cebu7, *iBth Philippine 8egislature0
;etalvero s. ;estin 5Ro"blon7, *iBth Philippine 8egislature, Record J ;irst Period, pp. @-+3@4A0
Mintanar s. Aldanese 5;ourth /istrict, Cebu7, *iBth Philippine 8egislature, Record J ;irst Period,
pp. ((1(, ((110 Aguilar s. Corpus 5Masbate7, Eighth Philippine 8egislature, Record J ;irst Period,
vol. :::, No. .@, pp. 6,1, 6,-). The Constitution has repealed section (6 of the ones 8a!. Act No.
--6+, section 4+6, "ust be dee"ed to have been i"pliedly abrogated also, for the reason that !ith
the po!er to deter"ine all contest relating to the election, returns and >ualifications of "e"bers of
the National Asse"bly, is inseparably lin#ed the authority to prescribe regulations for the eBercise of
that po!er. There !as thus no la! nor constitutional provisions !hich authori$ed the National
Asse"bly to fiB, as it is alleged to have fiBed on /ece"ber -, (,-., the ti"e for the filing of contests
against the election of its "e"bers. And !hat the National Asse"bly could not do directly, it could
not do by indirection through the "ediu" of confir"ation.
*u""ari$ing, !e conclude&
'a) That the govern"ent established by the Constitution follo!s funda"entally the theory of
separation of po!er into the legislative, the eBecutive and the Cudicial.
'b) That the syste" of chec#s and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties
often "a#es difficult the deli"itation of the po!ers granted.
'c) That in cases of conflict bet!een the several depart"ents and a"ong the agencies
thereof, the Cudiciary, !ith the *upre"e Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional
"echanis" devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
'd) That Cudicial supre"acy is but the po!er of Cudicial revie! in actual and appropriate cases
and controversies, and is the po!er and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the
govern"ent transcends the Constitution, !hich is the source of all authority.
'e) That the Electoral Co""ission is an independent constitutional creation !ith specific
po!ers and functions to eBecute and perfor", closer for purposes of classification to the
legislative than to any of the other t!o depart"ents of the govern"ents.
'f ) That the Electoral Co""ission is the sole Cudge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and >ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly.
'") That under the organic la! prevailing before the present Constitution !ent into effect,
each house of the legislature !as respectively the sole Cudge of the elections, returns, and
>ualifications of their elective "e"bers.
'h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the po!ers previously eBercised by the
legislature !ith respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and >ualifications of its
"e"bers, to the Electoral Co""ission.
'i) That such transfer of po!er fro" the legislature to the Electoral Co""ission !as full,
clear and co"plete, and carried !ith it e% necesitate rei the i"plied po!er inter alia to
prescribe the rules and regulations as to the ti"e and "anner of filing protests.
' +) That the avo!ed purpose in creating the Electoral Co""ission !as to have an
independent constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and
>ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration, !hich obCect !ould be frustrated if the National Asse"bly !ere to retain the
po!er to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the "anner of conducting said contests.
'() That section 4 of article F: of the Constitution repealed not only section (6 of the ones
8a! "a#ing each house of the Philippine 8egislature respectively the sole Cudge of the
elections, returns and >ualifications of its elective "e"bers, but also section 4+6 of Act No.
--6+ e"po!ering each house to prescribe by resolution the ti"e and "anner of filing
contests against the election of its "e"bers, the ti"e and "anner of notifying the adverse
party, and bond or bonds, to be re>uired, if any, and to fiB the costs and eBpenses of contest.
'l) That confir"ation by the National Asse"bly of the election is contested or not, is not
essential before such "e"ber3elect "ay discharge the duties and enCoy the privileges of a
"e"ber of the National Asse"bly.
'm) That confir"ation by the National Asse"bly of the election of any "e"ber against !ho"
no protest had been filed prior to said confir"ation, does not and cannot deprive the
Electoral Co""ission of its incidental po!er to prescribe the ti"e !ithin !hich protests
against the election of any "e"ber of the National Asse"bly should be filed.
He hold, therefore, that the Electoral Co""ission !as acting !ithin the legiti"ate eBercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assu"ing to ta#e cogni$ance of the protest filed by the respondent
Pedro %nsua against the election of the herein petitioner ose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Asse"bly of /ece"ber -, (,-. can not in any "anner toll the ti"e for filing protests
against the elections, returns and >ualifications of "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, nor prevent
the filing of a protest !ithin such ti"e as the rules of the Electoral Co""ission "ight prescribe.
:n vie! of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Co""ission as a
constitutional creation and as to the scope and eBtent of its authority under the facts of the present
controversy, !e dee" it unnecessary to deter"ine !hether the Electoral Co""ission is an inferior
tribunal, corporation, board or person !ithin the purvie! of sections 11@ and .(@ of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The petition for a !rit of prohibition against the Electoral Co""ission is hereby denied, !ith costs
against the petitioner. *o ordered.
,ance-a& C. ..& /ia0& Concepcion& and Horrilleno& ...& concur.
S&'#(#)& O'*$*o$+
A,A! SANTOS, J., concurring&
: concur in the result and in "ost of the vie!s so ably eBpressed in the preceding opinion. : a",
ho!ever, constrained to !ithhold "y assent to certain conclusions therein advanced.
The po!er vested in the Electoral Co""ission by the Constitution of Cudging of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and >ualifications of the "e"bers of the National Asse"bly, is Cudicial in
nature. 'Tho"as s. 8oney, (-4 9.*., -+10 -- 8a!. ed., ,4,, ,.(.) 2n the other hand, the po!er to
regulate the ti"e in !hich notice of a contested election "ay be given, is legislative in character.
'MDEl"oyle s. Cohen, (- Pet., -(10 (A 8a!. ed., (++0 Missouri vs. :llinois, 1AA 9. *. 4,@0 .A 8a!.
ed., .+1.)
:t has been correctly stated that the govern"ent established by the Constitution follo!s
funda"entally the theory of the separation of po!ers into legislative, eBecutive, and Cudicial.
8egislative po!er is vested in the National Asse"bly. 'Article F:, sec. (.) :n the absence of any clear
constitutional provision to the contrary, the po!er to regulate the ti"e in !hich notice of a contested
election "ay be given, "ust be dee"ed to be included in the grant of legislative po!er to the
National Asse"bly.
The Constitution of the 9nited *tates contains a provision si"ilar to the that found in Article F:,
section 4, of the Constitution of the Philippines. Article :, section ., of the Constitution of the 9nited
*tates provides that each house of the Congress shall be the Cudge of the elections, returns, and
>ualifications of its o!n "e"bers. Not!ithstanding this provision, the Congress has assu"ed the
po!er to regulate the ti"e in !hich notice of a contested election "ay be given. Thus section 1A(,
Title 1, of the 9nited *tates Code Annotated prescribes&
Hhenever any person intends to contest an election of any Me"ber of the =ouse of
Representatives of the 9nited *tates, he shall, !ithin thirty days after the result of such
election shall have been deter"ined by the officer or board of canvassers authori$ed by la!
to deter"ine the sa"e, give notice, in !riting, to the Me"ber !hose seat he designs to
contest, of his intention to contest the sa"e, and, in such notice, shall specify particularly the
grounds upon !hich he relies in the contest. 'R. *., par. (A..)
The Philippine Autono"y Act, other!ise #no!n as the ones 8a!, also contained a provision to the
effect that the *enate and =ouse of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole Cudges of the
elections, returns, and >ualifications of their elective "e"bers. Not!ithstanding this provision, the
Philippine 8egislature passed the Election 8a!, section 4+6 of !hich reads as follo!s&
The *enate and the =ouse of Representatives shall by resolution respectively prescribe the
ti"e and "anner of filing contest in the election of "e"bers of said bodies, the ti"e and
"anner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be re>uired, if any, and shall fiB
the costs and eBpenses of contest !hich "ay be paid fro" their respective funds.
The purpose sought to be attained by the creation of the Electoral Co""ission !as not to erect a
body that !ould be above the la!, but to raise legislative elections contests fro" the category of
political to that of Custiciable >uestions. The purpose !as not to place the co""ission beyond the
reach of the la!, but to insure the deter"ination of such contests !ith the due process of la!.
*ection 4+6 of the Election 8a! !as in force at the ti"e of the adoption of the Constitution, Article
IF, section 1, of !hich provides that J
All la!s of the Philippine :slands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Co""on!ealth of the Philippines0 thereafter, such la!s shall re"ain operative, unless
inconsistent !ith this Constitution, until a"ended, altered, "odified, or repealed by the
National Asse"bly, and all references in such la!s to the Eovern"ent or officials of the
Philippine :slands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Eovern"ent and
corresponding officials under this Constitution.
The "anifest purpose of this constitutional provision !as to insure the orderly processes of
govern"ent, and to prevent any hiatus in its operations after the inauguration of the Co""on!ealth
of the Philippines. :t !as thus provided that all la!s of the Philippine :slands shall re"ain operative
even after the inauguration of the Co""on!ealth of the Philippines, unless inconsistent !ith the
Constitution, and that all references in such la!s to the govern"ent or officials of the Philippine
:slands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the govern"ent and corresponding
officials under the Constitution. :t !ould see" to be consistent not only !ith the spirit but the letter of
the Constitution to hold that section 4+6 of the Election 8a! re"ains operative and should no! be
construed to refer to the Electoral Co""ission, !hich, in so far as the po!er to Cudge election
contests is concerned, corresponds to either the *enate or the =ouse of Representative under the
for"er regi"e. :t is i"portant to observe in this connection that said section 4+6 of the Election 8a!
vested the po!er to regulate the ti"e and "anner in !hich notice of a contested election "ay be
given, not in the Philippine 8egislature but in the *enate and =ouse of Representatives singly. :n
other !ords, the authority to prescribe the ti"e and "anner of filing contests in the elections of
"e"bers of the Philippine 8egislature !as by statute lodged separately in the bodies clothed !ith
po!er to decide such contests. Construing section 4+6 of the Election 8a! to refer to the National
Asse"bly, as re>uired by Article IF, section 1, of the Constitution, it see"s reasonable to conclude
that the authority to prescribe the ti"e and "anner of filing contests in the election of "e"bers of
the National Asse"bly is vested in the Electoral Co""ission, !hich is no! the body clothed !ith
po!er to decide such contests.
:n the light of !hat has been said, the resolution of the National Asse"bly of /ece"ber -, (,-.,
could not have the effect of barring the right of the respondent Pedro %nsua to contest the election of
the petitioner. By the sa"e to#en, the Electoral Co""ission !as authori$ed by la! to adopt its
resolution of /ece"ber ,, (,-., !hich fiBed the ti"e !ith in !hich !ritten contests "ust be filed !ith
the co""ission.
=aving been filed !ithin the ti"e fiBed by its resolutions, the Electoral Co""ission has Curisdiction to
hear and deter"ine the contest filed by the respondent Pedro %nsua against the petitioner ose A.
Angara.
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