Supreme Court to Decide on Marriage Dissolution

Savitri Pandey v.
Prem Chandra Pandey

IN THE
HONBLE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA

Case Concerning
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE

SAVITRI PANDEY
(APPELLANT)
V.
PREM CHANDRA PANDEY
(RESPONDENT)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANT

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

AYUSHI DWIVEDI
Roll No.-47
Sem-II
Section-A

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey

CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...ii
LIST OF CASES.iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION4
STATEMENT OF FACTS..5
ISSUES RAISED6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.....7

WRITTEN SUBMISSION...8-17

PRAYER FOR RELIEF18


i

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIR - All India Reporter
& - And
Anr. - Another
Edn - Edition
Expl. - Explanation
Etc. - Et Cetera
Ltd. - Limited
IPC - Indian Penal Code
Ors - Others
P. - Page number
RBI - Reserve Bank of India
SC - Supreme Court
SCC - Supreme Court Cases
v. - versus
vol. - Volume


ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Acts:
Hindu Marriage Act,1955
The Constitution Of India

Books:

1. Modern Hindu Law, Paras Diwan (22
nd
ed,2013)
2. D.Tolstoy, The Laws and Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes
3. Maynes , Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage,Bharat Law house

Dictionaries:
Blacks Law Dictionary (West Group Publishers, 2002)
The Law Lexicon, Bakshi, P. M., Ashoka Law House, New Delhi.


iii

LIST OF CASES

FOREIGN CASES
Bowron v. Bowron1898 79 L.T. 102
Gollins v. Gollins [1963] 2 All E.R. 966 at 976
Russell v Russell[1887] AC 395

INDIAN CASES
Anita Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal, (1997) 11 SCC 490
Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997) 4 SCC 226
Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176
Inder Mohan Tiwari v Manju Tiwari (1985 Cur Civ Cas 110 (Del)
Jyotish Chandra v. Meera1970 Cal 266
Laxman v. Meena, 1964 SC 40
Leela v. Suresh1994 Raj 128
Madhuri Mehta v. Meet Verma. (1997) 11 SCC 81
Naval Kishore Somani v Poonam Somani (1999) 1 DMC 415 (DB)
Prakash Kaur v. Harjinderpal Singh AIR 1999 Raj 46 at 47
Shashi Garg v. Arun Garg, (1997) 7 SCC 565
Shobha Rani v Madhukar Reddi AIR 1988 SC 121
Subbarma v. Saraswathi(1996) 2 M.L.J. 263
Sukhama v. Niranjan 1982 Del 409
Surbhi Agrawal v. Sanjay Agrawal AIR 2000 MP 139
Vira Reddy v. Kistamma1969 Mad 235


4

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant, Savitri Pandey, has approached the Honble Supreme Court of India, under a
Special Leave Petition under the Article 136 of the Constitution of India.


5

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. The facts of the case giving rise to the filing of the present appeals are that marriage
between the parties was solemnized on 6.5.1987. The appellant-wife lived with the
respondent-husband till 21st June, 1987 and according to her the marriage between
the parties was never consummated. After 21st June, 1987 the parties started living
separately.
II. Sometime thereafter the wife filed a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act on the grounds of cruelty and desertion; she also sought
permanent alimony and also to have her jewellery, given at the time of the marriage,
returned to her. She averred inter alia that her father had spent more than Rs. 80,000
on the marriage itself and gave gifts in the form of ornaments, cash and kind as
demanded by the respondent.
III. The respondent and his family members later demanded a color TV, refrigerator,
more jewellery and Rs. 10,000 in cash. In the first week of June, the appellants
father gave the respondent Rs. 10,000 and his, but still the respondent and his family
began tormenting the appellant. The appellant also alleged that her husband had
illicit relations with another woman. The respondent denied the allegations and
submitted that the appellant was taking advantage of her wrongs.
IV. The Family Judge granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion by the
husband and awarded Rs. 12,000 towards the price of a scooter gifted at the time of
marriage and also Rs. 500 per month as permanent alimony. Both the parties filed
appeals. The High Court disposed of the appeals by setting aside the decree and
holding that the appellant was the guilty party and that she has been unable to
prove the allegations of cruelty and desertion.
V. To this dispute rises the appeal.


6

ISSUES RAISED

I . Whether the defendant has treated the petitioner with cruelty or deserted her? I f
so, its effect?
I I . Whether the fact that the marriage has become an empty shell is an indication for
the breakdown of marriage?


7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. The respondent has not only deserted the appellant, but has also treated her with
cruelty and tortured her for dowry.
In this case, the appellant was deserted by the respondent and was tortured due to the
unending demands of dowry from the respondent and his family. They refused to bring her
back from her fathers home until and unless their demands are fulfilled and thereafter, the
respondent deserted the appellant. They not only inflicted physical pain upon her, but also
tormented her with mental agony and suffering.
II. The marriage between the parties became an empty shell, with no substance left and
just the form remaining.
The respondent in this case was found to have illicit relations with some other lady.
Moreover, he had solemnised this marriage just for the sake of his parents and for extracting
money from the appellants family. This made the marriage more of a deal than a relation
from the respondents side. Their marriage was never consummated and initially, both the
parties had filed petitions for divorce. The appellant had even entered into a second marriage
and had a child out of it. These facts are enough to prove that there is nothing substantial left
in this marriage.

III. The Court should allow the dissolution of the marriage as it is already irretrievably
broken down.
Since there is nothing left in this marriage which would be beneficial to either of the parties
or to the society, there is no point in continuing this marriage. Thus, in order to enhance and
protect everyones interest, the Honble Court should pass a decree of divorce to dissolve the
marriage.


8

WRITTEN SUBMISSION

I . ISSUE 1. Whether the defendant has treated the petitioner with cruelty or
deserted her? If so, its effect?
CONTENTION A: There was no co-habitation between the parties; even if it had been,
it was not constructive.
"Desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional
permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent
and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of
marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion,
therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting or
allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to
be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalizes the
sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race,
permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of
children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself; it is a continuous course of conduct
to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. After referring to host of
authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai
Shah v. Prabhavati
1
held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary
passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation,
it will not amount to desertion. It further held:
"For the office of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring
cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential
so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of
conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the
necessary intention aforesaid.

1
AIR 1957 SC 176

9

To prove desertion in matrimonial matter it is not always necessary that one of the spouse
should have left the company of the other as desertion could be proved while living under the
same roof. Desertion cannot be equated with separate living by the parties to the marriage.
Desertion may also be constructive which can be inferred from the attending circumstances.
It has always to be kept in mind that the question of desertion is a matter of inference to be
drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case.
In this case, the respondent has deserted the appellant in both actual and constructive manner.
A.1 Actual Desertion:In this case, marriage between the parties was solemnised on 6.5.1987
and after 21.6.1987 the parties started living separately. On 21.6.1987, the appellant returned
to her Maika as per custom along with her father only with a suitcase containing few clothes
of daily use. Repeated attempts for her Vidai from Maika were made by her parents but her
husband and his other members of the family did not agree to keep her as Bahu of their
family until and unless further demands are fulfilled. No efforts were made by the husband to
take back his wife with honour. He was least interested in doing so. The appellant was
deserted for two consecutive years.
As per the case the principle laid down in the cases Sukhama v. Niranjan
2
and Leela v.
Suresh
3
, when animus deserdendi (intention to desert) and the factum of separation co-exist,
it amounts to desertion. In this case, the respondent had no interest in living with his wife, but
was interested in her money. He had a clear intention to desert her which was later evident
from his act of not making any efforts to bring back his wife, or co-habit with her.
Thus, the respondent has deserted the appellant in an actual manner.
A.2 Constructive Desertion:
Constructive desertion happens when one partner causes the other partner to leave the marital
home through misconduct. If one partner is forced to leave the home because the others
misconduct, he or she has been constructively deserted. In this regime, the conduct of one
spouse makes it impossible for the other to stay in the marriage.

2
1982 Del 409
3
1994 Raj 128

10

Physical or mental cruelty to the spouse can constitute constructive desertion. Moreover,
refusing sexual intercourse can often be held to be constructive desertion. In some cases,
requiring a spouse to live with intrusive or abusive in-laws was held to be constructive
desertion, as was refusing to relocate to a new town or state.
In this case, the respondent following conducts make him offensive of Constructive
Desertion:
(i) Continuous pressure of dowry demands on the wife followed by torture which
made it impossible for the appellant to reside with him.
(ii) He had got illicit relations with a lady residing in -the District Gaya of the State of
Bihar and had married the appellant only for satisfaction of the members of his
family and to extract heavy amount and other valuables from her parents.
In Bowron v. Bowron
4
, Pollock, M.R. said that the party who intends bringing cohabitation
to an end and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion.
A.3 Effect of Desertion: Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act states that:
Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a
petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on
the ground that the other party-
(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary, sexual intercourse with any
person other than his or her spouse; or
(ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or
(ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately
preceding the presentation of the petition.
Thus , the appellant should be granted divorce under this ground.
CONTENTION B:
The appellant was treated with cruelty and was tortured for dowry.

4
1898 79 L.T. 102

11

According to Blacks Law Dictionary, cruelty is the intentional and malicious infliction of
mental or physical suffering on a living creature especially; a human.
5
It is the human
conduct or behaviour in relation to the matrimonial duties and obligations.
Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1) (ia) maybe defined
as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or
health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger.
6
It
should be understood as a behaviour by which pain is caused to another.
The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. Mental cruelty is defined
as one spouses course of conduct that creates such anguish that it endangers the life, physical
health, or mental health of the other spouse.
7

In Shobha Rani v Madhukar Reddi
8
, it was said that the word "cruelty" in Section
13(1)(ia) has not been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human
behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations.
It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be
mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. Even in the absence of any particular serious
incident causing the breakdown of matrimonial life, a continuous insolent, insulting and
degenerative treatment to the other spouse stretching over substantive span of matrimonial
life can result in cruelty.
9

Small twigs of abnormal behaviour when piled, one upon another, may become a heavy
burden of cruelty. Conduct or behaviour of the other spouse making it impossible to cohabit
constitutes cruelty.
10

Earlier cruelty only included physical violence. In Russell v Russell
11
Lopes, LJ ,defining
cruelty observed: There must be danger to life, limbs or health, bodily or mental or a
reasonable apprehension of it to constitute cruelty. Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage
Act,1955 is comprehensive enough to include cases of physical as also of mental cruelty.

5
Blacks Law Dictionary, seventh edition, Bryan A. Garner,1999
6
D.Tolstoy, The Laws and Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, 6
th
edition, pg-61
7
Supra note1
8
AIR 1988 SC 121
9
Inder Mohan Tiwari v Manju Tiwari (1985 Cur Civ Cas 110 (Del)
10
Naval Kishore Somani v Poonam Somani (1999) 1 DMC 415 (DB)
11
[1887] AC 395

12

The courts have to interpret and analyse and define what would constitute cruelty in a given
case depending upon many factors such as social status, background, customs, traditions,
caste and community, upbringing, public opinion prevailing in the locality etc.
12

B.1 The respondent has committed the offence of cruel treatment towards the wife.
In this case, marriage was solemnized according to Hindu Vedic rites on 6.5.1987 at
Allahabad. The Vidai took place on 7.5,1987 and the appellant went to reside at the residence
of her husband where she lived upto 21.6.1987. She found her husband and his other family
members greedy who made a further demand of colour T. V., Refrigerator and some other
ornaments besides a cash of Rs. 10.000. Her father anyhow managed and gave Rs. 10,000 in
the first week of June, 1987 but could not fulfil other demands ; when her parents could not
fulfil the said further demand, her husband and his other family members started torturing her
on one pretext or the other, treated her with physical and mental cruelty including mercilessly
beating and did not agree for her Vidai from their residence but on the repeated requests of
her father they anyhow agreed and on 21.6.1987 she returned to her Maika along with her
father only with a suitcase containing few clothes of daily use. Her husband has kept all the
articles, ornaments and valuables (cash and kind described in Schedules A, B and C) which
were given at or about the time of marriage as its consideration. Repeated attempts for her
Vidai from Maika were made by her parents but her husband and his other members of the
family did not agree to keep her as Bahu of their family until and unless further demands are
fulfilled. This treatment of the husband has caused a reasonable apprehension in her mind
that it will be not fit and proper for her to live with her husband, who has also deserted her for
a continuous period of more than two years
It is also not proper to discredit the wife as hypersensitive or prone to exaggeration. Anyone
who will face demand for money constantly will be apprehended to some wrong that could be
meted out to her if the demand is not fulfilled. It is important to note that even before the
marriage on demand by the respondents father a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was given and also a
scooter thereafter. This proves that there has always been greed on part of the respondent and
his parents. It may be pointed out that the respondents main philosophy is that since the
appellants parents are financially sound there is no wrong in his parents to ask for a few
more thousands. It may be pointed out that it appears that the sole object of marriage was to
get the money standing in the name of appellant transferred to the respondents name. It is

12
Maynes , Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage,Bharat Law house,2003,pg-259

13

not out of place to mention that respondents behaviour and treatment with appellant could
only be said to be a pointer for seeking money alone and marriage was a device.
The cumulative effect of the all the circumstances and the evidence of the parties lead to the
conclusion that demand of dowry went on with the support of the husband and the proof of
element of harassment was not necessary.
Explanation to s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code provides that any wilful conduct which is of
such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or likely to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical of the woman), and harassment
of the woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful
demand for any property or valuable security would constitute cruelty. Cruelty is a ground for
divorce under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, the word `cruelty' has not
been defined. Indeed, it could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to or in
respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is
adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or
unintentional.
From the context and the set up in which the word `cruelty' has been used in s. 13(1) (i-a),
intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary
sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be
inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained or, cruelty could be easily
established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by
ordinary sense in human affairs; the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as
cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no
deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. The same is also the line of reasoning adopted by the House
of Lords in Gollins v. Gollins,
13
where Lord Evershed said:
"I am unable to accept the premise that "cruelty" in matrimonial proceedings requires or
involves of necessity the element of malignity- though I do not of course doubt that if
malignity be in fact established it would be highly relevant to a charge of cruelty. In my
opinion, however, the question whether one party to a marriage has been guilty of cruelty to
the other or has treated the other with cruelty does not, according to the ordinary sense of the
language used by Parliament, involve the presence of malignity (or its equivalent); and if this
view be right it follows, as I venture to think, that the presence of intention to injure on the
part of the spouse charged or (which is, as I think, the same thing) proof that the conduct of

13
[1963] 2 All E.R. 966 at 976

14

the party charged was "aimed at" the other spouse is not an essential requisite for cruelty. The
question in all such cases is, to my mind, whether the acts or conduct of the party charged
were "cruel" according to the ordinary sense of that word, rather than whether the party
charged was himself or herself a cruel man or woman.............
It was also held in the case Surbhi Agrawal v. Sanjay Agrawal
14
, that intention to harm the
other spouse is not essential ingredient of cruelty. If bitter waters are flowing, it is not
necessary to enquire from which source they spring, the court remarked.
Clearly in this case the constant demand for dowry by the in-laws and husband is of such
nature so as to cause mental harassment to the appellant which is enough to establish cruelty.
It is immaterial if there was intention of cruelty or not. The intention to harm, harass, or hurt
could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained or, cruelty could be
easily established here.
As Lord Reid observed in Gollins v. Gollins,
15
"In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing
with objective standards; it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the
reasonable man (or the reasonable woman). We are dealing with this man or this woman."
Cruelty can thus be subjective in each case and with each individual. Thus it cannot be said
that demand of dowry did not amount to cruelty as it caused reasonable apprehension in the
mind of the appellant. Also the demand of dowry itself is very disheartening and shows the
intention of the respondent to marry the respondent. The very purpose of the marriage was to
get money from the appellant. This attitude of the respondent itself is against the basic
principle and essence of marriage which is love and mutual trust.
According to the Rajasthan High Court in Prakash Kaur v. Harjinderpal Singh
16
, the
demand for dowry is an act of cruelty because it is the negation of the matrimonial obligation
which one spouse has against the other.
Bearing in mind the proper approach to matrimonial offence, it can be inferred by the facts
and circumstances that there was demand for dowry. The demand for dowry is prohibited
under law. That by itself is bad enough. That, amounts to cruelty entitling the wife to get a
decree for dissolution of marriage.
Thus according to S.13(1) (ia) the appellant has the right to get a decree of divorce based on
the cruelty that was meted out to her in the form of constant demands for dowry.

14
AIR 2000 MP 139.
15
Ibid.
16
AIR 1999 Raj 46 at 47.

15

II. ISSUE 2. Whether the fact that the marriage has become an empty shell is an
indication for the breakdown of marriage?
CONTENTION A: The Respondent had illicit relations with another lady.
Adultery may be defined as consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a
person of the opposite sex, not the other spouse, during the subsistence of marriage.
17

In this case, the respondent had got illicit relations with a lady residing in the District Gaya of
the State of Bihar with whom he was stated to have solemnised a second marriage and was
expected to have children from her. Moreover, he had married the appellant only for
satisfaction of the members of his family and to extract heavy amount and other valuables
from her parents.
The Respondents relation with another lady clearly shows his lack of love and affection
towards his wife, the appellant. In such circumstance, the appellant cannot be expected to
have faith, trust and love towards her husband, without which the marriage is of no use.
As per the cases Vira Reddy v. Kistamma
18
and Subbarma v. Saraswathi
19
, One single
act of adultery is enough for divorce or judicial separation.
Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act has also considered Adultery as a ground for
divorce. Thus, the appellant is entitled to get divorce under this ground.
CONTENTION B: The continuous demands of dowry make the marriage more of a
monetary deal from the husbands side.
As earlier stated, the respondent had married the appellant only for satisfaction of the
members of his family and to extract heavy amount and other valuables from her parents. He
and his family members continuously threatened the appellant with their unending demands.
They were even not ready to bring back the appellant from her fathers home until and unless
their demands are fulfilled.

17
Reydon on Divorce, (10
th
Ed.), 172.
18
1969 Mad 235
18
(1996) 2 M.L.J. 263


16

In light of the above facts, it seems that the respondent was just interested in the appellants
money rather than her. This appears to be a blot on a pious and solemn relationship of
marriage. Greed and thirst for money being the only considerations from the respondents
side to marry make the marriage nothing but an empty shell.
Thus, divorce should be given to the appellant.
CONTENTION C: The marriage was never consummated.
As per the facts, both the parties lived with each other for a period of one and a half month.
During this period, there was no kind of conjugal relationship between the parties and their
marriage was not consummated.
This becomes a case of Wilful Neglect where both the parties to the marriage, though living
under the same roof, are ignorant towards each other and behave like strangers
20
. Sexual
relationship between parties to the marriage is one of the important factors which brings them
closer and strengthens their bond. In this case, even this factor is missing in addition to the
absence of any kind of emotions or sentiments. This again supports the fact that the
respondent had just married the appellant for money and nothing else.
As per the case Jyotish Chandra v. Meera
21
, indifference, neglect and sexual ignorance
from one party to another can lead to frustration, agony and suffering to the latter and hence
can be considered as a ground for divorce.
Thus, the Counsel on behalf of the appellant pleads for divorce under this ground.
CONTENTION D: Both the parties wanted to have a Divorce.
From the material on the record, it is clear that both sides wanted divorce from the very
beginning though for separate grounds. Even the respondent had filed a petition for divorce
but which was later withdrawn by him. This shows the level of dissatisfaction that both the
parties had from the marriage due to their own reasons.
Moreover, no effort was made by the husband to take her back with honour. There is no such
pleading either to this effect.

20
Laxman v. Meena, 1964 SC 40
21
1970 Cal 266

17

An advertisement was also published during this period in regard to marriage of the husband.
The advertisement is dated 2.7.1992, after the wife left the in-laws house on 21.6.87. this
even confirms that the respondent and his family were happy that the appellant had left the
house and were planning for his remarriage.
Thus, divorce should be granted when its found essential from the side of both the parties.
CONTENTION E: The Appellant solemnized a second marriage after the decree of
divorce passed by the Family Court.
After the passing of the order dated 8.7.1996 passed by Sri Surendra Pratap Mishra, Family
Judge, Allahabad in Matrimonial Petition No. 361 of 1991 allowing the petition of the wife
filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the
ground of desertion by the husband, the appellant had remarried with one Sudhakar Pandey
and a child has also been born to her out of the second marriage. Thus, it would be in interest
of justice and parties that the marriage between them is dissolved by a decree of divorce
22
, in
reference to the cases Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri
23
and Madhuri Mehta v. Meet
Verma
24
.
Moreover, the second marriage solemnised by the appellant is a indication that the previous
marriage had no substance in it. If a decree of divorce is not passed now, it would lead to
nothing but chaos and tension in the lives of four people, including the life of a innocent
child.
CONTENTION F: Marriage has been irretrievably broken down.
The essence of marriage is a sharing of common life, a sharing of all the happiness that life
has to offer and all the misery that has to be faced in life, an experience of the joy that comes
from enjoying, in common, things of the matter and of the spirit and from showering love and
affection n one's offspring. In this case, there is no substance in the marriage, just a form is
left. Hence, there is no use in continuing the marriage and Divorce should be seen as a
solution and an escape route out of a difficult situation. Thus, the Counsel on behalf of the
appellant pleads for a decree of divorce due to the above reasons.

22
Anita Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal, (1997) 11 SCC 490
Shashi Garg v. Arun Garg, (1997) 7 SCC 565
23
(1997) 4 SCC 226
24
(1997) 11 SCC 81

18

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

In the light of facts stated, arguments advanced, issues raised and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed on the behalf of the appellants , that is to honourable Supreme Court of India,
may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. Mr. Prem Chandra Pandey treated his wife, Mrs. Savitri Pandey with cruelty and had
deserted her.
2. The marriage between the parties was an empty shell and was irretrievably broken down.
3. The appellant is granted to get a decree of divorce with return of all things given at the
time of marriage and proper maintenance.
The honourable court may also be pleased to pass any of the order which it may feel deemed
in the light of justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is most humbly prayed

DATE OF FI LI NG: 5
th
April, 2014 COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
PLACE: DELHI AYUSHI DWIVEDI

Supreme Court to Decide on Marriage Dissolution

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Savitri Pandey v.

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