Basic Ignorance

Can a spouse marry the second time merely because of a well founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead? No. If a marriage is solemnized by a Judge outside the
area of his jurisdiction, is the marriage invalid? No. These are the two questions raised in an
administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MTCC) Judge HD whose jurisdiction
covers the Municipality of Sta. Monica and Burgos, Surigao del Norte.

On September 27, 1994, Judge HD solemnized the wedding of Bert and Lyn. Bert listed his
status in the marriage contract as separated but Judge HD still proceeded to solemnize
their wedding on the basis of an affidavit acknowledged before the MTC Judge of Basey,
Samar by two witnesses who attested: that they knew Bert to have been civilly married to
Ina in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ina left the conjugal dwelling; and that she has not returned nor been heard of for
almost seven years thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

Then on October 27, 1994, Judge HD also performed the marriage ceremony between Dan
and Emmy. Upon the written request of Emmy, the wedding was solemnized not in his office
but in his residence which is located in another Municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte that
does not fall within his jurisdictional area.

Based on these two specific acts, an administrative complaint was filed against Judge HD for
gross misconduct, inefficiency and ignorance of the law. Was Judge HD guilty?

Yes. Under Article 41 of the Family Code (FC), even if the spouse present has a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage.
This is a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the FC to
discourage subsequent marriage where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or that a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead in accordance with
pertinent provisions of law.

In the case of Bert, he did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first
wife Inas presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains marriage to Ina.
It was therefore manifest error for Judge HD to accept and rely only on the joint affidavit
submitted by Bert. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous and
thus void marriage between Bert and Lyn.

In the second wedding between Dan and Emmy, Article 3 of the FC requires as a formal
requisite the authority of the solemnizing officer. Judges, who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate weddings only within said areas and not beyond (Article 7 FC).
They perform wedding beyond their jurisdiction only at the point of death, in remote places
or upon request of both parties in a written sworn statement to this effect (Article 8, FC).
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside of his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down by Article 3, FC. This irregularity does not affect
the validity of the marriage but subjects the solemnizing official to administratively liability.

Here Judge HBs territory covers only Sta. Monica and Burgos. He was not clothed with
authority to solemnize a marriage in Dapa where he resides. He cannot cite the exceptions
in Article 8 because the request was only made by Emma and was not even a sworn
statement. By citing Article 8 as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, Judge
HB again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.

While magistrates may at times commit mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, Judge HB exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law in an area which
has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons. So he should be suspended for six
months and given a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely (Navarro vs. Domagtoy, A.M. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1998).




Simulated

This is a case explaining the meaning of in pari delicto which came into play between
husband and wife, Gerry and Rica.

Gerry and Rica were married on April 30, 1961 according to Chinese rites. On April 17, 1968
Rica purchased a parcel of land using her own separate personal funds so the title to the
property was issued and registered in her name.

Later on, sometime in 1992, after more than 30 years of marriage and with three children,
Gerry was able to convince Rica, through repeated importunings, to execute a Deed of Sale
of her property in his favor. Gerry promised Rica that he would construct a commercial
building on the property for the benefit of their children. He suggested that the property
should be in his name alone so that Rica would not be involved in the loan with the bank.
The consideration of the transfer of the property in his name consisted of his promise to
construct a commercial building for the benefit of their children to whom he will in turn,
execute a Deed of Absolute Sale, and to pay the loan he had obtained from the bank.
Because of Gerrys glib assurances, Rica signed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his favor with
the ostensible consideration of P200,000 which Gerry did not actually pay. So a new title
was issued in the name of Gerry alone. But to insure that Gerry would comply with his
promise, Rica did not deliver the owners copy of the TCT to Gerry.

From then on, marital trouble worsened as Gerry would insist on delivering to him the
owners copy of the title which Rica would ask Gerry to comply with his promise. The marital
spat was aggravated by Gerrys promiscuity, volcanic temper and other vicious vices until
he finally abandoned Rica and their children.

Gerry then fraudulently tried to obtain a new owners title by filing a petition in court
alleging that the original title was lost. When Rica learned about this scheme, she filed an
adverse claim and asked the Court to declare the Deed of Sale she signed null and void and
Gerrys title be cancelled. Gerry however contended that Rica should not be granted the
relief she was praying for because she was equally at fault (in pari delicto) in the execution
of the said Deed of Sale. Was Gerry correct?

No. The rule of in pari delicto applies to cases where the nullity arises from the illegality of
the consideration or the purpose of the contract. In this case, the nullity of the deed arises
not because of the illegality of the consideration but because the stated consideration had in
fact not been paid and therefore the said deed is fictitious, simulated, inexistent and
produces no effect whatsoever for lack of consideration. In pari delicto does not apply to
inexistent contract due to lack of consideration or other essential requisites. It applies only
to existing contracts with illegal consideration (Yu Bun Guan vs. Ong G.R. No. 144735
October 18, 2001.)


Splitting hair

This is a suit and countersuit between husband and wife explaining the meaning of litis
pendencia.

Romy and Candy had been married for five years, although during most of those years
Candy was abroad working as a nurse in the United Sates. Eventually, Candy learned that
prior to their marriage Romy was already married to another woman. She also discovered
that their marriage license was not validly issued.

So Candy filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo against Romy for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it is bigamous and for having been
solemnized without a valid marriage license. Candy also sought to recover from Romy the
sum of $32,000 she allegedly sent him while working in the States to buy properties as
investment for their future life together. She further asked for moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.

Two days later, Romy himself filed a complaint against Candy in the RTC of Davao seeking
likewise the annulment of the same marriage on the ground that he was forced to marry her
at gunpoint and that they had no valid license. He also prayed for moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.

Then in his answer to Candys complaint in Iloilo, Romy reiterated the allegations in his own
complaint in Davao by way of counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages and prayed
that their marriage be declared void from the beginning for having been performed illegally
and under force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy.

For her part, in response to Romys complaint filed in Davao, Candy filed a motion to dismiss
said case invoking litis pendencia citing the civil case she earlier filed in Iloilo. According to
Candy, Romys complaint should be dismissed because it involves (1) the same parties or at
least such as representing the same interest; (2) the rights asserted and relief prayed for
are the same and the (3) identity in the two cases is such that the judgment that may be
rendered in her pending complaint would, regardless of which party is successful, bar any
other judgment in Romys complaint.

Romy on the other hand contended that the possible judgment in Iloilo denying the
annulment of the marriage because of failure to prove that there was no valid marriage
license and that he deceitfully failed to disclose a prior marriage would not constitute a
ruling on whether he himself had been forced into the marriage. Was he correct?

No. Romy has resorted to nit-picking and in the process has lost track of the real issue
besetting the two actions which is simply the nullification of marriage contracted by the
parties. Interestingly in his answer with counterclaim filed in Iloilo, Romy has also raised the
issue of force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy, the very same issue in his
complaint in Davao. Hence, he cannot now deny that the issues as well as the arguments
raised before the two trial courts are identical. Any decision or ruling promulgated by the
RTC of Iloilo will necessarily be a bar to another judgment by the RTC of Davao and vice
versa.

Moreover, in his answer in Iloilo, he also presented a counterclaim for moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees by reason of the complaint filed by Candy. A counterclaim
partakes of the nature of a complaint and or a cause of action against a plaintiff in the case.
To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a subsequent
complaint against the same person or party would be splitting a cause of action not
sanctioned by the Rules (Mariscal vs. Court of Appeals et. al. G.R. No. 123926 July 22,
1999).

Romys complaint in Davao was thus dismissed. Eventually, Candy won the case In Iloilo
where her marriage to Romy was nullified on the ground that it was bigamous. Candy was
likewise awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees totaling to
P200,000.00.



Concurrent, not exclusive

This case of Pete and Carmen explains the exclusive original jurisdiction of Family Court to
hear and decide petitions for habeas corpus in relation to Custody of Children under
Republic Act 8369.

Pete and Carmen got married on July 7, 1993. Typical of marital unions, they started living
happily and harmoniously in a conjugal house near Petes parents. Their union was blessed
with three sons: Ron, Jun, Rico and a daughter, Carla.

But like most marriages, their relationship also had some rough sailing due to the usual
marital spats. One of those quarrels turned so bitter that after almost nine years of
marriage or on May 18, 2002, Pete left the conjugal abode with his three sons in tow,
transferring from one province to another apparently to avoid being traced by Carmen.

Carmen sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her
and Pete but to no avail. She then brought the matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa in their
Barangay which proved to be futile. Finally she had to file a petition for habeas corpus of
Ron, Jun and Rico who were then ages 8, 6, and 4 years respectively. Carmen alleged that
Petes act of leaving conjugal dwelling and going to different places disrupted the education
of their children and deprived them of their mother. She prayed that Pete be ordered to
produce their sons before the court and explain why they should not be returned to her
custody.

While initially Pete agreed to return custody of their sons to Carmen, he later changed his
mind and fought it out. Pete and Carmen hurled accusations against each other, blamed one
another for their breakup and pointed to each other as the one who left the conjugal
dwelling. Pete claimed that Carmen was unfit to take care of their children because of her
habitual drunkenness and frequent late night outs which are the same defects that Carmen
attributed to Pete whom she claimed to be an alcoholic, a drug addict and prone to violence.

On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a decision granting custody of Jun
and Rico who were then six and four years old respectively, to Carmen subject to visitation
rights of Pete. With respect to Ron who was then eight years old, the CA ruled that his
custody should be determined by the Family Court in a special proceeding on custody of
minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.

Pete questioned this ruling. He contended that the CA had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of
habeas corpus as jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under R.A. 8369.
Was Pete correct?

No. RA 8396 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8396 reveal no manifest
intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue said writ. Said law should be
read in harmony with the provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and
BP 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization ACT OF 1980) that Family Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of
minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated
April 22, 2004.

In this case, after Pete moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred
his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. By giving the family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leaving
individuals like Carmen without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be
helpless since they cannot seek redress from Family Courts whose writs are enforceable
only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of RA 8396.

Moreover, under RA 8396, the family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
custody cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
exclusively by the Family Courts under said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be
availed of in conjunction with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court (Madrinan vs. Madrinan, G.R. 159374, July 12, 2007).





Immaterial error

In a contract of sale, when the seller allegedly makes a legal mistake in consummating the
sale, can she invoke that mistake to undo what she has done and claim back the property
she sold on the ground that the sale is null and void? This is the question answered in this
case of Nita.

Nita is a married woman. But unlike other married women, Nita is not too dependent on her
husband. In fact, she generates more income than her husband and has accumulated
substantial paraphernal properties through her own hard work and separate earnings.
Somehow, this kind of setup eventually led to other independent ventures of Nita. She
also indulges in affairs with other men, which, under ordinary Filipino setting, is more of a
hardworking husbands exclusive privilege or practice.

After about 15 years of marriage, she declared her independence from her own husband,
abandoned him, and decided to live in with Romy, whom she met in one of her business
deals. While Nitas attraction to Romy was physical, Romys attraction to Nita was material,
considering Nitas substantial assets. The shrewd and worldly-wise Nita was aware of this
kind of relationship so she did not divulge nor even advise Romy of her transactions with
her own property while they were already living together as husband and wife.

During her cohabitation with Romy, Romy became mentally ill, necessitating hospitalization.
Because Nita loved Romy, she was forced to sell a parcel of land she acquired from a
government housing corporation to defray the hospitalization expenses of Romy. She alone
executed and signed the papers selling the said property to the couple, Nilo and Mila. Later
on, she realized that it was a mistake to have sold the property for the price persistently
offered by Nilo. Thinking it was not yet too late to get back the land she sold, she sued Nilo
and Mila to have the sale annulled on the ground that she had not obtained the consent of
her husband Romy. She invoked the law prevailing at that time (Art. 144 Civil Code) which
says that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but are not married,
the property acquired by either or both of them, through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries, shall be co-owned by them. Since Romy, the co-owner did not consent
to the sale, the sale is null and void Nita contended. Is Nita correct?

No. At the time Nita acquired the property which she sold to Nilo and Mila, Nita and Romy
were not yet living together as husband and wife. So the law invoked by Nita is immaterial
and inapplicable. Furthermore, if the sale was defective by reason of lack of Romys consent,
it was Romy or his heirs, not Nita, who had a right to ask for annulment. Nita could not
invoke her own fault or shortcoming (of not having obtained Romys consent to the sale) to
invalidate a sale she had consummated (Noveno vs. Court of Appeals, 8 SCRA 279).

Art. 144 of the Civil Code has been replaced by Arts. 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Art
144 regulates only the property relations of a man and a woman living together as husband
and wife who are not incapacitated or who are without impediment to marry each other or
the case of parties whose marriage is void from the beginning (except a bigamous
marriage). Aside from the foregoing situations, the Family Code has also expressly
regulated the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery and concubinage.





Overtaken by events

This is the unfortunate story of a couple who placed their lifetime savings in a bank and lost
all of it despite what they thought was a timely legal move on their part.

Between 1982 and 1984, the Santos couple opened and maintained both time and savings
deposits with a development bank located in Metro Manila. Their deposits totaled about
P950,000. When some of the time deposit certificates matured, the couple was not able to
withdraw them in cash. Instead, the bank issued a managers check which was dishonored
upon presentation for payment.

So the Santoses demanded payment and withdrawal of all their deposits. But the bank
likewise failed to comply with their demands. This prompted the couple to file a complaint in
court with a writ of preliminary attachment. The court ordered the issuance of a writ of
attachment and pursuant thereto one of the properties of the bank was attached.

While the case was pending, the Central Bank decided to place the bank under receivership
after finding that its condition was one of insolvency and its continuance in business would
result in probable loss to its depositors and creditors.

Thereafter, the couple obtained a judgment against the bank and filed a motion for
immediate execution so that their attachment will become permanent. The court however,
stayed the execution of the judgment because the bank was already placed under
receivership. Was the court correct?

Yes. To execute the judgment would unduly deplete the assets of the respondent bank to
the obvious prejudice of the other depositors and creditors because after the Monetary
Board declared that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the board
becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors.

One depositor or creditor cannot obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an
attachment of properties of the bank. After a declaration of insolvency, the remedy of the
depositors is to intervene in the liquidation proceedings. This is the ruling in the case of
Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal 154 SCRA 257.

Of course, if this case happens now, the couple can recover part of the deposit insured by
the PDIC.





Substantial Correction

The validity of marriages as well as the legitimacy and filiation of children can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party and not through a collateral
attack. This is the ruling in this case of Maricris.

Maricris married Lito on January 4, 1978. Their union bore three children: Paul, born on May
8, 1978, Carlo, born on June 4, 1980 and Janet born on June 7, 1983. After 25 years of
marriage, during which Lito worked and traveled abroad, Lito died in a vehicular accident in
Indonesia.

Following the repatriation of Litos remains to the Philippines, one of those who went to his
wake was Lucy with a boy named Nino in tow whom she began introducing as her and Litos
son.

This prompted Maricris to make inquiries and later on found out that in Ninos birth
certificate he was born on January 1, 1996 with Lucy listed as the mother and Lito as the
father, and that the boy was acknowledged by Lito as his son on January 13, 1996 and then
legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of the parents (Lucy and Lito) on April 22,
1998. So Maricris also obtained a marriage contract showing that Lito and Lucy were indeed
married on April 22, 1998.

Hence on December 23, 2005, Maricris together with her children Paul and Janet filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition against Lucy and the guardians of Nino, to correct
the entries in Ninos birth record with the local civil registrar under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Maricris contended that Nino could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lito and Lucy because the same is bigamous since Lito was still married
to her. She thus prayed for: (1) the correction of entries in Ninos birth record with respect
to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and use of the fathers
surname; (2) a directive to Lucy and the guardians of Nino to submit the latter to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation; (3) the declaration of nullity of the
legitimation of Nino, and for this purpose, for a declaration of the nullity of Lucy and Litos
marriage on the ground that it is bigamous.

In an order dated September 6, 2007, the RTC however dismissed the petition holding that
in a special proceeding for the correction of entry, it is not acting as a Family Court under
the Family Code and therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition to annul the marriage of
Lito and Lucy, to impugn the legitimacy of Nino and order his DNA testing. Hence, the RTC
said that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Lucy and her children however maintained that their main cause of action is for the
correction of entries in Ninos birth records and that in doing so the court can pass upon the
validity of the marriage and questions on legitimacy which are merely incidental thereto.
Were they correct?

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entries in the original registry under Rule 108,
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on the legitimacy and filiation.
The proceeding contemplated in said rule may generally be used only to correct clerical,
spelling, typographical and other innocuous error in the civil registry. A clerical error is one
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, an error made by a clerk or a
transcriber, a mistake in copying or writing; or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that is clearly misspelled or of a statement of the occupation of the parent.
Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly served.

In this case, Maricris and her children seek to declare as void the marriage of Lito and Lucy
for being bigamous and impugn Ninos filiation in connection with which they also ask the
Court that Nino be subjected to DNA test. These causes of action are governed not by Rule
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003 and Article 171 of
the FC respectively; hence the petition should be filed in a Family Court (Torres et.al, vs.
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental et. al, G.R. 181174, December 4,
2009).




Imprescriptible

If there are several heirs and they do not immediately settle and divide the inherited
property, they are all considered co-owners of the property even if one of them possesses
and administers the properties. But this loose arrangement sometimes give rise to problems
like this case of the heirs of the spouses Juan and Ana.

During their lifetime, Juan and Ana were the owners of two parcels of land. One parcel
contained an area of 39,000 square meters and covered by tax declaration No. 9725;
another parcel contained an area of 15,000 square meters and also covered by a tax
declaration only.

In 1919, both spouses died without a will, leaving as heirs two legitimate children, Ria and
Cindy, as well as a granddaughter Emy. Cindy assumed administration of the properties and
did not partition them during her lifetime. She just gave to her other co-heirs their shares of
the fruits thereof, though irregular and at times little, depending on the amount of the
harvest.

The property with an area of 15,000 square meters was later sold by Cindy to the husband
of her daughter. Subsequently, this property was in turn sold to Bernie who was able to
register the title in his name.

When Cindy died in 1955, the other heirs to the property, particularly Ria (through her
children) and Emy, demanded the settlement of the estate. When they found out that the
15,000 square meters property had been disposed of to Bernie, they asked for
reconveyance of the same. The heirs of Cindy and Bernie opposed the same, contending
that reconveyance was no longer possible because of prescription through the long lapse of
time and that the property had already been sold in good faith and for value. Were they
correct?

No. Under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, prescription generally does not run in favor of a co-heir
or co-owner as long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership like
Cindy in this case who showed during her lifetime that she never repudiated the other co-
heirs as co-owners of the property by giving them their shares of the fruits. With respect to
the claim of good faith, the record shows that when Cindy first sold the property, the land
was not yet registered under the torrens system but was only covered by a tax declaration
so the claim of good faith cannot be availed of because the issue of good or bad faith of the
buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land and the purchaser is
buying the same from a registered owner whose title is clean (David vs. Bardin 149 SCRA
140).





Vital social institution

In all cases of annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage the court shall order the
prosecution attorney or the fiscal assigned to it to appear in behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed (Article 48, Family Code (FC). This is the rule involved in this case
between Ricky and Vicky.

Ricky and Vicky who both belong to the elites in our society got married on June 3, 1972 at
a lavish wedding rites and reception. The first ten years of their marriage appeared to be
normal. They lived together in their conjugal abode and begot two children. But after seven
more years of living together or in 1989, the marriage apparently hit the rocks when Vicky
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Ricky after first obtaining a church annulment in 1986.

In her complaint, Vicky alleged that at the time of the marriage, Ricky was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became
manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights, one of which caused physical injuries to
her and impelled her to file a criminal complaint against Ricky; that Ricky also used
prohibited drugs, was apprehended and sentenced to a one year suspended penalty; that
Ricky is a womanizer and in 1984 left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in
succession; that after leaving the conjugal dwelling, he gave minimal support to the family
and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of the children compelling her to accept
donations and dole outs from family and friends; that Ricky mismanaged their conjugal
properties and spent extravagantly incurring large obligations from banks and financial
institutions. Finally, Vicky asserted that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all
failed because of Rickys refusal to reform.

Ricky answered denying the imputations against him. He blamed Vicky for the breakdown of
their marriage after ten years. He alleged that Vicky did not accord him the respect and
dignity due him as a husband but treated him as a persona non-grata; that due to extreme
animosities he left the conjugal home for a cooling off period; that it was Vicky who took
drugs and had affairs with another man; that he was not a womanizer but his work in media
exposed him to gossip linking him to various women; and that he was forced to dispose of
some conjugal properties due to financial reverses in his business. Thus he petitioned the
court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue administration of the
conjugal properties.

At the trial which commenced on March 20, 1990, Vicky presented four witnesses including
herself, their marriage counselor, a close friend and her own counsel to prove her
allegations. She also presented documents including news articles about her husbands
relationship with other women, his apprehension by authorities for illegal possession of
drugs and the copies of the church annulment.

Upon resting her case the court scheduled the reception of Rickys evidence. The first date
set on May 11, 1990 was postponed upon his motion because his counsel was abroad. On
the second date set by the court on June 8, 1990, he failed to appear thus prompting Vicky
to move that he be declared to have waived his right to present evidence and that the case
be deemed submitted for decision. On June 29, 1990, the RTC rendered judgment declaring
the nullity of Vickys marriage to Ricky and awarding custody of the children to Vicky.

Counsel for Ricky received a copy of the decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken
from the decision so it became final and executory. When Vicky was trying to execute the
decision on October 17, 1990, Ricky opposed it and filed a petition for relief from judgment
before the RTC, but the RTC denied it. Ricky appealed the order of denial to the Court of
Appeals (CA), but the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the RTC.

Ricky questioned this CA ruling before the Supreme Court contending among others that
when he failed to appear at the scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State and inquire as to the reason for his non-
appearance to prevent collusion between the parties pursuant to Article 48 of the FC. Was
Ricky correct?

No. The facts in the case at bar do not call for the application of Article 48 of the FC. For
one, Ricky was not declared in default for failure to answer. Ricky filed his answer to the
complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by Vicky. He actively participated in the
proceedings and cross-examined Vickys witnesses. It is crystal clear that every stage of the
litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. Under the
circumstances, the non-intervention by a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion
between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial
court.

Collusion should be prevented in the grant of annulment or legal separation because our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger
anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weaken our social
and moral fabric and hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA, 158).






Wrong remedy

Can the heirs ask for a declaration of nullity of the marriage of their deceased parent? This
is the issue raised in this case of the heirs of the spouses Ely and Nida. NO.

Ely and Nida were married on June 14, 1962 and begot seven children. But after more than
20 years, or in 1983, Ely separated and co-habited with another woman, Lita. On May 1,
2004, Nida died. Three months later, or on August 26, 2004, when Ely was already seriously
ill, he married Lita with whom he had been cohabiting. They got married before the
Municipal Mayor without the requisite marriage license by virtue of Article 34 of the Family
Code which exempts a man and a woman who had been living together for at least five
years without any legal impediment to marry each other. Six more months later or on
February 1, 2005, Ely already died.

On March 17, 2005, Elys children with his first wife Nida (the heirs) filed a declaration of
nullity of their fathers marriage to Lita. They argued that Article 34 of the FC allowing
marriage without license for those living together as husband and wife for at least five years
without legal impediment, was not applicable to the marriage of their father and Lita. They
posited that the marriage of Ely to their mother Nida was dissolved only upon the latters
death on May 1, 2004 which was barely three months from the date of the marriage of their
father Ely to Lita. Therefore, they said their father Ely and Lita could not have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years without any legal impediment. They
also raised as additional ground the lack of marriage ceremony due to Elys serious illness
which make its performance impossible.

In her answer Lita maintained that she and Ely lived together as husband and wife under
one roof for 21 years openly and publicly and even bore two children; hence they were
exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. She further claimed that the
marriage ceremony was performed in the municipal hall by the Mayor. As an affirmative
defense, Lita sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that pursuant to Section 2 (a)
of A.M. 02-11-10-SC issued by the Supreme Court on March 7, 2003, petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages under the FC may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.

Initially the RTC dismissed the heirs petition but later on reversed itself and reinstated it. It
held that A.M. 02-11-20-SC, Section 2 applies only when both parties to a void marriage are
still living. Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may file the
petition to declare the marriage void. It reasoned out that during the lifetime of their father
Ely, the heirs have only an inchoate right over his property so that only he can file a petition
to declare as void, his marriage to Lita. However upon his death his heirs already have a
vested right over whatever property he left behind, so they could already file a petition
declare his marriage to Lita void to protect their rights. Such vested right should not be
frustrated by any rule of procedure such as the A.M. in question, the RTC said. Was the RTC
correct?

No. A.M. 02-11-10-SC explicitly governs petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the FC which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The allegedly void marriage of Ely and Lita subject of the heirs petition for declaration of
nullity was celebrated on August 26, 2004. Hence said marriage falls squarely within the
ambit of the A.M.

Section 2 of said A.M. provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. There is no ambiguity in this Rule.
The heirs here therefore clearly have no cause of action before the RTC.

But it does not mean they are already without recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional rights, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules, such petition cannot
be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State because they
have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor and hence can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. So the heirs here can still question the validity of the marriage of their father Ely to
Lita in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Ely filed in the regular courts (Suazo
vs. Heirs of Catli-Medinaceli etc. G.R. 173614, September 28, 2007)






Personal liability

One of the practices used in obtaining a loan from a bank is for the borrower to appoint
another person as his or her attorney-in-fact or agent in negotiating for and getting the
loan. This is what Mila did. And this is what got her into trouble.

Mila was a married woman who had her own separate paraphernal property consisting of
two parcels of land duly titled. She signed a special power of attorney designating Ben, a
family friend, as her agent to secure a loan from any bank of financial institution for any
amount or otherwise mortgage the abovementioned properties and in that connection to
sign or execute any deed mortgage or other documents necessary in securing said loan.
Thereupon she gave the special power of attorney and her owners copy of the Transfer
Certificate of Title to Ben.

Subsequently Ben executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the said properties in favor
of a bank. He signed said deed plainly as mortgagor with the marital consent yet of his wife.
The three promissory notes secured by said mortgage was also signed by Ben on top of a
line beneath which is written signature of mortgagor, and by his wife on top of a line
under which is written signature of spouse. In all these loan documents there was no
mention that he signed them for and in behalf of Mila as mortgagor. Thus it is clearly borne
out by these documents that Ben was the intended user and beneficiary of the loans for his
bangus and sugpo fishpond.

When Mila discovered the transaction and after learning that Ben had left his residence and
transferred to an unknown place, she and her husband filed a suit against Ben and the bank
for the annulment of the mortgage since it was executed to secure the personal loans of
Ben and not in her behalf and therefore not enforceable against her. The bank contended
that the mortgage is valid because Ben was expressly authorized by Mila to mortgage her
property under the special power of attorney she signed in favor of Ben. Was the bank
correct?

No. Bens act of signing the deed of real estate mortgage in his name alone as a mortgagor,
without any indication that he was signing for and in behalf of the property owner Mila,
bound himself alone in his personal capacity as debtor of the bank and not as the agent or
attorney-in-fact of Mila. Under the law on agency, in order to bind the principal (Mila) to a
mortgage on real property executed by the agent, it must upon its face purport to be made,
signed and sealed in the name of the principal, otherwise it will bind the agent only. It is not
enough merely that the agent was in fact authorized to make the mortgage, if he has not
acted in the name of the principal. Neither is it sufficient that in the mortgage deed itself the
agent describes himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney, if in fact he acted, signed
and sealed the mortgage in his own name (Rural Bank of Bombon vs. Court of Appeals, 212
SCRA 25).




Conditional (builder in good faith, contract to sell)

This is a tale of two marriages entered into by a man. Both marriages, however, are valid
and legal because they were contracted in succession, after the first one had been dissolved
by the death of the first wife.

During his first marriage, Carling and his first wife purchased a property in a Quezon City
subdivision. The contract he signed was a lease and conditional sale agreement under which
Carling as lessee-vendee would pay a monthly rental of P290 for 20 years. In the lease
agreement, the lessor-seller transferred only the temporary use and enjoyment of the house
and lot for residential purposes. It was provided further in the agreement that if at the
expiration of the lease period, the lessee-vendee (Carling) should have fully and faithfully
complied with all the obligations stipulated, the lessor-vendor would immediately sell,
transfer and convey to him the property subject of the agreement. Four years later, his first
wife by whom he had three children, died. The widower Carling continued to pay for the
house and lot. Eight years later, he remarried Bessie. Thereafter, payment of the house and
lot was made out of the conjugal funds of the second marriage. Four years later, Nimfa, one
of Carlings daughters by his first marriage, built a house at the back portion of the
premises at the behest of Carling. Nimfa thus offered to continue paying the monthly rental
until the full lease amounts had been fully paid. Upon such full payment the lessor-seller
executed in favor of Carling the Deed of Absolute Sale over the premises and the next day,
he donated all his rights, title and interest over the lot and bungalow thereon to Nimfa. A
controversy arose when Carling died. However his wife Bessie, with whom he begot two
children, claimed that the property was acquired during the second marriage when the final
deed of sale was executed. Therefore it should be their conjugal property. Nimfa, on the
other hand, contended that the property was acquired during the marriage of her mother
and father when the lease and conditional sale agreement was signed by Carling. Is Nimfa
correct?

No. The agreement entered into by Carling during his first marriage to Nimfas mother is in
the nature of a contract to sell as contradistinguished from the contract of sale. In a
contract to sell or conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the
property but upon full payment of the purchase price. Compliance with the stipulated
payments is a suspensive condition, the failure of which prevents the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. So what was vested in the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage was merely the beneficial title. It was only upon full
payment of the amortizations (lease rentals) that Carling acquired ownership. And this was
during his second marriage. So the property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the
second marriage. Bessie would get 1/2 of the property and the other half to be divided
between her and her two children at 1/6 each. But she must reimburse the amount
advanced by the first conjugal partnership and by Nimfa. Furthermore, Nimfa was the
exclusive owner of the house she erected on the lot over which she had all the rights of a
builder in good faith. This was the ruling in Jovellanos vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 126.

Substantial compliance

If the property subject of a case is conjugal, can any of the spouses alone file or defend the
suit? This is the question raised in this case of the spouses Tito and Tita.

The ownership of the foreshore land involved here was claimed by the couple because they
have occupied it since time immemorial. But they were sued by Benny who said that they
were only his lessees of the property. Eventually the court ruled in favor of Benny which
ordered Tito and Tita to vacate the property except that portion which the couple reclaimed
from the sea and formed part of the shore. When the decision became final and a writ of
demolition was issued against Tito and Tita, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals against the lower court and the sheriff alleging grave abuse of
discretion in ordering demolition. In the petition, only Tito signed the certificate of non-
forum shopping (that there is no other action or proceeding involving the same issues
before any other court) which is necessary before their petition can be given due course.

Benny thus questioned the petition and asked the Court of Appeals not to give due course to
it. He contended that since the property they are claiming is allegedly conjugal, the
certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by both Tito and Tita. And since it was
signed only by Tito, the petition is defective. Was Benny correct?

No. The petition signed only by Tito constitute substantial compliance with the rules on non-
forum shopping. There are only two petitioners in this case and they are husband and wife.
Their residence is the subject property alleged to be conjugal. Whether it is conjugal under
the New Civil Code or the Family Code, the certificate signed by the husband Tito constitute
sufficient compliance.

Under the New Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. In
fact he is the sole administrator and the wife is not entitled as a matter of right to join him
in this endeavor. The husband may defend the conjugal partnership in a suit or action
without being joined by the wife. The husband as the statutory administrator of the conjugal
property could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition alone without the
concurrence of the wife. If suits to defend an interest in the conjugal properties may be filed
by the husband alone, with more reason, he may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping
to be attached to the petition.

Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband
and wife jointly. However unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the husband
and wife always act together. Each Spouse may validly exercise full power of management
alone subject to the intervention of the Court in case of disagreement by the wife over the
prevailing decision of the husband. Under the Family Code therefore, the husband alone
could have also filed the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition without being joined by the
wife.

Besides, the husband is reasonably presumed to know personally whether his wife has filed
any action or claim similar to the petition he filed concerning the conjugal property. So his
certification alone is substantial (Docena vs. Lapesura, 355 SCRA 658).




Preferred relationship

Article II Section 12 of the Constitution provides that the State shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. When the State so intervenes it is
exercising its prerogative of parens patriae which literally means father of the country
where the State, as sovereign, exercises powers of guardianship over persons under
disabilities.

This Constitutional provision strengthening the family under the doctrine of parens patriae
or father of the country is illustrated in this case of Pete and Betty.

Pete and Betty are husband and wife with only one child, Nina. Being the only daughter Nina
is the nia bonita of Pete. He dotes on Nina and loves her dearly. Apparently, Pete loves
his daughter more than his wife Betty. Petes love for his daughter somehow drove a wedge
between him and Betty. Their relationship became a bit shaky. Every incident, no matter
how small, became reason enough for the spouses to harbor suspicions on each other. So
when Pete insured himself, he instituted his daughter Nina as the beneficiary, with his
brother Tom, uncle of Nina, and not his wife Betty as trustee during the minority of Nina.
When Nina was about 12 years old, Pete died. And so pursuant to the terms of the
insurance policy, the proceeds of the life insurance was given to Tom, Ninas uncle and not
to Betty her mother. Thus, Betty filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the said proceeds
to her. Will Bettys suit prosper?

Yes. The insurance proceeds belong to the beneficiary (Nina). Nina a minor is under the
custody and parental authority of Betty, her mother. The said minor lives with her mother,
and she acquired proceeds by lucrative title. Said proceeds therefore belong to the minor
child in ownership and in usufruct to the mother. Under our law, the usufructuary (the
mother) is entitled to possession (Art. 321 Civil Code), Betty is entitled to the delivery of
the insurance proceeds. The trust in favor of Tom is null and void as it conflicts with said
law. Furthermore, it would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things
but the tradition of the country for a parent to be preferred. It could have been different if
the conflict were between father and mother and not between uncle and mother. Here it is
the mother asserting priority over the uncle. Certainly, the judiciary as the instrumentality
of the State in its role of parens patriae cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.
The family as a unit will be strengthened if the mother is given priority over that of an uncle
(Cabana vs. Pilapil 58 SCRA 94).




Impliedly accepted

This case of Benny is about a donation made in consideration of marriage, or a donation
made before its celebration and in favor of one or both of the future spouses, known in law
as donation propter nuptias.

Benny was the oldest of the six children of the spouses Gil and Minda. He was engaged to
be married to Myra on June 4, 1944. A few weeks before their marriage or on May 22,
1944, his parents Gil and Minda executed a donation written in the Ilocano dialect and
denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut wherein he and his prospective bride Myra were gifted
with four parcels of land, as well as a male cow and one-third portion of his parents own
conjugal house covered by OCT No. 18259. After their marriage, the fact of their marriage
were inscribed at the back of the land Titles donated.

Gil and Minda died on December 15, 1962 and January 9, 1968 respectively, leaving as
heirs, Benny and his two brothers and three sisters. With Benny and Myras permission, the
youngest sister Marta took possession and cultivated one of the lands donated to Benny and
Myra with an area of 4,876 square meters and covered by OCT No. 18383 wherein the fact
of their marriage was annotated.

Meanwhile on May 15, 1970 Benny and Myra already registered the Deed of Donation so the
titles of the donated land including OCT 18383 were already cancelled and in lieu thereof,
new titles were issued in Benny and Myras name. OCT 18383 was thus replaced by TCT
84897. Marta however remained in possession and cultivation of the land.

On March 18, 1973, Benny and his siblings executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of
Rights wherein the remaining properties of their parents consisting of 12 parcels of land
were distributed among the three sisters because Benny and his two other brothers have
already received their shares in the estates of their parents by virtue of previous donations
and conveyances. Subsequently on June 12, 1976, the heirs executed another Deed of
Compromise Agreement concerning the distribution of two more parcels of land that were
not included in the Deed of Partition. All the other stipulations and provisions in the Deed of
Partition were confirmed by the heirs.

Sometime in 1977, when Martas husband got sick, her daughter Vilma took over possession
of the land with an area of 4,876 sq. meters formerly covered by OCT 18383 and later
replaced by TCT 84897 already in the name of Benny and Myra which was one of the lands
donated to them by their parents.

Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was disturbed. Vilma filed
an action for annulment of title against Benny and Myra before the RTC which was however
dismissed. This move prompted Benny and Myra to file an action for ejectment of Vilma
before the Municipal Trial Court which rendered a decision on November 25, 1985 ordering
Vilma to vacate the land.

To counter this ruling, Vilma and her mother Marta filed another complaint before the RTC
for the annulment of Benny and Myras TCT No. 84897 They alleged that the donation
propter nuptias or Inventario Ti Sagut was spurious because it did not observe the form
required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate
public instrument. Were they correct?

No. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias are not governed by the same
rules especially as regards the formal requisites. Under the Old Civil Code (Article 1330),
acceptance is not necessary to the validity of said gifts. The execution of a public instrument
in which the property is specifically described and the celebration of the marriage between
the beneficiary couple are enough to effectuate the donation.

Under the new Civil Code, the donation must be in writing to be enforceable and acceptance
is necessary although it need not be expressed for the donation to be valid (Article 129).
Implied acceptance is sufficient.

The law applicable here is the law existing at the time of the execution of the contract. Since
the donation was executed in 1944, it is the old Civil Code which applies because the New
Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. So applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil
Code, it does not matter whether or not the donees accepted the donation for its validity.

Indeed even if the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of Marta and Vilma would
collapse just the same because implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices
under said Code. So Vilma has to turn over possession of the property to Benny and Myra
(Valencia and Valencia vs. Locquiao et. al., G.R. 122134, October 3, 2003).




Lasting affection

This is another case involving custody of children where the court used the childrens best
interest as the basis for deciding who between the mother and father has the right to their
custody. This is the case of Ali, a Muslim and Sally a Catholic.

Before Ali and Sally were married, Sally became a Muslim so they can marry according to
the Islamic rites. Thus on February 3, 1988 Ali and Sally were married at a hotel in Manila in
a Muslim ceremony. Ali was then 31 years old and a businessman whose work required
frequent travels abroad and be in different places most of the time, while Sally was only 20
years old, scion of a well to do family. At the time of their marriage Ali was still married to a
Saudi woman whom he divorced after marrying Sally.

Initially, the couple stayed with Sallys family in Makati as Ali attended to his business. Later
on the couple migrated and settled in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia where they begot two children,
Abdul, born on June 13, 1989 and Farah, born on September 29, 1990. They stayed in
Jeddah for two years, but by 1995, Sally and the two children went back to Manila. The
children lived in the house of Sallys mother in Ayala, Alabang where Ali used to visit them.
In December 1996, Sally was re-converted to Catholicism and had their children baptized as
Catholics.

Even before that or on March 11, 1996, Ali filed with the Sharia District Court an action to
obtain custody of his two children. He alleged that Sally was not fit to be entrusted with the
custody of their children because she was continually going out and leaving their children
hungry. She was seen with different men at odd hours wearing clothes detestable under
Islamic laws.

After filing her answer, an order was issued by Sharia court granting a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining Sally to desist from preventing Ali to exercise parental authority over
their children. Then on March 2, 1999 Sally filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter since she and her children are no longer Muslims. Ali
opposed the motion contending that at the inception of the case on March 11, 1996 both
parties were Muslims, himself by birth and Sally by conversion. Sally reconverted to
Catholicism only in December 1996, Ali said.

The Sharia court denied Sallys motion and proceeded to hear the case on the merits. Ali
submitted his evidence ex-parte in view of the non-appearance of Sally and on the basis of
said evidence it rendered a decision on November 16, 1999 granting custody of the children
and ordering Ali to support them and provide for their physical, mental and moral
development.

The court found Sally unworthy to care for her children applying the Muslim law which says
that when a woman engages in zina (illicit sexual relations) and continually goes out,
leaving her children, she is not worthy to be trusted with the custody of her children. On the
other hand, the court also found that Ali was capable both personally and financially to look
after the best interest of his minor children. Was the court correct?

No. The Muslim moral laws are no longer binding on Sally. The standard in determining the
proof on whether a woman is competent to care for her children, should not be restricted to
Muslim laws. What determines Sallys capacity is the standard laid down by the Family Code
(FC), now that she is no longer a Muslim. Although there is a need for the children to have
both father and mother, either party may lose parental authority over the children because
of their voluntary separation, taking into consideration the circumstances that would show
which parent can better take care of their children.

In this case, Sally has more capacity and time to see to the childrens needs. She is equally
financially capable of providing for all the needs of her children paying their tuition fees in
an exclusive school. Ali on the other hand has work that requires him to go abroad and be in
different places most of the time. Besides under PD 603, the custody of minor children,
absent any compelling reason, is given to the mother.

However, the award of custody to the wife does not deprive the husband of parental
authority. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other lost, the
attachment and feeling for their offspring invariably remain unchanged. Thus Ali should also
be granted visitorial rights at least once a week and may take them out with the written
consent of Sally (Artadi-Bondagan vs. Bondagan et. al. G.R. 140817, December 7, 2001).




Contradictory

May a spouse recover moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees as a consequence
of a marriage that has been declared null and void because of the psychological incapacity?
This is one of the issues raised and answered in this case of Leo and Lucy.

Leo and Lucy got married on July 4, 1979 and begot a son. From the start of their marriage
Leo appeared to give his career as a banker and businessman the first priority and was
unable to relate not only to Lucy as a husband but also to their son as a father. He appeared
to have no inclination to make their marriage work. Eventually when troubles came Lucy
and Leo separated. While Lucy tried to save the marriage, Leo was reluctant and refused to
reconcile.

In fact it was even Leo who filed with the RTC a petition on July 12, 1992 for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of Lucy.
After Lucy filed her answer, Leo amended his petition by stating that both he and Lucy were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. But in her
amended answer Lucy denied the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated and
specifically prayed for moral and exemplary damages in the total amount of P7 million
because Leo deceived her into marrying her when he was psychologically incapacitated.

After trial, the RTC found from the testimonies not only of the parties, particularly Lucy, but
likewise those of the two psychologists, that the acts of Leo after the marriage were
sufficient proof of his psychological incapacity and therefore the product of his incapacity to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Thus on July 31, 1995, the RTC rendered
judgment declaring the marriage between them null and void ab initio; awarding custody of
their son to Lucy; ordering the liquidation of their conjugal assets; and ordering Leo to pay
Lucy, moral damages in the amount of P2.5 million, exemplary damages of P1 million and
attorneys fees of P100,000.

In awarding moral and exemplary damages, the RTC said that as a result of Leo acts after
their marriage which proved his psychological incapacity, Lucy suffered mental anguish,
fright serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and social
humiliation. On the other hand, his act of filing the petition for annulment compelled Lucy to
litigate and hire a lawyer thereby entitling her to be reimbursed the attorneys fees she
paid. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Were the RTC and the CA
correct in awarding moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees?

No. Psychological incapacity is no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly in-cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It is the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

When the RTC and the CA considered Leos acts as proof of his psychological incapacity,
they considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral and
exemplary damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at
the same time consider the same set of acts as willful. By declaring Leo as psychologically
incapacitated, the awarding of moral and exemplary damages on the same set of facts was
negated.

Since psychological incapacity means that one is truly in-cognitive of the basic marital
covenants or has a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the
obligations of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that Leo purposely deceived
Lucy into marrying him. Thus the award of moral and exemplary damages was without
basis. For the same reason, the award of attorneys fees is left without basis (Buenaventura
vs. Court of Appeals and Buenaventura, G.R. 127358 and 127448, March 31, 2005).





Case to case

Before going to the case, let me correct a mistake first. Today is the 25th anniversary of the
Philippine STAR, not last Monday, July 25, 2011 as I wrote in my article that day entitled
Silver Star. Except for this error, everything else written is true and correct especially my
big thanks and best wishes to the STAR as it continues to shine brightly like gleaming silver
on its 25th year!

Our case now once more sets forth and clarifies the guidelines in the disposition of petitions
for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity especially
in connection with the sufficiency of the cause of action. This is the case between Dina and
her husband, Dino.

Dina and Dino were married on March 23, 1988. They have two sons Nilo and Mike. After 14
years of marriage, Dina already filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that both of them were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with their respective essential marital obligations.

Specifically, Dina alleged in her petition that Dinos psychological incapacity is manifested by
his lack of financial support; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his
working wife; his consistent jealousy and distrust of his wife; his alternating moods of
defiance and contrition; his refusal to assist in the maintenance of the family like the footing
of the household needs and other family needs; his arrogance and insensitivity to his wifes
feeling whom he liked to humiliate and embarrass even in the presence of their children. In
her petition Dina also cited the evaluation of a psychologist who found Dino to be suffering
from passive, aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and
irresponsible.

On the other hand, Dina likewise alleged in her petition that she is effusive and displays her
feelings openly and freely which change very quickly from joy to fury to misery to despair
depending on her day to day experiences. She also alleged that her tolerance for boredom
was very low; she was emotionally immature and cannot stand frustration or
disappointment; she cannot delay to gratify her needs, gets upset when she cannot get
what she wants while her self-indulgence lifts her spirit immensely. Dina also alleged that
according to the psychologist who evaluated her, she manifested psychological aversion to
cohabit with her husband and she suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with
Narcissistic features.

In the same petition Dina also mentioned the psychological report of the psychologist who
found that their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship and their incapacity
to accept and fulfill the essential marital obligations led to the breakdown of their marriage.
The report also declared that based on their psychological make-up, the psychological
incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their essential marital obligations is grave,
incorrigible and incurable.

On November 8, 2002, Dino filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
allegations therein are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. He claimed that the petition did not allege: the root cause of the
psychological incapacity; the gravity of the illness as to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential marital obligations and the marital obligations that were not
complied. Was Dino correct?

No. Contrary to Dinos contention, the petition contains allegations sufficient to support a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity as required by Article 36
of the FC and the guidelines set by this Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals 335 Phil. 664.
The petition alleged that the family backgrounds of both Dino and Dina which were clinically
identified by the competent and expert psychologist are the root causes of the psychological
incapacity. Also alleged in the petition is the report of the psychologist that Dina suffers
from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features while Dino suffers from
Passive, Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorders which are grave, incorrigible and
incurable illnesses as to bring about their disability to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. From the totality of the petition, it can also be gleaned that both of them failed
to live together as husband and wife, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support.

Besides the guidelines requires that proofs must be presented by the parties first during the
trial to determine whether or not the allegations are meritorious. Each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of prior
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. The
provision should be interpreted on a case to case basis, guided by experience, the findings
of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
This cannot be complied with by dismissing the petition without trying the case on the
merits (Aurelio vs. Aurelio, G.R. 175367, June 6, 2011)





Possession and ownership
A LAW EACH DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C. Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated
August 03, 2011 12:00 AM Comments (0) View comments

An action to quiet title to property by the person in possession does not prescribe. This is
the ruling applied in this case of Ben who had been in peaceful and continuous possession in
adverse manner of lot 452 since 1940.

Bens case arose when the adjacent lot 450 containing an area of 4,960 sq. m. was
surveyed on October 1, 1965 by a Cadastral Land Surveyor pursuant to the application for a
free patent filed by Tony. Subsequently on September 25, 1968, a Free Patent and Original
Certificate Title (OCT) covering lot 450 were finally issued in the name of the heirs of Tony
who had in the meantime died. The OCT was registered with the Register of Deeds on
August 29, 1974.

In 1991, when the heirs of Tony subdivided lot 450 covered by the OCT, they learned for the
first time that it included a 790 sq. m. portion of the adjacent lot 452 occupied and in
possession of Ben since 1940. Hence when Tonys heirs took possession of said portion, Ben
filed a protest with the DENR on December 26, 1991 against the Free Patent and the OCT
issued to Tonys heirs. Ben alleged that the 790 sq. m. portion of his lot 452 adjacent to lot
450 was erroneously included in the OCT.

After proper investigation, the DENR special investigator and the geodetic engineer who
assisted him and conducted a survey of the adjoining lots 450 and 452 found that the
disputed portion with an area of 790 sq. m. is really part of Bens property. The sketch plan
prepared by the surveyor clearly shows that said portion is within Bens property and part of
lot 452 taking into consideration the 57 year old coconut trees planted in a straight line
which form a common natural boundary between the lots of the parties as admitted by the
parties themselves.

The Director of Lands however failed to act on the recommendation of the DENR to file an
action for the annulment of the Free Patent and the OCT by segregating from it the 790
sq.m. So on October 9, 1998, Ben himself filed a complaint for annulment of the OCT,
ejectment and damages.

Tonys heirs however contended that Bens action is already barred by prescription. They
maintained that their OCT which was issued in 1968 and registered with the Register of
Deeds in 1974 is already indefeasible when Ben filed his complaint. Were they correct?

No. Bens action primarily seeks the re-conveyance of the disputed 790 sq. m. portion of
land through the amendment of the OCT. An action for re-conveyance of property respects
the decree of registration as incontrovertible and merely seeks the transfer of the property
wrongfully or erroneously registered in anothers name to the rightful owner or to one who
claims to have a better right.

The prescriptive period for the re-conveyance of registered property is ten years reckoned
from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. However the ten-year prescriptive
period is not applicable where the complainant is in possession of the disputed property. In
such a case an action for re-conveyance would be in the nature of an action to quiet title
which does not prescribe.

In this case, Ben who has been in possession of the disputed portion since 1940 by himself
and through his predecessors-in-interest is not barred from bringing this action against
Tonys heirs whose claim to the property is merely based on the OCT which mistakenly
included the 790 sq. m. portion over which Ben has a better right since he and his
predecessors-in-interest had long been in possession of the same in concept of owner. Re-
conveyance is just and proper to end the intolerable anomaly that patentees should have a
Torrens Title for the land which has never been in their possession and which has been
possessed by another person in the concept of owner. A person, whose certificate of title
included by mistake or oversight the land owned by another does not become the owner of
such land by virtue of the certificate alone. The Torrens system is intended to guarantee the
integrity and conclusiveness of registration but it is not intended to perpetrate fraud against
the real owner of the registered land (Heirs of Waga etc. vs. Sacabin, G.R. 159131, July 27,
2009).




Forced resignation
A LAW EACH DAY (Keeps Trouble Away) By Jose C. Sison (The Philippine Star) Updated
August 18, 2011 12:00 AM Comments (1) View comments

In illegal dismissal cases, the employer who interposes the defense of resignation has the
burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. This is the principle applied
in this case of Lynn.

Lynn was a licensed civil engineer for ten years already when she was hired by a
construction and development company (SMPI) as construction management specialist in
1991. Because of satisfactory performance on the job, she was promoted as technical
services manager in 1994 and then as project development manager in 1995. As project
development manager she also sat as a member of the companys management committee
(MC).

But on January 27, 1998, the Company CEO informed Lynn that the company was planning
to reorganize its manpower in order to cut on costs and that she had to file for resignation
otherwise face termination. Initially Lynn refused to sign the blank resignation form handed
to her by the companys human resources department. Since then she had been excluded
from the MC meetings and treated sourly that caused her humiliation and alienation.
Considering the alternative of being terminated from the service or resigning with an
attractive financial package offered her by the company, she opted for resignation instead of
suffer termination. So on February 18, 1998, she submitted the signed resignation letter.

Lynn however learned that there was no reorganization plan in place when she resigned or
immediately thereafter but only the hiring of new employees and some promotions of high
ranking personnel. So on June 26, 1998, Lynn filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging
that her separation from the service was practically forced upon her by management who
tricked her into signing the resignation letter due to an impending reorganization when
there was none after all. She thus alleged that she had been dismissed without cause and
prayed for reinstatement and damages.

But on March 26, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Lynns complaint for lack of merit.
The LA found no proven force, coercion, intimidation or any other circumstance which could
otherwise invalidate Lynns resignation. Being a well-educated person, Lynn could not just
be inveigled into resigning against her will. He said that being excluded from the
management committee meetings would not be so humiliating and alienating as to compel
her to resign and that the company indeed made some promotions and new appointments
which were measures implementing the reorganization. Was the LA correct?

No. Resignation is the formal pronouncement and voluntary act of relinquishment of a
position or office. The intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment.
Hence the act of the employee before and after the resignation must be considered in
determining whether he/she in fact intended to terminate his/her employment. In illegal
dismissal cases, the employer who asserts that there is voluntary resignation and not
dismissal has the burden of proving that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned. SMPI
was unable to discharge this burden.

In this case the question of whether or not there was such a reorganization plan in place at
the time of Lynns separation is material to the determination of whether her resignation
was voluntary as claimed by SMPI because she could not have filed her resignation had she
not been informed that there was such reorganization. And, it is quite clear that there was
actually no genuine corporate restructuring plan in place yet at the time the CEO presented
to Lynn the seemingly last available alternative options of voluntary resignation and
termination by abolition of office. Certainly, inasmuch as the necessity of corporate
reorganization generally lies within the exclusive prerogative of management, Lynn at that
point had no facility to ascertain the truth behind it, and neither was she in a position to
question it right then and there. Indeed she could not have chosen to file for resignation
had SMI not broached to her the possibility of her being terminated from the service on
account of the supposed reorganization. So it is understandable for Lynn to opt for
resignation considering the attractive financial package which SMPI offered to her, instead of
suffer termination that management made her believe will happen.

Thus Lynns separation from the company was the confluence of fraudulent representation
to her that her office would be declared redundant coupled with the subsequent alienation
which she suffered from the company by reason of her initial refusal to tender her
resignation. The element of voluntariness in her resignation is therefore missing. She has
been constructively, and hence illegally dismissed as indeed her continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely under the circumstances.

But considering that it has been more than a decade since she involuntarily resigned, and
with the changes in the corporate structure of SMPI, Lynns former position or its equivalent
may no longer be existing or is currently occupied. Furthermore there is a possibility that
Lynns rejoining SMPIs workforce would only create tension and strained relations and
would thus compromise her efficiency and productivity especially because she was holding a
key position founded on trust and confidence. Hence in lieu of reinstatement, she should be
given separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service plus full
backwages and P50,000 moral damages, P25,000 exemplary damages and 10% of the total
amount due as Attorneys fees (San Miguel Properties Inc. vs. Gucaban, G.R. 153982, July
18, 2011).




Insufficient proof

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to
apply there must be proof that it was acquired during the marriage. This is the ruling in this
case of Elvie, married to Manny.

Elvie was one of the sureties of a loan obtained from a bank (MBTC) by a business
corporation (CPDTI), amounting to a total of P160,000. When CPDTI defaulted in the
payment of the loan, MBTC filed a collection suit against it and its sureties including Elvie
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of MBTC ordering CPDTI and all
its sureties to pay the total outstanding loan already amounting to P260,000. When this
decision became final and executory, a writ of execution was issued against CDTI and its co-
defendants-sureties including Elvie. To implement the writ of execution, the Sheriff levied on
a property covered by TCT No. T-27967 registered in the name of Elvie married to Manny.

Elvie questioned the said levy, claiming that said property belongs to the conjugal
partnership. As such she asserts that it cannot be made to answer for her personal
obligation with the MBTC. To support her assertion, she submitted the Affidavit of Cris, the
Seller of said property, attesting that Elvie and her husband Manny were the buyers of the
subject property, and the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Manny as payment
for said property. In fact she said that the title to the land shows that it was registered in
the name of Elvie married to Manny. Was Elvie correct?

No. Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, the party
who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. Thus the time when the property was acquired is material.

Unfortunately for Elvie, the affidavit she presented can hardly be considered sufficient
evidence to prove her claim. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiant is placed on
the witness stand to testify on his affidavit, such affidavit must be rejected for being
hearsay. In this case, Cris was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his
affidavit.

In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. A
photocopy of a document has no probative value and is inadmissible as evidence.

Similarly the certificate of title could not support Elvies assertion. The fact that the land was
registered in the name of Elvie, married to Manny is no proof that the property was
acquired during their marriage. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.

Indubitably, Elvie utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the
conjugal partnership (Imani vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. 187023,
November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA, 357).

* * *

All Ateneo Law School alumni are invited to the 75th year Grand Alumni Homecoming on
Oct. 21, 2011, Friday at the Isla Ballroom of the Edsa Shangri-la Hotel, Mandaluyong City
starting at 5 p.m. with a mass at Boracay room. Host of the affair is Ateneo Law School
Class of 1987 which has prepared programs and activities for classmates, colleagues and
friends to reconnect, reminisce and relive the good old days at Padre Faura, dela Costa and
Rockwell. It will be great to see you there.