G.R. No.

164915 March 10, 2006

ERIC JONATHAN YU vs. CAROLINE T. YU

FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before CA
alleging that his estranged wife Caroline Yu unlawfully withheld from him
the custody of their minor child Bianca. Subsequently, respondent filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the
absolute community of property. The petition included a prayer for the
award to her of the sole custody of Bianca and for the fixing of schedule
of petitioners visiting rights "subject only to the final and executory
judgment of the CA.

ISSUE: Is WHC available to determine the custodial rights of parents over
their children?

HELD:

No. Articles 49 and 50 of the Family Code provides that the issue on the
custody of the spouses common children is deemed pleaded in the
declaration of nullity case. Hence, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
availed of by either spouse. Pursuant to the aforementioned provisions, it
is the court who shall determine the custody of the common children in
the case for declaration of nullity

Canlas v. NHA G.R. No. 182795 June 5, 2008

FACTS: The petitioners, settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in
Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, filed and sought for the issuance of a
"Writ of Amparo" on the premise that they were deprived of their liberty,
freedom and/or rights to shelter as embodied in our Constitution. Their
dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of
the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
With the claim that land titles were fraudulent and spurious, they
expressed willingness to help the government to unearth the so called
"syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, and by way of the said
prayer for the issuance of the "Writ of Amparo, the petitioners request
that the unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to answer their
participation in the issuances of fraudulent and spurious titles, which are
now in the hands of the private respondents. The petition was actually
made to seek the reversal of the Court's dismissal of previous petitions in
G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, considering that no motion
for reconsideration can be filed for the second or third time in the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Is the Writ of Amparo available against a threatened demolition of
a dwelling?

HELD :"The Writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof." The threatened demolition
of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included
among the enumeration of rights stated in the quoted description of "The
Writ of Amparo". Their claim of their dwelling, assuming they still have
any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not
constitute right to life, liberty and security. Thus, the petition has no legal
basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo. The petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 183711 June 22, 2010
EDITA T. BURGOS vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS: On July 17, 2008, the Court of Appeals (CA) issued a decision
1
in
the consolidated petitions for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus,
2
for Contempt
3
and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
4
filed by
petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her son Jonas Joseph T. Burgos,
who was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four men and by a
woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located
at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City, on April 28, 2007. This CA decision
5
dismissed the
petitioners petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus;
denied the petitioners motion to declare the respondents in contempt;
and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the
petitioner.

ISSUE: Did the PNP and AFP exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the
performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
requires in the investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos?

RULING: Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records
of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far
failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary
diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we
cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using
extraordinary diligence, is undertaken. From the records, we note that
there are very significant lapses in the handling of the investigation -
among them the PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches
of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on
their interview of eyewitnesses to the abduction. Based on these
considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring
should be undertaken. While significant leads have been provided to
investigators, the investigations by the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost
Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) have been
less than complete. The PNP-CIDGs investigation particularly leaves
much to be desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo requires. For this reason, we resolve to refer the
present case to the CHR as the Courts directly commissioned agency
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction
and the gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual
findings and recommendations to this Court. We take into consideration
in this regard that the CHR is a specialized and independent agency
created and empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines.
25


G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010
ROXAS vs. ARROYO.
FACTS: At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari
1
assailing the
Decision
2
dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00036-WRA a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on
the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule).
In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C.
Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied
the latters prayers for an inspection order, production order and return
of specified personal belongings.
ISSUE: Are enforced disappearances defined and penalized in our
jurisdiction?, If not, is there legal and/or constitutional basis for the writ
of amparo? Is the petitioner entitled to the writs prayed for?
RULING: The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing
judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and
directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty
or security.
106
While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing
or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix
liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the
personal belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can
only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been
fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above,
matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo
proceeding.
118

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a persons right to be restituted of his
property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property
rightswhich are no longer protected by the writ of amparo.
119
Section 1
of the Amparo Rule,
120
which defines the scope and extent of the writ,
clearly excludes the protection of property rights.

Rodriguez vs Arroyo
GR 191805
FACTS: Before this Court are two consolidated cases, namely, (1) Petition
for Partial Review on Certiorari dated 20 April 2010 (G.R. No. 191805),
and (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 19 August 2010 (G.R. No.
193160).[1][1] Both Petitions assail the 12 April 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals. Noriel Rodriguez (Rodriguez) is petitioner in G.R. No.
191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a member of Alyansa
Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). Rodriguez claims
that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.Sometime September of 2009, petitioner was
forcibly taken by a group of military men and was brought to a military
camp where he was interrogated with lots beatings and other forms of
torture.
ISSUE: What is a writ of amparo? What is the writ of habeas data? Can
the doctrine of command responsibility be used in amparo and habeas
cases?
The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent
remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It
is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves both
preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the
expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators
by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial
remedy to protect a persons right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As
an independent and summary remedy to protect the right to privacy
especially the right to informational privacy the proceedings for the
issuance of the writ ofhabeas data does not entail any finding of criminal,
civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are
proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access
to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in
case the database or information contains erroneous data or
information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.
Nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. Proceedings under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo do
not determine criminal, civil or administrative liability should not abate
the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility. It further
stated that protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, or threats
thereof, and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these
proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at
the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court
to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under
the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo.

G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MERALCO vs. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM,
FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).On June
4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering
Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan
Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The
letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5,
2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.
2
By
Memorandum
3
dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of
MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS
Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of " reports that
there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown
individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security."
ISSUE: May an employee invoke the remedies available under of the
writ of habeas data where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein
RULINGS: Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding
the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and
security against abuse in this age of information technology.
16
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution.
17
It is evident that respondents
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern
respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what
prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
Roquero vs UP Chancellor, GR 181851, March 9, 2010
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
seeking to set aside the Decision
1
dated 22 March 2007, and the
Resolution
2
dated 1 February 2008, of the Court of the Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87776 entitled, "Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero v. The
Chancellor of the University of the Philippine-Manila (UP Manila), et
al.," a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), which sought to reverse and set aside the Orders
dated 8 June 2004
3
and 9 November 2004
4
of the Administrative
Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of UP-Manila, chaired by Atty. Zaldy B.
Docena with Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara as members
ISSUE: Who can invoke the right to speedy disposition of
cases? In what cases can this right be invoked? What factors
are considered and balanced in determining that the right to
speed trial was violated? Was the right to speedy disposition
of case violated?
RULING: The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases"
is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to
all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and
in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or
even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy
disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both
the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as
the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
12

COCOFED vs Republic GR 177857-58

FACTS: Cast against a similar backdrop, these consolidated petitions for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assail and seek to annul
certain issuances of the Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case No. 0033-
A entitled, Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., et al., Defendants, COCOFED, et al., BALLARES, et al., Class
Action Movants, and Civil Case No. 0033-F entitled, Republic of the
Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,
Defendants. Civil Case (CC) Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F are the results of
the splitting into eight (8) amended complaints of CC No. 0033 entitled,
Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., a suit for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth commenced by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), for the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), against Ferdinand E. Marcos and several individuals, among
them, Ma. Clara Lobregat (Lobregat) and petitioner Danilo S. Ursua
(Ursua). Lobregat and Ursua occupied, at one time or another, directorial
or top management positions in either the Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) or the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), or
both.
[1]
Each of the eight (8) subdivided complaints correspondingly
impleaded as defendants only the alleged participants in the
transaction/s subject of the suit, or who are averred as owner/s of the
assets involved.

ISSUE: Is the right to speedy trial under Section 14, Art III the same or
different from the right to speedy trial under Section 14, Art III? Was the
right to speedy disposition of case violated?

RULING: It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition
of case and the accuseds right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit
kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being that a speedy
disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the
Constitution, obtains regardless of the nature of the case. In fine, the
right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly
criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of
cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In
the instant case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy
disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. As
a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled
exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.
[97]
The sporting idea forbidding one from pulling
surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case cannot
be dismissed for the alleged violation of petitioners right to a speedy
disposition of the case

pimentel v comelec 157870
FACTS: In 2002, RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 was implemented. Sec 36 thereof requires mandatory drug testing
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary
schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. On
23 Dec 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national
and local elections. Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-
election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates
for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987
Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution only
prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No.
6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that
there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 is an amendment to the
Constitution on the qualifications of Senators.

HELD: Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates
any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform;
no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge
of their defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. The provision [n]o
person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Is not tenable as it
enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing
and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations
to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress
cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.

Agustin vs. CA
Facts: In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in
1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and
gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at
the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate
was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-
natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for
Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,
with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the
police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since
then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin
sued Arnel for support.[6]

Issue: Is DNA compulsory testing a form of unreasonable search?

Ruling: No, In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed
national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative
Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does
not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to
stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public service and the
common good.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing
and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence

The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an
admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.



Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: This Petition for Certiorari,[1] dated December 13, 1996 seeks the
nullification of the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated August 18,
1994[2] and October 22, 1996.[3] The first assailed Resolution denied
petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for forfeiture filed against
them, while the second questioned Resolution denied their motion for
reconsideration.
Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit[4] on
February 4, 1992, claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has amassed
properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful income.

Issue: Is the respondent in forfeiture proceeding entitled of due
process?

Ruling: NO, In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
29
we ruled that forfeiture
proceedings under RA 1379 are civil in nature and not penal or criminal
in character, as they do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but
merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired in favor of
the State. Moreover, the procedure outlined in the law is that provided
for in a civil action
RA 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State of
Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public
Officer or Employee and Providing for the Procedure Therefor," expressly
affords a respondent public officer or employee the right to a previous
inquiry similar to preliminary investigation in criminal cases, but is silent
as to whether the same right is enjoyed by a co-respondent who is not a
public officer or employee.

Lejano vs People GR 176389
FACTS: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela,
nineteen years old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home
in Paraaque City. Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of
Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented
star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she
witnessed the crime. On August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an
information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al, The Court
granted the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen
specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver, which specimen was then
believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI pursuannt to section 4 of
the Rule on DNA Evidence6 to give the accused and the prosecution
access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of,
leading to a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010
the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen,
the same having been turned over to the trial court.
ISSUE: Were the accused denied of due process by prosecutions failure to
produce the semen specimen for DNA testing?
RULING: NO, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State
to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the
ruling in Brady v. Maryland
9
that he cites has long be overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood,
10
where the U.S. Supreme Court held
that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is
able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here,
the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of
the specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to
DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA
evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology
for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet
recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the
motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his
co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime
Quarto vs Ombudsman GR 169042

FACTS: Before the Court is a petition
for certiorari and mandamus
[1]
filed by Erdito Quarto (petitioner)
assailing the Ombudsmans January 7, 2004
[2]
and November 4,
2004
[3]
resolutions which granted Luisito M. Tablan, Raul B. Borillo, and
Luis A. Gayya (collectively, respondents) immunity from prosecution,
resulting in the respondents exclusion from the criminal informations
filed before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner seeks to nullify the
immunity granted to the respondents, and to compel the Ombudsman
to include them as accused in the informations for estafa through
falsification of public documents
[4]
and for violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.
[5]


ISSUE: How is the state interest in criminal prosecution satisfied while
respecting the individuals constitutional right against self-
incrimination? Who has the power to grant immunity from prosecution
and to implement the same?

Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between
the imperatives of an individuals constitutional right against self-
incrimination
[51]
(considered the fount from which all statutes granting
immunity emanate
[52]
) and the legitimate governmental interest in
securing testimony.
[53]
By voluntarily offering to give information on the
commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a person opens
himself to investigation and prosecution if he himself had participated in
the criminal act. To secure his testimony without exposing him to the
risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given
immunity from prosecution.
[54]
In this manner, the state interest is
satisfied while respecting the individuals constitutional right against
self-incrimination.

While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the
authority to implement is lodged elsewhere. The authority to choose
the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part
of the process and is essentially an executive function.

The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent
part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to
forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher
objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to
prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its
justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the
conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably
elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power
should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing
of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of
the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to
determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide
whom not to prosecute.