Santos v.

Maranang, 27 Phil 209

(1914) NAMLA
State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.
2,5; Rule 87, sec.1
Doctrine: 1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ALLOWANCE AND PAYMENT OF CLAIMS; TIME FOR
PRESENTATION.If the property of the estate has been properly inventoried, the committee on claims
regularly appointed, the publication of the notice required by law duly made, and there has been no
fraud in the proceedings, claims or debts which the law requires shall be presented to the committee on
claims must be presented to it within the limitation of time provided in section 689 (Code Civ. Proc.) or
they will be barred.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE WILL.Directions in the testator's will that such claims
and debts, or any of them, shall be settled in some other manner are void as opposed to public policy, at
least where there are heirs by force of law.

3.ID.; ID.; ACTION AGAINST ADMINISTRATOR.No action can be instituted directly against the
administrator of the estate for the collection of claims and debts which the committee on claims is
directed to pass upon.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DIRECTION IN WILL TO PAY DEBTS.An itemized list of debts in the will of the testator
which he directs shall be paid does not obviate the necessity of presenting them to the committee for
allowance. Nor do such directions in a will indicate that it was the testator's desire to have them paid
without being probated in accordance with the probate procedure provided in Act No. 190.

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MISTAKE OF LAW.If, because of such provisions in the will, a creditor fails to present
such claims to the committee in the belief that it is unnecessary, he is laboring under a mistake of law
for which no relief can be afforded by the courts. [Santos vs. Manarang., 27 Phil. 209(1914)

Who died: Don Lucas de Ocampo (November 18, 1906)

Facts: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal
property which, by his last will and testament, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will
reads as follows:

I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be
religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.

Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one
due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates
are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was
regularly appointed to hear and determine such claims against the estate

as might be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14,
1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be
required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of
testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the
present proceedings against the administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will
as due him. Relief was denied in the court below, and now appeals to this court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners claim is within the purview of the committees jurisdiction.

Ruling: YES

The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be
compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing
more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the
sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not seeking possession of or title to real property or specific
articles of personal property. When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall
be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to
recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of real estate and
personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)

It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure has
established a system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two
restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which pro
tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations
incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of
law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient
they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in
section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid
would not entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will
requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the
case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?

If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It
is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, establishing questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then the legal portion
is determined? If, in the meantime the estate has been

distributed, what security have the differences against the interruption of their possession? Is the
administrator required to pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not,
what authority has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an
executor may, with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due the
estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he
is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the
amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The
administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body as parties
litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the
administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the dual role of a
claimant and a judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this may not occur. The most
important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are those provisions of
the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal portions due to heirs by force of law, and
expressly recognized and continued in force by sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will must be paid without its being verified, there
is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a
guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be
determined.

Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of error he
alleges that the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the
estate. It is clear that this committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as
a legacy, either to the debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But
this case can only arise when the debt is anasset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a
testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation of a legacy
depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding force until his death,
and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt
arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be
extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender.
Legacies may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied
accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must
show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum
represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.

But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and
disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts
had been paid and the heirs by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the
inevitable result is that there must be a hearing sometime before some tribunal to

determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the
first instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must
present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.

For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Bank of the P.I. v. Hijos, Inc. 53 Phil
806 (1928) RAMOS
State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.
2,5; Rule 87, sec.1

Tan Sen Guan v. Go Siu San, 47 Phil
89 (1924) VARGAS
State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.
2,5; Rule 87, sec.1
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the administrator of the intestate estate of Tan Peng Sue, defendant is the administrator in
the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Antonio Tampoco. As per books kept by
the defendant, Antonio Tampoco owed Tan Peng Sue for P25,802.60 with the interest stipulated at the
rate of 9 6/10 per cent per year, amounted to P30,272.89 at the end of the year 1922. Upon the death
of Antonio Tampoco, proceeding was instituted in the CFI Manila for the settlement of his estate.
Commissioners were appointed, and rendered their final report. After the approval by the court of the
report, the plaintiff moved the court that the committee on claims be again authorized, or a new
committee appointed, to hear and decide a claim that he had and which he was to present against the
estate, alleging that the administrator Go Sui San had been assuring the heirs of Tan Peng Sue that they
would not lose their credit, were in no need of presenting their claim, and would be paid by the heirs of
Antonio Tampoco, and that in the meantime the credit might continue in the business of the deceased
Antonio Tampoco and thus earn interest.CFI appointed new commissioners, holding that the committee
on claims did not comply with sections 687 and 693 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the motion
of the plaintiff was in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 190. The new commissioners admitted
the claim of the plaintiff, recommending its payment by the defendant administrator. Judge Diaz
reversed, holding that the commissioners had no authority to hear and decide said claim due to lack of
court jurisdiction since more than fourteen months have elapsed from the final report by the former
committee. Plaintiff moved for new trial and Harvey set aside the decision, and ordered the
administrator of the estate of Antonio Tampoco to pay the administrator of the estate of Tan Peng Sue
P28,802.60, with interest. Hence this appeal. Defendant contends that the action has prescribed.

ISSUE:
W/N the action has prescribed.

Ruling:
NO. Plaintiff alleges that his failure to present the claim to the committee appointed by the court was
due to the machinations and fraudulent and false representations of the defendant. However,
prescription cannot be avoided on the ground of fraud or undue influence. The failure of Tan Chu Lay,
heir of Tan Peng Sue, to present his claim was an omission committed by an heir who had knowledge of
the existence of the credit of his deceased father. Also, the law does not make any reservation or
exception whatever. Plaintiff also alleges that the notice to the creditors was not published in the
manner prescribed by section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 693 requires the committee to
state in their report among other things, "the manner in which notice was given to the claimants." The
report was not written exactly in accordance with the technicality of the law; however, attached is the
affidavit of the editor of the newspaper La Nacion, the committee on claims had published for three
consecutive weeks a notice to claimants. The committee complied with the requirements of the law as
to publication of notice. There are also attached the appointment. The Court opines that the documents
attached to the report of said committee, the stipulation of facts and the approval of said report by the
trial court constitute a conclusive proof that the commissioners have complied with the publication of
the notice to the creditors.
Quinno v. Grospe, 169 SCRA 702
(1989) BERMAS
State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.
2,5; Rule 87, sec.1

Calma v. Tanedo, 66 Phil 594
(1938)CABARON
State of Non-Claims, Rule 86, secs.
2,5; Rule 87, sec.1
FACTS:
Eulalio Calma was married to Fausta Macasaquit. They were indebted to Esperanza Tanedo which was
chargeable to their conjugal property. Later Fausta died. In her will, she appointed her daughter Maria
as administratrix and upon probate, was appointed judicial adminstratrix (JA).
While the probate proceedings were pending, Tanedo filed a complaint against Eulalio for the recovery
of the aforementioned debt. The CFI ruled for payment of the sum and the aforesaid conjugal property
of Eulalio and Fausta was levied on execution and sold in auction despite opposition of the JA.
The JA brought action to annul the auction sale conducted and to declare that the estate of Fausta owns
solely and absolutely the properties.
CASES now existing:
Probate (1x)
Collection of sum of money (1x)
Note that the probate proceedings were instituted in accordance with Act No. 3176 Section 685.
When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in the testamentary or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, xxxx unless xxx extrajudicial partition and liquidation of
said property.

ISSUE:
W/N the sale of the community property to satisfy the judgment in the collection case is valid.
W/N Tanedo can properly run after Eulalio for satisfaction of the debt.

DECISION:
The sale is void. Said property should be deemed subject to the testamentary proceedings of the
deceased Fausta Macasaquit for all the purposes of that case. Testamentary proceedings and ordinary
action for partition and liquidation of property is alternative; the institution of one precludes the other
to avoid confusion i.e. testamentary proceedings should be given due course. Being an indebtedness
chargeable against conjugal property, no complaint for its payment can be brought against Eulalio
Calma, who had already ceased as administrator of the conjugal property; the claim for this amount had
to be filed in the testamentary proceedings of Fausta Macasaquit. It should be filed before the
committee on claims in said testamentary proceedings and, at all events, thereafter, by appeal to the
corresponding Court of First Instance, in an ordinary action against the judicial administratrix. Eulalio
Calma having ceased as legal administrator of the conjugal property had with his wife Fausta
Macasaquit, no complaint can be brought against him for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable
against said conjugal property, and that the action should be instituted in the testamentary proceedings
of the deceased Fausta Macasaquit in the manner provided by law.
Paredes v. Moya, 61 SCRA 527 (1974)
CABATO
Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5
Facts:
Petitioner Severino Parades commenced a suit for the collection of separation and overtime pays
against his employer, August Kuntze. Decision was rendered against the defendant Kuntze, from which
judgment, he appealed to the CA. While the case was pending, Kuntze died on June 19, 1972.
Accordingly, Parades was duly notified. Thereafter, Carmencita Kuntze, administratrix of the estate of
the deceased, was substituted in his place as party in the appealed case. CA dismissed the appeal for
appellant's failure to file the printed record on appeal, so the case was ordered remanded to respondent
court.

A motion for execution was filed by Parades. Sheriff levied on the properties of defendant, consisting of
two lots. In the auction sale, Paredes, being the highest bidder, acquired one of said lots.

However, in spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by respondent (Administratrix) and
still pending resolution, Parades sold the property he acquired in favor of his co-petitioner, Victorio
Ignacio.

Notwithstanding the opposition to the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, respondent Court, issued
an order setting aside the Writ of Execution, and the Sheriff's Sale and Public Auction of the property,
without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as a claim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate
of the deceased.

Issue:
WON the action for money claims survive even after the death of the defendant?

Held:
YES. In case of a money claim, where the defendant dies during the pendency of his appeal from the
judgment rendered against him, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue. Deceased
defendant should be substituted by his legal representative, namely, the executor or administrator of
the estate. If the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must afterwards go to the probate
court for an order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The Court that
originally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and a levy on the properties of the
deceased because the same are already in custodialegis in the probate court where administration
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant are already pending.

Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final
and executory; it was not arrested by his death.But it was error on the part of Paredes, to have the
money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceased Kuntze. Paredes should
have filed his claim in the administration proceedings of the estate of the deceased where private
respondent is the administratrix.

Judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed at the time limited in the notice (to creditors)
before the court where the administration proceeding involving the estate of the deceased Kuntze are
pending. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides:

All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same
be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed (before the probate court) within
the time limited in the notice (to the creditors); otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may
be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. (1st sentence, Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court) (Emphasis ours)

Consequently, the respondent court, correctly nullified its order of execution pursuant to the judgment
which became final and executory and the corresponding levy on execution and the public auction.

No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. The claim for satisfaction of
the money judgment should be presented in the probate court for payment by the administrator. In the
testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to
the estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties
have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the
estate is in custodialegis and the proper procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in the case of court
judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to pay
the amount due from the estate and required to be paid."

Our decision in this case against the petitioner Paredes binds his co-petitioner Victorio G. Ignacio not
only because the order of execution and the public auction sale in question are null and void, but also
because petitioner Ignacio cannot be considered as a purchaser in good faith, for Ignacio purchased the
"Right of Execution Sale" of Paredes over the property in question when, at that time, the respondent
administratrix of the estate of Kuntze had already filed a motion to quash the Writ of Execution and
auction sale; as a matter of fact the validity of said writ of execution was still up for respondent court's
resolution after the parties shall have submitted memoranda on the question raised in the aforesaid
motion as required by the respondent court.
Spouses Manalansan v. Castaeda, Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
Jr., 83 SCRA 777 (1978) CARDENAS

second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5

Malolos v. Asia Pacific Finance Corp.,
147 SCRA 61 (1987) DEGUSMAN
Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5
DOCTRINE:
The reason for the dismissal of the case is that upon the death of the defendant a testate or intestate
proceeding shall be instituted in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their
claims which shall be paid proportionately out of the property left by the deceased
FACTS:
Asia Pacific Finance Corporation purchased E. Francisco Liners Company, Inc. (herein referred to as
Francisco Liner) a postdated Far East Bank and Trust Company check numbered 214070 in the amount
of P105,000.00 issued in the latter's favor by herein petitioner, Josephine Cruz Malolos. When deposited
on its maturity date, the aforesaid check was dishonored for the reason that petitioner's bank account
had already been closed. Thereupon, APCOR demanded from Francisco Liners and also from petitioner,
in her capacity as drawer of the check, the payment of said check, but the obligation remained unpaid.
As a result, on August 15, 1979, APCOR filed a complaint for sum of money with preliminary attachment
docketed as Civil Case No. 125887 in the then CFI of Manila (now RTC) against E. Francisco Liners, Co.,
Inc., Elias A. Francisco (as president of Francisco Liners), and herein petitioner (in her capacity as drawer
of said check). An Order for Attachment was issued on grounds that the defendants were allegedly guilty
of fraud. Josephine Cruz Malolos died on April 27, 1980, and her counsel, on July 10, 1980, filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint as against her pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Private
respondent opposed the aforementioned motion and the late argued that while it is admitted that the
action again Josephine Cruz Malolos is one for recovery of money and being such it does not survive, the
circumstances obtaining in the case place the same among the exceptions to Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. The Court ordered the denial of the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an attachment levied on some properties of the defendant constitutes an exception to
the general rule of non-survival of the money claim as provided for in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court.
RULING:
No, it is not an exception. There is no question that the action in the court below is for collection or
recovery of money. It is already a settled rule that an action for recovery of money or for collection of a
debt is one that does not survive and upon the death of the defendant the case should be dismissed to
be presented in the manner especially provided in the Rules of Court. "The language of Section 21 of
Rule 3 is too clear in this respect as to require any interpretation or construction. It very explicitly says
that "when the action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
specially provided by the rules," meaning, Section 5 of Rule 86 and its related provisions." In the present
case, the money claim arose out of a pure and simple debt, which as aforementioned, under the
provision of Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the Rules of Court shall be dismissed and must be brought before the
probate court (1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 215-216). In the light of the
foregoing considerations, the conclusion is inevitable that the trial court deviated from the procedure
laid down by the above-mentioned provisions of the Rules.
Luzon Surety Co., v. IAC, 151 SCRA
652 (1987) GARCIA
Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5
Facts:
In Civil Case No. 59506 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Luzon Surety Co., Inc., v.
Material Distributors (Phil.), Inc., et al.," judgment was rendered against the defendants, including Gil
Puyat, for the principal sum of P20,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% computed and compounded
quarterly from June 25, 1958, and the further sum of P3,608.00 representing premiums and stamps. The
judgment became final on April 13, 1967, but was not enforced. Within the prescribed period, Civil Case
No. 93268 was instituted to revive the judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. On May 24, 1974, judgment
was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. On March 28, 1981 Gil Puyat died. On September 1, 1982, a claim
against the estate of Gil Puyat was filed. The Administrators oppose the claim for the reason that it is
unenforceable and barred by laches for no steps were taken by the claimant to secure a writ of
execution against defendant Gil Puyat during his lifetime to enforce the judgment in Civil Case No.
59506 or Case No. 93268. On November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case, the IAC
affirmed stating that the judgment-creditor is only entitled to revive the judgment only once. After the
expiration of five years from the date a judgment has become final the judgment is reduced to a mere
right of action in favor of the prevailing party. The period of ten years should be computed not from the
finality of the judgment in Civil Case 93268 but rather of Civil Case 59506 which became final on April
13, 1967. This judgment would have prescribed on April 30, 1977. However, this judgment was revived
by the decision of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case 93268.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may still file an action against the defendants estate.

Held:
The decision in Civil Case No. 59506 became final and executory on April 13, 1967. The judgment was
not enforced. The petitioner instituted Civil Case No. 93268 within the prescriptive period to revive the
judgment in Civil Case No. 59506. The revived judgment was rendered on May 24, 1974. This judgment
became final and executory sometime in 1974. Again, this was not enforced. On September 1, 1982, the
petitioner filed a claim in Special Proceedings No. Q-32291 before the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal. What is sought is a second revival of the judgment that had become final in 1967. This can no
longer be done due to the lapse of the allowable period. The Court finds that the right of the petitioner
to enforce the judgment against Gil Puyat, an accommodation party and a defendant in Civil Case Nos.
59506 and 93268, filed on September 1, 1982 had already prescribed considering that more than ten
(10) years had already elapsed from the finality of the original judgment on April 13, 1967. The failure of
the private respondents to raise prescription in their "Comment to Claim" does not imply the waiver of
such defense. In the instant rase, there is no new issue of fact that arises in connection with the
question of prescription. All the pertinent dates showing that the petitioner's enforcement of the
judgment under Civil Case No. 93268 has already prescribed can be found in the petitioner's allegations
in the "claim" as well as its evidence filed. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now the Court of Appeals, is AFFIRMED
Marini-Gonzales v. Lood, 148 SCRA
457 (1987) GENERAL
Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5

Albano v. Agtarap, 22 Phil 345 (1912)
LAJARATO
Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5
FACTS:
Lucio Agtarap owned several parcels of agricultural land in Laoag, Ilocos Norte. He died leaving 4 sons
Cornelio, Nicolas, Silverio and grandson Melencio Agtarap. Later on Silverio also died intestate and his
wife Juana Domingo filed a petition for the settlement of his estate as well as for the appointment of an
administrator. The trial court appointed Rodrigo Albano as administrator of the estate of Silverio.
Rodrigo Albano instituted a civil action improperly entitled in the matter of the claim for the widows
legal portion against the other three heirs of Lucio Agtarap namely Cornelio, Nicolas and a grandson
named Melecio Agtarap. Improperly so entitled, because in the present civil action the matter involved
is a claim in favor of the intestate estate of Silverio to certain property belonging to the decedent Lucio,
against the three heirs who have taken to themselves all the estate left by the latter, including the
fourth part which belongs to Silverio Agtarap.. Therefore the subject matter of this action can only be
this co-ownership, if it exists, in which the hereditary estate was left, and, if it does so exist, the partition
of the property among the four lawful co-owners, the heirs of Lucio Agtarap, and withdrawal of
Silverios portion in order to transfer it to his intestate estate. The trial court ruled that one-fourth part
of the property of their father Lucio be delivered to the administrator of the intestate estate of the late
Silverio Agtarap, as his legacy, so that, after proper proceedings, their respective portions may be
adjudicated to the widow and other heirs of the said Silverio. The court considered the action to be one
of partition. Defendants argued that the administrator has no power to compel the partition of the
estate on the ground that being an administrator, he has no title or interest in said estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an administrator may bring an action or claim to compel the partition of the estate.
HELD:
Yes.The claim or action made by the administrator Albano for recognition of the right the decedent
Silverio has to a portion of the property, held by persons who are heirs with him, should be enforced by
an action for partition, and the trial in such case should terminate with the judgment fixing the portion
that belongs to the said decedent. The necessary procedure will be the special proceedings in the
intestate estate of Silverio Agtarap, in which may properly be presented the claim of the administrator
of the said intestate estate on behalf of Juana Domingo for her legal portion as widow. In the trial held
for such purpose it will be determined who are the heirs of the intestate estate of Silverio Agtarap.
Dissenting opinion of Justice Moreland:
By common law executors and administrators acquired a qualified title to the personal property of the
decedent, and, when his interest therein was that of a co-tenant, he is authorized to compel partition.
As to real property, neither at common law nor under any statute does an executor or administrator
take any title. Neither can he compel partition, in the absence of a statute authorizing it.So far as I can
ascertain, nowhere in the law of these Islands is an administrator given power to bring an action for the
partition of real estate.
Heirs of Gregoire v. Baker, 51 Phil 75
(1927) NAMLA
Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5
Doctrine: 1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS) INSOLVENT ESTATE; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE BY
DECEDENT; REMEDY OF CREDITOR.Where an 68tate in administration appears to be insolvent, any
creditor who believes that a conveyance of property executed in life by the decedent was made in fraud
of creditors may, by leave of the court, and upon giving bond to indemnify the executor or administrator
against costs, commence an action in the name of the executor or administrator, and recover the
property thus fraudulently conveyed away. The personal representative of a decedent is not under the
peremptory duty of starting such action himself.

2.JUDGMENT; APPEAL; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.Orders made by a' court with reference to the
inclusion of items of property in the inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are manifestly of a
purely discretionary, provisional, and interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or change at
any time during the course of the administration proceedings Such orders are not conclusive of the
rights of any one, and the order in question not final in the sense necessary to make it appealable.

Who died: J.H. Ankrom (September 18, 1922, Davao)

Petitioner/Appointed Administrator: A.L. Baker

Facts: It appears that J. H. Ankrom and on September 25, thereafter, the appellee, A. L. Baker, qualified
as his administrator. On December 13 of the same year, the administrator filed his inventory of the
assets pertaining to the estate of his decedent, in which inventory was included a tract of land covered
by Torrens certificate of title and containing an area of more than 930 hectares. In this inventory, said
tract of land, with the improvements thereon, was estimated at nearly P60,000. On September 24, 1924,
the heirs of Rafael Gregoire, appellants herein, filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom for the P70,
877.56, based upon a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of the Republic of Panama.

This claim was allowed by the commissioners in the estate of Ankrom, and no appeal was at any time
taken against the order so allowing it. It appears that the total recognized claims against the estate
amounted originally to P76,645.13.

As the affairs of the estate stood upon the original inventory, there appeared to be sufficient assets to
pay all claimants; but while these intestate proceedings were being conducted the administrator
discovered that on April 22, 1920, or about a year and a half before his death, Ankrom had executed a
mortgage on the property here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company to secure that
company from liability on a note in the amount of P20,000.00, of the same date, upon which it had
made itself contigently liable. Two days after this mortgage had been executed Ankrom appears to have
made an assignment of all his interest in the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung Ohio, for a purported
consideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations.

Admin upon this knowledge omitted the said property but the court, however, having its attention
called to the fact that the omission of this property from the inventory would leave the estate insolvent,
made an order on October 7, 1925, directing the administrator to restore said item to his inventory.

Upon petition by admin, court made a new order, dated march 5, 1926, approving of the omission by
the administrator of said property from the inventory; and its is from this order that the present appeal
is here being prosecuted.

Issue: Would an appeal be proper?

Held: No. The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administrator against costs and,
by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the administrator to set aside the assignment or
other conveyance believed to have been made in fraud of creditors.

When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or administrator to pay debts and
expenses, and when the deceased person made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real
or personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of
the estate may, by license of the court, if the executor or administrator has not commenced such action,
commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor or administrator, an action for
the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit of the creditors, such real or personal estate,
or interest therein so conveyed. But such action shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court
a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor or
administrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the judgment by him
so recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as the court deems equitable.

For the appellants it is contended that, inasmuch as no appeal was taken from the order of October 7,
1925, directing the administrator to include the land in question in the inventory, said order became
final, with the result that the appealed order of March 5, 1926, authorizing the exclusion of said
property from the inventory, should be considered beyond the competence of the court. This
contention is untenable. Orders made by a court with reference to the inclusion of items of property in
the inventory or the exclusion of items therefrom are manifestly of a purely discretionary, provisional,
and interlocutory nature and are subject to modification or change at any time during the course of the
administration proceedings. Such order in question not final in the sense necessary to make it
appealable. In fact we note that the appealed order was expressly made without prejudice to the rights
of the creditors to proceed in the manner indicated in the provision above quoted from the Code of Civil
Procedure.

The order appealed from not being of an appealable nature, it results that this appeal must be
dismissed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959 (1962)
RAMOS
Claims that Survive, Rule 87, sec. 1,
second clause; Rule 3, secs. 16, 17,
20; Rule 86, sec. 5
Facts:
Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas filed to recover damages from
Hermogenes Llemos, alleging that the Llemos had served them by registered mail with a copy of a
petition for a writ of possession with notice that the same would be filed in the CFI of Samar. Aguas
proceeded to the court, traveling from Manila to Samar together with their lawyers and discovered that
no such petition had been filed, and that defendant maliciously failed to appear in court. Before he
could answer the complaint, the defendant died Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs.
The heirs filed a motion to dismiss, which the court approved, on the ground that the legal
representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and testate or intestate
proceedings should be initiated and the petitioners claim filed therein.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim survives the death of the decedent.

Ruling:
Yes, pursuant to Rule 87 Sec. 1 (sa full text nakalagay Rule 88 Sec. 1, nagkamali sila nyahahaha) the
following claims may be filed against the executor of the estate of the decedent, to wit:
xxx recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.
The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is
not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is
injured or diminished. To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this
case, is certainly injurious to that party's property.
Aguas v. Llenos, supra VARGAS Claims that Do Not Survive, Rule 87,
sec. 1, first clause; Rule 3, secs. 16-17
Facts:
Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas filed an action in CFI Catbalogan to
recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos, alleging that the latter had served them by registered mail
with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession; that plaintiffs proceeded to the court and discovered
that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant maliciously failed to appear in court. Before he
could answer the complaint, the defendant died Plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs.
The heirs filed a motion to dismiss, which the court approved, on the ground that the legal
representative, and not the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and testate or intestate
proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein. MR was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim survives the death of defendant and passes to the heirs.

Ruling:
YES. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses
and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money
against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the
plaintiffs-appellants Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors
or administrators: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to
enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The
present suit is one for damages under the last class. However, the parties have arrived at an amicable
settlement, and agreed to dismiss the appeal. The settlement has been approved. (MOOT AND
ACADEMIC)