The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within:

Fear, Conspiracy, and Rebellion in Early Colonial

Yucatan
*
by Matthias Gorissen
Abstract. This study describes a brief period of political unrest and turmoil in Yucatan
during the penultimate decade of the sixteenth century. Based on previously untapped ar-
chival sources, it tries to correct and extend earlier accounts of the two successive Cam-
peche uprisings. We suggest that these events should be analysed as part of a larger cul-
ture of fear which characterized the uneasy alliance between Maya and Spaniards in
Yucatans early colonial period. Consequently, contemporary descriptions of Indian re-
bellion were shaped by stereotyped representational conventions and mythical elabora-
tions. This transformation of accounts into a standardized story of Indian rebellion aimed
at the exclusion of alternative interpretations. In a second step, these standardized narra-
tives became politically effective themselves, as they taught Spanish officials how to de-
fine, how to detect, and how to deal with cases of Indian rebellion. The particular form
these stories took in a peripheral region of Spains colonial empire is best described as a
regional variant of the political ideology prevalent in the empires centre. This reading
also undermines the more conventional interpretation of colonial Maya rebellions as re-
vitalization movements.
Agood conspiracy is unprovable. I mean, if you can prove it, it means they screw-
ed up somewhere along the line.
Jerry Fletcher (aka Mel Gibson)
1
Once upon a time in the mid-1570s, the town council of Valladolid in
eastern Yucatan snatched up rumours of a projected Indian rebellion in
nearby Tekuch, a small village of some 80 families. Tekuchs encomen-
dero was Blas Gonzlez one of the old campaigners of the Spanish
* I would like to thank Ute Schren (LAI/FU Berlin) for incisive comments on an
earlier draft of this paper. The usual disclaimers apply.
1
Quoted from the movie Conspiracy Theory, directed by Richard Donner (War-
ner Bros., 1997).
Jahrbuch fr Geschichte Lateinamerikas 44
Bhlau Verlag Kln/Weimar/Wien 2007
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 67
conquest of Yucatan under the Montejos but by then already in his
eighties. Hastily, the council declared a younger citizen captain of war.
Presumably the same evening, Don Diego Sarmiento de Figueroa set
out for Tekuch with a small force of ten soldiers and a sergeant, all of
them on horseback. Upon reaching the outskirts of Tekuch long after
nightfall, Sarmiento ordered his troops to dismount their horses and to
light up the match-cords of their firearms. Silently, the Spaniards sneaked
into the village and encircled the house of the local cacique. The soldiers
lined up in the backyard, aiming their heavy arquebuses at the house.
The captain and his sergeant entered through the front-door, catching
and overwhelming the cacique in surprise. Still unnoticed by the
sleeping villagers, the Spanish forces headed back to Valladolid, drag-
ging the captured cacique with them for further examination.
Afew years later, the story of the Tekuch rebellion was recorded
in Sarmientos probanza de mritos, which includes a detailed account
by his sergeant.
2
Several witnesses made clear that further examina-
tions were actually conducted. They did not, however, mention the
specific result of these investigations nor is there any reference to a
formal sentence against or punishment of the cacique. Moreover, the
whole affair went unmentioned when Blas Gonzlez drew up a brief
report on his encomienda in 1580, even though the Great Maya Re-
volt of 1546 was vividly remembered by him and other citizens of
Valladolid.
3
One may argue, of course, that Sarmientos surprise-attack
on the local head-man had nipped the imminent rebellion in the bud.
But in the final analysis, one is left with hidden hints and allegations,
denunciation, and rumour spurious traces of rebellion, at best. There
may be a better case for a Tekuch conspiracy: for either the villages
68 Matthias Gorissen
2
Probanzas de Don Diego Sarmiento Figueroa [...], 1578: Archivo General de In-
dias, Seville (hereinafter AGI), Patronato 75, R.1, N.2.
3
Mercedes de la Garza (ed.), Relaciones histrico-geogrficas de la goberna-
cin de Yucatn (Mexico City 1983, original ca. 1580). Today, the revolt of 1546 is
usually seen as an indigenous response to the continuing Spanish wars of conquest in
the eastern part of the peninsula which can be classified as a rebellion only within the
ideological framework of the Spanish myth of pacification i.e., the assumption
that Spain had taken legitimate possession of Yucatan even before establishing a per-
manent military control. Victoria R. Bricker, The Indian Christ, the Indian King. The
Historical Substrate of Maya Myth and Ritual (Austin 1981), p. 6; Nancy M. Farriss,
Maya Society under Colonial Rule. The Collective Enterprise of Survival (Princeton
1984), p. 68; and Matthew Restall, Maya Conquistador (Boston 1998), p. 14.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 68
cacique had actual plans for rebellion, or someone else had conspired
against him, spreading some false allegations intended to break his
neck. But the latter interpretation assumes a good conspiracy in Gib-
sons sense: it is totally unprovable down to the present day.
By any account, the Tekuch rebellion was clearly not more than
a storm in a teacup. But it still makes up for a good story. And inter-
estingly enough stories of Indian rebellion proliferated in Yucatan,
despite the fact that outright rebellion was very rare.
4
These stories
grew out of the epistemic murk prevalent in colonial situations,
blurring the boundaries between fact and fiction, and often reflecting
what colonial officials could envision as a plausible plot.
5
When a
given set of events was transformed into a story of Indian rebellion ac-
cording to culturally specific rules, fear crept in as a crucial variable.
The peninsulas conquest in the 1530s and 1540s had been incomplete,
and towards the end of the sixteenth century, large areas remained out
of reach for the Spanish (Fig. 1). But even in the conquered regions,
adult male Spaniards found themselves to be vastly outnumbered by
potential Indian warriors.
6
And starting in 1559, Yucatans coast was
increasingly subject to raids by foreign pirates. Thereafter, Spanish
settlers envisioned themselves as wedged between internal and exter-
nal enemies, facing the double threat of enemies from the sea and
69 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
4
There has been little explicit discussion of what would qualify as a rebellion and
consequently, there is no consensus on the total number of rebellions in colonial period
Yucatan. Farriss has already reduced an earlier list of six examples to a single one, the
1761 rebellion in Cisteil. But the most comprehensive study of this event prefers to call
it an uprising and uses the term rebellion only in scare quotes. Others add new exam-
ples to the list, such as the mass flight of entire villages in 1661, now dubbed the Sah-
cabchen rebellion. Farriss, Maya Society (note 3), p. 68; Robert W. Patch, Culture,
community and rebellion in the Yucatec Maya uprising of 1761: Susan Schroeder (ed.),
Native Rebellion and the Pax Colonial in New Spain (Lincoln 1998), p. 6783; and
Gabriela Sols Robledo/Paola Peniche (eds.), Idolatra y sublevacin (Mrida 1996).
5
Michael Taussig, Culture of Terror, Space of Death. Roger Casements Putumayo
Report and the Explanation of Torture: Comparative Studies in Society and History 26
(1984), p. 467497; and Ann Laura Stoler, In cold blood. Hierarchies of Credibility and
the Politics of Colonial Narratives: Representations 37 (1992), p. 151189.
6
This ratio was estimated at 1:250 in 1565 and 1:125 in 1586. Note that the number
of Spaniards remained constant, and that the change was only due to the continuing de-
cline of the Indian population. See Informacin [...] para el peligro que tienen con los
franceses [...], 1565: AGI, Mxico 359, R.2, N.2; and Carta de Francisco de Sols,
gobernador de Yucatn, 12 de mayo de 1586: AGI, Mxico 359, R.6, N.30.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 69
enemies of the land. There was some discussion on which of these
enemies was worse. And ever since the first of these attacks, when In-
dians had allegedly transgressed Spanish orders by supporting the for-
eigners with food and other supplies, colonial officials feared that the
enemy within and the enemy without might join forces even though
this type of alliance remained only a vague possibility throughout the
colonial period.
7
In the long run, Spanish fears of Indian rebellion became a potent
social force of its own. These fears, however, were increasingly based
on stories rather than actual experience with rebellions. Thus, the nar-
ratives themselves became evidence of the process whereby a political
situation was created and sustained.
8
At the same time, Spanish stories
of Indian rebellion presented a standardized interpretation of past
events which served as a guide for political action in the present.
When the muddy affair in Tekuch was retold and put down to record,
it was transformed into a crucial precedent in which Spanish officials
learned how to define, how to detect, and how to cope with cases of
Indian rebellion.
The present essay will examine in detail two cases of alleged Indian
rebellions in Campeche, Yucatans principal harbour at the west coast.
At least in its general outline, the story of two successive Campeche
uprisings in the 1580s is well known to historians of Yucatan. It was
already briefly recorded in seventeenth-century reports by Pedro Sn-
chez de Aguilar and Diego Lpez de Cogolludo.
9
More recently,
Nancy Farriss summed up:
There were actually two so-called up-risings in the Campeche district, one in 1584
supposedly led by the cacique of Campeche and the other in 1585, led by D. Andrs
Cocom from Sotuta, who had managed to escape while being sent into exile in San
Juan de Ulua for idolatry.
10
According to Lpez de Cogolludo, Andrs Cocom
70 Matthias Gorissen
7
Ibidem.
8
Taussig, Culture of Terror (note 5), p. 482.
9
Pedro Snchez de Aguilar, Informe contra idolorum cultores del obispado de
Yucatn (Mexico City 1892, original ca. 1613), p. 93; and Diego Lpez de Cogolludo,
Los tres siglos de la dominacin espaola en Yucatn, o sea historia de esta provincia,
2 vols. (Graz 1971, original ca. 1656), vol. II, p. 6162 and 6566.
10
Farriss, Maya Society (note 3), p. 428, n. 39.
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[...] remained hidden in the territory of Campeche, and there he instigated a conspi-
racy, intending no less than to promote himself to kingship. He ordered the Indians
to pay him tribute and gathered many arms, which he had guarded in caves up to the
time in which they were discovered.
11
Based on a single date provided by Snchez de Aguilar, it is now
generally accepted that the Campeche uprisings ended in 1585 with
Cocoms execution. His conspiracy fits neatly into a standardized
anthropological interpretation of Maya rebellions as nativism or re-
vitalization movements.
12
Most recently, it has also been suggested
that the revolt of Andrs Cocom provides the key to the story of Anto-
nio Martnez, one of the most enigmatic texts in the Yucatec Maya
Books of Chilam Balam.
13
Our own analysis clearly does not sup-
port this view.
However, published accounts of these events remain all too brief,
fragmentary, and often confused. Lpez de Cogolludo, for example,
dated the entire affair to the term of office of Francisco de Sols, Yuca-
tans governor from 1582 to 1586. At the same time, he also noted the
involvement of Gaspar Len de Salazar, who was in fact the teniente
general of Solss successor Antonio de Voz Mediano, and who did
not come to Yucatan before the end of 1586.
14
Based on a broader
array of archival sources, we will argue here that the two successive
Campeche uprisings actually occurred in 1586 and 1589, respec-
tively. Below, we will first sketch the social background of these
events before turning to the two successive rebellions themselves
and their aftermath.
71 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
11
Lpez de Cogolludo, Los tres siglos (note 9), vol. II, p. 66. All translations in this
paper are the authors.
12
See especially Bricker, The Indian Christ (note 3).
13
Richard N. Luxton, The Book of Chumayel. The Counsel Book of the Yucatec
Maya, 15391638 (Laguna Hills 1996), p. 281283; and Antje Gunsenheimer, La his-
toria de Don Andrs Cocom en los Libros de Chilam Balam: Indiana 17/18 (2002), p.
269288.
14
Carta de Antonio de Voz Mediano, gobernador de Yucatn, March 7, 1587: AGI,
Mxico 359, R.7, N.31.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 71
FIGURE 1: YUCATAN IN THE 1580S, SHOWING MAJOR SETTLEMENTS AND
JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES
Shaded areas denote regions beyond the effective control of Spanish government.
Drawing by the author. Sources: see note 20.
1. CAMPECHE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
Colonial period Yucatan has been aptly characterized as the periphery
of a periphery: an isolated backwater linked to the secondary centres
of the Spanish Empire only by way of sea for much of its history.
15
72 Matthias Gorissen
15
Farriss, Maya Society (note 3), p. 393.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 72
During the Conquest period, Campeche was both an important Span-
ish administrative centre and a seat of early missionary activity. After
1541, the town lost much of its importance to Mrida but continued to
be the peninsulas principal commercial harbour. According to a colo-
nial Yucatec Maya text, Campeche was simply the base of the
land.
16
And in Spanish eyes, the harbour remained the central gate-
way to and from Yucatan whoever is in control of Campeche con-
trols the entire colony.
17
Campeche connected Yucatan to Veracruz and
Havana while acting at the same time as the central hub in a circum-
peninsular system of coastal shipping. Direct trade with Spain, on the
other hand, was not taken up before 1590.
18
In the mid-sixteenth century, the towns jurisdiction was roughly
coterminous with the modern state of Campeche, but much of this area
was either uninhabited or beyond the control of Spanish government.
Far to the south, the Chontal ruler Don Pablo Paxbolon educated by
Franciscan missionaries and a close Spanish ally reigned over a
quasi-independent realm.
19
In the central parts, Spanish control was
limited to a thin strip along the coast, focussing on the major settle-
ments at Champoton and Campeche, with a few additional Indian vil-
lages in the latters immediate hinterland. Further to the north, recently
congregated Maya villages were aligned like beads on a string along
the road from Campeche to Mrida. The two ecclesiastical districts in
this region, with their respective centres at Hecelchakan and Calkini,
held a much higher population than the Champoton-Campeche area.
20
73 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
16
Literally: u chun luum. Chun means among other things base, root, and
beginning. George B. Gordon (ed.), The Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel (Phila-
delphia 1913), p. 25.
17
Informacin (note 6).
18
Manuela Cristina Garca Bernal, El afianzamiento de un precario comercio.
Los intercambios entre Sevilla y Yucatn, 15901600: Historia Mxicana 50 (2000),
p. 201269.
19
France V. Scholes/Ralph L. Roys, The Maya Chontal Indians of Acalan-Tixchel.
A Contribution to the History and Ethnography of the Yucatan Peninsula (Washington,
DC 1948).
20
Guilln de las Casas, Carta de Don Guilln de las Casas, gobernador de Yucatn,
a Su Majestad con una memoria de los conventos, vicaras y pueblos de la provincia,
1582: F. V. Scholes/C. R. Menndez/J. I. Rubio Mae/E. Adams (eds.), La iglesia en Yu-
catn, 15601610 (Mrida 1938), p. 5165; Pedro Cardete, Memorial que el Provincial
y Definidores de la provincia de San Joseph de Yucatn envan al Real Consejo de las In-
dias en la Corte del Rey don Felipe nuestro Seor, 1586: ibidem, p. 95101.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 73
Legally, there were two Campeches: the Spanish town and the In-
dian village. Spatially, these were separated by the shot of an arque-
bus, or roughly a kilometre. However, the actual social composition
of this cluster of settlements was much more complex: annexed to the
Spanish town there was an entire ward settled by the descendants of
Central Mexican mercenaries, which functioned as a distinct political
unit with its own local government. About two-thirds of the inhabi-
tants of Spanish Campeche were ethnically Maya, and quite likely,
there was also a small minority of African descent. Politically, the
town was dominated by another minority of some 80 Spanish vecino
families. With some 300 tributaries, or a total population of 1,200, In-
dian Campeche was still slightly larger than the Spanish town and
with the sole exception of the three friars in the Franciscan convent
entirely Maya. Altogether, the three settlements near the harbour may
have held some 2,500 inhabitants in the 1580s, while a small number
of scattered villages in the towns hinterland made up for only a few
hundred. The inhabitants of some of these villages spoke a northern
dialect, even though a distinct southern dialect known as language of
Campeche could still be recognized across the entire base of the pen-
insula.
21
Despite its relative wealth and commercial importance, Campeche
was left largely undefended throughout the sixteenth century. Citizens
often complained about the long open shoreline and the lack of natu-
ral barriers. As early as 1565, Yucatans governor and the cabildo of
Mrida had applied to the Crown for artillery and fortifications.
22
However, actual construction of defensive works did not begin until
1610.
Throughout the peninsula, the mid-sixteenth century was still cha-
racterized by rapid population decline. Between 1549 and 1566, Cam-
peche, pueblo de indios, lost one third of its tributary population. As
the assessment of tribute rates was based on entire communities rather
74 Matthias Gorissen
21
Antonio Ciudad Real, Tratado curioso y docto de las grandezas de la Nueva Es-
paa (Mexico City 1993, original ca. 1589), p. 355356; Cardete, Memorial (note 20);
and Isabel Fernndez Tejedo, La comunidad indgena maya de Yucatn, siglos XVI y
XVII (Mexico City 1990), p. 60.
22
Informacin (note 6).
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 74
than individual obligations and tribute collectors employed increas-
ingly outdated population figures, this led to a worsening economic
crisis in the Maya villages. Both Maya and Spaniards likened Yucatan
to a land in which the living had to pay for the dead. This pressure un-
dermined the social distinction between the indigenous nobility and
commoners: while nominally still exempt from tribute themselves, the
nobles were held responsible for the fulfilment of their respective
communities tribute obligations and thus found themselves increas-
ingly reduced to the status of tributaries.
23
In 1583, the royal visitador Diego Garca de Palacio promulgated a
series of new laws which severely affected SpanishIndian relation-
ships and further blurred the boundary between Maya nobles and com-
moners. In the mid-1570s, Campeche and other Maya villages still had
both a hereditary cacique and a gobernador, the elected head of the
local council. The new laws restricted some privileges to the goberna-
dor and reserved half of the cabildo positions for commoners. The ca-
ciques lost much of their power and economic base unless they were
able to fill the post of governor themselves. Similarly, the honorific
title Don was no longer restricted to members of the nobility but in-
creasingly applied to anyone who held a cabildo office.
24
Garca de
Palacio also initiated a major tax reform. A new census adjusted the
number of tributaries to more realistic figures, and tribute rates were
now assigned on a per head basis. This reduced the total amount of trib-
ute demands in many communities, but as with any other tax reform,
there were both winners and losers: bachelors and widowers now had to
pay half of the usual rates, and the maestro cantores and sacristanes
indigenous aides of the missionaries were charged at the full rate.
The Franciscans promptly protested against the latter order, noting that
this left many of the lay preachers impoverished and highly suscepti-
ble to flight.
25
However, in many other respects church and state agencies now
worked hand in hand. The 1570s had still been characterized by a deep
75 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
23
Sergio Quezada, Tributos, limosnas, y mantas en Yucatn, siglo XVI: Ancient
Mesoamerica 12 (2001), p. 7378.
24
Edmundo OGorman (ed.), Papeles relativos a la visita del Oidor Dr. Diego
Garca de Palacio, ao de 1583: Boletn del Archivo General de la Nacin 11 (1940),
p. 385482; and Sergio Quezada, Pueblos y caciques yucatecos, 15501580 (Mexico
City 1993), p. 141142 and 154155.
25
Cardete, Memorial (note 20), p. 98.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 75
conflict between secular and ecclesiastical authorities over the use of
violence in a constant fight against Indian idolatry. For a brief time,
the council of Indian Campeche became a major player in this game,
when its members complained to the Audiencia de Mxico about pub-
lic punishments imposed during a Franciscan extirpation campaign.
26
In 1583, on the other hand, the royal inspector cooperated closely with
the new bishop Gregorio de Montalvo, a Dominican, and Governor
Francisco de Sols. Together, they launched another major attack on
the remnants of prehispanic Maya religion. Garca de Palacio focussed
on the jurisdiction of Valladolid, where he found entire villages to be
openly engaged in idolatry. In the Tulum region at the east coast, he
even encountered a still-functioning prehispanic temple, replete with
more than 500 idols. The temple was burned down, and the censers
and statues were broken and thrown into the sea.
To contain the disease of idolatry, Garca de Palacio tried to re-
strict the spatial movement of Indians in the peninsula. Vast tracts of
land were to be scanned annually for runaways and apostates, and In-
dians were to prepare their fields in close vicinity to their villages. For
the sake of good policy, he also ordered Spaniards who had taken up
residence with their families in the Maya villages to return to the
Spanish towns. But in punishing the heretics directly, even the power-
ful visitador was restrained by the Crowns previous decisions. He felt
that more rigour might be taken with the commoners but had to con-
centrate on the officials. Governor Sols even suggested that some of
the Indian governors who permitted idolatry in their villages, the na-
tive priests, and the maestros de los dolos should be condemned to
death. In reality, however, the worst form of penalty employed was
perpetual banishment. This was applied to dogmatizers, priests, and
maestros with the latter term referring, again, to the craftsmen
who make the statues and figures rather than the maestros canto-
res.
27
One of the convicts was a native of Sotuta named Andrs
Cocom. Sentenced to banishment from the peninsula and penal servi-
76 Matthias Gorissen
26
John F. Chuchiak IV, In Servitio Dei. Fray Diego de Landa, the Franciscan
Order, and the Return of the Extirpation of Idolatry in the Colonial Diocese of Yucatn,
15731579: The Americas 61 (2005), p. 611646.
27
Carta del doctor Diego Garca de Palacio, oidor de la audiencia de Mxico, De-
cember 26, 1583: AGI, Mxico 70, R.6, N.105; and OGorman, Papeles (note 24), p.
478480. Carta de Francisco de Sols, gobernador de Yucatn, March 11, 1584: AGI,
Mxico 359, R.6, N.24.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 76
tude in the fortress of San Juan de Ula, he was sent to Campeche. Al-
ready in the care of the sailors who were expected to deport him, he
was actually released for reasons which have never been clarified and
disappeared somewhere in Campeches hinterland.
2. INDIAN CAMPECHE, SIR FRANCIS DRAKE, AND THE
FIRST REBELLION
At daybreak on January 11, 1586, more than a thousand English sol-
diers landed on the shores of Hispaniola, nine or ten miles west of
Santo Domingo. Sir Francis Drake had crossed the Atlantic Ocean
with a fleet of 25 ships and now launched a major attack on Spains
most important administrative centre in the Caribbean. His troops
swiftly encircled the city, entrenched themselves, and started to burn
down the houses at the outskirts. Although unable to gain full control
of the city, Drake held Santo Domingo hostage for more than a month
before accepting a relatively moderate ransom of 25,000 ducats. Then,
the British packed up and left the island.
28
Reports on this attack reached Yucatan somewhat belatedly via Ha-
vana. Francisco de Sols immediately put the province in a state of
alarm. Permanent guards were set up in all harbours, the city of M-
rida, and the two Spanish towns of Valladolid and Campeche. Tel-
lingly, Bacalar an outpost of Spanish government in a rather hope-
less position is not even mentioned here. There were only some 400
Spanish males in the peninsula, widely dispersed and according to
the governor not very apt and badly disciplined. By any account,
Yucatans Spanish citizens would have made a poor match for the
British forces. Moreover, they also had to cope with a second, internal
threat: the number of Yucatecan Indians fit for military service was es-
timated at 50,000. When Sols was informed that the English had left
Hispaniola, he doubled the number of Mridas night watch to 24
77 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
28
Walter Biggs, Drakes Great Armada (New York 1910, original 1586) provides a
British eyewitness account of this voyage. Biggs argues, of course, that the attack on
Santo Domingo began on January 1, as the Gregorian calender reform of 1582 was not
accepted in Great Britain until 1752. For the sake of convenience, we have converted his
dates to their Gregorian equivalents.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 77
horsemen. And this, he later wrote to the Crown, I did more for the
natives of the land, rather than because of the enemy.
29
Nevertheless, he remained dependent on the Maya population as
auxiliaries. Spaniards were sent out to the pueblos de indios, telling
the Maya to hold their bows and arrows and hatchets ready. In case of
an attack from without, the Maya were told to cut down the forests, to
close the roads, and to impede the enemys advance.
The tensions heightened in March, when Drakes armada was still
busy blackmailing the city of Cartagena and dropped its ambitious
plan for an attack on Panama. In Yucatan, the Maya had begun their
own preparations, fabricating lances, pikes, and other iron weapons.
Sols issued orders that
in all the parts, at one day and at the same hour, they should be called to the church
and be disarmed, taking away from them all the arms and arrows and iron weapons,
and only a bow and six arrows I ordered to return to each Indian, the rest being
brought to the city [of Mrida].
30
At this point in time, Sols was informed about an imminent rebellion
in Campeche, led by the Indian villages cacique Don Francisco. Ac-
cording to rumours circulating in Campeche, the conspirators plan
was to put fire to the houses of the alcaldes of Spanish Campeche and
to attack the unarmed Spaniards while they were still trying to extin-
guish the fire. The planned rebellion was said to be scheduled for the
very same day Sols had singled out for the Mayas sudden disarma-
ment.
Sols sent a letrado in advance before departing for Campeche him-
self, with only my officials and servants, since I did not want to take
people with me, so as not to upset the land. When he arrived, the
scholar had already conducted investigations and detained some sus-
pects. According to Sols, many Indians freely confessed to their
plans, while the cacique and two other Indians, who had been elected
captains, only confessed under torture. All three were hanged, be-
headed, and their heads publicly displayed on stakes.
78 Matthias Gorissen
29
Carta de Francisco de Sols (note 6). This was also the source used by Farriss,
Maya Society (note 3), who dated the first rebellion to 1584. Solss letter, however,
firmly places this event within the chronological context of Drakes well-dated voyage.
For another report, which confirms the general outline of both the first and second
Campeche rebellion but adds hardly any detail, see Informaciones de los mritos y
servicios de Juan Vzquez de Andrada [...], 1598: AGI, Patronato 58, R.1.
30
Carta de Francisco de Sols (note 6).
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 78
In the meantime, Drakes fleet made its way north, crossing the
straits between Yucatan and Cuba on May 7. They failed, however, in
their first attempt to cross the straits of Florida, as unfavourable winds
swept them back to the westernmost tip of Cuba. Solss deputy reported
briefly on further disturbances in or around Mrida, and the guardian
of the Franciscan convent in Hocab warned of another imminent
uprising in his parish. He refused to give any details, and Sols
concluded that the friar must have received his information during
confession. In his report to the Crown on May 12, the governor consid-
ered the affair far from being settled, planning a tour through the en-
tire province to mildly punish the culprits. May God enlighten my
understanding, he sighed, so that I may do right in a matter which is
of such importance to the service of God and Your Majesty.
31
A day
later, he departed for Mrida, while the English ships left Cuba again
on May 23 and after a brief attack on Floridas Atlantic coast re-
turned home. At roughly the same time, a detachment of soldiers
under Captain Gmez de Castrillo was sent to Campeche when for-
eign ships showed up briefly along the coast. It is unlikely, however,
that one of Drakes ships actually made a detour to Campeche, some
600 kilometres west of Cabo San Antonio.
32
The case for a Campeche rebellion in 1586 seems to be more
clear-cut than the earlier one for an alleged rebellion in Tekuch: there
was a formal investigation, a trial, and finally the execution of the sus-
pected ringleaders. However, the fragmentary records still available
leave room for different interpretations. Francisco de Sols swiftly
acted upon mere rumours of rebellion. Acentral piece of evidence of-
fered in later reports was the naming of captains by the villages caci-
que Don Francisco. One witness, at least, argued explicitly that these
had been named for the planned rebellion.
33
On the other hand, the
same action might have been part of the Mayas usual preparations for
war ordered, after all, by Governor Sols.
79 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
31
Ibidem.
32
Gmez de Castrillos expedition to Campeche was already reported by Lpez de
Cogolludo but remains hard to date. It is not mentioned in Solss report from May 12.
As Juan Vzquez de Andrada had accompanied both Sols and Gmez de Castrillo to
Campeche, we conclude that the latters expedition must have occurred after the gover-
nors return to Mrida.
33
Informaciones [...] de Juan Vzquez de Andrada (note 29).
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 79
A deep sense of uncertainty is clearly evident in Solss somewhat
contradictory security policy: according to Lpez de Cogolludo, the
Spaniards first tried to prevent any information on the English attack
on Santo Domingo from leaking to the Maya population. When Span-
ish preparations for the peninsulas defence became all too obvious,
the governor resorted to an attempt of intimidation in publicly display-
ing Spanish military strength. In a third step, he tried to win the Maya
population over as allies and auxiliaries, ordering them to take up their
own preparations for the imminent war. When the Maya performed
too well, he issued secret orders for their sudden disarmament. While
this line of decisions was clearly made with an eye to Spanish fears,
the fears of Indians were not taken into account. And the Maya of
Campeche the central gateway to Yucatan now had any reason to
be scared by a potential attack from without.
Solss reaction to the first rumours of rebellion differed signifi-
cantly from other cases. In 1609, for example, a later governor scolded
officials who had uncritically forwarded rumours of a projected rebel-
lion in the Bacalar district, noting that this caused almost as much un-
rest among the Indians as an actual uprising. If both the exact date and
place of the planned rebellion were widely known, he argued, this
could be taken as a clear indication of the fact that the rumours lacked
any foundation.
34
In 1586, however, Francisco de Sols did not ask
why the conspirators failed to keep their plans secret, why so many of
them freely confessed to their crime, or why the ultimate proof for
the planned rebellion the confession of the suspected ringleaders
was only received under torture. With the spectre of Drakes armada
around his neck, doubts and uncertainties about the enemys plans,
strength, and whereabouts became all-important. In this heightened
state of alarm, Solss dealings with the enemy within became largely
grounded on rumour, assumptions, and notions of plausibility.
In a brief note written on December 1, King Philip II thanked his
governor of Yucatan for the quick subduction of the Indian rebellion
and asked for details of Solss further measures.
35
In Yucatan, how-
ever, Governor Sols had already been replaced by his successor to-
wards the end of October, and thus, a more detailed report on the first
80 Matthias Gorissen
34
Lpez de Cogolludo, Los tres siglos (note 9), vol. II, p. 180183.
35
Registro de oficio para autoridades de Yucatn: AGI, Mxico 2999, L.3.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 80
Campeche uprising of 1586 was probably never written. Nevertheless,
the kings note sanctioned the official interpretation of events presen-
ted by Sols. Thereafter, it became almost impossible to question whe-
ther an Indian rebellion had occurred at all.
When the new governor Antonio de Voz Mediano and his deputy
Gaspar Len de Salazar assumed their posts towards the end of 1586,
they immediately abolished the office of Protector and Defender of
the Indians, thus conforming to strict orders from the Crown. This de-
cision was promptly protested by the Franciscans and revised a few
years later.
36
More opposition came from Lic. Bustamente de Andrada,
who had formerly acted as Solss teniente general. In criticising the
same decision, he brought up much more serious and wide-ranging
charges: the first six months of Voz Medianos government had been
characterized by extreme corruption and nepotism, with considerable
damage to both republics. Left without legal defence, the Maya pop-
ulation was increasingly subject to economic exploitation and exces-
sive labour demands. Interestingly, the Franciscans did not fare any
better in the letrados account: in their zeal to eradicate Maya ido-
latry, the friars had again resorted to the unauthorized use of torture
during the fall of 1586. Their war on statues and censers was totally
pointless, Bustamente de Andrada explained: [...] when taking away
one [from the Indians], they will make four new ones from a little
piece of clay.
37
However, legal investigations were stopped or si-
lenced, royal decrees were covered up by the government, and both
secular and ecclesiastical authorities seemed to get away with any-
thing short of murder. The result was considerable political unrest
among the Indians and renewed flight to the forests. The licenciado
warned that Spanish greed had already depopulated Cuba and Hispan-
iola and that Yucatan might meet the same fate within a single decade.
In short, by 1587 the peninsulas Maya population was again on the
brink of rebellion.
81 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
36
Lpez de Cogolludo, Los tres siglos (note 9), vol. II, p. 71.
37
Carta del Lic. Bustamente de Andrada, teniente general que fue del gobernador
de Yucatn, April 4, 1587: AGI, Mxico 359, R.7, N.32.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 81
3. THE RETURN OF ANDRS COCOM
As far as we know today, Andrs Cocom had never left Yucatan; he
simply went underground for a couple of years. And yet, he was later
accused of having returned to the peninsula despite his perpetual
banishment. For an escaped convict, the very act of returning either
to Yucatan or to the public sphere was both a rhetorical and a practi-
cal problem. But at the same time, the act of returning vaguely in-
voked some powerful mythical images the legend of Kukulcn as well
as Christs promised return on Judgement Day which he might have
put into use for his own ends. Between 1587 and 1589, Andrs Cocom
organized a relatively successful messianic movement which focussed
on his own person and his return to Yucatan. The destruction of this
movement is now much better known than the way it was built up, but
the barest outlines of the underlying ideology can still be grasped from
the sources.
While Cocoms own writings have not survived, his opponent Gas-
par Len de Salazar is indirectly responsible for most of the documen-
tation still available today. Before his appointment as teniente general
of Yucatans governor, he had graduated as bachiller in Salamanca and
as licenciado in canon law in his native Seville. Unlike many other of-
ficials sent from Spain, Len de Salazar married into Mridas upper
class and settled down permanently in Yucatan. His struggle with An-
drs Cocom was only the starting point of a long administrative ca-
reer; he was repeatedly called back to duty by later governors, serving
a total of five terms as teniente general, as well as in several other of-
fices.
The most comprehensive account of the revolt of Andrs Cocom
is a six-page summary of Len de Salazars trial records which was
drawn up by the public notary Luis Torres in Mrida upon the appeal
of Pedro Ochoa de Leguizamo in 1604. This summary was explicitly
designed for submission to the Royal Council of the Indies. Later,
Ochoa used it to support a rather improbable conspiracy theory, which
is beyond the scope this essay. Torress sources comprised two differ-
ent files on this topic: the proceedings of the criminal process which
led up to Cocoms execution and a report on a later investigation con-
ducted among Cocoms followers in the Hocab-Homn region, some
150 kilometres north of Campeche. These records, which remained in
Torress possession, must have comprised several hundred pages.
82 Matthias Gorissen
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There are several references to documents in Yucatec Maya, such as
letters written by Cocom. In accordance with Ochoas request and his
orders from the governor, Torres focused on the final sentence against
Cocom, which he probably copied verbatim while summarizing the
rest more sweepingly. Admittedly, Ochoas expediente is a highly un-
usual collection of lies and forgeries, but there can be little doubt on
the material written up by Torres his summary was authenticated by
three well-known notaries in Mrida.
38
This report firmly places the
main events in the spring of 1589 rather than 1585. Our own summary
below favours this source over all the others.
Another brief, but well-researched, report appears in a 1645 pare-
cer by Governor Enrique DAvila y Pacheco on the behalf of Len de
Salazars son (also named Gaspar).
39
Lpez de Cogolludo vaguely poin-
ted to juridical writings he had seen in the mid-1650s but relied heavily
on the earlier account by Snchez de Aguilar. This account, in turn, was
probably based on little more than personal recollections from his
childhood. Again, there is some circumstantial information in the pro-
banza of Juan Vzquez de Andrada;
40
and finally, there is a somewhat
exaggerated and self-interested account by Len de Salazars son-in-
law written in 1657.
41
Our aim here is to explain rather than to elimi-
nate contradictions between these sources.
Andrs Cocom announced his return through messengers and a series
of letters which were widely distributed in the peninsula. He claimed to
have visited the king of Spain during the time of his absence. The king
had not only allowed Cocom to return, but had also entitled him to
become the king and ruler of Yucatan.
42
Cocoms claim to kingship
83 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
38
Expediente formado a instancias del capitn Pedro Ochoa de Leguizamo [...],
1605: AGI, Patronato 20, R.5, N.25, fols. 27r30r. In the more accessible electronic edi-
tion (http://pares.mcu.es), the relevant section may be found on p. 6975. Although Fer-
nndez Tejedo, La comunidad indgena (note 21), p. 170, has previously alluded to the
existence of this source, it has not been used in modern reconstructions of the Cocom
revolt.
39
Expediente de confirmacin de encomienda de Uqui a Gaspar Len de Salazar,
1662: AGI, Mxico 244, N.29.
40
Informaciones [...] de Juan Vzquez de Andrada (note 29).
41
Expediente de confirmacin de encomienda de Hunalku en Valladolid, Yucatn,
a Pedro de Azcrraga, 1664: AGI, Mxico 244, N.34.
42
There are a number of striking parallels with the religious movement behind the
1761 rebellion in Cisteil: Jacinto Canek sent out similar letters, coupled with a request
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 83
was at least partly based on his surname. The last name Cocom indica-
ted his membership in a patrilineage (chibal) which had long since
provided the ruling house in the province of Sotuta and still vied with
the Xiu, the Pech, the Chel, and others for recognition as the highest-
ranking lineage in Yucatan. The chibal, however, comprised both
commoners and nobles, and the surname was so widespread that it was
neither indicative of noble descent nor of membership to a particular
ruling house. As we shall see below, Andrs Cocoms social status was
highly contested.
In his letters, Cocom invited Maya villagers and officials to visit
him at his residence in the town of Campeche and to recognize him as
king. He asked for money and cotton blankets as tribute, and in some
of his messages, he thanked Maya communities for money already re-
ceived. He prophesied a future war and the end of Christianity within
sixty years. After the war, Andrs Cocom would reign as king, redis-
tributing all the political offices in the peninsula. He also expected the
future arrival of a judge from Spain who would examine to which line-
ages the Yucatec caciques belong.
These prophecies resound with a number of familiar themes. Legit-
imate rulership and proof of noble descent are also central topics in the
famous Language of Zuyua, one of the more mysterious texts in the
Yucatec Maya Books of Chilam Balam. Although this text has at
times been misread as a manifest of native resistance, it was actually
written for our Lord, the Governor Marshall, which most likely re-
fers to Don Carlos Luna y Arellano, Yucatans governor from 1604 to
1612. Here, the examination of the chiefs is expected for the transi-
tion from Katun 3 Ahau to 1 Ahau in 1638.
43
Andrs Cocoms date for
the end of Christianity would fall into the middle of the subsequent
Katun 1 Ahau (16381658), which is described as a time of war and
84 Matthias Gorissen
for help. He claimed that a British ship had brought him back to Yucatan after a time
of absence and to be the king whose arrival had been prophesied in the Bible. Patch,
Culture, community and rebellion (note 4).
43
For the Yucatec Maya text of the Language of Zuyua, see Gordon, Book of Chi-
lam Balam of Chumayel (note 16), p. 2842. For a reliable English translation see Ralph
L. Roys, The Book of Chilam Balam of Chumayel (Washington, DC 1933), p. 8898.
There are several other allusions to the riddles of Zuyuathan at the transition from 3
Ahau to 1 Ahau. Ibidem, p. 103, 147, and 157.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 84
the arrival of an eternal ruler in some prophecies. However, both the
almost total destruction of Christianity by its enemies and its miracu-
lous salvation by a new emperor prior to Judgement Day were also
basic tenets of sixteenth-century Spanish eschatology. The extent to
which Cocoms proclamations were directed against Spanish govern-
ment and Spanish presence in Yucatan must remain open to question.
It was religion which brought him in conflict with Spanish authori-
ties in the first place when he was banned for idolatry in 1583; but
in 1589, his crime was considered political and is probably best de-
scribed as high treason. In Spanish eyes, Cocoms aspirations to
kingship failed to acknowledge his status as a vassal of the king of
Spain. The surviving records vaguely refer to other statements about
mutiny and rebellion but remain silent on the details. It is worthy
to note, however, that Cocom himself tried to base his own power on
the ultimate authority of the Spanish Crown.
Early in 1589, Cocoms incumbent movement was brought down
by its own success, as more and more information on it leaked
through. In the Puuc region, Juan de Sanabria, the corregidor of Man,
conducted investigations on the (still hypothetical) uprising of An-
drs Cocom and submitted a report to the governor. In late March or
in early April, Andrs Cocom was arrested and tried by the cabildo of
Spanish Campeche. Probably due to the gravity of the case, Voz Me-
diano dispatched his teniente general to Campeche in order to conduct
a second trial. Apparently, Len de Salazar formally opened up the
process in Calkin while he was still half-way between Mrida and
Campeche. Upon arrival, he included the cabildos earlier records into
his own case and examined a number of witnesses. Andrs Cocom
was forced under torture to name those who had helped and favoured
him. Somewhat predictably, he was finally condemned to death for
having returned despite his banishment, for having collected contribu-
tions, and for having caused mutinies, seditions, and uprisings. At
the same time, a certain Francisco Cocom was sentenced to 100 lashes
and six years of unpaid personal service in the construction of Mri-
das oversized and still unfinished cathedral.
On April 29, when the sentence had just been announced, Andrs
Cocom was taken out of the prison in Campeche. Tied at the hands
and feet, he was dragged through the town, accompanied by a crier
who announced both his crime and the name of the judge who had
sentenced him. Thereafter, Andrs Cocom was hanged at the towns
85 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 85
public plaza. The sentence of death required someone to give his feet
a pull until he died naturally. Then, the delinquent was beheaded,
and his skull publicly displayed on a pole along the path which led
from Spanish Campeche to the Indian village. Taking down the head
was prohibited under penalty of death. All of Andrs Cocoms posses-
sions were confiscated and put up for sale; the revenue was used to
cover the costs of the criminal process against him.
Strangely enough, this was not sufficient to quell the messianic move-
ment. A few weeks later, the Indian governor of Homn, in northern
Yucatan, arrested a number of villagers who had prepared coloured
clothings for Andrs Cocom. After the execution of the movements
leader, these labour-intensive and highly valuable garments had been
sent to the governor of Homn, apparently in the hope that they might
still be used in one way or another to contribute to the fulfilment of
Cocoms prophecies. The local governor, however, brought Cocoms
supporters to trial, carefully recording the case in Yucatec Maya. In
Mrida, Antonio de Voz Mediano dispatched Pedro Ortiz Bocanegra
to Homn, a public notary who had already acted as clerk of the court
in the process against Andrs Cocom. Ortiz reviewed the original case
and conducted his own investigations in the Homn region, uncover-
ing a wider network of culprits, which even stretched into neighbour-
ing Hocab. In early June, he had arrested a total of 45 persons in both
villages and their respective dependencies. Most of the convicts were
sent to the public prison in Mrida. Only then did the Spanish feel con-
fident that Andrs Cocom would not return again.
Contemporary observers clearly recognized the second uprising as
a much more serious affair than the first. As a result, the Cocom re-
volt was more vividly remembered and mythically elaborated. Sev-
enteenth-century sources, for example, usually claim that Andrs
Cocom had secretly gathered weapons, which he stored in caves as an
active preparation for the imminent war. This strong indication of his
malicious intent, however, went unrecorded in the more reliable ac-
counts from the later sixteenth century. The same pattern becomes ap-
parent in contradictory statements on the social status of Andrs
Cocom. Snchez de Aguilar and Lpez de Cogolludo agree that he
was a member of the nobility. In 1598, five of six different witnesses
in Vzquez de Andradas probanza refer to the ringleader as Don An-
drs Cocom, the honorific title being already contained in Vzquezs
questionnaire. As all witnesses tended to repeat the questions verba-
86 Matthias Gorissen
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 86
tim, the titles omission in one case already becomes a matter of sus-
picion. In 1645, Governor Enrique DAvila y Pacheco, who had proba-
bly access to primary sources, simply referred to an Indian called An-
drs Cocom. And Torress summary of the trial records in one of
the sections probably copied verbatim unmistakably describes An-
drs Cocom as an Indian commoner, neither of noble [status], nor of
noble descent.
This pattern strongly suggests that Andrs Cocom was ennobled
posthumously in Spanish recollections. In 1589, his lowly origin made
his claim for kingship even more abhorrent, challenging the basic
order of both Spanish and Maya society. Later, he was transformed
into a more worthy enemy, which certainly raised the fame of his Span-
ish adversaries. The economic oppression so vividly described by
Bustamente de Andrada in 1587 may have paved the way for a reli-
gious movement which promised social justice and salvation, but such
an interpretation was systematically excluded from Spanish accounts.
Instead, the text of Torress summary put all the blame on Cocom, who
was said to have acted in diabolic spirit. This also substituted the ra-
ther inconceivable idea of a low-born, uneducated Indian commoner
leading a modestly successful rebellion with a more plausible plot.
The story of Indian rebellion was personalized, reduced to the cha-
risma and demonic nature of the ringleader, who deceived the simpli-
city of the Indians.
44
Of course, this argument required that Andrs
Cocom himself was represented as more than a simple Indian. On the
other hand, to view the entire affair as a peoples movement, as a
sign of protest against social inequality or widespread discontent re-
mained beyond the field of vision of colonial officials. The aims of
Cocoms revolt were later adjusted to Spanish notions of Indian re-
bellion: Azcrraga argued in 1657 that Cocom had planned to kill all
the Spaniards and to extinguish Christianity.
It is deeply ironic that Andrs Cocom may have been wrongly ac-
cused by later authors to have hidden weapons in caves, while a for-
mer governor of Yucatan did just that in the very heart of Spain. In
1590, Solss predecessor, Don Guilln de las Casas, was arrested by
some henchmen of the Holy Inquisition during a visit to Toledo. A
lengthy trial gradually revealed that Don Guilln had become instru-
87 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
44
Lpez de Cogolludo, Los tres siglos (note 9), vol. II, p. 65.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 87
mental in organizing a confraternity known as the Holy Cross of Res-
toration. The movement focused on the prophetic gift of a young
woman named Lucrecia de Len. Lucrecias dreams described the
imminent loss of Spain the fall of the Habsburg monarchy, the
conquest of Spain by her enemies, and her total destruction through
war, plague, and famine. Lucrecia saw falling stars, blood dripping
from the clouds, and a seven-headed dragon breathing fire across
Spain. The inquisitors later learned that Don Guilln and others had
started active preparations for the End of Days already two years be-
fore their detainment, in re-building a series of caves along the banks
of the Tagus river into a survivalists bunker, well-stocked with food
and firearms.
45
These images of decay and deterioration were highly appealing to
many Spaniards during the political crisis triggered by the defeat of
the Spanish Armada in 1588 (which Lucrecia was said to have predict-
ed eight months in advance). Like Andrs Cocom, the members of the
Holy Cross of Restoration believed that the end of Christianity was
near and that a horrendous war in the future would destroy the estab-
lished social order, and they hoped for the glory of a new kingdom
after that war. At the same time, they were deeply concerned about the
enemy within the morisco problem and about what they saw as a
morally corrupt government. On the other hand, there was hardly any-
thing in Lucrecias dreams which could be considered heretical not
even by the rigid standards of Spain in the age of Counter Reforma-
tion. When the Holy Cross of Restoration was finally crushed by the
Inquisition, this was clearly a political move rather than a religious
issue its members had simply become too critical of royal politics
and were defined as the enemy within themselves. Still, it is crucial to
note that contemporary accounts of Cocoms conspiracy and rebel-
lion followed a larger pattern of interpretation already existing in the
empires centre.
Today, the name of Andrs Cocom is still widely known in Yucatan,
and from time to time, it still turns up in local politics at least as a
pun: in 2005 the states government issued an official press release en-
titled Andrea Cocom, una rebelde con causa. Andrea Cocom, it turned
88 Matthias Gorissen
45
Richard L. Kagan, Lucrecias Dreams. Prophecy and Politics in Sixteenth-Cen-
tury Spain (Berkeley 1990), p. 124.
#8823_412-19506_06 28.09.2007 11:30 Uhr Seite 88
out, was a 20-year old student of Mridas Instituto Tecnolgico who
was distinguished by the governor for leading a movement which pro-
moted the re-use of plastic bottles.
46
4. THE LINGERING FEAR
The Spanish citizens of Campeche struggled with their enemies for yet
another century. In 1597, English pirates led by William Parker sacked
the town for several days. Thereafter, the new governor Diego Fernn-
dez Velasco did much to improve the defence of Yucatan, reorganizing
the local militia and challenging the positions of officers who would
probably remain in their houses in times of need, guarding what they
have got.
47
Moreover, he knew quite well how to rally support from
the Crown: in 1598, he paid for a solid supply of gunpowder from his
personal property. Then he applied for additional firearms which he
received. In 1601, four vessels scanned the entire coastline of Yucatan
for shipwrecks, recovering a total of 12 cannons. Then, the governor
applied for gunpowder and lead which he received as well.
48
In
1610, his successor issued orders for the construction of the first de-
fensive works in Campeche: two walls and a raised platform for the
artillery initiated a kind of arms race with foreign pirates, whose at-
tacks on the harbour became evermore frequent and ferocious. In the
1650s, Campeche was described as a frontier town in a constant state
of alarm, where citizens hardly ever left their homes unarmed as if
it were a fortress of paid soldiers.
49
And in fact, as constructions con-
tinued, the town and its fortifications became almost indistinguishable.
What remains from the colonial era defensive works today has won
the city a place on the UNESCO list of World Cultural Heritage sites
in 1999.
89 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
46
Online (posted September 30, 2005; last accessed January 15, 2007): http://
www.saladeprensa.yucatan.gob.mx/noticias/verarticulo.php?CategoriaSeleccionada=
Especiales&IdArticulo=48506 .
47
Carta de Diego Fernndez de Velasco, gobernador de Yucatn, June 1, 1598:
AGI, Mxico 359, R.8, N.34.
48
Carta de Diego Fernndez de Velasco, gobernador de Yucatn, May 14, 1601:
AGI, Mxico 359, R.8, N.41; and Registro de oficio (note 35).
49
Lpez de Cogolludo, Los tres siglos (note 9), vol. II, p. 282.
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Of course, high walls could not protect Campeche from the enemy
within. However, economic and demographic developments in the
seventeenth century greatly reduced the importance of Campeche,
pueblo de indios. Occasional military forays and intensive missionary
activities pushed the MayaSpanish political boundary back into the
interior of the peninsula. The Franciscans montaa missions in Cen-
tral and Southern Campeche turned out to be relatively short-lived
transit stations for the Maya and had to be abandoned towards the end
of the seventeenth century.
50
And yet, they may still have served a lar-
ger strategic goal by unintentionally depopulating regions which
were commonly considered the breeding ground of Indian rebellion.
Towards the end of March in 1619, Francisco Mas told a Spanish
citizen of Campeche certain things touching upon [the topic of] rebel-
lion. Throughout the Holy Week of that year, two squadrons of the
local militia remained on guard on Campeches plaza mayor a total
of 100 Spanish soldiers, with three pieces of artillery, ready to fight
off any form of treason which the Indians might plot. The rumours
of rebellion seemed plausible enough, as stories of real or alleged In-
dian rebellions often linked these events to major religious celebra-
tions, when much of the peninsulas population was on the move and
Spaniards were presumably busy with their own preparations. A citi-
zen of Spanish Campeche later testified that rebellion at Easter was
what the Indians had used to do on other occasions. The two squad-
ron leaders conducted further investigations, arresting a certain Diego
Cambal in Spanish Campeche. With his hands tied up, Diego Cambal
was forced to lead the officers to his home in the Indian village, thus
passing by the spot where the head of Andrs Cocom had been displayed
thirty years ago. In the yard of Cambals plot, the officers encountered
a small mound with a sculptured stone and a small cave from which
they retrieved ten idols and a little jar used as an incense burner.
Cambal was even able to give the proper name for each of the ten
idols quite obviously, demonic forces were still operative in Cam-
peches underground.
51
90 Matthias Gorissen
50
Scholes/Roys, The Maya Chontal Indians (note 19); and Jos Manuel A. Chvez
Gmez, Intencin franciscana de evangelizar entre los Mayas rebeldes (Mexico City
2001).
51
Informaciones de oficio y parte. Juan de Natera Altamirano, capitn de infante-
ra de Campeche [...], 1624: AGI, Mxico 236, N.24.
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One night during the Holy Week of 1619, ten or twelve houses
burned down in Spanish Campeche. An accident? Arson? Asecret sig-
nal to rebel forces, who failed to take their chance? Nobody knew.
And we cannot know today, of course. After all, a good conspiracy is
unprovable.
91 The Enemy Without, the Enemy Within
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