1

I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
APPELLANT ANNA MAY WONG (WONG), appeals all Orders of Judge
Whitneys beginning with the Order applying the CAPP program through the Order
Granting CLG Attorneys fees. All orders are final (Rule 54(b)).
The Appeal, subject to C.A.R. 31(c) and C. A. R. 28(a), RT=Reporters
Transcript; AA: =Appendix; Ad: =Addendum (Orders attached to brief).
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A. Whether the court erred in concluding that WONG failed to state a claim under
12(b) (5); and concurrently that defendant lacked standing.

B. Whether the Statute of Limitation of 1 year was tolled under the Continuing
injury Doctrine in WONGs FDCPA claim.

C. Whether the court erred in denying WONGs Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
the Trust had standing to foreclose and denying her defenses including
constitutional defense.

D. Whether the Court erred Granting Plfs Summary Judgment, where the Trustees
status as holder was disputed as sufficient to foreclose.

E. Whether the Court erred by holding that WONG may not, as a non-party,
challenge an assignment or agreement.

F. Whether the court committed error by applying the Civil Access Pilot Program
(CAPP) to Defendants foreclosure.

G. Whether the court abused its discretion by making rulings on evidence that
denied her a chance to tell her side, and withholding excess proceeds from the
sale.

H. Whether the plaintiff waived any deficiency judgment.

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I. Whether the court erred by granting the CLG attorneys fees from an Untimely,
and Procedurally Defective Request.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Trustee initially sought a Rule 120 which it ultimately withdrew fearing
Judge Valdez in the federal case # 11cv02172, would allow a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Rule 120. In the federal case WONG charged the above
foreclosure attorneys with conspiracy to deprive homeowners of due process by
drafting legislation in 2006, amending 38-38-101 et seq through HB06-1387, thus
eliminating the burden of proof lenders needed to show standing affecting non-
judicial & judicial foreclosures. That LPS assignment to the Trust furthered a
conspiracy, as well as the Trust pressing a claim in the Rule 120, which became
actionable as an injury by the courts Order Authorizing Sale post-bankruptcy. This
appeal involves standing of both parties; wrongful application of CAPP; viability of
WONGs defenses and claims, and abuse of discretion by Judge Whitney. The appeal
raises issues of first impression .
IV. STATEMENT FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
This case litigates complex issues of standing involving the public interest and
brings into question the role of state action and the interface between public and private
players in the foreclosure process as well as a broad conspiracy to deprive homeowners of
due process.
3

The question of whether Colo. Rev. Stat. 38-38-101 et seqa state statute which
impacts many thousands of Colorado residents given the role of Rule 120 and Rule
105 in foreclosure proceedingsis unconstitutional on due process grounds is
manifestly a matter that would be in the public interest to determine after careful and
deliberate consideration.
In adjudicating a creditor-debtor dispute implicating property rights, it is the
meaningfulness of the procedural forum that counts, not the fact that a particular
litigant may have, in fact, defaulted on a debt. Fuentes vs Shevin, 407 US 81 at 87
Several issues of First Impression arise from the facts in this case for which
oral arguments may provide additional basis to allay any concerns that this court
may have to determine the merits on appeal.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
WONG contends that the Trustee, advancing the claim of the Trust, does not
have standing because; LPS lacked authority to assign once its agency relationship
with First Washington ended; the LPS PROCEDURES MANUAL states that LPS
lacks authority to transfer debt; that the close relationship between the Trustee and
the Trust requires that the standard to be applied is: holder in due course, and the
Trustees post acquisition of mortgage debt was part of a conspiracy to shore up
under collateralized mortgage pools where First Washington committed a massive
4

fraud on investors. The fraud continued when the Trustee fraudulently acquired notes
after the Trusts closing date. Furthermore, WONG alleges that the CAPP procedure
was inapplicable where the lender was acting soley as a debt collector; the plaintiff
and its associates fraudulent acts show Unclean Hands and Unjust Enrichment; and
that the constitutional issues in the federal case over the Rule 120 also affects the
Rule 105.
In remanding the case for judicial foreclosure Judge Valdez bifurcated the
constitutional issues to be determined separately with the state to determine judicial,
and the federal to determine non judicial issues. The FDCPA claim is tolled by the
Continuing Injury Doctrine . Judge Whitney abused his discretion in requiring
excess proceeds to be held by the court, torpedoed the discovery process by
dismissal, and in granting judgment to include taxes & insurance paid after which
Bank of America waived any deficiency judgment. Finally the Order Granting
Attorneys Fees to CLG was improper and an untimely request buried in a Response.
VI. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When facts are undisputed, review is de novo. Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550, 558
Abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair. People v. Welsh, 176 P.3d 781,790 (2007)
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VII. ARGUMENT
A. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT WONG FAILED TO
STATE A CLAIM AND LACKED STANDING
a. Standing of WONG, I njury in Fact, and The Order Authorizing Sale

This case raises issues of standing requiring this court to review the ruling of
Judge Whitney holding that WONG lacked standing. Judge Whitney said "In sum,
because WONGs claims for monetary damages were not disclosed during her
bankruptcy proceeding, those claims are property of the bankruptcy estate and
Plaintiff lacks standing to bring them (AD: 109, DISMISSAL)
Review is de novo when facts are undisputed. Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550, 558
Judge Whitney concluded that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction,
because WONG was not the Real Party in Interest, and concurrently made
determinations under 12(b) (5) dismissal. (AD: 108-116, Dismissal)
The courts lack of subject matter jurisdiction means that a court has no power to
hear a case or enter a judgment, Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709, 714 (2009)
WONG filed Bankruptcy on 12/30/2011. (AA: 274) No Order Authorizing
Sale was issued pre-bankruptcy. On 04/2012 WONG was discharged. (AA: 274)
An injury in fact is defined as an invasion of a legally protected interest which
is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Kerchner v. Obama, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97546 (D.N.J. 10/ 2009)
6

Under current law, a plaintiff has standing upon alleging an injury in fact where
a plaintiff asserts the violation of a private right. WONG submits that there was no
injury in fact prior to the bankruptcy until the Court issued an Order Authorizing
Sale on 12/10/2012 pursuant to a stipulated agreement of 12/7/2012 when the loss or
damage became actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, and
therefore examination of accrual of her causes of action is necessary. (AA: 276-277)
WONGs Opposition in the federal (11cv02172) and state courts (2010cv747)
argued that WONGs causes of action accrued pre-bankruptcy and therefore were
assets of the bankruptcy estate. A view adopted in magistrate Brimmers Report
which assumed that plaintiffs causes accrued prior 2008 by the conduct of
defendants drafting and passing HB06-1387 which amended 38-38-101 et seq, or
by plaintiffs involvement in the Rule 120 in November of 2011.(AA: 262-263)
Magistrate Brimmer confused conduct with injury in fact when he said in his
Report:
The Plaintiff does not dispute that HB 06-1387 was passed and its
amendments to Colorados statutory non-judicial foreclosure procedures
became effective January 1, 2008. See Inre Durwick, LLC, No. 11-31267
ABC, 2012 WL 2046877, at *2 n. 3 (Bankr. D. Colo. June 1, 2012).
Accordingly, taking as true that the CS Defendants drafted portions of, or the
entire, bill, such conduct occurred before January 1, 2008, which in turn
occurred well before December 30, 2011.

Also, the foreclosure action (in which Plaintiff contends she was deprived of
constitutional rights) commenced in October 2011 and the Plaintiff filed a
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response and motion to dismiss the action in November 2011. Accordingly,
given this information, it appears the Plaintiffs claims arose well in advance
of the time she filed her bankruptcy petition. See Clementson v. Countrywide
Fin. Corp., 464 F. Appx 706, 711 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (affirming trial
courts finding that the defendants conduct, as described in the complaint,
occurred prior to the plaintiffs filing of a petition for bankruptcy).
First, the response and motion to dismiss was a boiler- foreclosure defense she
purchased on line to the Rule 120 which does not have the same preclusive effect as a
judgment in a regular court, and had nothing to do with conspiracy to deprive
homeowners of due process as alleged in the federal court (11cv02172).
Second, the conduct of defendants pre-bankruptcy merely amounted to a civil
conspiracy as outlined in SEEDS V. LUCERO, 113 P.3d 859 (2005), wherein the
court said that "Unlike a conspiracy in the criminal context, a civil conspiracy by
itself is not actionable, nor does it provide an independent basis for liability unless a
civil action in damages would lie against one of the conspirators." The Order
Authorizing Sale was that damage and injury in fact which becomes (a)
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Kerchner In WONGs federal Dismissal (11cv02172, ECF 200), the
Court said To demonstrate that a plaintiff has standing, three elements are required:
1. The plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact 2. There must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. 3. It
must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife.

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In, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,562 (1992), the Court found that
the plaintiffs lacked standing, because no injury had been established. "The 'injury
in fact' requires that the party seeking review must be among the injured, and it
must be imminent, not hypothetical. I D at 563. Judge Whitney adopted the decision
of Judge Valdez who espoused the principals as established in Lujan, but misapplied
those principles to the facts prior to the bankruptcy.
In LUERAS v. BAC HOME LOANS SERVI CI NG LP, G046799 (10/2013), the
court held that a "[s]ale of a home through a foreclosure sale is certainly a deprivation
of property to which a plaintiff has a cognizable claim." Slip op. at 1337.
Accordingly, the plaintiff had adequately alleged he "lost money or property"
within the UCL.
In J ay Boersma v. M&I Marshall & I lsley Bank, 1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (ARIZ.,
2010) the court examined the injury in fact issue and said:
Boersmas claims are not ripe [T]he injury he alleges is the potential loss of
his home... Boersmas subsequent assertions to this Court, contains no other
reason to believe that foreclosure is imminent. Falling behind on house
payments may lead to foreclosure, but it may also leadto loan modification.
Boersma has not alleged an "actual or imminent" injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560

WONG, like the homeowner in Boersma, was similarly situated prior to her
bankruptcy. While Bank of America N.A as trustee filed a foreclosure action in late
2011, the process pre-bankruptcy had not reached the point where an injury in fact
would be an indispensable requirement until a Court Order Authorizing Sale, the
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point WONG would realize impending loss of property. Since no Order had been
issued prior to the bankruptcy, no injury was imminent or concrete and
particularized as required under Lujan, and therefore no Causes of Action existed.
In I n re: Alfred J . Witko, Debtor vs Deborah C. Menotte, Trustee, 11th Circuit. -
374 F.3d 1040, (2004), the 11th Circuit held that Witko was not harmed pre-
bankruptcy, therefore his malpractice suit did not accrue pre-petition, and that [The
trustee] could take no greater rights than the debtor himself had. (Cite)
The Order Authorizing Sale was effective as an injury in fact on 12/10/2012,
post-bankruptcy, pursuant to the stipulated agreement of 12/07/2011. (AA: 276-277)
Scotus has held that A plaintiff who challenges a statute must demonstrate a
realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or
enforcement. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974). But [o]ne does not have
to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the
injury is certainly impending that is enough. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553 , 593 (1923) The issuance of an Order Authorizing Sale is an impending
threatened injury of a deprivation of a homeowners property in accordance to the
analysis in I d. 593, which triggers the homeowners statutory remedy in the Rule
120(d)-- injunctive relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction the aggrieved party
must show; a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury which may be
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prevented by injunctive relief, Frank Romero vs City of Fountain et al, No
11CA0690, (Colorado, 2011) [B]
Clearly the injury in fact requirement is the pending sale of the home.
b. Agreement with the Bankruptcy Trustee
During the pendency of this appeal, WONG entered into an agreement with the
Bankruptcy Trustee to re-assign the claims to her, which is contested by Bank of
America.
c. WONG Stated a Claim for Conspiracy

In the Order, Judge Whitney citing Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 129
Cal. Rptr. 467, 480 (2011). (AD: 113, Dismissal) quoted:
Even if LPS lacked authority to transfer the note, it is difficult to conceive how
plaintiff was prejudiced by LPSs purported assignment, and there is no
allegation to this effect. Because a promissory note is a negotiable instrument, a
borrower must anticipate it can and might be transferred to another creditor. .

The implication is that even if LPS and Bank of America committed fraud, it
didnt matter because WONG was not prejudiced. Judge Whitney infers that any
lender may come to court, pay no value for the debt, feign ownership of the note,
even if prohibited as a trust in acquiring debt post-closing date under N.Y.Law,
Pooling and Service Agreement. (PSA) &IRS as held in Glaski vs. Bank of America,
FO64556 (5th Dist. COA, 2013)
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Since no facts are disputed, the review is de novo application of the governing
legal standards. Lawry v. Palm, supra at p.558
Judge Whitneys Dismissal concluded that WONG did not state a claim for
conspiracy when he said A civil conspiracy requires pleading and proving
underlying actionable conduct....Therefore, "[I]f the acts alleged to constitute the
underlying wrong provide no cause of action , then there is no cause of action for
conspiracy itself.. (AD: 114) WONG alleged actionable conduct when Bank of
America obtained an Order Authorizing Sale in the Rule 120 resulting in pending
damage, thus making the parties conspiratorial acts alleged to deny her due process
traceable to the attorneys who drafted HB06-1387 to amend 38-38-101 which
lowered the burden of proof lenders needed to show standing, actionable to all. (AA:
212, (II))
In WONGs Second Claim (AA: 459,460, 12), WONG states:
Elements: There are five elements required to establish a civil conspiracy in
Colorado. [T]here must be: (1) two or more persons, and for this purpose a
corporation is a person; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of the
minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts;
and (5) damages as the proximate result thereof. Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v.
Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 502 (Colo. 1989)

15) At the time of the assignment on October 4th, 2011, both LPS and Bank
of America knew or should have known that LPS had no authority to assign
the promissory note on two counts:
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i. LPS was in direct conflict with provisions of the LPS
PROCEDURES MANUAL Which states at p. 48 that it cannot
transfer debt but did so anyway when it assigned the Promissory Note
to Bank of America N.A. along with the Deed of Trust.(Bank of
America, compl, Exhibit A, Excerpt)

ii. LPS assigned the subject knowing that it was not a nominee nor
an agent of any principle at the time it assigned the property to
Bank of America N.A as trustee because First Washington, the
original lender ceased operations in 2008 and therefore any agency
ended by operation of law RESTATEMENT THIRD,
TERMINATION OF AGENCY, 3.07
16) Bank of America N.A. as trustee of the mortgage trust knowingly
transfers mortgages into the mortgage trust in violation of New York Law,
and the Pooling and Service Agreement of Mortgage after the closing date of
the trust which in this case was on January 26th, 2007.
In Fontenot, supra, at 7 cited as authority by Judge Whitney, the court said:
LPS did not purport to act for its own interests in assigning the note. Rather,
the assignment of deed of trust states that LPS was acting as nominee for the
lender, which did possess an assignable interest. A "nominee" is a person or
entity designated to act for another in a limited rolein effect, an agent.

But, on October 4, 2011when LPS made the assignment to Bank of America as
trustee, LPS was no longer an agent of First Washington. In this case by operation
of the law. RESTATEMENT THIRD, TERMINATION OF AGENCY, 3.07
In the allegations preceding WONGs 2nd Cause of action for conspiracy,
WONG alleged that plaintiff brought this action without standing for the purpose of
inducing defendant to pay money not owed to plaintiff; that the Trust is governed
under New York Law and the PSA; that LPS assignment to the Trustee on
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10/04/2011 was a sham to give the illusion that the transaction was valid. That
the purpose was to cover-up fraud by First Washington, a prime actor in the 2008
sub-prime disaster. (AA: 457,458, 16, Amended Counter Compl.)
The object of the conspiracy was to shore up deficiencies generated
through First Washingtons fraud, and to mitigate investor lawsuits on the trusts.
To do that, the Trustee fraudulently acquired debt after the closing date of the
Trust.
In 2008, the financial crisis infected mortgage trusts bristling with defaulting,
undervalued collateral. Investors filed lawsuits against the originating lenders
like First Washington and their sponsors. (AA: 444,445, Answer 32, 33)
One such suit is AMBAC ASSUR Corp v First Washington Fin. Corp. and
Merrill Lynch Mortgage Trust 2013 NY Slip Op 51180(U) Judge Schweitzer
concluded that allegations of First Washington fraud were sufficient to deny the
motion to dismiss and said:
"Despite its repeated pronouncements about its sound lending practices, First
Washington was a prolific originator of risky, higher-yielding loans that put
volume ahead of all else, including in particular the quality of the loans that
were being originated. [A] recent complaint. details the underwriting
practices at First Washington as told by former First Washington underwriters,
one of whom described the lending practices at First Washington as "basically
criminal." This conduct by First Washington, one of the nation's largest
mortgage originators . contributed to the collapse of the real estate market,
and resulted in hardship for millions of Americans. The court can think of no
more egregious example of public fraud.
14


WONG alleged that AMBAC provides the motive for the Trustee pressing
fraudulent claims against homeowners because of the egregious conduct of First
Washington making fraudulent representations to its investors now suing the Merrill
Lynch/First Washington Trust. WONG only needs two parties for her conspiracy
claim. The Trustee aided by LPS to fraudulently press claims to acquire debt to
mitigate the fraud of First Washington. The Trustee has engaged in improper or
fraudulent conduct relating to this foreclosure and should be ineligible for relief under
the Unclean Hands Doctrine. Premier Farm Credit, PCA v. W-Cattle, LLC, 155
P.3d 504, 519 (Colo. 2006) (AA: 450,451, 56-58, Defendants Answer, Unclean
Hands)
B. THE CONTINUING INJURY IN THE RULE 120 WAS AN
EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION
ON THE FDCPA CLAIM
Judge Whitneys dismissal ruled that WONGs FDCPA claim is barred by the 1
year statute of limitation. (AD: 115, DISMISSAL)
WONG contends that the Rule 120 was part of a continuing injury and an
exception to the 1 year limitation because the continuing wrong ended when the Trust
withdrew the non-judicial foreclosure on 05/14/2013 to proceed to judicial
foreclosure filed 5/17/2013. (AA: 430, 70, Compl)
15

WONGs federal action claimed that 38-38-101 as amended by HB06-1387
violated the 14
th
Amendment by lowering the burden of proof, making the Rule 120
unconstitutional as well as judicial foreclosures(AA: 438-443, s 7-23, Answer )
Since no facts are in dispute, review is de novo. Lawry v. Palm, supra at p.558
In I N RE: Robert N. HOERY, No.02SA241, the Colo. Supreme Ct. said:
[W]e hereby hold that where a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause of
action accrues at, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last injury
or when the tortious overt acts or omissions cease.)

WONG was also subjected to a Rule 120 which does not provide a full and fair
hearing at a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U. S. 545 (1965)
In Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) the court
analyzed the Rule 120:
The scope of inquiry at such hearing shall not extend beyond the
existence of a default , and such other issues required by the Service
Member Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 U.S.C. 520 The court observed
that Neither the granting nor the denial of a motion under this Rule shall
constitute an appealable order or judgment. CRCP.120 (d). [B]
Although the constitutional issue was not raised in Rosenfield, the 10th Circuit
described a violation of due process as explained in Lindsey vs Normet - 405 U.S. 56
at p.78 (1972) when the Court said:
This Court has recognized that, if a full and fair trial on the merits is provided,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State
to provide appellate review. (Cite)
16


Accordingly, The Rule 120 violates the 14
th
Amendment because it neither
accords a full and fair hearing, nor a right to appeal.
While the Rule 120 was open, it was a continuing tort; and each day of its
existence was another injury to WONG for which the statute of limitation began to
run when the Trustee withdrew the Rule 120 on 05/14/2013.(AA: 275 )
C. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
DISMISS, AND DENYING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES INCLUDING
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

a. Constitutional Issue
The facts are undisputed. Issues of pure law are reviewed de novo. Trinen v. City
& Cnty. Of Denver, 53 P.3d 754, 757 (Colo. App. 2002)
On 10/29/2011, the trustee initiated a Rule 120 against WONG to obtain an Order
Authorizing Sale (AA: 427, 44, Compl.) On 10/12/2012, WONG filed a federal
suit alleging the Rule 120 violated section 1 of the 14
th
Amendment when 38-38-101
et seq was amended by HB06-1387 in 2006, lowering the burden of proof lenders
needed to show standing, affecting judicial and non-judicial foreclosures irrespective
of Judge Whitneys mistaken belief that the (Constitutional) issues concerning
defendants in the Rule 120 may be tangentially applicable but not directly at issue
in Bank of Americas request for judicial foreclosure. (AD: 114 Dismissals) (AA:
438-443, Defs Answer, s 7-23) But the Burden of Proof of both procedures are
17

directly and not tangentially applicable by application of HB06-1387 which
amended 38-38-101. (AA: 210, 41(3))
On remand, Judge Valdez held that the constitutional question related to Rule 105
be left to the state while he addressed the Rule 120 thus bifurcating the two. (AA:
238) even though both procedures were affected by HB06-1387 which amended 38-
38-101 et seq. (AA: 210, 41(3)) which states:
(3) The provisions of this act shall apply to the foreclosure of any deed of
trust or other lien with respect to which a notice of election and
demand or lis pendens is recorded in the office of the clerk and recorder of
the county where the property or a portion of the property is located on or
after the applicable effective date of this act .

38-38-101(6) provides

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (6), the
original evidence of debt or a copy thereof without proper indorsement or
assignment shall be deemed to be properly indorsed or assigned if a qualified
holder presents the original evidence of debt or a copy thereof to the officer

It is a standard of proof too lax to make reasonable assurance of accurate fact
finding which violates the Due Process Clause. Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 214
The Public Trustees Association presentation explained its 2006 role with James
King & Robert Hopp and other attorneys in drafting HBO6-1387, the root of the
conspiracy. (AA: 224-226) LPS furthered the conspiracy by the assignment, as did
the Trustee under 42 US 1983 to deny due process by pressing a Rule 120 which
18

became an injury upon issuance of the Order of Sale on 12/10/2012 pursuant to a
stipulated agreement. (AA: 276, 277)
b. Standing of Plaintiff
CRCP 17(a) requires that every action "be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. If a partys status as real party in interest is premised upon an
assignment, as is in this case by LPS assignment of the Deed of Trust and Note (AA:
223), the plaintiff must, in addition to the other elements of a claim, prove its status
as assignee. Alpine Associates, I nd. v. KP&R, I nc., 802 P.2d 1119 (COA, 1990). A
plaintiff must establish that by virtue of substantive law, he has a right to invoke the
aid of the court in order to vindicate the legal interest in question. Goodwin v.
District Court, 779 P.2d 237 (1989)
A court lacks jurisdiction of a case unless a plaintiff has standing which is a
threshold issue that must be resolved before deciding a case on the merits. Barber v.
Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) If the plaintiff lacks standing, the case must
be dismissed. State Bd. For Community Colleges v. Olson, 687 P.2d 429, 435
(Colo.1984) [A] plaintiff has standing to sue if he or she has suffered an injury-in-
fact to a legally protected interest. Id. at 856. To constitute an injury-in-fact, the
injury may be tangible, such as physical damage or economic harm. Barber, 196
P.3d at 245-46 With respect to the Trust we speak only of economic harm.
19

Since no facts are in dispute, review is de novo. Lawry v. Palm, supra at p. 558
The Trustee claims to have standing soley by virtue of LPS assignment of
10/04/2011 and the submission in court of an unauthenticated note on 12/09/2013.
WONG requested to have the note authenticated but it was subsequently deemed by
the Court as the original after the court stated at the hearing it was not yet accepting
it as original. (RT: 34, lns 11-18) Deeming the promissory note as an original for
dismissal and foreclosure under 38-38-101(6) upon application of a standard of
proof too lax to make reasonable assurance of accurate fact finding violates the Due
Process Clause. Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 214
c. WONGs Note Never Entered the Trust
WONG alleged that the note was never put into the Trust which would have been
an asset purchased by the investors, a fact that is undisputed. (AA: 443, 28, Answer)
The only claim that plaintiff has made is as a holder, not as a holder in due
course. This is an admission that the note never entered the Trust or purchased it,
otherwise the Trusts claim would have been as a holder in due course, who took
the note for value, in good faith, without notice of defects with a claim of an injury
in fact entitling the Trust to relief. The assignment of 10/04/11 presented several
infirmities (AA: 460, 15-17, Def. Answer; AA: 223, Assignment).
LPS assignment (AA: 223) to Bank of America N.A. as trustee stated the
following:
20

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the sum of ten dollars and other
valuable consideration paid to the Assignor, the receipt, adequacy and
sufficiency of which is hereby assigns unto the said Assignee, the said Deed
of Trust and Promissory Note secured thereby together with all moneys now
owing or that hereafter become due or owing in respect thereof....

2. In the assignment of October 4th, 2011 to Bank of America N.A. as trustee,
LPS purports to be the nominee to lender, successors and assigns. The
original lender was First Washington Mortgage that ceased operations in
March of 2008. (Exhibit B) Accordingly, an agency relationship with First
Washington Mortgage ended by operation of the law. RESTATEMENT
THIRD, TERMINATION OF AGENCY 3.07

3. The TRUST cannot transfer mortgage debt past the closing date of the
trust. In this case January 26th, 2007.

The assignment was notarized on October 7
th
, 2011, 3 days after the assignment
on October 4
th
, 2011. A fact that raises suspicion about the assignment. (AA: 223)
D. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AS
WONG DISPUTED THAT TRUSTEE, AS HOLDER, SUFFICED TO
FORECLOSE INSTEAD OF HOLDER IN DUE COURSE.
The Trustee moved for Summary Judgment waiving any benefit of a favorable
judgment on Quantum Meruit & Unjust Enrichment to foreclose quickly.
To defeat a motion for summary judgment there can be no genuine issue of
material fact. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas v. Samora, 2013 COA 81
Granting Summary Judgment is drastic, especially when the result is homelessness.
A trial courts ruling is reviewed de novo. Lawry v. Palm, supra at p.558 .
21

WONG contends that the Trustee is not advancing a claim for the Trust as a
Holder in Due Course to foreclose. Judge Whitney could not distinguish between a
Holder, and a Holder in Due Course as did the court in Samora when in his Order
granting Plaintiffs Summary Judgment, (AD: 120) Judge Whitney said:
WHAT EFFECT, IF ANY, DOES A FINDING OF WHETHER
PLAINTIFF IS A HOLDER OR A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE HAVE
UPON WONG'S OBLIGATION TO PAY PLAINTIFF THE AMOUNTS
DUE UNDER THE NOTE?
There is no question that Plaintiff is the Holder of the Note which was
endorsed in blank. However, WONG contends that Plaintiff is not a Holder
in Due Course, and therefore holds the note subject to her defenses.
Section 3--306. Rights of One Not Holder in Due Course. (AA: 204)

Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the
instrument subject to

(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and

b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a
simple contract; and

(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance of any
condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose (Section
3--408); and

(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the
instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to such holder
would be inconsistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement. The
claim of any third person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a
defense to any party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the
action for such party.

22

Under the UCC, negotiable paper is transferred from the original payor by
negotiation. 3-301. Order paper must be endorsed; bearer paper need only be
delivered. 3-305. For the note to be enforced, the person who asserts the status of
the holder must be in possession of the instrument. ( 1-201 (20)) The original and
subsequent transferees are referred to as holders who take with no notice of
defect or default and are called holders in due course, and take free of many
defenses. UCC 3-305(b) A person who takes a note without notice of any claim as
described in section 3-306, claims ownership just like the payee would have a claim
of ownership to any other lost personal property. This provision would thus prevent
the finder from becoming a holder in due course.
In Samora at p. 24, the court said:
47 Because the warranty deed is not void, in order for Samora to defeat
Deutsche Banks claim to quiet title in the Trust, she must show that Deutsche
Bank as trustee is not advancing a claim by the Trust as a holder in due course
of the Note and Deed of Trust.

As in Samora, to defeat the Trustees claim, WONG must show that the Trustee
is not advancing a claim for the Trust as a holder in due course of the Note and Deed
of Trust. The argument of holder in due course goes to the Trusts right to
foreclose ,and is consistent with the reasoning in Samora. Judge Whitneys ruling was
prejudicial, and allows a trustee, who paid no separate value, to enforce a note in blank
for the trust, in a proceeding subject to no defenses contrary to UCC 3-306. (AA:
23

204) Though the Trustee is the holder, the Trust is the intended owner who must
accept the note under the requirements of a holder in due course for value, in good
faith, and without notice of any defects in the transaction.
In determining that being a note holder was sufficient to foreclose, Judge
Whitney condoned the defects known to the Trustee and LPS, including the nominal
consideration paid, even though Judge Whitney acknowledged concern. (AD: 120,
Order) Judge Whitney said:
WONG questions the Plaintiff's right to recover damages for Quantum Meruit
and Unjust Enrichment, contending that such must be predicated upon the
amount of consideration Plaintiff paid for the Note.
[T]he Court has concerns with regard to the applicability of this argument
where, as here, Plaintiff has physical possession of the Note with an open
endorsement, such was not fully briefed as Plaintiff has moved to dismiss this
claim if it receives judgment on its claim for judicial foreclosure.

The Trustees claimed that WONG would be unjustly enriched by allowing her to
retain her property, while WONG claimed the Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched
because they paid no value for the property (AA: 451, 60,Answer)
With due respect to Judge Whitney, the issue was fully alleged and briefed in
Sixth Affirmative Defense (Unjust Enrichment) (AA: 451, 59, 60, Answer)
WONG alleged:
[T]his Answering Defendant alleges that Bank of America N.A. as trustee
will be unjustly enriched if this court allows Plaintiff possession and
ownership on proof so lax that it violates the burden of proof required under
the 14
th
Amendment.
24

LPS assigned the Deed of Trust and Promissory Note for a cost of $10.00
dollars while the value of the property was in excess of 170,000 dollars.

As Judge Valdez at the May 6
th
, 2013 hearing in WONGs case (12cv0276, AA:
249-1, lns 22-25 &, 250, lns 1-16) said to Bank of Americas attorney,
THE COURT: Well, if we were operating in a procedural setting pre-2006
where in order to prevail at a Rule 120 hearing the holder in due course would
have to come in with an original deed of trust and an original promissory
note, or a verified assignment document, I would agree with you, because
then the real party in interest and who is the true holder of the note would not
have been an issue.
But what this lawsuit raises in my mind is we have a totally changed
landscape post-2006, and there's a very real issue as to who is actually the
owner of this property. If it turns out that U.S. Bank, your clients are not
the owners right now, Ms. WONG is the owner, but if it turns out that your
clients are in fact the actual holders of the deed of trust and note, then I agree
your clients have been victimized by Ms. WONG,***
However, if your clients are not the actual holders in due course of the
note and deed of trust, then she's the victim, because she loses her property
to folks who can't prove they actually own the deed of trust or promissory
note. [B, U]

The facts were fully before the court and never disputed in WONGs Motions to
Dismiss & Reconsideration and Opposition to Summary Judgment (AA: 473,474),
WONG cited Samora for controlling law and said:
Therefore there exist material issues of fact as to whether the Trust who is
[not]the holder in due course, took the negotiable instrument or assignment
for value, in good faith, without notice of certain problems with the
instrument. The evidence is in the record. The Deed of Trust (Exhibit A);
The Promissory Note (Exhibit B); and, The Assignment for the
consideration of $10.00 dollars.(Exhibit C) On property with a fair market
value according to Zillow of almost $222,000 dollars (Exhibit D)

According to Samora, just being a holder is insufficient when it said at fn 3:
25


While Deutsche Bank is the current holder of the Note, it did not give
separate value for the Note, and, therefore, it may only enjoy the same status
that the Trust has. See 4-3-302(a) (2) (a holder in due course must give
value for the instrument).

Like Deutsche Bank, Bank of America did not give separate value for the Note,
and like Deutsche Bank, it can only enjoy the same status as the Trust.
In BAKER v. WOOD et al., No. 162. 157 U.S. 212 (1895) Scotus considered
whether the Colorado assignee obtained the assignment for value and without
knowledge of fraud and said [I]f,a negotiable note is shown to have been
obtained by fraud, the presumption, arising merely from the possession of the
instrument, that the holder in good faith paid value, is so far overcome that he
cannot have judgment. [B, U]The Court further said:
The amount of the consideration is, under some circumstances, important in
determining whether, within the rule on the subject, the purchaser paid value,
for the amount paid may be so disproportionate to the real value of the
security purchased that the claim to have paid value will be treated as a
pretense;; and ...upon the question of notice and good faith..

As in Baker, the assignment Plaintiff purportedly paid TEN Dollars, should be
invalidated because of the lack of value and bad faith of the Trustee, and the Trust
who did not satisfy the requirements of a holder in due course because it had
knowledge of the infirmities, either actual or imputed under the Close Relationship
Doctrine where there is such a significant ongoing interconnected business
26

relationship that the Trustees conduct is imputable to the Trust. Stotler v. Geibank
I ndus. Bank, 827 P.2d 608, 611 (Colo. App. 1992)
Here, the consideration given was so greatly disproportionate to the value of the
property that it forms a significant element in the transaction. To be an owner of the
note, the Trust must satisfy the requirements of a Holder in Due Course. UCC
3-302(AA: 202)
Moreover, Judge Whitneys order (AD: 123) that Plaintiff is the Holder of the
Note which was endorsed in blank is sufficient to foreclose runs afoul of Baker
where Scotus held that mere possession of the negotiable instrument obtained by
fraud is so far overcome that it would not be given judgment.
WONG proved that LPS lacked authority to assign the Deed of Trust and Note,
and Judge Whitneys response was that Even if LPS lacked authority to transfer the
note, it is difficult to conceive how plaintiff was prejudiced by LPS's purported
assignment, and there is no allegation to this effect.(AD: 113, DISMISSAL) Judge
Whitney quoting Fontenot, supra. In Fontenot, supra, at 15, the court said:
A nonjudicial foreclosure sale is presumed to have been conducted regularly
and fairly; one attacking the sale must overcome this common law
presumption by pleading and proving an improper procedure and the
resulting prejudice.

Fontenot spoke to irregularities in the procedures, while here, the prejudice is
substantive-- the Trusts standing to foreclose which being substantive is defined as
27

[A]n essential part or constituent or relating to what is essential. Blacks Law
Dictionary, 9
th
Ed., It was not mere irregularities in procedures as in Fontenot .
In COLORADO ENVI RONMENTAL COALI TI ON et al. VS KEN SALAZAR
et al.(2011 ), No. 09-cv-00085-J LK, the court said:
A non-party may, however, challenge a settlement agreement if it has been
prejudiced by that settlement. New England Health Care Employees Pension
Fund v. Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2008).
In order to establish prejudice, Intervenor Defendant must show either that the
settlement interferes with its contract rights or that the settlement strips it of a
legal claim or cause of action. ). A non-party may, however, challenge a
settlement agreement if it has been prejudiced by that settlement. New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283,
1288 (10th Cir. 2008). In order to establish prejudice, Intervenor Defendant
must show either that the settlement interferes with its contract rights or that
the settlement strips it of a legal claim or cause of action.

Not allowing WONG to challenge the assignment, or the Pooling and Service
agreement would be prejudicial, and strip WONG of a legal claim or cause of action.
I D p. 7.
Neither Trustee nor LPS ever denied that First Washington ceased operations in
2008 ending the agency relationship by operation of the law. Both knew that LPS
assignment to Trustee in 2011 was a sham. With LPS help, the Trustee could take
the property for the Trust for Ten Dollars and therefore no value. First Washington
never received the Ten Dollars since it ceased to exist in 2008.
28

E. WONG HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ASSIGNMENT
In American Jurisprudence 6A C.J.S. Assignments 132 states:
"The obligor of an assigned claim may defend a suit brought by the assignee on
any ground that renders the assignment void or invalid, but may not defend on
any ground that renders the assignment voidable only."

Judge Whitney, in his Order sided with LPS that WONG lacked standing as a
non-party to challenge the Assignment, and that WONG was not prejudiced. (AD:
113, Dismissal) His ruling is not supported by Colorado case law.
a. The Burden of Proof to Enforce an Order Authorizing Sale devolves on The
Party Seeking Validation of the Assignment

In Goodwin vs District Court, 779 P.2d 837, 842,843 (1989) the court allowed
non-parties to the challenge an assignment and said:
The Goodwins raise the following arguments in support of their claim that
Marjory Ollson and Etta Mae Vann were not the real parties in interest: that
the purported assignment of the promissory note to Marjory Ollson was
invalid.. Without passing on the merits of the Goodwins' "real party in
interest" defense, we are satisfied that they should have been entitled to raise
that defense at the C.R.C.P. 120 hearing.
The Goodwins were non-parties to the assignment, yet the Court in Goodwin said
they were still entitled to challenge the assignment and raise the real party in interest
defense, just as WONG should be entitled.
In Alpine Associates, I nd. v. KP&R, I nc., and 802 P.2d 1119 (1990), the court
said:
29

If, as here, plaintiff's status as a real party in interest depends upon an
assignment from the original real party in interest, it is necessary for the
plaintiff to prove, in addition to the basic elements of its case, its status as
an assignee. .. Generally, this burden is met by proving a full and
complete assignment of the claim from an assignor who was a real party
in interest with respect to the claim. [B]

In Alpine, Section II, the plaintiff sought to estop a party who had dealt with the
business in its corporate capacity from denying the legal existence of Alpine Supply,
the purported Assignor. The Court refused to acknowledge the assignment because,
like First Washington which ceased to exist as a legal entity prior to the assignment,
Alpine Supply ceased to exist as a legal entity prior to the assignment and could not
legally transact business. The Court said To hold otherwise would subvert the
public policy of the state Graham, I nc. v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 680 P.2d 1334 (Colo.App.1984).
Judge Whitney did not require the Trustee to prove the validity of the assignment
which conflicts with the requirements under Alpine and Goodwin at p.843 when the
Goodwin court said [T]herefore, the burden should devolve upon the party seeking
the order of sale to show that he is indeed the real party in interest.
Who was the Real Party in Interest if First Washington was defunct in 2008?
What was the status of the agency relationship between LPS and First Washington
on October 4
th
, 2011?
30

Colorado Case Law allows assignment challenges from non-parties as seen in
Alpine and Goodwin and to any agreement which is prejudicial to the non-party
where the non-party is stripped of a legal claim or cause of action. COLORADO
ENVI RONMENTAL COALI TI ON et al, supra, at. p. 7.
Moreover, Bank of America as trustee acknowledges in its Brochure, Entitled
Role of the Trustee: Parties to a Mortgage Backed Securities Transaction to its
clients that parties to the securitization include the borrower. (AA: 234)
b. More J urisdictions are allowing Non-party Challenges to
assignments by Trusts acquiring debt Post Closing Date.
In SALDI VAR VS J PMORGAN CHASE BANK. N.A. et al, 11-10689, (Texas,
2013) Chase and Deutsche Bank argued that the Saldivars lacked standing to
challenge the validity of the assignment to the trust. The Court held that however,
if the assignment was void, ab initio, because it occurred after the closing date,
the Saldivars have a valid argument that the banks are not valid Note Holders.
In Glaski vs. Bank of America, FO64556 (5th Dist. CAL, 2013) the court said:
We conclude that Glaski's factual allegations regarding post-closing date
attempts to transfer his deed of trust into the WaMu Securitized Trust are
sufficient to state a basis for concluding the attempted transfers were void.
In this case, however, we believe applying the statute to void the attempted
transfer is justified because it protects the beneficiaries of the WaMu
Securitized Trust from the potential adverse tax consequence of the trust
losing its status as a REMIC trust under the Internal Revenue Code.

31

In J AMES HENDRI CKS, et aI ., vs Bank of America N.A. as trustee, Case No. 10-
849-CH, (Mich. 2011) The judge applied New York law because all First Washington
Trusts are governed under New York law.(AA: 423, . 1 , compl.)
The Court reviewed the PSA concluding that LPS lacked authority to assign the
property. Since the Note never passed to Merrill Lynch, the Trust could not have
validly received it. The record before the Court was that the only assignment of the
mortgage that was recorded was the assignment from LPS to USB, as trustee. As the
Court in Hendricks said, Other than First Washington, a division of National City
Bank, none of the Defendants owned the indebtedness.. The Trust in that case, like
the Trust here never paid for the note and cannot claim by virtue of the default an
Injury to acquire standing. The Trust could not claim Holder in Due Course status.
In REI NAGEL v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATI ONAL TRUST COMPANY, No.
12-50569 (2013) the court said:
Texas courts follow the majority rule that the obligor may defend on any
ground which renders the assignment void. A contrary rule would lead to
the odd result that Deutsche Bank could foreclose on the Reinagels' property
though it is not a valid party to the deed of trust or promissory note, which, by
Deutsche Bank's reasoning, should mean that it lacks standing to
foreclose.
c. Defendant May Challenge the Assignment as a Spurious Document
Judge Whitney failed to address in the Order on Reconsideration whether
Defendant could challenge the assignment through CRCP 105.1. (AD: 124-126)
32

The construction of a statute or rule is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551, 554 (Colo. 2006). CRCP 105.1 states:
Any person whose real or personal property is affected by a spurious lien or
spurious document, as defined by law, may file a petition in the district
court. for an order to show cause why the lien or document should not be
declared invalid.

The assignment of the Deed of Trust and Note is a document affecting WONGs
real property, and therefore can be scrutinized as a spurious document requiring the
assignor & assignee the burden of proving their validity.
A spurious document as defined by 38-35-201, C.R.S. 2012 states: (3)
Spurious document means any document that is forged or groundless, contains a
material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise patently invalid. Therefore, the
fact that LPS has no authority to assign, and the Trust paying no value, shows the
assignment of 10/04/2011 contains material misstatements or false claim making the
assignment a spurious document as stated under 38-35-201, C.R.S. 2012 .
F. THE COLORADO CIVIL ACCESS PILOT PROJECT WAS
IMPROPERLY APPLIED IN THIS CASE
On 10/29/2013, Judge Whitney arbitrarily ruled that the CAPP procedure was applicable. (AD:
103) The facts are undisputed. The Trustee is advancing the claim on behalf of the Trust. A trial
courts interpretation of a rule of civil procedure is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. City
& County of Broomfield v. FarLPS Reservoir & I rrigation Co., 239 P.3d 1270, 1275 (Colo. 2010).
WONG objected to the application of CAPP. (AA: 293-295) The FDCPA defines debt collector as,
33

[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any
business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or. who regularly
collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another. 15 U.S.C.A. 1692a (6)

Lenders who foreclose on their own mortgage loans are not debt collectors. Olroyd v.
Associates Consumer Discount Co., 863 F.2d 237 (D.C., E D. Penn 1994).
Here, the Trustee is attempting to foreclose on behalf of the Trust and not collecting on its own.
Some trustees fall under the exception to debt collector that covers any person collecting or
attempting to collect any debt due another to the extent such activity is incidental to a bona
fide fiduciary obligation.15 U.S.C.A. 1692a (6) (F)(i) (West 1998). In Wilson v. Draper, 443
F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006) the court concluded that a trustees actions to foreclose on a property
pursuant to a deed of trust are not incidental to its fiduciary obligation rather, they are central to
it. Thus, to the extent the trustees use the foreclosure process to collect the alleged debt, they could
not benefit from the exemption contained in 1692a (6) (F) (i). In Draper at p. 23, the court said
that the exemption,
[D]oes not include a .debtors trustee solely for the purpose of conducting a
foreclosure sale (i.e., exercising a power of sale in the event of default on a loan). [B]

Judge Whitney misapplied CAPP because Bank of America, as a financial institution, was
soley engaged in collecting a debt and is excluded from using CAPP as seen in Appendix A
Section II, Excluded Actions--- d. Actions brought by commercial banks or other financial
institutions solely for the collection of debt. (AA: 219 Excerpt), (AD: 103, Order)
G. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY MAKING RULINGS THAT
WERE MANIFESTLY, UNREASONABLE, OR UNFAIR
Judge Whitneys application of the CAPP program was unreasonable and
arbitrary and manifestly unjust. It was a procedure that favored the Plaintiff as
34

well as deeming the promissory note as original and dismissing the action before
WONG could have an expert examine the note for its authenticity as he promised at
the Case Management hearing of 12/09/2013. (RT: 34, lns 11-18)
Judge Whitney arbitrarily decided he would hold excess proceeds from the sale
when he said (4) finally, to pay any balance remaining into the registry of this Court,
to be applied as this Court may hereafter direct. (AD: 123, Order, Summary
Judgment) Judge Whitney glossed over arguments such as the Holder in Due
Course argument to reach his decision for Plaintiff which was arbitrary, and
manifestly unjust.
H. THE TRUST WAIVED ANY DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT

Judge Whitney ruled that defendant pay taxes and insurance totaling
$5,618.01(AD: 122, Order: Sum Judgment) even though in Bank of Americas said
Due to her bankruptcy discharge, the Trust is not seeking a personal deficiency
judgment against WONG for any deficiency due under the Note after the foreclosure
Sale. (RT: 19, 14-20)
I. THE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING CLG ATTORNEYS FEES
ON AN UNTIMELY & DEFECTIVE REQUEST
On May 23rd, 2014, Judge Whitney granted attorneys fees to CLG under 13-
17-20, made in its response to defendants motion for Reconsideration. (AA: 397,
398)
35

Since no facts are in dispute, review is de novo. Lawry v. Palm, supra at p.558
WONG objected to any award of attorneys fees. (AA: 481-489) Judge Whitney said
Third party defendant The Castle Law Group, LLC is correct that the Court
did not address its request for fees and costs. (AD: 129)
a. The Request for attorneys fees was untimely
The Order of Dismissal was on 01/14/ 2014.(AD: 104) No motion was made by
the CLG, let alone a timely one required under the section. The only request for
attorneys fees was embedded within CLGs Response in Opposition to Defendants
Motion for Reconsideration filed February 14
th
, 2014. (AA: 397-398)
C.R.C.P Rule 121, 1-22. 2. ATTORNEY FEES b. states:

(b) Motion and Response. Any party seeking attorney fees under this practice
standard shall file and serve a motion for attorney fees within 15 days of
entry of judgment or such greater time as the court may allow. [B]

CLG was required to file its motion within the time constraints in Rule 121, 1-
11.2. Judge Whitney noted in his Order that in March, 2012, that the time for filing a
motion was extended to 21 days. (AD: 130) But even if the time had been extended,
the request was still untimely and without a motion. Given that the Order of
Dismissal was on January 14
th
, 2014 and the request for attorneys fees was on
February 14
th
, 2014, the difference between the two dates is 30 days. If you count the
1
st
day January 15
th
, 2014, subtract 3 days for mailing leaves 27 days. The maximum
allowed, even using the 21 days plus 3 for mailing is 24 days. CLG missed the
36

deadline on the motion, even if their purported motion embedded in a response was
acceptable, it was still untimely by 3 days. Their motion should have been made by
February 11
th
, 2014. In KATHLEEN MILLS VS THE PRUDENTI AL
I NSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERI CA, Civil Action No. 11-cv-02127-DME-
CBS the court denied the motion for attorneys fees as untimely and said Unless a
statute or court order provides otherwise, the motion must [] be filed no later than 14
days after the entry of judgment.
b. The Request for Attorneys Fees was Procedurally Improper

No Colorado State authority seemingly addresses whether a Request for
Attorneys fees may be made within a response or reply. It is an issue of First
Impression. Colorado Federal Local Rules prohibits the practice. COLO.LCivR 7.1
(c) MOTIONS states: A motion shall not be included in a response or reply to the
original motion. A motion shall be made in a separate document. Additionally, a
motion would have required conferral (C.R.C.P. 121)
C.R.C.P. 7 Pleadings allowed (b) Motions and Other Papers
(1). The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a
written notice of the hearing of the motion. [U]

No notice of a hearing was made by CLG. (AA: 397, 398, Response)
37

In re Marriage of J ames H. Nelson, 2012 COA 205, pgs 19, 20 the court
said the wifes request for attorney fees wasnt part of the findings or Order,
suggesting that she should submit a separate motion for fees, as CLG should.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth , this court should find for WONG on all issues, and remand
back with direction denying Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend
WONGs claims to include Lawrence E. Castle named James King in this case which
Judge Whitney concluded was not properly served, and grant WONGs Motion to
Dismiss.
Respectfully,


___________________, Dated:_______.2014
ANNA MAY WONG














38


39

EXHIBIT A




40

EXHIBIT B

41



SEC I nfo Home Search My Interests Help Sign In Please Sign I n

First Washington Mortgage Loan Trust/Series 2007-FF1 8-K For 1/26/07 EX-4.1
Filed On 2/12/07 5:29pm ET SEC File 333-130545-42 Accession Number 950123-7-
1844

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in

this entire Filing.

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every "hit".

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As Of Filer Filing For/On/As Docs:Size
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2/12/07 First Washington Mortgage..2007-FF1 8-K{8,9} 1/26/07 3:409
Bowne of NY City...01/FA

Current Report Form 8-K
Filing Table of Contents
Document/Exhibit Description Pages Size

1: 8-K Current Report 5 15K
2: EX-4.1 Pooling and Servicing Agreement 394 1.49M
3: EX-99.1 Mortgage Loan Sale and Assignment Agreement 10 32K


EX-4.1 Pooling and Servicing Agreement
Exhibit Table of Contents













EXHIBIT C
42

Merrill Lynch Throws in Towel, Shuts First
Washington, NationPoint


Colin Robertson March 5, 2008 Comments Off

Merrill Lynch finally came forward today and formally announced that it was halting all loan
origination via its First Washington and Lake Forest, CA-based NationPoint operations effective
immediately.
According to the press release, the company based the decision on the deterioration of the
subprime lending market.
Since July, we have reduced staffing at First Washington by nearly 70 percent, but after
evaluating a number of strategies, we believe it is appropriate to discontinue mortgage origination,
said David Sobotka, head of Fixed Income, Currencies & Commodities at Merrill Lynch.
Merrill said about 650 employees would be affected by the decision, and that estimated charges
related to the move will cost approximately $60 million, half of which will be recorded in the first
quarter.
Heres an excerpt from the companys website, which is now just a one page exit message:
Effective March 5 at 2 p.m. PST, 2008 First Washington Financial Corporation will no longer
accept mortgage loan applications.
Thank you for considering us as a source for your mortgage originations.? We realize that our 26
years of success and accomplishments would not have been possible without the people and
businesses in the mortgage industry.
It is assumed that the mortgage lender will continue to process locked loans and possibly loans in
progress, although that is uncertain at the moment.
The company also said it plans to sell its loan servicing unit, Home Loan Services, and will solicit
bids in coming weeks.
Merrill Lynch will continue to originate prime mortgages via its Global Wealth Management
Group unit and through Merrill Lynch Credit Corporation.














EXHIBIT D
43


44


45


46


47


48


49


50


51


52


53


EXHIBIT G