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Disturbances
Author(s): Toomas Karmo
Source: Analysis, Vol. 37, No. 4, (Jun., 1977), pp. 147-148
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Analysis Committee
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327341
Accessed: 29/07/2008 20:21
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DISTURBANCES
By
TOOMAS KARMO
A
STREAM of
water,
e.g.
the stream
running
down a rain-soaked
windscreen,
must be distinct from the water which it at
any given
moment
happens
to
contain,
for one and the same stream
may
at two
distinct moments contain two distinct
consignments
of water. But if
water and stream are
distinct,
then in what does that relation consist
which we describe
by saying
that the one constitutes the other?
The correct answer to this is
perhaps
that a stream is a
species
of
disturbance,
where a disturbance is definable as an
object
or
entity
found
in some other
object-not
in the sense in which a letter
may
be found in
an
envelope,
or a biscuit in a
tin,
but in the sense in which a knot
may
be
in a
rope,
a wrinkle in a
carpet,
a hole in a
perennial
border,
or a
bulge
in
a
cylinder.
One
way
of
telling
whether an
object
Xis "in" an
object
Yin
the sense
peculiar
to disturbances is to
enquire
whether X can
migrate
through
Y. A knot is a disturbance because it
may slip along
the
rope
in
which it is
tied,
and a hole a disturbance because it can be
pictured
as
moving
around the flowerbed in which it was
dug
(as
a vortex
may
move
in a
pool).
A
bulge
in a
cylinder, again,
is a
disturbance,
because it can be
pictured migrating
in the
way
a
bulge migrates
down the
body
of a boa
constrictor when it swallows a
goat.
That which a disturbance is in is its
medium;
a stream is a disturbance in that total
consignment
of water
which is
now,
has at
any
time in the
past
been,
or will at
any
time in the
future be found in it. The
process
which is the
flowing
of a stream
may
equally
well be described as a stream's
migrating
through
a
quantity
of
water,
even
though
in an absolute sense the stream
stays stationary
and
the water does the
migrating. (The
stream
migrates
in the sense in which
a kink
migrates along
a hose
pulled through
a
stationary pair
of con-
stricting rollers.)
Streams are not alone in
being
constituted of distinct
consignments
of
stuff at distinct instants in their careers. A
living
creature can be con-
ceived of as a disturbance
migrating through
a
consignment
of
organic
chemicals,
since the
consignment
of
organic
stuffs
constituting
a
living
thing
one month is distinct from the
consignment constituting
it the
next.
Those,
again,
who
suggest
that one and the same
pair
of
stockings
could be first silk and
then,
at the end of a
long process
of
patching,
worsted in effect
suggest
that
stockings
be viewed as disturbances in
consignments
of fibre.
It is
possible
that this view of
living
creatures as disturbances was held
by
Aristotle. At
any
rate Aristotle mentions an
object
which we would
call a disturbance while
discussing substantiality
in the
Metaphysics:
'...
what is still weather?-A stillness in a
large expanse
of air.
147
The matter is the
air,
while the
actuality
and substance is the stillness'
(1o43a22-24).
He uses this same
preposition
'in' in
describing
the re-
lation of the form of a man to his flesh and bones
('to
toionde eidos en
taisde tais sarxi kai ostois',
Metaphysics 1o34a6),
and
explicitly compares
living
tissues with
flowing
water at de Gen. et Corr.
3zib24-25. Finally,
if Aristotle does not discuss the relation of streams as such to the water
in
them,
he does at least
suggest
at
Topics I27a3-8
that a wind is better
defined as movement in air than as air in
movement;
and the
parallel
between wind and air on the one hand and stream and water on the other
is
fairly
obvious.
St.
John's College, Oxford
? TOOMAS KARMO
1977
A NOTE ON MR. KARMO'S DISTURBANCES
By
T.
J.
M. BENCH-CAPON
N his
essay
on
disturbances,
Toomas Karmo asks us to believe three
things:
(I)
That X
may
be in Y in two
quite
different
ways, exemplified by
'a biscuit is in the tin' and 'a dent is in the
tin',
(2)
that a
way
of
telling
if X is in Y in this second
way
is to see whether
it is
possible
for X to
migrate through
Y,
(3)
that streams are in
consignments
of water and
living organisms
in
consignments
of chemicals in this second
way.
I want to
argue
that if
(2)
is
true,
then
(3)
is
false,
and the reason
why
this is so should lead us to
reject (i)
also.
If X is to be able to
migrate through
Y,
then it must make sense to
ask where X is in
Y,
because the
possibility
of X's
migrating through
Y
depends
on the
possibility
of there
being
different answers to this
question
at different times. But it makes no sense to ask where the stream
is in the
water,
or where the
organism
is in the chemicals.
So,
they
cannot
migrate
in the
required way
and so fail the test advocated in
(2).
Moreover,
the fact that it does make sense to ask where the Xis in the
Y in both the
paradigms
offered in
(i) ought
to lead us to
suspect
that
these
ways
of
being
in are not as
disparate
as Mr Karmo would have us
believe. For both these
ways
of
being
in,
that X is in Y entails that X is
somewhere in Y. This entailment does not hold for streams and water or
organisms
and
chemicals,
and so if we want to hold on to the claim that
The matter is the
air,
while the
actuality
and substance is the stillness'
(1o43a22-24).
He uses this same
preposition
'in' in
describing
the re-
lation of the form of a man to his flesh and bones
('to
toionde eidos en
taisde tais sarxi kai ostois',
Metaphysics 1o34a6),
and
explicitly compares
living
tissues with
flowing
water at de Gen. et Corr.
3zib24-25. Finally,
if Aristotle does not discuss the relation of streams as such to the water
in
them,
he does at least
suggest
at
Topics I27a3-8
that a wind is better
defined as movement in air than as air in
movement;
and the
parallel
between wind and air on the one hand and stream and water on the other
is
fairly
obvious.
St.
John's College, Oxford
? TOOMAS KARMO
1977
A NOTE ON MR. KARMO'S DISTURBANCES
By
T.
J.
M. BENCH-CAPON
N his
essay
on
disturbances,
Toomas Karmo asks us to believe three
things:
(I)
That X
may
be in Y in two
quite
different
ways, exemplified by
'a biscuit is in the tin' and 'a dent is in the
tin',
(2)
that a
way
of
telling
if X is in Y in this second
way
is to see whether
it is
possible
for X to
migrate through
Y,
(3)
that streams are in
consignments
of water and
living organisms
in
consignments
of chemicals in this second
way.
I want to
argue
that if
(2)
is
true,
then
(3)
is
false,
and the reason
why
this is so should lead us to
reject (i)
also.
If X is to be able to
migrate through
Y,
then it must make sense to
ask where X is in
Y,
because the
possibility
of X's
migrating through
Y
depends
on the
possibility
of there
being
different answers to this
question
at different times. But it makes no sense to ask where the stream
is in the
water,
or where the
organism
is in the chemicals.
So,
they
cannot
migrate
in the
required way
and so fail the test advocated in
(2).
Moreover,
the fact that it does make sense to ask where the Xis in the
Y in both the
paradigms
offered in
(i) ought
to lead us to
suspect
that
these
ways
of
being
in are not as
disparate
as Mr Karmo would have us
believe. For both these
ways
of
being
in,
that X is in Y entails that X is
somewhere in Y. This entailment does not hold for streams and water or
organisms
and
chemicals,
and so if we want to hold on to the claim that
148 148
ANALYSIS ANALYSIS