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Section 19: Pardoning Powers of the President (Only starting from Llamas)

Llamas v. Orbos

FACTS: Llamas Vice Gov of Tarlac, Ocampo Gov of Tarlac

Ocampo, as Gov, enters into a Loan with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, wherein he is President
Complaint was filed in DLG. DLG found him guilty of violating the Anti-graft and corrupt practices act,
suspended him for 90 days. Llamas took over as Acting Gov. Exe. Sec Orbos granted him executive clemency.
ISSUE: WON Clemency may be granted in an administrative case.
HELD:
Petitoner: Clemency can only be granted in Criminal cases, as the word conviction in Section 19 refers to
Criminal Conviction.

Supreme Court: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. The law does not distinguish, the court
will not distinguish. Also, it would not be necessary to exclude impeachment cases if the said section only
applies to criminal cases. If the President can grant pardon and clemency in criminal cases, so much more in
administrative cases since these are less serious in nature. The Clemency also falls under the power of
control in this case, because the Department of Local Government is under the Executive Branch. Pardon is
also a private and official act which is delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not
communicated officially to the court, thereby petitioners right to due process was not violated when he was
not notified about the grant of clemency.

Petition dismissed


Drilon v. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Raul Paredes and Rodolfo Ganzon were charged with double murder in a military court during the year
1973. Paredes was acquitted and Ganzon was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labor. On 1978,
Ganzon was released and placed under house arrest. On 1986, he was granted pardon by the President.
Around 1988, Secretary of Justice Drilon wants to conduct preliminary investigation against Paredes and
Ganzon for the double murder, but the Court of Appeals disposed of the case upon motion to dismiss by the
said accused, citing that he had already been convicted of the crime and was already pardoned.

ISSUE: WON Gazon was Pardoned by the President
HELD:
Petitioner: Fact of Presidential Pardon is not Proved
Supreme Court: Ganzon served six years, before Marcos ordered his release, subject to the condition that he
would be under house arrest. Thus, the President unavoidably commuted Ganzons imprisonment to six
years, which he has already served. Thus, if he has served his sentence fully, he cannot be reinvestigated.

Pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable, so is commutation of sentence. It extinguishes
criminal liability partially, and has the effect of changing the penalty to a lesser one.

COMMUTATION OF SENTENCE NEED NOT BE IN A SPECIFIC FORM. It is sufficient that Ganzon was
voluntarily released in 1978 with the condition of house arrest.

Petition dismissed
People v. Salle

FACTS:
Salle and Mengote were found guilty by the RTC of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson,
sentenced to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua. Both filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals.

Salle and Mengote were granted a conditional pardon by the President. Salle filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal without informing his counsel Atty. Lao. On the other hand, Mengote did not file a motion to
withdraw his appeal.

Court granted Salles motion and considered the case as terminated in so far as he is concerned. However,
Mengotes
OSG posits that conditional pardon of Mengote is not enforceable because the judgment of conviction is not
yet final due to his appeal in the CA. Atty. Lao argues that Mengote is deemed to have abandoned his appeal
by accepting the pardon.

ISSUE: Can a pardon be enforced when it is granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from
judgment?

HELD: No.
Framers of the Constitution deemed it undesirable for the President to grant pardon even before conviction.

Thus, there are two limitations on Pardoning Power:
1. Power must be exercised after conviction by final judgment
a. Judgment of Conviction is Final when:
i. No appeal is seasonably perfected
ii. Accused commences to serve the sentence
iii. When the accused applies for probation, waiving his right to appeal
2. Does not extend to cases of impeachment

Final Judgment was required by the 1987 constitution to avoid the derogation of judicial power. Monsanto v.
Factoran ruling that acceptance of pardon is deemed as an abandonment of appeal is mere obiter dictum,
and in that case the Pardon was extended under the 1973 constitution, which allowed a the grant of such
before or after conviction.

The Court hereby declares that the present constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full
or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction. Acceptance of
pardon shall not serve as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and those who release such persons by
virtue of pardon before withdrawal of an appeal shall be administratively liable. Agencies and
Instrumentalities of the Government concerned must show proof that the accused has not appeal from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. This rule shall fully bind pardons extended after 31 January
1995.

Mengote is freed from the full force of the rule since he stands on the same ground as the accused-appellants
in the Hinlo case, subject to the condition that his counsel secures from him the withdrawal of his appeal
within 30 days.






Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice

FACTS:
Echegaray was convicted for the crime of rape of the 10 year old daughter of his common-law spouse, and
death penalty by lethal injection was sentenced upon him.

However, the implementing law for R.A. No. 8177, an act designating lethal injection as the method for
carrying out capital punishment, was deemed as unconstitutional due to provisions which expand the law,
particularly the grant of 3 year suspension of the execution of a woman who is pregnant, whereas in the RPC
as amended, it only provided 1 year.

The Court ruled that the respondents be enjoined from executing the death penalty until the proper
amendments have been made, and unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the
death penalty law is going to be made.

ISSUE: WON Judiciary may suspend the execution of its judgment after it reaches finality


HELD: Yes.
Jurisdiction of the Court to execute its judgment is different from its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter
the same. The finality of judgment deprives the court of its jurisdiction of the latter, but not of the former.

Entirety of Judicial power is vested in the Judiciary; To be sure, the most important part of a litigation,
whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may
change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts
have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them
conformable to law and justice.

Power of the Court to suspend the execution of its judgment, in the case at bar, the execution of the death
penalty, does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant pardons. Sec. 19 of Art. 7 is merely the
source of power of the President. This cannot be interpreted as denying the courts the power to
control the enforcement of its decisions after its finality. In the same vein, Congress can amend the
death penalty law to reduce the punishment of death penalty to life imprisonment. The effect of such is like a
commutation of sentence, but by no means does this violate the Presidents power to commute final
sentences after conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the
life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right
than the right to life.














Section 20: Power of President to Contract Foreign Loans

Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia

FACTS:
A Financing Program to address the Foreign Debt was created by Corazon Aquino. 2 Debt-Relief Options:
1. Cash buyback of the portions of the Philippine foreign debt at a discount
2. Convert existing Philippine debt instrument into any 3 kinds of bonds/securities
a. New Money Bonds
b. Interest-Reduction Bonds
c. Principal-Collateralized Interest-Reduction Bonds

On 28 February 1992, the Philippine Debt Negotiating Team, chaired by respondent Pelaez, negotiated an
agreement with the countrys Bank Advisory Committee, representing all foreign commercial bank
creditors, on the Financing Program which respondents characterized as a multi-option financing package.

Petitioner: Bonds and the buyback scheme are not loans. Only the President may personally exercise the
power of contracting foreign loans.

ISSUE: WON the Financing Program is within the Presidents power in Sec. 20, Article 7.

HELD:
In their Comment, petitioners assert that the power to pay public debts lies with Congress and was
deliberately withheld by the Constitution from the President. It is true that in the balance of power between
the three branches of government, it is Congress that manages the countrys coffers by virtue of its taxing
and spending powers. However, the law-making authority has promulgated a law ordaining an automatic
appropriations provision for debt servicing by virtue of which the President is empowered to execute debt
payments without the need for further appropriations.

Regarding the Bonds, the language of the Constitution is clear. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of
certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of debt instruments are more onerous than others.
Constitution should be construed in a way that will allow the full exercise of the power provided in the
Constitution. The only restriction is the prior concurrence of the monetary board.

Buyback is a necessary power which springs from the grant of the foreign borrowing power. Every statute
is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The President
was not granted the power to contract loans without the power of implementing its payment, as such is
necessary in the exercise of such power.

The fact is that it is the Department of Finance which has the expertise regarding foreign loans. The
President is not expected to spend so much of his time trying to exercise every aspect of his foreign
borrowing power. The doctrine of qualified political agency applies to the Secretary of Finance, and it must
also be noted that the Secretary is bound to secure the Presidents consent to or subsequent ratification of
his acts. Petitioners were not able to show that the President has repudiated such acts.






Section 21: 2/3 Senate concurrence for the ratification of treaties MEGA DIGESTS VERSION

Gonzales v. Hechanova The case where importation of rice and corn were prohibited by 2 statutes, but
the Government of the Philippines entered into two contracts for the purchase of rice, with both Vietnam
and Burma. President may enter into executive agreements without prior legislative authority, but it cannot
enter into transactions prohibited by statutes as his main function is to enforce the laws enacted by
Congress. He cannot defeat the legislative enactments by indirectly repealing them through executive
agreements which allows the performance of those very acts which are prohibited.

Pimentel v. Ermita The case where the Rome Statute was signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations, which establishes the International Criminal Court. A proviso of the said Statute require
that it be subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval of the signatories. Senate filed a petition requesting
for a copy of the said statute for its ratification. The issue is WON Exec. Sec. of DFA has the duty to provide
such copy to the Senate even if it is not the President who signed such Statute. Court rules that the President
has the sole authority of negotiating with other states in the realm of treaty making. Ratification is a formal
act by which the state confirms the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative, and it is the
President who does this ratification. Senates role is limited only to giving or withholding its consent to the
ratification. President has the authority to refuse to submit the treat to the Senate, or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. The court has no jurisdiction to compel the President to submit
such documents to senate.

Lim v. Exec. Sec. The case where Balikatan 02-1, a series of joint military exercises between the United
States armed forces and the AFP in Mindanao, was questioned by petitioners on the ground that the Mutual
Defense Treaty states that mutual military assistance can only be provided in case of an armed attack by an
external aggressor, and neither does the Visiting Forces Agreement allow American soldiers to engage in
combat operations in the Philippines, not even to fire back if fired upon. Court rules that the Balikatan
Exercises are under the VFA, which permits US personnel to engage in activities subject to the approval of
the Philippines on an impermanent basis. However, the constitution does not allow US forces to engage in an
offensive war inside the country, as evidenced by several of its provisions. This is because in the Philippines,
the constitution prevails over treaties.

Bayan v. Exec. Sec. The VFA case, where the Court ruled that all treaties or international agreements
entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that International law makes no distinction between treaties and executive agreements: they
are equally binding obligations upon nations. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal
acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of
ratification of a treaty.

The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when:
(a) the treaty provides for such ratification,
(b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required,
(c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or
(d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.

Court reiterates that the Power to Ratify lies with the President, not in the Legislature. Role of the Senate is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.



Sec. of Justice v. Judge Lantion The case where civil liberties and a treaty agreement with the United
States are in conflict with each other. According to the Court, The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the
oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict
between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts
should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the doctrine of incorporation. However, if after efforts were taken to reconcile the 2 and the
same cannot be done, municipal law shall prevail, especially the constitution, which is the highest law of the
land. Both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

Bayan Muna v. Sec. Romulo - After the signing of the Rome Statute, and pending the completion of the
ratification, approval, and concurrence process of said Statute here in the Philippines, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines approved and accepted the US Embassy Note which proposed a Non-Surrender
Agreement between the RP & US. This agreement provides that both countries shall not surrender those
persons of the other, who are in their territory, to any international tribunal. It was assailed because it was
not subjected to the concurrence of the Senate, but the Supreme Court elaborated:

Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as an international agreement
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.

International agreements may be in the form of:
(1) Treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or
(2) Executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative
concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties.

Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of
their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers. Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the
Constitution.

An exchange of notes falls into the category of inter-governmental agreements, which is an
internationally accepted form of international agreement. The United Nations Treaty Collections (Treaty
Reference Guide) defines the term as follows:

An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed
by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State
to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The
technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid
the process of legislative approval.

Exchange of notes and executive agreements have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being
considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action.

When a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving political issues, to be in the
form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the
Senate by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification process.

By constitutional fiat and by the nature of his or her office, the President, as head of state and government, is the sole
organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. The Constitution vests in the President the power to
enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate cases, to the required concurrence votes of the
Senate. But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. As the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of the nation
is, as Bayan would put it, executive altogether. The right of the President to enter into or ratify binding executive
agreements has been confirmed by long practice.

Vinuya v. Romulo The case where it is assailed that the Treaty of Peace by the Philippine Government with Japan is
void for waiving the rights of Filipino comfort women who were raped during the 2
nd
World War, and petitioners are
seeking to compel the Executive to assist them in filing claims against Japan. However, the Executive did not espouse
such claims, stating that the Peace Treaty has already satisfied Japans compliance for the compensation of comfort
women. Petitioners filed for certiorari in SC alleging that the Executive acted with grave abuse of discretion, that the
crimes of Japan were crimes against humanity and that the Philippines must advance their claims and compel Japan to
issue an apology. The Court ruled that the conduct of foreign relations is committed by the Constitution to the
Executive and Legislative, and that the question of whether the Philippines should espouse such claims is a political
one. The executive has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951, and the wisdom of such decision cannot be questioned by
the courts. To rule otherwise would mean an assessment of foreign policy judgments, which is committed to the
executive and not to the courts, as the President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign relations.