The Issue:

The European Neighborhood

Policy (ENP) has failed in its
goal of creating a ring of
well-governed states around
the EUs borders. Instability,
authoritarianism, civil strife,
sectarianism, and international
confict characterize much of
the EUs hinterland to the east
and to the south. Intolerance
and archaic forms of nationalism
are obstacles to political and
economic development. The EU
cannot impose democracy and
the rule of law through political
conditionality without an offer of
membership. It must fnd new
ways to advance its values and
interests in adjoining countries.
Policy Recommendation:
The EUs new high
representative for foreign affairs
and security policy should
propose to the member states
a thorough overhaul of the ENP.
Security, energy, and trade
should be at the heart of the
EUs relations with its neighbors.
A more strategic approach is
needed, including dialogue
with interested third countries,
especially Russia, Turkey, the
Gulf countries, and the United
States.
A New Strategy for Europes Neighborhood
by Michael Leigh
1744 R Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
T 1 202 683 2650
F 1 202 265 1662
E info@gmfus.org
Europe Program
Policy Brief
September 2014
Vol. 1, No. 1
Introduction
A thorough overhaul of the European
Neighbourhood Policy should be the
top priority of the EUs new foreign
policy chief, Federica Mogherini, who
was nominated in late August. If the
EU can expect to have an infuence on
world politics, it is frst and foremost
in its own neighborhood. Europe
faces security threats from violence
and war in Ukraine and the Middle
East, state failure and dysfunctional
democracy in North Africa, returning
European jihadists intent on terrorist
acts in their countries of origin, and
severe energy shortages if Russia cuts
of supplies this coming winter.
Russias intervention in Ukraine,
which amounts to acts of war, openly
faunts the principles on which the
post-Cold War order in Europe is
based, posing a challenge both to
the European Union and the United
States. A winner-take-all approach
undermines the prospect of estab-
lishing functioning liberal democra-
cies around the EUs periphery.
Te EUs prolonged economic crisis
and preoccupation with its own future
has dimmed its appeal as a model
to many in neighboring countries.
Tey are increasingly subject to other
infuences including intolerant forms
of religion and archaic appeals to
nationalism. Strengthening peace and
security in Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean Basin is an interest the
EU shares with the United States. Te
new high representative for foreign
afairs and security policy should
take a lead in overhauling the policy
in close consultation with the United
States and other interested third
countries.
Challenges in the East
Te ENP was introduced a decade
ago, as the EU prepared to take in ten
new member states. Te ENPs goal
was to create a ring of well-governed
states to the east and the south of
the enlarged EU. Te policy covers
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan countries
that, since 2008, have been included
in the EUs Eastern Partnership
as well as all the countries on the
southern and eastern shores of the
Mediterranean, and the Palestinian
Authority. Ten years afer its launch,
the European Neighbourhood Policy
has run out of steam.
Russias objection to the conclusion of
an ambitious EU association agree-
ment with Ukraine, negotiated under
the ENP banner, was the proximate
cause for the outbreak of violent civil
strife and international confict over
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the countrys future. Te failure of the Vilnius summit in
November 2013, Russias annexation of Crimea, and the
destabilization of Ukraine and of the region, put paid to
the notion that the ENP could provide the EU with a stable
hinterland in Eastern Europe.
Frozen conficts involving Georgia, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, and Moldova, which fare up at times and carry the
constant risk of escalation, have proved intractable, and
Ukraine may well witness another such situation. Tere is
a feeling of anxiety in Estonia and Latvia, with their large
Russian-speaking minorities. Putins doctrine of limited
sovereignty for former Soviet states with Russian-speaking
minorities could, they fear, one day be applied to them,
putting NATOs security guarantee to the test. Poles are
troubled by the risk that Ukraine, its immediate neighbor,
might again fall under Russian domination. Te persistence
of authoritarian rule in several former Soviet states covered
by the ENP shows that it has not generated a consensus
there in favor of European values.
Failure in the South
Te repercussions of the uprisings in North Africa and
the Middle East, violent sectarian confict in Syria with its
fallout in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as a new outbreak of
hostilities between Israel and Hamas indicate that the ENP
has been no more successful to the south. Te winner-take-
all approach that prevails afer elections in many of these
countries has intensifed underlying political, economic,
social, and religious tensions. It has become a barrier to
transition toward a more inclusive form of liberal democ-
racy. Only Tunisia and Morocco show possible signs of
evolving toward more open societies. Regions covered by
the ENP now pose security risks to the EU itself, not least
in the form of returning European jihadists ofen tran-
siting through Turkey.
The Neighbors of the Neighbors
Developments in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the
Levant are strongly infuenced by contiguous countries not
covered by the ENP, including Russia, Iraq, and Iran as well
as Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan; this puts the geographic
logic of the policy into question. Russia remains the
major point of reference for the countries of the Southern
Caucasus that would become neighbors of the EU only
in the increasingly unlikely event of Turkish accession.
Armenia has been pressured by Russia into joining the
Eurasian customs union, President Vladimir Putins
framework for ingathering former Soviet states.
Te very existence of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria in their
present forms depends largely on what happens in Iraq,
which, in turn, is infuenced by Iran and the Gulf. Te
Islamic State pursues its violent course in Iraq and Syria,
without heed to the boundaries of policies made in Brus-
sels. Europes security environment needs to be analyzed
as a whole and policy responses developed accordingly.
Neighborhood is too confning a concept for cali-
brating policies to advance EU values and interests in such
unstable, diverse, and interdependent regions.
Dialogue and engagement with the neighbors of the
neighbors is an essential condition for the success of any
future eforts to stabilize regions adjoining the EU. When
designing future initiatives, the EU should take a more
integrated approach, responding to various trans-boundary
threats and challenges. It should coordinate closely on
objectives and initiatives with the United States and other
like-minded countries.
A New Security Strategy
Te ENP does not have a well-thought-out strategic dimen-
sion. Its long-term goals remain unclear beyond a general
yearning for a peaceful and well-governed hinterland. Its
basic design, modelled on the enlargement process but
without the perspective of EU membership, is uncon-
vincing. Te ENP is ill-equipped to address transnational
phenomena, including terrorist groups, organized crime,
The persistence of authoritarian
rule in several former Soviet
states covered by the ENP
shows that it has not generated
a consensus there in favor of
European values.
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and international migration fows, which are among the
main sources of tension and human sufering around the
Mediterranean Sea. Te new high representative should
mainstream these issues as part of a new European security
strategy and coordinate closely with the intelligence, secu-
rity, and border management services of member states.
No Leverage Without Incentives
In the absence of an ofer of membership, the EU lacks the
incentives and the political standing to impose on third
countries respect for the rule of law, democracy, and the
protection of human rights or the territorial integrity of
states and the inviolability of borders. Tese are among
the core principles upon which the EU and, indeed, the
liberal international order are based, but they are not the
top priority in most neighboring countries. Te putative
benefciaries of the ENP are increasingly subject to other
non-western models and ideologies, including authoritari-
anism, intolerant forms of religion, and archaic forms of
nationalism. Some, like Libya, face the risk of state failure.
Te fnancial resources at the disposal of the ENP pale by
comparison with those mobilized by the Gulf States, for
example to prop up Egypt. Tese states clearly do not share
the European approach to fundamental rights and free-
doms. Te scale of their aid renders inefective EU eforts
to reward supposed political reforms by marginal incre-
ments of EU assistance (known in EU jargon as more for
more).
In any event, member states themselves generally ignore
ENP political conditionality in their bilateral dealings
with the countries concerned and are infuenced rather by
traditional links as well as commercial and energy inter-
ests. Under these circumstances, EU institutions, especially
the Commission, lack credibility when seeking to impose
political conditionality.
A Test Case for European Foreign Policy
Te success or failure of the EUs overall eforts to create
a foreign and security policy will largely be determined in
the EUs own neighborhood; this is the part of the world
where the EU could most expect to exercise an infuence.
Te ENP has been adjusted several times to take into
account the difculties that have arisen and the changed
circumstances. Tese adjustments include diferent
modules for countries to the east (the Eastern Partner-
ship promoted by Poland and Sweden) and for Mediter-
ranean countries. But such variants have failed to convince;
indeed, the Eastern Partnership contributed to a dramatic
escalation of regional tensions in the case of Ukraine. In
light of the fast deteriorating situation in the EUs neigh-
borhood, a fundamental rethink of the overall approach
is urgently needed. Another minor adjustment will not be
enough to enable the EU to make a real contribution to
security, stability, and economic development in neigh-
boring regions.
Te ENP label coexists with a plethora of policy frame-
works with similar goals including Black Sea Synergy,
Eastern Partnership, the Barcelona Process, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, and the Union for the Mediter-
ranean. Te earlier term Wider Europe is still current.
All this creates confusion and obscures political messages.
Te new high representative should make a clean sweep of
these overlapping initiatives and put into place a dedicated
strategy for each country, or group of countries, based on
their specifc needs and capacities. Tere is a strong case for
dropping the ENP branding altogether.
Vested interests in the member states will be reluctant
to depart from the status quo, however inefective it has
proved. Southern member states may resist any perceived
downgrading of certain dysfunctional Mediterranean
states with which they have traditional links. Tey tend to
demand equal funding for states to the south and the east,
regardless of their respective merits. Nordic countries may
object to a high level of engagement, for example on energy
security, with authoritarian states like Azerbaijan that are
far from meeting EU human rights standards. Te high
representative will need to mobilize considerable reserves
of political capital and powers of persuasion to alter an
EU institutions, especially the
Commission, lack credibility
when seeking to impose political
conditionality.
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existing policy that is essentially a package deal based on
the lowest common denominator among member states.
Te European External Action Service should continue to
provide political analysis and guidance. But the new high
representative should work much more closely with the
Commission, including the commissioner with a dedi-
cated neighborhood or wider Europe portfolio. Most
of the EU instruments that could have an impact in neigh-
boring countries are managed by the Commission. She
should make full use of the authority that comes with her
simultaneous role as vice-president of the Commission for
external relations to coordinate the work of her colleagues
with a bearing on external relations.
Closer coordination on political priorities, not merely
projects, should be undertaken with the European Invest-
ment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development as well as other international fnancial
institutions and bilateral donors. Dialogue with the Gulf
States and with Russia, if political circumstances eventually
permit this, should aim to improve understanding of each
others priorities and to focus eforts on areas of greatest
need.
To be sure, worrying developments in the EUs neighbor-
hood cannot principally be ascribed to the inadequacies of
a policy framework devised in Brussels. Such developments
are the product of internal dynamics within the societies
themselves precipitated, at times, by external interven-
tion. Te EU is not the only external actor that could help
bring order to troubled regions. Coordination with other
multilateral and bilateral actors is essential. Still, the EU
can make a signifcant contribution to international eforts
to bring better political and economic prospects to Eastern
Europe, North Africa, and the Levant, provided it adopts
practical and attainable objectives and develops efective
policy instruments.
Values and Interests
A thorough strategic evaluation of EU interests in each
of the countries and regions concerned should precede
any further adjustments in EU policy toward neighboring
countries. Tis analysis should be wide-ranging and
realistic, taking fully into account spillover from adjoining
regions. Te high representative should be ready to propose
that the ENP be replaced by dedicated policies addressing
the specifc needs and capacities of each of the countries
concerned.
Te review should question the assumption that shared
values are the basis for European polices toward neigh-
boring countries. It should acknowledge the growing
prevalence of values and practices in a number of these
countries that are very diferent from those prevailing in
the EU itself. However the prudent promotion of Western
values, in societies that are receptive to them, should
remain part of the EUs approach.
A Differentiated Approach
A diferentiated country-by-country approach is required.
It should combine the EUs security, energy, and commer-
cial interests with support for better governance, the rule
of law, and democracy in societies that themselves have
opted for these. Member states must summon the political
will to support those in neighboring countries who seem
genuinely committed to Western values, while maintaining
a greater political distance from corrupt, authoritarian, or
dysfunctional regimes. Nonetheless the EU will ofen need
to do business with regimes that are not to its liking, in line
with the practice of member states.
In the future, the EU should design policies to address the
specifc needs and capacities of individual countries, or,
where they share policy-relevant characteristics, groups
of countries. Tis implies, for example, that Ukraine,
Moldova, and Georgia might qualify for a deeper form of
engagement than Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. None-
theless, in the case of Azerbaijan, the EU should be ready
to develop relations in areas of common interest, notably
energy.
The EU is not the only external
actor that could help bring order
to troubled regions. Coordination
with other multilateral and
bilateral actors is essential.
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No Over-Ambitious Agreements
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements
(DCFTAs), requiring the adoption and implementation of
vast swathes of EU laws and rules (the acquis), are not
necessarily the most appropriate instrument for countries
facing fundamental political and economic development
challenges. Such agreements should be limited to rather
few countries that have demonstrated the will and capacity
to adapt their societies to the standards and practices
prevailing in the EU. Even where such agreements are
already on the table, the EU should replace them with more
limited forms of engagement adapted to the specifc situa-
tion of the countries concerned.
At present in North Africa and the Levant, beyond Israel,
Morocco, and Tunisia, there is little scope for concluding
ambitious and demanding DCFTAs. Te EU should take
initiatives toward Jordan and Lebanon designed principally
to reinforce their fragile political foundations and help
them cope with the huge infux of refugees. Te EU needs
to develop political, security, and humanitarian initia-
tives covering Iraq and Syria, in close liaison with Turkey.
Turkish cooperation should be sought in preventing
the transit of European jihadists. Any ofces in Turkey
servicing jihadists should be closed.
Despite the rise of xenophobia within the EU, as mani-
fested in the 2014 European Parliament elections, EU
leaders must be resolute in pushing through incentives, in
the form of trade openings and easier migration facilities
for legitimate travelers, if they wish to wield infuence in
the few countries that have chosen the path of political and
economic reform.
Partners Crucial to Success
Te top priority of the EUs new high representative should
be a thorough review of the ENP in close liaison with the
Commission and member states. Te high representative
should consult with the United States, Turkey, Israel, the
Gulf countries, and other interested states in preparing this
analysis. Te United States is supportive of a renewed EU
commitment to strengthen security and stability in Eastern
Europe and the Mediterranean basin, in line with Washing-
tons wish to see Europe assume greater responsibilities in
these areas. When political conditions permit, a dialogue
should be opened with Russia.
Te new high representative will need to make full use
of her prerogatives as Commission vice-president to
mobilize such policy instruments as trade, fnancial and
development assistance, institution building, training, and
mobility partnerships in support of new EU initiatives
toward neighboring countries.
Recommendations to the High Representative
1. Given the urgency of the situation, a thorough prag-
matic, policy-oriented review of the ENP should be
the high representatives top priority.
2. Within 100 days of taking ofce, the high represen-
tative should present an assessment of the ENPs
efectiveness and recommendations for modifying or
replacing it.
3. Te geographical scope of the ENP, its goals, meth-
odology, and branding, should be included in the
analysis. Te option of dissolving the ENP and
replacing it with dedicated policies addressed to
individual countries or groups of countries should be
considered.
4. A commissioner should be appointed with specifc
responsibility for relations with non-EU Euro-
pean countries and those in adjoining regions. Tis
commissioner should work together with the high
representative to mobilize initiatives in areas such as
trade, competition policy, development assistance,
humanitarian aid, human rights, energy, transport,
environment policy, and migration to enable the EU
to achieve its foreign and security policy objectives.
5. Te goal of EU policies toward its neighbors should
be to reinforce European security, stability, and pros-
perity through carefully calibrated engagement with
each partner country.
Turkish cooperation should be
sought in preventing the transit of
European jihadists.
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6. Te EU should promote good governance in coun-
tries open to advice and support from the EU. It
should further develop existing institution-building
and training programs as well as eforts to improve
the investment climate in countries with a genuine
political will to move forward in these areas.
7. Te EU should work with partners to strengthen the
efectiveness and independence of the judiciary and
the transparency of public procurement and should
share its experience in the fght against corruption.
8. Te EU should be ready to respond to requests
from governments and civil society representatives
to provide support for institutional building and
other reforms designed to strengthen the rule of
law, democracy, and the protection of human rights.
Commitments in these areas should not, however, be
conditions for working together in mutually advanta-
geous areas such as security, trade, energy, environ-
mental protection, and migration.
9. Efective capacities for confict prevention, confict
management, and confict resolution should be devel-
oped by the EU, in close liaison with relevant agencies
in the member states.
10. Te EU and partner countries should work together
to limit illegal cross-border fows of people; at the
same time the EU should promote mobility for busi-
ness people, professionals, university faculty and
students, skilled workers, and other bona fde trav-
elers.
11. Te EU should propose a range of strategic partner-
ships, trade and cooperation agreements, or associa-
tion agreements adapted to the needs and capacities
of each partner country.
12. Te EU should be ready to conclude DCFTAs with
countries that demonstrate the will and the capacity
to implement them. Such agreements should not be
proposed to countries whose level of development
and administrative capacity present obstacles to their
implementation. At present, DCFTAs are not appro-
priate frameworks for relations with most Mediterra-
nean countries, beyond Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia.
13. Te EU should provide carefully targeted fnancial
assistance to partner countries to help them achieve
mutually agreed objectives; this assistance should be
coordinated with the member states, the European
Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development, other international fnancial
institutions, and bilateral donors. Te EU should
encourage these institutions to expand their lending
programs for viable projects of common interest.
14. Partner countries should be invited to cooperate with
the EU in the framework of relevant international
conventions, including those covering environmental
protection and individual rights.
15. Te EU should support regional cooperation among
partner countries if they request it to do so. Regional
cooperation should be based on mutual interests in
concrete felds such as environmental protection and
the security and stability of energy installations. Te
EU should promote regional cooperation only among
countries that see added value from it and ask to
beneft from Europes experience.
16. Te EU should set up dedicated dialogues respec-
tively with the United States, Turkey, Israel, and the
Gulf States to share assessments and coordinate initia-
tives toward the countries concerned. On the EU side,
these dialogues should be led by the high representa-
tive with the participation of the relevant commis-
sioner and member state representatives.
17. A successful neighborhood policy requires the EU
and Russia to develop a sound framework for bilat-
eral relations, including a dialogue on their common
The EU should promote regional
cooperation only among countries
that see added value from it and
ask to beneft from Europes
experience.
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Te views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the
views of the author alone.
About the Author
Sir Michael Leigh is senior adviser to the German Marshall Fund of
the United States.
About the Europe Program
Te Europe Program aims to enhance understanding of the challeng-
es facing the European Union and the potential implications for the
transatlantic relationship. Analysis, research, and policy recommen-
dations are designed to understand the dichotomy of disintegration
and deepening of the EU and to help improve the political, economic,
fnancial, and social stability of the EU and its member states. In 2014,
the Europe Program focuses on integration and disintegration in the
EU, the deepening of the euro area, the changing role of Germany in
Europe and the world, as well as challenges in the EUs neighborhood.
About GMF
Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by
supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF sup-
ports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in
1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also
has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
neighborhood. When circumstances permit, EU
leaders should signal their willingness to overcome
tensions and to engage with Russia. Te unsuccessful
pursuit of common spaces that has dominated
EU-Russia interactions for much of the past decade
should be set aside in favor of a more operational
framework in which common interests, including
trade, energy, and relations with neighboring coun-
tries, can be handled efectively. Te EU needs both
to uphold the principles that have generally ensured
peace and stability in post-cold war Europe and to
be pragmatic in taking Russian perceptions of its
own interests, and of the shifing balance of power
in Europe, into account. In the long run, the ques-
tion of working toward a common economic space
throughout Europe should be considered.