Professional Documents
Culture Documents
U
N
N
o
r
m
s
o
n
t
h
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
o
f
t
r
a
n
s
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
w
i
t
h
r
e
g
a
r
d
t
o
h
u
m
a
n
r
i
g
h
t
s
2
0
0
6
G
l
o
b
a
l
O
n
l
i
n
e
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
A
c
t
f
r
s
t
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
b
y
R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
C
h
r
i
s
t
o
p
h
e
r
S
m
i
t
h
2
0
0
6
C
o
n
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
H
e
a
r
i
n
g
T
h
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
i
n
C
h
i
n
a
:
A
T
o
o
l
f
o
r
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
o
r
S
u
p
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
?
2
0
0
8
G
l
o
b
a
l
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
l
a
u
n
c
h
e
d
2
0
0
8
U
.
S
.
S
e
n
a
t
e
h
e
a
r
i
n
g
o
n
G
l
o
b
a
l
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
:
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
R
u
l
e
o
f
L
a
w
J
a
n
-
1
0
S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y
C
l
i
n
t
o
n
s
S
p
e
e
c
h
R
e
m
a
r
k
s
o
n
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
M
a
r
-
1
0
U
.
S
.
S
e
n
a
t
e
H
e
a
r
i
n
g
G
l
o
b
a
l
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
:
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
R
u
l
e
o
f
L
a
w
P
a
r
t
I
I
2
0
1
1
O
S
C
E
R
e
p
o
r
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
o
f
E
x
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
e
b
-
1
1
S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y
C
l
i
n
t
o
n
s
S
p
e
e
c
h
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
R
i
g
h
t
s
a
n
d
W
r
o
n
g
s
:
C
h
o
i
c
e
a
n
d
C
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
s
i
n
a
N
e
t
-
w
o
r
k
e
d
W
o
r
l
d
M
a
y
-
1
1
e
G
8
M
e
e
t
i
n
g
:
T
h
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
A
c
c
e
l
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
G
r
o
w
t
h
2
0
1
1
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
f
o
r
C
y
b
e
r
s
p
a
c
e
:
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
,
P
r
o
s
p
e
r
i
t
y
a
n
d
O
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
i
n
a
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
e
d
W
o
r
l
d
1
9
8
9
L
a
w
o
n
G
u
a
r
d
i
n
g
S
t
a
t
e
S
e
c
r
e
t
s
2
0
0
1
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
S
o
c
i
e
t
y
o
f
C
h
i
n
a
2
0
0
2
P
u
b
l
i
c
P
l
e
d
g
e
o
n
S
e
l
f
D
i
s
c
i
p
l
i
n
e
f
o
r
C
h
i
n
a
s
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
2
0
0
5
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
o
n
t
h
e
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
N
e
w
s
a
n
d
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
2
0
0
7
B
l
o
g
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
S
e
l
f
-
d
i
s
c
i
p
l
i
n
e
P
u
b
l
i
c
P
l
e
d
g
e
M
a
r
-
0
8
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
o
f
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
a
n
d
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
f
o
r
m
e
d
M
a
y
-
0
9
G
r
e
e
n
D
a
m
S
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
i
n
t
r
o
-
d
u
c
e
d
A
p
r
-
1
0
R
e
v
i
s
e
d
L
a
w
o
n
G
u
a
r
d
i
n
g
S
t
a
t
e
S
e
c
r
e
t
s
M
a
y
-
1
1
S
t
a
t
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
O
f
f
c
e
f
o
r
m
e
d
1
9
4
0
1
9
7
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
C
h
i
n
a
G
l
o
b
a
l
K
e
y
D
a
t
e
s
Google Yahoo! Cisco Microsoft Skype
Operations in China Search Engine Search Engine and
e- mail
Routers Operating System Bing Search Engine MSN Services IM and VoIP
Ethical Issue Filtered content in
accordance with
Chinese law
Provided user
information to
Chinese authorities
Provides equipment for
Golden Shield
Supplied source code to the
Chinese Government
Partnered with Baidu;
likely fltering content
in accordance with
Chinese law
Censorship of
popular MSN Spaces
blog Zhao Jing
Filtering; violation of
user privacy through
stored information
Effect on Chinese
Citizens
Limits access to
nformation
Arrest and prosecution of
several dissidents
Enables government
to censor content and
surveil internet users
Exposes vulnerabilities in state and
defence operating systems
(Likely) limits access
to information; privacy
concerns
Limits freedom of
expression and
information
(Potential) User data
can be used to surveil,
arrest and prosecute
dissidents
Major Chinese
Corporate Partner
TOM online ended
partnership in 2010
Sina.com.cn severed
ties in March 2011
Alibaba Group
(Partnered after
Shi Tao case)
Alibaba Group China Standard Software
Company (state owned), one of
over 3000 Chinese partners
Baidu Shanghai Alliance
Investment Ltd (SAIL);
Renren
TOM
Major Connection to
Chinese Government
MIIT; SCIO MIIT; SCIO; State
Security Bureau
Ministry of Public Safety China Information Technology
Security Certifcation Center;
Ministry of Education
MIIT; SCIO SAIL, led by son of
former PRC president
Jiang Zemin; MIIT; SCIO
MIIT; SCIO
Google
Yahoo!
Microsoft
Skype
1
9
4
8
U
n
i
t
e
d
N
a
t
i
o
n
s
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
a
l
D
e
c
l
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
H
u
m
a
n
R
i
g
h
t
s
1
9
7
6
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
C
o
v
e
n
a
n
t
o
n
C
i
v
i
l
a
n
d
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
R
i
g
h
t
s
e
n
t
e
r
s
i
n
t
o
f
o
r
c
e
1
9
7
6
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
C
o
v
e
n
a
n
t
o
n
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
S
o
c
i
a
l
a
n
d
C
u
l
t
u
r
a
l
R
i
g
h
t
s
e
n
t
e
r
s
i
n
t
o
f
o
r
c
e
2
0
0
0
U
N
G
l
o
b
a
l
C
o
m
p
a
c
t
l
a
u
n
c
h
e
d
2
0
0
3
U
N
N
o
r
m
s
o
n
t
h
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
o
f
t
r
a
n
s
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
w
i
t
h
r
e
g
a
r
d
t
o
h
u
m
a
n
r
i
g
h
t
s
2
0
0
6
G
l
o
b
a
l
O
n
l
i
n
e
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
A
c
t
f
r
s
t
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
b
y
R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
C
h
r
i
s
t
o
p
h
e
r
S
m
i
t
h
2
0
0
6
C
o
n
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
H
e
a
r
i
n
g
T
h
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
i
n
C
h
i
n
a
:
A
T
o
o
l
f
o
r
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
o
r
S
u
p
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
?
2
0
0
8
G
l
o
b
a
l
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
l
a
u
n
c
h
e
d
2
0
0
8
U
.
S
.
S
e
n
a
t
e
h
e
a
r
i
n
g
o
n
G
l
o
b
a
l
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
:
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
R
u
l
e
o
f
L
a
w
J
a
n
-
1
0
S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y
C
l
i
n
t
o
n
s
S
p
e
e
c
h
R
e
m
a
r
k
s
o
n
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
M
a
r
-
1
0
U
.
S
.
S
e
n
a
t
e
H
e
a
r
i
n
g
G
l
o
b
a
l
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
:
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
R
u
l
e
o
f
L
a
w
P
a
r
t
I
I
2
0
1
1
O
S
C
E
R
e
p
o
r
t
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
o
f
E
x
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
F
e
b
-
1
1
S
e
c
r
e
t
a
r
y
C
l
i
n
t
o
n
s
S
p
e
e
c
h
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
R
i
g
h
t
s
a
n
d
W
r
o
n
g
s
:
C
h
o
i
c
e
a
n
d
C
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
s
i
n
a
N
e
t
-
w
o
r
k
e
d
W
o
r
l
d
M
a
y
-
1
1
e
G
8
M
e
e
t
i
n
g
:
T
h
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
A
c
c
e
l
e
r
a
t
i
n
g
G
r
o
w
t
h
2
0
1
1
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
S
t
r
a
t
e
g
y
f
o
r
C
y
b
e
r
s
p
a
c
e
:
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
,
P
r
o
s
p
e
r
i
t
y
a
n
d
O
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
i
n
a
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
e
d
W
o
r
l
d
1
9
8
9
L
a
w
o
n
G
u
a
r
d
i
n
g
S
t
a
t
e
S
e
c
r
e
t
s
2
0
0
1
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
S
o
c
i
e
t
y
o
f
C
h
i
n
a
2
0
0
2
P
u
b
l
i
c
P
l
e
d
g
e
o
n
S
e
l
f
D
i
s
c
i
p
l
i
n
e
f
o
r
C
h
i
n
a
s
i
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
2
0
0
5
P
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
o
n
t
h
e
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
N
e
w
s
a
n
d
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
2
0
0
7
B
l
o
g
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
S
e
l
f
-
d
i
s
c
i
p
l
i
n
e
P
u
b
l
i
c
P
l
e
d
g
e
M
a
r
-
0
8
M
i
n
i
s
t
r
y
o
f
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
a
n
d
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
f
o
r
m
e
d
M
a
y
-
0
9
G
r
e
e
n
D
a
m
S
o
f
t
w
a
r
e
i
n
t
r
o
-
d
u
c
e
d
A
p
r
-
1
0
R
e
v
i
s
e
d
L
a
w
o
n
G
u
a
r
d
i
n
g
S
t
a
t
e
S
e
c
r
e
t
s
M
a
y
-
1
1
S
t
a
t
e
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
O
f
f
c
e
f
o
r
m
e
d
1
9
4
0
1
9
7
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
Cisco opens offces in China
Secured contract to build Golden Shield
Announces major investment in China
Internal 2002 Cisco presentation
leaked
Du v. Cisco
Doe v. Cisco
Licensed as an ISP in China
Goes live in China with fltered
search engine
Gmail accounts hacked
Stops censoring results and
redirects user to unfltered Hong
Kong based search engine
China renews operating license
1996
1998
2007
2008
2011
2011
Signs Government Security Program
disclosing its source code
Establishes joint venture with Shanghai
Alliance Investment Ltd (SAIL)
Admits blocking popular MSN Spaces
blog Zhao Jing
Partners with Baidu, Ren Ren, and
China Standard Software Company
Acquires Skype
TOM-Skype launched in China
Disclosed that it operated a key
word flter on text chats
Extensive surveillance,
monitoring and fltering revealed
VoIP declared illegal in China but
TOM-Skype still operating
Signs Pledge of Self Discipline for the
Chinese Internet Industry
Wang Xiaoning, Li Zhi, and Jiang Liju
sentenced to prison
Shi Tao convicted and sentenced to
prison
Yahoo! sued by wife of Wang
Xiaoning in federal court
2005
2006
2009
2010
2011
Cisco
2002
2003
2005
2007
2003
2005
2006
2011
2011
2004
2006
2008
2011
C
O
L
L
U
S
I
O
N
A
N
D
C
O
L
L
I
S
I
O
N
:
S
e
a
r
c
h
i
n
g
f
o
r
g
u
i
d
a
n
c
e
i
n
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
c
y
b
e
r
s
p
a
c
e
Google Yahoo! Cisco Microsoft Skype
Operations in China Search Engine Search Engine and
e- mail
Routers Operating System Bing Search Engine MSN Services IM and VoIP
Ethical Issue Filtered content in
accordance with
Chinese law
Provided user
information to
Chinese authorities
Provides equipment for
Golden Shield
Supplied source code to the
Chinese Government
Partnered with Baidu;
likely fltering content
in accordance with
Chinese law
Censorship of
popular MSN Spaces
blog Zhao Jing
Filtering; violation of
user privacy through
stored information
Effect on Chinese
Citizens
Limits access to
nformation
Arrest and prosecution of
several dissidents
Enables government
to censor content and
surveil internet users
Exposes vulnerabilities in state and
defence operating systems
(Likely) limits access
to information; privacy
concerns
Limits freedom of
expression and
information
(Potential) User data
can be used to surveil,
arrest and prosecute
dissidents
Major Chinese
Corporate Partner
TOM online ended
partnership in 2010
Sina.com.cn severed
ties in March 2011
Alibaba Group
(Partnered after
Shi Tao case)
Alibaba Group China Standard Software
Company (state owned), one of
over 3000 Chinese partners
Baidu Shanghai Alliance
Investment Ltd (SAIL);
Renren
TOM
Major Connection to
Chinese Government
MIIT; SCIO MIIT; SCIO; State
Security Bureau
Ministry of Public Safety China Information Technology
Security Certifcation Center;
Ministry of Education
MIIT; SCIO SAIL, led by son of
former PRC president
Jiang Zemin; MIIT; SCIO
MIIT; SCIO
SecDev Analytics 14
2.4 Skype: Breaching trust
In China, the 3.1 million users of TOM-Skype
(Voice Over Internet Protocol Software) have had
their communications and personal user details
surveilled, fltered and stored on public servers.
Recently acquired by Microsoft, Skype has sus-
tained widespread criticism for its operations in
China, which also includes keyword fltering.
In November 2004, Skype launched a version
of its online voice and chat system developed
in partnership with TOM Online Inc., a Hong
Kong-based company. This version, tailor-made
for the Chinese market, prevented users from
sending text messages with banned phrases like
Falungong and Dalai Lama.
71
By 2005, with
3.1 million users, China was Skypes third largest
market.
72
Skypes CEO Niklas Zennstrom readily disclosed
that TOM had implemented a text flter, which
is what everyone else in that market is doing.
73
But he insisted that the privacy and security of
users were never compromised.
74
In 2006, Skype
assured TOM-Skype users that:
75
The text flter does not affect in any way
the security and encryption mechanisms of
Skype.
Full end-to-end security is preserved and
there is no compromise of peoples privacy.
Calls, chats and all other forms of
communication on Skype continue to be
encrypted and secure.
There is absolutely no fltering on voice
communications.
Behind the scenes, things were murkier. A
detailed investigation of log fles across eight
servers in 2008 revealed that TOM-Skype
violated every assurance it had made to its users
in 2006.
76
The entirety of chat messages passed
over the TOM-Skype platform had been upload-
ed and stored on servers if fagged keywords were
detected. These messages were accompanied by
user details, such as IP addresses and usernames.
Most damaging were the log fles that recorded
caller information, such as date, time and recipi-
ent phone number. All of these details were stored
on insecure public servers along with the associ-
ated encryption key.
Analysts suspect that surveillance was not exclu-
sively based on keyword technology. Many of the
fagged words were too common to be fltered
across the platform. They hypothesize that
fltering criteria may have included specifc user-
names and TOM-Skype accounts, which suggests
much more targeted surveillance practices.
77
Despite cooperation with the government, TOM-
Skypes future in China became uncertain at the
end of 2010. In January 2011, the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology announced
that all VOIP phone services are illegal on the
Chinese mainland, except those provided by
telecommunications carriers China Telecom and
China Unicom.
78
This announcement was followed with confu-
sion and bureaucratic wrangling. Unfazed, Skype
assured customers in February that it was still
operating through its majority Chinese partner,
TOM Online.
79
That seems to be the case today.
It is prudent to consider whether Chinese restric-
tions against foreign operated VOIP services may
have had more to do with co-opting the market
for Chinese companies than security concerns.
80
Microsofts acquisition of Skype in May 2011
for $8.5 billion USD may affect the TOM-Skype
partnership due to Microsofts joint venture with
Baidu. Its future remains to be seen.
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
15
2.5 Cisco: Selling surveillance
Cisco is unique among these case studies, in that
it sells hardware to the Chinese government.
Routers have many purposes, from parental
controls to fltering online child pornography.
They are designed to control online content,
and there are many legitimate applications for
Cisco products. Nevertheless, irrefutable evidence
has surfaced that Cisco hardware is a critical
component of Chinas online surveillance system.
Cisco has been heavily engaged in China since
1998 when it secured a major contract with
telecommunications company CHINANET to
help build the Golden Shield.
81
A 2002 internal Cisco presentation was leaked,
detailing the mechanisms and motivations
behind The Golden Shield Project. A particularly
damaging slide describing a Public Network
Information Security Monitor System feature
revealed the extent of Ciscos complicity. It cited
combat Falun Gong evil religion and other
hostilities as one of three objectives in creating
the Golden Shield.
82
The slides immediately
following outlined business opportunities this
contract would entail, including high starting
point planning, high standard construction,
technical training, and security, operation
maintenance.
83
According to journalist Ethan Gutmann, based
on discussions with an unnamed top Chinese
engineer, Cisco developed a router device, an
integrator, and a special frewall box specifcally
for government censorship. These were sold
to China at a signifcantly discounted price.
84
Cisco insists that it did not tailor its products to
Chinese government specifcations, but the leaked
presentation, along with journalistic accounts,
suggest otherwise.
This surveillance system, some have contended,
has grown into the policenet, recording a
vast amount of personal information such as
work history, personal relationships, political
tendencies, surfng activity, and email for at least
60 days. The system is portable and accessible to
law enforcement throughout China.
85
David Zhou, a systems engineer manager at
Cisco HQ, said, We dont care about the
[Chinese governments] rules. Its none of Ciscos
business, and admitted that, We have the
capability to look deeply into the packet.
86
Simply put, Zhou revealed that Ciscos routers
can intercept information and essentially render
the entire Chinese web keyword searchable. He
also disclosed that Cisco reported to State
Security, the Public Security Bureau and the
Peoples Liberation Army but would not say
whether Chinese authorities were given access
to these surveillance capabilities.
87
Cisco continues to be closely partnered with the
Chinese government. In 2007 it unveiled a plan
to invest $16 billion dollars over the next three
to fve years, in consultation with the Chinese
government, to boost the countrys social,
economic and environmental performance.
The program involves signifcant investments into
Web 2.0 technologies, and reaches out to small
and medium sized companies through its business
partner Alibaba.
88
In addition to fnancing
vocational training centers to teach network
skills, and investing $17.5 million dollars into
Alibaba as part of its IPO, Cisco is making $400
million dollars available in fnancing to the
Chinese government to buy Cisco equipment.
89
Another recently announced project, Peaceful
Chongqing, is slated to be Chinas most extensive
video-surveillance initiative, with half a
million video cameras designed to cover nearly
400 square miles. Cisco has allegedly been
awarded the contract to supply the necessary
routing equipment to operate a sophisticated
video surveillance network. The objective of
Peaceful Chongqing clearly goes beyond traffc
control and into the realm of law enforcement.
90
Although it is unclear whether Ciscos
participation has been secured, the prospect of
Western companies contributing to this dual-
hatted scheme is in direct contravention of
the Tiananmen sanctions,
91
which suspended
export licenses for crime control and detection
instruments and equipment.
92
Since 2002, two cases have been brought against
Cisco Systems which are intended to set legal
precedent for corporate social responsibility in
this sector.
93
The frst complaint, Du v. Cisco
being tried in the United States District Court
of Maryland, alleges that Cisco knowingly
and actively collaborated
94
with the Chinese
government and customized its products to
facilitate surveillance and censorship, which has
resulted in gross human rights violations. The
plaintiffs argued that the defendants sought to
maximize their proft share in the Golden Shield
Project, while fully cognizant of the resulting
SecDev Analytics 16
human rights violations. The plaintiffs maintain
that Ciscos participation in the creation,
expansion, and maintenance of the Golden Shield
Project has rendered them responsible for the
human rights violations that have occurred under
its jurisdiction.
95
A second case, fled by the
Human Rights Law Foundation, seeks a class-
action status on behalf of Falun Gong members.
The plaintiffs accuse Cisco of knowingly
providing Chinese government agencies with
equipment to identify, incarcerate, torture, and
sometimes kill Falun Gong members.
96
**
2.6 Having their cake and eating it too
As the case studies show, China is a hard nut to
crack. Complying with local regulations is evi-
dently a necessary part of doing business in any
jurisdiction. However, if those local regulations
contravene commonly held and even self-declared
values, this signals a problem. Companies are
clearly struggling with how to navigate the
censorship terrain while staying competitive at
the same time. But as the fnal section of this
report aims to show, there is little recourse be it
national or international, voluntary or binding
to control or offer guidance for behavior.
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
17
U.S. internet companies in China do not have an
easy ride. The competition between economic
interests and the protection of human rights is
a crucial and controversial issue. As Google
discovered before their eventual withdrawal from
the country, they were unable to operate legally in
China without censoring results.
Quite aside from Chinese regulations, U.S.
companies must also take into account U.S.
and international law, in addition to a litany of
non-binding principles and initiatives, as well as
reasonable ethical standards. In addition,
businesses themselves often have signed
statements supporting freedom of expression and
protection of privacy.
97
While U.S. corporations
cannot change Chinese law, they do have a
responsibility to respect the rules, regulations,
and values of their home base.
The real challenge lies in realistically and
adequately translating these norms concerning
freedom of expression, privacy, and human rights,
into actionable policies. Remaining a competitive
player in such an infuential and large market is
undoubtedly important. But so too is ensuring
that operations are conducted ethically and in
line with national and international obligations.
In this section, we examine four sources that
bear on U.S. internet companies and discuss
why thus far they have failed to address
operating challenges in China:
1. U.S. policy as articulated by Secretary of
State Hillary Rodham Clinton and
enshrined in the May 2011 International
Strategy for Cyberspace. Although
current U.S. policy is a valuable and
admirable step, there has been scant
concrete action. Voluntary codes of
conduct have so far accomplished little.
2. Relevant U.S. statutory and case law that
may afford remedies to aggrieved parties
against companies who aid and abet
abuses: U.S. courts have found that current
statutes do not apply to corporations,
meaning that the worst legal repercussion
for a corporation is a bruised ego
3. Internationally recognized legal principles:
These boil down to commonly held ethical
values and suggested positions that are
ultimately unenforceable and subject to
broad interpretation.
4. Proposed legislation that attempts to
address the challenges that this paper
raises: While this is a potential partial
remedy, it remains to be seen whether it
will pass. Previous iterations have stalled.
Below we aim to show that the existing norms
and legislation are inadequate with respect to
U.S. corporations doing business in China in
general, and internet companies in particular.
The combination of inaction, widely varying
interpretations, and a myriad of formal caveats
and reservations has rendered the legal and policy
terrain unnavigable. But the onus is not just on
the government. Businesses themselves must
make an active choice to behave responsibly.
Part 3. Current policy and legal measures
SecDev Analytics 18
3.1 Locutions of liberty: U.S. policy
The U.S. is at the global forefront of states
supporting freedom of expression online.
In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton aligned Franklin Roosevelts
classic Four Freedoms - freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, freedom from fear, and
freedom from want - with a ffth freedom to
connect, i.e. the freedom of expression,
assembly and association online.
Secretary of State Clinton tied the internet to
traditional forms of freedom of expression: this
freedom is no longer defned solely by whether
citizens can go into the town square and criticize
their government without fear of retribution.
Blogs, emails, social networks and text messages
have opened up new forums for exchanging ideas
and created new targets for censorship.
98
Clinton also emphasized the tension with China,
stating that: we look to the Chinese authori-
ties to conduct a thorough review of the cyber
intrusions that led Google to make its announce-
ment. And we also look for that investigation and
its results to be transparent.
The internet has already been a source of
tremendous progress in China, and it is fabulous.
There are so many people in China now online.
But countries that restrict free access to informa-
tion or violate the basic rights of internet users
risk walling themselves off from the progress of
the next century.
99
In February 2011, she reiterated the earlier call
for a global commitment to internet freedom and
the protection of human rights online this time
emphasizing protecting both transparency and
confdentiality in addition to being a public
space, the internet is also a channel for private
communications. And for that to continue, there
must be protection for confdential communica-
tion online.
100
Importantly, Clinton acknowledged that the
U.S. itself restricts certain kinds of speech in
line with law and international obligations, but
asserted that such enforcement was transparent
and was subject to appeal. While this did not
assuage all critics, the emphasis on transparency
and accountability is undoubtedly lacking in the
Chinese context.
Building on these seminal speeches, the United
States released its foreign policy on cyberspace,
International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity,
Security and Openness in a Networked World,
affrming the U.S. core commitments to
fundamental freedoms, privacy, and the free
fow of information. The strategy outlines a
framework for achieving its policy priorities of
openness, security, reliability and interoperability
in cyberspace.
101
With this in mind, current policy pronouncements
are commendable. Clintons speeches hit points
of crucial importance, emphasizing the impact
that freedom of access has on progress and
competition as well as the importance of
protecting privacy.
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
19
3.2 Tools to implement U.S. policy: Voluntary
codes
Despite White House support for online freedom
of expression, the tools, rules, and regulations
that put policy into practice or hold U.S. citizens
or corporations accountable for human rights
abuses are wanting. Voluntary codes have
been rather unsuccessful and existing statutory
authority is limited. Proposed legislation to
protect freedom of connectivity remains in the
drafting stage, while earlier efforts to move
similar
legislation forward have stalled.
The Global Network Initiative (GNI) a U.S.-
dominated coalition of stakeholders including
Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google, and several academic
and civil society groups is one example of a
voluntary code that may prove useful. It aims to
provide a systemic approach for companies
facing government requests to protect the rights
to freedom of expression and privacy of their
users while respecting legitimate government
authority.
102
Ultimately, the GNI hopes its
principles will become a shared standard for
technology companies and stakeholders.
Independent monitors are to produce written
evaluations of each companys implementation
of GNIs principles (which include freedom
of expression, privacy, responsible company
decision-making, multi-stakeholder collaboration,
accountability and transparency). The evaluations
will report on corporate responses to government
demands that contravene the principles of free
expression and privacy. Their objective is to
document case studies so as to determine the
effcacy of various approaches.
The reports are likely to prove interesting,
educational, and even persuasive. However,
as they have no legal traction and incur no
consequence for corporations who violate core
principles, they are unlikely to represent a robust
solution to the challenges outlined in this paper.
103
Proposed voluntary agreements by companies
to respect codes of conduct may be effective
in encouraging a shift in ethos. But thus far,
there is no evidence as to how effective they
will be. Likely, a more robust accounting and
consequence system is required.
3.3 The American way: Statutory remedies
There are effectively no repercussions for
corporations acting against U.S. and international
norms. In other words, there is currently no
concrete reason for companies to act with
reasonable ethical standards except for a
corporate conscience. But conscience-driven
decision-making has been elusive.
Aggrieved plaintiffs seeking relief for human
rights abuses resulting from activity online
have invoked two federal statutes: the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS)
104
and the Torture Victim
Protection Act (TVPA).
105
Despite the existence
of ongoing litigation, no case law currently
supports the conclusion that either of these
statutes applies to companies such as Yahoo!,
Microsoft, Google, Skype, or Cisco. There is
no statute that provides meaningful relief to a
plaintiff for damages incurred as a result of
corporate complicity in human rights abuses.
Turning over private information that leads
to arrest, torture, imprisonment or death,
or complicity in limiting freedom of expression
or, as Clinton phrases it, freedom to connect
is not punishable in an American court.
Alien Tort Statute
The ATS allows U.S. courts to hear human rights
cases brought by foreign citizens for abuses
conducted outside of the United States. However,
it has proved legally tortuous to apply to specifc
claims for relief. The only recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision to interpret the statute is Sosa v
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
The court explained that the ATS provided
jurisdiction to hear cases but did not create a
cause of action. It also rejected the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) and the UN Charter as legally
enforceable, particularly given that the U.S. only
ratifed the Covenant on the condition that it
was not self-executing.
106
It suggested that claims
made under the ATS must violate a norm of
customary international law so well-defned that
it requires the creation of a federal mechanism to
deal with them a point on which Alvarez failed.
A further issue with the ATS is that its
application to corporations is tenuous at best.
While it has been invoked in lawsuits, in the
case of Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621
F.2d 111 (2nd Circuit 2010), the Second Circuit
held that corporations cannot be held liable for
SecDev Analytics 20
violations of customary international law: that
corporations are liable as juridical persons under
domestic law does not mean that they are liable
under international law (and therefore, under
the ATS). Rather, individual liability had been
limited to natural persons.
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v Talisman
Energy, Inc., the Second Circuit imposed a higher
standard of pleading in their dismissal of the
complaint, requiring that the mens rea standard
for aiding and abetting liability in Alien Tort
Statute actions is purpose rather than knowledge
alone. In non-legalese, this means that abuses
must be intentional in order to qualify under the
ATS. The court determined that in order to show
that a defendant aided and abetted a violation of
international law, a complainant must prove that:
1. the principal violated international law
2. the defendant knew of the specifc violation
3. the defendant acted with the intent to assist
that violation, that is, the defendant
specifcally directed his acts to assist in the
specifc violation
4. the defendants acts had a substantial effect
upon the success of the criminal venture
5. the defendant was aware that the acts
assisted the specifc violation.
The court found no evidence that Talisman
acted with the purpose of advancing the Sudan
Governments human rights abuses. That is a
standard that the plaintiffs who have sued Yahoo!
and Cisco might well surmount. Nevertheless,
the issue of the lack of applicability of the ATS to
corporations remains a stumbling block.
The Torture Victim Protection Act
The Torture Victim Protection Act also affords
no relief against companies. In Bowoto et al v
Chevron Corporation et al, 621 F.2d 1116 (9th
Circuit 2010), the plaintiffs took over an oil
platform operated by Chevron Nigeria Limited
off the coast of Nigeria. The court found that
the TVPA did not render the corporation liable
for the deaths of two protesters. The key is that
the statute states that individuals are liable
107
-
and accordingly the Ninth Circuit found that
Congress intended that only natural persons,
and not corporations should be found liable
under the Act.
There are no real alternatives to these two
statutes. Without relevant legislation, companies
cannot be held legally accountable for violating
human rights abroad. Currently, the worst result
is a damaged public image which generally gets
resuscitated fairly speedily.
3.4 We are the world: International principles and
initiatives
Despite the plethora of international initiatives,
positions, and statements concerning the internet,
freedom of expression, and corporate social
responsibility, there is a distinct lack of binding
commitments in any arena. Broad, sweeping
statements make for powerful rhetoric, but do
not provide for specifc action.
The U.S. Supreme Court enumerated appropriate
sources of international law in United States
v Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-161
(1820): the law of nations may be ascertained
by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law; or by the general usage
and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law. Although
international principles are in general diffcult to
enforce in U.S. courts (and indeed, the majority
of those discussed below are not legally binding)
they demonstrate the international communitys
position on the issue of censorship, freedom of
expression online, and corporate responsibility.
In general, they contrast strongly with the efforts
of the Chinese authorities to block access to
information. But rules and principles can be
applied so broadly that they become essentially
vacuous and meaningless. The U.S. should
not follow suit. They should pay attention to
international opinion and review existing laws
and regulations accordingly, taking informed
action that aims to deter corporations from
engaging in conduct that abuses or runs contrary
to those precepts. These norms support new
thinking and action by the U.S. to vindicate
accepted standards of law for free expression and
privacy, while continuing to enable the protection
of national security.
The following is in no way intended to be
a comprehensive survey of international
standpoints, but rather some brief examples of
where action has been suggested or undertaken.
It discusses:
United Nations statements that can be applied to
censorship and privacy; the UN Global Compact,
an initiative aimed at securing corporate social
responsibility; and, the 2011 eG8 meeting.
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
21
United Nations statements
There are several UN statements concerning the
importance of upholding the rights to freedom of
expression and privacy, and standards of con-
duct for companies. These include the: Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);
108
the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR);
109
the International Covenant for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR);
110
UN Norms on the Responsibili-
ties of Transnational Corporations and other
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights;
111
and, commentary on the UN Norms, adopted by
the UN Sub-Commission for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights.
112
The frst three items and two Optional Proto-
cols
113
comprise the International Bill of Human
Rights. While the ICCPR and ICESCR are both
treaties, the Universal Declaration is non-binding.
However, there are some overlaps: for instance,
ICCPR echoes UDHR Article 12, stating that
no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlaw-
ful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. The Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) recently
released a report on internet freedom that refer-
enced Article 19 of both the ICCPR (including
that everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through
any other media of his choice) and UDHR as
the key international norms that nations should
comply with to protect media freedom and free-
dom of expression online.
114
The United Nations Human Rights Commission
requires that any restriction on the freedom of
expression satisfy a three-part test: i) be provided
by law; ii) be required for the purpose of safe-
guarding a legitimate interest noted in Article 19
of the ICCPR; and iii) be necessary to achieve the
goal.
115
China would likely consider that legiti-
mate interest in particular, 19(iii)(b) concerning
the protection of national security or of public
order provides for its policy of online censor-
ship. It could be argued, albeit at a consider-
able stretch, that all of the seemingly innocuous
blocked content constitutes a national security
threat and is therefore a legitimate concern,
eligible for exemption from the principles of free
expression. Common sense says otherwise.
China signed but did not ratify the ICCPR while
the U.S. both signed and ratifed it in 1992.
Nevertheless, amongst several additional
reservations and declarations,
116
the U.S. Senate
imposed a declaration that the provisions of
Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not
self-executing. This lack of potential for action is
compounded by the broad scope of the UN
statements. The statements hold undoubtedly
huge importance and form the basis of shared
values, but those values are so general that they
are relatively easy to satisfy or justify. In practice,
they present few restrictions on conduct, particu-
larly as they precede the internet by quite some
time and hence do not take into account the po-
tential issues that come with such a special case.
UN Global Compact
Established in July 2000, the UN Global Com-
pact (UNGC) is a non-binding voluntary in-
ternational initiative that attempts to promote
corporate social responsibility via a common
policy framework of ten principles, including
safeguarding human rights.
117
Companies from
any industry worldwide may join, except if they
are sanctioned or blacklisted by the UN for ethi-
cal reasons, or manufacture cluster bombs and
landmines.
118
Those companies that sign up must
fulfll several expectations, including a mandatory
annual disclosure (known as a Communication
of Progress, or COP) of their progress in pursuit
of UN goals to their stakeholders. If a participant
does not complete the COP, they are downgraded
in status and after two years are de-listed and ef-
fectively publicly shamed by the UNGC.
As of 1 September 2011, there were 416
participating U.S. companies, the frst of whom
were Nike and Deloitte. Technology companies
who are part of the compact include Cisco, HP,
Microsoft, and eBay (who failed to submit a COP
in 2010). Although well-intentioned, the Global
Compact does not police companies or provide
legally enforceable standards of behavior rather,
it is a platform to encourage respect for its
principles.
119
e-G8
In May 2011, an eG8 meeting preceded the
Deauville G8 summit. This marked the frst time
that private sector actors and civil society groups
working with the internet met in the context of
the G8. The eG8 was designed to be a multi-
stakeholder, consultative method to develop
norms and policies for internet governance.
SecDev Analytics 22
The G8 host, French President Nicolas Sarkozy,
drew widespread criticism for a speech at the
meeting named Civilize the internet, arguing
that governments should intervene to regulate the
internet instead of simply protecting its openness.
He suggested that the internet should respect the
values and rules of each nation state. While cer-
tainly not a nonsensical statement, at one end of
the spectrum it counteracts the idea of the inter-
net as a kind of global commons and open space.
Ars Technica criticized the speech for its pater-
nalistic tone, and in an article wondered whether
civilization was in fact a code for regulations
favorable to big business and the national secu-
rity state.
120
The executive chairman of Google,
Eric Schmidt, warned against Sarkozys message,
saying that the internet is the greatest force for
good in the world. She should not have prema-
ture regulation ahead of innovation.
121
The G8 Declaration concerning Renewed
Commitment for Freedom and Democracy,
released at the conclusion of the Deauville sum-
mit, devoted signifcant attention to internet
policy issues. The fnal statement characterized
the internet as a lever for economic development
and an instrument for political liberty and eman-
cipation, stating that arbitrary or indiscriminate
censorship or restrictions on access to the internet
are inconsistent with States international obliga-
tions and are clearly unacceptable.
122
This statement is an important reference point for
the issues raised in this paper. However, the dec-
larations support for internet openness does not
sit easily with other aspects, including the state-
ments emphasis on the protection of intellectual
property and the need for increased government
regulation as well as certain G8 members domes-
tic cyber security policies.
3.5 Transmission delay: The proposed Global
Online Freedom Act
Legislative attempts to exert some control over
business operations in countries with internet re-
strictions have remained in limbo in Washington.
The U.S. has not hesitated to exercise jurisdiction
over citizens for conduct abroad. For instance,
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act provides severe
penalties for paying commercial bribes.
123
The
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
banned all new U.S. trade and investment in
South Africa and motivated Europe and Japan to
impose similar sanctions.
124
To date, there is no
parallel legislation that relates to the internet.
The most important move towards binding
U.S. legislation that would cover the conduct
of U.S. internet companies operating abroad is
the Global Online Freedom Act. Representative
Christopher Smith frst introduced the Act in
2006, when it drew limited traction. In 2011, he
introduced a revised version and at the time of
writing is expected to introduce a further itera-
tion of the bill.
The bill aims to prevent United States businesses
from cooperating with repressive governments in
transforming the internet into a tool of censor-
ship and surveillance, to fulfll the responsibility
of the United States Government to promote
freedom of expression on the internet, to restore
public confdence in the integrity of United States
businesses, and for other purposes.
125
The bill
emphasizes that to the extent that a United
States business empowers or assists an authori-
tarian foreign government in restricting online
access to identifed U.S. government websites,
U.S. government-supported websites, or to
identify individual internet users, such business
is deemed to be working contrary to the foreign
policy interests of the United States.
126
The current bill empowers the Secretary of State
to designate after consultation with the Secre-
tary of Commerce internet-restricting coun-
tries, i.e. those whose governments are directly
or indirectly responsible for a systematic pattern
of substantial restrictions of internet freedom
during any part of the preceding 1-year pe-
riod.
127
Other key provisions envisioned include
annual country reports on human rights prac-
tices, reports on trade-related issues that arise due
to government censorship or disruption of the
internet, protecting U.S. content providers from
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
23
malicious attacks, and measures to require U.S.
listed companies to disclose to the Securities and
Exchange Commission their human rights due
diligence with respect to policies on the collection
and sharing of personally identifable informa-
tion, information on blocking, or restriction of
information online.
Finally, an interesting provision concerns export
controls for internet-restricting countries, with
the current drafted intention being that if a U.S.
company is exporting hardware or software that
can be used for surveillance, tracking, blocking
etc. to an internet-restricting country, then a red
fag is raised with respect to exports to all end
users in that country. All exports to law-enforce-
ment end users in internet-restricting countries
will require an export license, with a presumption
of denial for the license. It is expected that this
section will be amended to provide more specifc
details.
128
The Act has not been fnalized. It does however
appear to fall neatly in line with the Obama
administrations policy. Its journey has thus far
been and remains uncertain. Discussions con-
cerning the provisions of the bill and its potential
implementation will be enormously worthwhile
in encouraging dialogue on these issues. It will be
interesting to see if Secretary Clinton, President
Obama, and Congressional leaders eventually
get behind the bill and secure its passage.
129
If a
promising version of the bill is passed, it will be a
step in the right direction.
**
SecDev Analytics 24
Part 4: What is to be done: To new beginnings and new behavior
A new approach is needed. The U.S. government
and U.S. corporations have an opportunity to
lead the world by putting into practice legislation
and policies that ensure that businesses operat-
ing abroad are accountable both to their foreign
customers and to their home country. There are
no simple or straightforward solutions. But
more of the same will incur damage beyond the
reputations of the U.S. corporations or the U.S.
government. It risks the future of cyberspace as
an enabler of human development and economic
growth.
This report has attempted to outline some of the
complexities involved in balancing ethics and
profts. It also fags some of the possibilities that
can be found in law and self-regulation. The
research is not suffcient to map out a compre-
hensive strategy. But it is possible to offer
preliminary recommendations:
Formal legislation is not the only answer.
Better behavior when faced with ethical
challenges ultimately stems from a shift of
ethos and attitude by corporations. But to
date, voluntary codes have not served to
change behavior. In the absence of any
honest change of heart, formal commit-
ments would at least provide a sense of
direction. Compromising values has caused
unwanted and perhaps unexpected damage
to the reputations of some of the largest and
most successful companies in the world.
China is a market that presents substantial
opportunities but companies must not
continue to be unguardedly opportunistic.
Consistency with principles. The United
States needs to adhere to its image as a
proactive nation founded on valuing
freedom instead of one whose greatest
exports transgress U.S. commitments under
domestic U.S. law, and contravene U.S.
commitments to UN covenants and
conventions. This does not mean continu-
ally forcing the imposition of values: it is
unrealistic and not the place of the U.S. or
any other country to directly force changes
in Chinese law. It means ensuring that
corporations operate within sensible
boundaries. Such boundaries can be drawn
by legally enforceable, binding, specifc
commitments and it is here that policy
makers, legislators, and corporate leaders
have a chance to step up and embrace the
challenge.
The commons of cyberspace needs to be
preserved. The emergence of the internet
and its expansion to encompass almost
two-thirds of humanity has led to a parallel
expansion in human choice. The worlds
knowledge is now accessible on-line and
nearly everywhere. New industries and
sources of prosperity have been created.
Political lines have been redrawn and
redefned. People have become empowered.
Their local voices can be heard across the
globe in real-time. This is now at risk unless
the emerging norms that accept the
legitimacy of national censorship regimes
and other controls that attempt to restrict
the internet are challenged.
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
25
1 Netmarket Share. 2011. Desktop Search Engine Market
Share. http://www.netmarketshare.com/search-engine-
market-share.aspx?qprid=4&qpcustomd=0 (accessed
September 2011).
2 China Internet Network Information Centre (CNNIC).
2011. zhongguo hulianwangluo fazhan zhuangkuang tongji
baogao (27th Statistical Survey Report on Internet Develop-
ment in China). 19 January 2011 http://research.cnnic.cn/
html/1295338825d2556.html (accessed September 2011).
3 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of
the Peoples Republic of China. http://www.miit.gov.cn/
n11293472/index.html (accessed September 2011).
4 Nolan, Justine M. 2009. The China Dilemma: Internet
Censorship and Corporate Responsibility. Asian Journal of
Comparative Law 4:1. http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol4/
iss1/art3/ (accessed September 2011).
5 Thompson, Clive. 2006. Googles China Problem (and
Chinas Google Problem). The New York Times. 23 April
2006.
6 OpenNet Initiative. Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005:
A Country Study. http://opennet.net/studies/china (accessed
September 2011).
7 Cheung, Anne S.Y. 2006. The business of governance:
Chinas legislation on content regulation in cyberspace.
New York University of International Law and Politics 38:
1-2. supra, p. 8. She notes: The major Internet Interconnect-
ing networks are CSTNET, which is owned by the Chinese
Academy of Science; CHINANET, which is owned by China
Telecom; UNINET, which is owned by China Unicom; CNC-
NET, which is owned by China Netcom; CERNET, which
is owned by the State Educational Commission; CMNET,
which is owned by China Mobile; CSNET, which is owned by
ChinaSat; CIETNET, which is owned by the China Interna-
tional E-Trade Centre; and CGWNET, which is owned by the
China Great Wall Group.
Also see: China Internet Network Information Centre.
2006. 17th Statistical Report on the Internet Develop-
ment in China. 9 January 2006. http://www.cnnic.net.cn/
download/2006/17threport-en.pdf (accessed September
2011). For information on ownership of network operators,
see China Internet Network Information Centre. 2003. A
Brief Introduction to the Ten Major Network Operators (Shi
Da Hu Lian Wang Dan Wei Jian Jie). http://www.cnnic.net.
cn/html/Dir/2003/11/17/1330.htm (accessed September
2011). In 1996 there were only four major interconnecting
networks. See Rayburn, Mike J. and Conrad, Craig. 2004.
Chinas Internet Structure: Problems and Control Mea-
sures. International Journal of Management 21:4: 471-480.
supra, p. 471, 472-73.
8 Although China Telecom has announced that it will switch
on its fourth terrestrial cable linking Europe and Asia in the
next few months, indicating that connections may have
multiplied. See: Wood, Nick. 2011.China Telecom to light
up fourth Europe-Asia fber route by end-2011. Total Teleco.
31 August 2011.
9 Fallows, James. 2008. The connection has been reset.
The Atlantic. March 2008.
10 Thompson, Clive. 2006. Googles China Problem (and
Chinas Google Problem). The New York Times. 23 April
2006.
11 Details are found in the case-study, in Part 2.5 below.
Source is: Terry Alberstein, a senior director of corporate
communications at Cisco. From Stirland, Sarah Lai. 2008.
Cisco leak: Great Firewall of China was a chance to sell
more routers. Wired. 20 May 2008.
12 Goldsmith, Jack and Wu, Tim. 2008. Who Controls the
Internet? Oxford: Oxford University Press. supra, p. 93. They
present a concise summary of Chinas actions.
13 OpenNet Initiative. Country profle: China. http://opennet.
net/countries/china (accessed September 2011).
14 Hu, Marty. 2011.The Great Firewall: a technical
perspective. Torfox. 30 May 2011. http://www-cs-faculty.
stanford.edu/~eroberts//cs181/projects/2010-11/FreedomO-
fInformationChina/great-frewall-technical-perspective/index.
html (accessed September 2011).
15 OpenNet Initiative. 2009. Chinas Green Dam: The
Implications of Government Control Encroaching on the
Home PC. OpenNet Initiative Bulletin. 12 June 2009. http://
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/fles/GreenDam_bulletin.pdf
(accessed September 2011).
16 Chao, Loretta and Dean, Jason. 2009. Chinese delay
plan for censor software. Wall Street Journal. 1 July 2009.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124636491863372821.html
(accessed September 2011).
17 Cheung, Anne S.Y. 2006. The business of governance:
Chinas legislation on content regulation in cyberspace.
New York University of International Law and Politics.38:
1-2. supra, p. 8.
18 Harwit, Eric and Clark, Duncan. 2001. Shaping the
Internet in China: Evolution of Political Control over Network
Endnotes
SecDev Analytics 26
Infrastructure and Content. Asian Survey 41:3. May/June
2011. Also see: Human Rights Watch. 2006. Race to the
bottom: Corporate complicity in Chinese Internet Censor-
ship. 10 August 2006. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/cou
ntry,,,COUNTRYREP,CHN,,45cb138f2,0.html (accessed
September 2011).
19 Internet Society of China. 2002. Public Pledge of Self-
Regulation and Professional Ethics for China Internet Indus-
try. 19 July 2002. http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ca102762.
htm (accessed September 2011).
20 Internet Society of China. 2007. Convention on Blog Ser-
vice Discipline. http://www.isc.org.cn/hyzl/hyzl/listinfo-15609.
html (accessed September 2011).
21 Ibid
22 Buckley, Chris. 2011. China state paper urges Internet
rethink to gag foes. Reuters. 2 September 2011.
23 MacKinnon, Rebecca. 2009. Chinas Censorship 2.0:
How companies censor bloggers. First Monday 14:2. 25
January 2009. http://www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/2378/2089 (accessed September
2011).
24 Chinese Human Rights Defender. How does government
monitor our online communication? (Zhengfu Ruhe Jiankong
Women De Dianzi Wangluo Tongxu). http://crd-net.org/
Article/Class1/200803/20080324093843_8168.html (ac-
cessed September 2011).
25 Human Rights Watch. 2006. Race to the bottom: Corpo-
rate complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship. 10 August
2006. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,COUNTRYRE
P,CHN,,45cb138f2,0.html (accessed September 2011).
26 Information Offce of the State Council combined with the
Ministry of Information Industry. 2005. Provisions on News
Information Services. China IT Law. http://www.china.org.
cn/business/2010-01/21/content_19281869.htm (accessed
September 2011). Article 19 of the Provisions on News In-
formation Services includes: (1) violating the basic principles
as they are confrmed in the Constitution; (2) jeopardizing
the security of the nation, divulging state secrets, subvert-
ing of the national regime or jeopardizing the integrity of the
nations unity; (3) harming the honor or the interests of the
nation; (4) inciting hatred against peoples, racism against
peoples, or disrupting the solidarity of peoples; (5) disrupt-
ing national policies on religion, propagating evil cults and
feudal superstitions; (6) spreading rumors, disturbing social
order, or disrupting social stability; (7) spreading obscenity,
pornography, gambling, violence, terror, or abetting the com-
mission of a crime; (8) insulting or defaming third parties,
infringing on the legal rights and interests of third parties; (9)
inciting illegal assemblies, associations, marches, demon-
strations, or gatherings that disturb social order; (10) con-
ducting activities in the name of an illegal civil organization;
and (11) any other content prohibited by law or rules.
27 See Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China,
Articles 35, 40, and 47. Also relevant is Article 37, which pro-
tects against unlawful searches, and Article 33, which states
that the state respects and preserves human rights.
28 Human Rights in China. 2010. China Sharpens Legal
Weapons for Information Control. 29 April 2010. http://www.
hrichina.org/content/394 (accessed September 2011).
29 Cheung, Anne S.Y. 2006. The business of governance:
Chinas legislation on content regulation in cyberspace.
New York University of International Law and Politics 38:
1-2. supra, p. 18; citing Article 7 of Peoples Republic of
China State Security Bureau. 2006. Administration of the
Maintenance of Secrets in the International Networking
of Computer Information Systems Provisions. China Law
Practice. 25 January 2000, [hereinafter State Secrecy Provi-
sions]. http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1694656/
Search/Administration-of-the-Maintenance-of-Secrets-in-the.
html?Keywords=Administration+of+the+Maintenance+of+S
ecrets+in+the+International+Networking+of+Computer+In
formation+Systems+Provisions (accessed September 2011).
30 State Secrecy Provisions, Articles 3 and 10. Although
not directly pertinent to the current study, this all-embracing
scheme provides an important factual precedent for a prima
facie case to hold the government legally responsible for
several incidents of cyber piracy a truly 21st century prob-
lem - despite government claims that these are purely the
actions of non-state actors over whom it has no control.
31 Buckley, Chris. 2011. China state paper urges Internet
rethink to gag foes. Reuters. 2 September 2011.
32 In 2006 executive chairman Eric Schmidt declared that:
The prize is a world in which every human being starts life
with the same access to information, the same opportunities
to learn and the same power to communicate. I believe that
is worth fghting for. See: Schmidt, Eric. 2006. Let more of
the world access the Internet. The Financial Times. 21 May
2006.
33 Levy, Steven. 2011. Inside Googles China misfor-
tune. Fortune. 15 April 2011. http://tech.fortune.cnn.
com/2011/04/15/googles-ordeal-in-china (accessed Septem-
ber 2011).
34 OpenNet Initiative. 2006. Google.cn Filtering: How It
Works. 25 January 2006. http://www.opennetinitiative.net/
blog/?p=87 (accessed September 2011) and, Thompson,
Clive. 2006. Googles China Problem (and Chinas Google
Problem). The New York Times. 23 April 2006 and Zeller,
Jr., Tom. Web frms are grilled on dealings in China. The
New York Times. 16 February 2006.
35 Levy, Steven. 2011. In the Plex: How Google Thinks,
Works and Shapes Our Lives. New York: Simon and Schus-
ter. supra p.306.
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
27
36 Thompson, Clive. 2006. Googles China Problem (and
Chinas Google Problem). The New York Times. 23 April
2006.
37 Sergey Brin on Chinas Google Decision. TED Blog. 24
February 2010. http://blog.ted.com/2010/02/24/our_focus_
has_b (accessed September 2011).
38 Villeneuve, Nart. 2008. Search Monitor Project: Toward a
Measure of Transparency. Citizen Lab Occasional Paper #1
http://www.nartv.org/projects/search_monitor/searchmonitor.
pdf (accessed September 2011).
39 OpenNet Initiative. China. http://opennet.net/research/
profles/china-including-hong-kong (accessed September
2011).
40 Thompson, Clive. 2006. Googles China Problem (and
Chinas Google Problem). The New York Times. 23 April
2006.
41 Zeller Jr., Tom. 2006. Web frms are grilled on dealings
in China. The New York Times. 16 February 2006.
42 Thompson, Clive. 2006. Googles China Problem (and
Chinas Google Problem). The New York Times. 23 April
2006.
43 Dickie, Mure. 2008. Google faces lawsuit for blocking
name. The Financial Times. 1 February 2008.
44 Thompson, Clive. 2006. Googles China Problem (and
Chinas Google Problem). The New York Times. 23 April
2006.
45 Sergey Brin on Chinas Google Decision. TED Blog.
24 February 2010. http://blog.ted.com/2010/02/24/our_fo-
cus_has_b (accessed September 2011).
46 Davidson, Alan. 2010. Testifying before the Congressio-
nal-Executive Commission on China. Google Public Policy
Blog. 24 March 2010. http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.
com/2010/03/testifying-before-congressional.html (accessed
September 2011).
47 Google hardly stood alone. GoDaddy.com, the worlds
largest Internet domain registrar and manager of 27,000
Chinese domain names, also decided to pull out of China in
response to government interference and privacy concerns.
With more than 400 million users worldwide, Facebook de-
clined to enter the Chinese market and remains blocked by
the Great Firewall. It runs a Chinese version from outside of
China. Twitter has resisted giving any control to China. See
Johnson, Bobie, Branigan, Tania and Nasaw, Daniel. Were
staying in China, says Microsoft, as free speech row with
Google grows. The Guardian. 25 March 2010. http://www.
guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/mar/25/china-microsoft-
free-speech-google (accessed September 2011).
48 Helft, Miguel and Barboza, David. Google Shuts China
Site in Dispute over Censorship. The New York Times. 22
March 2010.
49 Barboza, David. 2011. Microsoft to Partner with Chinas
Leading Search Engine. The New York Times. 4 July 2011.
50 Thinesen, Erica. 2011. Chinese Government Renews
Googles Internet Content Provider License. IT ProPortal. 7
September 2011. http://www.itproportal.com/2011/09/07/chi-
nese-government-renews-googles-internet-content-provider-
license/#ixzz1XwIvqz4o (accessed September 2011).
51 In response to Notice of Evidence Collection from the
Beijing State Security Bureau, Yahoo! employees handed
over Shi Taos email account registration information for
huoyan-1989@yahoo.com.cn, all login times, corresponding
IP addresses, and relevant email content from February 22,
2004. See: Mackinnon, Rebecca. 2007. Shi Tao, Yahoo!
and lessons for corporate social responsibility. 30 December
2007. http://rconversation.blogs.com/YahooShiTaoLessons.
pdf (accessed September 2011).
52 Mackinnon, Rebecca. 2007. Shi Tao, Yahoo! and lessons
for corporate social responsibility. 30 December 2007. http://
rconversation.blogs.com/YahooShiTaoLessons.pdf (ac-
cessed September 2011).
53 Lantos, Tom. 2007. Statement of Chairman Lantos at
hearing, Yahoo! Incs provision of false information to Con-
gress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 6 November
2007. http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/lantos110607.htm
(accessed September 2011).
54 28 U.S.C.A. 1350.
55 Perez, Juan Carlos. 2007. Yahoo Settles Chinese Dis-
sident Lawsuit. PCWorld. 14 November 2007. http://www.
pcworld.com/article/139619/yahoo_settles_chinese_dissi-
dent_lawsuit.html (accessed September 2011).
56 Mackinnon, Rebecca. 2007. Shi Tao, Yahoo! and lessons
for corporate social responsibility. 30 December 2007. http://
rconversation.blogs.com/YahooShiTaoLessons.pdf (ac-
cessed September 2011).
57 For instance, in 2002, Microsoft gave millions to software
engineering schools in fve universities. They also worked
with the Ministry of Education to create curriculums and
outft computer laboratories. In an effort to combat software
piracy, Microsoft announced funding for training programs in
the eastern city of Hangzhou. Microsoft also donated their
operating system, Windows, to the state-run China Telecom
and Chinas State Economic and Trade Commission as part
of a marketing strategy. See: Microsoft. 2006. Microsoft
in China: Microsofts Strategy and Goal in the Chinese
Market. http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/presskits/Chi-
naPresident/documents/ChinaBG.pdf; and Magnier, Mark
and Menn, Joseph. 2005. As China Censors the Internet,
Money Talks. Los Angeles Times. 17 June 2005. http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2005/jun/17/world/fg-censor17/2 (accessed
September 2011).
SecDev Analytics 28
58 Human Rights Watch. 2006. Race to the bottom: Corpo-
rate complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship. 10 August
2006. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,COUNTRYR
EP,CHN,,45cb138f2,0.html. (accessed September 2011).
Funded by the Shanghai City Government, SAIL is a venture
fund led by Jiang Mianheng, son of former PRC president
Jiang Zemin. See also Cheng, Allen T. 2001. Shanghais
King of I.T.. Asiaweek.com. 9 February 2001, and Lee,
Melanie and Wong, Jacqueline. 2011. Chinas Renren signs
agreement with Microsoft. Reuters. 24 August 2011. http://
www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/us-renn-msn-idUS-
TRE77N0UG20110824 (accessed September 2011).
59 Pan, Philip P. 2006. Bloggers Who Pursue Change
Confront Fear and Mistrust. Washington Post. 21 Febru-
ary 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/02/20/AR2006022001304.html (accessed
September 2011).
60 Human Rights Watch. 2006. Race to the bottom: Corpo-
rate complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship. 10 August
2006. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,COUNTRYREP
,CHN,,45cb138f2,0.html (accessed September 2011).
61 Ibid
62 Fried, Ina. 2006. Microsoft clarifes policy on cesor-
ing blogs. CNET News. 31 January 2006, http://
news.cnet.com/Microsoft-clarifes-policy-on-censoring-
blogs/2100-1028_3-6033343.html (accessed Septem-
ber 2011) and, Barboza, David. Microsoft to Partner
With Chinas Leading Search Engine. The New York
Times. 4 July 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/
technology/05microsoft.html (accessed September 2011)
and,
Fletcher, Owen . 2011. Microsoft to Provide English Search
Results on Baidu. The Wall Street Journal. 4 July 2011.
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110704-701613.html
(accessed September 2011).
63 Barboza, David. 2011. Microsoft to Partner With Chinas
Leading Search Engine. The New York Times. 4 July 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/technology/05microsoft.
html (accessed September 2011).
64 Fletcher, Owen. 2011. Microsoft to Provide English
Search Results on Baidu. The Wall Street Journal. 4 July
2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110704-701613.
html (accessed September 2011).
65 Barboza, David. 2011. Microsoft to Partner With Chinas
Leading Search Engine. The New York Times. 4 July 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/technology/05microsoft.
html (accessed September 2011).
66 Begany, Tim. 2011. A stock thats up 50% in THIS
market. Street Authority. 12 September 2011. http://www.
streetauthority.com/international-investing/stock-thats-50-
market-458563 (accessed September 2011).
67 Levy, Steven. 2011. In the Plex: How Google Thinks,
Works and Shapes Our Lives. New York: Simon and Schus-
ter. supra p.298.
68 Lee, Melanie and Wong, Jacqueline. 2011. Chinas
Renren signs agreement with Microsoft. Reuters. 24 August
2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/24/us-renn-
msn-idUSTRE77N0UG20110824 (accessed September
2011).
69 Microsoft News Center. Microsoft Formalizes Cross-
Platform Collaboration With CS2C in China. 22 August 2011.
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2011/aug11/08-
22CS2CPR.mspx (accessed September 2011).
70 Yun-Hee Kim. Microsoft to Add Staff in China. The Wall
Street Journal. 22 February 2011. http://online.wsj.com/ar-
ticle/SB10001424052748703529004576160013344234354.
html (accessed September 2011).
71 Mashland, Alison. 2006. Skype says texts are cen-
sored by China. The Financial Times. 18 April 2006.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/875630d4-cef9-11da-925d-
0000779e2340.html (accessed September 2011).
72 Skype. 2005. TOM Online, Skype Announce Joint
Venture in China. 5 September 2005, http://about.skype.
com/2005/09/tom_online_skype_announce_join.html (ac-
cessed September 2011).
73 Ibid
74 Aughton, Simon. 2006. Skype comes clean over China
censor. PCPro. 19 April 2006. http://www.pcpro.co.uk/
news/86146/skype-comes-clean-over-china-censor (ac-
cessed September 2011).
75 See: Silverman, Josh. 2008. Skype President Ad-
dresses Chinese Privacy Breach. The Big Blog. October
2008. http://blogs.skype.com/en/2008/10/skype_presi-
dent_addresses_chin.html (accessed September 2011); and
Skype. 2006. Comments about Skype chat text fltering in
China. The Big Blog. 19 April 2006. http://blogs.skype.com/
en/2006/04/comments_about_skype_chat_text.html (ac-
cessed September 2011).
76 Villeneuve, Nart. 2008. Breaching Trust: An analysis of
surveillance and security practices on Chinas TOM-Skype
platform. Information Warfare Monitor and ONI Asia Joint
Report. http://www.nartv.org/mirror/breachingtrust.pdf (ac-
cessed September 2011).
77 Ibid
78 CNN. 2011.Skype illegal in China? Not so fast. CNN
GO. 4 January 2011. http://www.cnngo.com/shanghai/
life/skype-illegal-china-well-not-so-fast-617634 (accessed
September 2011).
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
29
79 Skype says it is operational in China despite reports
of crackdown by the government. Asia Pacifc Telecom. 1
February 2011.
80 Presumably Skypes position solidifed in May 2011,
when Microsoft acquired Skype.
81 Walton, Greg. 2001. Chinas Golden Shield. Interna-
tional Center for Human Rights and Democratic Develop-
ment. http://www.ichrdd.ca/site/_PDF/publications/globaliza-
tion/CGS_ENG.PDF (accessed September 2011).
82 Cisco Systems. 2002. Overview of the Public Security
Sector. http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/fles/
cisco_presentation.pdf (accessed September 2011). supra
Slide 57.
83 Cisco Systems. 2002. Overview of the Public Security
Sector. http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/fles/
cisco_presentation.pdf (accessed September 2011). supra
slide 58.
84 Gutmann, Ethan. 2004. Losing the New China: A Story of
American Commerce, Desire, and Betrayal. San Francisco:
Encounter Books.
85 Gutmann, Ethan. 2006. Aiding the Policenet. Founda-
tion for Defense of Democracies. http://www.defenddemoc-
racy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
11776837&Itemid=347 (accessed September 2011) and
Bambauer, Derek. 2006. Cool Tools for Tyrants. Legal Af-
fairs. January-February 2006 . http://legalaffairs.org/issues/
January-February-2006/feature_bambauer_janfeb06.msp
(accessed September 2011).
86 Gutmann, Ethan. 2004. Losing the New China: A Story of
American Commerce, Desire, and Betrayal. San Francisco:
Encounter Books, 2004.
87 Ibid
88 Regan, Keith. 2007. Ciscos China Investment Mush-
rooms to 16 Billion. Ecommerce Times. 1 November 2007.
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/Ciscos-China-
Investment-Mushrooms-to-16-Billion-60114.html (accessed
September 2011).
89 Ibid
90 Chao, Loretta and Clark, Don. 2011. Cisco Poised to
Help China Keep an Eye on its Citizens. The Wall Street
Journal. 5 July 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052702304778304576377141077267316.html (accessed
September 2011).
91 Ibid
92 Rennack, Dianne E. 2006. China: Economic Sanctions.
CRS Report for Congress. Order Code RL31910. http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31910.pdf (accessed Septem-
ber 2011).
93 Reitman, Reiny. 2011.Cisco and Abuses of Human
Rights in China: Part 1. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 22
August 2011. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/cisco-
and-abuses-human-rights-china-part-1. (accessed Septem-
ber 2011).
94 Ibid. Named plaintiffs are Du Daobin, Zhou Yuanzhi, and
Liu Xianbin.
95 Ibid
96 Human Rights Law Foundation. 2011. Cisco Complaint.
19 May 2011. http://www.docstoc.com/docs/80369767/
Cisco-Complaint (accessed September 2011).
97 For instance, cell phone provider Verizon has an explicit
Human Rights Statement which includes protecting cus-
tomer privacy by notifying customers about how their data is
being used and giving them choice and control over the use
of their private information. The full statement is available
online at http://responsibility.verizon.com/home/approach/
human-rights . Further examples of human rights policies
from businesses are available at http://www.business-hu-
manrights.org/Documents/Policies
98 Clinton, Hillary. 2010. Remarks on Internet Freedom.
U.S. Department of State. 21 January 2010. http://www.
state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm (accessed
September 2011).
99 Ibid
100 Clinton, Hillary. 2011. Internet Rights and Wrongs:
Choices and Challenges in a Networked World. U.S. De-
partment of State. 15 February 2011. http://www.state.gov/
secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm (accessed September
2011).
101 The White House. May 2011. International Strategy
for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a
Networked World. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
fles/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf
(accessed September 2011).
102 Global Network Initiative. Global Network Initiative
FAQ. http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/faq/index.
php#48 (accessed September 2011).
103 Global Network Initiative. 2010. Inaugural Report 2010:
Our work. Our vision. Our progress. http://www.globalnet-
workinitiative.org/cms/uploads/1/GNI_annual_report_2010.
pdf (accessed September 2011).
104 Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006)
105 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codifed at 28 U.S.C. 1350
(1994))
SecDev Analytics 30
106 Self-executing means that ratifcation creates no
private right of action with the U.S. judicial system unless
Congress acts to implement agreement with the legislation.
107 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codifed at 28 U.S.C. 1350
(1994))
108 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was ad-
opted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948,
at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris. Article 12 states that no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to protection
of the law against such interference or attacks. Article 19
states: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media, regardless of frontiers. Avail-
able online at: United Nations. 1948. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr
(accessed September 2011).
109 United Nations. 1966. International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.
htm (accessed September 2011). Adopted December 16,
1966 by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI). It came
into force on March 23, 1976. By December 2010 the Cov-
enant had 72 signatories and 167 parties. China has signed
but not ratifed.
110 United Nations. 1976. International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/cescr.htm (accessed September 2011). Adopted
by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI). Entry
into force, January 3, 1976, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 27, requiring thirty-fve members to ratify or
accede to the Treaty. As of July 2011, the Covenant had 160
parties. Six more had signed but not ratifed. Certain nations
conditioned their signing, including China, as to labor rights,
and has not ratifed it.
111 United Nations. 2003. Norms on the Responsibilities of
transnational corporations and other business enterprises
with regards to human rights. Economic and Social Council.
26 August 2003. http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.
nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En. (accessed
September 2011).
112 United Nations. 2003. Commentary on the norms
on the Responsibilities of transnational corporations and
other business enterprises with regards to human rights.
Economic and Social Council. 26 August 2003. U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 The adoption is also mentioned
by Amnesty International on p4 of their 2004 report The UN
Human Rights Norms for Business: towards legal account-
ability
113 The First Optional Protocol to the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights establishes an individual
complaints mechanism through which individuals may
complain to the human rights Committee about violations to
the Covenant. It has 113 parties.
114 OSCE (Offce of the Representative on Freedom of
the Media). 2011. Freedom of Expression on the Internet:
Study of legal provisions and practices related to freedom of
expression, the free fow of information and media pluralism
on the Internet. http://www.osce.org/fom/80723 (accessed
September 2011).
115 Hussein, Abid. 1995. Report of the U.N. Special Rappor-
teur, Mr. Abid Hussein, pursuant to the Commission on Hu-
man Rights Resolution 1943/45, Reference E/CN.4/1995/32.
14 December 1995. supra para. 48; See also: Nolan, Jus-
tine. 2008. The China Dilemma: Internet Censorship and
Corporate Responsibility. University of South New South
Wales Faculty of Law Research Series. http://law.bepress.
com/unswwps/frps08/art57 (accessed September 2011).
116 U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138
Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992). University
of Manitoba Human Rights Library. http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html (accessed September 2011).
117 United Nations Global Compact. The Ten Principles.
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrin-
ciples/index.html (accessed September 2011).
118 United Nations Global Compact. Frequently Asked
Questions. http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/
faq.html
119 Deva, Surya. 2007. Corporate Complicity in Internet
Censorship in China: Who Cares for the Global Compact
or the Global Online Freedom Act? George Washington
International Law Review 39:255-319.
120 Anderson, Nate. 2011. France attempts to civilize the
Internet; Internet fghts back. Ars technica. May 2011. http://
arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/05/france-attempts-
to-civilize-the-internet-internet-fghts-back.ars (accessed
September 2011).
121 Wintour, Patrick. 2011. Facebook founder Zuckerberg
tells G8 summit: dont regulate the web. The Guardian.
26 May 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/
may/26/facebook-google-internet-regulation-g8 (accessed
September 2011).
122 G8. 2011.Renewed Commitment for Freedom and
Democracy. G8 Declaration. 26-27 May 2011. http://www.
g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g8/english/live/news/renewed-com-
mitment-for-freedom-and-democracy.1314.html (accessed
September 2011).
Collusion and Collision:
Searching for guidance in Chinese cyberspace
31
123 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C.A.
78dd-1 (1977).
124 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C.A.
5001 (2002).
125 United States House of Representatives. 112th Con-
gress, 1st Session. H.R. 1389. Global Online Freedom Act
of 2011 [introduced in the House 6 April 2011]. http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h112-1389 (accessed
September 2011).
126 Ibid
127 Ibid
128 Ibid
129 The issue is not inherently partisan. Congressman
Smith is a Republican. Former Governor Mitt Romney,
a leading contender for the Republican nomination, has
recently taken a hard line on Chinese theft of intellectual
property and currency manipulation. Alexander Burns, Mitt
Romney brings China message to Ohio, Politico.com, July
27, 2011. Others, like former U.S. Ambassador to China
Jon Huntsman and also a candidate for the GOP nomina-
tion, have been more ambivalent. Huntsman recently joined
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is calling for an
agreement to restrict cyber attacks and designate some
areas as off-limits to hacking. Neither addressed the issues
of freedom of speech or privacy, or Chinas policy of extort-
ing technology transfers as a price for doing business in the
country. See Kissinger, Huntsman: U.S., China need cyber
dtente, Reuters, June 14, 2011. Huntsman is unlikely to
secure the Republican nomination but there is a quiet move
afoot to position him as a third party candidate. House
Speaker John Boehner has spoken up, declaring that China
has a responsibility to do better at guaranteeing freedom
and dignity for its citizens and that the United States has a
responsibility to hold them to account. Boehner has not
finched from pressing his views directly to President Hu Jin-
tao, which he did in January during the Chinese Presidents
visit to Capitol Hill. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Boehner
Says China Has Responsibility to Do Better, Bloomberg
Business Week, January 20, 2011.
SecDev Analytics