RULE 121

Quintin Saludaga and SPO2 Fiel Genio VS Sandiganbayan and PeopleGR No. 184537, April 23, 2010
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order assailing the July 14, 2008 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal, denying the Motion for
Preliminary Investigation filed by the petitioners who were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. At first, the Information was quashed for lack of amount of actual damaged
cause in the alleged crime which is essential. The information was re-filed thus, petitioners filed a
Motion for Preliminary Investigation which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its opposition.
Petitioners contend that there was a substitution of the first Information which should have preceded
by a preliminary investigation. Further, they claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-
examination of the finding of a prima facie cause to file the case. The prosecutors on the other hand
argues that the re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely
modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not
such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation. Moreover, no new allegations
were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the re-filed information. Thus, new
preliminary investigation is not in order. The motions filed by the petitioners were denied by the court
hence, this petition to the highest court.
Issues: WON the Honorable Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it refused to order the preliminary.
Rulings: The court found no merit on the petition. Petitioners insist that the offenses charged in the first
and second Information are not the same, and what transpired was a substitution of Information that
required prior conduct of preliminary investigation. Even assuming there was no substitution,
substantial amendments were made in the second Information, and that its submission should have
been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. The court ruled that the use of the disjunctive term
or connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), as 2 different modes of
committing the offense.
This does not however indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an
accused may be charged under either mode or under both which implies that theres no substituted
information.
Preliminary investigation is applicable only when there was substantial amendment in the Information
such as the facts which was altered however; no such circumstance is obtaining in this case, because
there was no modification in the nature of the charged offense. Consequently, a new preliminary
investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners. Finally, the newly discovered
evidence mandates due re-examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case, deserves
scant consideration. But the court ruled that it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it
was already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case.

Payumo vs. Sandiganbayan
654 SCRA 277, July 25, 2011
Facts: The petitions stem from the facts of Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident that
occurred on February 26, 1980 at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta.
Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police
(INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing one and wounding several others. The
accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the
Sandiganbayan. After four (4) years of trial, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered its
Decision[4]dated October 5, 1984, penned by Justice Romeo M. Escareal, convicting the accused as co-
principals in the crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder. On January'11, 1985,
the accused filed their Motion for New Trial, which was denied. The accused elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, which set aside the October 5, 1984 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and remanding the
case for a new trial. Thus, Criminal Case No. 4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was raffled
to the First Division. Accordingly, the First Division received anew all the evidence of the parties, both
testimonial and documentary. Later, with the creation of the Fourth and Fifth divisions, Criminal Case
No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth Division. On February 23, 1999, the Fifth Division
promulgated judgment, penned by Justice Godofredo T. Legaspi, convicting the accused of the crime
of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Omnibus Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and for New Trial. Since the Fifth Division could not reach unanimity in resolving the aforesaid
omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was constituted pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule XVIII of the
1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. On September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-2,
issued the subject Resolution promulgated on October 24, 2001,setting aside the November 27, 1998
Decision and granting a second new trial of the case. The Special Fifth Division pronounced among
others that a second new trial would enable it to allow the accused to adduce pertinent evidence
including the records of the Judge Advocate Genera lOffice (JAGO), Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
shed light on the "serious allegations"
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted anew trial of
Criminal Case No. 4219.
Held: On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in Criminal
Case No. 4219, the Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis. Rule 121, Section
2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that: new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds
to grant a new trial. The records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the
criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on
newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence
was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case,
however, such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented
during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records cannot be considered
as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that prevented the accused from using these records
during the trial to substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a military
operation. The Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of
its jurisdiction when it nullified the November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal
Case No. 4219. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the power
to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. Accordingly, the assailed
Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside.

Agulto v. CA
-read full text (very short)

RULE 122
Ysidro v. Leonardo de Castro
No digest found

Dimarucot v. People
No digest found

Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan
Read already.
Yu v. Samson Tatad
Doctrine: There is no distinction between the periods to appeal between criminal and civil cases, thus
the Fresh Period rule enunciated in Neypes applies also to criminal cases.
FACTS:
1. The RTC convicted Yu of Estafa in a May 26, 2005 decision.
2. 14 days later or on Jun 9, Yu filed with the RTC a MNT alleging she discovered new and material
evidence but was denied on Oct 17.
3 .On Nov 16, Yu filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC alleging she has a fresh period of 15days pursuant
to the Neypes Rule from Nov 3 (the receipt of the denial of her MNT) or up to Nov 18 within which to
file her NOA.
4. On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for
his guidance.
5. On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days
late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.
6. The prosecution filed a Motion for Execution of the decision which was considered by the RTC.
7. Yu then filed a petition for prohibition and TRO against the RTC.
8. Yu argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution'smotions when she filed her notice
of appeal within the 15-dayreglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the"fresh
period rule" enunciated in Neypes
ISSUE: WON the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals incriminal cases? YES
RATIO:
1. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. -- An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation
of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal
shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the
order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance
of the period begins to run.
2. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court's pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule
122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the following reasons:
a. BP 129 makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in criminal and civil cases when it
categorically stated for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions
of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) dayscounted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from
b. The provisions of R41S3 and R122S6 although differently worded, mean exactly the same.
There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned - the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new
trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason
exists why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
c. While the SC did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal in criminal cases, it did include
R42 on petitions for review from the RTC to the CA and R45 governing appeals by certiorari to
the SC, both of which also applies to appeals in criminal cases.
3. Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction)
and to the SC in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods to appeal
from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and criminal cases under
Section 3 of Rule 41 and Section 6of Rule 122 should be treated differently.
4. If the SC were to interpret strictly the fresh period rule, a double standard of treatment would exist.
5. In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on
November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005,the date of
receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.
People v. Maraorao
No digest found.