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G.R. No. 162411, June 30, 2008, NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE

ANDSTEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI), represented by RAMON
M. CALO, petitioner, vs. NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (NELU)-
ALU-TUCP,represented by DONELL P. DAGANI, respondent.
FACTS: NIASSI is a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit,
Agusan del Norte. Respondent Nasipit Employees Labor Union (Union) was
and may still be the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees
of NIASSI and is a local chapter of the Associated Labor Union. The dispute
started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
Board (Wage Board) of Caraga Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage
Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which granted an additional PhP12 per day cost of
living allowance to the minimum wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly
to NIASSIs failure to implement the wage order, the Union filed a complaint
before the DOLE Caraga Regional Office for the inspection of NIASSIs
records and the enforcement of WORXIII-02. A DOLE inspection team
was accordingly dispatched and reported that WO RXIII-02 was not applicable
to NIASSIs employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher
than the prescribed minimum wage. Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE
Regional Director indorsed the case to the NLRC Regional Arbitration
Branch for further hearing, which in turn referred the case to the NCMB for
voluntary arbitration. On February 22, 2002, Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus
G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Unions prayer for the
implementation of WO RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not
specifically prohibit the grant of wage increase to employees earning above the
minimum wage. On the contrary, Chavez said, the wage order
specifically enumerated those who are outside its coverage, but did not include
in the enumeration those earning above the minimum wage. He also held that
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between NIASSI and the Union
provides that wage increases granted by the company within one year from
CBA signing shall not be creditable to future legally mandated wage increases.
Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with the
CA a petition for review, which affirmed the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator.
ISSUE: WON the wage order may be made to apply and cover Nasipits
employees who, at the time of the issuance and effectivity of the wage order,
were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prevailing minimum wage.
DECISION: No. It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions
of WO RXIII-02 and its IRR that only minimum wage earners are entitled to
the prescribed wage increase. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.6 The
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.
The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific nough to cover
only minimum wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates
above the prescribed minimum wage. The only situation when employees
receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the WO RXIII-02 may still
benefit from the order is, as indicated in Sec. 1 (c) of the IRRs, through the
correction of wage distortions. Clearly then, only employees receiving salaries
below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage increase set forth
under WO RXIII-02, without prejudice, of course, to the grant of increase to
correct wage distortions consequent to the implementation of such wage order.
Considering that NIASSIs employees are undisputedly already receiving a
wage rate higher than that prescribed by the wage order, NIASSI is not legally
obliged to grant them wage increase.CA reversed.** Petitioners reliance on
the above quoted CBA provision and on the flawed arbitrators case disposition
is really misplaced. Consider that in his decision, Chavez, after admitting that
NIASSIs employees were receiving a wage rate higher than the prescribed
minimum wage, proceeded to fault NIASSI for not presenting evidence to
show that the overage or excess resulted from general wage increases granted
by the company itself within one year from the effectivity of the CBA in 1997.
By simplistically utilizing the adage "doubt is resolved in labor," instead
of relying on the case records and the evidence adduced, the voluntary
arbitrator extended the coverage of WO RXIII-02 to include those who, by the
terms of the order, are not supposed to receive the benefit. If only the voluntary
arbitrator was circumspect enough to consider the facts on hand, he would have
seen that the CBA provision on non-creditability finds no application in the
present case, because creditability is not the real issue in this case. And neither
is the interpretation of the CBA provision. The real issue in this case, as
discussed above, is the coverage and application of WO RXIII-02.While it
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behooves the Court to accord protection to the working class, tilting the
balance of justice in its favor whenever appropriate, it is not possible to resolve
every dispute to further the cause of labor. In every case, justice is to be
granted to the deserving and dispensed in the light of established facts and the
applicable law and doctrine, DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Philam v Arnaldo G.R. No. 76452 July 26, 1994
J. Quiason

Facts:
One Ramon Paterno complained about the unfair practices committed by the
company against its agents, employees and consumers. The Commissioner
called for a hearing where Paterno was required to specify which acts were
illegal. Paterno then specified that the fees and charges stated in the Contract of
Agency between Philam and its agents be declared void. Philam, on the other
hand, averred that there Paterno must submit a verified formal complaint and
that his letter didnt contain information Philam was seeking from him. Philam
then questioned the InsuranceCommissions jurisdiction over the matter
and submitted a motion to quash. The commissioner denied this. Hence this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the legality of the Contract of Agency
falls within the jurisdiction of the Insurance Commissioner.

Held: No. Petition granted.

Ratio:
According to the Insurance code, the Insurance Commissioner was authorized
to suspend, directors, officers, and agents of insurance companies. In general,
he was tasked to regulate theinsurance business, which includes:
(2) The term "doing an insurance business" or "transacting an insurance
business," within the meaning of this Code, shall include
(a) making or proposing to make, as insurer, any insurance contract;
(b) making, or proposing to make, as surety, any contract of suretyship as a
vocation and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate business or
activity of the surety; (c) doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance
business, specifically recognized as constituting the doing of aninsurance
business within the meaning of this Code; (d) doing or proposing to do any
business insubstance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to
evade the provisions of this Code. (Insurance Code, Sec. 2[2])
The contract of agency between Philamlife and its agents wasnt included with
the Commissoners power to regulate the business. Hence,
the Insurance commissioner wasnt vested with jurisidiction under the rule
expresio unius est exclusion alterius.
The respondent contended that the commissioner had the quasi-judicial power
to adjudicate under Section 416 of the Code. It stated:
The Commissioner shall have the power to adjudicate claims and complaints
involving any loss, damage or liability for which an insurer may be answerable
under any kind of policy or contract of insurance, or for which
such insurer may be liable under a contract of suretyship, or for which a
reinsurer may be used under any contract or reinsurance it may have entered
into, or for which a mutual benefit association may be held liable under the
membership certificates it has issued to its members, where the amount of any
such loss, damage or liability, excluding interest, costs and attorney's fees,
being claimed or sued upon any kind of insurance, bond, reinsurance contract,
or membership certificate does not exceed in any single claim one hundred
thousand pesos.
This was, however, regarding complaints filed by the insured against the
Insurance company.
Also, the insurance code only discusses the licensing requirements for agents
and brokers. The Insurance Code does not have provisions governing the
relations between insurance companiesand their agents.
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Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines v. Social
Security Commission- that aninsurance company may have two classes of
agents who sell its insurance policies: (1) salaried employees who keep definite
hours and work under the control and supervision of the company; and (2)
registered representatives, who work on commission basis.
The agents under the 2
nd
sentence are governed by the Civil Code laws on
agency. This means that the regular courts have jurisdiction over this category.
MONTOYA V. ESCAYO, G.R. NO. 82211-12, MARCH 21, 1989, 171
SCRA 442
FACTS: All formerly employed as salesgirl
s in Montoyas store, the "Terry's Dry Goods Store,"
separately filed complaints for the collection of sums of money against the petitioner for alleged
unpaid overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and service leave pay: for violation
of the minimum wage law, illegal dismissal, and attorney's fees. Montoya moved for the
dismissal of the complaints claiming that among others, salesgirls failed to refer the dispute to the
Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and to secure the certification required from the
Lupon Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the Labor Arbiter. These actions were
allegedly violative of the provisions of P.D. No. 1508.
ISSUE: WON P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) is applicable to labor disputes?
HELD:
No. The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the submission of disputes
before the barangay Lupong Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court
or other government offices are not applicable to labor cases. Requiring conciliation of
labor disputes before the barangay courts would defeat the very salutary purposes of the law.
Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the
proper court or office to decide it finally, the position taken by the petitioner would only duplicate
the conciliation proceedings and unduly delay the disposition of the labor case.

PRIVATE ACTS AND CONTRACTS STATUTE
EMETERIA LIWAG, Petitioner vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent
G. R. No. 189755July 04, 2012Sereno, J.
FACTS
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned
from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former
failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo
over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from
the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to
lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA)and the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the
subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of
the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11,
Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. C-350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner,
wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association
demanding the removal of the overhead water tank over the parcel of land. The
latter refused and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving
heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent
Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for
water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-
350099wherein the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on
appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot
11, Block 5 was not an open space
ISSUE
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an open
space as defined in P.D. 1216.
RULING
Yes, t he aforementioned parcel of land is considered an open space.
The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to
determine whether the area falls under other similar facilities and amenities
since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water
facilities. Ejusdem generis states that where a general word or phrase follows
an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class, the general
word or phrase is to be construed to includeor to be restricted tothings akin
to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned.
Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers to
areas reserved for the common welfare of the community. Therefore, the
phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be interpreted in like
manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the
community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival in the
community would be impossible.