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www.elsevier.com/locate/COGNIT
0010-0277/$ - see front matter 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2006.09.008
When we think about thinking:
The acquisition of belief verbs
Anna Papafragou
a,
, Kimberly Cassidy
b
, Lila Gleitman
c,d
a
Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, 109 Wolf Hall, Newark, DE 19716, USA
b
Department of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College, 101 North Merion Avenue, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010, USA
c
Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Pennsylvania, 3401 Walnut St,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
d
Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, Busch Campus, Room A133, 152 Freylinghuysen Road,
Piscataway, NJ 08854, USA
Received 13 April 2006; revised 5 September 2006; accepted 11 September 2006
Abstract
Mental-content verbs such as think, believe, imagine and hope seem to pose special problems
for the young language learner. One possible explanation for these diYculties is that the con-
cepts that these verbs express are hard to grasp and therefore their acquisition must await rele-
vant conceptual development. According to a diVerent, perhaps complementary, proposal, a
major contributor to the diYculty of these items lies with the informational requirements for
identifying them from the contexts in which they appear. The experiments reported here explore
the implications of these proposals by investigating the contribution of observational and lin-
guistic cues to the acquisition of mental predicate vocabulary. We Wrst demonstrate that partic-
ular observed situations can be helpful in prompting reference to mental contents, speciWcally,
contexts that include a salient and/or unusual mental state such as a false belief. We then com-
pare the potency of such observational support to the reliability of alternate or concomitant
syntactic information (e.g., sentential complementation) in tasks where both children and adults
are asked to hypothesize the meaning of novel verbs. The Wndings support the eYcacy of false
belief situations for increasing the saliency of mental state descriptions, but also show that