The Neypes Rule

STATEMENT OF THE RULE

The "Neypes Rule," otherwise known as the Fresh Period Rule,
states that a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within
15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it
within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. (Domingo Neypes
versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005)


PURPOSE OF THE RULE

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it
practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of
the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. (supra)

The raison dtre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the
appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as
to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day
period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not
concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to
appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or
any final order or resolution. (Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa Samson-
Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

THE RULE PRIOR TO NEYPES

Before the Supreme Court prmulgated Neypes, the rules mandate that
the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the
period to appeal; and that an appeal should be taken within 15 days
from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. While the
period to file an appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, the appellant does not have the full fifteen (15) days.
The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period
to file the notice of appeal. Thus, some rules on appeals are:

Sec. 39. [B.P. 129] Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal
shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed
from. x x x

SEC. 3. [Rule 41] Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

SEC. 6. [Rule 122] When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be
taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or
from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting
an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion
has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the
balance of the period begins to run.

IN WHAT CASES APPLICABLE

`Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40
governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts
to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or
make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. (Neypes,
supra)

Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either
motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory
after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
Section 3. (Neypes, supra)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party
opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this
manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize
and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we aim to resolve cases
with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. (Neypes,
supra)

APPLICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts
pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should equally apply to
the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of
Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in
a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically
states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we
(this Court) also ought not to recognize any distinction.
17


Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the
same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions
insofar as legal results are concerned the appeal period stops
running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and
starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for
new trial or reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes
addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this situation in criminal
cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal
period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review
from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this Court,
both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be
by petition for review under Rule 42.
x x x x

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all
other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and
criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why the periods
to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to
the CA in civil and criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and
make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall
effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in
a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a
criminal case a situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and
unjustly discriminates against the accused-appellants. It suggests a
double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where
property interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty
stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this double and
unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have
recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to
reason is not allowed in law Quod est inconveniens, aut contra
rationem non permissum est in lege.
18
(Judith Yu versus Hon. Rosa
Samson-Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, 09 Feb. 2011)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT

The determinative issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced
in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for
appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was
promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the
general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there
being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
17
Amendments to
procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not
create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
18


Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically
warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer
justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of
statues ! they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh
period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event
that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court.
Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period
rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the "fresh period rule"
will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of
judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year
2000, as compared to the notice of judgment and final order
in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and
illogical that parties receiving notices of judgment and final orders
issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the "fresh period
rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant
case, will not.
19


Notably, the subject incidents in Sps. De los Santos occurred in August
2000, at the same month as the relevant incidents at bar. There is no
reason to adopt herein a rule that is divergent from that in Sps. De los
Santos. (Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. versus Hon. Marietta Homena J.
Valencia, G.R. No. 173942, 25 June 2008)


NOT INCONSISTENT WITH RULES OF COURT

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the
disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies.33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15
days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the
"final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998
order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration. (Neypes,
supra)