PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION V.

IAC
Emergency Recitation:
Dionisio was on his way home and had taken a shot or two of liquor from a
cocktail party. He alleged that his headlights had failed so he switched it on bright
and saw an improperly parked not parallel to the street curb! dump truck on the
street. He smashed into the dump truck. "s a result# he suffered some physical
in$uries# permanent facial scars# a ner%ous breakdown and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
Dionisio filed an action for damages against &arbonel truck dri%er! and
'hoeni( employer!# claiming that the pro(imate cause of his in$uries was the
negligence of &arbonel in parking his truck. 'hoeni( countered that Dionisio was
recklessly dri%ing at the time of the accident while under the influence of liquor.
ISSUE: )*+ there was comparati%e negligence on the part of Dionisio. , -E./ ..but
'hoeni( is still liable. &omparati%e negligence merely decreased the award of
damages.!
Dionisio was negligent at the night of the accident. He was hurrying home and
dri%ing faster than he should ha%e been and he purposely e(tinguished his headlights
because there was a nearby police station and there was a curfew since it was
martial law at the time.
Howe%er# the .& agreed that the pro(imate cause of the accident was the
negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked. Dionisio0s negligence was
merely a foreseeable inter%ening cause
1
to which 'hoeni( should be ultimately liable
for. 2he collision between the dump truck and car would in all probability not ha%e
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or
reflector de%ices. 2he truck dri%er owed a duty to Dionisio and others similarly
situated not to impose upon them the %ery risk he had created.
2he court held that Dionisio0s negligence was only contributory. Hence# the
award of damages to Dionisio was decreased by 345.
(Disclaimer: Ang daming diniscuss ng case, hinati ko na lang into topics sa ratio.
Nilagay ko na lahat just in case me itanong sya about it.)
FACTS:
"t 1:64 "7# Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails8and8dinner
meeting with his boss and had taken 9a shot or two9 of liquor.
Dionisio was dri%ing his :olkswagen car when his car headlights in his
allegation! suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on 9bright9 and saw a
;ord dump truck some 381<3 meters away from his car.
2he dump truck# owned by and registered in the name of 'hoeni(
&onstruction =nc. 9'hoeni(9!# was parked on the right hand side of the street
facing the oncoming traffic. =t was parked askew not parallel to the street
curb! in such a manner as to stick out onto the street# partly blocking the way
of oncoming traffic. 2here were no lights nor any so8called 9early warning9
1
Foreseeable Intervening Cause 8 =f the inter%ening cause is one which in ordinary human
e(perience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances# the defendant may be negligent among other reasons# because
of failure to guard against it> or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
reflector de%ices set anywhere near the dump truck# front or rear.
2he dump truck had earlier that e%ening been dri%en home by &arbonel# its
regular dri%er# with the permission of his employer 'hoeni(# in %iew of work
scheduled to be carried out early the following morning.
Dionisio claimed that he tried to a%oid a collision by swer%ing his car to the
left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. "s a result of
the collision# Dionisio suffered some physical in$uries including some
permanent facial scars# a 9ner%ous breakdown9 and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages basically claiming that the legal
and pro(imate cause of his in$uries was the negligent manner in which
&arbonel had parked the dump truck. 'hoeni( and &arbonel# on the other
hand# countered that the pro(imate cause of Dionisio?s in$uries was his own
recklessness in dri%ing fast at the time of the accident# while under the
influence of liquor# without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
'hoeni( and &arbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner in
which the dump truck was parked# that negligence was merely a 9passi%e and
static condition9 and that Dionisio?s recklessness constituted an inter%ening#
efficient cause determinati%e of the accident and the in$uries he sustained.
2he trial court rendered $udgment in fa%or of Dionisio# which was affirmed by
="&. Hence# this petition for re%iew.
ISSUE:
)*+ there was comparati%e negligence on the part of Dionisio. , -E./ ..but
'hoeni( is still liable to him. &omparati%e negligence merely decreased the
award of damages.!
HELD:
)HERE;*RE# the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by
reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages# loss of e(pected
income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 2! of such amount.
RATIO:
You may choose not to read the first bullet and its subbullets. Additional factual
circumstances lang sya from !"#s ratio.)
2here are four factual issues that need to be looked into:
o a! whether or not pri%ate respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass %alid
and effecti%e for that e%entful night> " NO. Dionisio was unable to
pro%e possession of a %alid curfew pass during the night of the
accident and that the preponderance of e%idence shows that he did not
ha%e such a pass during that night. ($his %as during martial la%.)
o b! whether Dionisio was dri%ing fast or speeding $ust before the
collision with the dump truck> " #ES. 'atrolman &uyno testified that
people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that
Dionisio?s car was 9mo%ing fast9 and did not ha%e its headlights on.
o c! whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car?s headlights
before contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights
accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision> 8 the
$or%&r. 'hoeni(0s theory i.e. Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights e%en before he reached the intersection so as not to be
detected by the police in the police precinct which he knew was not far
away from the intersection! is a more credible e(planation than that
offered by Dionisio i.e.# that he had his headlights on but that# at the
crucial moment# these had in some mysterious if con%enient way
malfunctioned and gone off# although he succeeded in switching his
lights on again at 9bright9 split seconds before contact with the dump
truck!.
o d! whether Dionisio was into(icated at the time of the accident. NO.
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed
car and brought to the hospital but this e%idence is not sufficient to
show that Dionisio was so hea%ily under the influence of liquor as to
constitute his dri%ing a motor %ehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. 2here simply is not enough e%idence to show how much
liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical
faculties or upon his $udgment or mental alertness. 9*ne shot or two9
of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
2he conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances is that Dioni'io ()'
n&*li*&nt t+& ni*+t o$ t+& )cci,&nt. He was hurrying home that night and
dri%ing faster than he should ha%e been. )orse# he e(tinguished his
headlights because there was a nearby police station and there was a curfew
since it was martial law at the time! and thus did not see the dump truck that
was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane.
+onetheless# t+& l&*)l )n, -ro.i%)t& c)u'& o$ t+& )cci,&nt )n, o$
Dioni'io/' in0uri&' ()' t+& (ron*$ul 1 or n&*li*&nt %)nn&r in (+ic+
t+& ,u%- truc2 ()' -)r2&, in ot+&r (or,'3 the negligence of &arbonel.
2hat there was a reasonable relationship between &arbonel?s negligence on
the one hand and the accident and Dionisio0s in$uries on the other hand# is
quite clear.
"ause &. "ondition
'hoeni(# howe%er# urge that the truck dri%er?s negligence was merely a
9passi%e and static con,ition9 and that Dionisio?s negligence was an 9efficient
inter%ening c)u'& and that consequently Dionisio?s negligence must be
regarded as the legal and pro(imate cause of the accident rather than the
earlier negligence of &arbonel. )e note# firstly# that e%en in the @nited .tates#
the distinctions between 9cause9 and 9condition9 which the ?petitioners would
ha%e us adopt ha%e already been 9almost entirely discredited.9 'rofessors and
Aeeton make this quite clear:
o =f the defendant has created only a passi%e static condition which
made the damage possible# the defendant is said not to be liable. But
so far as the fact of causation is concerned# in the sense of necessary
antecedents which ha%e played an important part in producing the
result it i' 4uit& i%-o''ibl& to ,i'tin*ui'+ b&t(&&n )cti5& $orc&'
)n, -)''i5& 'itu)tion'. 9&ause9 and 9condition9 still find occasional
mention in the decisions> but the ,i'tinction i' no( )l%o't &ntir&ly
,i'cr&,it&,6 it is not the distinction between 9cause9 and 9condition9
which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the
inter%ening cause.
2he truck dri%er?s negligence far from being a 9passi%e and static condition9
was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. 2he collision between the
dump truck and the car would in an probability not ha%e occurred had the
dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
de%ices.
'oreseeable (nter&ening "ause
Dionisio?s negligence was not an efficient inter%ening or independent cause.
)hat the 'etitioners describe as an 9inter%ening cause9 was no more than a
foreseeable inter%ening cause for which 'hoeni( should be liable for.
Foreseeable Intervening Cause 8 =f the inter%ening cause is one which in
ordinary human e(perience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the
defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances# the
defendant may be negligent among other reasons# because of failure to guard
against it> or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.
o 2he standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to
protect the plaintiff against ?that occasional negligence which is one of
the ordinary incidents of human life# and therefore to be anticipated.?
2hus# one %ho parks an automobile on the high%ay %ithout lights at
night is not relie&ed of responsibility %hen another negligently dri&es
into it.
=n other words# t+& truc2 ,ri5&r o(&, ) ,uty to Dioni'io )n, ot+&r'
'i%il)rly 'itu)t&, not to i%-o'& u-on t+&% t+& 5&ry ri'2 t+& truc2
,ri5&r +), cr&)t&,. Dionisio?s negligence was not of an independent and
o%erpowering nature as to cut# as it were# the chain of causation in fact
between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident# nor to
se%er the $uris %inculum of liability.
7& +ol, t+)t Dioni'io/' n&*li*&nc& ()' 8only contributory38 t+)t t+&
8i%%&,i)t& )n, -ro.i%)t& c)u'&8 o$ t+& in0ury r&%)in&, t+& truc2
,ri5&r/' 8l)c2 o$ ,u& c)r&8 )n, t+)t con'&4u&ntly r&'-on,&nt Dioni'io
%)y r&co5&r ,)%)*&' t+ou*+ 'uc+ ,)%)*&' )r& 'ub0&ct to %iti*)tion
by t+& court' (Article )*+,, "i&il "ode of the -hilippines).
Doctrine of .ast "lear "hance
'hoeni( also ask us to apply what they refer to as the 9last clear chance9
doctrine. 2he common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant reco%ery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent pro%ided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to a%oid the casualty and failed to do so.
"ccordingly# it is difficult to see what role# if any# the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a $urisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to reco%ery by the plaintiff# has
itself been re$ected# as it has been in "rticle 31CD of the &i%il &ode of the
'hilippines.
@nder "rticle 31CD# the task of a court# in technical terms# is to determine
whose negligence E the plaintiff?s or the defendant?s E was the legal or
pro(imate cause of the in$ury. 2hat task is not simply or e%en primarily an
e(ercise in chronology or physics# as the petitioners seem to imply by the use
of terms like 9last9 or 9inter%ening9 or 9immediate.9 *f more fundamental
importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and
the character and gra%ity of the risks created by such act or omission for the
rest of the community.
-resumption of negligence on employer
&arbonel?s pro%en negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part
of his employer 'hoeni( in super%ising its employees properly and adequately.
'hoeni( was not able to o%ercome this. 2he circumstance that 'hoeni( had
allowed its truck dri%er to bring the dump truck to his home whene%er there
was work to be done early the following morning# when coupled with the
failure to show any effort on the part of 'hoeni( to super%ise the manner in
which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises# is an
affirmati%e showing of culpa in &igilando on the part of 'hoeni(.
Lastly (only part na nabanggit yong "/0-A1A$(23 N34.(43N"3)
o 2urning to the award of damages and taking into account the co%-)r)ti5&
n&*li*&nc& of Dionisio on one hand and &arbonel and 'hoeni( upon the
other hand# we belie%e that the demands of substantial $ustice are satisfied by
allocating most of the damages on a 2"9 r)tio.