PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

and GRACE DE GUZMAN
FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as
Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as
reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and
July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.
On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where
probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under
civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When
petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a
memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder
about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from
the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993
declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having
contracted marriage in violation of company policies.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an
employee.
HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free
to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best
business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.
PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is
afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our
Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally
because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company,
and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor
code:
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate
expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a
woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and
it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of
policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited
in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the
land not only for order but also imperatively required.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was
discriminatory
Whether or not Graces act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence
Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed
HELD:
There was discrimination. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by
reason of the marriage of a female employee.
Petitioners policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners assertion that it
dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses
clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her supposed acts
of dishonesty.
Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty
Verily, private respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because
she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by
that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be
simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employers caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal, or unjustified.
However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be sanctioned
and therefore agreed with the NLRCs decision that the dishonesty warranted temporary suspension of
Grace from work.
Grace attained regular status as an employee
Private respondent, it must be observed, had gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When
she was served her walking papers on Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period
of 150 days as she was contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal
would be effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible
conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.
There was illegal dismissal
As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had been dismissed without just
cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to full
back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent.
On Stipulation against Marriage
In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&Ts policy against marriage is that it strikes at the very essence,
ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the
foundation of the nation. Petition dismissed.

Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003
FACTS: Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City,
requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man
not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another
woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally
married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of
Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of
the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch
Tower Central Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD: A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a
high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it
should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant,
a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor
General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondents position that
her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise
protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause
protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.
Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom but
must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor
General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the
sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show
that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious
freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court
Administrator's receipt of this Decision.



ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, vs. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
FACTS: The parties were legally and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her
parents. The defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of
her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other successive dates, made
similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just
refusals of the plaintiff exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed
and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and that, as the plaintiff was
unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from
maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents. This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile. It
was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant cannot be compelled to
support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a
divorce or separation from the defendant.
Issue:
Whether or not the husband be compelled to pay the pension outside of the conjugal domicile?
Held:
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the solemnities
established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are concerned requiring the consent of
the parties. To this extent a marriage partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something
more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not upon
the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties,
and obligations. Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested. It is a relation for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of
any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long as it continues, are
such as the law determines from time to time, and none other. When the legal existence of the parties is
merged into one by marriage, the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government
upon principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And when the object of a
marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable




Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252
FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on
January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a
month before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for
support outside the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her
husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent
maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or
divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of
marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of
his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.











Balogbog vs. CA
FACTS: Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt
Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of
First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three
children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso
was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they
were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and
Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They
started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how
Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew
as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they
presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who
both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate
by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in
Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office
did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time
of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or
have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that
of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided
that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.


HELD: Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino
and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their
grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having
been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of
this country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil
Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights,
and the rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not
mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and
Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that
they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Eugenio vs Velez
FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she
was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner,
Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of
habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that
a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
HELD: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the
surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and
left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine
law does not recognize common law marriages where a man and a woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon
FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge
Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in
MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage
license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias
& Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya &
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to
be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code
thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to
complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with the
civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of
which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally solemnized
because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not
included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant
Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario
were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license and
that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without the requisite license due to the
insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD: Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it
was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by
judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They
already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to
the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing
of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was
simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano &
Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with
considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage contract that
Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6 years
already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less
than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have
been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have
executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall
not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

Wassmer vs Velez
FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days
before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his
mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest
assured returning soon. Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of
promise to marry.
LETTERS:
1) Will have to postpone wedding -my mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today. Please do
not ask too many people about the reason why -That would only create a scandal.
2) Nothing changed rest assured returning very soon apologize mama papa love.
ISSUE: Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
HELD: The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to
walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under
Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy
FACTS: Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific
acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds
of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27,
1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they
are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and
been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge
holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50
km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
HELD: The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being
a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and
the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a
summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where
it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not
invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.



Aranes vs. Judge Occiano
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of
the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the
marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on
January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed
it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged
marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to
conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage
license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from
stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that
same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license
and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.