Magno vs.

CA (Crim1)
Oriel Magno, petitioner, vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, respondents.

June 26, 1992

Paras, J:

Facts:
Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President,
Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third party who could
lend him that amount.
Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.
As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest had no
sufficient fund.
Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the
equipment.
Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.
Issue:
Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.
Held:
No
Ratio:
To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not his own
account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he did not receive
the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company which is
managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND DENNIS GARAY, RESPONDENTS.

G. R. NO. 167011, APRIL 30, 2008

FACTS:

Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of
Section 10[11] of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street,
Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa
Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City.
The petitioners contended, inter alia that Section 45(j) of the Voters Registration Act was void for being vague
as it did not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense ;
hence, it ran contrary to Section 14(1) and section 14 (2) , Article III of the 1987 Constitution ( due process
clause)
Nevertheless, the Commission on Election (COMELEC) Charged the petitioners with violations of Section
10 (g) and (j) , in relation to Section 45 (J) of the Voters Registration Act.
1. Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provides that a qualified voter shall be
registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to
be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application
form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on
any date during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter. The application shall,
inter alia, contain the following data: Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of
registration and a statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct.
2. Section 45(j) of the same Act provides, inter alia, that the following shall be considered election
offenses under this Act: Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or in excess of its jurisdiction
when it premised its resolution on a misapprehension of facts and failed to consider certain relevant facts that
would justify a different conclusion.

HELD:

NO. The Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law
is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the
challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation or an on-its-face
invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.
Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose
cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of actual case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness.The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech,
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of
probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Title: Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council
SCRA Citation: 632 SCRA 146
Date Promulgated: October 5, 2010

Petitioners: This is a consolidation of 6 petitions, thus:
GR No.
178552
Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc.
NGO
certiorari and
prohibition
Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr.
Concerned
citizen, taxpayer,
and lawyer
GR No.
178554
KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR citizens
GR No.
178581
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL,
COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
PAMALAKAYA, ACT, HEAD, Guingona, Jr.,
Lumbera, Constantino, Jr., Sr. Manansan,
OSB, Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco, Ret. Col.
Cunanan, Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Pagaduan-
Araullo, Reyes, Ramos, De Jesus, Baua,
Casambre

GR No.
178890
SELDA, EMJP, PCPR
GR No.
179157
IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III,
and Taada

GR. No. BAYAN-ST, other regl chapters and orgs
179461 mostly based in Southern Tagalog

Respondents:
Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of:
o Chairperson Eduardo Ermita
o Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales
o Acting Defense Secretary Alberto
Romulo
o National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales
o DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno
o Finance Secretary
MargaritoTeves
AFP Chief of Staff General
HermogenesEsperon
PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon
PGMA
Support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism
Council, namely:
o National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency
o NBI
o Bureau of Immigration
o Office of Civil Defense
o Intelligence Service of the AFP
o Anti-Money Laundering Center
o Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime
o PNP intelligence and
investigative elements

FACTS:
This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, An Act to Secure the
State and Protect our People from Terrorism, aka Human Security Act of 2007.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standion the basis of being suspected communist fronts by
the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and
their status as citizens and taxpayers.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to
close security surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons
and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They
likewise claim they have been branded as enemies of the State.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA,
ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged
action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such
tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution.
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.


ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners resort to certiorari is proper NO.
2. WON petitioners have locus standiNO.
3. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged tagging NO.
4. WON petitioners can invoke the transcendental importance doctrine NO.
5. WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens NO.
6. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy NO.
7. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO.
8. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners NO.
9. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its
validity NO.

HELD AND RATIO:
1. Petition for certiorari is improper.
a. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that petition for certiorari applies when
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
b. Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without
or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
c. The power of judicial review has 4 requisites:
i. There must be an actual case or controversy.
ii. Petitioners must possess locus standi.
iii. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case.
The present case lacks the 1
st
2 requisites, which are the most essential.
2. Petitioners lack locus standi.
a. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure concrete adverseness.
b. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary,locus standihas been defined as
that requiring:
i. That the person assailing must have a direct and personal interest AND
ii. That the person sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct
inquiry as a result of the act being challenged.
c. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must show that:
i. He has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury;
ii. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; AND
iii. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
d. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Such necessitates closer
judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
e. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no, however, suffice to clothe
the IBP or any of its members with standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its
mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties.
f. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of political
surveillance also lacks locus standi. The same is true for WigbertoTaada and Osmea III, who
cite their being a human rights advocate and an oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury has
been pinpointed, hence, no locus standi.
3. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging.
a. Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:
i. matter must be one of common and general knowledge
ii. must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain or capable of
accurate and ready determination
iii. known to be within thelimits of the jurisdiction of the court
b. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. It can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to: (1) facts
evidenced by public records and (2) facts of general notoriety.
c. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or
non-existence of a fact of which the Court has no constructive knowledge.
d. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or
proscription under RA 9371 has been filed against them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies any
claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct
injury to their organization and members.
e. Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the Arroyo administration will adopt
the US and EU classification of CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations, there is yet to be filed
before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist
or outlawed organization under RA 9372.
4. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona,to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are the determinants:
a. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised
In the case at bar, there are other partiesnot before the Court withdirect and specific interests in
the questions being raised.
5. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.
a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for
its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and
personal interest in the implementation of the law.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish
locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
6. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of them faces any charge under
RA 9372.
a. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An actual case or
controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.
b. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. The
pleadings must show:
i. an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right and
ii. a denial thereof
c. However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is
qualified by the presence of sufficient facts.
d. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory
petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a
petitioner seeks to do, as there would be a justiciable controversy. However, in the case at bar,
the petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid
constitutionally protected conduct or activity. No demonstrable threat has been established,
much less a real and existing one.
e. Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported surveillance and the
implementation of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and
supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion,
which is not its function. If the case is merely theorized, it lies beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.
7. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case
since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not
speech.
a. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal
statutes.
b. Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the
Court nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein
subject election offense under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein
petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.
c. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendozas Separate Opinion in the Estrada
case: Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its
validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one, which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does
not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect. If facial
challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to
free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
8. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an
actual or imminent chargeagainst them.
a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same
plane.
i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:
1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to
the Constitution in 2 ways:
a. Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid
b. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means,
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
b. A facial challenge is likewise different from an as applied challenge.
i. As applied challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.
ii. Facial challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If
facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible.
9. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of
its validity.
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the enumerated special penal laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech
clause. The argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.
c. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on
just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some
mincing of words on the part of offender. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental
to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially
harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech.

Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:
- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that the grounds for dismissal in
this case are more procedural than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises and when it
becomes ripe for adjudication, the specific questions raised here may be raised again.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Petitioner: Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Respondents: Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines
Ponente: J. Bellosillo
FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No.
7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being
prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element
of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the
legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is amalum in se. The
predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are
committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of
plunder is a malum in se.

People v Dacuycuy
Facts:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. They
also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than P1000,
or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel and
unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled that the
said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of delegation of legislative power.

Issue:
W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.

Held:
NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if the
judicial department was a legislative dept. The exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use legislative
power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of existing laws
to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of powers and non-delegability of
legislative powers

Minucher v CA
Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking
an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with
the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military
intelligence community).

Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained
to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas
Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo
expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.

Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a
buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts
concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.

It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both
were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash
summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for
damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.

TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that
because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission
investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.

Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a
Diplomatic Note.

Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service
of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect
in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with
Counterclaim.

The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate
that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and
functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima
facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with
evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000



Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by
the MeTC. After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
The next day, the MeTC judge received an office of protocol from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication
that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal
cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside
the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion
for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that
he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of
the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Govt.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioners case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication
from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs
to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity
under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in
official capacity. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case.
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.
The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

PEOPLE vs. Lacson, October 7, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures, and that
these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused. Petitioner
asserts that Sec 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line with the
constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 5 Associate Justices inhibit themselves from deciding in the Motion for Reconsideration
given they were only appointed in the SC after his Feb. 19, 2002 oral arguments.

The rule should be applied prospectively. The court upheld the petitioners contention that while Sec.8 secures
the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public
justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a
retroactive application.

2. WON the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a retroactive application without
reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the accused.

The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused. The time-
bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and
the accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it intended that the rule be applied prospectively and
not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial
of the States right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.

GO VS DIMAGIBA

Go vs. Dimagiba
Post under case digests, Criminal Law at Wednesday, February 29, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for
encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed. Subqequently,
Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and
Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes, approved on April 3, 1979).
He was found guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the
offended party the amount he owed plus interest. On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the
Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision. Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the
penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The MTCC denied the
motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October
9, 2001, Dimagiba filed with the RTC ofBaguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by
the said court after hearing the case.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the properremedy.

(2) Whether or not SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive application.

Held:
(1) No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration
and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of
the MTCC Order denying these motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to
reopen a case that had already become final and executory, an action deplorably amounting to forum
shopping.

(2) No. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the
accused. SC-AC No. 12-2000 cannot be given retroactive application for it is not a law that deletes the penalty
of imprisonment. It is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar
circumstances of the case.


US v. BullThe United States vs. H.N. BullGR L-5270Jan 15, 1910Facts:On the 2
nd
of December 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Standardcommanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila,
Philippines. It was found that said vessel fromAmpieng, Formosa carried 677 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper suitablemeans for
securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others to havedied while in transit.This cruelty to animals is
said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Constitution.It is however contended that cases cannot be
filed because neither was it said that the court sittingwhere the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say
about ships not licensedunder Philippine laws, like the ship involved.Issue:Whether or not the court had
jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship whileinside the territorial waters of the
Philippines.Held:No court of the Philippines has jurisdiction over any crimes committed in a foreign ship on the high seas,but the moment it entered into
territorial waters, it automatically would be subject to the jurisdiction of the country. The offense, assuming that it originated in Formosa, which the Philippines would
have no jurisdiction, continued until it reached Philippine territory which is already under jurisdiction of thePhilippines.Every state has complete
control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. The Supreme Court of theUnited States has recently said that
merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for thepurpose of trade would subject themselves to the laws which
govern the ports they visit, so long as theyremain.Defendant is thereby found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, and to pay the costs