Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato
2
admitting
petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed
in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business,
married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he
filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his
qualifications as required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in 3 of the
law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions
of Letter of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization,
Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but
the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee
on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such
that processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was
suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the
State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is
rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major
portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your
Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines.And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to
counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as
the petitioner himself.
3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to
state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to
conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and
(5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization
filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No.
031767,
5
in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had
likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however,
failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that
his petition must fail.
6
The state also annexed income tax returns
7
allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself
and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once
before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with
his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It
was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any.
The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract
8
and a Joint-
Affidavit
9
executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when
petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona
Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of
marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with
his wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence,
10
petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said
address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already
noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from
raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal.
11
The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong
Chia failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name,
"LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous application
under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in
the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a
decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons
who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the
authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that
he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7
of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition
"his present and former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and
failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by
the Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the
investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of the petition,
an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving
the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of
the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of
wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year
cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her
three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and
irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore
disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . .
.
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00,
exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His
failure to file an income tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet"
confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown
that the employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable
margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus
avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they
are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance
given to them by their children. The monthly pension given by the elder
children of the applicant cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative
because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE
COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE
CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER
HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS
PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS
PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND
IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the
basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been
presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of
any evidentiary value,"
12
so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143
13
of the Rules of Court
which provides that
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) now
being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy
or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on
appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata.
14
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from
later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due
process.
15
We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party
the chance to object to their admissibility.
16
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court
by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No.
031767) which was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been
established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . .
is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee
is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be
considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal.
17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case
No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet
18
of the Special Committee on Naturalization which
was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no
evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely, the petition in SCN Case
No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his
wife, and petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have
been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a
satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of
these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but
to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to
include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with 7, C.A. No.
473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document
which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization.
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that
since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published,
19
with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with 7.
20
This is allegedly because the publication effectively
satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of
the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior
on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another.
21
It is
settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
22
As noted by the State,
C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in
the petition his present and former places of residence.
23
This provision and the rule of
strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of
"substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On
this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
For automatic review is the decision
1
promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional
Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105. It
found appellant Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No.
7659. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection.
In an Information dated September 26, 1996, appellant was charged as follows:"That on
or about September 25, 1996, at Sitio Bulan, Barangay Sawmill, Municipality of
Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was caught in flagrante delicto and
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
plant, cultivate and culture seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp
weighing 2.194 kilos, from which dangerous drugs maybe (sic) manufactured or derived,
to the damage and prejudice of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
"That the property where the said seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants were planted,
cultivated and cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
2

On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police
force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September
24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana
plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya.
3
The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police
Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then
formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The team was composed
of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1
Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same."
4

At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by
their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown.
After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives
arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant alone in his
nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had
his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut.
5
PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the
prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.
6
The
police uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.
7
The police
took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants.
8
Appellant was then
arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis.
9
Inspector Prevy
Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a
positive indication for marijuana.
10
She next conducted a chemical examination, the
results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:
"SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: Exh "A" - 1.090 grams of uprooted suspected marijuana
plant placed inside a white sack with markings.
x x x
"FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on the above stated specimen gave
POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug."
11

The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant, on which the growing marijuana
plants were found, was Lot 3224 of Timberland Block B, which formed part of the
Integrated Social Forestry Area in Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
12
This lot was part of the
public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the
lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
13

As its sole witness, the defense presented appellant. He testified that at around 10:00
o'clock A.M., September 25, 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan
when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go
with the latter to "see something."
14
This unknown person then brought appellant to the
place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his
nipa hut.
15
Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the
hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there.
When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him
to admit ownership of the plants.
16
Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he admitted
owning the marijuana.
17

The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He
was then made to uproot five of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where
another photo was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana
plants.
18
The police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the
way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied
the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to
participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the
marijuana, otherwise he would "be put in a bad situation."
19
At the police headquarters,
appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police.
20

On cross-examination, appellant declared that there were ten other houses around the
vicinity of his kaingin, the nearest house being 100 meters away.
21
The latter house
belonged to one Carlito (Lito) Pascua, an uncle of the barangay peace officer who had a
grudge against him. The spot where the marijuana plants were found was located between
his house and Carlito Pascua's.
22

The prosecution presented SPO3 Tipay as its rebuttal witness. His testimony was offered
to rebut appellant's claim that the marijuana plants were not planted in the lot he was
cultivating.
23
Tipay presented a sketch he made,
24
which showed the location of marijuana
plants in relation to the old and new nipa huts of appellant, as well as the closest
neighbor. According to Tipay, the marijuana plot was located 40 meters away from the
old hut of Valdez and 250 meters distant from the hut of Carlito Pascua.
25
Tipay admitted
on cross-examination that no surveyor accompanied him when he made the
measurements.
26
He further stated that his basis for claiming that appellant was the owner
or planter of the seized plants was the information given him by the police informer and
the proximity of appellant's hut to the location of said plants.
27

Finding appellant's defense insipid, the trial court held appellant liable as charged for
cultivation and ownership of marijuana plants as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of cultivating
marijuana plants punishable under section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, accused is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection. Costs against the
accused.
"SO ORDERED."
28

Appellant assigns the following errors for our consideration:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
THE SEVEN (7) MARIJUANA PLANTS DESPITE THEIR
INADMISSIBILITY BEING PRODUCTS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT
OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 9, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 DESPITE THE
INADMISSIBILITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI AND THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH UPON APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE LAND WHERE THE
MARIJUANA PLANTS WERE PLANTED IS A PUBLIC LAND ON THE
ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED APPELLANT PLANTED THE SUBJECT
MARIJUANA.
29

Simply stated, the issues are:
(1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case
lawful?
(2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused?
(3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
(4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct?
The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated.
Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law
enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the
marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the
mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling
of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868
(1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion
protects people, not places.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show
that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out
that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew
about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted
by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus,
in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a
warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine.
The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police
team on the finding that:
"...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the
plantation site merely to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too
much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the
plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in
the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants
upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot
was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced the
occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect,
hence, no search warrant was required."
30

The Constitution
31
lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on
the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed
"unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure
is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded.
32
Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding.
33

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to
search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where
the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and
apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and
inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search
and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants.
34
The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights
covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law
enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.
We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain
view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right
to be where they are; and
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
35

In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana
plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant.
36
Hence, there was no valid
warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the
police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the
prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer isnot searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object.
37
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area,
they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
plants.
38
Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a
"further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain
view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.
Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were
found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the
Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's person, which includes his
residence, his papers, and other possessions.
39
The guarantee refers to "the right of
personal security"
40
of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to
be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places.
41
To conclude
otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the
absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures,
he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of
Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of
his bedroom.
We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were
evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which
involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find
that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as
evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was,
therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied
upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana
plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now address the question of
whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant?
In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police
officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was
asked who planted them. It made the following observation:
"It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the
marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent counsel.
But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial investigation.
His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional
fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without
any counsel."
42

Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question
cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police
investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied upon said admission of
ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not a
general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana
plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him,
competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought
information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims
the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported
voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his
constitutional right to counsel during investigation.
The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was
not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the
marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not
yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false motive for the police
officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted.
The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
43
An
investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a
particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or
exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense.
44
The
moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from
a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted
by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel.
45

In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police
appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants
were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely
"verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest
appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to
appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The
questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry.
46

Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator
of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his
constitutional rights because we are just asking him..."
47
In trying to elicit information
from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point,
he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not
yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way."
48
As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated
appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed
policemen.
49
All had been dispatched to arrest him.
50
From these circumstances, we may
infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant
way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police made
him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants.
Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its
admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing.
51
The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also
uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation,
without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal
investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during
criminal investigations, it is also hearsay.
52
Even if the confession or admission were
"gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of
such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
53

It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a
crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was
committed and that the accused is the author thereof.
54
The evidence arrayed against the
accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason,
55
it must likewise be credible
and competent.
56
Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence.
57
Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to
receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial."
58

In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict
appellant of the offense charged.1wphi1 These were the seized marijuana plants, and
appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the
police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link appellant
with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have
admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to
convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted.
First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of
appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search
and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted without the requisite judicial
warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had
sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity
for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this
case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt
without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the
inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.
Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly
made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill
of Rights. The purported confession was made without the assistance of competent and
independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to
convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in
a criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel
during such investigation.
In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary
confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt
failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.
The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..."
59
To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
accused.
60
Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an
acquittal.
61
In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime charged
are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for
any purpose in any proceeding."
62
Nor can the confession obtained during the
uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence
against him."
63
Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the
prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence
necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his
favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order.
In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow.
Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the
evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."
64

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on February 18, 1997, by the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3105, finding
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and imposing upon him the death penalty, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence. Appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately from confinement unless held for
another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's
knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for
damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return
and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein
petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the
documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return
them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's
only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,
1
this Court ruled that the
documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that
case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney,
Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is
contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment.
Among other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice
or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty.
Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"
2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix,
Jr.], he maintains that:

. . . .
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional
Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7."
On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on
a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date
which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the
enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit
the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon
as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and
authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him
in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr.
Martin himself under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and,
therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his
admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the
same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.


Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a
declaration that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr.
Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of
the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish
the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of
violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because,
at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court
was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually
lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was
dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and
papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to
be] inviolable"
3
is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law."
4
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
6
Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
7
But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes
to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140538-39 June 14, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
GODOFREDO B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J .:
The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire, startling the
otherwise tranquil but sanguine folks of Pacol, Naga City. As the fusillade of shots
ceased and the wisp of smoke cleared, frolicking promenaders stumbled upon Ompong
Chavez who was gasping his last, clutching his intestines which had spewed out from his
bloodied stomach. He did not in fact reach the hospital alive. A breath away, Abe Cuya
lay lifeless on the pavement. He died on the spot. For the twinned deaths, the Adors, six
(6) of them, were haled to court.
In two (2) separate informations,
1
Diosdado Sr.,
2
Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo,
Rosalino and Allan, all surnamed Ador, were charged with the murder of Absalon "Abe"
S. Cuya III and Rodolfo "Ompong" S. Chavez. The Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-
6815 and 97-6816 identically read:
That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with treachery and the aid of armed men, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot ABSALON "ABE" CUYA III (RODOLFO
"OMPO" CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES
3
for Crim. Case No. 97-6816) with
firearms, inflicting upon him multiple and mortal gunshot wounds which caused
his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino
and Allan, were taken into custody. The two (2), Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained
at large. Trial thus proceeded only against Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan
who all pleaded not guilty. Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and
Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of Allan. Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are
brothers.
4

In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the prosecution presented a total of
sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy Beria, Larry Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City
Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Police Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa,
SPO3 Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian, Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli
Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan, Inspector Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3
Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren Chavez and Pablo Calsis.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10, 1997, at around seven-
thirty in the evening, while Mercy Beria, Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others were
leisurely walking along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga
City, to attend a wedding anniversary, they heard several gunshots. Shortly after, they
met a certain Pablito Umali who told them that "Ompong" Chavez had been shot. They
ran to Chavez straight off and saw him already lying on the ground, about 1 meters
away from a lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines
which were starting to come out. Beria shook Chavez and asked him what had
happened. Chavez replied "tinambangan kami na Ador" ("We were ambushed by the
Adors") and requested that he be brought to the hospital as he was dying. About eight (8)
meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay "Abe" Cuya, dead.
5

Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio communication, SPO1
Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2 Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the
crime scene to conduct an investigation. SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1 Wilfredo
Fernandez, among others, were already there.
6
SPO1 Barbosa collected some pieces of
evidence, took some pictures and made some sketches.
7
SPO1 Fernandez on the other
hand interviewed one Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was nearby, and when he
heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez to the hospital but the
latter expired on the way.
8

That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge
against the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa sought the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez
to accompany him to the residence of the Adors. They arrived at the Adors at around ten
oclock that evening and spoke with their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa
looked for the other male members of the Ador family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that
they were already asleep. Diosdado Sr. nevertheless promised to present them the
following day.
9

The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the
Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to
SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to choose their own counsel. They were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the Provincial Headquarters and subjected to
paraffin tests.
10
On the way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort that
he had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his residence.
11
The information
was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who
ordered PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun because
Godofredo
said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3 Nepomuceno. Thus, Major Idian, PO3
Nepomuceno and some others accompanied Godofredo to the latters residence.
Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to
their backyard, retrieved the gun from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the
latter. Godofredo allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside their house on
the night of March 10 after he heard several gunshots.
12
PO3 Nepomuceno identified the
gun as a caliber .38 "paltik" handgun which had no serial number.
13
PO3 Nepomuceno
then turned over the handgun to Major Idian
14
who likewise identified it as a .38 caliber
revolver. Major Idian returned the handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin
examination.
15
Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his initials on the gun and put it in
his private locker while preparing the documents for the examinations and the possible
filing of a case for Illegal Possession of Firearm.
16

Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-Legal Officer of
Naga City, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Chavez and Cuya. Based on the
autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado testified that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and
died from "cardio-pulmonary arrest, massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial
hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and
digestive tract."
17
Chavez on the other hand had three (3) gunshot wounds and died from
"traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot
wounds penetrating the right kidney and the internal abdominal organs."
18
Dr. Jurado
further testified that that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head three (3) days after he
conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives called his attention to a protruding mass in
Cuyas head. Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver sent back to the funeral parlor, opened it and
was able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug which he thereafter submitted to the City
Prosecutors Office.
19

Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City, testified that based on the ballistic
examination he conducted on the bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug
recovered from Cuyas head matched the three (3) .38 caliber test bullets which were
test-fired from the suspected firearm surrendered by Godofredo. He however averred that
the .38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a .357 Smith and Wesson Magnum
homemade revolver without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber revolver.
20

The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Services for examination and yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus

(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;
(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;
21

(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive.
22

Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing of his son was driven
by the long-standing feud between the Adors and his family. He said that Diosdado Jr.
had earlier accused his other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for allegedly stabbing
him (Diosdado Jr.).
23
Then, Adelina, a daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a case for
abduction with multiple rape against him, Absalon III, Rayne and Josephine, all
surnamed Cuya, after the romantic relationship between Adelina and his deceased son
Absalon III turned sour.
24
He also presented official receipts of the funeral and burial
expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.
25

Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the animosity between the
Chavez and the Ador families. He produced a certification from the PNP Naga City
Police Station that on February 17, 1997, a blotter was entered in the Daily Record of
Events showing that deceased Chavez reported a certain Ricardo Ador who while under
the influence of liquor caused him physical injury.
26
The witness likewise presented an
official receipt showing that the family spent P3,500.00 for the funeral of the deceased
Chavez.
27
After presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence "for utter lack of
evidence."
28
On May 13, 1998, the trial court dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr.,
Rosalino and Allan but denied the demurrer to evidence against Godofredo
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be justified for the
accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador, hence, the same
is hereby granted insofar as these accused are concerned. Said accused
therefore, namely: Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are
ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816. The bailbonds posted
for their provisional liberty are hereby cancelled.
Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned shall proceed.
SO ORDERED.
29

Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.
For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of Cuya and Chavez.
He said that on March 10, 1997, at around seven oclock in the evening, he heard several
gunshots while he was having dinner with his wife and four (4) children in their house in
Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife advised him not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner.
The following day, while he was gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend Dominador
Bautista arrived and asked him to go down from the tree. Bautista wanted to borrow
money and on his way to see him, found a gun by the footpath. Bautista gave the gun to
him. It was his first time to hold a gun. He tried it out and fired three (3) times. After
firing the gun, he removed the empty shells from its chambers and threw them away. He
then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut trunk. Bautista left when he
told him that he had no money. He then continued to gather pili nuts until Major Idian
and three (3) other policemen came.
Godofredos father told him that they were being suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya
the night before. Thus, they went to the provincial headquarters, were subjected to
paraffin testing and made to sign a blank bond paper. After that, they went back to the
central police station. At the central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain
Calabia that that morning, his friend Bautista found a gun along the road and gave it to
him. He hid the gun under a coconut trunk. Calabia relayed the information to Major
Idian who directed PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the gun. Godofredo
led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the gun, retrieved it and handed it to the latter.
They then returned to the police headquarters where he was jailed. He asserted that the
gun presented in court is different from the gun he surrendered to the police.
30

Bautista corroborated Godofredos story. He testified that he found the gun which
Godofredo yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno. He said that he was on his way to see
Godofredo to borrow money when he chanced upon the handgun on the pathway. He
gave the gun to Godofredo and the latter tested it by pulling its trigger. After firing the
gun, Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw them. Godofredo then wrapped the
gun with plastic and hid it under a fallen coconut trunk.
31

Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at Barangay Doa, Orani,
Bataan, and committed to the Naga City Jail on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III
surrendered to the court and was committed to the same city jail on November 22, 1998.
On November 23, 1998, both Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty. Hence, trial against them commenced and proceeded jointly with the
case of the remaining accused, Godofredo.
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis
32
as a witness against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado
III. Calsis testified that on March 10, 1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by
the house of Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola Kising at Kilometer 10,
Pacol, Naga City, before going home from work. After asking permission from her to go
home and while about to urinate outside her house, he heard several gunshots. He ducked
by asineguelas tree at a nearby flower plantation. As he was about to stand up, he saw
Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another unidentified man run away.
Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while Diosdado Jr. had a long firearm.
33
He saw
Chavez and Cuya lying on the road. Chavez was about five (5) meters away from where
he stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away. The place was illuminated by a bright
light from an electric post. There were no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear
that he might be identified by the assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but shirked
nevertheless.
34

Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after about one (1) year and nine
(9) months. Fear struck him.
35
He maintained that he knew the assailants because he and
his wife lived in the house of Lola Kising after they got married.
36
Immense fear
prevented him from attending to Chavez, even while he heard him murmuring, and from
informing the families of the victims of the incident that very same night. He was about
to tell the Chavez family the following morning but was counseled by his Lola Bading,
the sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the case.
37
Calsis and his family
left their residence in Pacol one (1) month after the incident because he was afraid the
assailants might have identified him.
38
Even Lola Kising left her residence two (2)
months after the incident.
39
It was only after he learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that the
trial court dismissed the cases for lack of evidence insofar as some of the original accused
were concerned that he took pity on the respective families of the victims who have failed
to get justice for the death of their loved ones.
40

In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in Marikina City
working as a warehouseman and timekeeper of the Consuelo Builders Corporation. He
was there the whole time from February 15, 1997, until March 24, 1997.
41
Pablo Aspe, a
co-worker of Diosdado Jr., corroborated the latters testimony. He said that on February
15, 1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga City, together to work in Consuelo
Construction in Marikina City. They were with each other in Marikina City the whole
time from February 15, 1997, until he (Aspe) went home to Naga City on March 22,
1997. While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together in their barracks at the
construction site.
42

Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On March 10, 1997, at around seven oclock in
the evening, he was at their house at Zone 1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with
his parents and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard gunshots. They ignored the
gunshots, continued watching television and slept at eight oclock. The following day, at
around six oclock in the morning, while he was fetching water, four (4) policemen
arrived at their house and talked to his father. Thereafter, his father called him, his
brother Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and Reynaldo. The policemen then
requested all of them to go to the PNP Central Police Headquarters for investigation
regarding the killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching the police headquarters, they
were interviewed by the media and afterwards brought to the provincial headquarters
where they were subjected to paraffin tests. They were then brought back to the Central
Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back home to Pacol.
Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested by the police. Diosdado III was
at their residence when his father was picked up. Only his father was taken by the police.
He continued to reside in their house until April, 1998, when he transferred to Sagurong,
San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, to work as a fisherman. On November 21, 1998, he received
a letter from his father telling him to come home. Thus, he went home the following day.
On November 23, 1998, he surrendered to the court.
43

The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr.
and Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles. Perez testified that he was the barangay captain of Pacol
from 1982 until May, 1997. In 1996, Cresenciana Mendoza left their barangay
permanently to live with her children in Manila because she was sickly and alone in her
house. He said that Mendoza never came back. He does not know any Pablo Calsis and
the
latter could not have talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that time,
Mendoza was not there and her house was already abandoned.
44
Similarly, Bobiles
confirmed the testimony that Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in
his residence from May 1, 1998, until November 1998 when Diosdado III received a
letter from his father and had to go home.
45

In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez asserted that he interviewed
Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful night of March 10, 1997.
46
After the rebuttal witness
was presented, the cases were finally submitted for decision.
47

On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that "a chain of circumstances x x x lead to a
sound and logical conclusion that indeed the accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo)
committed the offense charged"
48
and as such rendered judgment
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused Godofredo B.
Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases Nos.
97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby sentences the said accused Godofredo B. Ador
and Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in
Criminal Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No.
97-6816, to pay the heirs of Absalon "Abe" Cuya III P25,000 each by way of
actual damages and P50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity. To pay
the heirs of Rodolfo "Ompong" Chavez the sum of P50,000 in each criminal
case by way of indemnity, such accessory penalties as provided for by law and
to pay the cost. For insufficiency of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby
ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.
The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered to forthwith
release from its custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr., unless his further
detention is warranted by any other legal cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.
49

Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and Godofredo. They maintain that
the trial court gravely erred in convicting them of murder based on circumstantial
evidence. The testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them running
away from the scene of the crime was concocted. The handgun turned in by Godofredo
was not the same gun presented by the prosecution during the trial. The unusual
discovery of a slug from the head of the deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy was
conducted and after the cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim - was quite
doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration of the victim specifically pointed to
neither Diosdado III nor Godofredo. And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
those taken against them in violation of their constitutional rights to counsel during
custodial investigation.
50

The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt.
51
It may be the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of all
the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion which suffices to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
52
All the circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense
charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are innocent and
with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
53
The evidence must
exclude each and every hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence.
54
Also,
it should be acted on and weighed with great caution.
55
Circumstantial evidence which has
not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of
conviction.
56

Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
57
Like an ornate tapestry created out of interwoven fibers which cannot
be plucked out and assayed a strand at a time apart from the others, the circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
58
The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record are
sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be
consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his
innocence.
59
Accordingly, we have set guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence:
(1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with
the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and (4)
the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the
judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the
offense.
60

Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the accused
based on the circumstantial evidence presented.
The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that the accused were
supposedly seen fleeing from the locus criminis, armed with their respective weapons.
Thus, the trial court, gleaning from the evidence presented, found that "[w]hen about to
stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador, Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador III,
and a person going to the direction of the house of the Adors which is about 500 meters
away."
61
In fact, prosecution witness Calsis allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying "a
long firearm but x x x could not determine what kind of gun it was."
62
However, the trial
court acquitted Diosdado Jr. But only rightly so. For, Calsis had difficulty in identifying
the Adors notwithstanding his assertion that he knew and saw them personally. We defer
to his direct examination
ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. You said you recognized the persons running, could you tell us their names?
PABLO CALSIS:
A. Yes sir.
Q. Name them?
A. Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.
Q. How about the others?
A. I could not tell his name but if I see him I could identify him.
Q. The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they are present in court, please
point them out?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.?
A. (Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a person inside the courtroom
who answered by the nameDiosdado Ador, Jr.)
Q. How about this Sadang III?
A. (Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who answered by the name of
Diosdado Ador III.)
Q. Likewise, point to the third person?
A. (Witness pointed to a man)
COURT:
Delete that portion from the record, he is not on trial.
ATTY TERBIO:
Q. You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one inside the courtroom?
A. None sir.
Q. But if you saw that person, will you be able to recognize him?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know these persons whom you just tapped the shoulder?
x x x x x x x x x
A. I know these persons having lived in the house of Lola Kising.
Q. How far?
A. Around 100 meters.
Q. On the said date and time and place, you said you saw them running, how far
were you from them?
A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)
63

The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against Diosdado III whom he
miserably failed to positively identify during trial. In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by
the trial court renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious doubt. Calsis was
presented to positively identify the assailants who were supposedly personally known to
him and were just ten (10) meters away from him. It puzzles us no end why he cannot
even identify the Adors in open court.
Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of the assailants, the trial court
doubted him and gave credence to the alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka,
Marikina, when the killings took place. The trial court favored the unbiased testimony of
Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr. worked as a timekeeper and warehouseman with him at
the Consuelo Construction at Nangka, Marikina, from February 15, 1997, until March 22,
1997, and went home to Pacol only on May 27, 1997. This ruling is strengthened by the
fact that on the morning following the killings, all the male members of the Ador family
were brought to the police headquarters for paraffin examination and Diosdado Jr. was
not among them.
64
We thus respect the finding of the trial court that indeed Diosdado Jr.
was not at the scene of the crime absent any indication that the lower court overlooked
some facts or circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of the case.
65

While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or reject an entire testimony, and
may believe one part and disbelieve another,
66
our Constitution and the law mandate that
all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Calsis committed an obvious blunder
in identifying the supposed assailants which this Court cannot simply let go. On the
contrary, it creates reasonable doubt in our minds if Calcis really saw the persons he
allegedly saw or if he was even where he said he was that evening. For, it is elementary
that the positive identification of the accused is crucial in establishing his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. That is wanting in the instant case.
What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could no longer be used against
Godofredo since both the prosecution and the defense have already rested and the case
against Godofredo was already submitted for decision when Calsis was
presented.
67
Neither can they still be used against Diosdado Jr. who was already acquitted
by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against them. But, while it is
true that alibi and denial are the weakest of the defenses as they can easily be
fabricated,
68
absent such clear and positive identification, the doctrine that the defense of
denial cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
69
Hence, while denial is concededly fragile and
unstable, the conviction of the accused cannot be based thereon.
70
The rule in criminal
law is firmly entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be predicated on the strength of
the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.
71

The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo. But this was bungled
by the prosecution. Major Idian, Deputy Chief of Police of the Naga City Police Station,
to whom the handgun was turned over after Godofredo surrendered it, identified it as a
caliber .38 revolver, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What kind of firearm was it?
MAJOR IDIAN:
A. Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds ammunition.
Q. What is the caliber?
A. .38 caliber.
72

Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the PNP for eight (8) years already
and to whom Godofredo turned in the handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What is the caliber of that gun?
PO3 NEPOMUCENO:
A. .38 caliber.
73

However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, testified that "[t]he indorsement coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x
x alleged that the .38 caliber live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver. But our
office found out that the firearm was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber
revolver."
74

Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory? While the prosecution traced the trail of police officers who at every stage
held the gun supposedly recovered from Godofredo, it never clarified this discrepancy
which is quite glaring to ignore. It is difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief of Police and
a police officer of eight (8) years will both mistake a .357 caliber for a .38 caliber
handgun. Likewise, a Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory cannot be presumed not to know the difference between the two (2)
handguns. Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed to clear up the variance and for this
Court to suggest an explanation would be to venture into the realm of pure speculation,
conjecture and guesswork. Thus, faced with the obvious disparity in the suspected
firearm used in the crime and that which was turned over by Godofredo, his declaration
that the handgun presented in court was different from the gun he gave to the police
deserves serious, if not sole consideration.
Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered
from the head of the victim three (3) days after the autopsy was conducted loses
evidentiary value as its source is now highly questionable. It has become uncertain
whether the deformed slug was fired from the .38 caliber revolver turned in by
Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as attested to by the Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the
results of the paraffin tests to convict either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute
these, we need not go far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial court partially
granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beria,
that she heard Rodolfo "Ompong" Chavez say "tinambangan kami na Ador" (We were
ambushed by the Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned by the
witness. Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) "Adors" were involved. This
testimony if it will be given credence may inculpate any person with the family name
Ador as assailant. The prosecution therefore was not able to establish with moral
certainty as to who of the Adors were perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin tests are
not conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.
The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder nitrates does not
conclusively show that they fired the murder weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such
forensic evidence should be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of
probability, but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances
other than gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No. 121195, 27 November 1996;
People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283)
75

Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with
certainty the assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. Also, while a paraffin test
could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the
source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms a person who tests positive may
have handled one or more substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as
explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous
plants.
76
In People v. Melchor,
77
this Court acquitted the accused despite the presence of
gunpowder nitrates on his hands
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not
conclusive. While it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand,
it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by
the discharge of firearm. The person tested may have handled one or more of a
number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and leguminous plants
such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have
nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the
products of combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates or nitrites,
therefore, should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of
infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun.
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno
including the gun in question cannot be considered in evidence against him without
violating his constitutional right to counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial
investigation when he made his admissions and surrendered the gun to the police
authorities. The police had already begun to focus on the Adors and were carrying out a
process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting incriminating statements and
evidence: the police went to the Ador residence that same evening upon being informed
that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the following day, all the
male members of the Ador family were told to go to the police station; the police was
also informed of the dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the Adors as the
assailants; the Adors were all subjected to paraffin examination; and, there were no other
suspects as the police was not considering any other person or group of persons. The
investigation thus was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors
were already being held as suspects for the killings of Cuya and Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, including the right to
counsel, have already attached to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3),
1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with
the assistance of counsel. Admissions under custodial investigation made without the
assistance of counsel are barred as evidence.
78
The records are bare of any indication that
the accused have waived their right to counsel, hence, any of their admissions are
inadmissible in evidence against them. As we have held, a suspects confession, whether
verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver
of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had been
voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were
gospel truth.
79
Thus, in Aballe v. People,
80
the death weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife,
which was found after the accused brought the police to his house and pointed to them
the pot where he had concealed it, was barred from admission as it was discovered as a
consequence of an uncounseled extrajudicial confession.
With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution likewise played up the feud
between the Adors on one hand and the Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and
suggested that the Adors had an axe to grind against the Chavezes and the Cuyas. For
sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence
from which it may reasonably be adduced that the accused was the malefactor.
81
Motive
alone cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of innocence.
82

All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court, we cannot rest easy in
convicting the two (2) accused based on circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the
said circumstantial evidence presented do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that they
are guilty.
83
The prosecution witness failed to identify the accused in court. A cloud of
doubt continues to hover over the gun used and the slug recovered. The dying declaration
and paraffin examination remain unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled admissions
including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence. And, the supposed motive of the
accused is simply insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the
accused committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused
cannot be established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when evidence is purely
circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its
own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on
nothing less than moral certainty.
84

Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to nothing but mere
suspicions and speculations. It is hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can
never be the basis of conviction in a criminal case.
85
Courts must ensure that the
conviction of the accused rests firmly on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the
results of passion and prejudice.
86
If the alleged inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence is not adequate to
support conviction.
87
The court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction.
88
Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of
the accused.
89
The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence
of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
90
It is thus
apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence
with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden. Accordingly, we have to acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in
Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of murder and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B.
Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is
hereby ORDERED unless they are being held for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
Efren A. Santos for private respondent.

PADILLA, J .:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse
the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 entitled
"Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
incapacity of the petitioner. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-5360
and raffled to Branch 94, RTC of Quezon City presided over by respondent Judge Romeo
F. Zamora.
Private respondent, after presenting his evidence, orally formally offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" to "M".
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of
evidence on 9 June 1992; on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private
respondent's offered evidence.
A motion for reconsideration from petitioner was denied on 23 June 1992.
A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
On 10 June 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment which is the subject of the
present petition, which in part reads:
It is much too obvious that the petition will have to fail, for two basic
reasons:
(1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes,
depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial
judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even
handed administration of justice.
(2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a
supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling
on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on
jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the
appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special
civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it
exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by
appeal and not by certiorari.Otherwise, we will have the sorry
spectacle of a case being subject of a counterproductive "ping-pong"
to and from the appellate court as often as a trial court is perceived to
have made an error in any of its rulings with respect to evidentiary
matters in the course of trial. This we cannot sanction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari being devoid of merit, is
hereby DISMISSED.
1

From this adverse judgment, petitioner filed the present petition for review, stating:
Grounds for Allowance of the Petition
10. The decision of respondent [Court of Appeals] has no basis in law
nor previous decision of the Supreme Court.
10.1 In affirming the questioned order of
respondent judge, the Court of Appeals has decided
a question of substance not theretofore determined
by the Supreme Court as the question of
admissibility in evidence of tape recordings has not,
thus far, been addressed and decided squarely by
the Supreme Court.
11. In affirming the questioned order of respondent judge, the Court of
Appeals has likewise rendered a decision in a way not in accord with
law and with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court.
11.1 Although the questioned order is interlocutory
in nature, the same can still be [the] subject of a
petition for certiorari.
2

The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals.
The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal
from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
3

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence
offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of
petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
4

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act
No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a
clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Additionally, it should be mentioned that the above-mentioned Republic Act in Section 2
thereof imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and up to six
(6) years for violation of said Act.
5

We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability
of American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette
tapes are inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 149889 December 2, 2003
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J .:
On automatic review is the Decision of July 11, 2001 promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18, convicting Ruel Baconguis y Inson (appellant)
of murder and sentencing him to death.
To the charge of murder allegedly committed as follows,
That on or about June 23, 2000 at 2:04 early in the morning at Phase 3, Block 21, Lot 9,
Villa Trinitas Subd., Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery and with intent to kill,
attacked one Roberto C. Mercado with the use of an undetermined caliber of a gun
thereby inflicting mortal wounds which is the cause of his immediate death.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to RA 7659, as amended.
1

appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on July 27, 2000.
2

Culled from the evidence for the prosecution is its following version of the case:
On June 23, 2000, at around 2:40 a.m., while Lydia Mercado-Lledo was sleeping in her
3-bedroom one storey house, she was awakened by the sound of a gunshot. She
immediately looked out of her bedroom window and saw to her right a tall man some five
meters away from her
3
leave her house and jump over the 2
1
/
2
- 3 meters high bamboo
fence.
4
Before the man who was wearing khaki short pants and a white T-shirt jumped, he
turned his face to the left, thus enabling her to see his slim face and tall nose.
5

Lydia soon heard someone moaning. She thus repaired to the sala where she found her
younger brother, taxi-driver 24-year old Roberto Mercado (the victim), sprawled and
bleeding on the floor. He was brought to the hospital but he died on the way due to severe
hemorrhage resulting from a gunshot wound at the left chest. Aside from the chest, the
victim also suffered gunshot wounds on his left forearm.
6

The investigating officers found that the description of the man seen leaving Lydias
house matched that of herein appellant Ruel Baconguis who was a suspect in several
cases of theft and robbery.
In the afternoon of the incident, the police arrested appellant in the house of his in-laws at
Purok 2-B, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
7
At about noon of the following day or on June
24, 2000, appellant was paraffin-tested and was found positive for gunpowder nitrates on
both hands.
8

Lydia was accordingly informed by her other brother, policeman Adolfo Mercado, that
the suspect had been arrested. In the early afternoon of June 24, 2000, she was brought to
the cell of the police station where appellant was detained and was informed that the lone
detainee therein was the suspect.
9
On seeing appellant, she declared that he was the man
she saw leaving her house and jumping over the fence.
10

The defense, on the other hand, denied the accusation.
Proffering alibi, appellant claimed that on the night of June 22, 2000, he took a walk
along Limketkai with his common-law-wife Liezel Sacala, child, mother-in-law and
sister-in-law after which they returned to the house of his in-laws; and at the time of the
incident, he was fast asleep.
11

Liezel corroborated appellants claim, adding that on the night of the incident she woke
up twice to give milk to their 2-year old baby, and appellant never left the house
following their return from the walk.
12

Crediting Lydias positive identification of appellant as the man she saw leaving her
house and jumping over the fence and the results of the paraffin test, the trial court
convicted appellant by the decision on review,
13
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, and after taking into account the presence of one
generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without any mitigating, the said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is
further directed to indemnify the heirs the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS as
damages for the death of the victim, another FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS as exemplary
damages, actual expenses in the amount of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS, plus
to pay the costs. Pursuant to section 22 of R.A. 7659 and section 10 of Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court, let the entire record of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
14

In his brief, appellant proffers the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITEFAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
ACCUSED AND DEFENSE WITNESSES AND IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE
ACCUSED WAS NOT ASSISTED BY A LAWYER DURING THE CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION IN VIOLATION OF HIS BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF THE
GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DWELLING DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. (Underscoring
supplied)
Appellant questions his arrest as bereft of a valid warrant. Having, however, submitted to
the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea
15
and actively participated in
the trial of the case, any infirmity in his arrest was deemed cured.
16

Appellant likewise questions his subjection to custodial interrogation without the
assistance of counsel. There was, however, nothing inculpatory or exculpatory obtained
from him by the police during his custodial investigation.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be informed
of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not
shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement
from himwhether inculpatory or exculpatorywhich was used in evidence against
him. The records do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial
court relied on such statement x x x x In other words, no uncounseled statement was
obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against
him.
17

It bears noting that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is circumstantial.
It is settled that for circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict, the following requisites
must be met: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
18

The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that appellant was seen
leaving the house where the victim lay bleeding of gunshot wounds not long after a
gunshot was heard.
Prosecution witness Lydia identified appellant, then alone in the detention cell, and in
open court as the person she saw leaving the house.
The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is largely dependent
upon the out-of-court identification she made while appellant was in the custody of the
police. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,
19
this Court held that corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the
case.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects,
courts have adopted thetotality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
20
(Underscoring supplied)
The totality of circumstances test has been fashioned to assure fairness as well as
compliance with constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court
identification.
21

Applying the above-said test, there are nagging doubts if Lydia had a good opportunity to
view the man she saw leaving her house. For by her claim, after hearing a gunshot, she
stood up and "opened" the 3-panel jalousied and grilled bedroom window upon which
she saw a tall, slim man who was about 5 meters away at the "right side of the
window";
22
and the man turned his face to the left, glancing at the terrace
23
which terrace
she could not see from where she was, but which was lighted by an 18-watt "[n]ot quite
dim" but "more yellow" bulb "attached to the road (sic)."
24

If Lydia could not see the terrace
25
which was five meters away from where she was, how
could the suspect, who was by her account also five meters away from the terrace, glance
at the terrace by merely turning his whole face to the left, given the logical location of the
terrace to be obliquely behind (to his right) him.
If before appellant jumped he was, by Lydias claim, about three meters away from the
light bulb "attached to the road" which light illuminated the terrace, how could Lydia
have clearly seen the face of the man turning his face to the left?
As for the circumstances surrounding the identification process, they were clearly tainted
by improper suggestion. While there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a
proper identification, as even without it there could still be proper identification as long
as the police did not suggest the identification to the witness,
26
the police in the case at
bar did even more than suggest to Lydia.
Thus, by Lydias own account, the following transpired after she arrived at the cell where
appellant was detained.
Pros. Nolasco: On June 24, that is the following day, where were you?
A : I was in our house.
Q : In the afternoon or morning?
A : In the morning, Adolfo Mercado went to my house and informed me that they already
arrested a suspect last June 23.
Q : And what did you do with that information?
A : At 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, June 24, I went together with my brother to Puerto
Police Station.
Q : What did you do?
A : They let me see the suspect.
Q : Were you able to see the suspect?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What was your reaction upon seeing the suspect?
A : I was so mad because the person whom I saw at that time was the same person.
27

x x x
Atty. Azis [defense counsel]: You said that at about 8:00 o'clock of the same morning
there were operative[s] from the Puerto Police Station and you said they investigated you
about the incident?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : Who among the police officer[s]?
A : PO3 [Eddie] Akut, PO3 Ruben and PO3 Achas.
Q : You only described to them what you saw, the description of the suspect?
A : Yes, maam.
Q : About his being slim built?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : You could not determine whether he is a fair skin[ned] or dark person?
A : I could not determine.
Q : In fact you could not determine whether there is mark on his face?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : You said that on June 24, 2000 you were informed that there was already a suspect
arrested by the police?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : But you were not or you did not accompany the police officer where that suspect was
arrested?
A : No, ma'am.
Q : So it was not you who pointed to the suspect in order for him to be arrested?
A : No maam.
Q : And when you went to the Puerto Police Station they introduced to you the
suspect?
A : Yes ma'am.
Q : When did you first know his name?
A : From my brother.
Q : When?
A : When he went to the house on June 24 in the morning.
Q : Where did you see the suspect inside the police station?
A : He was still inside the cell when they let me see.
Q : In other words, when you saw him he was inside the cell?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : But he was alone at the time?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And the police officer pointed to you that that is Ruel Baconguis?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And after pointing to you they told you that he was the suspect?
A : Yes, ma'am.
Q : And because of that, you were convinced that he was the one?
A : I was convinced because his face is the same person whom I saw [jump] over the
fence.
28
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A showup, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of appellant by
Lydia, has been held to be an underhanded mode of identification for "being pointedly
suggestive, generating confidence where there was none, activating visual imagination,
and, all told, subverting their reliability as an eyewitness."
29
Lydia knew that she was
going to identify a suspect, whose name had priorly been furnished by her brother-
policeman, when she went to the police station. And the police pointed appellant to her,
and told her that he was the suspect, while he was behind bars, alone.
30

The unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification, which revolts against
accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of every just man,
and commands neither respect nor acceptance.
31

In People v. Acosta,
32
this Court rejected the identification by a witness of the accused
while the latter was alone in his detention cell. There, this Court held that the
identification of the suspect, which was tainted by the suggestiveness of having the
witness identify him while he was incarcerated with no one else with him with whom he
might be compared by the witness, was less than objective to thus impair the
trustworthiness of their identification.
33

Under the circumstances attendant to the identification of appellant, this Court is not
prepared to hold that the prosecution had established that appellant was the man seen
leaving the house-scene of the crime soon after a gunshot was heard.
As for the positive paraffin findings on appellant, it is well settled that nitrates are also
found in substances other than gunpowder.
34
Thus, in a number of cases,
32
the Court
acquitted the accused despite the finding of gunpowder nitrates on his hand, noting that:
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.
While it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always
indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm.
The person tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give
the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who
uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances
are present in the products of combustion of tobacco. The presence of nitrates, therefore,
should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the
person tested has fired a gun.
33

In fact, prosecution witness Police Superintendent Liza Madeja Sabong, who conducted
the paraffin test on appellant, testified that a person who fires a gun can transfer
gunpowder from his hands to someone standing very near him even if the second person
did not fire a gun himself.
34

But even assuming arguendo that appellants being positive for gunpowder may be
credited as circumstantial evidence indicating his culpability, that is only one
circumstance, and since no other circumstance was established by the prosecution, the
first requirement for circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of appellant has not
been met.
The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cagayan
de Oro City finding appellant RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON guilty of murder is hereby
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and appellant is ACQUITTED thereof. He is ordered
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other
legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to forthwith implement this Decision immediately
and to inform this Court within five days from receipt hereof of the date appellant shall
have actually been released from confinement.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the
victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in
the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual
damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and
costs of litigation.
1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to
have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the
latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and
on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said
Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
2

The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen
year old Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their
grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking
about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel
Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to
appellant earlier that morning.
3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left
for their farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband
departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event
she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to
the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.
4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the
house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house
through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what
he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his
mother.
5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant
descend the ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards
the back of the house.
6
She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with
collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did not find
this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.
7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time,
he was wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he
would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed
that appellants eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband
was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyns husband then arrived and
appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.
8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in
her house were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the
ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up
earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to
see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went
down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold
and rigid.
9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked
body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband
arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn
sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach.
Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called
the police.
10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was
found in Isabel Dawangs house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to
the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going
down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside
her naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered
with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of
Kathylynss death,
11
however, he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police
Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away
from the police station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect,
"Nagtaray!" (Hes running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the
gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately
70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.
12
He was
charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant
pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353,
otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced
to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. In his Brief, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted.
13
Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial
court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent
reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the
reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.
14
Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of
credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect.
15
Where there is nothing to
show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
16

The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled
rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available,
as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove
beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and
five (5) incised, were found on the victims abdomen and back, causing a portion of her
small intestines to spill out of her body.
18
Rigor mortisof the vicitms body was complete
when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him,
the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior
to the completion ofrigor mortis.
19
In other words, the estimated time of death was
sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the
timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel
Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician,
Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma
were noted on the victim,
20
Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal
canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of
semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the
victim.
21
In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the
sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right
forearm indicating resistance to the appellants assault on her virtue.
22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the
sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellants gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.
23
A
persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons
lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal
cells.
24
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means
to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a
fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in
effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the
conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper
administration of justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate
one from suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used.
26
Incidents involving
sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or
saliva which can be left on the victims body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from
clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victims body
during the assault.
27
Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime
scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the
scene of the crime.
28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in
this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short
Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for
analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.
30
Based on
Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of
appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.
31
The blood sample
taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19,
TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from
the victims vaginal canal.
32
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the
trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology
in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing
doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,
33
it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically
valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges,
under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow
at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is
one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
34
Applying the Daubert test to the case at
bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellants semen found in the victims vaginal
canal, the trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient
to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living
in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998,
appellants wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received
from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on
June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00
p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely
and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down
the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at
1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband
of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white
shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found
dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by
a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines
protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her
stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory
examination revealed sperm in the victims vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The
stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood;
(12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant
are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was
subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.
35

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken
chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of
others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample
taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to
remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art.
III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion.
37
The right against self- incrimination is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does
not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero
38
that although accused-appellant insisted that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence
against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v.
Gallarde,
39
where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of
the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the
right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling
which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of
an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The
science of DNA typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the
evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers
primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA
evidence and bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at
Isabel Dawangs house during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link
him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in
this case where the two places are located in the same barangay.
40
He lives within a one
hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute
walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens hisalibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed
reversible error in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be
acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellants assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never
on mere conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something
more than a minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance
must contain a "plus value."
41
This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from
being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and
hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not
legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative
value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from
which the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain
a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.
42
This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on
the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the
offense charged.
43
In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the
present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as
to the identity of the culprit.
44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that
she last saw the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel
Dawang.
45
She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs of Isabels house and
proceeding to the back of the same house.
46
She also testified that a few days before the
victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape
her after she came from the school."
47
The victim told Judilyn about the incident or
attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her naked and violated body was
found dead in her grandmothers house on June 25, 1998.
48
In addition, Judilyn also
testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her
husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."
49
According to Judilyn, who was
personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact
words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will
kill all your family and your relatives x x x."
50
These statements were not contradicted by
appellant.
Thus, appellants motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant
case. It is a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the
testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his
motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn
Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed,
permanently sealed the victims lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her
untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had
carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means
of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal
knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the
woman.
52
However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-
father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual
force or intimidation be employed.
53
Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.
54
The fact that the victims hymen is intact does not negate a
finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of
rape.
55
The strength and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to
stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not
disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.
56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victims aunt. He is seven years older
than the victim Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the
house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife. After the separation,
appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters
from his mother-in-laws house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree,
he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices
of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that
the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,
57
actual damages incurred by
the family of the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,
58
and
moral damages of P75,000.00
59
should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and
jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since
the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk,
Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias
"Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of
the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00,
P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109144 August 19, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J .:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C.
Prieto were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid
child in a complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L.
Salcedo, which reads:
That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the
first week of April 1989, in Barangay Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
have (sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant's
daughter, a woman who is a mongoloid and so weak of mind and in
intellect as to be capable of giving rational and legal consent.
1

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and due
trial ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of
Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child,
who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the
time she expressed herself by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four
security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto
and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and
wife and daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside Camp Lucas
Naranjo, Provincial Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was
occupied by Col. Salcedo, his wife and Sandra while the lower storey had two (2) rooms,
one of which was occupied by the four security men and the other by Alexander Salcedo
and his wife.
It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then
brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra
but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and
unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the
kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos."
2

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to Regina
Hospital. Sandra was able to relieve herself the following day but still remained moody
and irritable. She refused to take a bath in spite of scoldings from her mother. She did not
want to eat and whenever she did, she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, the
examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist,
conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant.
3
Mrs. Pastora
Salcedo could not believe that her daughter was pregnant and so she brought Sandra to
Madonna and Child Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE
Specialist, examined Sandra and subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound examination. The
results were positive. The fetus' gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks.
4
Another
ultra-sound examination at the United Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City
on September 11, 1989 confirmed that she was indeed pregnant.
5

On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob Salcedo.
Hence, the filing of the complaint
6
by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different
persons were laid on the table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her
assailants. Sandra singled out the pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
7
Later,
Sandra was brought out of the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people,
including Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her
assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
8

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo
and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually molested her.
9

Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested her. Sandra
revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her. Sandra
demonstrated how she was raped. First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged
and her panty was taken off. A push and pull movement followed.
10
Celsa testified that
she was present when the victim demonstrated how she was sexually abused by the two
accused, including the way her nipples were touched saying "dito hawak," and holding
her breasts to emphasize. She likewise went through the motion of removing her panty,
uttering at the same time "hubad panty."
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the
persons who raped her and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to
her.
11
She once again demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held her two
thighs with her two hands next to her sexual organ saying, "panty" and then placed her
hand on her breast and gestured as if she were sucking. She also touched her private
organ and made a push and pull movement.
12

During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test"
and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the
two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that
Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type
"A" and accused-appellant type "O".
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was impossible for
them to have committed the crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime
charged but acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that he
"has a different type of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is
"A", while that of child Jacob Salcedo is
type "O".
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1
Moreno Tumimpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape, as charged in the information, and pursuant to the provisions of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission
of the crime, said accused Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the
offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and to
suffer the other accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay
the costs of the proceedings.
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared
ACQUITTED from the charge.
SO ORDERED.
13

Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:
1. The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of
committing the offense charged without detection.
2. The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant base on
major blood grouping test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal
test known as chromosomes or HLA test.
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime of
rape because most of the time he and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col.
Salcedo on inspection tours while the victim was always in the company of her mother.
He further contends that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really been
molested, not to have shouted out of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult to injury,
accused-appellant suggests that it was Sandra's brother, Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a
drug user, who could have raped her.
We are not convinced.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection tours but
sometimes they were left behind and would play pingpong or card games with Sandra at
the ground floor of the house. While Sandra was always with her mother, there were
times when she was left alone in the house with the accused.
14

Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:
Q How many security men remain if you can recall
when your husband reported for work?
A Two (2).
Q Who were these security men who remained?
A Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.
Q How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and
Colaljo?
A My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and
sometime they used to go with my husband to the
office.
Q Every time when your husband is out what they
do while they were (sic) at the headquarter?
A I saw them sleeping and sometime they were
playing at the porch with my daughter Sandra
playing pingpong and sometime they were listening
music.
Q Where did they play usually take place?
A Living room.
15

xxx xxx xxx
Q By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while
ago when you were at the headquarters you were
able to do your choirs, (sic) doing laundry jobs in
the second storey of your house. Do you know
where is your daughter Sandra at that time?
A Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.
Q What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to
stay?
A Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in
the living room.
Q Did she has (sic) any playmates?
A Moreno and Prieto.
Q Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing
with your daughter?
A Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards.
16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad as
one of the perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS,
Sandra singled out accused-appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30)
pictures of different persons shown to her. Second, at the police lineup of several persons,
likewise conducted by the CIS, Sandra once again unerringly pointed accused-appellant
and his co-accused as the ones who raped her. Third, in open court, Sandra without
hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
The following is the victim's own testimony:
PROS. RAMOS:
Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable
Court what Moreno and Ruel did to you?
RECORD:
The witness when she stood up held both her thighs
(sic) with her two hand (sic) down to her sexual
organ saying a word "panty" and she placed her
hand on her breast and did something as if sucking
and held her private part (sic) and did a push and
pull movement and she cried.
Q When you said that there was a push and pull
movement of the body and when this was being
done did you feel pain?
A Yes pain.
Q What part of your body is painful?
RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?
A Yes.
Q Where did you see these blood?
RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q When this push and pull movement was being
made, did you see a man's organ?
A Yes sir.
Q Where did you see this male organ?
A Witness touching her private part.
Q Who did this to you, who removed your panty?
A Moreno and Ruel.
Q Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?
A Yes.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
A The witness touching her private parts.
Q How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken (sic)
off his pants?
A Yes.
Q Did you see his sex organ?
A Yes, witness again touching her private part.
Q Both of them?
A Yes.
Q Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your
panty?
A Moreno.
Q In your house?
A Yes.
Q What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel
remove your panty?
A Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.
Q What part of the ground floor, was it outside or
inside the room?
A In the room.
Q When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the
courtroom now, can you point to them?
A Yes.
Q Will you please point to them?
PROS. RAMOS:
May we request the accused to stand up your
honor?
RECORD:
Both accused stood up from where they were sitting
inside the courtroom.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to
accused Moreno Tumimpad)?
A Moreno.
RECORD:
The witness pointing to a certain person who is
standing and when asked what is his name, he
readily answered that he is Moreno Tumimpad.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person standing besides Moreno?
A Joel.
PROS. RAMOS:
If your honor please, she could not pronounced
(sic) well the word Ruel but the way she called this
name is Joel which refers to the same person who is
one of the accused in this case.
17

Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra demonstrated to her
how she was ravished by the two accused, thus:
Q Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra
Salcedo told (sic) you as to how she was abused?
A By what she had stated there were also actions
that she made.
Q Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable
Court how did Sandra Salcedo was abused as
narrated or demonstrated to you by Sandra
Salcedo?
A According to her she was held in her thigh and
then she was hugged and then the panty was taken
off and making a push and pull movement (witness
demonstration by holding her thigh)?
Q Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and
demonstrated to you how she was abused. What
else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had told you
any more matter?
A She did not say anything more.
Q Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say
anything else. What happened next?
A Then it was Celsa who asked her.
Q Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra
Salcedo?
A I was just beside her.
Q You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to
talk, Celsa did the questioning, did you hear the
question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
A Yes.
Q And what was the question being asked by Celsa
to Sandra Salcedo?
A Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other
things that these two had done to her?
Q And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to
what was done to her?
A By way of talking and action.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?
A He (sic) answered it by action and talking.
Q And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as
related by her to Celsa through words and action?
RECORD:
The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic)
nipple going down to her thigh.
Q What else had transpired next?
A No more.
Q Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the
names of accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel
Prieto, have you observed whose names was
usually mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
A She mentioned first the name of Moreno
Tumimpad and Ruel.
Q And what happened after that?
A I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra
Salcedo had told us.
Q When did you tell your mother-in- law about
what Sandra Salcedo told you and Celsa?
A That very evening sir.
18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was
based on the medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by
the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show
that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been
the father of the child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals
19
:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood
samples of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be
established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular
child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he
is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have recognized the
value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the
results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in
which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely
accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where
the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the
results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible
to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the
alleged father or any one of many others with the same blood type
may have been the father of the child.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA.
ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto M. Maiquez for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT ELIMINATE
POSSIBILITY THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN AT SCENE OF THE CRIME. Although We
agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We cannot
sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course
of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have been at the scene of
the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logical
explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not being present at the scene of
the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a
crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of
complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination.
The latent fingerprints are actually oily substance adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact
with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide
against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police
investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding
which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many
circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a
particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-
appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any
identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The
findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in
their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT REQUIRED BY LAW
FOR PROPER IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND BODY MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE
LASTING IMPRESSION ON VICTIM. Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is
that they were positively identified at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a
proper identification. The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be
doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her.
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant
and body movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their memory.
3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. They claim that the fact
that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to do so,
prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during the
first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were again required to
appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an
indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of
innocence. We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does not
necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming
evidence to establish their guilt.
4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT;
EXCEPTION. this Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in
convicting the three accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par.
2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the evidence
presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus: "There is need to stress anew that this Court has long
been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the
testimony as to the facts fully proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he
ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a different finding."
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY;
INDEMNITY TO VICTIM FOR MULTIPLE RAPE ATTENDED BY CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED
SOLIDARILY LIABLE THEREFOR. With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple
rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all, each must be liable for
all the three rapes committed, they must be held solidarily liable for said indemnity which the trial court
fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of P90,000.00.
6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE OFFSPRING.
This Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the offspring if
there by any." In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the offended
woman. In a case where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of the accuse was
ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to determine the paternity thereof.
D E C I S I O N
CAMPOS, JR., J p:
The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna
convicted all three accused-appellants in its decision ** dated November 7, 1990, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy
Bascoa (sic) y Lazarte and Vicente Sta. Ana y Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals of the crime of Robbery With Rape, defined and penalized in
Article 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; there being two aggravating
circumstances without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences
each of the said accused to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories
provided for by the law.
Each of the three accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen the
sum of P30,000.00, and each of them shall recognize the offspring if there be any.
The said accused are likewise ordered to return the personal properties stolen or pay its
equivalent amount of P17,490.00 to Rogelio de Belen, the lawful owner thereof.
SO ORDERED." 1
The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:
It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his
sister Vilma de Belen were sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant
broke in and woke him up, poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and made him
lie flat on his stomach and asked for the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and that of
his companions, he reluctantly told them where the key was kept.
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played
possum. When the three saw her on the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth
as another poked a knife at her neck. They threatened to kill her if she should make an
outcry.
They raised her blouse and removed her underwear. They tied both her hands so that she
could offer no resistance. She was at such a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy
Bascua went on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, while Vicente Sta.
Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy finally inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied his
bestial desire. After Jimmy was over, Vicente took his turn and then Joel. After the three
of them had successfully deflowered Vilma, they left, carrying with them the money and
other personal belongings of the de Belen family.
After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from
the bed and switched the lights on and called to his neighbors for help. Vilma,
meanwhile, had lost consciousness due to shock.
Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who lives right next to his house responded to
his cry for help. She went to their house and untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her
upper body naked and sobbing so she covered Vilma with a blanket. Soon after, his other
sister-in-law also arrived. They reported the incident to the Barangay Captain.
They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A. Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital
at about 10:00 that same morning. He conducted external and internal examinations. His
external examination showed no physical injuries except that he noted several abrasions
at the genital area. His internal examination showed fresh lacerations of the hymen at
9:00 and 4:00 positions. The vagina admitted two fingers with ease.
In the present appeal the lone assigned error is:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF
THE PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT HENCE, THEIR ACQUITTAL IS
INEVITABLE.
This appeal has no merit.
The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report
submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of
the specimen latent fingerprints were found to be positive. It is their contention that since
their fingerprints were not found in the objects found in the scene of the crime they
cannot be held guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has
great significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the
fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it
must be concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative
findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logical
explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not being present
at the scene of the crime.
Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in
a crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken
lines instead of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied
upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substances
adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very
nature, oily substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide against the surface
they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police
investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly
in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the
interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of
proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not
immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the
scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any identifiable latent
fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The
findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to cast even just a
reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
The accused-appellants likewise contend that the police line-up had been irregularly
conducted revealing suggestibility to their prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of
coaching complainant Vilma de Belen when she identified her three assailants. They
claim that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they were not allowed to select their positions at
the line-up; that they were not placed in line under a numeral against a wall marked to
indicate their respective height in feet and inches; that there was no record made of their
descriptions and physical characteristics; that the witness/victim was not out of view of
the three (3) accused lined-up for identification purposes." 2
We find these claims of irregularities of little if not, of no significance at all when
considered in the light of the natural desire in the victim to seek retribution not simply
from anybody who may be put before her but from the very same offenders who actually
did violence against her. It would be most illogical for an outraged victim to direct her
anger against anyone other than her three offenders. We cannot accept the accused-
appellants' claim that it was on Pat. Reyes' suggestion that the victim pointed to the
accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount of coaching will be sufficient to counter
the natural outrage of a rape victim against her abuser when said abuser is presented
before her in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the rape victim was a
spontaneous reaction. She identified her assailants because of no other reason except to
let people know who hurt her.
Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively
identified at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. 3 The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers
cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of
the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence
to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the
crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof,
create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their memory. 4
The accused-appellants further claim that "the Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez
concludes that the alleged victim of rape, Vilma de Belen must have had sexual
experienced (sic) five (5) to six (6) days before the alleged incident happened on July 2,
1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the morning". 5 There is no truth to this claim. In fact,
there was no categorical or positive assertion on the part of Dr. Ramirez that the sexual
intercourse with Vilma was committed on the very date when the alleged "robbery with
rape" took place on July 2, 1988.
This is a clear distortion of the testimony of Dr. Ramirez who on cross-examination
testified as follows:
"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
Q You cannot also determine when was the first and when was the last intercourse as per
your examination?
FISCAL
Objection, witness is incompetent.
COURT
Witness may answer.
A The findings suggest that because of hymenal laceration the injuries was (sic) recent
not more than one week, sir.
Q When you say it is not more than one week, could it be 6 or 5 days?
A Possible, sir.
Q When you say it is possible that the victim could have experienced sexual intercourse 6
to 5 days that was indicated in your examination marked as Exh. A, can you determine as
per your finding?
A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal laceration because laceration will determine
whether it is fresh or old because of the characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.
Q At the time you examined the patient in your medical opinion it could have been 5 or 6
days had elapsed?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
That will be all." 6
The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion to seek clarification in witness' testimony
proceeded as follows:
"COURT:
Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that there was an abrasion?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Is that more than one abrasion?
A I found 3 mm., your Honor.
WITNESS (continuing):
and on the lower opening of the vagina on the right side, that is the only place, sir.
COURT:
Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that portion there is no other injury which you
found?
A None, your Honor.
Q Because laceration stated in your medicolegal certificate that there was fresh hymenal
laceration noted at 9 and 4 o'clock on the face of the clock?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Do we gather it right when you stated in your medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet
healed?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q From that finding of yours regarding the existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said
that it least one or 2 days had elapsed before you have conducted the physical
examination?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q In other words from one to 5 days?
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q But it is possible that it could be more than one or two days?.
WITNESS:
A Yes, your Honor." 7
It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never categorically concluded that the sexual intercourse
causing the fresh hymenal lacerations took place five to six days before the date of her
examination. The accused-appellants' claim that the sexual intercourse took place on June
26 or 27, 1988 is conjectural and without factual basis.
The claim of the accused-appellants that the prosecution failed to present rebuttal
evidence to refute the averments of Joel Sartagoda that they tried in vain to persuade him
to admit the charge against him and to implicate his two (2) co-accused did not deserve
the attention of the trial court nor does it deserve Ours, being per se unacceptable and
unbelievable in the light of human experience.
Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee,
even when they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were
allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during the first confrontation at
the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were again required to
appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit
that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the
opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.
We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not
necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is
overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.
This Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in
convicting the three accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under
Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are
firmly grounded on the evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:
"There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the principle that
the determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the
facts duly proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he
ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a
different finding." 8
We are for the affirmance of the conviction of the three accused-appellants. With regard
to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of
conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes
committed, they must be held solidarily liable 9 for said indemnity which the trial court
fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of P90,000.00. 10
However, this Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to
"recognize the offspring if there be any". In multiple rape, not one maybe required to
recognized the offspring of the offended woman. In a case 11 where three persons, one
after another, raped a woman, neither of the accused was ordered to recognize the
offspring simply because it was impossible to determine the paternity thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are held jointly and severally liable to
indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple rape in the amount of P90,000.00, and that none
of the accused is required to recognize the offspring.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132676 April 4, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO, accused-
appellants.
PER CURIAM:
The accused might as well have borrowed the famous line of Shakespeare "How this
world is given to lying!"
1
when they impute error to the trial court for relying on the
testimony of a single witness in convicting them of multiple murder complexed with
attempted murder for the death of Florentino Dulay, Norwela Dulay and Nissan Dulay,
and the wounding of Noemi Dulay.
2

The challenged testimony of witness Ruben Meriales follows:
3
On 25 August 1996 at
about 8:00 oclock in the evening while he was watching television with his family his
dogs barked. His mother who was apprehensive that their cow might be stolen prodded
him to check the disturbance. To allay her fears he stood up, took his flashlight and
trudged the unpaved path towards his cow that was tied to a mango tree. Then the noise
grew louder thus arousing his suspicion that something was really wrong. After
transferring his cow nearer to his house, he went inside the kitchen, stood atop the
concrete washbasin, hid himself behind the bamboo slats and peeped outside to observe.
The darkness helped conceal him from outside view while the light from the two (2)
bulbs positioned at about three (3) meters from where he stood filtered through the slats
and illumined the surroundings. There was also moon in the sky.
A few minutes later, he saw barangay captain Jaime Carpo together with Warlito Ibao
suspiciously stooping near his barn. He knew Jaime and Warlito very well. Jaime was his
uncle and Warlito lived in his neighborhood. Warlitos son Roche was also there; he was
standing by the mango tree. They were all looking in the direction of Florentino Dulays
house which was about a meter to the south from where he was. He also saw Oscar Ibao,
another son of Warlito, striding towards Dulays hut. As soon as he reached the hut Oscar
lifted the sawali mat near the wall and hurled something inside. Oscar then scurried off
towards the nearby creek with Roche following him. Seconds later, a loud explosion
shook the entire neighborhood and Teresita Dulays screams broke into the night.
Ruben Meriales rushed outside. He ran towards Florentinos hut but was deterred by
darkness. He returned home to take his flashlight and raced back to lend aid to Teresita.
Inside the hut he was stunned by the terrifying gore that greeted him a bloodied
Florentino cradled in the arms of his weeping widow, Norwela and Nissan lying side by
side on a cot both doused in blood, and a motionless Norma whose head was oozing with
blood.
Realizing the exigency of the situation, he left the crime scene to borrow the jeepney
of Brgy. Kagawad Edgardo Marquez for the hapless victims. The neighbors milling
around at once gave up hope on Florentino so that only Norwela, Nissan and Noemi were
loaded in the jeepney and rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On their
way, Norwela who had injuries on her chest and lower appendage died. Nissan who was
five (5) years old and the youngest of the victims died later due to "shock from pains"
caused by the shrapnel wounds in her left shoulder, abdomen and lower
extremities.
4
Noemi luckily survived. Her attending physician, Dr. Emiliano Subido,
testified that Noemi was semi-conscious and vomiting although ambulatory at the time he
examined her. But due to the seriousness of her wounds and the hospitals lack of
facilities she was taken to another hospital in Dagupan City.
5

In the course of their investigation, the policemen questioned the people who might have
witnessed the carnage. Fearful however that the culprits would return, Ruben Meriales
refused to give any statement but intimated to Police Officer Guillermo Osio that he
would go to the police station after the burial.
On 4 September 1996, or a week later, Ruben kept his promise and went to the police
station where he gave his statement to Police Officer Osio. He named Jaime Carpo,
Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao as the perpetrators of the crime. He further said
that Florentino was killed because he was about to testify against Roche Ibao for the
murder of his brother Delfin Meriales.
6

On 3 October 1996, solely on the basis of Rubens testimony, a criminal complaint for
the murder of Florentino Dulay and his two (2) daughters Norwela and Nissan as well as
the frustrated murder of his daughter Noemi was filed against Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao,
Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao. Warrants for their immediate arrest were issued by the
municipal circuit trial court.
On 25 October 1996 Jaime Carpo was taken into custody by the police, while Roche Ibao
eluded arrest until 9 December 1996 when he was apprehended by police officers in La
Union. With Roches arrest, Oscar and Warlito realized the futility of hiding and
surrendered themselves to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in La Union.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Ruben, Noemi, Dr. Rosalina O. Victorio, Dr.
Emiliano Subido and Police Officers Virgilio dela Cruz, Jovencio Tapac and Guillermo
Osio as witnesses.
Police Officer Osio testified that on the night of 25 August 1996 after receiving a report
of an explosion in Brgy. Baligayan, he together with Police Officers Julius Aurora,
Ricardo Lugares and Jovencio Tapac immediately responded. They were able to gather
several grenade shrapnels and a grenade shifting lever from the crime scene. He spoke
with the weeping Teresita Dulay who told him that she suspected the accused of having
perpetrated the assault. He likewise conferred with Ruben Meriales who named the same
set of suspects and who promised to give his statement to the police after the funeral.
After speaking with Teresita and Ruben, he summoned his colleagues to go with him to
Warlito Ibaos house which was just across the road. Warlitos house was dark and its
front door was locked. He called out but there was no answer. They then proceeded to
Oscars house which was also padlocked and unoccupied. He went to Roches house and
peeped inside before they left.
7

Against their positive identification by Ruben, the four (4) accused interposed alibi
claiming that they were somewhere else when the Dulay hut was blasted. They likewise
assailed Rubens testimony for being a fabrication and insisted that he lied to get back at
them because Roche was a suspect in the killing of his brother Delfin Meriales.
Jaime and his wife Veronica Carpo were one in testifying that in the evening of 25
August 1995 Jaime was at home in Brgy. Libsong, a hundred and fifty (150) meters away
from the house of the Dulays in Brgy. Baligayan. When he heard the loud explosion, he
summoned his tanods to check whether the blast happened within their barangay. When
he learned that the explosion occurred in the adjoining Brgy. Baligayan, he went home to
sleep. Brgy. Baligayan is separated from his barangay by a creek and could be reached in
ten (10) minutes. However, on the night of the incident, the creek was neck deep such
that one had to make a detour through a mountainous route for about thirty (30) minutes
to reach Brgy. Baligayan.
8

Jaime testified that Ruben implicated him because the latter was angry at him. Rubens
grudge supposedly started when Jaime sided with the Ibaos in the murder case instituted
by the Merialeses against Roche for the death of Delfin Meriales. As a matter of fact, on
10 December 1996 while he was incarcerated at the Balungao District Jail, Ruben
supposedly visited him asking his forgiveness for having named him as one of the
perpetrators of the crime. Ruben subsequently pleaded with him to reveal the names of
those responsible but when he claimed ignorance, Ruben left in a huff.
Warlito, Oscar and Roche Ibao testified that on the night of the explosion their family
was having a farewell party for the familys only girl Maribel Ibao who was leaving for
Hongkong. They heard the blast but they did not bother to check. They denied having
heard the police officers call for them an hour after the explosion. Roche further asserted
that he did not have a house in Brgy. Baligayan as reported because he lived with his
parents-in-law inBrgy. Libsong. However, on the night of the blast, he slept at his
parents house as all of his siblings and their families were there. He only learned of the
bloodbath the following morning when they went home to his in-laws. His wife Jovelyn
corroborated his testimony in the same manner that Remedios supported the story of her
husband Warlito.
9

In convicting Jaime Carpo, Warlito Ibao, Oscar Ibao and Roche Ibao of the multiple
murder of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and the attempted murder of Noemi
Dulay the trial court gave full credit to the testimony of Ruben.
10
It accepted his
straightforward testimony and ruled that "at no instance throughout the twin testimonies
of Meriales did the Court notice a twitch of falsehood on his lips."
11
Accordingly, in
accordance with Sec. 6, RA 7659, and Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code the trial court
imposed upon all of the accused the supreme penalty of death and ordered them to
solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased as well as Noemi Dulay in the amount of
P600,000.00.
12

Forthwith, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. After the filing of
briefs, the accused filed anAddendum to Appellants Brief urging that the favorable result
of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records.
13

A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological
changes, capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not
telling the truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test
inasmuch as it has not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.
14

The explosion by means of a hand grenade on the night of 25 August 1996 resulting in
the death of Florentino, Norwela and Nissan Dulay and in the wounding of Noemi Dulay
is an admitted fact. The identity of the perpetrators, as tenaciously questioned by the
accused, depends upon the credibility of Ruben Meriales.
In this appeal, accused-appellants challenge the veracity of the testimony of Ruben
Meriales primarily on two (2) grounds: first, Rubens testimony in court is different from
and is contradictory to his affidavit of 4 October 1996; and second, Ruben is not a
disinterested witness because he has a grudge against the Ibaos.
Consistent with giving due deference to the observations of the trial court on credibility
of witnesses, we agree with the court a quo when it believed Ruben Meriales more than
the defense witnesses.
15
Indeed, the trial court is best equipped to make an assessment of
witnesses, and its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal unless it has
overlooked, misunderstood or disregarded important facts,
16
which is not true in the
present case.
The twin arguments therefore raised by accused-appellants against the testimony of
Ruben Meriales are devoid of merit. A scrutiny of the records reveals that his testimony
is not inconsistent with his affidavit of 4 October 1996 inasmuch as the former merely
supplied the details of the event which the latter failed to disclose. But assuming that
there was any inconsistency, it is settled that whenever an affidavit contradicts a
testimony given in court the latter commands greater respect.
17
Such inconsistency is
unimportant and would not even discredit a fallible witness.
18

The mere fact that Ruben admitted harboring resentment against the Ibaos for the murder
of his brother Delfin does not confirm that he fabricated his story. His frankness in
admitting his resentment against the Ibaos should even be considered in his favor.
19

There is likewise nothing unnatural in Rubens attitude of concealing himself behind the
kitchen wall instead of warning the Dulays of the looming danger to their lives. It is a
well-known fact that persons react differently to different situations there may be some
who will respond violently to an impending danger while there may be others who will
simply assume a cravenly demeanor. In this case, Ruben was ruled by his fear rather than
by his reason, but for this alone, his credibility should not be doubted.
Apropos Jaimes imputation that Ruben had admitted to him while in jail that he lied in
his testimony, we find this accusation farcical as nothing was ever offered in support
thereof. The lone corroborative testimony, which was that of Roche, does not inspire
belief since Roche himself admitted overhearing the conversation while Jaime together
with other prisoners was constructing a hut outside of his cell at about three (3) meters
away. As correctly hinted by the prosecution, the noise generated by the construction
made it unlikely for Roche to hear conversations three (3) meters away.
20

The defense proffered by the accused is alibi. But this is futile. By his own admission,
Jaime was only a hundred and fifty (150) meters away from the scene of the crime. In
fact, it would only take him thirty (30) minutes, at the most, to be at the place of the
Dulays.
More so for the Ibaos who acknowledged that they were having a party just a stones
throw away from the crime scene at the time of the explosion. Curiously though, if they
were indeed reveling inside their house on that fateful night, then we cannot comprehend
why they did not go out to investigate after hearing the blast. Besides, it was rather
strange for the Ibaos not to have joined their neighbors who had instantaneously milled
outside to view the mayhem. Their conduct indeed betrayed them.
Further, the immediate flight and tarriance of the Ibaos to La Union until Roches arrest
cannot but demonstrate their guilt and desire to evade prosecution.
21

The trial court also correctly ruled that accused-appellants conspired in perpetrating the
offense charged. From the detailed account of Ruben, Jaime and Warlito positioned
themselves near the hay barn while Roche casually stood by the mango tree. As observed
by the trial court, the present of Jaime, Warlito and Roche inescapably gave
encouragement and a sense of security to Oscar, the groups preceptor. Surely, the latter
was emboldened to commit the crime knowing that his co-conspirators were not far
behind.
Under the doctrine enunciated in People v. Tayo,
22
the crime committed may otherwise
be more appropriately denominated as murder qualified by explosion rather than by
treachery. However, since it was treachery that is alleged in the Information and
appreciated by the trial court, the explosion of the grenade which resulted in the death of
Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, and the wounding of Noemi can only be multiple
murder complexed with attempted murder.
23

The crime committed against Noemi Dulay was correctly denominated by the trial court
as attempted murder considering that none of her injuries was fatal. Her attending
physician even made conflicting statements in the assessment of her wounds, to wit:
although he said that Noemi could have died from the shrapnel wound in her head, he
specifically ruled out the possibility of "intercerebral hemorrhage"
24
and despite the
seriousness of the possible complications of her injuries she would suffer from physical
incapacity for only ten (10) to fourteen (14) days.
As none of her wounds was severe as to cause her death, accused-appellants not having
performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is only
attempted murder.
25

Since the three (3) murders and attempted murder were produced by a single act, namely,
the explosion caused by the hurling of a grenade into the bedroom of the Dulays, the case
comes under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code on complex crimes. Article 48 provides
that the penalty for the more serious crime, which in the present case is reclusion
perpetua to death, should be applied in its maximum period. As the crime was
complexed, the death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court.
At this point, we take exception to the court a quo's award of damages in the "negotiated
amount of P600,000.00." It appears that under the auspices of the trial court counsel for
the defense entered into an oral compromise with the public prosecutor, which was
subsequently ratified by the private complainant, limiting the amount of civil liability to
P600,000.00. We

note the discourse between the court and the counsel for both parties
regarding the award:
PROS. CORPUZ: x x x x (W)e would like to enter into stipulation the civil
aspect of the case.
COURT: Are the accused confident that they could be acquitted in this
case? Atty Sanglay?
ATTY. SANGLAY: I think so, your Honor.
COURT: What about Atty. Rafael?
ATTY. RAFAEL: We are confident, your Honor.
COURT: All right. So you can easily stipulate. First of all, how much do
you want Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: P1,282,740.00, your Honor x x x x
COURT: x x x x Agree gentlemen of the defense?
ATTY. SANGLAY: P600,000.00, your Honor.
COURT: Do you agree Fiscal?
PROS. CORPUZ: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: All right so P600,000.00 is the agreed liquidated amount in case of
conviction without necessarily having to interpret this stipulation as admission
of guilt on the part of any of the accused. All right so we will dispense with the
testimony on the civil aspect x x x x
COURT: x x x x Are you the private complainant in this case?
TERESITA DULAY: Yes, sir.
COURT: If the accused get convicted and I will hold them severally liable
for you of damages in the liquidated sum of P600,000.00 as agreed upon by the
counsel, will you be satisfied? x x x x
TERESITA: Yes, sir.1wphi1.nt
COURT: So let that be of record. Will you sign the note so that there will be
evidence.
(At this juncture private complainant Teresita Dulay affixed her signature at the
bottom right margin of the stenographic notes page 2 hereof).
26

Article 1878 of the Civil Code and Sec. 23 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court set forth the
attorney's power to compromise. Under Art. 1878 of the Civil Code, a special power of
attorney is necessary "to compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the
right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections to the venue of an action or to
abandon a prescription already acquired." On the other hand, Sec. 23, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court provides, "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by
any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeal, and in all matters
of ordinary judicial procedure, but they cannot, without special authority, compromise
their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of their clients' claims but the full
amount in cash."
The requirements under both provisions are met when there is a clear mandate expressly
given by the principal to his lawyer specifically authorizing the performance of an
act.
27
It has not escaped our attention that in the present case counsel for both parties had
no special power of attorney from their clients to enter into a compromise. However,
insofar as Teresita was concerned, she was apprised of the agreement and in fact had
signed her name as instructed by the court, thereby tacitly ratifying the same. As for
accused-appellants, the aforecited dialogue between the court and counsel does not show
that they were ever consulted regarding the proposed settlement. In the absence of a
special power of attorney given by accused-appellants to their counsel, the latter can
neither bind nor compromise his clients' civil liability. Consequently, since Atty. Sanglay
and Atty. Rafael had no specific power to compromise the civil liability of all accused-
appellants, its approval by the trial court which did not take the precautionary measures
to ensure the protection of the right of accused-appellants not to be deprived of their
property without due process of law, could not legalize it. For being violative of existing
law and jurisprudence, the settlement should not be given force and effect.
In light of the foregoing, the award of damages must be set aside and a new one entered
with all the circumstances of the case in mind. For the death of Florentino, Norwela and
Nissan Dulay, civil indemnity at P50,000.00 each or a total amount of P150,000.00 is
awarded to their heirs. This is in addition to the award of moral damages at an aggregate
amount of P150,000.00 for their emotional and mental anguish. With respect to Noemi,
an indemnity of P30,000.00 would be just and proper. All taken, an award of
P330,000.00 is granted.
Four (4) members of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of
the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty
should be accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellants JAIME
CARPO, OSCAR IBAO, WARLITO IBAO and ROCHE IBAO GUILTY of the
complex crime of multiple murder with attempted murder and sentencing them to the
supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that they are
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Florentino, Norwela and Nissan, all surnamed
Dulay, P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each death
or an aggregate amount of P300,000.00. In addition, accused-appellants are ordered to
pay Noemi Dulay P30,000.00 as indemnity for her attempted murder. Costs against
accused-appellants.
In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code,
upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.