Section 4.

A. Prior restraint

EASTERN BROADCASTING (DYRE) VERSUS DANS JR.
G. R. NO. L-59329 (JULY 9, 1985)

CASE DOCTRINE: The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion
of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Broadcast stations deserve
the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses
of the Constitution.

The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media
into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the
industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The clear and present danger
test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated
among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without
regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.All forms of communication are entitled to
the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper
and print media.The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of
all Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones
of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like
food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found
everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously
received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who
happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves
reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different
I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be


difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike
readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject
the utterance.

FACTS OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio
Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.

The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that
the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit
of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed
beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was
taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The
petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents'
general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards
what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public
affairs.

HOWEVER THE CASE BECAME MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN THE PETITONER EASTERN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION HAS ALREADY SOLD ITS RADIO BROADCASTING STATION IN FAVOR OF MANUEL
PASTRANA AS WELL AS THE RIGHTS AND INTEREST IN THE RADIO DYRE IN CEBU INCLUDING ITS RIGHT
TO OPERATE ITS EQUIPMENT. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its
willingness to grant to the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to
operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE. In
view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B.
Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further.

ISSUE OF THE CASE: WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN VALIDLY RESTRAIN THE RADIO BROADCASTING
CORPORATION ON THE GROUND OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

HELD:YES. It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due
process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that
any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid. All forms of media,
whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
present danger rule that words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a


clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
prevent.

The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The
interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The
sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A
public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus
can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the
Constitution.

The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media
into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the
industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling. The clear and present danger
test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums. Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated
among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without
regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.All forms of communication are entitled to
the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper
and print media.The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of
all Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones
of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like
food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found
everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be simultaneously
received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who
happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves
reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different
I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be
difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike
readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject
the utterance.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,


vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

DOCTRINE:
All laws passed restraining the privilege of press freedom are unconstitutional. The EVAT imposed is
valid becauser it is not a prior restraint on press freedom.

The VAT is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.
It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of
services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is
not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to
general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

FACTS:
The Expanded Value Added Tax (E-VAT) law was passed under RA. NO. 7761.

The Philippine Press Institute, one of several petitioners in this consolidated petition, is seeking a motion
for reconsideration of an earlier Supreme Court decision dismissing the petition filed in this case for the
declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It is contended by the PPI that by removing the
exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
against the press. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate
against the press because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the E-VAT constitutes a prior restraint to press freedom

RULING:
NO.



We have held that, as a general proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State
and that what the constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or
target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the
press on the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.

The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press
because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):

The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded by the First
Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it
classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of
hucksters and peddlers and treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the
ordinance. Freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.

The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise
of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to
the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it is one thing to
impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax on him for
delivering a sermon."

A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957)
which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the sale of
general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by the
American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate.

The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much
less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or
the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the
press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution




FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the DOJ; and (NTC)

DOCTRINE: Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely
freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless
of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it
precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even
injunctions against publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain
newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as previous
restraint or censorship. Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before
publication can be made, commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at
the courts.

It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents
while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements
as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act
done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by
the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a
formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements
at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on
the right to free speech and press.

FACTS: This is a case about the audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the
President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the (COMELEC. The
conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Secretary Bunye produced two versions of
the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, "doctored" or altered version,
which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election
results in the Presidents favor. It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of
President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction.



Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting
or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included
Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime
was committed or was being committed in their presence. The NTC also gave warning of possible
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
companies for broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation.

Secretary Gonzales ordered the NBI to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread,
the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving
the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections.

ISSUE: WN/ the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in question constitute
a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution..

HELD: Yes. Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has
recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom
from punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of
circulation.

The determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom of
speech has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint.
And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on a case-to-
case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the circumstances in
which they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with which to evaluate.
Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is
wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. X x x x x x x x x.
Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on
freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral
regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time,
place or manner, and under well defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e.,
the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction
determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.


When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to
suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an
intermediate approachsomewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and
the compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions.

On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck
down

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech
sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened
harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid
As formulated, "the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an
intermediate review. A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and
is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if
justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague.

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the
clear and present danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused
solely on but one objecta specific content fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations
between the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as
to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.



A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the
strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media,
including broadcast media.
This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a)
the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the
quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have
the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle
the clear and present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is
the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at
bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear
and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of
the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The
Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a "complete" version and the
other, an "altered" version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the hows of the
wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the
wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether
its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents
while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements
as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act
done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by
the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an "act" does not limit itself to acts already converted to a
formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements
at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on
the right to free speech and press.


B. Subsequent punishment

G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant. MALCOLM, J.:



Doctrine:
- It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to
abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press
and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.

- But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection
among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.

FACTS:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1922, in the presidencia of Pilar, they
became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which
resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code
having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted
thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court.

ISSUE:
W/N the accused is convicted of Art. 256 of penal code?
W/N should the accused be punished with a crime other than designated in the information?

RULING:
1. NO. Must be convicted of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law.



It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion must
bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of
article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under
the Libel Law, exist and must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary,
namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels, constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and
Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.

Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code,
it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is not this article but rather a portion of the
Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused
did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a
disturbance in the community.

It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to
abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the
intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press
and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State. (III
Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto,
supra.)

Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of
government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to
the Government and obedient to the laws.

The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of
the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be exercised


in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the
Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the
rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42 Phil., 599;
U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)

Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have
been placed on the statute books exactly to meet such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate
scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or against the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any
act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty,
or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or
incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or
which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two
years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has made a
statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has
made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and
may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

2. YES.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended,
is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the offense with which the defendant is charged. The
designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged
is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused
may be found guilty and convicted of a graver offense than that designated in the information, if such
graver offense is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by the
proof presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of
Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)



The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law,
and will, we think, sufficiently punish the accused.

The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused
of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is
affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the defendant
and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs


Gonzales v. Comelec - 27 SCRA 835

C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process

Sanidad v. Comelec -181 SCRA 529
Doctrine: While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by
respondent to justify such abridgement. This form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.

Facts: R.A. No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Petitioner Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper
columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the
City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167, which provides: Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the
plebiscite issues. It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the
Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news,
petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his
opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner believes that said
provision of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 constitutes a prior restraint on his constitutionally-
guaranteed freedom of the press and further imposes subsequent punishment for those who may
violate it because it contains a penal provision.



Issue: W/N Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is null and void and unconstitutional

Ruling: Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. Comelec has not been granted
the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite.

Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 does not absolutely bar petitioner-columnist from expressing his
views and/or from campaigning for or against the organic act because he may do so through the
Comelec space and/or Comelec radio/television time, the same is not meritorious. While the limitation
does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the
forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such
abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a restriction of petitioner's freedom
of expression for no justifiable reason.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to
be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite
should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either
specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times.

Adiong v. Comelec - 207 SCRA 715
Doctrine:
The COMELECs prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional
grounds. The qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix,
the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.



This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937];
Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or
persuade is denied and taken away.

The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2)
inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place, including mobile places whether public
or private except in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and
stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in
this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule
prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. The prohibition on posting of
decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.-

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.

FACTS:
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the
resolution provides:
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following are lawful election propaganda:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.
Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.
It is unlawful:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place,
whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or
billboards



Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the
COMELECs Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like
cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE:
WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on mobile places, public or private,
and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

RULING:
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC
providing that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided
in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELECs prohibition on
posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private except in designated areas
provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly
infringes on the citizens fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article
III).

Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is
void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad
that it encompasses even the citizens private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle
(The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or
stickers in the privacy of ones living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another
cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights
provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to
property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a liberty
interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and
irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and
Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting
decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and


stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner
of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda
not the financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on mobile places whether public or private
except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be
justified by the Constitution.


ABS-CBN v. Comelec - 323 SCRA 811

SWS v. Comelec 357 SCRA 497
Doctrine: the Supreme Court held that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted
can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research
institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.

Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local
candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.

Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior
to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the
conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election
surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers


or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the
election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of
election surveys, which are relatively objective.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to
prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous
surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey
results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e.,
the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys,
bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be
prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited
both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local
election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.

Issue:
WON Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression and the press

Held:
Based on the above reasons (petitioner), yes, it constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom
of expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that 5.4 is invalid because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.

Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting the
publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15)
days immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local election. Because of tile
preferred status of tile constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to
this Court bearing a heavy Presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint. Nor may it be argued that
because of Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of


invalidity attaches to a measure like 5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining tile ban on media
political advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring
"equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities "public information campaigns and forums among
candidates."


David v. Arroyo 489 SCRA 160
DOCTRINE: The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes
in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases. A plain reading of
PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conductit is actually a
call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. It is also not intended for testing
the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conductoverbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids
the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conducteven if expressive
falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.

FACTS: 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed alleging that in issuing PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, PGMA committed grave abuse of discretion. The said PP 1017, as petitioner KMU
contended, was the basis of the police for the dispersal of their assemblies in which the police arrested
(without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a UP professor and a columnist, and Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan. Also, Daily Tribune offices in Manila were raided by the CIDG and news
stories were confiscated.

ISSUE: WON PP 1017 violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly



HELD: PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by PGMA on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof
that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication
and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts

IN RE: EMIL JURADO
DOCTRINE:
No Constitutional Protection for Deliberately False or Recklessly Inaccurate Reports

FACTS:
Emil Jurado is columnist and also a lawyer. He was charged with an administrative complaint because of
having published statements against the judiciary stating therein in his column in Manila Standards
that the judiciary has been filled with corrupt judges. He published said libellous remarks in the Manila
Standards. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court then issued an order creating a task force to
investigate the truth of such statements.

ISSUE:
Is Jurado laible for published statements demonstrably false or misleading and derogatory against the
judges? Is his right to write defamatory articles constitutionally protected?

HELD:
No. Jurado is not protected. He was held in contempt.



Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the
press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being required to
submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently than his other colleagues in media
who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad
Hoc Committee. The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to
answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute,
obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the
performance of its functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled out. What has happened
is that there have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course, sworn statements
branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of substantiating those reports
or assuming responsibility for their publication.
Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar
he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar
earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a lawyer for his statements as a journalist. This
is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to
sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and
present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of
the administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do with
the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate liability.

Jurado is not being called to account for declining to identify the sources of his news stories, or for
refusing to appear and give testimony before the Ad Hoc Committee. He is not being compelled to
guarantee the truth of what he publishes, but to exercise honest and reasonable efforts to determine
the truth of defamatory statements before publishing them. He is being meted the punishment
appropriate to the publication of stories shown to be false and defamatory of the judiciary stories
that he made no effort whatsoever to verify and which, after being denounced as lies, he has refused, or
is unable, to substantiate.

There is hardly need to belabor the familiar doctrine about group libel and how it has become the
familiar resort of unscrupulous newsmen who can malign any number of anonymous members of a
common profession, calling or persuasion, thereby putting an entire institution like the judiciary in
this case in peril of public contumely and mistrust without serious risk of being sued for defamation.
The preceding discussions have revealed Jurado's predilection for, if not his normal practice of, refusing
to specifically identify or render identifiable the persons he maligns. Thus, he speaks of the "Magnificent
Seven," by merely referring to undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the "Magnificent Seven"
in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices who supposedly vote as one; the "Dirty Dozen," as
unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an anonymous group of justices
and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who


reportedly spent a prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their families. This resort to generalities and
ambiguities is an old and familiar but reprehensible expedient of newsmongers to avoid criminal
sanctions since the American doctrine of group libel is of restricted application in this jurisdiction. For
want of a definitely identified or satisfactorily identifiable victim, there is generally no actionable libel,
but such a craven publication inevitably succeeds in putting all the members of the judiciary thus all
together referred to under a cloud of suspicion. A veteran journalist and lawyer of long standing that he
is, Jurado could not have been unaware of the foregoing realities and consequences.

The question, too, is whether or not we are prepared to say that a journalist's obligation to protect his
sources of information transcends, and is greater than, his duty to the truth; and that, accordingly, he
has no obligation whatsoever to verify, or exercise bona fide efforts to verify, the information he is given
or obtain the side of the party adversely affected before he publishes the same.

True, the pre-eminent role of a free press in keeping freedom alive and democracy in full bloom cannot
be overemphasized. But it is debatable if that role is well and truly filled by a press let loose to print
what it will, without reasonable restraints designed to assure the truth and accuracy of what is
published. The value of information to a free society is in direct proportion to the truth it contains. That
value reduces to little or nothing when it is no longer possible for the public to distinguish between truth
and falsehood in news reports, and the courts are denied the mechanisms by which to make reasonably
sure that only the truth reaches print.

No Constitutional Protection for Deliberately
False or Recklessly Inaccurate Reports
It is worth stressing that false reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from
sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the most liberal view of
free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, specially the persistent and
unmitigated dissemination of patent lies.
The U.S. Supreme Court,29 while asserting that "(u)nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea," and that "(h)owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas"

nonetheless made the firm pronouncement that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact," and "the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection (although) . . .


nevertheless inevitable in free debate." "Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error," it said,
"materially advances society's interest in "unhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues.

They belong to that category of utterances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."

"The use of calculated falsehood," it was observed in another case, 30 "would put a different cast on the
constitutional question. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise
of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a
public official, should enjoy a like immunity.

(T)he knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do
not enjoy constitutional protection.
Jurado's actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those
of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase
the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed
himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the
"Golden Rule" and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

Clearly unrepentant, exhibiting no remorse for the acts and conduct detailed here, Jurado has
maintained a defiant stance.
WHEREFORE, the Court declares Atty. Emil (Emiliano) P. Jurado guilty of contempt of court and in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, hereby sentences him to pay a fine of one
thousand pesos (P1,000,00).


People v. Godoy - 243 SCRA 64
DOCTRINE: (1) Theres a need to make a distinction between adverse criticism of the court's decision
after the case is ended and "scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and
scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. Contempt


proceedings dismissed. Such comments may constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated
as in contempt of the court's authority.
(2) In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its
members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been
terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:
a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or
b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. And
this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in
contempt proceedings.

FACTS: For separate resolution, as an incident arising from these criminal cases under automatic review
by the court, is a complaint filed by Judge Gacott, Jr. of the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
Branch 47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon,
publisher and chairman of the editorial board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is
based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column, "On the Beat," and published in
the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City.

The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the
administration of justice; that the article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous,
insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on the integrity and honesty of
complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an
imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub
judice because it is still pending automatic review.

Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his Comment that his article does not intend to impede
nor obstruct the administration of justice because the same was published after complainant had
promulgated his decision in the case; that such publication will not affect or influence the review by the
Supreme Court of the criminal case, considering that the Palawan Times is circulated only in the City of
Puerto Princess and some parts of Palawan; that the comments made therein were made in good faith
and in the exercise of the freedom of expression and of the press; that while the article may contain
unfavorable comments about complainant, it cannot be considered as having the tendency to degrade
or impede the administration of justice; and that the complaint, which is for contempt of a judge of a
regional trial court, was erroneously filed with the Supreme Court contrary to Section 4, Rule 71 of the
rules of Court.



ISSUES: 1. WON Post-Litigation Publications can be the Subject of Contempt Proceedings; and 2. Which
court has jurisdiction over a contempt committed against the trial court while the case is pending on
appeal.

RULING: 1.) In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings
and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has
been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances:

a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or
b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be impeded. And
this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in
contempt proceedings.

On the issue of whether the specified statements complained of are contumacious in nature, we are
inclined, based on an overall perusal and objective analysis of the subject article, to hold in the negative.
We have read and reread the article in its entirety and we are fully convinced that what is involved here
is a situation wherein the alleged disparaging statements have been taken out of context. If the
statements claimed to be contumelious had been read with contextual care, there would have been no
reason for this contempt proceeding.
In our aforestated evaluation, we were sufficiently persuaded to favorably consider the following
explanation of respondent Ponce de Leon in her Supplemental Comment.
On the other hand, a reading of the subject article in its entirety will show that the same does not
constitute contempt, but at most, merely constitutes fair criticism.

A. Effect of Freedom of Speech and Press Guaranties
In the case of In re Sotto, 17 this Court had the opportunity to define the relation between the courts
and the press, quoting there in the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. vs. Sullen, thus:

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally
sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and
duties and should cooperate uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former
receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be
scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is


necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, this Court will not
hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to
proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference
obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court,
and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its
existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.

Hence, a person charged with contempt of court for making certain utterances or publishing writings
which are clearly opprobrious may not, ordinarily, escape liability therefor by merely invoking the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press. Liberty of speech and the press must not be
confused with an abuse of such liberties. Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the
administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of speech or the
press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.

Guaranties of free speech and a free press, as they appear in the Constitution, are frequently couched so
as to impute responsibility for any abuse of the privilege, and it is sometimes recognized that with
respect to whether an allegedly scandalous publication or utterance is to be treated as a contempt, a
line must be drawn between those speeches or writings which are protected by the privilege of free
speech and a free press and those which constitute an abuse of it.

The right of freedom of the press is only a specific instance of the general right of freedom of speech;
persons engaged in the newspaper business cannot claim any other or greater right than that possessed
by persons not in that business.

2.) The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire
case has already been appealed, jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court
where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or where there is a tendency to affect
the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this Court
having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents, it has
taken judicial cognizance thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.





RE: RADIO/TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA TRIAL, 360 SCRA 248
DOCTRINES:
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the
judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the
paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its
constitutional proportions.
Citing Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court holds that the television coverage of judicial
proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights of an accused, also identified the following as
being likely prejudices: (a) The approaching trial immediately assumes an important status in the public
press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged; (b) The
quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of the
knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable; (c) A major aspect of the
problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on the trial judge. His job is
to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial; and (d) Its presence is a form of mental - if not
physical-harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree.

FACTS: The Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised
and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting this Court
to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by
Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato
Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident
bearing in mind the right of the public to vital information affecting the nation.

ISSUE: WON the trial of the former Pres. Estrada should be broadcast for the purpose of informing the
people.

HELD: NO. The SC reiterates its ruling on the 23rd October 1991 in a case for libel filed by then President
Corazon C. Aquino. The court states that:
Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or
televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television
or news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or


printing press into the courtroom. In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that
television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a
criminal defendant xxx Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of
mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's
constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally
necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due
process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced
to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom xxx.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial
that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. The effect of
television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our
basal conception of a trial such as we know it now.

The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions involving as they do
a former President of the Republic. The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to, turn a
blind eye to yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into
even the business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a
change in the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear
to be propitious.





E. Libel

Borjal v. Court of Appeals - 301 SCRA 1
Doctrine: The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that
privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.



Facts
A civil action for damages based on libel was filed before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing
and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and offensive against Francisco Wenceslao,
attacking among others the solicitation letters he send to support a conference to be launch concerning
resolving matters on transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous activities.
Wenceslao however was never named in any of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing.
The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for damages which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

A petition for review was filed before the SC contending that private respondent was not sufficiently
identified to be the subject of the published articles. Petitioners contend that the right to free press is a
privilege communication.

Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.

Held:The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press and that
privileged communications must be protective of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public
interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair
comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the
facts.

The questioned article dealt with matters of public interest as the declared objective of the conference,
the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be
funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. Respondent is also
deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue. The court held that
freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the reminder among media
members to practice highest ethical standards in the exercise thereof.



G.R. No. 164437
HECTOR C. VILLANUEVA, Petitioner,
- versus -
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC., LETTY JIMENEZ MAGSANOC,ROSAURO G. ACOSTA, JOSE MARIA
NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T. ENGRACIA, JR., RAFAEL CHEEKEE, and MANILA DAILY BULLETIN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, BEN F. RODRIGUEZ, ARTHUR S. SALES, CRIS J. ICBAN, JR.,
Respondents.
May 15, 2009

DOCTRINE: Consistent with good faith, reasonable care and the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
the press, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as
for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively
function as critical agencies in our democracy. A newspaper, especially one national in reach and
coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate
interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges
for malice or damages, i.e. libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of
morality and civility prevailing within the general community.

For liability in libel cases to arise without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." There can be no presumption of actual malice on privileged
communication, thus it must be sufficiently proved. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged communication and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander for as such, no
malice can be aptly be presumed on them. The instant articles of the case dealt with matters of public
interest. These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the
very public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media mileage and drew
public attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates. Thus, no malice may be imputed on
these articles for the action of libel to stand, it must be sufficiently proved.

FACTS:


Petitioner was one of the mayoralty candidates in Bais, Negros Oriental during the May 11, 1992
elections.

On March 30, 1990, Ricardo Nolan, another mayoralty candidate, petitioned for the disqualification of
petitioner from running in the elections. Said petition, however, was denied by the COMELEC.

Two days before the elections, or on May 9, 1992, respondent Manila Daily Bulletin Publishing
Corporation (Manila Bulletin) published the following story:

The Comelec has disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of Bais City for
having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and harassment in
1987, while he was officer-in-charge of the mayors office of Bais City.

A day before the elections or on May 10, 1992, respondent Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. (PDI) also came
out with a similar story, to wit:
The Commission on Elections disqualified Hector G. Villanueva as Lakas-NUCD candidate for mayor of
Bais City for having been convicted in three administrative cases for grave abuse of authority and
harassment in 1987, while he was the officer-in-charge of the mayors office in the city.

On May 11, 1992, the national and local elections were held as scheduled. When results came out, it
turned out that petitioner failed in his mayoralty bid.

Believing that his defeat was caused by the publication of the above-quoted stories, petitioner sued
respondents PDI and Manila Bulletin as well as their publishers and editors for damages before the RTC
of Bais City. He alleged that the articles were maliciously timed to defeat him. He claimed he should
have won by landslide, but his supporters reportedly believed the news items distributed by his rivals
and voted for other candidates. He asked for actual damages of P270,000 for the amount he spent for
the campaign, moral damages of P10,000,000, an unspecified amount of exemplary damages, attorneys
fees of P300,000 and costs of suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Bulletin and Philippine Daily Inquirer are liable for damages or libel for the
published article.



RULING: NO
For liability in libel cases to arise without offending press freedom, there is this test to meet: "The
constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
communication and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander for as such, no malice can
be aptly be presumed on them. The rule on privileged communication had its genesis not in the nations
penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.
As early as 1918, in United States v. Caete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for
reasons of public policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech.

In the instant case, there is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.
These are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very
public character of the election itself. For this reason, they attracted media mileage and drew public
attention not only to the election itself but to the candidates.

In the instant case, we find no conclusive showing that the published articles in question were written
with knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of what was false or not.

Nevertheless, even assuming that the contents of the articles turned out to be false, mere error,
inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in
any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the
press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in
the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment.
Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as
critical agencies in our democracy.

A newspaper, especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court
by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for malice or damages, i.e. libel, so long as the
newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general
community.



As aptly observed in Quisumbing v. Lopez, et al.:
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that
the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of
the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of
stories, press reporters and edition usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good
faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest
mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

We find respondents entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out
of constitutional guaranties in our Bill of Rights. We cannot punish journalists including publishers for an
honest endeavor to serve the public when moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by their sense of
responsibility as news media to report what they perceived to be a genuine report.


DISINI VS SEC OF JUSTICE
DOCTRINE:
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in
relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes similar means for committing libel. But the Courts
acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or
article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel
were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.

FACTS:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the
Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cyber libel under cybercrime law is constitutional?



RULING:
Yes. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and
that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code,
already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
similar means for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime
law penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies,
unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet
media is distinct from that of print. Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as spam is
entitled to protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads
would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection
as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.








F. Obscenity and indecency

G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
LEO PITA doing business under the name and style of PINOY PLAYBOY, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON BAGATSING, and NARCISO CABRERA, respondents.




DOCTRINE:
The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act(unlawful seizure due to the anti-smut campaign) was
sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize property in disregard of due process. In Philippine
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, We defined police power as "state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Presidential
Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves,
authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of
the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the commandments of the Constitution, the right to
due process of law and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, specifically.

FACTS:
The petitioner, publisher of Pinoy Playboy, a "men's magazine", seeks the review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, rejecting his appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dismissing his
complaint for injunctive relief. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures of the Constitution, as well as its prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law.

The case sprung from the raid and confiscation made by the elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics
Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District of the magazines, publications and other
reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized
materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, without benefit of a valid
warrant of search and seizure. Such confiscation was made in compliance with the then Mayor
Bagatsings Anti Smut Campaign. Apparently, petitioners publications were amongst the confiscated
items, thus, they argued that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not
per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and of the press. Petitioners filed for an injunctive relief but the same was denied by the RTC
and CA.

ISSUE:
WON the fact that Petitioners magazines were believed to be indecent and obscene removes it from
the Constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

RULING:


The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required proof to justify a ban
and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which mandatory injunction had been sought below.
First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be
pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.

The fact that the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license to seize
property in disregard of due process. In Philippine Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, We defined police
power as "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare." Presidential Decrees Nos. 960 and 969 are, arguably, police
power measures, but they are not, by themselves, authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt
our law enforcers, in carrying out the decree of the twin presidential issuances (Mr. Marcos'), from the
commandments of the Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, specifically.

Under the Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they
become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 43 We counter-minded
the orders of the Regional Trial Court authorizing the search of the premises of We Forum and
Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila dailies, by reason of a defective warrant. We have greater reason
here to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact
that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos, a political case,
because, and as we have indicated, speech is speech, whether political or "obscene".

The Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, as the Rules of Court (1964 rev.) (the Rules then
prevailing), provide:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested. A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.



Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any party, under Article
201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code.

We reject outright the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free
the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant," and that "violation of
penal law [must] be punished." For starters, there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be
"punished". Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of
an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal
laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into
one. And precisely, this is the very complaint of the petitioner.

G. Assembly and petition
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948]
DOCTRINE: To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced, that the danger apprehended is imminent, and that the evil to
be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction
of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the
state.

FACTS:An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the
City of Manila to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of
grievances to the government.
The reason alleged by the MAYOR in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the
part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving
emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances
of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in
any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.-YES.



HELD: Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1)
the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit
for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine
or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the 2nd construction. First construction
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except
perhaps in cases of national emergency.

The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one .
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC), petitioner, vs. RAMON BAGATSING, as
Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as in the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.

It was not by accident or coincidence that the right to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled
in a single guarantee i.e. to petition the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not Identical, are inseparable.

The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.



Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in
our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even
more so than on the other departments rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect
for and deference to such preferred rights.

It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access.
Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it
were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection
question.

While the General rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their
assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if
it be shown that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made.

FACTS: Petitioner was refused a permit to hold a rally in front of the US Embassy due to police
intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time
and at the place applied for." To be more specific, reference was made to persistent intelligence reports
affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." The permit called for the holding
of a rally starting at the Luneta Park and ending at the US Embassy along Roxas Boulevard.

ISSUE: Whether the denial may be made the object of a mandatory injunction in view of the existence of
an Ordinance prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission.

RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as in the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.

It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and
acts of vandalism must be avoided, To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to call for


condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme
of values.

There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil,
on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Reference was made, in a
previous case, to such plazas as the Luneta "being a promenade for public use," which certainly is not
the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be
granted for the rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta. . To repeat, it is settled law that as to
public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it were, then the
freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an equal protection question. Neither
can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two
block-away at the Roxas Boulevard.

On the ordinance:
Its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the
constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. There was no showing in this case that the
distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown
that such a condition is satisfied, it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he
did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a
case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly
presents itself.

On the application of permit to hold rally:
The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the
public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead
in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached.
If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants
must be heard on the matter.




MIRIAM COLLEGE vs CA
The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free
speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus,
while we upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out
disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. The school
administration of Miriam College is empowered to maintain and impose discipline on the conduct of its
students without violating their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and free speech.

FACTS:
Obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid of
all moral values. This was how some members of the Miriam College community allegedly described
the contents of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam Colleges school paper
(Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho). Following the publication of the
paper and the magazine, the members of the editorial board, all students of Miriam College, received a
letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee informing them of
complaints filed by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student.
When they were asked to submit their response, none was given. An investigation ex parte was made by
the school administration and they sanctioned some of them with either expulsion or suspension.

ISSUE: WON the expulsion/suspension of students for publishing obscene articles for the perusal of
school community is violative of their right to peaceably assemble and free speech - NO

HELD:
The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free
speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus,
while we upheld the right of the students to free expression in these cases, we did not rule out
disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."
The school administration is empowered to maintain and impose discipline on the conduct of its
students.

JACINTO VERSUS COURT OF APPELS


G. R. NO. 124540 ( NOVEMBER 14, 1997)

CASE DOCTRINE: The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the "terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are
governed by law." . . . Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to
secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers
and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the
unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government
employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective
bargaining agreements.

Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees, do not seek to establish
that they have a right to strike. Rather, they tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in
September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their gathering was not a strike;
therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense. MPSTA vs. Laguio and ACT vs.
Cario, in which this Court declared that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons," should not principally resolve
the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.

Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees
as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment; or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.With
these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition.

It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-
holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute
that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities


essentially, their "employers" to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to
benefit them materially.

FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metropolitan Manila.
Between the period September 17 to 21, 1990, they incurred unauthorized absences in connection with
the mass actions then staged; and on September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cario immediately
issued a return-to-work order. The order stated that under Civil service law and rules, strikes,
unauthorized mass leaves and other forms of mass actions by civil servants which disrupt public services
are strictly prohibited. And that those who are engaged in the above-mentioned prohibited acts are
therefore ordered, in the interest of public service, to return to work within 24 hours from your walkout
otherwise dismissal proceedings shall be instituted against them.
The directive was ignored by petitioners. Consequently, on separate dates, Secretary Cario issued
formal charges and preventive suspension orders against them. They were administratively charged
with gross misconduct; gross neglect of duty, etc. for joining unauthorized mass actions; ignoring report-
to-work directives; unjustified abandonment of teaching posts; non-observance of Civil Service law,
rules and regulations; non-compliance with reasonable office rules and regulations; and incurring
unauthorized absences without leave, etc. An investigation committee was then created by Sec. Cario
to look into the matter. However, during the investigation, petitioners did not file their answers or
controvert the charges against them. As a consequence, Sec. Cario, in his decisions found them guilty
as charged and imposed the penalty of dismissal, except with respect to petitioners Merlinda Jacinto
and Adelina Agustin who were meted only six (6) months suspension.

ISSUE OF THE CASE: WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC SCHOOL, HENCE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, HAVE THE
RIGHT TO STRIKE.

HELD: NO.
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. . . . To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . .
."
". . . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough
to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. . . ."
The right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the proviso "in accordance with law."
This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny


certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of
government workers to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which "enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service," by stating that the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed.

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that the "terms and conditions of employment in
the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by law." . . .
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers
cannot use the same weapons employed by the workers in the private sector to secure concessions
from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws
and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized
private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment,
however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.

Petitioners, who are public schoolteachers and thus government employees, do not seek to establish
that they have a right to strike. Rather, they tenaciously insist that their absences during certain dates in
September 1990 were a valid exercise of their constitutional right to engage in peaceful assembly to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. They claim that their gathering was not a strike;
therefore, their participation therein did not constitute any offense. MPSTA vs. Laguio and ACT vs.
Cario, in which this Court declared that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike;
they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the
teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons," should not principally resolve
the present case, as the underlying facts are allegedly not identical.

Strike, as defined by law, means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees
as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms and conditions of employment; or the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.With
these premises, we now evaluate the circumstances of the instant petition.



It cannot be denied that the mass action or assembly staged by the petitioners resulted in the non-
holding of classes in several public schools during the corresponding period. Petitioners do not dispute
that the grievances for which they sought redress concerned the alleged failure of public authorities
essentially, their "employers" to fully and justly implement certain laws and measures intended to
benefit them materially.

Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not penalized for the exercise of their
right to assemble peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil
Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
having absented themselves without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in
order to participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the non-holding of classes
and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners
availed themselves of their free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their
grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one not the
DECS, the CSC or even this Court could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their
constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting from their
activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition
against strikes by government workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law,
rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made answerable.

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), and GABRIELA vs. EDUARDO
ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Manila City Mayor LITO ATIENZA, Chief of the Philippine
National Police, Gen. ARTURO M. LOMIBAO, NCRPO Chief Maj. Gen. VIDAL QUEROL, and Western Police
District Chief Gen. PEDRO BULAONG, G.R. No. 169848, May, 2006

Doctrine:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Although the right of the people to freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is constitutionally
guaranteed, such is not absolute. It may be regulated by the government through its police power. B.P.
No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it is


not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies.

Calibrated Preemptive Response is unconstitutional. The fundamental rights of our people, especially
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is guaranteed. For this reason, the so-called calibrated
preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness
that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify
abuses.

The Facts:

Petitioners come in three groups.

The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of the
Philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) No. 880.

The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al., in G.R. No. 169848, who
allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on
September 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on
October 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to Malacaang to protest issuances of the Palace
which, they claim, put the country under an undeclared martial rule, and the protest was likewise
dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.

The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No. 169881, allege that they
conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual
members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880
and the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it.

STATEMENT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA



On Unlawful Mass Actions

In view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government groups to inflame the
political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duty constituted authorities, we have
instructed the PNP as well as the local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy,
disperse groups that run afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as
well as ordinances on the proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.

The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of maximum tolerance. The
authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of
people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the
national community.

Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens have the right to be
protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory.

They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of
the message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not
apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting
or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they
are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.

Furthermore, the law delegates powers to the Mayor without providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are
inconsistent.



Regarding the CPR policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum
tolerance set forth in B.P. No. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

Finally, petitioners KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and
therefore B.P. No. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that
the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: First, allowing the
Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too
comprehensive. Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events
require instant public assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.

As to the CPR policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of B.P. No. 880 and violates the Constitution
as it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

I s s u e s:

1. On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and 14(a)
thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160: Do they constitute prior restraint?


2. On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):

Ruling:

Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P.
No. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks.
They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their
claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the Constitutional guarantee.
Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the
public assemblies held without the permit.



Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the
realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic
polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias,
this Court said:

The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-
ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of
the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This
sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment
of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political
subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called
municipal and city councils enact ordinances for purpose

B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v. Comelec,[1] where the Court
referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies.[2]



A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies[3] that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable
and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and influencing in the
definition of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning
the government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and petition
only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils Congress has the
right to prevent.

There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the regulation.

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people, especially
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive
response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds
freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. On the
other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies.
Far from being insidious, maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound clear and present danger standard.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR), insofar as
it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents
are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance.




IBP v. Atienza - GR No. 175241, February 24, 2010











Section 5.

A. Non-establishment of religion

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937 GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
LAUREL, J.:

Doctrine:
- The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.
Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the estate will use the church,


and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation
of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development;
- It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration.
- Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs.
- Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous
to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money
or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
- It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing
a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the
City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-
7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one
which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated.

FACTS:
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33th (Thirty-third)
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of
the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue,
green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16,
20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof,


to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner
herein.

Hence, the petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church,
seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance and sale of postage stamps violates of Sec. 23, Subsec. 3, Art. VI of 1935 Consti?
W/N Writ of Prohibition is the proper legal remedy?

RULING:
1. NO.
Section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or system of religion,
or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.
Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the estate will use the church,
and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation
of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of
Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's
Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy
Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme
expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy both religious
and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath
to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional


guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be
stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere.

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME
AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE
COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous
to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money
or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.

In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination.
The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money
derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of
the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to
this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public
Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's
complaint).



It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a
Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the
City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-
7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities
simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one
which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts,
175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

2. YES
The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case,
which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . .
jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate
cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the
writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga
and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs


Garces v. Estenzo - 104 SCRA 510

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers - 59 SCRA 94
Doctrine: The constitution only prohibits the legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion


within limits of utmost amplitude. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance
of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect.

Facts: Benjamin Victoriano, a member of the religious sect known "Iglesia ni Cristo" had been in the
employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a
closed shop provision which requires membership in the union as a condition of employment for all
permanent employees workers. Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted providing that the employer was not
precluded from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in
any such labor organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union. Thereupon, the Union wrote a
formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact
that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified
Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the
Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to
file an action for injunction. In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective
bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350.

Issue: W/N Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.

Ruling: No. The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights. Members of said religious sects
cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious
sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union. The act does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to
affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to
their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither
does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to
join.



What the constitution prohibits is only the legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance
of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy
and eternal. In enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the
constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a
burden that is imposed by union security agreements.

The Constitution does not deny equal protection of the laws and further allows classification.
Classification is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the
class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.

Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects. The fact that the law grants a
privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional. The mere
fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.

Islamic Dawah v. Executive Secretary 405 SCRA 497
Doctrine:
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community
can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its citizens and instead
allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity.


In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right
to health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged
with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims.

Facts:
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-governmental organization that
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the
functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and issue
halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of
the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation.
Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision
on the separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate
policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said scheme is a function only religious
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.

ISSUE: WON the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom of religion.

RULING:
The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the
Muslim community as a "national cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in
mind the constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does
not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the non-establishment clause and the "free
exercise of religion" provision found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion
was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently
affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used are
drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products


as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave
danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.
In a society with a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the
affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious
activity. There is no compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like
herein petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the
health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue
halal certifications. The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already
provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46,
these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory bodies given
detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and safety of food products, the perceived
danger against the health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal
certifications issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official religious
approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s.
2000, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.


B. Free exercise of religion

American Bible Society vs City of Manila

FACTS: New Yorks Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of
charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education
contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order
barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellants members from office for
failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase
of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute
unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the
appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but
the law is not unconstitutional.



ISSUE: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free
exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).'

RULING: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:(7) No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision
afore quoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. It may be true that in the
case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit
higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business
or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the
provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in
doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as
its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the
Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution,
nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be
considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is
powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.


Ebralinag v. Superintendent - 219 SCRA 256

Doctrine: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious profession and
worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on ones belief. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to
religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and
interests where State has right to prevent.

Facts:


The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the
Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions.

Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious
devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God". They consider
the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control..

Issue:
Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled from school for
disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8

Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator

The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a
right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from
the schools is not justified. (Teehankee)

The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they
do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no
warrant for their expulsion.



The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing
the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a
"small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a
nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of
country and admiration for national heroes" . What the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag
ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic
way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture
but also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for
human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and
spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the
petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in
Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony
that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully
constituted authorities.

Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled
violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to "protect and promote the right
of all citizens to quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).


David v. Arroyo 489 SCRA 160
DOCTRINE: The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes
in free speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases. A plain reading of
PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conductit is actually a
call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. It is also not intended for testing
the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conductoverbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids
the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conducteven if expressive
falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of
facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the


incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.

FACTS: 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed alleging that in issuing PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, PGMA committed grave abuse of discretion. The said PP 1017, as petitioner KMU
contended, was the basis of the police for the dispersal of their assemblies in which the police arrested
(without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a UP professor and a columnist, and Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan. Also, Daily Tribune offices in Manila were raided by the CIDG and news
stories were confiscated.

ISSUE: WON PP 1017 violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of
assembly

HELD: PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by PGMA on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not
related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof
that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and
violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as
well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication
and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.



ESTRADA V. ESCRITOR
DOCTRINE:
The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our
Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights "the
most inalienable and sacred of human rights,"

FACTS:


A complaint was filed by Alejandro Estrada against Soledad Escritor for for living with a man not her
husband, and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to
remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.2 Consequently,
respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I,
Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code. Respondent Escritor testified that when
she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998.4 She
admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than
twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted
that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.

ISSUE:
Should Escritor be punished?

HELD:
Administrative complaint against Soledad Escritor was dismissed. Her right to freedom of religion is
upheld.

Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights
in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights
"the most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to
contend that the states interest is important, because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious
freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests
can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free
Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the States broad interest in "protecting the institutions of marriage and the family," or
even "in the sound administration of justice" that must be weighed against respondents claim, but the
States narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondents faith
finds moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives at risk if
exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives will be undermined
if exemptions are granted.



To paraphrase Justice Blackmuns application of the compelling interest test, the States interest in
enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot
be merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a
criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to
enforce that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing
the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to
prosecute respondent nor her partner. The States asserted interest thus amounts only to the symbolic
preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent Escritors
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be
upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the
state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode
the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such
state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

Section 6.

A. Liberty of abode and of travel

Marcos v Manglapus 177 SCRA 668 (1989)
DOCTRINE: The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the
Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres.
Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so


within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.

They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

RULING: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country,
a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the
country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration
speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the
other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be
restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate
rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.



The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

MANOTOC vs. CA, 142 SCRA 149
DOCTRINES:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.

FACTS: Petitioner, Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain
period of time and subsequently went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a
management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a
case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for
departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued. There was a torrens title submitted
to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate
criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged
with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for
permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and
opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed
petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request
denying his leave to travel abroad. According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter
of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel.

HELD: NO. Petitioners contention is untenable. The SC ruled that that object of bail is to relieve the
accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same
time, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper
officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what
the law may require of him. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.


Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel, the
duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial
discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country.

Section 7.

A. Right to information

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission - 150 SCRA 530
Doctrines;

Right to information, self-executory. Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
of, or access to, information of public concern.


While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies

Facts:

Petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier
denied Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil
service examinations for sanitarians.



Issue:

whether or not Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed must be granted on the basis of his right to information

Held
Yes. These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access
to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature.
What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access
to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7
have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the
right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.

Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public
concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in
custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the
public.

Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to
afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.









G.R No 74930
Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy del Castillo, Rolado Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez,
Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun Ninoy Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro and Rolando Fadul, petitioners,
Vs.
Feliciano Belmonte JR., respondent.
DOCTRINES: The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore
restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The
right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees,
the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is limited
to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."
Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, the requirements before mandamus may
issue by virtue of the constitutional right to information, 1) it must be clear that the information sought
is of "public interest" or "public concern," and 2) is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. (The loans of GSIS are matters of public concern or interest but admittedly are
covered by the right to privacy of the individual members, however, the right of privacy cannot be
invoked by the GSIS as it is a constitutional right with a personal character therefore only the individual
members may claim coverage under the right to privacy. Therefore, the petitioners may have access to
these loans)

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant
has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty
of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific. (It is not the GSIS duty to furnish copies, thus, mandamus as
regards the furnishing of copies must fail.)
FACTS:



Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager,
requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa
including the ten (10) opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million each on
guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible, an access to those said documents. Apart
from Valmontes letter, he is stressing the premise of the request on the present provision of the
Freedom constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious legal
implications seek the help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter,
a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may
be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be
proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.

On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel,
Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to receive a reply, they are now
considering themselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue their
desired objective in pursuance of public interest.

Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed
a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

In his comment, respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among
which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that actions
of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However,
did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore asserted that since administrative
remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to access and be
furnished of copies of the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.

RULING:
Access Yes.


Copies No.
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the
state. Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by
the people. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. Peoples right
to information is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service
Insurance act of 1977 provide for annual appropriations for to pay for contributions, premiums , interest
and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which
the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the
GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these
funds are managed properly with end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first
to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions
were above board.

Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is
argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. He
further contends that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally protected by the Constitution and
by existing laws, the documents, evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the
ambit of the right to information.

There can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of
Morfe vs. Mutuc, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando stated that ultimate and pervasive control
of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control.

Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to
the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and the government agencies like the GSIS.
Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of


privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.

Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked only by the person whose
privacy is claimed to be violated.

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions are private in nature and
hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which
guarantees access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions only. Further, they argued that GSIS, is a governmental corporation
performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the peoples right to access to official
records.

This Dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated in ACCFA v. Confederation
of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government WHETHER
carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of
service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS , in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary
function would NOT justify the exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to
information.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may
specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with
the decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO ORDERED.


Gonzales v. Narvasa 337 SCRA 733
AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO
(Sorry about this guys, the whole case was really long and I felt the need to indicate many necessary
topics involving the right to information)



DOCTRINE:
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy
of full public disclosure.

Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure of the rolling texts which
may undergo radical change or portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the
negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed to explore
alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working
drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.

A complicated negotiation . . . cannot be carried through without many, many private talks and
discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries
come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with other countries
and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances and would
not do under other circumstances. . . If these reports . . . should become public . . . who would ever trust
American Delegations in another conference?

While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
ample opportunity for discussion before *a treaty+ is approved the offers exchanged by the parties
during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to
conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic
confidentiality*27+ would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged
without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do
not, the rationale for the privilege being that it is a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect
the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial
power.



Closely related to the presidential communications privilege is the deliberative process privilege
recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co,[34] deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but,
on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each
remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to
enhance the quality of agency decisions.

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications
is similar, if not identical.

FACTS:
Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers seek via the
present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Petitioners invoke their constitutionally guaranteed right to information and thus they are entitled to
the full text of the JPEPA as well as other pertinent documents during the negotiations stage. As to
petitioners request for the full text of JPEPA, the same has become moot and academic as the same has
already been submitted to the senate. Thus the crux of the the case is now focused on the entitlement
of the petitioners to the pertinent documents involved during the negotiation of JPEPA. To this, the
respondents refused invoking executive privilege.

ISSUE:
WON, the requested documents during JPEPAs negotiation are covered by the constitutionally
guaranteed right to information.

RULING:
Yes, to be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern. Apropos is the teaching of Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission:


In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the
doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy
of full public disclosure.

It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy of full public
disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or public interest, are
recognized as privileged in nature. Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.[21] In the present case, the ground for
respondents claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz:

x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of
diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. In this case, the privileged character of the
diplomatic negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents particularly
respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.

The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and
legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of
public concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive privilege. At
the time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were
ongoing as they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change.
Considering the status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently covered by
executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.

Practical and strategic considerations likewise counsel against the disclosure of the rolling texts
which may undergo radical change or portions of which may be totally abandoned. Furthermore, the
negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as of Japan must be allowed to explore
alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the same manner as judicial deliberations and working
drafts of opinions are accorded strict confidentiality.



In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the Presidents
representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases
Agreement.*25+ The Court denied the petition, stressing that secrecy of negotiations with foreign
countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information. The Resolution went on to state, thus:

The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are
inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.
Although much has been said about open and secret diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter,
Secretaries of State Hughes and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the words of
Mr. Stimson:

A complicated negotiation . . . cannot be carried through without many, many private talks and
discussion, man to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries
come and tell you in confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with other countries
and with other delegates; they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances and would
not do under other circumstances. . . If these reports . . . should become public . . . who would ever trust
American Delegations in another conference?

In the moment that negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to muscle in. An ill-timed
speech by one of the parties or a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on
both sides would quickly lead to widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has
been drafted and its terms are fully published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before it is
approved.

Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.[26] that
the President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries, viz:

x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems,
the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties
with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. AsMarshall said in his great
argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, The President is the sole organ of the


nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Annals, 6th Cong., col.
613. . . (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)

Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the
JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be ample opportunity for
discussion before *a treaty+ is approved the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that historic
confidentiality*27+ would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public scrutiny would
discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.
While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from entering into
compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for that matter, normally
involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have to be willing to grant concessions in
an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest.

Indeed, by hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be jeopardizing higher
national goals for the sake of securing less critical ones.

Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA
negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not
mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in
which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of
the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.

While there certainly are privileges grounded on the necessity of safeguarding national security such as
those involving military secrets, not all are founded thereon. One example is the informers privilege,
or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish
information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.[30] The suspect
involved need not be so notorious as to be a threat to national security for this privilege to apply in any
given instance. Otherwise, the privilege would be inapplicable in all but the most high-profile cases, in


which case not only would this be contrary to long-standing practice. It would also be highly prejudicial
to law enforcement efforts in general.

Also illustrative is the privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed
privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those
which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that

x x x [a] frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. x x x[31] (Emphasis supplied)

In the same way that the privilege for judicial deliberations does not depend on the nature of the
case deliberated upon, so presidential communications are privileged whether they involve matters of
national security.

Closely related to the presidential communications privilege is the deliberative process privilege
recognized in the United States. As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co,[34] deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.
Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but,
on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each
remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to
enhance the quality of agency decisions. [35]

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative process and
presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the rationale for the
confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process, and presidential communications
is similar, if not identical.

The Courts statement in Senate v. Ermita that presidential refusals to furnish information may be
actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations *state secrets privilege, informers
privilege, and a generic privilege for internal deliberations], and may be asserted, with differing degrees
of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations,*41+ implies that a privilege, once
recognized, may be invoked under different procedural settings. That this principle holds true


particularly with respect to diplomatic negotiations may be inferred from PMPF v. Manglapus itself,
where the Court held that it is the President alone who negotiates treaties, and not even the Senate or
the House of Representatives, unless asked, may intrude upon that process.

Clearly, the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens demands for
information, but also in the context of legislative investigations. Hence, the recognition granted in PMPF
v. Manglapus to the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations cannot be considered irrelevant in
resolving the present case, the contextual differences between the two cases notwithstanding.

True, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order. x x x[46]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It follows from this ruling that even definite propositions of the government may not be disclosed if they
fall under recognized exceptions. The privilege for diplomatic negotiations is clearly among the
recognized exceptions, for the footnote to the immediately quoted ruling cites PMPF v. Manglapus itself
as an authority.

In Pimentel v. Executive Secretary[57] where the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and
otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.



This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to enter into treaties is unlimited but for
the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all treaties will
substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may not
interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate
concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole that has been
given the authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only
the Senate.
While herein petitioners-members of the House of Representatives may not have been aiming to
participate in the negotiations directly, opening the JPEPA negotiations to their scrutiny even to the
point of giving them access to the offers exchanged between the Japanese and Philippine delegations
would have made a mockery of what the Constitution sought to prevent and rendered it useless for
what it sought to achieve when it vested the power of direct negotiation solely with the President.



Section 8.

A. Government employees

SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

DOCTRINE: The employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees and that
the SSS is one such GOCC with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum
prohibiting strikes.

FACTS: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the unions demands concerning
the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued TRO pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The position of the petitioners is that the


RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the
writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the DOLE or teh NLRC, since the case involves a
labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws,
rules and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore
the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

ISSUE: WON SSS employers have the right to strike----PROHIBITED
HELD:The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be
enacted by Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission
which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by govt
employees enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result
in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of any legislation
allowing govt. employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as government employees
and that the SSS is one such GOCC with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commissions memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and
PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC. respondents.

The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes
"not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial
employees from forming or joining labor organizations.



By the very nature of (managerial employees) functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity
to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of
labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or
joint a labor union equally applies to them.

The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in
view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence
of managerial employees in Union membership.

FACTS: Petitoner union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on
appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are
managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership pursuant to Art. 245 of the Labor
Code.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provision of the Labor Code is contrary to the Constitution.

RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise
should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations.

In the first place, all these employees, with the exception of the service engineers and the sales force
personnel, are confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a
confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial
functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial
employees to form, assist or joint a labor union equally applies to them.

The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would
belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in
view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence
of managerial employees in Union membership.