Torts 2010

torts & damages A2010 - 1 - prof.
casis

INTRODUCTION

NAGUIAT V NLRC (National Organization of
Workingmen and Galang) 269 SCRA 565
PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997

NATURE
Special civil action in the Supreme Court, certiorari

FACTS
- Clark Field Taxi, Inc. held a concessionaires contract
with the Army Air Force Exchange Services for the operation of
taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio Naguiat was the
president of CFTI while Antolin Naguiat was its vice president.
Like Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. which was a trading firm, it was
also a family-owned corporation. - Respondents were employed
by the CFTI as taxicab drivers. > They were required to pay a
daily boundary fee of US$26.50 (for those on duty from 1AM-
12N) or US$27 (for those on duty from 12N to 12 MN) >
Incidental expenses were maintained by the drivers (including
gasoline expenses).
> Drivers worked 3-4 times a week depending on the
availability of vehicles and earned no less than US$15.00 a
day. In excess of that amount, they had to make cash
deposits to the company which they could withdraw every
fifteen days.
- AAFES was dissolved because of the phase-out of
the military bases in Clark and the services of the respondents
were officially terminated on November 26, 1991.
- AAFES Taxi Drivers Association, the drivers union,
and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits.
They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers would
be given P500 for ever year as severance pay. Most of the
drivers accepted this but some refused to do so. - Those who
did not accept the initial severance pay disaffiliated themselves
with drivers union and through the National Organization of
Workingmen, they filed a complaint against Sergio Naguiat
under the name and style Naguiat Enterprises, AAFES and
AAFES union.
- The labor arbiter ordered the petitioner to pay the
drivers P1,200 for every year of service for humanitarian
consideration, setting aside the earlier agreement between the
CFTI and the drivers union. It also rejected the idea that the
CFTI was forced to close it business due to great financial
losses and lose opportunity since at the time of its closure it
was profitably earning. The labor arbiter however did not award
separation pay because to impose a monetary obligation to
an employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic)
shot down by force majeur would be unfair and unjust. - The
NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter after
respondents appealed by granting separation pay to the private
respondents. It said that half of the monthly salary should be
US$120 which should be paid in Philippine pesos. Naguiat
Enterprieses should be joined with Sergio and Antolin Naguiat
as jointly and severally liable.

Petitioners Claim:
- Petitioners claim that the cessation of the business
was due to the great financial losses and lost business
opportunity when Clark Air Base was phased out due to the
expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement and the
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo.
- They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers
union to grant the taxi drivers separation pay equivalent to P500
for every year of service. - They allege that Sergio and Antolin
Naguiat were denied due process beause the petitioners were
not furnished copies of the appeal to the NLRC. - They also
allege that NOWM cannot make legal representation in behalf
of the respondents because the latter should be bound by the
decision of the drivers union.
Respondents Comments:
- The drivers alleged that they were employees of
Naguiat Enterprises although their individual applications were
approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to
Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTO and that
Naguia Enterprises managed, controlled and supervised their
employment.
- They averred that they should be entitled to
separation pay based on their latest daily earnings or US$15 for
working 16 days a month.

ISSUES
1. WON the NLRC acted in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in granting separation pay
2. WON NOWM was authorized to represent the private
respondents 3. WON Naguiat Enterprieses, Sergio Naguiat and
Antolin Naguiat were
liable
4. WON Sergio and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process

HELD
1. NO, the NLRC did not act in excess of jurisdiction or with
abuse of discretion.
Ratio Findings of fact of administrative bodies and quasi-
judicial bodies are afforded great respect by the Court and are
binding except when there is a showing of grave abuse of
discretion or the decision was arrived at arbitrarily.
Reasoning
- Respondents showed that their monthly take home
pay amounted to no less than $240 and this was not disputed
by petitioners.
- There is no record or evidence which shows that the
closure of the taxi business was brought about by great
financial losses no thanks to the Pinatubo eruption. It was
rather brought about by the closure of the military bases.
- Art. 283 of the CC provides that separation pay shall
be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. The NLRC ruling was
correct in terms of US$120 as the computed separation pay.
2. Petitioners can no longer question the authority of NOWM
and are held in estoppel.
Reasoning
- NOWM was already representing the respondents before the
labor arbiter and the petitioners did not assail their juridical
personality then. - Petitioners also acknowledged before the
Court that the taxi drivers are themselves parties in the case.
3. Naguiat Enterprises is not liable, Antolin Naguiat is not
personally liable whereas Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable.

- Re: Naguiat Enterprises liability
Reasoning
- The respondents were regular employees of CFTI
who received wages on a boundary basis. They offered no
evidence that Naguiat Enterprises managed, supervised and
controlled their employment. They instead submitted
documents which had to do with CFTI, not Naguiat Enterprises.
- Labor-only contractors are those where 1) the person
supplying workers to the employer does no have substantial
capital or investment in the form of tools or machinery and 2)
the workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal
business of the employer.
- Independent contractors are those who exercise
independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work
according to their own methods without being subject to the
control of their employer except as to the result of their work.
- Sergio Naguiat was a stockholder and director of
Naguiat Enterprises but, in supervising the taxi drivers and
determining their employment terms, he was carrying out his
responsibility as president of CFTI.
- Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while
CFTI was in the taxi business.
- The Constitution of the CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers
Association states that the members of the union are
employees of CFTI and for collective and bargaining purposes,
the employer is also CFTI.
- Re: Antolin Naguiats liability
Reasoning
- Although he carried the title of general manager, it
has not been shown that he had acted in such capacity.
- No evidence on the extent of his participation in the
management or operation of the business was proferred.
- Re: Sergio Naguiats liability
Ratio A director or officer may be held solidarly liable with a
corporation by a specific provision of law because a
corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its
directors and officers. Obligations incurred by them, acting as
such corporation agents, are not theirs but the direct
accountabilities of the corporation they represent. In the
absence of definite proof of who clearly are the officers of the
corporation, the assumption falls on the President of the
corporation.
Reasoning
torts & damages A2010 - 2 - prof. casis

- In his capacity as President, Sergio Naguiat cannot
be exonerated. - An employer is defined to be any person
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
- Case in point is A.C. Ransom Labor Union CCLU vs.
NLRC held that the identified employer A.C. Ransom
Corporation, being an artificial person, must have an officer and
in the absence of proof, the president is assumed to be the
head of the corporation.
- Both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were close family
corporations owned by the same family. To the extent that
stockholders are actively engaged in the management or
business affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall
be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among
themselves. Said stockholders shall be liable for corporate torts
unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate
liability insurance. > Nothing in the records indicate that CFTI
obtained reasonable adequate liability insurance.
> Jurisprudence is wanting in the definition of corporate tort.
Tort essentially consists in the violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of legal
duty.
> Art. 238 mandates the employer to grant separation pay to
employees in case of cessation of operations or closure of
the business not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses which is the condition on this case.
4. There was no denial of due process.
Reasoning
- Even if the individual Naguiats were not impleaded as
parties of the complaint, they could still be held liable because
of jurisprudence (A.C. Ransom case).
- Both also voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they filed a position paper.
DISPOSITION The petition is partly granted. 1) CFTI and
Sergio Naguiat are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
individual respondents of US$120 for every year of service and
2) Naguiat Enterprises and Antolin Naguiat are absolved from
liability.

BARREDO V GARCIA
BOCOBO; July 8, 1942

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS
- from CA, holding Fausto Barredo liable for damages
for death pf Faustino Garcia caused by negligence of Pedro
Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Fausto Barredo
- May 3, 1936 in road between Malabon and
Navotas, head-on collision between taxi of Malate Taxicab and
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis thereby causing
overturning of the carretela and the eventual death of Garcia,
16-yo boy and one of the passengers
- Fontanilla convicted in CFI and affirmed by CA and
separate civil action is reserved
- Parents of Garcia filed action against Barredo as sole
proprietor of Malate Taxicab as employer of Fontanilla
- CFI and CA awarded damages bec Fontanillas
negligence apparent as he was driving on the wrong side of the
road and at a high speed > no proof he exercised diligence of a
good father of the family as Barredo is careless in employing
(selection and supervision) Fontanilla who had been caught
several times for violation of Automobile Law and speeding >
CA applied A1903CC that makes inapplicable civil liability
arising from crime bec this is under obligations arising from
wrongful act or negligent acts or omissions punishable by law
- Barredos defense is that his liability rests on RPC TF
liability only subsidiary and bec no civil action against Fontanilla
TF he too cannot be held responsible

ISSUE
WON parents of Garcia may bring separate civil action against
Barredo making him primarily liable and directly responsible
under A1903CC as
employer of Fontanilla

HELD
YES
- There are two actions available for parents of Garcia.
One is under the A100RPC wherein the employer is only
subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the crime
thereby first exhausting the properties of Fontanilla. The other
action is under A1903CC (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana)
wherein as the negligent employer of Fontanilla, Barredo is held
primarily liable subject to proving that he exercising diligence of
a good father of the family. The parents simply took the action
under the Civil Code as it is more practical to get damages from
the employer bec he has more money to give than Fontanilla
who is yet to serve his sentence. Obiter
Difference bet Crime and Quasi-delict
1) crimes public interest; quasi-delict only private
interest
2) Penal code punishes or corrects criminal acts; Civil
Code by means of indemnification merely repairs the damage
3) delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts; crimes are
only punished if there is a penal law; quasi-delicts include any
kind of fault or negligence intervenes
NOTE: not all violations of penal law produce civil responsibility
e.g. contravention of ordinances, violation of game laws,
infraction of rules of traffic when nobody is hurt
4) crime guilt beyond reasonable doubt; civil mere
preponderance of evidence - Presumptions:
1) injury is caused by servant or employee, there instantly
arises presumption of negligence of master or employer in
selection, in supervision or both 2) presumption is juris tantum
not juris et de jure TF may be rebutted by proving exercise of
diligence of a good father of the family - basis of civil law
liability: not respondent superior bu the relationship of pater
familias
- motor accidents need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles

ELCANO V HILL
77 SCRA 98
BARREDO; May 26, 1977

NATURE
Appeal from an order of the CFI Quezon City

FACTS
- Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of
occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito
Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake.
- Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of
damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI
dismissed it.

ISSUES
1. WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability
was not reversed 2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last par) of the
CC can be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the fact
that at the time of the occurrence, Reginald, though a minor,
living with and getting subsistence from his father, was
already legally married

HELD
1. NO
The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.
-Barredo v Garcia (dual charactercivil and criminal of fault
or negligence as a source of obligation):
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same
act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In
that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent
and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action.
And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued."
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could
have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act
of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of
an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa

aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the
wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could
have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
-Culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or
in violation of a penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
-ART 1162: "Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, Article
2177 of the new code provides: "ART 277. Responsibility for
fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising front
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant."
- According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing
provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so
novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of
criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquilian' or quasi-delict,
of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or
'cuasi-delito' has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly
tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to
a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a
double recovery,"
- Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that
giveth life" rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent
of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that me preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 12) from the civil responsibility
arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2
and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, its
"more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and
more in harmony with modern progress", to hold, as We do
hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent.
- Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.
2. YES (but)
- Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. (However, inasmuch as
it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.)
- While it is true that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and
under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of
the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the
child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money
or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian." -
Under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company."
- In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
- It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa,
the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with
their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation
of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to
prevent them from causing damage to third persons. - On the
other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that
a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or
be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation.
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
CINCO V CANONOY
90 SCRA 369
Melencio-Herrera; May 31, 1979

NATURE

FACTS
- Cinco filed on Feb 25, 19701 a complaint for recovery
of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated
by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito. - Subsequently, a
criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising
from the same accident.
- At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit. - The City Court of Mandaue
ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioners MFR
having been denied, he elevated the matter on Certiorari to the
CFI Cebu., which in turn dismissed the petition.
Plaintiffs claims:
- it was the fault r negligence of the driver in the
operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused
the collision. - Damages were sustained by petitioner because
of the collision - There was a direct causal connection between
the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private
respondents.
- They observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees, particularly of Romeo Hilot.

ISSUE
WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action

HELD
YES
- Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action,
as specifically provided for in Art 2177 of the Civil Code.
- The separate and independent civil action for quasi-
delict is also clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. In the cases prvided
for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code f
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required
in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
- Petitioners cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Art 2176 of the
Civil Code, is so broad that in includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction
between damage to persons on the one hand and
damage to property on the other. The word damage is used
in two concepts: the harm done and reparation for the
harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it
includes both injuries to person and property since harm is
not limited to personal but also to property injuries.
DISPOSITION Writ of Certiorari granted.


BAKSH V CA (Gonzales)
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE, JR; Feb.19, 1993

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari to review and set aside the CA decision
which affirmed in toto the RTCs decision

FACTS
- Private respondent Marilou Gonzales (MG) filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat
Baksh for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. **MGs allegations in the complaint:
- That she is a 22 yr. old Filipina, single, of good moral
character and respected reputation in her community.
- That Baksh is an Iranian citizen, residing in Dagupan,
and is an exchange student taking up medicine at the Lyceum
in Dagupan. - That Baksh later courted and proposed to marry
her. MG accepted his love on the condition that they would get
married. They later agreed to get married at the end of the
school semester. Petitioner had visited MGs parents to secure
their approval of the marriage. Baksh later forced MG to live
with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
started maltreating her even threatening to kill her and as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. A day
before the filing of the complaint, Baksh repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore
and that he is already married to someone in Bacolod. She
prayed for payment for damages amounting to Php 45,000 plus
additional costs.
- Baksh answered with a counterclaim, admitting only
the personal circumstances of the parties in the complaint but
denied the rest of the allegations. He claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married; neither sought
the consent of her parents nor forced her to live in his apt.; did
not maltreat her but only told her to stop coming to his place
after having discovered that she stole his money and passport.
He also prayed for 25,000 as moral damages plus misc.
expenses.
- The RTC, applying Art. 21 CC decided in favor of
private respondent. Petitioner was thus ordered to pay Php
20,000 as moral damages and 3,000 pesos attys. fees plus
litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed this decision to
respondent CA, contending that the trial court erred in not
dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and in
ordering him to pay moral damages, attys fees, etc.
- Respondent CA promulgated the challenged decision
affirming in toto the trial courts ruling which prompted Baksh to
file this petition for certiorari, raising the single issue of WON
Art. 21 applies to this case.

ISSUE
WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the
basis of Art.21 of the Civil Code

HELD
1. YES
Ratio In a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a
victim of moral seduction, Art. 21 may be applied.
Reasoning
- Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice
or inveigle to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual
act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art.21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
- In the instant case, respondent Court found that it
was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in
with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. In short, the
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but
because of moral seduction. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Art.337 or
Art.338 of the RPC because the private respondent was above
18 years of age at the time of the seduction.
- Moreover, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the
credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely
their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court
had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. Petitioner has
miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or value which
could alter the result of the case.
**Obiter: on Torts and Quasi-delicts
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in
the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil
Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided
in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men...
- This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept
of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
- As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the
sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice,
to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art.21 Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing
norm: 'A' seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.' A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above 18 yrs of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and although the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she
and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
- Art.2176 CC, which defines a quasi-delict, is limited to
negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is
an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Art.2176 CC. In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Art.21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Art.21 fills that
vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and
20 of the Civil Code, Art.21 has greatly broadened the scope of
the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
DISPOSITION finding no reversible error in the challenged
decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED

PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS
285 SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998

NATURE
An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
qualified by treachery.

FACTS
- evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-
brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his
brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and
Marcial Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel
Tolentino. They proceeded to attend a dance but did not stay
long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and
his companions who were giving them dagger looks. In order to
avoid trouble, especially during the festivity, they decided to
head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation
of Galo and his companions.
- The group had barely left when their owner jeep was
fired upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from
the jeep and landed just beside it, scurried to the side of the
road and hid in the ricefield. His younger brother Jerry also
managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and died.
Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained
injuries. Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his
seat and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney
which caused his death.
- Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal
Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan
were issued. - All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted
on Galo and Ballesteros produced positive results. Bulusan
was not tested for nitrates.
In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to
Bulusan or any of his companions. Having been found with
gunpowder residue in his hands, Galo attempted to exculpate
himself from the results by confessing that he had been a
cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact, just
consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test., and that his
hand may have been contaminated by a nitrogenous
compound, the source of which is urine. Lastly, he said that he
was not even present at the crime scene
- Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, that he
went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. He
returned home and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at
9:00 oclock. The next morning, he busied himself with some
chores, which included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate.
He handled the fertilizers without gloves. He said that he uses
his left hand in lighting cigarettes and he had no motive to kill
the victims. - Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and
Ballesteros - The trial court found the three accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, and
ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily: 1. The heirs of Jerry
Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and actual
damages in the amount of P35,755.00, with interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P20,000.00, and actual damages in the total amount
of P61,785.00, with interest; 3. Carmelo Agliam, actual
damages in the amount of P2,003.40, and moral damages in
the amount of P10,000.00, with interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino,
moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with interest.
5. The costs.

ISSUES
1. WON the trial court was correct in finding accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
2. WON the Court correctly ruled in finding that the
offense was qualified by treachery
3. WON the Court was correct in the award of damages
to the heirs of the
victims

HELD
1. YES
Ratio Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to
convict a person of a criminal charge. The doubt to the benefit
of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable
doubt, not a whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but
wholly improbable possibilities and unsupported by evidence.
Reasonable doubt is that engendered by an investigation of the
whole proof and inability, after such investigation, to let the
mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
Reasoning
- In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam both
described the area to be well illumined by the moon.
Considering the luminescence of the moon and the proximity
between them, the victims could distinctly identify their
assailants. Also, the constant interaction between them through
the years (in the buying and selling of cattle and Bulusan was a
classmate of Vidal) would necessarily lead to familiarity with
each other such that, at the very least, one would have been
able to recognize the other easily
- That accused-appellants had no motive in
perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. Motive is the moving
power which impels one to action for a definite result. Intent, on
the other hand, is the purpose to use a particular means to
effect such result. The prosecution need not prove motive on
the part of the accused when the latter has been positively
identified as the author of the crime.
- on their excuses regarding the source of the
gunpowder traces found on their hands: Experts confirm the
possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine may leave traces
of nitrates, but these are minimal and, unlike those found in
gunpowder, may be washed off with tap water.
- on the defense of alibi: for the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove, not only that he was at some
other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti
or within its immediate vicinity. This accused-appellants failed to
satisfactorily prove. Positive identification prevails over denials
and alibis.
- None of them attempted to corroborate their alibi
through the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never
attempted to present as witnesses those who could have
testified to having seen them elsewhere on the night in
question.
2. YES
Ratio The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1) (t)hat at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.
Reasoning
- Here, it is obvious that the accused-appellants had sufficient
opportunity to reflect on their heinous plan. The facts show that
the attack was well-planned and not merely a result of the
impulsiveness of the offenders. Manifestations of their evil
designs were already apparent as early as the time of the
dance. They were well-armed and approached the homebound
victims, totally unaware of their presence, from behind. There
was no opportunity for the latter to defend themselves
3. YES
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some
duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral
damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering,
moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that
these were the proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or
omission.
Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the party
making a claim for such must present the best evidence
available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated
by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the
heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been
fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and
presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages
is proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages
to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be
amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount
of P 50,000.00 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of
indemnity, and not as compensatory damages. As regards
moral damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and
injury caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable,
may be determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence,
we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
DISPOSITION The decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.


CUSTODIO V CA (Heirs Of Mabasa)
253 SCRA 483
REGALADO; February 9, 1996

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA

FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellee Mabasa owns a parcel of land
with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior
P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. As access
to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff's property, there are 2 possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one
meter wide and is about 20m distant from Mabasa's residence
to P. Burgos St. Such path is passing in between the row of
houses of defendants. The second passageway is about 3m in
width. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter
wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6m in length, has
to be traversed.
- When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there
were tenants occupying the remises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However,
sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the
apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first
passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was
first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property
which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in
such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it
was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated
the area. Defendant Cristina Santos testified that she
constructed said fence because there was an incident when her
daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of
the tenants in said apartment along the first passageway. She
also mentioned some other inconveniences of having at the
front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants
were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of
their footwear were even lost. - TC ordered (a) defendant-
appellants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent
access ingress and egress, to the public street; (b) the
plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses P8,000 as
indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
- Private respondents, went to CA raising the sole
issue of WON lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. CA affirming TC judgment with modification,
awarding damages to plaintiffs (P65K as actual damages, P30K
as moral damages and P10K as exemplary damages). Mfr
denied. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES
1. WON the grant of right of way to herein private respondents
is proper
2. WON CA erred in awarding damages to plaintiff-appellee
Mabasa

HELD
1. Ratio Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an
appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative
relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower
court
Reasoning
- Petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo
granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are
presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the
finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the
issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been
laid to rest.
2. YES
Ratio There is no cause of action for acts done by one person
(in this case, upon his own property) in a lawful and proper
manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an
unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is
damnum absque injuria.
Reasoning
[1] To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be
both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom.
[2] Obiter: There is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. [3] In order that the law will give
redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. The
injury must result from a breach of duty or a legal wrong.
[4] In this case, although there was damage, there was
no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents,
petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right (Art.21 CC)
[5] The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It
is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and
fence their property (See Art.430 CC).
DISPOSITION The appealed decision of CA is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is
REINSTATED.

THE CONCEPT OF
QUASIDELICT

GARCIA V FLORIDO
[CITATION]
ANTONIO; [DATE]

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental, dismissing petitioners' action
for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
Pedro Tumala, "without prejudice to refiling the said civil action
after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by
the Chief of Police of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte", and
from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS
- On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia,
Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife,
Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said
hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with plate No. 241-8 G
Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a
roundtrip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the
purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government
hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of
Regional Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. - At about
9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on
the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan,
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided with an
oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N.
71 owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and
driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid
collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which
necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
- Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the
passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their
respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent
and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the
PU car, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia,
and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with
respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental an
action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private
respondents, owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car
and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer
for preliminary attachment.
- The principal argument advanced by Mactan Inc. et.
al to in a motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no
cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the
filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro

Tumala was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the
Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a
complaint filed by the Chief of Police and that, with the filing of
the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed
subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is
premature, because the liability of the employer is merely
subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been
rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence;
that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art
33 applied only to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide,
not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
- The lower court sustained Mactan Inc. et. Al. and
dismissed the complaint

ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in dismissing the
complaint for damages on the ground that since no express
reservation was made by the complainants, the civil aspect of
the criminal case would have to be determined only after the
termination of the criminal case
2. WON the lower court erred in saying that the action is
not based on quasidelict since the allegations of the complaint
in culpa aquiliana must not be tainted by any assertion of
violation of law or traffic rules or regulations and because of the
prayer in the complaint asking the Court to declare the
defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory
and exemplary damages
.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An action based on quasi-delict may be maintained
independently from a criminal action. By instituting a civil action
based on a quasi-delict, a complainant may be deemed to
abandon his/her right to press recovery for damages in the
criminal case. Reasoning
- In the case at bar, there is no question that
petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by
the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much
less has the said criminal action been terminated either by
conviction or acquittal of said accused.
- It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the
present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the
criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the
present civil case.
- As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability
of private respondents to the former has ceased to be involved
in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his
right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only
when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his
right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the
civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the
criminal case has disappeared. - As we have stated at the
outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce
a civil liability arising from crime or create an action for
quasidelict or culpa extracontractual. The former is a violation of
the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in
accordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon quasi-
delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for
criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to .
. . Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the
letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were
drafted . . . and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the
general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The
proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33
and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the
reservation required in the proviso."
- But in whatever way We view the institution of the
civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by
petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the
provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which
require reservation by the injured party considering that by
the institution of the civil action even before the
commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners
have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or
one where reservation to file the civil action need not be
made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the
Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of
the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing
the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,
We find no legal justification for respondent court's order
of dismissal. 2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the
elements of quasi-delict. Ratio An action shall be deemed to
be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments
under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,
namely:
a) act or omission of the private respondents;
b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due
care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by
respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus
with the passenger car;
c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by
petitioners as a result of the collision;
d) existence of direct causal connection between the
damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents; and
e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations
between the parties. Reasoning
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents
violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast
clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in
violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of
the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the
nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa
aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of
the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the
interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted
in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in
violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since
the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal
action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal
Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable
that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints
would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that
the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil
liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal
Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This
distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et
all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621).
- It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule
111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on
January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39
and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by
the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section
1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such
reservation shall be made.

SEPARATE OPINION

BARREDO [concur]
- Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability
distinct and different from the civil action arising from the
offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since
Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code
articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised
Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in
the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in
Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the
latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character
and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it
cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an
enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.
- Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850
should be deemed as the reservation required, there being no
showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so.
- Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the
order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No.
2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the
last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means
that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is
entitled exclusively to the bigger one.

ANDAMO V IAC (Missionaries Of Our Lady Of
La Salette,
Inc)
191 SCRA 195

-
FERNAN; November 6, 1990

NATURE
Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

FACTS
- Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious
corporation.
- Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths
and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed,
which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused
a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants,
washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners
and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
- In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin,
officers and directors of respondent corporation, for destruction
by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal
Code.
- On February 22, 1983, petitioners filed a civil case for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against respondent corporation. Hearings were
conducted including ocular inspections on the land.
- On April 26, 1984, the trial court issued an order
suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment
in the related Criminal Case. And later on dismissed the Civil
Case for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.The
decision was based on Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of
Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from
the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action."
- Petitioners appealed from that order to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. - On February 17, 1986,
respondent Appellate Court affirmed the order of the trial court.
A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by
the Appellate Court .

ISSUE
WON a corporation, which has built through its agents,
waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land,
can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
case

HELD
Ratio YES. As held in In Azucena vs. Potenciano, in quasi-
delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal
case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There
can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the
criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter."
Reasoning
- A careful examination of the complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose
acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
- The waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and
the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages. - In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, the
Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority constructs
a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication between a
creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages
to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to
the use and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to
the payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the
injured party.
- While the property involved in the cited case
belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained
and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the
recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation
supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-
existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
- It must be stressed that the use of one's property is
not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides
that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE
TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining
landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as
not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although
we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to
adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
- Article 2176
1
of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability
on a person for damage caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence. - Article 2176, whenever it
refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the
tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177
2
of
the Civil Code. According to the Report of the Code
Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the
exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-
contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain ... In the case of Castillo vs. Court
of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana
is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasidelicts or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action
for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the
event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact
from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability.

TAYLOR V MANILA ELECTRIC

1
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
2
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.


16 PHIL 8
CARSON; March 22, 1910

NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other
injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his
nearest relative.

FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in
the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in
the city of Manila. The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time
when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age,
the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the
average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics. - On the 30th of September, 1905,
plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of
age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the
purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature
engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his
quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and
perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to have taken
in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the
company's premises.
- After watching the operation of the travelling crane
used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place where the
company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves a considerable explosive power. they opened one
of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a
yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap
while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An
explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all
three. Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to
the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run
away, received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand
burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by
several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his
right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by
the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
- The evidence does definitely and conclusively
disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises,
nor how long they had been there when the boys found them.
- No measures seems to have been adopted by the
defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from entering
and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt
disposed so to do.
- The trial court's decision, awarding damages to the
plaintiff, upon the provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code
read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by
quasicontracts, and illicit acts and omissions or by those in
which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be
obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible. The father, and on his death or incapacity the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
live with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter may be employed
or on account of their duties.
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage
caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been
cared for with due diligence, and for kindling of explosive
substances which may not have been placed in a safe and
proper place.
- Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his
appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the
trial do not established the liability of the defendant company
under the provisions of these articles.

ISSUE
WON the defendants negligence is the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries

HELD
NO
- We are of opinion that under all the circumstances of
this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury received by the plaintiff. - We agree with counsel for
appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action
such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right
to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond,
was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the
negligence and the damage.
- These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do
not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the
application of these principles to the particular facts developed
in the case under consideration. - It is clear that the accident
could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left
exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner
had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate
place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been
injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience,
entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around
thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and
had he not picked up and carried away the property of the
defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not
thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a
match to its contents.
- But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of
plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant
company's premises, and the intervention of his action between
the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should
not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident,
which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's
negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they
were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the proximate cause
of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies
on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort in
the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and
"Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84
U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a
railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant
while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposes of
amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances,
attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on
which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not
bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers
who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its
tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years
is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of
adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the
fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free
from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in
each case by the circumstances of the case." - The doctrine of
the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously
controverted and sharply criticized in several courts. But the
doctrine of the case is controlling in our jurisdiction.
- This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and
necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to do
what will with his own property or that children should be kept
under the care of their parents or guardians, so as to prevent
their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to
put in doubt.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon
defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or
permission would not have relieved defendant from
responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other
fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the
negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the

-
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the
negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred. Plaintiff contends,
upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that
because of plaintiff's youth the intervention of his action
between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises and the explosion which resulted in his
injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the
accident; and it is because we can not agree with this
proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the Turntable
and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and
to consider that doctrine at length in this decision.
- In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident
was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea
as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves
no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness
stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with
which he was amusing himself.
- True, he may not have known and probably did not
know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he
incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous
explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully,
recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be
held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such
circumstances. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case
had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to
the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that
his age and his experience qualified him to understand and
appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of
caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him
must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of
his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate
and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.

TAYAG V ALCANTARA
98 SCRA 723
CONCEPCION; July 23, 1980

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari the order of CFI Tarlac
(dismissing petition for
damages)

FACTS
- Pedro Tayag was riding a motorcycle when he was
bumped by a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa,
which caused his instantaneous death. Pending the criminal
case against the driver, the heirs of Tayag instituted a civil
action to recover damages from the company (Phil Rabbit Bus
Inc) and the driver. In turn, the company and driver filed a
motion to suspend trial of the civil case on the ground that the
criminal case was still pending. Judge Alcantara granted this
motion.
- In the criminal case, the driver as acquitted based on
reasonable doubt. The company and driver then filed for
dismissal of the civil case on the ground that the heirs do not
have a cause of action because of the acquittal. Judge
Alcantara granted this and dismissed the civil case.

ISSUE
WON Judge Alcantara correctly dismissed the civil case on the
ground of no
cause of action due to the acquittal of the driver

HELD
1. NO
Ratio The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi-
delict, the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a
bar to the prosecution for
damages based on quasi-delict
Reasoning
- Art. 31, NCC provides: When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter
- Evidently, this provision refers to a civil action based
on an obligation arising from quasi-delict. The complaint itself
shows that the claim was based on quasi-delit, viz:
6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lino, Inc., has failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan. Otherwise, the accident in
question which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and
damage to his property would not have occurred; All the
essential averments for a quasi-delictual action are present:
(1) act or omission constituting fault /negligence on the
part of respondent
(2) damage caused by the said act or omission
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the
act or omission and
(4) no preexisting contractual relation between the
parties. Citing Elcano v Hill: a separate civil action lies against
the offender in a criminal act, WON he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that offended party is not
allowed to recover damages on both scores
DISPOSITION petition granted. Order of CFI Tarlac set aside,
case REMANDED to lower court for further proceedings.

SEPARATE OPINION

AQUINO [concur]
- I concur because petitioners' action for damages is
based on article 2177 of the Civil Code, under which according
to the Code Commission, "acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall
not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana". Article 33 of the Civil Code also justifies the
petitioners' independent civil action for damages since the term
"physical injuries" therein embraces death (Dyogi vs. Yatco,
100 Phil. 1095).
- Moreover, the acquittal of Romeo Villa was based on
reasonable doubt. The petitioners, as plaintiffs in the civil case,
can amend their complaint and base their action also on article
29 NCC which allows an independent civil action for damages
in case of acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt. - The
requirement in section 2, Rule III of the Rules of Court that
there should be a reservation in the criminal cases of the right
to institute an independent civil action is contrary to law.
PEOPLE V LIGON 152
SCRA 419
YAP; July 29, 1987

NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of the RTC Manila

FACTS
- February 17, 1986, RTC convicted Fernando Gabat,
of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua where he robbed and killed Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a
seventeen-year old working student who was earning his keep
as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of his cigarette
box containing cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. Rogelio
Ligon,the co-accused, was never apprehended and is still at
large.
- October 23, 1983 - at about 6:10 p.m. Gabat, was
riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father and
driven by the other accused, Ligon which was coming from
Espaa Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. At the
intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before
turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, they

stopped. While waiting, Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor,
Rosales to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached
the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While
this transaction was occurring, the traffic light changed to
green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and
Rosales at the crucial moment, and immediately thereafter,
is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and
the defense. It is not controverted, however, that as the Kombi
continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the
window of the Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell
down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some
bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was
treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat
until his death on October 30, 1983.
- Following close behind (about 3 meters) the Kombi at
the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Castillo. He was
traveling on the same lane in a slightly oblique position. The
Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement
near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped
towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the driver
stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument,
Castillo saw an ownertype jeep with two persons in it. He
sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them
"nakaaksidente ng tao." The two men in the jeep joined the
chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas
Boulevard, Castillo was able to overtake the Kombi when the
traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while
the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the
jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo
Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the
driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando Gabat, to
alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third
person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was
sleeping at the rear seat.
- The three were all brought by the police officers to
the Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fermin
Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also went along
with them. Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report,
dated October 23, 1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo
Primicias were released early morning the following day, but
Rogelio Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's
Office for further investigation. - December 6, 1983 -
Investigating Fiscal Cantos, filed an information against Rogelio
Ligon charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
- October 31, 1983 - an autopsy was conducted by the
medico-legal officer of NBI which stated the cause of death of
Rosales as "pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to
traumatic injuries of the head." - June 28, 1984 - Assistant
Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon
and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with Homicide based on a
Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo and a joint affidavit
of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who
allegedly witnessed the incident . These affidavits were already
prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on January
17, 1984.
- prosecution tried to establish, through the sole
testimony of the taxicab driver that Gabat grabbed the box of
cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from
the window of the Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and
hitting the pavement.
- The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's
version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat forcibly
took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because,
otherwise, there could be no reason for the latter to run after
the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed
Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the
right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi,
otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down, having already
been able to balance himself on the stepboard. - On the other
hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of
Gabat that the cigarette vendor placed the cigarette box on the
windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he
was trying to get from his pocket the change for the 5peso bill
of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that
cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of
their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his precious box of
cigarettes in order to change a peso bill given by a customer.

ISSUE
WON the prosecutions set of facts should be given credence

HELD
NO
- a careful review of the record shows that certain
material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the
trial court which, if taken into account, would alter the result of
the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable
doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal. - While the
prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness
with no motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see
that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with
bias, is not entirely free from doubt because his observation of
the event could have been faulty or

mistaken. The taxicab which Castillo was driving was lower in
height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact
admitted by Castillo at the trial.
- Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the
rear windshield of the 1978 Volkswagon Kombi is on the upper
portion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end
of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to
observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front
end where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which
must be taken into consideration in evaluating Castillo's
testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the
cigarette vendor during that crucial moment before the latter fell
down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at
a distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was
partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony
that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and
forcibly pry loose the latter's hand from the windowsill of the
Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially
considering that this occurrence happened in just a matter of
seconds, and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in
the traffic. - Considering the above circumstances, the Court is
not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the accused
Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable
doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof necessary to sustain
Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with
homicide has not been met in this case. He is therefore entitled
to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
- However, it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of
the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is
required in a civil action for damages.
- Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the
acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily
exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has
been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
"This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails
to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability
and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from
each other, One affects the social order and the other, private
rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender
while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from
each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code
reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action
arising from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of
the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just
and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine
upon the accused, the offense should be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the
complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of
every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal
law?
DISPOSITION Appellant acquitted for the crime of robbery and
homicide, but sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales
y Ortiz.

PADILLA V CA (Vergara)
129 SCRA 558
GUTIERREZ; [date]

NATURE
Petition of rcertiorari to revies the decision of the Court of
Appeals

FACTS
- Petitioners, on or about February 8, 1964, went to the
public market to execute an alleged order of the Mayor to clear
the public market of stalls which were considered as nuisance
per se. The stall of one Antonio Vergara was demolished
pursuant to this order. In the process however the stock in trade
and certain furniture of Vergara were lost and destroyed. - The
petitioners were found guilty of grave coercion after trial at the
CFI and were sentenced to five months and one day
imprisonment and ordered to pay fines.
- On appeal, the CA reversed the findings of the CFI
and acquitted the appellants based on reasonable doubt but
nonetheless ordered them to pay P9,600.00 as actual
damages. The decision of the CA was based on the fact that
the petitioners were charged with coercion when they should
have been more appropriately charged with crime against
person. Hence, the crime of grave coercion was not proved in
accordance with the law. - The petitioner filed the appeal to the
SC questioning the grant of actual damages despite a no guilty
verdict.

ISSUE
WON the CA committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after
acquitting them from the criminal charge

HELD
NO
- The SC, quoting Section 3 (C) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court and various jurisprudence including PNB vs
Catipon, De Guzman vs Alvia, held that extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment
that the facts from which the civil action might arise did not
exist. In the case at bar, the judgment of not guilty was based
on reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof to be used in
civil cases is preponderance of evidence, the court express a
finding that the defendants offenses are civil in nature. - The
Court also tackled the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code
to clarify whether a separate civil action is required when the
accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The SC took the position that the said provision merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by
an acquittal for the same criminal act. The acquittal
extinguishes the criminal liability but not the civil liability
particularly if the finding is not guilty based on reasonable
ground.

CRUZ V CA (UMALI)
282 SCRA 188
FRANCISCO; 1997

NATURE
Civil action for damages in a medical malpractice suit.

FACTS
- Rowena Umali De Ocampo accompanied her mother
to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. Prior to
March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who
found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.

- Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the
evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was to be operated on
the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. According to
Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window
and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with.
Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to
persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation.

- The following day, Rowena asked the petitioner if the
operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into
her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed
Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated
on as scheduled.
- Rowena and her other relatives waited outside the
operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they
were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and
instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister
immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr.
Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for
Lydia. They bought type "A" blood and the same was brought
by the attendant into the operating room.
- After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed
them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then
went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some

thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating
room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the
other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately,
they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there
was no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank.
- Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which
was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother,
who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.
Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's
husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to
the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given
the fresh supply of oxygen as soon as it arrived.

- At around 10pm, she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition
necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so
she could be connected to a respirator and further examined.
The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was without
the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present
who found out about the intended transfer only when an
ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District
Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then boarded a
tricycle and followed the ambulance.
- Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District
Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was
blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending
physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo
District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was
already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was
already 0/0. While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall,
the patient died. Her death certificate states "shock" as the
immediate cause of death and "Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.

ISSUE
WON the circumstances are sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide

HELD
NO
- The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the
offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence;
and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
- WON has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members
of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances
bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time
of treatment or the present state of medical science.
- For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised
the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.
The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified
physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess
unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should
have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the
courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the
standard of care employed by other physicians in good
standing when performing the same operation. It must be
remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are
admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable
presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in
attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently
established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion
which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
- Even without expert testimony, that petitioner was
recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon,
no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused
petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of
reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property
was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.
- In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff
has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a
reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual
connection of such breach and the resulting death of his
patient.

PHIL. RABBIT V PEOPLE
[citation]
PANGANIBAN; April 14, 2004

NATURE
Petition for Review

FACTS
- Napoleon Macadangdang was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years, 9 months and
11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. But in the event the
the accused becoems insolvent, Phil. Rabbit will be held liable
for the civil liabilities. But admittedly, the accused jumped bail
and remained at large.

ISSUE
WON an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of
its accusedemployee, may appeal the judgment of conviction
independently of the accused

HELD
NO
- The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal
unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or
are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them. While at large, they cannot seek relief
from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and
refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is
deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.
- After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party has the
right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the
former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.
- In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-
employee, it participated in the proceedings before the RTC;
thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due
process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not
denied its day in court. In fact, it can be said that by jumping
bail, the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of
the right to appeal.
- On Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment:
- Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters
insolvency.
- To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in
a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same
token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of
their employees without the latters consent would also result in
improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
- The decision convicting an employee in a criminal
case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from
that of the employee.
DISPOSITION Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

CANGCO V MANILA RAILROAD CO
38 Phil 768
FISHER; October 14, 1918

NATURE
An appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
disallowing the claim of the plaintiff for P1,000 against the
estate of the deceased James P.
McElroy.

FACTS
- Jose Cangco, was employed by Manila Railroad
Company as clerk. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal, located upon
the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily
by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he

worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. -
January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was returning home by rail from
his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San
Mateo the plaintiff while making his exit through the door, took
his position upon the steps of the coach.
- On the side of the train where passengers alight at
the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which begins
to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the
company's office and extends along in front of said office for a
distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As
the train slowed down another passenger, Emilio Zuniga, also
an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise
from the level of the ground. When Jose Cangco stepped off,
one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of
watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him
and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled
from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where
his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. After the plaintiff
alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six
meters before it came to a full stop.
- The accident occurred on a dark night, and the train
station was lit dimly by a single light located some distance
away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred
were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a
lighted car.
- The sack of melons on the platform is because it was
the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large
lot had been brought to the station for shipment to the market.
This row of sacks was so placed that there was a space of only
about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of
the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to
the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the
moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he
failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be
credited.
- The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an
unconscious condition, and with serious injuries. He was
immediately brought to a hospital where an examination was
made and his arm was amputated. The plaintiff was then
carried to another hospital where a second operation was
performed and the member was again amputated higher up
near the shoulder. Expenses reached the sum of P790.25 in
the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.
- August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the
CFI Manilato recover damages of the defendant company,
founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons
upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a
menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
company's trains. At the hearing in the CFI, the trial judge,
found the facts substantially as above stated, and although
negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the
fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the
plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from
the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering.
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant
company, and the plaintiff appealed.

ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff

HELD
NO
Ratio In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act - that is to say, whether the passenger
acted prudently or recklessly - the age, sex, and physical
condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily
affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered.
Reasoning
- The employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform. Their presence
caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that
they constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. It follows that the defendant company
is liable for the damage unless recovery is barred by the
plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
- The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is
the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for
the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises from the breach
of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise
due care in its performance.
- Its liability is direct and immediate, imposed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of
the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations -
In commenting upon article 1093, Manresa clearly points out
the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent,
which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between
persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa
considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation
already existing . . .."
- In the Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. the
court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that
article 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract.
- Under the Spanish law, in cases imposed upon
employers with respect to damages due to the negligence of
their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by
contract, such is not based upon the principle of respondent
superior - but upon the principle announced in article 1902
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good
the damage caused.
- The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without
willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in
the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the
qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the
duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs
them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third
persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he
incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third
persons suffer damage. Article 1903 presumes negligence, but
that presumption is refutable.
- In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, an action is brought
upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant
to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his
employee while acting within the scope of his employment The
Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, said: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or
in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection
and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability.
- Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-
contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its
source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which
civilized society imposes upon its members, or which arise from
these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of
society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, which the existence
of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The
breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to
mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an
obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental
distinction between obligations of this character and those
which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of
non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when
entering into the contractual relation.
- The railroad company's defense involves the
assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its
servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a
breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of
approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate
cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of
comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case, if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is
imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused
by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It

is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact
guilty of negligence.
- The Court is of the opinion that the correct doctrine
relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has
been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving
railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be
considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age,
sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which
may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the
care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury." - In considering the probability
of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff the
following circumstances are to be noted: The company's
platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the
steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger
would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The cement
platform also assured to the passenger a stable and even
surface on which to alight. The plaintiff was possessed of the
vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so
risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. The
place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily
custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could be
no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the
step which he was required to take or the character of the
platform where he was alighting. It is the Courts conclusion that
the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train
was yet slightly under way was not characterized by
imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
DISPOSITION The decision of the lower court is reversed, and
judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25,
and for the costs of both instances.

SEPARATE OPINION

MALCOLM, [dissent]
- With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of
full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited
until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With
the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory
negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt
to alight from a moving train is negligence per se." Adding these
two points together, we have the logical result - the Manila
Railroad Co. should be absolved from the complaint, and
judgment affirmed.

FORES V MIRANDA
[citation]
REYES, J.B.L.; March 4, 1959

NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
- Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney
driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was descending the
Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost
control thereof, causing it to swerve and to hit the bridge wall.
The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five
of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who
suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was taken to
the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was
subjected to a series of operations; the first on May 23, 1953,
when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and
screwed into place; a second, effected to insert a metal splint,
and a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it
appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his
right arm.
- The driver was charged with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of
guilty was sentenced accordingly.

ISSUE
WON the defendant is entitled to moral damages

HELD
NO.
Ratio Moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions
predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view
of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide
as follows:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstance, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith."
Reasoning
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of
moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the description term "analogous cases" used in Art.
2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the
damages that are caused by contractual breach, but because
the definition of quasi-delict in Act. 2176 of the Code expressly
excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual
relation between the parties."
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission caused damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pro-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter." -
In sum the rule is:
Delict (breach of contract)
Gen. Rule: no moral damages
- Reason: the advantageous position of a party suing
a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains, to
some extent, the limitation imposed by the new Code on the
amount of the recovery. The action for breach of contract
imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon
mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from
the duty to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees,
and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove the it was due
to an unforeseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in
suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it
has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its
employees
- Exception: with moral damages if:
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
result in the death of a passenger in which case Article
1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the
rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse, descendants
and ascendants of the deceased passenger to "demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death
of the deceased"
- The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as
the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual
negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex
contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from
viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously
embodying an action on tort.
DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified
by
eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damages

M.H. RAKES V THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND
PACIFIC
COMPANY
7 Phil 359 TRACEY;
January 23, 1907

NATURE
Action for damages

FACTS
- the plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-
American laborers in the employment of defendant, Atlantic,

was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila.
The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars, some behind or
at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. At
one point, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and
the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the
cars side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated at the
knee.
- the plaintiffs witness alleged that a noticeable
depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. This was
reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had not been proven
that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of
inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to keep
the rails from slipping off.
- However, the companys officers and 3 of the
workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all against walking by the side of cars. As
Rakes was walking along the cars side when the accident
occurred, he was found to have contributed in some degree to
the injury inflicted, although not as the primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through
negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official
directly responsible and that the employer be held only
subsidiarily liable.

ISSUES
1. WON Atlantic is only subsidiarily liable
2. WON there was contributory negligence on the part of
petitioner and if so,
WON it bars him from recovery

HELD
1. NO
- By virtue of culpa contractual, Atlantic may be held primarily
liable as it failed in its duty to provide safe appliances for the
use of its employees. Petitioner need not file charges with the
foreman to claim damages from Atlantic; a criminal action is not
a requisite for the enforcement of a civil action.
2. YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car
despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman. However, the
contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the
action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the injured party's negligence. Petitioners
negligence contributed only to his own injury and not to the
principal occurrenceit was merely an element to the damage
caused upon him. Had it been otherwise, parties being
mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The
law has no scales to determine in such cases whose
wrongdoing weighed most in the compound that occasioned the
mischief (Railroad v Norton). In this case, petitioner may
recover from the defendant, less a sum deemed suitable
equivalent for his own imprudence.
- Damages are awarded to petitioner at Php5,000,
deducting Php 2,500, the amount fairly attributable to his own
negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION

WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
-the negligence of the defendant alone was insufficient to cause
the accidentit also required the negligence of the plaintiff.
Because of this, plaintiff should not be afforded relief
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY V CA
241 SCRA 671
VITUG; February 23, 1995

NATURE
Petition for review

FACTS
- In October 1986, Luis A. Luna applied for, and was
accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far East
Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon
his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to Clarita
S. Luna.
- In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC
was forthwith informed. In order to replace the lost card, Clarita
submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's
internal security procedures and policy would appear to be- to
meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card,
as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. - On 06
October 1988, Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close
friend, a Fil-Am, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop
Restaurant of the Hotel Intercon Manila. To pay for the lunch,
Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter who
promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's
Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Luis
was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13.
Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
- In a letter, dated 11 Oct. 1988, Luis Luna, through
counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of damages.
Adrian V. Festejo, a VP of the bank, expressed the bank's
apologies to Luis in his letter which stated that: In cases when a
card is reported to our office as lost, FAREASTCARD
undertakes the necessary action to avert its unauthorized use
to protect its cardholders. However, it failed to inform him about
its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of
the Bank's Credit Card Department did not consider the
possibility that it may have been him who was presenting the
card at that time (for which reason, the unfortunate incident
occurred). - Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the
Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure the latter that Luis was a
"very valued clients" of FEBTC. William Anthony King, F&B
Manager of the Intercon, wrote back to say that the credibility of
Luis had never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent
to Luis by Festejo.
- Still evidently feeling aggrieved, Luis filed a complaint
for damages with the RTC of Pasig against FEBTC.
- On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig ordered FEBTC
to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's
fees.
- On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate
court affirmed the decision of the trial court.Its motion for
reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court,
FEBTC has come to this Court with this petition for review.

ISSUE
WON the petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary damages

HELD
NO
- In culpa contractual, moral damages may be
recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil
Code provides:
- Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find
that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due.
The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not
simple, negligence.

Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage,
moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a
passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed

) of the
common carrier.

- Concededly, the bank was remiss in indeed
neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's
cancellation. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any
deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private
respondents. Neither could FEBTC's negligence in failing to
give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to
amount to malice or bad faith.
- Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose
or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of
negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.

- Article 21 states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
- Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed,
contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we
are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a
breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when
the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly
no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article
21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human
relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific
provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant
of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach
is due to fraud or bad faith.

- Fores vs. Miranda

explained with great clarity the
predominance that we should give to Article 2220 in contractual
relations; we quote:
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent,
the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that
moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions
predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view
of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provide
as follows:
- Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
(1) A criminal offense resulting in
physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries; xxx xxx xxx
- Art. 2220. Wilful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it
immediately becomes apparent that:
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of
transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or
deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of
moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered
included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art.
2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the
damages that are caused contractual breach, but because the
definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly
excludes the cases where there is a "preexisitng contractual
relations between the parties."
- Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. The exception to the basic rule of damages now under
consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger,
in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly
subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse,
descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to
"demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764
makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger
does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is
proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We
think it is clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver
does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or
bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there
is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of
moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral
damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof of bad
faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art.
2220, would be to violate the clear provisions of the law, and
constitute unwarranted judicial legislation. xxx xxx xxx
- The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in
the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence
(as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be
ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their consequences being clearly
differentiated by the Code.
- Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable
shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences
of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
- In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude,
the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the nonperformance of the obligation.
- It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of
the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral
damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. It is true that
negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to
malice; but the fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's
bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the carrier's
employees.
- The Court has not in the process overlooked another
rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a
contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable
principles on tort

even where there is a pre-existing contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant This doctrine,
unfortunately, cannot improve private respondents' case for it
can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of
would constitute an actionable tort independently of the
contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to
underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where,
without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or
omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself,
the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private
respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their
contractual relationship; without such agreement, the act or
omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as a
separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.
- Exemplary or corrective damages, in turn, are
intended to serve as an example or as correction for the public
good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages (Art. 2229, Civil Code. In criminal
offenses, exemplary damages are imposed when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Art.
2230, Civil Code). In quasidelicts, such damages are granted if
the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross
negligence as to approximate malice. In contracts and
quasicontracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner (Art. 2232, Civil
Code).
- Given the above premises and the factual
circumstances here obtaining, it would also be just as arduous
to sustain the exemplary damages granted by the courts below.
- Nevertheless, the bank's failure, even perhaps
inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private respondent
Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages
sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing
thusly:
- Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.
- Reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered where
the court deems such recovery to be just and equitable (Art.
2208, Civil Code). We see no issue of sound discretion on the
part of the appellate court in allowing the award thereof by the
trial court.
DISPOSITION The appealed decision is MODIFIED by
deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private
respondents; in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay private
respondent Luis A. Luna an amount of P5,000.00 by way of
nominal damages. In all other respects, the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED.

AIR FRANCE V CA (Carrascoso, Et. Al)
18 SCRA 155
SANCHEZ; September 28, 1966

NATURE
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS

Carrascoso, a civil engineer, left Manila for Lourdes w/ 48
other Filipino pilgrims. Air France, through PAL, issued plaintiff
a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso traveled in first class
but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there
was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better
right' to the seat. When asked to vacate his 'first class'
seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said
Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man
[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified
Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the 'white man; and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his
'first class' seat in the plane."
- both TC and CA decided in favor of Carrascoso

ISSUES
Procedural
1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of
fact on all the issues properly laid before it, and if such, WON
the Court could review the questions of fact
Substantive
2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the first class
seat he claims, as proved by written documents (tickets)
3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages,
when his action is planted upon breach of contract and thus,
there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA
allegedly failed to find
4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air
France, granted that their employee was accused of the
tortuous act 5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding the
account made by the air-carriers purser is admissible in
evidence as hearsay 7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to
exemplary damages
8. WON Carrascoso was entitled to attorneys fees
9. WON the amounts awarded to Carrascoso was excessive

HELD
1. NO, NO
Ratio A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that
prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of
the Court of Appeals, contains the necessary facts to warrant
its conclusions, it. is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the
evidence for the defense"."The mere failure to specify (in the
decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for
refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same
contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law and the
Constitution"; "only questions of law may be raised" in an
appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Obiter.
- Constitution mandates that a judgment determining
the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based" and that "Every
decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete
findings of fact on all issues properly raised before".xxx
The law, however, solely insists that a decision state the
"essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn.
- FINDINGS OF FACT: "the written statement of the
ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the
decision and judgment rendered thereon".16 They consist of
the court's "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts
in issue"
- QUESTION OF LAW: one which does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties
2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket
without any reservation whatever.
Ratio .A written document speaks a uniform language; that
spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve
stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier,
adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable.
Reasoning
- Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent
the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that
said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he
had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a
first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first
class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of
first class seats. However, CA held that Air France should know
whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not.
The trial court also accepted as evidence the written documents
submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of the air-
carriers employees attested that indeed, Carrasco was issued
a first class ticket.
- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder
is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that
seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an
air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline.
-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in
Bangkok, he was granted the first class seat. If there had
been no seat, and if the white man had a better right to the
seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat?
3. YES
Ratio. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether or
not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an
award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any,
was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform
to the evidence is not even required.

Reasoning
- There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg;
Second, said contract was breached when petitioner failed to
furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, there
was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after
he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class,
by reason of which he suffered inconvenience,
embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages.
- Air France did not present evidence that the white
man made a prior reservation, nor proved that the white
man had better right over the seat; also, if the managers
actions could be justified, they should have presented the
manager to testify in court but they did not do so
- The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his
arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different
from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a
"state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior
purposes
4. YES
- The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its
employees need not. be essayed. For the willful malevolent act
of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer.
5. YES
- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have
said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation
of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict.
Damages are proper. (note: it was held that it was a case of
quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract)
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in
kind and degree from any other contractual relation.43 And is,
because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and I advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages.
Reasoning
- Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious
language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees
towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae
Ratio. Testimony of the entry does not come within the
proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible.

-
- alsoFrom a reading of the transcript just quoted,
when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The
excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this
environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they
grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical
condition of the declarant".

Reasoning
- Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier
made an entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger
was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene". The petitioner contents that it
should not be admitted as evidence, as it was only hearsay.
However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Also, the said entry was made outside the Philippines
and by an employee of petitioner. It would have been easy for
Air France to contradict Carrascosos testimony if they had
presented the purser.
7. YES
Ratio The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant
exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only
condition is that defendant should have "acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner".
Reasoning
- The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his
first class seat fits into this legal precept
8. YES
Ratio. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
Judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that
the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given.\
9. NO
Ratio. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial
court. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point
to the reasonableness thereof.
DISPOSITION On balance, we, say that the judgment of the
Court of Appeals does not suffer from 'reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner.

PSBA V CA
[citation]
PADILLA; February 4, 1992

NATURE
Petition to review the decision of Court of Appeals.

FACTS
- A stabbing incident on August 30, 1985 which caused
the death of Carlitos Bautista on the premises of the Philippine
School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the
parents of the deceased to file suit in the Manila RTC. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the
schools academic community but were outsiders.
- The suit impleaded PSBA, its President, VP,
Treasure, Chief of Security and Assistant Chief of Security. It
sought to adjudge them liable for the victims death due to their
alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security
precautions.
- Defendants (now petitioners) sought to have the suit
dismissed alleging that since they are presumably sued under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of
action against them since academic institutions, like PSBA, are
beyond the ambit of that rule.
- Respondent Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
And the MFR was similarly dealt with. Petitioners the assailed
the trial courts dispositions before the respondent appellate
court which affirmed the trial courts ruling.

ISSUE
WON respondent court is correct in denying dismissal of the
case

HELD
Ratio Although a school may not be liable under Art. 2180 on
quasi-delicts, it may still be liable under the law on contracts.
Reasoning
- The case should be tried on its merits. But
respondent courts premise is incorrect. It is expressly
mentioned in Art. 2180 that the liability arises from acts done by
pupils or students of the institution. In this sense, PSBA is not
liable. But when an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, the school makes itself responsible in providing
their students with an atmosphere that is conducive for
learning. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of
physics or explore the realm of arts when bullets are flying or
where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb.
DISPOSITION the foregoing premises considered, the petition
is DENIED. The Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue
proceedings consistent wit this ruling of the Court. Costs
against the petitioners.

SYQUIA V CA (Mla Memorial Park)
217 SCRA 624
CAMPOS, JR.; January 27, 1993

NATURE
Petition for review of CA decision dismissing Syquia familys
complaint for
damages against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Mla
Memorial)

FACTS
- Juan SYQUIA, father of the deceased Vicente
Syquia, authorized and instructed the defendant to inter the
remains of deceased. - After about a month, preparatory to
transferring the remains to a newly purchased family plot also
at the same cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of
the deceased was removed from its niche underground. As the
concrete vault was being raised to the surface, the Syquias
discovered that the vault had a hole approx 3 in. in diameter
near the bottom and it appeared that water drained out of the
hole.
- Pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal
Court of Paraaque, they caused the opening of the concrete
vault and discovered that:
(a) the interior walls showed evidence of total flooding; (b)
coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth and silt causing the
wooden parts to separate and to crack the viewing glass panel
located directly above the head and torso of the deceased;
(c) entire lining of coffin, clothing of the deceased, and the
exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged and
soiled. - SYQUIAS base their claim for damages against Mla
Memorial on either: (1) breach of its obligation to deliver a
defect-free concrete vault; (2) gross negligence in failing to
seal the concrete vault (Art. 2176)
- Whatever kind of negligence it has committed, MLA
MEMORIAL is deemed to be liable for desecrating the grave of
the dead.
Trial Courts Ruling
- Contract between the parties did not guarantee that
the cement vault would be waterproof.
- No quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty
of any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-
existing contractual relation between the Syquias and Mla
Memorial.
- The father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite
despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled
with water to keep the grass green and that water would
eventually seep through the vault. - The act of boring a hole in
the vault was necessary so as to prevent the vault from floating
away.
- CA affirmed judgment of dismissal; MFR was also
denied.

ISSUES
1. WON Mla Memorial breached its contract
with petitioners, or alternatively
2. WON it can be liable for culpa aquiliana

HELD
1. NO
Ratio Parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is
the law between them. A contracting party cannot incur a
liability more than what is expressly specified in his
undertaking. It cannot be extended by implication,
beyond the terms of the contract. (RCBC v CA)
Reasoning

- They entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale
and Certificate of Perpetual Care." Mla Memorial bound itself to
provide the concrete box to be sent in the interment.
- Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of MLA
MEMORIAL provides that: Every earth interment shall be
made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall of stone,
brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made
by the employees of the Association. Pursuant to this, a
concrete vault was installed and after the burial, the vault was
covered by a cement lid. - Syquias claim that there was a
breach of contract because it was stated in the brochures that
lot may hold single or double internment underground in
sealed concrete vault."
- "Sealed" meant "closed." Standard dictionaries define
seal as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be
opened without rupture and that serve as a check against
tampering or unauthorized opening.
- "Sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". When
the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of
the stipulation shall control.
2. NO
Ratio Negligence is defined by law as the "omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time
and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal
provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in
the performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a
good father of a family.
Reasoning
- Although a pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana,
circumstances of the case do not show negligence. The reason
for the boring of the hole was explained by Henry Flores,
Interment Foreman, who said that: When the vault was
placed on the grave a hole was placed on the vault so that
water could come into the vault because it was raining heavily
then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the
grave would be filled with water.
- Private respondent has exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water
inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of
earth around the grave. Finding no evidence of negligence,
there is no reason to award damages. Dispositive CA
decision affirmed in toto.

NEGLIGENCE

PICART V SMITH
[citation]
STREET; March 15, 1918

NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union

FACTS
On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his pony over
the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
- Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going
at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour.
- As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the
plaintiff and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
- He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge, he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to
him that the man on horseback before him was not observing
the rule of the road. - The plaintiff saw the automobile coming
and heard the warning signals. - However, given the novelty of
the apparition and the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the
pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left.
- He did this because he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side.
- As the automobile approached, the defendant guided
it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the
machine. - In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side.
- The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider
had made no sign for the automobile to stop.
- Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed. - When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse
getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so
doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head toward the railing.
- In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind
leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
- The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence.
- As a result of its injuries the horse died.
- The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
- CFI absolved defendant from liability
- Hence, the appeal

ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the manner
above described, was guilty of negligence that would give rise
to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done

HELD
YES
- As the defendant started across the bridge, he had
the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass
over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of
the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was
too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving
vehicle. - In the nature of things this change of situation
occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away;
and from this moment it was no longer within the power of the
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater
safety.
- The control of the situation had then passed entirely
to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on
the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away
from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
- The defendant ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse. He was, the court thinks, deceived into doing
this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.
- But in view of the known nature of horses, there was
an appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was
unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and jump
under the conditions which here confronted him. - When the
defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger, he
was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
- The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence.
- The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed
to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law.
- The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. -
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the
facts involved in the particular case. Could a prudent man, in
the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of
the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the
actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.
- Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences. - Applying this test to the conduct of the
defendant in the present case, negligence is clearly

-
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have
foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the
law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
- The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he
was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. It will be noted however, that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under
these circumstances the law is that the person who has the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to
do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
DISPOSITION Appealed decision is reversed.

TAYLOR V MANILA RAILROAD
[citation]
CARSON; March 22, 1910

NATURE
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other
injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by his father, his
nearest relative.

FACTS
- The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in
the operation of a street railway and an electric light system in
the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end
of a small island in the Pasig River within the city of Manila,
known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be
reached by boat or by crossing a footbridge, impassable for
vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
- The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the same time
when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age,
the son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the
average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics.
- On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy
named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge of the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting
one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who had promised
to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on
inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys,
impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the
unusual interest which both seem to have taken in machinery,
spent some time in wandering about the company's premises.
The visit made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear
that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the power house
where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
- After watching the operation of the traveling crane
used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across the
open space in the neighborhood of the place where the
company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces.
Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps
scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately of the
size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has
attached to it two long thin wires by means of which it may be
discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use
in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in
themselves considerable explosive power. After some
discussion as to the ownership of caps, and their right to take
them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them of a
stick, of which each took one end, and carried them home. After
crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie
Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of
the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments
with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric
light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the
cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a hammer, but
could not find one. They then opened one of the caps with a
knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance
they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied
a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing
more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who, when the
boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap,
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight
cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal
capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as
to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in
to care for his wounds.

-
The Defendant Companys defense that the caps were under
the duty of independent contractors deserves scant
consideration since these workers have been under the
supervision of one of the companys foremen. - Plaintiff Taylor
appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his
decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of article 1089 of
the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908
of that Code.
- "ART. 1089. Obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasicontracts, and by illicit acts and omissions
or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs."
- "ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence
shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
- "ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omission,
but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
- "The father, and on his death or incapacity the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who
alive with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprises are
equally liable for the damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or
on account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
- "ART. 1908.The owners shall be also be liable for the
damages caused "1. By the explosion of machines which
may not have been cared for with due diligence, and for
kindling of explosive substance which may not have been
placed in a safe and proper place."
- In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relied
on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last result in
the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and
"Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon.In the typical
cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad
company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender
years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of
amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a
place where the railroad company's premises, at a place where
the railroad company knew, or had a good reason to suppose,
children who would likely to come, and there found explosive
signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's
employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor,
exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the
premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable left in such
condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it
would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the
infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great
weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable.
- As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout ( 17 Wall. (84
U.S.), 657), (wherein the principal question was whether a
railroad company was liable for an injury received by an infant
while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or for purposed of
amusement, if such injury was, under the circumstances,
attributable to the negligence of the company), the principles on
which these cases turn are that "while railroad company is not
bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere strangers
who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such
strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or from its
tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years
is not to be judged by the same rule which governs that of an
adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to
entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the
fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free
from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in
such case by the circumstances of the case." - The doctrine of
the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously
controverted and sharply criticized in severally state courts,
saying that (1) That the owner of land is not liable to
trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to
his wanton or willful acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists
in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery
naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an
invitation of license to cross the premises of another can not be
predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to
interfere with such practice; (4) that there is no difference
between children and adults of an invitation or a license to enter
upon another's premises. However, after an exhaustive and
critical analysis and review of may of the adjudged cases, both
English and America, formally declared that it adhered "to the
principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court
of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs. Marlow, said that:
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon
childlike instincts and impulses; and others who are chargeable
with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate
upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave
exposed to the observation of children anything which would be
tempting to them, and which they in their immature judgment
might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play
with, they should expect that liberty to be taken."
- The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things
attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are
expressively or impliedly permitted to enter to or upon which the
owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about
for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take
precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the
premises can not be heard to say that because the child has
entered upon his premises without his express permission he is
a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation
whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to
prevent the child form entering premises at a place where he
knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam
about or to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely
to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to
enter, and where the child does not enter under such conditions
the owner's failure to make reasonable precaution to guard the
child against the injury from unknown or unseen dangers,
placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of
duty, a negligent omission, for which he may and should be
held responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other
fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a
stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold
otherwise would be expose to all the children in the community
to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the
owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally
and reasonably be expected to enter.

ISSUE
1. WON the defendants negligence was the proximate cause
of the injuries, making the company liable

HELD
1. NO
- Just because the kids trespassed doesnt mean that
the company is not liable for anything bad that might happen to
them. However, we also have to look at the proximate cause
and the maturity of the plaintiff if it was his negligence that
contributed to the principal occurrence of the tragedy. In the
case at bar, the Court said that it is of the opinion that under all
the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant
in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the
proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which
therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the
negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause of
the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred. "While it is the general
rule in regard to an adult that entitle him to recover damages for
an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he
must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in
regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution
required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity
only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstance of the case."
- As regards the maturity of the child, this has to be
examined on a case-tocase basis. In the case at bar, plaintiff at
the time of the accident was well grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his
age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the
injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he
was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of
record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the
witness stands, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments
made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as

-
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other
explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about
by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little
girl, 9 years of age, who was with him at the time when he put
the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and
ran away.
- We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus
stated, the immediate cause of the explosion , the accident
which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was his own act of putting a
match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed
to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
can not recover." DISPOSITION
The petition is DISMISSED.

JARCO MARKETING CORP V CA (AGUILAR)
DAVIDE; December 21, 1999

FACTS
- Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner
of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo
Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the store's branch
manager, operations manager, and supervisor, respectively.
Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth
Aguilar.
On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2
nd
flr or
Syvels Dept. Store. Criselda momentarily let go of her
daughters hand to sign her credit card slip at the payment and
verification counter. She suddenly felt a gust of wind and heard
a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter on
the floor, pinned by the gift-wrapping counter. Zhieneth was
crying and screaming for help. Criselda was able to ask people
to help her and bring her daughter to the hospital.
- She was operated on immediately at the hospital.
Gonzales, a former employee of Syvels Dept Store who helped
bring Zhieneth to the hospital, heard her tell the doctor that she
nothing. I did not come near the counter and the counter just
fell on me, when asked what did you do? She died 14 days
later, on the hospital bed. She was 6 years old. The cause of
her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
- After the burial of their daughter, the Aguilars
demanded from the petitioners the reimbursement of hospital
and medical bills, and wake and funeral expenses. Petitioners
refused to pay. So the Aguilars filed a complaint for damages
wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for actual
damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney's
fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and
exemplary damages. - RTC for Jarco Marketing Corp, et al.
RTC mfr for the Aguilars. CA and CA mfr for the Aguilars.
- Jarco Mktg Corp, et als side: Criselda was negligent
in taking care of her daughter for allowing her to roam freely.
Zhieneth was guilty of contributory negligence because she
tried to climb the counter. The counter was made of sturdy
wood with a strong base and was used without incident for the
past 15 years. It was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid
such accidents. The testimony of two former employees,
Gonzales and Guevarra, should not be believed because he
might have ill feelings towards petitioners. The testimony of the
present employees (that Zhieneth climbed the counter so it fell)
should instead be believed.
- The Aguilars side: While in the dept store, Criselda
never let go of her daughter except to sign the credit card slip.
Gonzales testified that the gift wrapping counter was right
beside the verification counter where Criselda was signing.
Both Gonzales and Guevarra testified to the structural instability
and shakiness of the counter which is in the shape of and
inverted L, with a base smaller than the top. The protruding
part of the counter was at the costumer side. They both had
informed management (while they were still working there) that
the counter should be nailed to the floor. The management did
nothing.

ISSUE
1. WON the incident is accident or attributable to negligence
2. If negligence, who was negligent?

HELD
1. NEGLIGENCE.
- An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which
no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a
fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or
partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom
it happens." - On the other hand, negligence is the omission to
do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury."
- Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs
when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which
is not caused by fault of any person and which could not have
been prevented by any means suggested by common
prudence.
- The test in determining the existence of negligence is
enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty
of negligence.
- Gonzales testimony about what Zhieneth said to the
doctor should be accepted because at the time she said it, she
was in so much pain and she answered right away. This means
she wasnt making it up. It is axiomatic that matters relating to
declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a
physician are generally considered declarations and
admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of
the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the
influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time
to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person
who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described,
it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and
in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with
her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony
on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated
her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence
or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base.
2. JARCO MKTG, ET AL.
- Petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were
personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable
counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the
situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and
patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably
failed to discharge the due diligence required of a good father
of a family.
No contributory negligence from Zhieneth
- The conclusive presumption favors children below
nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory
negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age
is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment,
and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains
in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age,
unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasidelict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a
child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence
in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is
a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a
child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
(Sangco)
- Even if we attribute contributory negligence to
ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no
injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that
the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a
frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse.
The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and
Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record
reveal that it was not durable after all. Shaped like an-inverted
"L" the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica.
It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base
was not secured.
No contributory negligence from Criselda

- CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any
contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA
momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was
reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child.
Further, at time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter,
she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping
counter was just four meters away from CRISELDA. The time
and distance were both significant. ZHIENETH was near her
mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress
upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her at
the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on
her.
Disposition The instant petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED

MAGTIBAY V TIANGCO
74 Phil 756
BOCOBO; February 28, 1944

NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance Batangas

FACTS
- Defendant-appellant Tiangco, a minor under 18 years
of age, pleaded guilty to an information for homicide through
reckless negligence in that he had recklessly driven an
automobile and thereby caused the death of Magtibay, of whom
plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. The Court of First
Instance (CFI) Batangas found Tiangco guilty as charged, but
as he was under 18 years of age, the sentence was
suspended, and he was committed to the care and custody of
Atty. Abaya, until Tiangco would reach his majority, subject to
the supervision of the Superintendent of Public Schools of the
Province. Subsequently, Abaya, in view of Tiangcos good
conduct recommended the dismissal of the case. The CFI
dismissed the criminal case, but reserved such right as the
heirs of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil
action against said Tiangco. Accordingly, the civil action in the
instant case was filed against defendant-appellant for damages
in the sum of P2,000 for the death of Magtibay. The CFI gave
judgment for plaintiffs for P2,000 as damages. Hence this
appeal.

ISSUE
WON the suspension of the sentence under Art. 80 of the RPC,
after
appellant had pleaded guilty, exonerated him from the crime
charged

HELD
NO
- The suspension of the sentence under Art.80 of the
Revised Penal Code, after appellant herein had pleaded guilty,
did not wipe out his guilt, but merely put off the imposition of the
corresponding penalty, in order to give the delinquent minor a
chance to be reformed. When, therefore, after he had observed
good conduct, the criminal case was dismissed, this did not
mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged, but
simply that he would suffer no penalty. Nor did such dismissal
of the criminal case obliterate his civil liability for damages.
Liability of an infant for his torts is imposed as a mode, not of
punishment, but of compensation. If property has been
destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act, it is just
that the loss should upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather
than that of a guiltless person, and that without reference to the
question of moral guilt. Consequently, for every tortuous act of
violence or other pure tort, the infant tort-feasor is liable in a
civil action to the injured person in the same manner and to the
same extent as an adult.
DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed.

DEL ROSARIO V MANILA ELECTRIC CO.
57 PHIL 478
STREET; November 5, 1932

FACTS
***This action was instituted by Julian del Rosario for the
purpose of recovering damages from Meralco for the death of
his son, Alberto, resulting from a shock from a wire used by the
defendant for the transmission of electricity.
- Aug 4, 1930 2pm: a wire used by the defendant on
Dimas- Alang St for the purpose of conducting electricity used
in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs.
- Jose Noguera saw that the wire was burning and its
connections smoking. One of the ends of the wire fell to the
ground among some shrubbery close to the way.
- As soon as Noguera took cognizance of the trouble,
he stepped into a garage which was located nearby and asked
Jose Soco to telephone the Malabon station of MERALCO that
an electrical wire was burning at that place.
- Soco transmitted the message at 2.25 p.m. and
received answer from the station to the effect that they would
send an inspector.
- At the time that message was sent the wire had not
yet parted, but from the testimony of Demetrio Bingao, one of
the witnesses for the defense, it is clear that the end of the wire
was on the ground shortly after 3 p.m. - At 4 p. m. the
neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went
home.
- Alberto del Rosario, 9 yrs old, who was a few paces
ahead of his classmates, Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina,
all members of the second grade in the public school.
- As the three neared the place where the wire was
down, Saturnino made a motion as if it touch it.
- Jose, who happened to be the son of an electrician,
knew never to touch a broken electrical wire (as his dad told
him so!)- stopped Saturnino- telling him that the wire might be
charged.
- Saturnino yielded to this admonition and stopped, but
Alberto, who was somewhat ahead, said, I have for some
time been in the habit of touching wires.
- Jose rejoined that he should into touch wires as they
carry a current, but Alberto, no doubt feeling that he was
challenged in the matter, put out his index finger and touch the
wire.
- He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay!
madre". - The end of the wire remained in contact with his body
which fell near the post.
- A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire
and disengaged the body. Upon being taken to St. Luke's
Hospital the child was pronounced dead.
- The wire was an ordinary number 6 triple braid
weather proof wire, such as is commonly used by the defendant
company for the purpose of conducting electricity for lighting.
- The wire was cased in the usual covering, but this
had been burned off for some distance from the point where the
wire parted.
- The engineer of the company says that it was
customary for the company to make a special inspection of
these wires at least once in six months, and that all of the
company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds
to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind.
- There is nothing in the record indicating any
particular cause for the parting
of the wire.l

ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is liable

HELD
YES
Reasoning
- When notice was received at the Malabon station at
2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the
scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard
the point of danger; but more than an 1 hours passed before
anyone from MERALCO appeared on the scene, and in the
meantime Alberto had been claimed as a victim.
- The mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution
of Jose (8 yrs old), doesnt alter the case.
- But even supposing that contributory negligence
could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased,
such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action
in this case, not having been the determining cause of the
accident. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359.)
- With respect to the amount of damages recoverable, Julian is
entitled to recover P250 for expenses incurred in connection
with the death and burial of the boy.
- Citing Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Company: Julian
should recover the sum of P1,000 as general damages for
loss of service.
Disposition judgment reversed


-
SEPARATE OPINION

ABAD SANTOS [concur in part and dissent in
part]
- He concurs that MERALCO is held liable for the
death of Alberto, but dissents in so far as the decision allows
the recovery of the father of the sum of P1,250 only as
damages. It should be P 2250.
- His reasoning: It is well settled in this jurisdiction that
an action will lie to recover damages for death caused by the
wrongful act. (Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821.)
- In criminal cases- indemnity to the heirs of the
deceased is equivalent to P1,000
- Whatever may be the reasons for the rule followed in
criminal cases, I am of the opinion that those reasons do not
obtain in fixing the amount of the damages recoverable in the
present case.
- The indemnity allowed in criminal case is merely
incidental to the main object sought, which is the punishment of
the guilty party.
- In a civil action, the principal object is the
recovery of damages for wrongful death; and where, as in
this case, the defendant is a corporation, not subject to criminal
prosecution for the act complained of, the question assumes a
vastly different aspect.
- There should be a distinction between the civil liability
of an ordinary person who, by wrongful act, has caused the
death of another; and the civil liability of a corporation,
organized primarily for profit, which has caused the death of a
person by failure to exercise due care in the prosecution of its
business.
- The liability of such a corporation for damages must
be regarded as a part of the risks which it assumes when it
undertakes to promote its own business; and just as it is
entitled to earn adequate profits from its business, so it should
be made adequately to compensate those who have suffered
damage by its negligence.

YLARDE V AQUINO
[citation]
GANCAYCO; July 29, 1988

NATURE

FACTS
- Soriano was principal. Aquino was a teacher. The
school was littered with concrete blocks. Teacher Banez
started burying them. Aquino gathered 18 male pupils to help.
He ordered them to dig. Work was unfinished.
- Ff day, Aquino called 4 of the 18 to continue. Aquino
continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit
throwing out the loose soil. Aquino left the children to level the
loose soil and borrowed a key from Banez.
Aquino told the kids not to touch the stone.
- 3 of the 4 kids jumped into the pit. The remaining
Abaga jumped on the concrete block causing it to slide down. 2
were able to escape but student Ylarde sustained injuries. 3
days later he died.
Parents filed suit against Aquino and Soriano. Lower court
dismissed and CA affirmed and said child Ylarde was negligent.

ISSUE
WON Aquino and Soriano can be held liable for damages

HELD
- Principal Soriano cannot be held liable, being head of
academic school and not school of arts and trades, in line with
Amadora case and Art 2180 of Civil Code. It is only the teacher
who should answer for torts committed by their students.
Besides, Soriano did not order the digging. - Based on Article
2180, Aquino can be held liable. However, petition is based on
Article 2176. Did the acts/omissions of Aquino cause the death
of Ylarde? Yes. He is liable for damages. The work required
adult laborers. He required the children to remain in the pit
after they finished digging. He ordered them to level the soil
when a huge stone was at brink of falling. He went to another
place and left the kids.
- Left by themselves, IT WAS BUT NATURAL FOR
THE CHILDREN TO PLAY AROUND. IN RULING THAT
YLARDE WAS IMPRUDENT, THE LOWER COURT DID NOT
CONSIDER HIS AGE AND MATURITY. A MINOR SHOULD
NOT BE HELD TO THE SAME DEGREE OF CARE AS AN
ADULT.
- Aquino also said the digging was part of Work
Education. This is unacceptable. Work is too dangerous and it
was not even in the lesson plan.


CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO V
PHILIPPINE
MOTORS CORPORATION
[citation]

NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI

FACTS
- Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in
Manila and plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor
schooner Gwendoline.
- Cranston decided to have the engine on the
Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil
burner. He had a conference with Quest, Phil. Motors manager,
who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment
should be made upon completion of the work. - The work was
begun and conducted under the supervision of Quest, chiefly by
a mechanic whom Quest took with him to the boat. Quest had
the assistance of the members of the crew of the Gwendoline,
who had been directed by Cranston to place themselves under
Quest's directions.
- Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest
concluded that a new carburetor was needed and thus installed
a Zenith carburetor. The engine was tried with gasoline and the
result was satisfactory. The next problem was to introduce into
the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil
mixed with distillate. A temporary tank to contain the mixture
was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the
compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected
with the carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently
not well fitted at the point where it was connected with the tank.
The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the
engine compartment. The new fuel line and that already in use
between the gasoline tank and carburetor were so fixed that it
was possible to change from the gasoline fuel to the mixed fuel.
This arrangement enables the operator to start the engine on
gasoline and then, after the engine had been operating for a
few moments, to switch to the new fuel supply. - It was
observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the
gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to
the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quest's
attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten to
running well, the flooding would disappear.
- The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run.
The engine stopped a few times during the first part of the
course, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. In the
course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine
compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a
view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would
give best results in the engine.
- As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine
stopped, and connection again had to be made with the
gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the
mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the
new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred in the cylinder
chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor,
and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered
with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were
unable to subdue. The salvage from, the wreck, when sold,
brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat, before the
accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000. - CFI gave
judgment in favor of the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the
sum of P9,850, with interest at 6 per centum per annum from
the date of the filing of the complaint, until satisfaction of the
judgment, with costs.
ISSUE
WON the loss of the boat is chargeable to the negligence and
lack of skill of
Quest

HELD
YES
Ratio When a person holds himself out as being competent to
do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
Reasoning
- The temporary tank in which the mixture was
prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from the
carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the
hydrostatic pressure in the carburetor was greater than the
delicate parts of the carburetor could sustain. This was the
cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result was that;
when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the
carburetor, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames,
whence the fire was quickly communicated to the highly
inflammable material near-by. The leak along the pipe line and
the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous
situation, which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this
nature, would have taken precautions to avoid. The back fire
may have been due either to the fact that the spark was too
advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
- Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in
fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not
appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on
boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on
deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his
mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did
not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There
was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent
inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence.
The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted
from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable
accident. It would not have occured but for Quest's
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether
the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was
free from blame.
- The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea
that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the Gwendoline during
the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the
position of a bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of
proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself from
responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the
fault of Quest. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship
in its owner's yard, or a mechanic who repairs a coach without
taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and
liabilities are determined by the general rules of law, under their
contract. The true bailee acquires possession and what is
usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a
consequence of such possession and special property, the
bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem
to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration.
- This action was instituted about two years after the
accident had occured, and after Quest had ceased to be
manager and had gone back to the US. Upon these facts, the
defendant bases the contention that the action should be
considered stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was
brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and
the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be
properly invoked.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from affirmed.

UNITED STATES V PINEDA
37 Phil 456
MALCOLM; January 22, 1918

NATURE
Appeal requiring a construction and an application, for the first
time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy Law.

FACTS
- Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist of long standing
and the owner of a drug store located at Calle Santo Cristo,
Manila. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented
a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and
which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with
good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription
read: "clorato de potasa - 120 gramos - en seis papelitos de 20
gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the
prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of
six papers marked, "Botica Pineda - Clorato potasa - 120.00 -
en seis papeles - Para caballo- Sto. Cristo , Binondo, Manila."
Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium
chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in
water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another
package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not
used. The two horses, to which had been given the
preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took

-
the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for
examination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science,
found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but
barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists
also went to the drug store of the defendant and bought
potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be
barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a
poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a
veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found
that death was the result of poisoning.

ISSUES
1. WON the lower court erred in admitting the testimony
of the chemist Pea and Darjuan as to their purchase of
potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which
proved to be barium chlorate
2. WON the lower court erred in finding that the
substance sold by the accused to Feliciano Santos was barium
chlorate and not potassium chlorate 3. WON the lower court
erred in finding that the accused has been proved guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt of an infraction of the Pharmacy Law, Act
No. 597, section 17, as amended

HELD
1. NO
Ratio On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates
to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a
particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person,
there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a
court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear
that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question
at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Reasoning
- What appellant is relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta.
As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by
a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this
maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort
is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there
an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and
thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain
defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If
the defendant has on more than one occasion performed
similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified and fraudulent intent may even be
established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of
negligence than the frequency of accidents.
2. NO
Reasoning The proof demonstrates the contrary.
3. NO
Ratio In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the
public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do
not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any
druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be
through negligence or mistake.
Reasoning
- The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with
the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
- Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing
on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a
pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the
quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And finally it is
provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or
poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the word "fraudulent"
which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature
intend to convey by this restrictive adjective?
- Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of
a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a
material representation; that it was false; that when he made it
he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any
knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; that he made
it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the
purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that
the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal
following of well-known principles on the subject of fraud would
strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the
innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good
faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any
unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good
reason so devitalize the law. - The rule of caveat emptor cannot
apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the
vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions.
An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to
prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his
absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is
such that examination would not avail the purchaser any thing.
It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an
examination of a compound of which he can know nothing.
Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will
deliver the drug called for.
- Remembering particularly the care and skill which are
expected of druggists, that in some jurisdictions they are liable
even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed
upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot
be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word
"fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake
cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be
wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the
misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances
the fact of occurrence is attributable to the druggist as a legal
fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of
drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of
the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name," what is made
unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This
view is borne out by the Spanish translation, which we are
permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish
"supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous
with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsity, deception,
and injury must be present - but not scienter.
Dispositive Judgment of the lower court, sentencing the
defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the
costs of this instance against the appellant, without prejudice to
any civil action which may be instituted.

BPI V CA
216 SCRA 51
GUTIERREZ; November 26, 1992

FACTS
- In the afternoon of October 9, 1981, a person
purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market
placement as evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity
date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of
P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The
caller wanted to preterminate the placement, but Reginaldo
Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in BPI's Money Market Department,
told her "trading time" was over for the day, which was a Friday,
and suggested that she call again the following week. The
promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-
over of an earlier 50-day money market placement that had
matured on September 24, 1981.
- Later that afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request
for pretermination to the officer who before had handled Eligia
G. Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left
to attend to the pretermination process.
- On October 12, 1981, the caller of the previous
Friday followed up with Eustaquio, merely by phone again, on
the pretermination of the placement. Although not familiar with
the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made
certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by
"verifying" that the details the caller gave about the placement
tallied with the details in "the ledger/folder" of the account.
Eustaquio knew the real Eligia G. Fernando to be the Treasurer
of Philippine American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife)
since he was handling Philamlife's corporate money market
account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally
handled Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered
to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request
for pretermination.
- Informed that the placement would yield less than the
maturity value because of its pretermination, the caller insisted
on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks
be issued for the proceeds, one for P1,800,000.00 and the
second for the balance, and that the checks be delivered to her
office at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the
"purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as
required by office procedure, and from his desk, the papers,
following the processing route, passed through the position
analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and documentation clerk,
before the two cashier's checks, nos. 021759 and 021760 for
P1,800,000.00 and P613,215.16, respectively, both payable to
Eligia G. Fernando, covering the preterminated placement,

were prepared. The two cashier's checks, together with the
papers consisting of the money market placement was to be
preterminated and the promissory note (No. 35623) to be
preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and
Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant,
respectively, in BPI's Treasury Operations Department, both
authorized signatories for BPI, who signed the two checks that
very morning. Thereafter, the checks went to the dispatcher for
delivery.
- Later in the same morning, however, the same caller
changed the delivery instructions; instead of the checks being
delivered to her office at Philamlife, she would herself pick up
the checks or send her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, to pick
them up. Eustaquio then told her that if it were her niece who
was going to get the checks, her niece would have to being a
written authorization from her to pick up the checks. This
telephone conversation ended with the caller's statement that
"definitely" it would be her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, who
would pick up the checks. Thus, Eustaquio had to hurriedly go
to the dispatcher, Bernardo Laderas, to tell him of the new
delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he changed the
delivery instruction on the purchase order slip, writing thereon
"Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up.
- It was, in fact Rosemarie Fernando who got the two
checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt.
As it turned out, the same person impersonated both Eligia G.
Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. Although the checks
represented the termination proceeds of Eligia G. Fernando's
placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher
failed to get or to require the surrender of the promissory note
evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Eligia
G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the
pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie Fernando
to pick up the two checks, both of which letters were
presumably handed to the dispatcher by Rosemarie Fernando,
was compared or verified with Eligia G. Fernando's signature in
BPI's file. Such purported signature has been established to be
forged although it has a "close similarity" to the real signature of
Eligia G. Fernando. In the afternoon of October 13, 1981, a
woman who represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando
applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the
opening of a current account. She was accompanied and
introduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by
Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened, earlier
that year, an account upon the introduction of Valentin Co, a
long-standing "valued client" of CBC. What Cuaso indicated in
the application form, however, was that the new client was
introduced by Valentin Co, and with her initials on the form
signifying her approval, she referred the application to the New
Accounts Section for processing. As finally proceeds, the
application form shows the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando",
"her" date of birth, sex, civil status, nationality, occupation
("business woman"), tax account number, and initial deposit of
P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account is
indicated on the application form by the initials of Regina G. Dy,
Cashier, who did not interview the new client but affixed her
initials on the application form after reviewing it.
- On October 14, 1981, the woman holding herself out
as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy
with Current Account No. 126310-3. Her endorsement on the
two checks was found to conform with the depositor's specimen
signature. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of
endorsement was then stamped on the two checks, which CBC
forthwith sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same
day. - Two days after, withdrawals began on Current Account
No. 26310-3: On October 16, 1981, by means of Check No.
240005 dated the same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to
"cash", which the woman holding herself out as Eligia G.
Fernando encashed over the counter, and Check No. 240003
dated October 15, 1981 for P48,500.00, payable to "cash"
which was received through clearing from PNB Pasay Branch;
on October 19, 1981, by means of Check No. 240006 dated the
same day for P1,000,000.00, payable to "cash," which the
woman identifying herself as Eligia G. Fernando encashed over
the counter; on October 22, 1981, by means of Check No.
240007 dated the same day for P370,000.00, payable to "cash"
which the woman herself also encashed over the counter; and
on November 4, 1981, by means of Check No. 240001 dated
November 3, 1981 for P4,100.00, payable to "cash," which was
received through clearing from Far East Bank. The last
withdrawal on November 4, 1981 left Current Account No.
26310-3 with a balance of only P571.61.
- On November 11, 1981, the maturity date of Eligia G.
Fernado's money market placement with BPI, the real Eligia G.
Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She
disclaimed having preterminated her placement on October 12,
1981. She executed an affidavit stating that while she was the
payee of the two checks in controversy, she never received nor
endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of
the checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the
original of the promissory note (No. 35623 with maturity value of
P2,462,243.19) evidencing the placement which matured that
day, BPI issued her a new promissory note (No. 40314 with
maturity date of December 23, 1981 and maturity value of
P2,500.266.77) to evidence a roll-over of the placement. - On
November 12, 1981, supported by Eligia G. Fernando's
affidavit, BPI returned the two checks in controversy to CBC for
the reason "Payee's endorsement forged". CBC, in turn,
returned the checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These
incidents led to the filing of this case with the Arbitration
Committee.
- The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and
ordered CBC to pay the former the amount of P1,206,607.58
with interest thereon at 12% per annum from August 12, 1983.
- However, upon CBCs motion for reconsideration, the
Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration
Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while
ordering it to pay CBC the sum of P1,206,607.58. - BPI then
filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
who dismissed said petition but modified the award by including
a provision for attorneys fees in favor of CBC, among others. -
The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.

ISSUES
1. WON the collecting bank has absolute liability on a
warranty of the validity of all prior endorsements stamped at the
back of the checks
2. In the event that the payee's signature is forged,
WON the drawer/drawee bank (in this case BPI) may claim
reimbursement from the collecting bank which earlier paid the
proceeds of the checks after the same checks were
cleared

HELD
1. NO
- BPI contends that respondent CBC's clear warranty
that "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements
guaranteed" stamped at the back of the checks was an
unrestrictive clearing guaranty that all prior endorsements in the
checks are genuine. Under this premise petitioner BPI asserts
that the presenting or collecting bank, respondent CBC, had an
unquestioned liability when it turned out that the payee's
signature on the checks were forged. With these
circumstances, petitioner BPI maintains that considerations of
relative negligence become totally irrelevant.
In presenting the checks for clearing and for payment, the
collecting bank made an express guarantee on the validity of
"all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the
checks are the clear warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS
AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED.
Without such warranty, the drawee bank would not have paid
on the checks. No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear
meaning of the warranty. As the warranty has proven to be
false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage
arising out of the falsity of its representation.
- Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this
Court has emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser
generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain
the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the
act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an
assertion that the party making the presentment has done its
duty to ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. If the
drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was
forged after it has paid the amount of the check to the holder
thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank.
However, the point that comes uppermost is whether the
drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration
or the forgery.
- The general rule under Section 23 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law is to the effect that a forged signature is
"wholly inoperative", and payment made "through or under such
signature" is ineffectual or does not discharge the instrument.
The exception to this rule is when the party relying in the
forgery is "precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority. In this jurisdiction we recognize negligence of the
party invoking forgery as an exception to the general rule.
- In the present petition the payee's names in the
checks were forged. Following the general rule, the checks are
"wholly inoperative" and of no effect. However, the underlying
circumstances of the case show that the general rule on forgery
is not applicable. The issue as to who between the parties

-
should bear the loss in the payment of the forged checks
necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the
parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged
checks.
- The records show that petitioner BPI as drawee bank
and respondent CBC as representing or collecting bank were
both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged
checks.
- The Arbitration Committee in its decision analyzed
the negligence of the employees of petitioner BPI involved in
the processing of the pre-termination of Eligia G. Fernando's
money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of
the subject checks in this wise: a) The impostor could have
been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call, which nobody
in BPI bothered to make to Eligia G. Fernando, a vice-president
of Philamlife; b) The officer who used to handle Eligia G.
Fernando's account did not do anything about the account's
pre-termination; c) Again no verification appears to have been
made on Eligia G. Fernando's purported signature on the letter
requesting the pre-termination and the letter authorizing her
niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature was in BPI's file;
and d) Another step that could have foiled the fraud, but which
BPI neglected to take, was requiring before the two checks in
controversy were delivered, the surrender of the promissory
note evidencing the money market placement that was
supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee,
however, belittled petitioner BPI's negligence compared to that
of respondent CBC which it declared as graver and the
proximate cause of the loss of the subject checks to the
impostor who impersonated Eligia G. Fernando.
- The PCHC Board of Directors, however, stated that
these withdrawals, without any further showing that the CBC
employees had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or
knowledge of such facts (Sec. 56, Negotiable Instruments Law)
that their action in accepting their checks for deposit and
allowing the withdrawals against the same amounted to bad
faith cannot be considered as basis for holding CBC liable.
- Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of
pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their
employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary
clerks and employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are
expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees.
- In the present case, there is no question that the
banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The Arbitration Committee, the PCHC Board of
Directors and the lower court, however disagree in the
evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. While the
Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent
CBC graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower courts
declared that petitioner BPI's negligence was graver. To the
extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the proximate
cause of the loss, we rule that the issue as to whose negligence
is graver is relevant. No matter how many justifications both
banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact
that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
2. NO
- The next issue hinges on whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an
impostor. Petitioner BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear
chance should have been applied considering the
circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, where both
parties were negligent and such negligence were not
contemporaneous, the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
- Applying these principles, petitioner BPI's reliance on
the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not
well-taken. CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by
BPI's employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's
money market placement. Moreover, Fernando is not a
depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of
Eligia G. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando,
which respondent CBC did, could not have resulted in the
discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no way to
discover the fraud at all. In fact the records fail to show that
respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or implied, of the fraud
perpetrated by the impostor and the employees of BPI.
- BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of
respondent CBC are the cause "that set into motion the actual
and continuous sequence of events that produced the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred."
Petitioner BPI anchors its argument on its stance that there was
"a gap, a hiatus, an interval between the issuance and delivery
of said checks by petitioner BPI to the impostor and their actual
payment of CBC to the impostor. Petitioner BPI points out that
the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance and
delivery of the checks to the impostor is material on the issue of
proximate cause. At this stage, according to petitioner BPI,
there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided to
desist from completing the same plan and could have held to
the checks without negotiating them. - Petitioner BPI's
contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The
gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the
checks bearing the impostor's name as payee and the
impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an
account and depositing the same with

-
respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural or
unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G.
Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees, the impostor
would complete her deception by encashing the forged checks.
There is therefore, greater reason to rule that the proximate
cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was
due to the negligence of petitioner BPI. This finding,
notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that petitioner BPI
must solely bear the loss of P2,413,215.16, the total amount of
the two (2) forged checks. Due care on the part of CBC could
have prevented any loss.
- The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC
employees closed their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of
huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the
account was opened. The opening of the account itself was
accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence.
And while we do not apply the last clear chance doctrine as
controlling in this case, still the CBC employees had ample
opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI.
They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence
expected of bank employees would have sufficed to seize it. -
Both banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of
their employees resulting in the encashment of the forged
checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome
the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision
of their employees. It was the gross negligence of the
employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and the
subsequent loss. While it is true that petitioner BPI's negligence
may have been the proximate cause of the loss, respondent
CBC's negligence contributed equally to the success of the
impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks.
Under these circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil
Code to the effect that while respondent CBC may recover its
losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Disposition The questioned Decision and Resolution are
MODIFIED. BPI shall be responsible for 60% while CBC shall
share 40% of the loss of
P2,413,215.16

E.M. WRIGHT V MANILA ELECTRIC R.R. &
LIGHT CO.
28 Phil 122
MORELAND; October 1, 1914

NATURE
An action to recover damages for injuries sustained in an
accident

FACTS
- Defendant Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in
operating an electric street railway
- Plaintiffs residence in Caloocan fronts on the street
along which defendants tracks run. To enter his premises from
the street, plaintiff must cross defendants tracks.
- One night, plaintiff drove home in a calesa and, in
crossing the tracks to enter his premises, the horse stumbled,
leaped forward, and fell, throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle
and causing injuries
- At the point where plaintiff crossed the tracks, the
rails were above-gruond, and the ties upon which the rails
rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of
the ground, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or
more above the level of the street.
- It is admitted that the defendant was negligent in
maintaining its tracks, but defendant claims the plaintiff was
also negligent in that he was so intoxicated, and such
intoxication was the primary cause of the accident
Trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that
plaintiffs negligence was not as great as defendants, awarded
plaintiff P1,000.

ISSUE
WON the negligence of plaintiff contributed to the principal
occurrence or only to his own injury. (If the former, he
cannot recover; if the latter, the trial
court was correct in apportioning damages)

HELD
NO
Ratio Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a
circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending
to prove negligence.
Reasoning
- Intoxication in itself is not negligence, and no facts,
other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated, are stated which
warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The
conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been
injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to
say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle
under the conditions described.
- A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the
rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground,
stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the
vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a
wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no
matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such
circumstances, a sober man would not have fallen while a
drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the
realm of speculation and guesswork.
DISPOSITION Plaintiff not negligent. No facts to merit a higher
award of damages to plaintiff.

US V BAGGAY
20 PHIL 142
TORRES; September 1, 1911

NATURE
Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April
28, 1910, whereby he was declared exempt from criminal
liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered
woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the
case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until
further order of the court.

FACTS
- About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were
assembled in the defendant's house in the township of
Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of
holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian
custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without
provocation suddenly attacked the woman Bil-liingan with a
bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she
expired immediately; and with the same bolo he like wise
inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan,
Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named
Dioalan.
- For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint
in the court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging the non-
Christian Baggay, jr., with murder, because of the violent death
of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted separately
from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and proof that
the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the judge
on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the
defendant's counsel appealed to this court.

ISSUE
WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still
be civilly liable

HELD
YES
Ratio Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every
person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also
liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the
harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts
ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their
perpetrators exempt from criminal liability.
Reasoning
- Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in
spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable
condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly
liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even
though they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his
fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his
harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate
condition. Law and society are under obligation to protect him
during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with
his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled
to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance,
but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused
to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the
consequences of his acts.

- -
- Article 17 of the Penal Code states:
Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor
is also civilly liable.
- Article 18 of the same code says:
The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3,
7, and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced, subject to the following:
(1) In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable
for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under
9 years of age, or over this age and under 15, who has not
acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have
them under their authority, legal guardianship or power,
unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on
their part.
Should there be no person having them under his
authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent,
the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their
own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their
support in accordance with the civil law. DISPOSITION
Therefore, the judgment appealed from being in accordance
with law, affirmation thereof is proper, and it is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

AMEDO V RIO
[citation]
CONCEPCION; May 24, 1954

FACTS
- This case was instituted on October 18, 1950. In her
original complaint, plaintiff Elena Amedo sought to collect from
defendant Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., the sum of P2,038.40 as
compensation for the death of her son, Filomeno Managuit, who
worked for the defendant as a seaman of the M/S Pilar II. The
main allegation of said original complaint was:
That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning,
while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S "Pilar
II" as such seaman, he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-
peso bill belonging to him, and as a consequence of which, he
was drowned.
- this however was dismissed due to lack of a cause of
action which defendant filed stating that the allegation does not
show that the death of plaintiff's son was due to an "accident
arising out of and in the course of employment,".
- she was allowed to file an amended complaint which
was remanded to the trial court.
- her amended complaint stated: That on May 27,
1949, at or about 11:30 o'clock in the morning while the said
Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his employment,
performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on defendant's
M/S "Pilar II", which was anchored then about 1 1/2 miles from
the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-peso bill
was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to retrieve
the same from the waters he was drowned.
ISSUE
WON Amedo could claim compensation from employer Rio

HELD
NO
- Plaintiffs basis for appeal is the Workmens
Compensation Act. Sections 2 and 4 of which:
Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee
receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment, or contracts any illness
directly caused by such employment, or the result of the nature
of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in
the sums and to the persons hereinafter specified. Sec. 4.
Injuries not covered. Compensation shall not be allowed for
injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the employee to
inflict such injury upon himself or another person; (2) by
drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the accident;
(3) by notorious negligence of the same.
- from these provisions three conditions are essential
to hold an employer liable. These are: (1) the accident must
arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the course of
the employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the
"notorious negligence" of the employee. Point in question is
whether the accident was committed under these 3 conditions -
"The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the
accident and are descriptive of its character, while the words `in
the course of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under
which the accident takes place - it may be conceded that the
death of Filomeno took place "in the course of" his employment,
in that it happened at the "time" when, and at the "place" where-
according to the amended complaint-he was working. However,
the accident which produced this tragic result did not "arise out
of" his employment. The blowing of his 2-peso bill may have
grown out of, or arisen from, his employment. It was the result
of a risk peculiar to his work as a seaman or incidental to such
work. But, his death was the consequence of his decision to
jump into the water to retrieve said bill. The hazardous nature of
this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment.
It was a risk to which any person on board the M/S Pilar II, such
as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been
exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Filomeno
had.
- was the accident caused by Filomenos notorious
negligence?
- "notorious negligence" has been held to be
tantamount to "gross negligence", which, in turn, has been
defined as follows:
By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to
raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the
probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or
worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others."
(Wall vs. Cameron [1882] 6 Colo., 275; see, also, The Law
Governing Labor Disputes in the Philippines by Francisco, 2nd
ed., p. 877.)
- It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one
mile and a half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang,
Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and
diligence," that he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety"
of his person, that he could not have been but conscious of the
probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was
"indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury.
- case provides for other jurisprudence which describe
instances of gross negligence attributable to employee (see
case).
- this is distinguishable from cases wherein the act
done is not dangerous per se such as when an employee drops
a cigarette on the pavement and picks it up. So, also, if, while
Filomeno Managuit was working, his 2-peso bill merely fell from
his pocket, and as he picked up the bill from the floor something
accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely be
entitled to compensation, his act being obviously innocent.
- since the act done by Filomeno was dangerous, his
accident could be attributed to his gross negligence.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS V
WORKMENS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
99 PHIL 48
BENGZON; June 30, 1956

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the WCC

FACTS
- A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging to
Marinduque, turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the
death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers.
- Macunat was prosecuted, convicted and was
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He has paid
nothing, however, to the latter. - Deceaseds wife now seeks
compensation by Marinduque as the employer.

ISSUE
1. WON Mamador has a right to compensation by Marinduque
2. WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for
having violated
the employers prohibition to ride haulage trucks

HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner alleges that the criminal case sentencing
Macunat to indemnify the heirs of the deceased was a suit for
damages against a third person, thereby having the effect of
releasing the employer from liability.
The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages
against third persons because the heirs did not intervene

therein and they have not received the indemnity ordered by the
court.
- At any rate, even if the case was against a third
person, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that
criminal prosection of the "other person" does not affect the
liability of the employer.
- Petitioner also contends that the amicable settlement
entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat barred the
widow's claim against the employer because she has already
elected one of the remedies. - This contention cannot be
sustained because what the widow waived was the offender's
criminal proscution and not all civil action for damages.
2. NO
- Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride
thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because
transportation by truck is not dangerous per se.
- Although the employer prohibited its employees to
ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute
negligence per se, but it may be an evidence of negligence.
- Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be
declared negligence because the proibition had nothing to do
with the personal safety of the riders. - Notorious negligence
means the same as gross negligence which implies "conscious
indifferenece to consequences", "pursuing a course of conduct
which would naturally and probably result in injury".
Disposition Award for compensation by WCC affirmed

LAYUGAN V IAC
167 SCRA 363
SARMIENTO; November 14, 1968

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of IAC decision

FACTS
- Plaintiff Pedro Layugan testified that while in
Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, he and a companion were repairing
the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right
side of the National Highway. Defendant's truck driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a
result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. Due to said
injuries, his left leg was amputated so he had to use crutches to
walk.
- Defendant Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership
of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano.
Defendant said that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a
truck helper being a brother-in-law law of the driver of said
truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired was parked,
occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva
Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the
incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in
installing the early warning device,
- Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew
the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving, he checked
the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in
driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan,
plaintiff, while the same was at a stop position. From the
evidence presented, it has been established clearly that the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's
driver, Daniel Serrano. Serrano also testified that, When I
was a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with
round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not function
with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid
pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not
function. - Plaintiff points to the negligence of the defendant
driver while Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as
negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it would,
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as
well as his helper, the petitioner herein, who was fixing the flat
tire of the said truck.

ISSUES
1. WON defendant driver Serrano was negligent
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case

HELD
1 NO
- (Procedural) Ratio Findings of fact are entitled to
great respect and will not ordinarily be disturbed by this Court
unless it falls down under the exceptions provided by the Court
to merit review of the facts.
Reasoning
- This is a question of fact. But this case is an
exception since: 1) the finding are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise, or conjecture; 2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, 3) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; 4) CA findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; 5) the said findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
and 6) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted on
record. Hence, SC entertained review of the factual question.
- (Substantive) Ratio The test by which to determine
the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.
Reasoning
[1] Negligence defined. Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do
[2] Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the
absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether cargo
truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the
road is immaterial taking into account the warning device
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the
back of the truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck
driven by Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo
truck. As a direct consequence of such accident Layugan
sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
2. NO
Note that for our purposes this was not raised as an issue in
this case. Therefore this only Obiter Dicta. But as far as were
concerned and relevant to our discussion in the outline, I
formulated it in an issue-type. This is what the Court actually
said in the case to prove its just obiter, and its relevant to the
main issue on negligence: At this juncture, it may be
enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of
negligence to examine the
doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
Obiter
[1] What is the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur? Two ways to put
it: (a) This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care, and
(b) According to Blacks Law dictionary, Res ipsa loquitur.
The thing speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or inference
that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive
control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not
happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of
evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be
inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided
character of accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not
have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to
have been under management and control of alleged
wrongdoer. [2] In our jurisdiction, and the way we apply it in
cases, particularly in the law of negligence: Res ipsa loquitur as
a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The
doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of
proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies
or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which
is the cause of the injury, or where theres direct evidence as to
the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And
once the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no
inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made,
whatever the source of the evidence.

- -
In this case it is inapplicable because it was established by
clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant
driver. Disposition Petition GRANTED with costs against
private respondents.

RAMOS V CA
[citation]
KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999

NATURE
Petition For Certiorari

FACTS
- In the case at bar, the Court is called upon to rule
whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should
be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a
patient scheduled for cholecystectomy.
- Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except
for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly
caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder she was
as normal as any other woman. Because the discomforts
somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought
professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation
for the removal of a stone in her gall bladdershe underwent a
series of examinations which included blood and urine tests
which indicated she was fit for surgery. She and her husband
Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka, one of the
defendants in this case, on June 10, 1985. They agreed that
their date at the operating table at the De Los Santos Medical
Center, would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M.. Dr. Hosaka
decided that she should undergo a cholecystectomy
operation after examining the documents presented to him.
Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a
good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn, assured Rogelio
that he will get a good anesthesiologist. She was admitted in
the hospital and was with her sister-inlaw, Herminda Cruz, who
was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center, was also there for moral support. After praying, she was
given injections. At the operating room, Herminda saw about
two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other
defendant, who was to administer anesthesia. Although not a
member of the hospital staff, Herminda introduced herself as
Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center
who was to provide moral support to the patient, to them.
Herminda was allowed to stay inside the operating room.
- Hours later at about 12:15 P.M., Herminda Cruz, who
was inside the operating room with the patient, heard
somebody say that Dr. Hosaka is already here. She then
saw people inside the operating room moving, doing this and
that, [and] preparing the patient for the operation. As she held
the hand of Erlinda Ramos, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez
intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr.
Gutierrez say, ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan (id., p. 17). Because of
the remarks of Dra. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on
what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She thereafter noticed bluish
discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless
Erlinda even as Dr. Hosaka approached her. She then heard
Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon,
another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the
operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate
the patient. The patients nailbed became bluish and the
patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately
thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told
Rogelio E. Ramos that something wrong was x x x
happening. Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient.
- Herminda Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw
that the patient was still in trendelenburg position. At almost
3:00 P.M. of that fateful day, she saw the patient taken to the
Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
- Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka were also asked by
the hospital to explain what happened to the patient. The
doctors explained that the patient had bronchospasm. Erlinda
Ramos stayed for about four months in the hospital, she
incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25. She has been
in a comatose condition. After being discharged from the
hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still needing
constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring
a monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. She
was also diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral
parenchymal damage.
- Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private
respondents alleging negligence in the management and care
of Erlinda Ramos.
- During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to
the possible cause of Erlindas injury. Plaintiff presented the
testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. Mariano Gavino to
prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of
oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her
airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. On
the other hand, private respondents primarily relied on the
expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a pulmonologist, to
the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlindas allergic
reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).

- Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners. Court of Appeals reversed.
- The decision of the Court of Appeals was received on
9 June 1995 by petitioner Rogelio Ramos who was mistakenly
addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. No copy of the decision,
however, was sent nor received by the Coronel Law Office,
then counsel on record of petitioners. Rogelio referred the
decision of the appellate court to a new lawyer, Atty. Ligsay,
only on 20 June 1995, or four (4) days before the expiration of
the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration.
On the same day, Atty. Ligsay, filed with the appellate court a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
The motion for reconsideration was submitted on 4 July 1995.
However, the appellate court denied the motion for extension of
time in its Resolution dated 25 July 1995. Meanwhile petitioners
engaged the services of another counsel, Atty. Sillano, to
replace Atty. Ligsay. Atty. Sillano filed on 7 August 1995 a
motion to admit the motion for reconsideration contending that
the period to file the appropriate pleading on the assailed
decision had not yet commenced to run as the Division Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals had not yet served a copy thereof
to the counsel on record. Despite this explanation, the
appellate court still denied the motion to admit the motion for
reconsideration of petitioners in its Resolution, dated 29 March
1996, primarily on the ground that the fifteen-day (15) period for
filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired.
- A copy of the above resolution was received by Atty.
Sillano on 11 April 1996. The next day, or on 12 April 1996,
Atty. Sillano filed before this Court a motion for extension of
time to file the present petition for certiorari under Rule 45. The
Court granted the motion for extension of time and gave
petitioners additional thirty (30) days after the expiration of the
fifteen-day (15) period counted from the receipt of the resolution
of the Court of Appeals within which to submit the petition. The
due date fell on 27 May 1996. The petition was filed on 9 May
1996, well within the extended period given by the Court.

ISSUES
1. WON it should be dismissed for being filed later than
allowable 15 day period for the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration
2. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable
3. WON the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
private respondents were not negligent in the care of Erlinda
during the anesthesia phase of the operation and, if in the
affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the proximate
cause of Erlindas comatose condition. Corollary thereto, we
shall also determine if the Court of Appeals erred in relying on
the testimonies of the witnesses for the private respondents
4. What is the cost for the damages

HELD
1. NO
- A careful review of the records reveals that the
reason behind the delay in filing the motion for reconsideration
is attributable to the fact that the decision of the Court of
Appeals was not sent to then counsel on record of petitioners,
the Coronel Law Office. In fact, a copy of the decision of the
appellate court was instead sent to and received by petitioner
Rogelio Ramos on 9 June 1995 wherein he was mistakenly
addressed as Atty. Rogelio Ramos. Based on the other
communications received by petitioner Rogelio Ramos, the
appellate court apparently mistook him for the counsel on
record. Thus, no copy of the decision of the appellate court
was furnished to the counsel on record. Petitioner, not being a
lawyer and unaware of the prescriptive period for filing a motion
for reconsideration, referred the same to a legal counsel only on
20 June 1995.
- It is elementary that when a party is represented by
counsel, all notices should be sent to the partys lawyer at his
given address. With a few exceptions, notice to a litigant
without notice to his counsel on record is no notice at all. In the
present case, since a copy of the decision of the appellate court
was not sent to the counsel on record of petitioner, there can be
no sufficient notice to speak of. Hence, the delay in the filing of
the motion for reconsideration cannot be taken against
petitioner. Moreover, since the Court of Appeals already issued
a second Resolution, dated 29 March 1996, which superseded
the earlier resolution issued on 25 July 1995, and denied the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner, we believe that the
receipt of the former should be considered in determining the
timeliness of the filing of the present petition. Based on this, the
petition before us was submitted on time.
2. YES
- We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in
the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the damage
sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall
bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa
loquitur.
- Considering that a sound and unaffected member of
the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is
unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of
the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice
dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts
and under these circumstances the Court would be able to say,
as a matter of common knowledge and observation, if
negligence attended the management and care of the patient.
Moreover, the liability of the physicians and the hospital in this
case is not predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the
desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of skill in
the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no operation or treatment
was ever performed on Erlinda. Thus, upon all these initial
determination a case is made out for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. - Nonetheless, in holding that res
ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying
that the doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury
occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all
anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light
and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur
coverage.
- Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally
means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The
phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact
of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption
of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and
present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation. Where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its
management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want
of care. - The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common
knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of
occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part
of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury
in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is
charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of
ordinary human experience and on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced
from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa
loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a
rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability.
Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of
a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of
the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof,
permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence,
and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going
forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be
allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someones negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
- In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the
control of the instrumentality which caused the damage.
Such element of control must be shown to be within the
dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit of the
rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must
show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that
the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a
particular incident. - In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of
expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where

-
common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury
would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been
exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise
to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without
medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only
what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine
is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of
the defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa
loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual
and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress
for injury suffered by him. - It does not automatically apply to all
cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden
of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the
ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously
applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is
generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a
layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and
observation, that the consequences of professional care were
not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had
been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure
to secure results, and the occurrence of something more
unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment
rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that
particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or
of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was
not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not
produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not
available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the
desired result of an operation or treatment was not
accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in
the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or
unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred
which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional
activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would
themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the
negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If
there was such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to
explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
3. YES
- The CA commited a reversible error. Private
respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. -
Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. In the case
at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda
for the first time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June
1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-
operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day
of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the
physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise
not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face
during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent
Dra. Gutierrez act of seeing her patient for the first time only an
hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore,
an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and
vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the
physicians centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow
this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her
negligence.
- Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view
that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlindas coma was due to
bronchospasm

mediated by her allergic response to the drug,
Thiopental Sodium, introduced into her system. Towards this
end, they presented Dr. Jamora, a Fellow of the Philippine
College of Physicians and Diplomate of the Philippine Specialty
Board of Internal Medicine, who advanced private respondents'
theory that the oxygen deprivation which led to anoxic
encephalopathy, was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to
the short-acting barbiturate. We find the theory of private
respondents unacceptable.
- First of all, Dr. Jamora cannot be considered an
authority in the field of anesthesiology simply because he is not
an anesthesiologist. Since Dr. Jamora is a pulmonologist, he
could not have been capable of properly enlightening the court
about anesthesia practice and procedure and their
complications. Dr. Jamora is likewise not an allergologist and
could not therefore properly advance expert opinion on allergic-
mediated processes. Moreover, he is not a pharmacologist
and, as such, could not have been capable, as an expert would,
of explaining to the court the pharmacologic and toxic effects of
the supposed culprit, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
- An anesthetic accident caused by a rare drug-
induced bronchospasm properly falls within the fields of
anesthesia, internal medicine-allergy, and clinical
pharmacology. The resulting anoxic encephalopathy belongs to
the field of neurology. On the basis of the foregoing transcript,
in which the pulmonologist himself admitted that he could not
testify about the drug with medical authority, it is clear that the
appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr. Jamoras testimony
as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium.
- Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately
caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from
the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury
or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct
result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or
omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing cause. -
Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure
to exercise the proper authority (as the captain of the
operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist
observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on
record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if
respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka
had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the
same time as Erlindas cholecystectomy, and was in fact over
three hours late for the latters operation. Because of this, he
had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding
the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in
his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares
equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlindas
condition. - We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital in
this particular incident. The unique practice (among private
hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting
consultants, who are allegedly not hospital employees,
presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence
in medical malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only
more apparent than real.
- In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control
in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their
work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for
consultant slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit
proof of completion of residency, their educational
qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the
appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most
cases, and references. These requirements are carefully
scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a
review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or
reject the application. This is particularly true with respondent
hospital. - After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or
attending consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico-
pathological conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks,
interns and residents, moderate grand rounds and patient
audits and perform other tasks and responsibilities, for the
privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the hospital, and/or
for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In
addition to these, the physicians performance as a specialist is
generally evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of
mortality and morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients,
nurses, interns and residents. A consultant remiss in his duties,
or a consultant who regularly falls short of the minimum
standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer review
committee, is normally politely terminated.
- In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and
exercise real control over their attending and visiting
consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically
employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in
denying all responsibility for the patients condition, the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all
fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing,
we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship
in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and

visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now
arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily
liable with respondent doctors for petitioners condition.
- The basis for holding an employer solidarily
responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article
2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable
not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on
the formers responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity
concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a
good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words,
while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs,
once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents
(parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that
they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. - In the instant case, respondent hospital,
apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with
regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its
physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a
similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge
its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having
failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily
responsible with its physicians for Erlindas condition. - Upon
these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are
solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.

4. Given these considerations, the amount of actual damages
recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least
reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of
the care the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to
avoid bankruptcy.
- Art. 2199. - Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
damages.
- Our rules on actual or compensatory damages
generally assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered
as a consequence of an act of negligence has been completed
and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these provisions
neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case,
where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible
future complications directly arising from the injury, while certain
to occur, are difficult to predict. - In these cases, the amount of
damages which should be awarded, if they are to adequately
and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the
time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain
to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case,
be made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages can
and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory
damages in instances where the injury is chronic and
continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases,
no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate
damages are provided for. The reason is that these damages
cover two distinct phases.
- As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the
best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim in
such cases to constantly come before the courts and invoke
their aid in seeking adjustments to the compensatory damages
previously awarded - temperate damages are appropriate. The
amount given as temperate damages, though to a certain
extent speculative, should take into account the cost of proper
care.
- In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide
only home-based nursing care for a comatose patient who has
remained in that condition for over a decade. Having premised
our award for compensatory damages on the amount provided
by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would be now much
more in step with the interests of justice if the value awarded for
temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide optimal
care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes
in such care. They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the
aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly
inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be
reasonable.
- Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and
financial cost of the care of petitioner would be virtually
impossible to quantify. Even the temperate damages herein
awarded would be inadequate if petitioners condition remains
unchanged for the next ten years.
- The husband and the children, all petitioners in this
case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty of the
patients illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil.
They have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of
petitioner, altering their long term goals to take into account
their life with a comatose patient. They, not the respondents,
are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the
victim. The familys moral injury and suffering in this case is
clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an award of
P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate. -
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length
and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that
attorneys fees valued at P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
DISPOSITION the decision and resolution of the appellate
court appealed from are hereby modified so as to award in favor
of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the
following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of
the date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly
payment of P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda
Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00 as
moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4)
P100,000.00 each as exemplary damages and attorneys fees;
and, 5) the costs of the suit.

BATIQUIN V CA (Villegas)
258 SCRA 334
DAVIDE; July 5, 1996

NATURE

FACTS
- Mrs. Villegas submitted to Dr. Batiquin for prenatal
care as the latter's private patient sometime before September
21, 1988. In the morning of September 21, 1988 Dr. Batiquin,
along with other physicians and nurses, performed a caesarian
operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the
latters baby.
- After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She
also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at
the latter's polyclinic who prescribed for her certain medicines.
However, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr.
Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr Kho suggested that
Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.
- When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas
she found whitishyellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on
each of the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and
pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber material on the
right side of the uterus, embedded on the ovarian cyst. The
piece of rubber appeared to be a part of a rubber glove. This
was the cause of all of the infection of the ovaries and
consequently of all the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas
- The piece of rubber allegedly found was not
presented in court, and Dr. Kho testified that she sent it to a
pathologist in Cebu City for examination. Aside from Dr. Kho's
testimony, the evidence which mentioned the piece of rubber
are a Medical Certificate, a Progress Record, an Anesthesia
Record, a Nurse's Record, and a Physician's Discharge
Summary. The trial court, however, regarded these
documentary evidence as mere hearsay, "there being no
showing that the person or persons who prepared them are
deceased or unable to testify on the facts therein stated
- There was also doubts as to the whereabouts of the
piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Khos testimony:
1) that it was sent to the Pathologist in Cebu as testified to in
Court by Dr. Kho and (2) that Dr. Kho threw it away as told by
her to Defendant. The failure of the Plaintiffs to reconcile these
two different versions served only to weaken their claim against
Defendant Batiquin. The trial court ruled in favor of the
defendants. The CA reversed the decision.

ISSUES
Procedural
WON the court can review questions of fact
Substantive
WON Dr. Batiquin is liable


-
HELD
Procedural
YES
- While the rule is that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari, there are exceptions,
among which are when the factual findings of the trial court and
the appellate court conflict, when the appealed decision is
clearly contradicted by the evidence on record, or when the
appellate court misapprehended the facts
Substantive
- The focal point of the appeal is Dr. Khos testimony.
There were inconsistencies within her own testimony, which led
to the different decision of the RTC and CA. The CA was
correct in saying that the trial court erred when it isolated the
disputed portion of Dr. Khos testimony and did not consider it
with other portions of Dr. Khos testimony. Also, the phrase
relied upon by the trial court does not negate the fact that Dr.
Kho saw a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas'
abdomen, and that she sent it to a laboratory and then to Cebu
City for examination by a pathologist. Furthermore, Dr. Kho's
knowledge of the piece of rubber could not be based on other
than first hand knowledge for, as she asserted before the trial
court. - It is also worth noting that the trial court paid heed to Dr.
Batiquins testimony, that there was neither any tear on Dr.
Batiquin's gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her
hands upon removing her gloves. But the trial court failed to
recognized that these were mere denials or negative
testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is
stronger than negative testimony.
While the petitioners claim that contradictions and falsities
punctured Dr. Kho's testimony, a reading of the said testimony
reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a credible
witness. Dr. Kho was frank throughout her turn on the witness
stand. Furthermore, no motive to state any untruth was ever
imputed against Dr. Kho, leaving her trustworthiness
unimpaired. The trial court's following declaration shows that
while it was critical of the lack of care with which Dr. Kho
handled the piece of rubber, it was not prepared to doubt Dr.
Kho's credibility, thus only supporting out appraisal of Dr. Kho's
trustworthiness.
- Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a
credible witness, her positive testimony prevails over the
negative testimony in favor of the petitioners. As such, the rule
of res ipsa loquitur comes to fore.
- This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which
causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care."
- In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to
the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the
cesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr.
Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of
direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the
foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas'
body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through
the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the
cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no
other operation which could have caused the offending piece of
rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such
could only have been a by-product of the cesarean section
performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed
to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort
to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore
liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse
effects thereof
DISPOSITION Decision affirmed

D.M. CONSUNJI V CA
KAPUNAN; April 20, 2001

NATURE
Appeal from CA affirming decision of RTC ordering defendant
D.M. Consunji,
Inc. to pay damages to plaintiff Maria J. Juego

FACTS
- At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego,
a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from
the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation
disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie
Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board
a steel platform with plywood flooring and cable wires attached
to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect
the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole
platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement
of the elevator core of the building under construction, save his
2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
- On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in
the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against D.M.
Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUES
1. WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to
prove petitioners negligence
2. WON respondent is precluded from recovering
damages under the Civil
Code

HELD
1. YES
Ratio As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and
furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is
based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and
therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms
and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in
order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily
available, provided the following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14
th
floor of a building to the
basement while performing work in a construction site unless
someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia
and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the
second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence
was attributed to the appellees deceased husband; thus, the
last requisite is also present. A reasonable presumption or
inference of appellants negligence arises. Regrettably,
petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or
presumption of negligence arising from the application of res
ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
2. NO
Ratio Claimants may invoke either the Workmens
Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to
the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the
other and that the acceptance of compensation under the
remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits
under the other remedy. The exception is where a claimant who
has already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act
may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for
the first remedy. The choice of a party between inconsistent
remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver requires a
knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived,
with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or
by the evidence. There is no showing that private respondent
knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the
ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that
she was not aware of her rights.
DISPOSITION The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in
its decision is more than that of the ECC, whereupon payments

already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code
shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision
of the CA is AFFIRMED.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V REMONQUILLO
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956

NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS
- August 22, 1950: Efren Magno went to the house of
Antonio Pealoza, hid stepbrother, on Rodriguez Lanuza St,
Manila, to repair a leaking media agua. The media agua
was just below the window of the third story.
- Standing on said media agua, Magno received
from his son thru the window a 3x6 galvanized iron sheet to
cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came
into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric
Company parallel to the media agua and 2 feet from it,
causing his death by electrocution.
- his widow and children filed suit to recover damages
from the company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
- The electric wire in question was an exposed,
uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles pm the street
and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installed there some
two years ago before Pealozas house was constructed.
During the construction of said house a similar incident took
place, with less tragic consequences. The owner of the house
complained to defendant about the danger which the wire
presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther
from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end
where it was.
- Regulations of the City required that all wires be
kept three feet from the building.
- There was no insulation that could have rendered it
safe, because there is no insulation material in commercial use
for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was not
refuted).
Petitioners Claim
- Owner of the house exceeded the limit for the
construction of the media agua (17% more).
Respondents Comment
Owner was given final permit despite the excess of the media
agua.

ISSUE
WON Manila Electric is guilty of negligence.

HELD
NO
- It was the victim who was guilty of negligence
Ratio the liability of electric companies for damages or personal
injury is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such
companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.
Reasoning
- The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own
negligence, and in some measure by the too close proximity of
the media agua to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city
and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the
media agua. Had the house owner followed the terms of the
permit given him by the city for the construction of his
media agua, the distance from the wires to the edge of said
media agua would have been 3ft and 11 3/8 inches.
- The company cannot be expected to be always on
the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the
distance between its wires and said construction, and to change
the installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance.
- The violation of the permit for the construction was
not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it.
The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or
negligent act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to
his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had
training and experience for the job. He could not have been
entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in
them.
- To hold the defendant liable in damages for the death
of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must
have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident.

Disposition The appealed decision of the CA is reversed, and
complaint against the Company dismissed.

BERNARDO V LEGASPI
29 Phil 12
MORELAND; December 23, 1914

NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila dismissing the complaint
on the merits
filed in an action to recover damages for injuries

FACTS
- Due to a collision between the respective
automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action
to recover damages for injuries sustained by his car which he
alleged were by reason of Legaspi's negligence in causing said
collision.
Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a cross-complaint alleging it
was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for damages.
- The lower court found upon the evidence that both
the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their
automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character
and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from
recovering.

ISSUE
WON the parties may recover damages

HELD
1. NO
- Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions, collide
on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and
is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally
negligent and contributed equally to the

principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can
recover of the other for damages suffered.

BERNAL V HOUSE
54 PHIL 327
MALCOLM; January 30, 1930

FACTS
- Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion
Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession of Holy
Friday. - After the procession, they, accompanied by two other
persons, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan.
- The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her friends.
- While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric &
Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared on which frightened the
child. She turned to run, but fell into the street gutter. At that
time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the
Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House.
- When the mother and her companions reached the
child, they found her face downward in the hot water.
- The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite
his efforts, the child died that same night.
- It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns,
3rd Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes
were "Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest &
abdomen.
- The defense was that the hot water was permitted to
flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the
knowledge and consent of the authorities; that the cause of
death was other than the hot water; and that in the death the
plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.
- The trial judge, however, after examination of the
evidence presented by the defendants, failed to sustain their
theory of the case, except as to the last mentioned special
defense. He nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the
action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE
WON the action should be dismissed due to the contributory
negligence of
the plaintiffs

HELD
NO
- The death of the child was the result of fault and
negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public
streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it - The mother and her child
had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held.
- There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along
a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee
the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened
child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
- The doctrines announced in the much debated case
of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907], 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902
of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense
could only result in reduction of the damages.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from was in part be
reversed and in the court of origin another judgment was issued
in favor of Fortunata Enverso and against J.V. House for the
amount of P1,000, and for the costs of both instances.
SEPARATE OPINION

ROMUALDEZ [dissent]
- Even taking the finding that the defendant by its
negligence helped to bring about the accident which resulted in
the death of the child Purificacion Bernal, plaintiff, by
negligence, contributed to that most regrettable result.
- Judgment appealed from should be affirmed.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V
CHATTO
210 SCRA 18
DAVIDE JR.; June 16, 1992

FACTS
- Plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old
daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother
Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco
Investment Corporation.
- Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the
ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into
darkness and pandemonium ensued.
- Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under
the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the
street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day. - The next day, they
transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was
treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina
Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.
- Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and
dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further
treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in
Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3)
months during which time she had to return to the Cook County
Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times.
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force
majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any
structural or construction defect.
- The trial court awarded actual or compensatory and
moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.
- Respondent Court found the appeal later filed to be
without merit. - Its motion for reconsideration of the decision
having been denied by the respondent Court, petitioner filed the
petition in the SC.

ISSUE
WON the collapse of the ceiling was caused by force majeur

HELD
NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded
on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted
that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed."
Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove
that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. That Mr.
Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force
majeure. - Definitions of force majeure as cited in Pons y
Compaia vs. La Compaia Maritima:
1. Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law:
Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any
physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning. tempest,
perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness
or death of a person.
2. Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudenci,: The event which we could neither foresee nor
resist; as for example, the lightning stroke, hail, inundation,
hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says
Cayo, ea quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari
potest. Accident and mitigating circumstances.
3. Bouvier: Any accident due to natural cause, directly
exclusively without human intervention, such as could not have
been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care
reasonably to have been expected.
4. Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English
case, said that were a captain uses all the known means to
which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have
recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him;
and if, under such circumstances, he is overpowered by storm
or other natural agency, he is within the rule which gives
immunity from the effects of such vis major. The term generally
applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those
caused by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc.
-The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or
reason is that either he did not actually conduct the
investigation or that he isincompetent. He is not an engineer,
but an architect who had not even passed the government's
examination.
- Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be
considered as material to the present proceedings. What is
significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the
respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction
defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
- The building was constructed barely 4 years prior to the
accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes

denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or
at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could
have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due
diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.
But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the
accident.
- That the structural designs and plans of the building
were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building
permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all
prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially
as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was
offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.
- It is settled that:
The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement
impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they
are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract
against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or
reasonable means.
- This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury
is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of events would not have happened
if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a
presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on
the part of the defendant.
- That presumption or inference was not overcome by
the petitioner. - Even assuming that the cause of the collapse
was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable
because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court
denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of
and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be
exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exercised
care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
Disposition Judgment was denying the instant petition with
costs against petitioner.

PLDT V CA (SPS ESTEBAN)
REGALADO; September 29, 1989
[CITATION]

NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the resolution of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS
- July 30, 1968 Jeep of Esteban spouses ran over a
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its
underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that
respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench
which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness
and the lack of any warning light or signs.
- Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her
arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek,
while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the
windshield of the jeep was shattered. - PLDT, in its answer,
denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by
respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence
and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is
L.R. Barte and Company, an independent contractor which
undertook the said construction work.
- TC ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas the
CA reversed the ruling.

ISSUE
WON the Esteban spouses can claim damages from PLDT

HELD
NO
Ratio A person claiming damages for the negligence of another
has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence.
Reasoning
- The accident was due to the lack of diligence of
respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
> Jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If
it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
accident mound > That plaintiffs jeep was on the inside lane
before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have
been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the
south of the ACCIDEN MOUND.
> Plaintiffs jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as
plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he could have
braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT
MOUND.
> If the accident did not happen because the jeep was
running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or
other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb
over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff husband had
not exercised the deligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the accident.
- The above findings clearly show that the negligence
of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his
injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors,
and thereby precludes their right to recover damages.
Disposition resolutions of respondent CA, dated March 11,
1990 and September 3, 1980, are hereby SET ASIDE, Its
original decision, promulgated on September 25, 1979, is
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

GENOBIAGON V CA (PEOPLE OF THE PHILS)
178 SCRA 422
GRIO-AQUINO; October 22, 1957

NATURE
Petition for review of the CAs decision affirming the conviction
of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless
imprudence.

FACTS
- On Dec 31, 1959, at about 7:30 PM, a rig driven by
Genobiagon bumped an old woman who was crossing the
street. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of
two meters. The old woman started to cross when the first rig
was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so
fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but
also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him,
the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who fell at the
middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on, but a
by-stander Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at the
appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused
to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why he
bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old
woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place
where the old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was
unconscious. She was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the
hospital where she died 3 hours later.
- Genobiagon was convicted of homicide thru reckless
imprudence. CA affirmed
- Genobiagon claims CA erred in not finding that the
reckless negligence of
the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to
her death

ISSUES
WON contributory negligence can be used as defense by
Genobiagon

HELD
NO
- The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if
any, does not exonerate the accused.
- "The defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another
to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs.
Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29, 1947)." (People vs.
Quiones, 44 O.G. 1520)
Disposition the appealed decision is affirmed with
modification as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is
hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against petitioner.

RAKES V ATLANTIC
[CITATION]
[PONENTE]

NATURE
Action for damages

FACTS
- The plaintiff, Rakes, one of a group of 8 African-
American laborers in the employment of defendant, Atlantic,
was at work transporting iron rails from the harbor in Manila.
The men were hauling the rails on 2 hand cars, some behind or
at it sides and some pulling the cars in the front by a rope. At
one point, the track sagged, the tie broke, the car canted and
the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff who was walking by the
cars side, breaking his leg, which was later amputated at the
knee.
- The plaintiffs witness alleged that a noticeable
depression in the track had appeared after a typhoon. This was
reported to the foreman, Mckenna, but it had not been proven
that Atlantic inspected the track or had any proper system of
inspection. Also, there were no side guards on the cars to keep
the rails from slipping off.
- However, the companys officers and 3 of the
workers testified that there was a general prohibition frequently
made known to all against walking by the side of cars. As
Rakes was walking along the cars side when the accident
occurred, he was found to have contributed in some degree to
the injury inflicted, although not as the primary cause.
- Atlantic contends that the remedy for injury through
negligence lies only in a criminal action against the official
directly responsible and that the employer be held only
subsidiarily liable.

ISSUE
WON there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner

HELD
YES
- Petitioner had walked along the side of the car
despite a prohibition to do so by the foreman.
-The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury
but not being one of the determining causes of the principal
accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but only in
reduction of his damages. Each party is chargeable with
damages in proportion to his fault. - Trial court assessed that
damages to plaintiff amount to PhP5,000. SC deducted
PhP2,500, the amount fairly attributable to his own negligence.

SEPARATE OPINION

WILLARD AND CARSON [dissent]
- the negligence of the defendant alone was
insufficient to cause the accidentit also required the
negligence of the plaintiff. Because of this, plaintiff should not
be afforded relief

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE V CA
(ROMMELS
MARKETING CORP.)
269 SCRA 695
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 14, 1997

NATURE
Petition for review challenging the CA decision affirming the
RTC decision in
a civil case

FACTS
- the case stems from a complaint filed by Rommels
Marketing Corporation (RMC) to recover from the former
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) the sum of P304,979.74
representing various deposits it had made in its current account
with the bank but which were not credited, and were instead
deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly
due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner
bank.

ISSUE
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of
P304,979.74, suffered by the private respondent RMC
petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's?

HELD
- The proximate cause of the loss was the negligent
act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in
validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate,
presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad, notwithstanding the
fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely
accomplished. Ratio Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter
Reasoning
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.

- In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the
damage suffered by the private respondent. Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would do.
- Test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
- Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's
teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating,
officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and
presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the
duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the
selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper
validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by
Ms. Mabayad herself. - The fact that the duplicate slip was not
compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should
not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd
circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital
information that of the name of the account holder should
have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily
validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have
proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the
true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate
slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She
should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and
sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect
that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record,
she would simply fill up the blank space later on.
11
A
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence"
12
would not have given
credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the
space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation.
Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded
thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. -
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but
also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection
and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. In the testimony of Mr.
Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the
petitioner, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation
of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips
were validated in total disregard of the bank's validation
procedures. - It was in fact only when he testified in this case in
February, 1983, or after the lapse of more than seven (7) years
counted from the period when the funds in question were
deposited in plaintiff's accounts (May, 1975 to July, 1976) that
bank manager Bonifacio admittedly became aware of the
practice of his teller Mabayad of validating blank deposit slips.
Undoubtedly, this is gross, wanton, and inexcusable negligence
in the appellant bank's supervision of its employees.
- It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection
and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate
cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not
the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as
insisted by the petitioners.
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each
case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy

and precedent. Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals,
17

defines proximate cause as "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the act of Ms.
Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy
of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility
with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
- LAST CLEAR CHANCE: under the doctrine of "last
clear chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening
negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was
indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof. The rule would
also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by
another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have
avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the
latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced
by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner
bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their
selfimposed validation procedure.
- In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required
is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the
fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks
are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the
highest degree of care.

- The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied
that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the
company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being
committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would
definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC,
particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance
in their financial affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to
contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that
may be awarded to the private respondent
23
under A2179 CC,
to wit:
. . . When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio.
Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be
borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60%
needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's
fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioner.
Disposition the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private
respondent is entitled to by 40%. Petitioners may recover from
Ms. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private
respondent. Private respondent shall have recourse against
Ms. Irene Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate court's
decision is
AFFIRMED.
SEPARATE OPINION

PADILLA [dissent]
- It seems that an innocent bank teller is being unduly
burdened with what should fall on Ms. Irene Yabut, RMC's own
employee, who should have been charged with estafa or estafa
through falsification of private document. Why is RMC
insulating Ms. Irene Yabut from liability when in fact she
orchestrated the entire fraud on RMC, her employer?
- Going back to Yabut's modus operandi, it is not
disputed that each time Yabut would transact business with
PBC's tellers, she would accomplish two (2) copies of the
current account deposit slip. PBC's deposit slip, as issued in
1975, had two parts. The upper part was called the depositor's
stub and the lower part was called the bank copy. Both parts
were detachable from each other. The deposit slip was
prepared and signed by the depositor or his representative,
who indicated therein the current account number to which the
deposit was to be credited, the name of the depositor or current
account holder, the date of the deposit, and the amount of the
deposit either in cash or in checks.
- Since Yabut deposited money in cash, the usual
bank procedure then was for the teller to count whether the
cash deposit tallied with the amount written down by the
depositor in the deposit slip. If it did, then the teller proceeded
to verify whether the current account number matched with the
current account name as written in the deposit slip.
- In the earlier days before the age of full
computerization, a bank normally maintained a ledger which
served as a repository of accounts to which debits and credits
resulting from transactions with the bank were posted from
books of original entry. Thus, it was only after the transaction
was posted in the ledger that the teller proceeded to machine
validate the deposit slip and then affix his signature or initial to
serve as proof of the completed transaction. - It should be
noted that the teller validated the depositor's stub in the upper
portion and the bank copy on the lower portion on both the
original and duplicate copies of the deposit slips presented by
Yabut. The teller, however, detached the validated depositor's
stub on the original deposit slip and allowed Yabut to retain the
whole validated duplicate deposit slip that bore the same
account number as the original deposit slip, but with the
account name purposely left blank by Yabut, on the assumption
that it would serve no other purpose but for a personal record to
complement the original validated depositor's stub.
- Thus, when Yabut wrote the name of RMC on the
blank account name on the validated duplicate copy of the
deposit slip, tampered with its account number, and
superimposed RMC's account number, said act only served to
cover-up the loss already caused by her to RMC, or after the
deposit slip was validated by the teller in favor of Yabut's
husband. Stated otherwise, when there is a clear evidence of
tampering with any of the material entries in a deposit slip, the
genuineness and due execution of the document become an
issue in resolving whether or not the transaction had been fair
and regular and whether the ordinary course of business had
been followed by the bank. - The legal or proximate cause of
RMC's loss was when Yabut, its employee, deposited the
money of RMC in her husband's name and account number
instead of that of RMC, the rightful owner of such deposited
funds. Precisely, it was the criminal act of Yabut that directly
caused damage to RMC, her employer, not the validation of the
deposit slip by the teller as the deposit slip was made out by
Yabut in her husband's name and to his account. - LAST
CLEAR CHANCE: As for the doctrine of "last clear chance," it is
my considered view that the doctrine assumes that the
negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence
of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the
injury. In short, there must be a last and a clear chance, not a
last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It must
have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably
prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid
the injury and the resulting damage to himself.
- In the case at bar, the bank was not remiss in its duty
of sending monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC
so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be
brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity.
Private respondent failed to examine these bank statements not
because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but
because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does
not normally check bank statements given by banks.
- It was private respondent who had the last and clear
chance to prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it
only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank
statements sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a sizable
amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private respondent
should, at least, have taken ordinary care of its concerns, as
what the law presumes. Its negligence, therefore, is not
contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its
injury.

JUNTILLA V FONTANAR
136 SCRA 624
GUITERREZ JR; May 31, 1985

NATURE
Petition to review the decision of CFI of Cebu

FACTS
- Petitioner Roberto Juntilla was sitting a the front seat
of a jeepney (driven by one Berfol Camoro, registered under

the franchise of Clemente Fontanar, but actually owned by
Fernando Banzon) when its right rear tire exploded causing it to
turn turtle. Plaintiff was thrown out of the vehicle and lost
consciousness upon landing on the ground. When he came
back to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on
his right palm, injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his
back and also found this Omega wrist watch was lost. He
went to Danao city and upon arrival there he entered the City
Hospital to attend to his injuries and asked his father-in-law to
go to site of the accident to look for his watch but the watch was
nowhere to be found. - Petitioner then filed a civil case for
breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu
against Fontanar, Banzon, and Camoro, who filed their answer,
alleging that the accident was beyond their control taking into
account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and
slightly used at the time it blew up.
- City Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner.
The respondents then appealed to the CFI of Cebu, which
reversed the judgment upon a finding that the accident in
question was due to a fortuitous event. Petitioners MFR was
denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUES
1. WON the CFI erred in absolving the carrier from any liability
upon a finding that the tire blow out is a fortuitous event 2.
WON the accident was due to a fortuitous event

HELD
1. YES
- The CFI relied on the ruling of the CA in Rodriguez v
Red Line Transportation Co., that a tire blow-out does not
constitute negligence unless the tire was already old and
should not have been used at all. This conclusion is based on
a misapprehension of overall facts. In La Mallorca and
Pampanga Bus Co. v De Jesus, et al, We held that, not only
are the rulings of the CA in Rodriguez v Red Line Trans. Co.
not binding on this Court but they were also based on
considerations quite different from those that obtain in the case
at bar. In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence
on the part of the respondents. The records show that the
passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch
immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence
shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast
speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of
the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and
safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire
blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger
jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The
petitioner stated that there were 3 passengers in the front seat
and 14 in the rear.
- While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still
good because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact
alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event.
No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due
to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by
the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to
cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have
been caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire
coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident.
2. NO
Ratio A caso fortuito (fortuitous event) presents the following
essential characteristics:
1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will
2. It must be impossible to foresee the even which
constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid
3. The occurrence must be such as to render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner
4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation
of the injury resulting to the creditor
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will.
The accident was caused either through the negligence of the
driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common
carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles
not to exceed safe and legal speed limits and to know the
correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the
safety of passengers at all times.
- Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects,
we held in Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al, that: The
preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a
passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an
injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a
manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have
been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of
care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it.
with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests.
For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is
considered as being in law the agent or servant of the carrier,
as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance.
According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer
will not relieve the carrier from liability. - It is sufficient to
reiterate that the source of a common carrier's legal liability is
the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it
binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
The records show that this obligation was not met by the
respondents.
Disposition Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Decision of City Court is REINSTATED

HERNANDEZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
179 SCRA 39
CRUZ; November 6, 1989

NATURE
A petition to reverse Commission on Audits denial of relief

FACTS
- Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and
special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the
Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. He went to the main
office in Manila to encash 2 checks covering the wages of the
employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He
estimated that the money would be available by 10am and that
he would be back in Ternate by about 2pm of the same day.
However, the processing of the checks was completed only at
3pm. The petitioner decided nevertheless to encash them
because the Project employees would be waiting for their pay
the following day. And so, he collected the cash value of the
checks. The petitioner had two choices: (1) return to Cavite that
same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2)
take the money with him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan,
spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following
morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. He
took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. It was
while the vehicle was along EDSA that two persons with knives
boarded and forcibly took the money he was carrying.
Hernandez, after the initial shock, immediately followed in
desperate pursuit. He caught up with Virgilio Alvarez and
overcame him after a scuffle. Alvarez was subsequently
charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. But the hold-upper
who escaped is still at large and the stolen money he took with
him has not been recovered. - the petitioner, invoking the
foregoing facts, filed a request for relief from money
accountability under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
3
- however, the Commission on Audit, through then
Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the petitioner's
request, observing inter alia:
In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the
accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to his
negligence because had he brought the cash proceeds of the
checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate
immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office,
which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds,
the loss of said cash thru robbery could have been aborted.
- In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the
respondent COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying him relief and in holding him negligent for the loss of
the stolen money. He avers he has done only what any
reasonable man would have done and should not be held

3
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty Notice to
Auditor. When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in
transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other casualty, the officer accountable therefor or
having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General, or the provincial
auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the
other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or provincial
auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his application for relief, with
the available evidence in support thereof. An officer who fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the
settlement of his accounts.


accountable for a fortuitous event over which he had no
control. - On his decision to take the money home that
afternoon instead of returning directly to Ternate, he says that
the first course was more prudent as he saw it, if only because
his home in Marilao was much nearer than his office in Ternate;
that the likelihood of robbery during the time in question was
stronger in Ternate than in Marilao; that what happened was a
fortuitous event that could not have reasonably been foreseen,
especially on that busy highway.
- then Solicitor-General argued that Hernandez was
negligent in the safekeeping of the stolen funds. Later,
however, his successor sided with the petitioner, agreeing that
Hernandez had not committed any negligence or, assuming he
was guilty of contributory negligence, had made up for it with
his efforts to retrieve the money and his capture of one of the
robbers, who was eventually convicted.
- COA insists that the petitioner should not be relieved
from his money accountability because it was his own
negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had sought to
take not to Ternate but to Marilao. Its contention is that the
petitioner should not have encashed the checks as the hour
was already late and he knew he could not return to Ternate
before nightfall. The memo concludes that in deciding to take
the money with him to Marilao after imprudently withdrawing it
from the main office, the petitioner was assuming a risk from
which he cannot now be excused after the loss of the money as
a result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably exposed.

ISSUE
WON petitioners acts are so tainted with negligence or
recklessness as to justify the denial of the petitioner's request
for relief from accountability for the
stolen money

HELD
NO
- This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by
the said provisions, something that could not have been
reasonably foreseen although it could have happened, and did.
For most of us, all we can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of
what might happen, based on common sense and our own
experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without any mystic
ability to peer into the future. So it was with the petitioner.
- It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the
Court feels he should not be blamed for that. The decision he
made seemed logical at that time and was one that could be
expected of a reasonable and prudent person.
Disposition The petitioner is entitled to be relieved from
accountability for the money forcibly taken from him.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION V
CHATTO
210 SCRA 18
DAVIDE JR; June 16, 1992

NATURE
Petition for Review

FACTS
- In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 Gloria E. Chatto,
and her 15-year old daughter, Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see
the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by
defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought
balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats
considering the number of people patronizing the movie. Hardly
ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its
balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and
pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to
crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get
out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where
they were confined and treated for one (1) day.
- The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital.
Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5
to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11.
Per Medico Legal Certificate (Exh, "C") issued by Dr. Ernesto
G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered the following
injuries:
- Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force
majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any
structural or construction defect.

ISSUES
1. WON Jesus Lim Ongs investigation maybe given weight in
the trial
2. WON the collapse was due to force majeure

HELD
1. NO
- there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial
civil and structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the
theater's ceiling, Jesus Lim Ong is not an engineer, He is a
graduate of architecture from the St. Louie University in Baguio
City. It does not appear he has passed the government
examination for architects. In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong
about the cause of the collapse of the ceiling of their theater
cannot be equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that
proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence.
2. NO
- Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling of the
theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded
on facts because its own witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted
that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed."
Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove
that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could
not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could not
offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. Petitioner
could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed
it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why
Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he
did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the
respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an
engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the
government's examination. Verily, post-incident investigation
cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings.
What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by
the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction
defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding.
The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the
accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes
denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or
at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could
have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due
diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.
But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the
accident. His answers to the leading questions on inspection
disclosed neither the exact dates of said. inspection nor the
nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and
plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer
and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were
issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the
construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that
no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at
all.
- It is settled that - The owner or proprietor of a place
of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises,
appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for
which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other
exception or qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable
means. - This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that -
Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement
is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and
exclusively under the control and management of the
events would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an
inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.
Disposition judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the
instant petition with costs against petitioner.

SERVANDO V PHILIPPINE STEAM
NAVIGATION CO
117 SCRA 832
ESCOLIN; 1982

NATURE
This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals, seeks to
set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 7354 and 7428, declaring

appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for
the loss of the appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which
gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental.

FACTS
- On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo
Servando loaded on board the appellant's vessel for carriage
from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental several cargoes
(cavans of rice, colored papers, toys etc) as evidenced by the
corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. Upon
arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November
18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good
order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At about
2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was
razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees'
cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico was able to
take delivery of 907 cavans of rice

Appellees' claims for the
value of said goods were rejected by the appellant. - On the
bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a
decision, ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. The
court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to
the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery
contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the
warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of
the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the
appellant.
Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following:
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or
damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or
damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be
responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure,
dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public
enemies; . . . fire . ...

ISSUE
WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the
shipowner in this
case

HELD
YES
Ratio The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so
long as the stipulation is not contrary to law, morals, public
policy. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of
caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid.
Reasoning
- We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there
is nothing therein that is contrary to law, morals or public policy.
- Appellees would contend that the above stipulation
does not bind them because it was printed in fine letters on the
back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the same.
This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in
Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979,
3

where the Court held that while it may be true that petitioner
had not signed the plane ticket , he is nevertheless bound by
the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held to be a
part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the
passenger regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent
to the regulation'. It is what is known as a contract of 'adhesion',
in regards which it has been said that contracts of adhesion
wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on
the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts
not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is
in reality free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his
consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462,
citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31,
1951, p. 49). - Besides, the agreement contained in the above
quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of
law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code
4
Thus, where
fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and
proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability
for nonperformance. The Partidas, the antecedent of Article
1174 of the Civil Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that
takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire,
shipwreck, violence of robbers.'
- In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the
Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola
5
says: "In a legal sense and,
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso fortuito'
presents the following essential characteristics: (1) the cause of
the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of
the human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it
must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such
as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor." In the case at bar, the burning of the customs
warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened
independently of the will of the appellant. The latter could not
have foreseen the event.
- There is nothing in the record to show that appellant
carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance of its obligation. It
appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the
arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be
withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico
had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of
the warehouse. Nor can the appellant or its employees be
charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in the
Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the
appellees was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and
consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained
by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to
the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the
same. Disposition judgment appealed from is hereby set
aside.

4
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption
of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen,
or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

SEPARATE OPINION

AQUINO [concur]
- I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the
extraordinary liability of the common carrier continues to be
operative even during the time the goods are stored in the
warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the
consignee has been advised of the arrival of the goods and has
had reasonable opportunity thereafter to remove them or
otherwise dispose of them".
- From the time the goods in question were deposited
in the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in the morning of their
arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the same day, when
the warehouse was burned, Amparo C. Servando and Clara Uy
Bico, the consignees, had reasonable opportunity to remove
the goods. Clara had removed more than one-half of the rice
consigned to her. Moreover, the shipping company had no
more control and responsibility over the goods after they were
deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and
stevedoring operator. No amount of extraordinary diligence on
the part of the carrier could have prevented the loss of the
goods by fire which was of accidental origin.

NATIONAL POWER CORP V CA (RAYO ET AL)
DAVIDE JR; May 21, 1993

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court

FACTS
- When the water level in the Angat dam went beyond
the allowable limit at the height of typhoon Kading NPC opened
three of the dams spillways to release the excess water in the
dam. This however caused the inundation of the banks of the
Angat river which caused persons and animals to drown and
properties to be washed away.
- The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent
release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the
Angst Dam (Hydroelectric Plant).
Plaintiffs claim:
- NPC operated and maintained a multi-purpose
hydroelectric plant in the Angat River
- despite the defendants' knowledge of the impending
entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence
in monitoring the water level at the dam
- when the said water level went beyond the maximum
allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants
suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the
dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water
which inundated the banks of the Angat River causing the
death of members of the household of the plaintiffs, together
with their animals Respondents comments:

- NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in
the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant
- NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the
selection of its employees
- written notices were sent to the different
municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about
the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset
of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary
Precautions
- the water released during the typhoon was needed to
prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to
people and property - in spite of the precautions undertaken
and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or
control the flood that resulted
- the damages incurred by the private respondents
were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in
the nature and character of damnum absque injuria.
ISSUES
1. WON NPC was guilty of negligence
2. WON (applying the ruling of NAkpil & Sons v. CA)
NPC is liable given that the inundation was caused by force
majeure

HELD
1. YES
- A similar case entitled National Power Corporation, et al. vs,
Court of Appeals, et al.," involving the very same incident
subject of the instant petition. The court there declared that the
proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the
plaintiffs therein--who were similarly situated as the private
respondents herein-was the negligence of the petitioners, - on
the basis of its meticulous analysis and evaluation of the
evidence a dduced by the parties in the cases subject of CA-
G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public respondent found as
conclusively established that indeed, the petitioners were guilty
of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and
negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam,"
and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the
magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
defendants-appellees headlessness, slovenliness, and
carelessness."and that the 24 October 1978 'early warning
notice" supposedly sent to the affected municipalities, the same
notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.
2. YES
- given that NPC is guilty of negligence. Juan F. Nakipil
& Sons vs. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the
concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is
concerned.
- In the Nakpil case it was held that "To exempt the
obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a
breach of an obligation due to an 'act of God,' the following
must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must
be independent of the will of the debtor, (b) the event must be
either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free
from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an
act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence,
delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of
the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape
liability.
- The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively
by the violence of nature and all human agencies are, to be
excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be
considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation
of man whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it
were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
(1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175). Disposition Petition
dismissed.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA
PURISIMA; July 10, 1998

NATURE
Petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision
promulgated on July 31, 1996, and Resolution dated
September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in Juanita de
Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc.,
which reduced the moral damages awarded below from
P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. The Resolution under attack
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

FACTS
- Private respondents are owners of a house at 326
College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey
school building along the same College Road. On October 11,
1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon
Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the
roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown
away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of
private respondents house. After the typhoon had passed, an
ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by
a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr.
Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latters Report
i[5]

dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
5. One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous
event is the formation of the buildings in the area and the
general direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is
an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus,
with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like
structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the
heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are
portions of the roofing, those located on both ends of the
building, which remained intact after the storm.
6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the
dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper
anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2
diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams
which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to
the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not
even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not
anchored at all to the roof beams.
- It then recommended that to avoid any further loss
and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the
vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be declared
as a structural hazard.
- In their Complaint
ii[6]
before the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, Branch 117, for damages based on culpa
aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the damage to their
house rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay
temporarily in others houses. And so they sought to recover
from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual damages,
P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary
damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorneys fees; plus
costs.
- In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school
building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other
calamities in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof
giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility to
see to it that said school building, which houses school
children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-top
condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of
God and therefore beyond human control such that petitioner
cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby,
absent any negligence on its part. - The Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals gave credence to the ocular inspection made
by the city engineer. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUES
WON the damage on the roof of the building of private
respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of
the school buildings roof ripped off by the strong winds of
typhoon Saling, was, within legal contemplation, due
to fortuitous event
HELD
YES
- Petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages
suffered by the private respondents. This conclusion finds
support in Article 1174 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
- The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is
found in the Partidas which defines it as an event which takes
place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
iii[9]

Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event or act of God
which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. Civilist Arturo M.
Tolentino adds that [f]ortuitous events may be produced by
two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes,
storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man,
such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental
prohibitions, robbery, etc.
iv


- In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person
from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may
have been occasioned.. An act of God cannot be invoked for
the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross
negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse
consequences. When a persons negligence concurs with an
act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such
person is not exempt from liability by showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result
of the participation of man whether it be from active
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence
is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to
acts of God.
- After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence
on record, this Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the
general rule that factual findings by the trial court, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and
conclusive upon this Court. After a careful scrutiny of the
records and the pleadings submitted by the parties, we find
exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts
misappreciated the evidence proffered.
- There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a
fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen
but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or
care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any
adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have
been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In
other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must
not be guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly
understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates
undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand,
v[17]
or the omission to do
something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by
affairs, would do. From these premises, we proceed to
determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if it were
not, the damage caused to private respondents house could
have been avoided?
- At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person
claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden
of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his
injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence,
vi[19]
not
merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner,
merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team
which made an ocular inspection of petitioners school building
after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is
one by means of actual sight or viewing.
vii[20]
What is visual to
the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause
behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees
a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a
third person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or
caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause
and effect must be clearly shown.
- In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the
real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioners school building.
Private respondents did not even show that the plans,
specifications and design of said school building were deficient
and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation
from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they
conclusively establish that the construction of such building was
basically flawed.
- Moreover, the city building official, who has been in
the city government service since 1974, admitted in open court
that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure
has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of
the case at bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons
are common occurrences in this country. If subject school
buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses,
obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several
typhoons even stronger than Saling. - In light of the
foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain
the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that
petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding
the construction and maintenance of its school building in
question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause
of the damage suffered by private respondents house.

AFIALDA V HISOLE
85 Phil 67
REYES; November 29, 1949

NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI Iloilo

FACTS
- This is an action for damages arising from injury
caused by an animal. Loreto Afialda was the caretaker of the
carabaos of spouses Hisole. While tending the animals, he was
gored by one of them and later died as consequence of his
injuries. The action was filed by the sister of Loreto, and
contended that the mishap was due neither to Loretos own
fault nor to force majeure.
- She uses Art.1905, CC (now Art.2183
5
) as ground for
the liability:
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such
animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case the damage should
arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who
may have suffered it. - Spouses moved for dismissal for lack of
cause of action, which the CFI granted. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE

5
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost.
This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is
caused to its
caretaker (as opposed to a stranger)

HELD
1. NO
Ratio It was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including
himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he
had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
Reasoning
- The lower court took the view that under the
abovequoted provision of the CC, the owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for
damage caused to the caretaker of the animal the owner would
be liable of fault under article 1902 only if he had been
negligent or at the same code.
- Claiming that the lower court was in error, plaintiff
contends that art. 1905 does not distinguish between damage
caused to a stranger and damage caused to the caretaker and
makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or
at fault.
- The distinction (between stranger and caretaker) is
important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the
animal as the person liable for any damages it may cause
and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has
the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in
a position to prevent it from causing damage.
- In the present case, the animal was in the custody
and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his
work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try
to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he
had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
- On the other hand, if action is to be based on Art.
1902, it is essential that there be fault or negligence on the part
of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the
damage. But the complaint contains no allegation on those
points.
- In a decision of the Spanish SC, cited by Manresa,
the death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his
master had asked him to take to his establishment was by said
tribunal declared to be a veritable accident of labor which
should come under the labor laws rather than under article
1905, CC. The present action, however, is not brought under
labor laws in effect, but under Art.1905.
Disposition Judgment AFFIRMED.

ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY V CA
(LUIS ET AL)
179 SCRA 5

PARAS; November 6, 1989

FACTS
- 5- 6AM June 29, 1967 - strong typhoon "Gening" in
Ilocos Norte brought floods and heavy rain. Isabel Lao Juan,
(Nana Belen) went to her store, Five Sisters Emporium, to look
after the merchandise to see if they were damaged. Wading in
waist-deep flood, Juan suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly
sank into the water. Her companions, two girls (sales girlls)
attempted to help, but were afraid because they saw an electric
wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in
the water. Yabes, the son-in law, upon hearing the electrocution
of his mother-in-law, passed by the City Hall of Laoag to
request the police to ask Ilocos Norte Electric Company or
INELCO to cut off the electric current. The body was recovered
about two meters from an electric post.
- 4AM June 29, 1967- Engineer Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of NPC at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed
certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. - 6-6:30AM
June 29, 1967- he set out of the Laoag NPC Compound on an
inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric
lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. When he went
to INELCO office, he could not see any INELCO lineman.
- Engr. Juan attempted to resuscitate Nana Belen but
his efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left
palm of the deceased, there was a hollow wound. In the
afternoon, the dangling wire was no longer there. - Dr. Castro
examined the body and noted that the skin was grayish or
cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On the left
palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" or a first
degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was
a burned wound. The cause of' death was ,'circulatory shock
electrocution"
- In defense and exculpation, INELCO presented the
testimonies of its officers and employees, which sought to
prove that (1) on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric
service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did
not suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life
and property. (2) The service lines and devices had been
newly-installed prior to the date in question. (3) Also, safety
devices were installed to prevent and avoid injuries to persons
and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as
floods, typhoons, fire and others. (4) 12 linesmen are charged
with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up of the areas
respectively assigned to them. (5) They also presented own
medical expert and said that cyanosis could not have been the
noted 3 hours after the death because it is only manifest in live
persons. (6) Lastly, the deceased could have died simply either
by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable
only to herself and not to INELCO because of the installation of
a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to
the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the
latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. The switch
must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's
electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early
morning of June 29, 1967
- CFI: awarded P25,000 moral damages; P45,000
attys fees
- CA: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for
the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses);
P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in accordance
with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA
511) with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the
deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's
fees

ISSUE
WON the legal principle of "assumption of risk" bars private
respondents from
collecting damages from INELCO

HELD
NO
Ratio The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by
petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative
to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the
deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the
subsiding typhoon. As testified by the salesgirls, the deceased
went to the Five Star Emporium "to see to it that the goods
were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising
her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing
upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the
risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a
person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he
voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril, or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as
the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced
with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time
the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a
right to be without regard to INELCOs consent as she was on
her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private
respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by INELCOs
negligence
Reasoning
- INELCO can be exonerated from liability since
typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that
typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality
which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. -
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag
City on the night of June 28 until the early hours of June 29,
1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to
be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident
that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that
defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that
there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor
even manning its office.
- INELCO was negligent in seeing that no harm is
done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of
electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where
persons have a right to be" The negligence of petitioner having
been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by
arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous
event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant
is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission" Disposition CA decision,
except for the slight modification that actual damages be
increased to P48,229.45, is AFFIRMED.

RAMOS V PEPSI COLA
19 SCRA 289
1967

NATURE
Appeal from a CA decision

FACTS
- The facts with regard the accident that Andres
Bonifacio caused is not in the case. The Court limited its ruling
on the decision of the CA to absolve defendant Pepsi Cola from
liability under Article 2180
6
of the Civil Code. There was,
however, a finding that Bonifacio was in fact negligent.
- The petiton for appeal questioned the testimony of
one Anasco with regard the process and procedures followed
by Pepsi in the hiring and supervision of its drivers. The SC
ruled that the issue brought before it with regard the credibility
of Anasco is one of fact and not of law. It went on to stay that
the CA is a better judge of the facts.

ISSUE
WON Pepsi Cola is liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability

HELD
NO
- The Court ruled that based on the evidence and
testimonies presented during the trial, Pepsi Cola exercised the
due diligence of a good father in the hiring and supervision of
its drivers. This being the case, the Company is relieved of any
responsibility from the accident.
Reasoning
- In its ruling, the court citing its ruling on Bahia as
follows:
From this article (2180) two things are apparent:
(1) that when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arise a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the employer or
master either n the selection of the servant or employee, or
in the supervision over him after the selection, or both, and

(2) that they presumption is juris tantum ( so much or so
little of law) and not juris et de jure (of law and from law), and
consequently may be rebutted .
- It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.

6
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible,

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.

The responsibility treated of this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
- It was shown in this case that Pesi Cola did not merely satisfy
itself that Bonifacio possessed a drivers license. A background
check was done and he was required to submit various
clearances, previous experience, and medical records. He was
also made to undergo both theoretical and practical driving
tests prior to being hired as driver. In terms of the aspect of
supervision, the petitioners raised no questions. Given this, the
proof called for under Article 2180 to show diligence of a good
father of a family has been met.
Disposition Decision of the CA is affirmed.

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP V CA
(CUSTODIA)
223 SCRA 521
REGALADO; June 21, 1993

FACTS
- At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28,
1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying
passenger a public utility jeepney, then driven by defendant
Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino
Lamayo, bound for her work, where she then worked as a
machine operator earning P16.25 a day.
- While the jeepney was travelling at a fast clip along
DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, another fast moving vehicle, a
Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) bus driven by defendant
Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road,
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan.
- As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP
Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and
slacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn
approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between
them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side
portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-
appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the
passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling
onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries.
- She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where
she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat,
she was confined for twentyfour (24) days, and as a
consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half
months (31/2).
- A complaint for damages was filed by herein private
respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her
parents, against all of therein named defendants following their
refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result
of the collision.
- Said defendants denied all the material allegations in
the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as
being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner MMTC, a
government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in
the court a quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo,
contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and
counterclaim

that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and
careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the
passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering
that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it
was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer
of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees and should thus be
held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus
through the fault and negligence of its employees. - Defendant
Victorino Lamayo alleged that the damages suffered by therein
plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver,
Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter's negligence was the
sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed
to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

ISSUES
1. WON the oral testimonies of witnesses even without
the presentation documentary evidence, prove that driver
Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance
requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and
examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that said
positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening
of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the
field
2. WON petitioner exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees

HELD
1. While there is no rule which requires that testimonial
evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary
evidence, or even subject evidence for that matter, inasmuch
as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we
cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that
there was observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.
- Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
familias in the selection and supervision of employees through
oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same
with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might
obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. - It is
procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own
affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law.
The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the
affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial
such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable
judgment. It is entirely within each of the parties discretion,
consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance
and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby, to
present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the
manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to
prove its or his position, provided only that the same shall
measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In
making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and
most complete evidence be formally entered.
- Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a
family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof
which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been
clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is
enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption
of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its
control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner
MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and
indifference.
2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by
petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a
good father of a family, which for an employer doctrinally
translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees but which mandate, to use an
oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in
the observance.
- Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's
procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its
employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros
Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its
transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly
testified for MMTC.
- Their statements strike us as both presumptuous and
in the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities and
shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity.
- The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of
Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil
Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are
present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose
act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and
effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by plaintiff. It is to be noted that petitioner
was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under
Article 2180.
- Article 2180 applicable only where there is an
employer-employee relationship, although it is not necessary
that the employer be engaged in business or industry.
Employer is liable for torts committed by his employees within
the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to
establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task

when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that
the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose
the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. The diligence of a good father of a family required
to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article
2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees in order to protect the public.

- With the allegation and subsequent proof of
negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-
employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in
this instance, the case in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict
under Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to
his own negligence while performing his own duties, there
arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the
diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such
legal presumption of negligence in the selection and
supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible
for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship of
pater familias or on the employer's own negligence.
- Due diligence in the supervision of employees
includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom
the employer has relations through his or its employees and the
imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees
in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. - In order that the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily
invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies
on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the
actual supervision of their work.
- Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the
exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial court's
award, without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an
item of damages just because of delay in the determination
thereof, especially since private respondent did not specifically
pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code
provides that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages
may be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a
matter of right.

KRAMER VS CA (TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING
LINES)
178 SCRA 289
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989

FACTS
- The F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto
Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and
Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-
island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned byTrans-Asia
Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B
Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
- The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B
Marjolea and its fish catch was due to the negligence of the
employees of Trans-Asia. The Kramers instituted a Complaint
for damages against the private respondent before Branch 117
of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Trans-Asia filed a
motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for
damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is
four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed
their Complaint within four years from the date when their
cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the
maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the
Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-
year prescriptive period.
Petitioners claim:
- that maritime collisions have peculiarities and
characteristics which only persons with special skill, training
and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry
can properly analyze and resolve
- that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled
by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action
accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision
ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia
Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive
period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed
from the said date.

ISSUE
WON a Complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners
against the
private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by
presciption

HELD
YES
- Under A1146 CC, an action based upon a quasi-
delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive
period begins from the day the quasidelict is committed. In
Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action
being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive
period must be counted from the day of the collision.
- In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, this Court held: The right of action accrues
when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3
elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an
obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c)
an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or
takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has
arisen. From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive
period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes
place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the
cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action for
damages arising from the collision of 2 vessels the 4 year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination
by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that
the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other
party before he can file an action for damages. Immediately
after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the
courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners,
agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondent
court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed.
The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for
damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985, was beyond
the 4 year prescriptive period. Disposition petition is
dismissed.

ALLIED BANKING V CA (YUJUICO)
178 SCRA 526
GANCAYCO; October 13, 1989

NATURE
Petition seeking the reversal of the decision of CA in "Joselito
Z. Yujuico vs. Hon. Domingo D. Panis, RTC Judge of Manila
and Allied Banking Corp.,"1 and the resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision.

FACTS
- Mar 25, 1977 - Respondent Yujuico, a ranking officer
in General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) and a
member of the family owning control of the said bank, obtained
a loan from the said institution in the amount of 500K. Private
respondent issued a promissory note in favor of GENBANK.
- March 25, 1977 the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing
business in the Phil. It was followed by another resolution
ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. - In the Memorandum of
Agreement between Allied Banking Corp (Allied) and Amulfo
Aurellano as liquidator of GENBANK, Allied acquired all the
assets and assumed the liabilityies of GENBANK, including the
receivable due from Yujuico.
- Yujuico failed to comply with his obligation prompting
Allied to file a complaint for the collection of a sum of money
before the CFI Manila (now RTC).
- First case: CA affirmed RTC decision in a special
proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made
in bad faith. This decision declared as null and void the
liquidation of GENBANK. It was then that Yujuico filed the third
party complaint to transfer liability for the default imputed
against him by the petitioner to the proposed third-party
6

6
A third-party complaint is a procedural device whereby a "third-party" who is
neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be
brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as third-party

defendants because of their tortious acts which prevented him
from performing his obligations. - Second and current
proceeding (1987) Yujuico filed a motion to admit
Ammended/Supplemental Answer and a Third Party Complaint
to impead the Central Bank and Aurellano as third-party
defendants. The complaint alleged that by reason of the
tortuous interference by the CB with the affairs of GENBANK,
he was prevented from performing his obligation such that he
should not be held liable thereon. RTC Judge Mintu denied the
third-party complaint but admitted the amended/supplemental
answer. The case was re-raffled where presiding Judge Panis
reiterated the order made by Judge Mintu. Both parties filed for
motions of partial reconsideration, which were both denied.
- CA, in a petition for certiorari questioning the denied
motions, rendered a decision nullifying the RTC order. The RTC
judge was found to be in grave abuse of discretion and was
ordered to admit the third-party complaint. - Petitioner claims
that the cause of action alleged in the third-party complaint has
already prescribed. Being founded on what was termed as
"tortious interference," petitioner asserts that under the CC on
quasi-delict" the action against third-party defendants should
have been filed within four (4) years from the date the cause of
action accrued. On the theory that the cause of action accrued
on March 25, 1977, the date when the Monetary Board ordered
GENBANK to desist from doing business in the Philippines,
petitioner maintains that the claim should have been filed at the
latest on March 25, 1981. On the other hand, private
respondent relies on the "Doctrine of Relations" or "Relations
Back Doctrine" to support his claim that the cause of action as
against the proposed third-party defendant accrued only on
December 12,1986 when the decision in CA (first case)became
final and executory. It is contended that while the third party
complaint was filed only on June 17,1987, it must be deemed to
have been instituted on February 7, 1979 when the complaint in
the case was filed.

ISSUE
1. WON there was ground to admit the third-party complaint
2. WON the cause of action under the third-party complaint
prescribed

HELD
1. YES
- The first instance is allowable and should be allowed
if it will help in clarifying in a single proceeding the multifarious
issues involved arising from a single transaction.
- The judgment of the CA in its first decision is the
substantive basis of private respondent's proposed third-party
complaint. There is merit in private respondent's position that if
held liable on the promissory note, they are seeking, by means
of the third-party complaint, to transfer unto the third-party
defendants liability on the note by reason of the illegal

plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the plaintiffs claim. The third
party complaint is independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiffs
complaint.

liquidation of GENBANK which was the basis for the
assignment of the promissory note. If there was any confusion
at all on the ground/s alleged in the third-party complaint, it was
the claim of third-party plaintiff for other damages in addition to
any amount which he may be called upon to pay under the
original complaint. While these allegations in the proposed
third-party complaint may cause delay in the disposition of the
main suit, it cannot be outrightly asserted that it would not serve
any purpose.
- The tests to determine whether the claim for
indemnity in a third-party claim is "in respect of plaintiff 's claim"
are: (a) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which
the plaintiff's claim is based, or whether the third-party's claim,
although arising out of another or different contract or
transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim; (b) whether
the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the
original defendant, although the third-party defendant's liability
arises out of another transaction; or (c) whether the third-party
defendant may assert any defense which the third-party plaintiff
has, or may have against plaintiffs claim. (Capayas v CFI
Albay) The claim of third-party plaintiff, private respondent
herein, can be accommodated under tests (a) and (b)
abovementioned.
2. YES
- The action for damages instituted by private
respondent arising from the quasidelict or alleged "tortious
interference" should be filed within four 4 years from the day the
cause of action accrued.
- It is from the date of the act or omission violative of
the right of a party when the cause of action arises and it is
from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned.
(Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Admistration) -
While the third party complaint in this case may be admitted as
above discussed, since the cause of action accrued on March
25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GENBANK to
desist from doing business in the Philippines while the third
party complaint was filed only on June 17, 1987, consequently,
the action has prescribed. The third party complaint should not
be admitted.
Disposition petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA denying
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner are hereby
reversed and set aside and declared null and void, and another
judgment is hereby rendered sustaining
the orders of the RTC denying the admission of the third party
complaint

CAUSATION

BATACLAN V MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957

FACTS
- Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after midnight. While
the bus was running very fast on a highway, one of the front
tires burst. The bus fell into a canal and turned turtle. Four
passengers could not get out, including Bataclan. It appeared
that gasoline began to leak from the overturned bus. Ten men
came to help. One of them carried a torch and when he
approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the four
passengers trapped inside.
- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate
cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the
bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself
and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the
time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered
physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so
damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical
injuries suffered by him.

ISSUES
What is the proximate cause of death of the four passengers?

HELD
The proximate cause of death is the overturning of the bus.
- see definition of proximate cause under A1
- It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus
overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him
physical injuries, "If through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by
lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it
on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still
contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and
not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case and
under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
hesitate to hold that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that
when the vehicle turned not only on 'Its side but completely on
its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark
(about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light
with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a
torch, the most handy and available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence
of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its
passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor.
According to the witnesses, the driver and the conductor were
on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the
overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from

the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and detected -even from a
distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. -(I guess this
case says, if not for the overturning of the bus then the leak
and the fire wouldnt have happened)

FERNANDO V CA (City of Davao)
208 SCRA 714
MEDIALDEA; May 8, 1992

NATURE

FACTS
- Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property for
the re-emptying of the septic tank of Agdao. Invitations to bid
for cleaning out the tanks were issued, which was won by
Bascon. However, before the date they were to work, one of the
bidders, Bertulano, and four other companions including an
Alberto Fernando were found dead inside the septic tank. The
City Engineers office, upon investigation, found that the men
entered without clearance or consent of the market master.
They apparently did the re-emptying as the tank was nearly
empty. The autopsy showed that the victims died of asphyxia
caused by lack of oxygen supply in the body. Their lungs had
burst due to their intake of toxic sulfide gas produced from the
waste matter in said tank.
*Di nakalagay sa case, pero mukhang kinasuhan ni Sofia
Fernando yung
Davao City for negligence in a previous case dahil namatay
yung asawa nya
- Upon dismissal of the case by the TC, petitioners
appealed to then IAC (now CA) which set aside the judgment
and rendered a new one, granting the families of the deceased
men P30k each in compensatory damages, P20k each as
moral damages and P10k for attorneys fees.
- Both parties filed their separate MFRs; the CA
rendered an amended decision granting Davao Citys MFR,
dismissing the case. Hence this petition.

ISSUES
1. WON Davao City is guilty of negligence
2. WON such negligence is the proximate cause of the deaths
of the victims

HELD
1. NO
- Although public respondent had been remiss in its
duty to re-empty the tank annually (for almost 20 years), such
negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the
market master about the need to clean said tank, it immediately
responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Public
respondent lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet
the situation. Also, public respondents failure to empty the tank
had not caused any sanitary accidents despite its proximity to
several homes and the public market as it was covered in lead
and was air-tight. In fact, the public toilet connected to it was
used several times daily all those years, and all those people
have remained unscathed which is ironically evidenced by the
petitioners witnesses. The only indication that the tank was full
was when water began to leak, and even then no reports of
casualties from gas poising emerged.
- Petitioners in fussing over the lack of ventilation in
the tanks backfired as their witnesses were no experts. Neither
did they present competent evidence to corroborate their
testimonies and rebut the city government engineer Alindadas
testimony that safety requirements for the tank had been
complied with.
- The Court also does not agree with petitioners
contention that warning signs of noxious gas should be placed
around the area of the toilets and septic tank. As defined in Art
694 of the NCC, they are not nuisances per se which would
necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public. -
Petitioners contention that the market master should have
been supervising the area of the tank is also untenable. Work
on the tank was still forthcoming since the awarding to the
winning bidder was yet to be made by the Committee on
Awardshence, there was nothing to supervise.
2. NO
- Proximate cause is defined as that cause which in
natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. To be entitled to damages, one
must prove under Art 2179 of the NCC that the defendants
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. A test for
such a relationship is given in Taylor v Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Co. which states that a distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those
acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt.
- A toxic gas leakage could only have happened by
opening the tanks cover. The accident is thus of the victims
own doingan ordinarily prudent person should be aware of
the attended risks of cleaning out the tank. This was especially
true for the victim, Bertulano, since he was an old hand to
septic services and is expected to know the hazards of the job.
The victims failure to take precautionary measures for their
safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
- When a person holds himself out as being competent
to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for
negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill required in
what he attempts to do. As the CA observed, the victims would
not have died, had they not opened the tank which they were
not authorized to open in the first place. They find it illogical that
the septic tank which had been around since the 50s would be
the proximate cause of an accident which occurred only 20
years later, especially since no other deaths or injuries related
to the tank had ever occurred.
Disposition amended decision of the CA is AFFIRMED

URBANO V IAC
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ JR; January 7, 1988

NATURE
Petition to review the decision of the then IAC

FACTS
ON oct. 23, 1980, Marcelo Javier was hacked by the Filomeno
Urbano using a bolo. As a result of which, Javier suffered a 2-
inch incised wound on his right palm.
On November 14, 1981, which was the 22nd day after the
incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw
and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence
of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus. On November 15, 1980, Javier died in the
hospital.
- In an information, Urbano was charged with the crime
of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan
City.
- The trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. The
lower courts held that Javier's death was the natural and logical
consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. He was sentenced
accordingly. - The then IAC affirmed the conviction of Urbano
on appeal. - Appellant alleges that the proximate cause of the
victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to
work without his wound being properly healed, and that he
went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of
November, 1980. He states that the proximate cause of the
death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr.
Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier
got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to
his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands
exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
ISSUE
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death
HELD
YES.
- The case involves the application of Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall
be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for
all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom."

- The record is clear that - The evidence on record
does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.
The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was
already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the
fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to
when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
- PROXIMATE CAUSE "that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
- The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms,
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period
indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or
3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
- Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as
restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered
occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are
pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity,
and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In
fact, trismus in the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is
responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As
more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity
and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms
develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority,
however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the
signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major
muscle groups affected.
- Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of
the first symptom, an interval referred to as the onset time. As
in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is
associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by
sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and
excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists.
Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense
and longer lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central
nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least
14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is
usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized
spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria
for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset
time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
(Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp.
1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
- Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to
tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation
period of the disease.
- In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano
used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23,
1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more
than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the
onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The
more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could
have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his
wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but
not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal
conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
- Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the
wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have
been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the
petitioner had nothing to do. - A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition
except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause
DISPOSITION :. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of
homicide.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. (CARBONEL)
VS. IAC
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO, MARCH 10, 1987

NATURE
Petition for review

FACTS
-About 1:30 am, Leonardo Dionisio (DIONISIO) was driving
home (he lived in Bangkal, Makati) from cocktails/dinner
meeting with his boss where he had taken a shot or two of
liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Sts. At Bangkal, Makati (not far
from his home) and was proceeding down General Lacuna
Street without headlights when he hit a dump truck owned by
Phoenix Construction Inc. (PHOENIX), which was parked on
the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (DIONISIOs
lane). The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as
to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming
traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or
rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel (CARBONEL), its
regular driver, with the permission of his employer PHOENIX, in
view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following
morning, DIONISIO claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
DIONISIO suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two
gold bridge dentures.
DIONISIOs claim: the legal and proximate cause of his injuries
was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the
dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix
PHOENIX + CARBONELs claim: the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at
the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor,
without his headlights on and without a curfew pass; if there
was negligence in the manner in which the dump truck was
parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness
constituted an intervening, efficient cause determinative of the
accident and the injuries he sustained.
TC: in favor of Dionisio, awarded damages in favor of Dionisio

IAC: in favor of Dionisio, reduced the damages awarded

ISSUES
Factual issues: (court discussed this to administer substantial
justice without remanding the case to the lower court since
both TC and IAC did not consider defenses set by petitioners)
1. WON private respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass
valid and effective for that eventful night
2. WON Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just
before the collision with the dump truck;
3. WON Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's
headlights before contact with the dump truck
4. WON Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. Substantial Issues:
5. WON the legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner
in which the dump truck was parked
a. WON the drivers negligence was merely a "passive
and static condition" and that Dionisio's negligence was an
"efficient intervening cause," and that consequently
Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of
Carbonel
b. WON the court, based on the last clear chance
doctrine, should hold Dionisio alone responsible for his
accident
6. WON Phoenix has successfully proven that they exercised
due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver 7. WON the amount of damages awarded should be
modified

HELD
FACTUAL
1. NO. none was found with Dionisio. He was not able
to produce any curfew pass during the trial. (It is important to
determine if he had a curfew pass to shed light to the 2
nd
and
3
rd
factual issues)
-Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken DIONISIO to
Makati Med testified that none was found with Dionisio.
Although Dionisio offered a certification attesting that he did
have a valid curfew pass, the certification did not specify any
serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed
curfew pass.
2. YES. Testimony of Patrolman Cuyno attesting that
people gathered at the scene of the accident told him that
Dionisios Car was MOVING FAST and that he DID NOT have
its HEADLIGTS ON.
Ratio. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not
under the official records exception to the hearsay rule but
rather as part of the res gestae. Testimonial evidence under
this exception to the hearsay rule consists of excited utterances
made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently
startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal
reflective thought processes of the observer and hence made
as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not
the result of reflective thought. -Dionisio claimed that he was
traveling at 30kph and had just crossed the intersection of
General Santos and General Lacuna Streets and had started to
accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision
took place. He also asserts that Patrolman Cuynos testimony
was hearsay and did not fall within any of the recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to
were not acquired by him through official information and had
not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
-BUT: an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly
smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a
sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than
reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be
around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was
therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have
been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight
should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it
did not, as it could not, have purported to describe
quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio was
travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
3. YES. Phoenixs theory more credible than Dionisios.
DIONISIOS CLAIM: he had his headlights on but that, at the
crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient
way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in
switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before
contact with the dump truck
PHOENIXs CLAIM: Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights
even before he reached the intersection so as not to be
detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a
resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection (less than 200m away).
4. NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE
ANYTHING.
EVIDENCE PRESENTED: Patrolman Cuyno attested that
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken to Makati
med + Dionisio admitted he had taken a shot or two
- not enough evidence to show how much liquor Dionisio had in
fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or
upon his judgment or mental alertness. "One shot or two" of
hard liquor may affect different people differently.

SUBSTANTIAL
5. YES. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump track was
a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's
negligence. Private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the
injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages
though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
a. NO. Besides, this argument had no validity under our
jurisdiction and even in the United States, the distinctions
between" cause" and "condition" have already been "almost
entirely discredited.
- the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and
static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient
cause; Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent
cause. The petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose
upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature
as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the
improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability.
FROM PROF. PROSSER AND KEETON: "Cause and condition. Many
courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the
harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated If
the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the
fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite
impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case the latter am the result of
other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be
culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the
gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as
the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited So far as it has any
validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent
safety. and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not
the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important,
but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening
cause."

"Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which
in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one
which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent
only for that reason Thus one who sets a fire may be required to foresee
that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later will spread it
beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions
to prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or
explosive material exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire
from some independent source. x x x In all of these cases there is an
intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to
produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence
consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which
the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original
risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite
generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category
will not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the
usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such
as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one
who leaves an obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee
that a vehicle or a train will run into it; x x x.
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the
foreseeable negligence of others. x x x [T]he standard of reasonable

conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against
'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of
human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who
blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the
plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when
the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into
it - - "

b. NO. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was
imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a
matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its
way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. Accordingly, it is
difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been
rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
-The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's
and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of
the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more
fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character and gravity of the
risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the
community.
ON LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE: The historical function
of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the
harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of
contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was
also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively
minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also
been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so.

6. NO. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its
track driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there
was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled
with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to
supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when
away from company premises, is an affirmative showing of
culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

7. YES. Taking into account the comparative
negligence ot DIONISIO and the petitioners, the demands
of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio. As to the other awards of
damages, sustain.
20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be home by
private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 800% needs to
be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
solidarily liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary
damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be home
exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled
to reimbursement from Carbonel.

Disposition. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent
appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of
compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral
damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of
such amount. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

PILIPINAS BANK V CA (REYES)
234 SCRA 435
PUNO; July 25, 1994

NATURE
- Petition for review of CA decision

FACTS
- FLORENCIO REYES issued two postdated checks.
These are for WINNER INDUSTRIAL CORP. in amount of
P21T due Oct.10, 1979 and for Vicente TUI in amount of
P11.4T due Oct.12.
- To cover the face value of the checks, he requested
PCIB Money Shop's manager to effect the withdrawal of P32T
from his savings account and have it deposited with his current
account with PILIPINAS BANK.
- PILIPINAS BANKS Current Account Bookkeeper
made an error in depositing the amount: he thought it was for a
certain FLORENCIO AMADOR. He, thus, posted the deposit in
the latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in
the deposit slip was REYES.
- On Oct.11, the Oct.10 check in favor of WINNER
INDUSTRIAL was presented for payment. Since the ledger of
Florencio REYES indicated that his account had only a balance
of P4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to
try it for next clearing.
- It was redeposited but was again dishonored. The
same thing happened to the Oct.12 check. The payee then
demanded a cash payment of the checks face value which
REYES did if only to save his name. - Furious, he immediately
proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of
his account. That was only when they noticed the error. RTC:
ordered petitioner to pay P200T compensatory damages,
P100T moral damages, P25T attorneys fees, as well as costs
of suit. CA: modified amount to just P50T moral damages and
P25T attorneys fees and costs of suit.

ISSUE
WON Art.2179
7
of NCC is applicable

7
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's

HELD
NO
- For it to apply, it must be established that private
respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury. Definition of Proximate Cause: "any
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained
of and without which would not have occurred and from which it
ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a
person of ordinary case that the injury complained of or some
similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence."
Reasoning The proximate cause of the injury is the negligence
of petitioner's employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit
of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had
a similar first name.
- The bank employee is deemed to have failed to
exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his
duties.
Dispositive Petition denied.

QUEZON CITY V DACARA
PANGANIBAN; JUNE 15, 2005

NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
-On February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara,
Jr., owner of 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the
said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found
at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired
by the Quezon City government. -As a result, Dacara, Jr.
allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered
extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
-Indemnification was sought from the city government, which
however, yielded negative results.
-Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in behalf of his minor son, filed a
Complaint for damages against Quezon City and Engr. Ramir
Tiamzon. -Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident
but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a
mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with
sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the
incident.
-In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by
providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to
avoid accident, and that the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.
fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latters
negligence and failure to exercise due care.
-RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, ordering the defendants to
indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand pesos as

lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.

actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages,
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and other costs of suit. -Upon
appeal, CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by
respondent.
-Hence, this Petition

ISSUES
1. WON petitioners negligence is the proximate cause
of the incident
2. WON moral damages are recoverable
3. WON exemplary damages and attorneys fees are
recoverable

HELD
1. Yes.
-Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would
not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.
-What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual
issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample
showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions.
-The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual
ascertainment that petitioners negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings
and substituting these with our own. -That the negligence of
petitioners was the proximate cause of the accident was aptly
discussed in the lower courts finding:
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident
of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the
existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the
base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have
served as an adequate warning to motorists especially during
the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to
the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were
signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be
blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented
to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary
signs were placed. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how
then could it be explained that according to the report even of
the policeman, none was found at the scene of the accident.
-The provisions of Article 2189
8
of the New Civil Code
capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to
the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the
control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant

8
. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
to comply with the statutory provision is tantamount to
negligence which renders the City government liable
-Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at
the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the
accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum
limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light traffic, as
provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Thus,
petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic
regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article
2185 of the Civil Code.
-These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any
time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they
brought up for the first time in their Motion for Reconsideration.
-It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. To
consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the
proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play,
justice, and due process.
-Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which
are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly
point to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the
damages suffered by respondents car. No adequate reason
has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
2. No.
-To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof
of the following requisites: (1) an injury--whether physical,
mental, or psychological-clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a
culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful
act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219. -Article
2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for
quasidelicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical
injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless
the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury.
-In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondents
son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries.
-It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate
courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a medical
certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to
prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus,
there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral
damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
-Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury unjustly inflicted on a person.
-Well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded
in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. The
award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite
showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and
mental sufferings.
3. Yes.
-Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right;
they can be awarded only after claimants have shown their
entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory damages.
-In the case before us, respondent sufficiently proved before
the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was the proximate
cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to actual or
compensatory damages. He has adduced adequate proof to
justify his claim for the damages caused his car. -Article 2231
of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted
with gross negligence.
-Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a
presumption that the persons at fault must have been
conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness,
and that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or
worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of
others. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for
the safety of persons or property.
-Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
-The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners
of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a
single warning device at the area under renovation.
-Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions.

Dispositive
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with the
modification that the award of moral damages is deleted.

GABETO V. ARANETA
42 Phil 252. October 17, 1921 Street

Facts:
Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata
near Plaza Gay, in the City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a
cockpit on Calle Ledesma in the same City. When the driver of
the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction
indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the
street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at
the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called
this carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to
the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta, and
that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata
as the first who had offered employment. At or about the same
time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse
from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle
might pass on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle
on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which
it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it
became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in
order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near
the curb, by one or the other it makes no difference which
and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.

While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free
from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved
forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the
carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over.
After going a few yards further the side of the carromata struck
a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the
sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and
frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full
speed up the street.
Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio
Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside
the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had
unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse
had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission
Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in
so doing received injuries from which he soon died.
This action was brought by Consolacion Gabeto, in
her own right as widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian
ad litem of the three children, Conchita Gayetano, Rosita
Gayetano, and Fermin Gayetano, for the purpose of recovering
damages incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the
said Proceso Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act
of the defendant Agaton Araneta.
Judge awarded damages to the widow to which
decision Araneta appealed.

Issue: WON the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the
middle of the street was too remote from the accident that
presently ensued to be
considered the legal or proximate cause thereof

Held: NO. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and
the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be
easily broken. it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing
the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and Julio, after
alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix
the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely
off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to
go away.

Disposition: Judgment is REVERSED.

URBANO V IAC (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES)
157 SCRA 1
GUTIERREZ; January 7, 1988

Nature : This is a petition to review the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:When Filomeno Urbano found the place where he stored
his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed he went to see what happened
and there he saw Marcelo Javier admitted that he was the one
responsible for what happened. Urbano then got angry and
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel
between them ensued. Urbano hacked Javier hitting him on the
right palm of his hand . Javier who was then unarmed ran away
from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him
again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said
bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
On November 14,1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth
General Hospital in a very serious condition. Javier had lockjaw
and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who
personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious
condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence
of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been
infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital.

Appellants claim:
-there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time
the deceased was wounded to the time of his death
-the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own
negligence in going back to work without his wound being
properly healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty
irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980
- Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he
returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus
germs.

ISSUE:
WON there was an efficient intervening cause from the time
Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death

HELD:
Yes. The medical findings lead us to a distinct possibility that
the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,
distinct and foreign to the crime.
Reasoning:
-The case involves the application of Article 4
9
of the Revised
Penal Code.
-The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound
inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered
the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with
tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not
clear from the record.
-In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we
adopted the following definition of proximate cause:

9
Art. 4. Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended x x
x." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed
by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom
"x x x A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in
Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by
plaintiffsappellants in their brief. It is as follows:
"x x x 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.'
(at pp. 185-186)
-The court looked into the nature of tetanus to determine the
cause -Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside
a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
- Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when
he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This
incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like
lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15,
1980, he died.
If,therefore,the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was
already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus
appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more
than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
-Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six
days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's
wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus
that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or
a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical
findings lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the
wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra)
As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remaquillo, et al. (99 Phil.
118). "'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would

not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is
the proximate cause. '(45 C.J. pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)

FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA)
297 SCRA 30
REGALADO; October 1, 1998

NATURE
Review on certiorari the CA decision affirming TC decision
holding FESC and
Gavino solidarily liable
FACTS
- On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under
the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far
Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of
Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock
in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila
International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto
Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to
supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino
was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA)
to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel to Berth No. 4.
- Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine
anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master
of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of
Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its
cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage
and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was
calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.
- When the vessel reached the landmark (the big
church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier,
Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was
already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the
anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the
vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were
dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected.
The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued
between the crew members. A brief conference ensued
between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino
inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing to it.
- After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take
hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was
then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching
the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not
take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before
the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the
bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing
considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage
too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report
to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports
Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident.
- The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the
Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25.
PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE
- The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage
District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section
8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order
No. 03-85:
SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a
harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or
straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and
undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or
another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign
trade shall be under compulsory pilotage.
- In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties
and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have
been specified by the same regulation:
SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On
compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the
service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage
caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his
negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if
the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities
provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to
prevent or minimize damage.
The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel
even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or
overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board.
In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and
property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the
Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the
registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice
to recourse against said Master
Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its
pilots shall be determined by competent authority in
appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and
circumstances of each particular case.
SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots'
Association.
The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be
as follows: xxx xxx xxx
f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a
vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof
until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided,
however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment
the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order.
- Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty
years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the
responsibilities of pilots:
Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the
direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control
thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided,
That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master
neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. xxx
xxx xxx
Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or
anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so
by the master of such vessels.

ISSUE
WON both the pilot and the master were negligent

HELD
YES.
- The SC started by saying that in a collision between
a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption
of fault against the moving object (based on common sense
and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot
and the master was negligent.
PILOT
- A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified,
and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in
certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the
seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the
pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties
with extraordinary care because the safety of people and
property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake.
- Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court
found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not
holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow.
As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such
happenings.
MASTER
- In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily
becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however may
intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger
to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the
pilot is drunk.
- Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never
sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold and
they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the
pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the
pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything
that the pilot was seeing and hearing.
- The masters negligence translates to
unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence
on the part of FESC.
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
- As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a
person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is
sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more
efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of
the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to
produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he
is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the
negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as
great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the
person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent

tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his
negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the
other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing
an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without
which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be
attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured
person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a
proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the
negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for
the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole
cause of the injury.
- There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors
whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate
cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and
either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for
the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and
FESC are solidarily liable.
SABIDO AND LAGUNDA V CUSTODIO, ET AL
17 SCRA 1088
CONCEPCION; August 31, 1966

NATURE
Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals

FACTS
In Barrio Halang, , two trucks, one driven by Mudales and
belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other
driven by Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido, going in
opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Custodia,
LTB bus passenger who was riding on the running board as
truck was full of passengers, was sideswiped by the truck
driven by Lagunda. As a result, Custodio was injured and died.
To avoid any liability, Lagunda and Sabido throw all the blame
on Mudales. However, Makabuhay, widoy of Custodio, testified
that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB Bus.
And Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if
he had been sufficiently careful and cautious because the two
trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the
right side of the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting
Custodio.

The sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow passengers
took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the morning of
June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load to passengers
was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and sliding
downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was climbing up
with no cargoes or passengers on board but for three helpers,
owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-309, Mendoza).
LTB passengers had testified to the effect that the 6 x 6 cargo
truck was running at a fast rate of speed. Driver Lagunda
admitted that three passengers rode on the running board of
the bus when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7 meters
from the bus. Despite the presence of a shallow canal on the
right side of the road which he could pass over with ease,
Lagunda did not avert the accident simply because to use his
own language the canal "is not a passage of trucks.

Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna
and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas
Bus Co. hereinafter referred to as the carrier and its driver
Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had violated the
contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners
Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of
which all of them were held solidarity liable.

ISSUES
1. WON petitioners were guilty of negligence
2. WON petitioners should be held solidarily liable with the
carrier and its
driver

HELD
1. YES. The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed
of the truck and its location at the time of the accident are in the
nature of findings of fact, which we cannot disturb in a petition
for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any rate, the
correctness of said findings is borne out by the very testimony
of petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers
riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still
five or seven meters away from the truck driven by him. Indeed,
the distance between the two vehicles was such that he could
have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were not
running at a great speed.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is
independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck
driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate
cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact, the negligence
of the first two would not have produced this result without the
negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners'
negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on
the running board of the carrier's bus sometime before
petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in
this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.

2. YES. Where the carrier bus and its driver were
clearly guilty of contributory negligence for having allowed a
passenger to ride on the running board of the bus, and where
the driver of the other vehicle was also guilty of contributory
negligence, because that vehicle was running at a considerable
speed despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve,
and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, it was
driven on its middle portion thereof and so near the passenger
bus coming from the opposite as to sideswipe a passenger on
its running board, the owners of the two vehicles are liable
solidarily for the death of the passenger, although the liability of
one arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the other
springs from a quasidelict. Where the concurrent or successive
negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although
acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the
direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person,
and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each
contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole
injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the
entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the
acts of the other tort-feasor.

Dispositive Judgment affirmed.

VDA. DE BATACLAN VS. MEDINA
102 PHIL 181
MONTEMAYOR; October 22, 1957

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Cavite

FACTS
- Shortly after midnight, a bus of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town
of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its
regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about 18
passengers, including the driver and conductor.
- At about 2am, while the bus was running within the
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the
vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the
right side of the road and turned turtle.
- the three passengers Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan
and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could
not get out of the overturned bus.
- Some of the passengers, after they had clambered
up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the bus.
Calls or shouts for help were made to the houses in the
neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on
one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost
immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming
the bus, including the 4 passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and
escape from the gasoline tank.
- That same day, the charred bodies of the four
deemed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Bataclan. His widow, Salud Villanueva brought
the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory,

moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P87,150.
- the CFI awarded P1,000 plus P600 as attorney's fee,
plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by
Bataclan

ISSUES
1. WON there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon, thus making
him liable.
2. WON the the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire
that burned the bus.

HELD
1. NO.
Ratio There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow
out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the
passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the
testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from
the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal
where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance
of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must
have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of
the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell
into the canal and turned turtle.
Reasoning Our new Civil Code amply provides for the
responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their
goods.
11

2. YES
Ratio Tthe proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.
Reasoning under the circumstances obtaining in the case, we
do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the
leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was
in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
Neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus.
- According to the evidence, one of the passengers who,
because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized, and
while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano
Medina, and in the course of his visit, she overheard him
speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to
have the tires of the bus changed immediately because they
were already old, and that as a matter of fact, he had been
telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did
not follow his instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that
the driver had not been diligent and had not taken the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers

11
ART. 1733
ART. 1755
ART. 1759
ART. 1763
- The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of
the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but
rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-
passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire
started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical
injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered
by him. - In the public interest the prosecution of said erring
driver should be pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice,
but for the promotion of the safety of passengers on public
utility buses.
Note: This case was under the heading but for. I dont
know if the italicized phrases are pertinent, but these were
the only ones that contained but for.

DISPOSITION
In view of the foregoing, with the modification that
the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased to P6,000 and P800, for the death of
Bataclan and for the attorney's fees, respectively.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC v. IAC &
CASIANO
PASCUA, ET AL.,
189 SCRA 158
MEDIALDEA/August 30, 1990

NATURE: CERTIORARI
FACTS:
- This case is for recovery of damages for the 3
jeepney passengers who died as a result of the collision
between the Phil. Rabbits bus driven by Tomas delos Reyes
and the jeepney driven by Tranquilino Manalo.
- Other passengers of the jeepney sustained physical
injuries. - It was said that upon reaching a certain barrio, the
jeepneys right rear wheel detached which caused it to run in an
unbalanced position. -Manalo stepped on the brake, as a result
of which, the jeepney which was then running on the eastern
lane (its right of way) made a U-turn, invading and eventually
stopping on the western lane of the road in such a manner that
the jeepney's front faced the south (from where it came) and its
rear faced the north (towards where it was going).
-The jeepney practically occupied and blocked the greater
portion of the western lane, which is the right of way of vehicles
coming from the north, among which was Bus No. 753 of
Rabbit
- Almost at the time when the jeepney made a sudden
U-turn and encroached on the western lane of the highway, or
after stopping for a couple of minutes, the bus bumped from
behind the right rear portion of the jeepney which resulted in the
said deaths and injuries.
- At the time and in the vicinity of the accident, there
were no vehicles following the jeepney, neither were there
oncoming vehicles except the bus.
The weather condition of that day was fair.
- A criminal complaint against the two drivers for
Multiple Homicide. - Manalo was eventually convicted and was
imprisoned. The case against delos Reyes was dismissed for
lack of sufficient evidence.

***As regards the damages.
- Three cases were filed and in all 3 the spouses
(owners of the jeepney) Mangune and Carreon, (jeepney
driver)Manalo, Rabbit and (Rabbits driver)delos Reyes were all
impleaded as defendants. - Plaintiffs anchored their suits
against spouses Mangune and Carreon and Manalo on their
contractual liability.
- As against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based
their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.
- Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc. (the
insurer of the jeepney) was also impleaded as additional
defendant in the civil case filed by the Pascuas.
- Damages sought to be claimed in the 3 cases were
for medical expenses, burial expenses, loss of wages, for
exemplary damages, moral damages and attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
- Rabbit filed a cross-claim for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
- On the other hand, spouses Mangune and Carreon
filed a cross-claim for the repair of the jeepney and for its non-
use during the period of repairs. - TC: found the couple and
Manalo to be NEGLIGENT and held that there was a breach of
the contract of carriage with their passengers; ordered them to
pay the damages. Filriters was jointly and severally liable as it
was the jeepneys insurer. Rabbit was to be paid by the jeepney
party for actual damages.
- IAC reversed this ruling in the sense that it found
delos Reyes to be negligent; ordered to pay jointly and
severally with Rabbit the plaintiffs; Applied primarily (1) the
doctrine of last clear chance, (2) the presumption that drivers

who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause of
the accident unless contradicted by other evidence, and (3) the
substantial factor test to conclude that delos Reyes was
negligent.
ISSUE: WON THE JEEPNEY OWNERS AND ITS DRIVER
ARE LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES AND DEATH SUFFERED
BY THE PASSENGERS OF
THE JEEPNEY

HELD: YES. BUT ONLY THE SPOUSES AND FILRITERS
ARE LIABLE.

REASONING:
TC WAS CORRECT IN APPRECIATING THE FF FACTS
CONCERNING MANALOS NEGLIGENCE.
(1) That the unrebutted testimony of his passenger
Caridad Pascua that the Mangune jeepney was "running fast"
that his passengers cautioned driver Manalo to slow down but
did not heed the warning
(2) The likewise unrebutted testimony of Police
Investigator Tacpal of the San Manuel (Tarlac) Police who
found that the tracks of the jeepney ran on the Eastern shoulder
(outside the concrete paved road) until it returned to the
concrete road at a sharp angle, crossing the Eastern lane and
the (imaginary) center line and encroaching fully into the
western lane where the collision took place as evidenced by the
point of impact;
(3) The observation of witness Police Corporal Cacalda
also of the San Manuel Police that the path of the jeepney they
found on the road \was shown by skid marks which he
described as "scratches on the road caused by the iron of the
jeep, after its wheel was removed;" (4) His conviction for the
crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious Physical
Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence by
the CFI of Tarlac, as a result of the collision, and his
commitment to prison and service of his sentence
(5) The application of the doctrine of res-ipsa loquitar attesting
to the circumstance that the collision occured on the right of
way of the Phil. Rabbit Bus.
SC:
-The principle about "the last clear" chance would call for
application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt
the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground
that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence. (Anuran, et al. v. Buo et al.)

-On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another
vehicle guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted
by other evidence: would have been correct were it not for the
undisputed fact that the U-turn made by the jeepney was
abrupt. Delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-
turn executed by Manalo.

***With regard to the substantial factor test:
- The IAC held that
. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test
that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or
the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from
being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d).
Here, We find defendant bus running at a fast speed
when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest
effort to avoid the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is
thus a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the
passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving
fast and did not even attempt to avoid the mishap but also
because it was the bus which was the physical force which
brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the
jeepney.
-The speed of the bus was even calculated by the IAC. But the
SC was not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was
travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because
the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming such
calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in
highways.
- Delos Reyes cannot be faulted for not having avoided
the collision because as was shown, the jeepney left a skid
mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear
wheel was detached up to the point of collision. - Delos Reyes
admitted that he was running more or less 50 kph at the time of
the accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the
distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed
of 80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that
distance in only 2.025 seconds. Verily, he had little time to react
to the situation.
- To require delos Reyes to avoid the collision is to ask
too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there
were no options available to him. - Also, It was shown by the
pictures that driver delos Reyes veered his Rabbit bus to the
right attempt to avoid hitting the Mangune's jeepney. That it was
not successful in fully clearing the Mangune jeepney as its
(Rabbit's) left front hit said jeepney must have been due to
limitations of space and time. - That delos Reyes of the Rabbit
bus could also have swerved to its left (eastern lane) to avoid
bumping the Mangune jeepney which was then on the western
lane: Under such a situation, he would run the greater risk of
running smack in the Mangune jeepney either head on or
broadside as the jeepney then was abruptly making a U-turn.
-SC: The proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune and Carreon.
They all failed to exercise the precautions that are needed
precisely pro hac vice.
- In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger dies or
is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may
only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-
ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and
1756 of the New Civil Code
2
or that the death or injury of the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event
3
(Lasam v. Smith, Jr.,
45 Phil. 657). - To escape liability, defendants Mangune and
Carreon offered to show thru their witness Natalio Navarro, an
alleged mechanic, that he periodically checks and maintains the
jeepney of said defendants, the last on Dec. 23, the day before
the collision, which included the tightening of the bolts. This
notwithstanding the right rear wheel of the vehicle was
detached while in transit. As to the cause thereof no evidence
was offered. Said defendant did not even attempt to explain,
much less establish, it to be one caused by a caso fortuito. . . .
-In any event, "[i]n an action for damages against the carrier for
his failure to safely carry his passenger to his destination, an
accident caused either by defects in the automobile or through
the negligence of its driver, is not a caso fortuito which would
avoid the carriers liability for damages (Son v. Cebu Autobus
Company, 94 Phil. 892 citing Lasam, et al. v. Smith, Jr., 45 Phil.
657; Necesito, etc. v. Paras, et al., 104 Phil. 75).

***On the sole liability of the J eepney Owners (excluding
Manalo)

-the contract of carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual liability, the carrier is
exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger, even if such
breach be due to the negligence of his driver (Viluan v. CA, et
al., April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 742).
- if the driver is to be held jointly and severally liable
with the carrier, that would make the carrier's liability personal,
contradictory to the explicit provision of A 2181 of the NCC.

DISPOSITION: TC S DECISION WAS REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED BUT MODIFICATION THAT ONLY THE COUPLE
AND THE FILRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE CORP. INC
WERE LIABLE. AFFIRMED TOO THE AMOUNT OF
DAMAGES BUT MODIFIED THE INDEMNITY FOR LOSS OF
LIFE FROM 3K (AS PER A1746 TO A2206 NCC) TO 30K.

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC v IAC
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; Mar 10, 1987

Nature:
Petition to review the decision of the IAC

Facts:
- at about 1:30 am on November 15 1975, Leonardo Dionisio
was on his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting
with his boss. Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
- Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just
crossed an intersection when his car headlights (in his
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on
"bright" and saw a Ford dump truck about 21/2meters away
from his car.

- The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of
Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the
right hand side of the street (i.e., on the right hand side of a
person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's
car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. It was
parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a
manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way
of oncoming traffic. There were no lights or any so-called
"early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the
dump truck, front or rear.
- The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home
by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the
permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work
scheduled to be carried out early the following morning.
- Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving
his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into
the dump truck.
- As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical
injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
- Trial court ruled in favor of Dionisio. IAC affirmed the lower
courts ruling, with modification on award of damages.
Petitionerscomments
- the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and
without a curfew pass.
- if there was negligence in the manner in which the dump
truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive
and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's
recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient cause
determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained.
(NOTE: this was the contention of petitioners which
SC noted in is decision)
Private respondents comments
- the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix

Issue:
WON the proximate cause of the accident was Dionisios
negligence (driving faster than he should have, and without
headlights) or the negligence of the driver in parking the truck.

Held:
- it is the drivers negligence. (see previous digest)
- ON CAUSE v CONDITION (under IV A 3c, page 5 of outline)
- petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of
the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States.
These arguments, however, do not have any validity in this
jurisdiction.
- Even in the United States, the distinctions between" cause"
and "condition" have already been "almost entirely
discredited." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite
clear:
Many courts have sought to distinguish between the
active "cause" of the harm and the existing
"conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the
defendant has created only a passive static condition
which made the damage possible, the defendant is
said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation
is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the
result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between
active forces and passive situations, particularly since,
as is invariably the case the latter (is) the result of
other active forces which have gone before. The
defendant who spills gasoline about the premises
creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites
the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to
bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the
very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the
lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect
liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still
be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward.
"Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in
the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must
refer to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force
intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is
important, but the
nature of the risk and the character of the intervening
cause."
- the truck driver's negligence, far from being a "passive and
static condition", was an indispensable and efficient cause.
The collision would not have occurred had the dump truck
not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down that
street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible.
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident,
was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the
petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was only a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck
drivers negligence
MANILA ELECTRIC v REMOQUILLO
99 PHIL 117
MONTEMAYOR; May 18, 1956

NATURE
Review by certiorari of a CA decision

FACTS
- Efren Magno went to his stepbrothers 3-story house to fix a
leaking media agua, (downspout). He climbed up to the
media agua which was just below the 3
rd
floor window and
stood on it to receive a galvanized iron sheet through the said
window. After grabbing hold of the sheet, he turned around and
a portion of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact
with an electric wire of Manila Electric Company (the Company)
strung 2.5 ft parallel to the edge of the media agua,
electrocuting him and killing him. - His widow and children
filed a suit to recover damages from the company and the TC
rendered judgment in their favor. The Company appealed to the
CA, which affirmed the judgment. It is this CA decision the
Company now seeks to appeal.

ISSUE
WON the Companys negligence in the installation and
maintenance of its
wires was the proximate cause of the death

HELD
No. It merely provided the condition from which the cause arose
(it set the stage for the cause of the injury to occur).
Ratio A prior and remote cause (which furnishes the condition
or gives rise to the occasion by which an injury was made
possible) cannot be the basis of an action if a distinct,
successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury
intervenes between such prior and remote cause and the injury.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
act or condition is the proximate cause.
Reasoning We fail to see how the Company could be held
guilty of negligence or as lacking in due diligence. To us it is
clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution
was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather
the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and
swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any
precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the
wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter's length of 6 feet. - The real cause of the accident or
death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself.
When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media
agua just below the third story window, it is to be presumed that
due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so.
Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had had training
and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely
a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But
unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience
failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-
ft iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently
without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the
winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of
his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. Disposition
CA decision reversed. Complaint against company dismissed


RODRIGUEZA V. MANILA RAILROAD
COMPANY

NATURE
Appeal from judgment of CFI

FACTS
Rodrigueza et al seek damages fr fire kindled by sparks fr a
locomotive engine. The fire was communicated to four houses
nearby. All of these houses were of light construction, except
that of Rodrigueza which was of strong materials. Plaintiffs say
that the company failed to supervise their employees properly
and was negligent in allowing locomotive to operate without
smokestack protection for arresting sparks. They also say that
the sparks were produced by an inferior fuel used by the
company Bataan coal. Defense said Rodiguezas house
stood partly within limits of land owned by company.
Rodrigueza didnt mind the warnings from the company. His
houses materials included nipa and cogon, this indicates
contributory negligence on his part.
Trial judge decided against Manila Railroad, which appealed.

ISSUE
WON damage was caused by Rodriguezas contributory
negligence

HELD
Yes.
- Manila Railroads defense is not a bar to recovery by
the other plaintiffs. - There was no proof that Rodrigueza
unlawfully intruded upon companys property. His house was
there before the railroad companys property. He may be at
risk for fire, but should not bear loss if the fire resulted from the
companys negligence.
- The PROXIMATE AND ONLY CAUSE of the damage
was the negligent act of the company. That Rodriguezas
house was near was an ANTECEDENT CONDITION but that
cant be imputed to him as CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
because that condition was not created by himself and because
his house remained by the toleration and consent of company
and because even if the house was improperly there, company
had no right to negligently destroy it. The company could have
removed the house through its power of eminent domain.

MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG
211 SCRA 517
DAVIDE; July 16, 1992

NATURE
Appeal from decision of the IAC

FACTS
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck
owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang,
and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision
resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort. - When the northbound Ford
Escort was about 10 meters away from the southern approach
of the bridge, two boys suddenly darted from the right side of
the road and into the lane of the car. Jose Koh blew the horn of
the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he
then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes
and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could
do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in
the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.
- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977.
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben
Galang with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property" was filed with the trial court. - Judge Capulong found
Galang guilty of the criminal charge and ordered him to pay
damages. Galang appealed to IAC. IAC affirmed decision. -
Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded
private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages,
and attorneys fee. Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its
consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of
the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The
decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused
the accident. The appellate court further said that the law
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants, as
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the
latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not
allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising the said employee.
- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil
cases was reversed. Hence this petition.

ISSUES
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution
are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations,
conjectures and presumptions.

HELD
YES
- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of
Appeals may be set aside when such findings are not
supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to
consider the material facts which would have led to a
conclusion different from what was stated in its judgment.
- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision
occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the
driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
presumed negligence, IAC immediately concluded that it was
Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate
cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the
evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road
from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do
- The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
- Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose
Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have
tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car
away from where they were even if this would mean entering
the opposite lane.
- Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and
is required to act without time to consider the best means that
may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his
own negligence. - Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is
negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been
defined as: that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred; the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
probably result therefrom. - Although it may be said that the act
of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual
injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient
intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which
was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into
the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had
the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to
slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its
proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure
under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full
speed towards the car. - The truck driver's negligence is

apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was
running at 30 miles (48 km) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kph.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle
is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation.
- Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine
of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is
a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise
of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such
cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences thereof.
- Last clear chance: The doctrine is that the negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence
of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine of last clear chance means
that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a
position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is
entitled to recovery. a person who has the last clear chance or
opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed
to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. The practical import of the
doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's
peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware
of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
- As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly
and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption
that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their
employee. That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not
juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. The answers of the private respondents in
the civil cases did not interpose this defense. Neither did they
attempt to prove it.
On the separate civil and criminal actions
- The civil cases, which were for the recovery of civil
liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of criminal
case. They were eventually consolidated for joint trial. The
records do not indicate any attempt on the part of the parties,
and it may therefore be reasonably concluded that none was
made, to consolidate criminal case with the civil cases, or vice-
versa.
- Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and
abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the
work of the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least
expense to the parties litigants, would have easily sustained a
consolidation, thereby preventing the unseeming, if no
ludicrous, spectacle of two judges appreciating, according to
their respective orientation, perception and perhaps even
prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter rendering
conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case.
- The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a
quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. In the case of
independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of
the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be
entirely irrelevant to the civil action. What remains to be the
most important consideration as to why the decision in the
criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the fact
that private respondents were not parties therein.
Dispositive Petition granted. Assailed decision set aside while
its original is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that the
indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to
P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and
Kim Koh McKee

TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ 51
SCRA 181
MAKALINTAL; June 4, 1973

FACTS
- The Realistic Institute, owned and operated by
Mercedes M. Teague, was a vocational school for hair and
beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi
Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the
comer of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila.
The second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about
400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of
about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which
was provided with two fire-escape ladders, and the presence of
each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall.
- In the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out
in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the
institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the
Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic
ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructresses of
the institute were present and they, together with the registrar,
tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at
the time, telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi
Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete, and
that the fire was anyway, across the street. They told the
students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by
two, or to use the fireescapes. The panic, however, could not
be subdued and the students kept on rushing and pushing their
way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede. No part of
the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over,
four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs,
were found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede. - The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and
dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA, which by
a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members
having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and
sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the
sum of P11,000, plus interest at the legal rate from the date the
complaint was filed.
- The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based
primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been
complied with in connection with the construction and use of the
Gil-Armi building. This provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions, exits and stairways - All
buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings
otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories,
having one or more persons domiciled therein either
temporarily or permanently, and all public or quasipublic
buildings having less than three stories, such as hospitals,
sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human detention,
assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the like,
shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not
less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and an
inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular,
in case of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise
be provided when required by the chief of the fire department,
said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible."
The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the
second storey of the building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters
wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the
time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway
under construction.

ISSUES
1. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence did not
apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership
2. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the
building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner, who is a
mere lessee, who should be liable for the violation
3. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of
the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez

HELD
1. NO.
Ratio it is not ownership which determines the character of
buildings subject to its requirements, but rather the use or the
purpose for which a particular building, is utilized.
Reasoning Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is
devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance
- for instance as a school, which the Realistic Institute precisely
was - then the building is within the coverage of the ordinance.
Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two (2)
separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no relevance or
reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but does have

such relation to the use or purpose for which the building is
devoted.
2. NO.
Reasoning It was the use of the building for school purposes
which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance;
and it was the petitioner and not the owners who were
responsible for such use.
3. YES.
Ratio The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another
agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which
it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance
was intended to prevent.
Reasoning The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by settling other
affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
probably result there from. [Citing Bataclan v Medina] - The
petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death
of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2)
fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic
in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. The
violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote
cause, and cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes which produced
the injury complained of.
- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis
of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would
not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no
danger existed in the condition except because of the
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
act or condition is the proximate cause. [Citing MERALCO v
Remoquillo]
- According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic
and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The
weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of
the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is
true that the petitioner's non-compliance with the ordinance in
question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of
time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of
the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a
specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants
of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case
it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it
could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available.
It is true that in this particular case there would have been no
overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire
in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and
rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was
precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the
ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one
stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building.
- To consider the violation of the ordinance as the
proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in
its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the
overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that
it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by
requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under
the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle
of proximate cause applies to such violation. Dispositive
Decision appealed from is affirmed.

PICART V SMITH
STREET; March 15, 1918

NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of La Union

FACTS
On December 12, 1912, plaintiff was riding on his pony
over the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union.
Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile,
going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour.
As the defendant neared the bridge he saw the plaintiff
and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge,
he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him
that the man on horseback before him was not observing
the rule of the road.
The plaintiff saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals.
However, given the novelty of the apparition and the
rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of
going to the left.
He did this because he thought he did not have sufficient
time to get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it
toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for
the machine.
In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman
would move to the other side.
The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had
made no sign for the automobile to stop.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant,
instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly
toward the horse without diminution of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to
escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as
then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in
such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its
head toward the railing.
In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by
the flange of the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violence.
As a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for
several days.
CFI absolved defendant from liability
Hence, the appeal

ISSUE
WON the defendant, in maneuvering his car in the manner
above described, was guilty of negligence that would give rise
to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done

Ratio: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other part.

HELD
Yes.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the
right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass
over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center
of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have
perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with
safety in front of the moving vehicle.
In the nature of things this change of situation occurred
while the automobile was yet some distance away; and
from this moment it was no longer within the power of the
plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety.
The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other
persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass
sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of
collision.

The defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon
the horse. He was, the court thinks, deceived into doing
this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright.
But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an
appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was
unacquainted with automobiles, he might get excited and
jump under the conditions which here confronted him.
When the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this
danger, he was, in our opinion, negligent in the eye of the
law.
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of
the facts involved in the particular case. Could a prudent
man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty
of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining
the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the
present case, negligence is clearly established. A prudent
man, placed in the position of the defendant, would have
recognized that the course which he was pursuing was
fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm
to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed
on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
The plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. It will be noted however, that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not
contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable
interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
Dispositive: Appealed decision is reversed.

BUSTAMANTE V CA (DEL PILAR AND
MONTESIANO)
193 SCRA 603
MEDIALDEA; February 6, 1991

NATURE: petition for certiorari to review decision of CA

FACTS: a truck and a passenger bus sideswept each other,
causing the deaths of the passengers of the bus. This is the
way the collision happened: The bus, driven by Susulin, was
traversing an inclined road when the driver saw from 30 meters
away an approaching truck (driven by Montesiano), going very
fast and the front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also observed
that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this
circumstance due to his belief that the truck driver was merely
joking, Susulin shifted from 4
th
to 3
rd
gear in order to give more
power and speed to the bus, which was ascending the inclined
part of the road, in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor
being pushed by a person along the shoulder of the highway.
While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the
hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two
vehicles sideswiped each other at each other's left side.
The heirs of the victims filed for damages. The RTC awarded
damages, saying that the negligent acts of both drivers were
the cause of the accident, thus their liability must be solidary.
The driver and owner of the truck appealed to the CA, which
was denied at first, but was granted on MFR, absolving the
defendants based on the doctrine of last clear chance, saying
that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, and that his negligence was the proximate cause of
the same.

ISSUES:
1. WON the CA was correct in absolving the driver and owner
of the truck
(answered by WON CA correctly applied the doctrine of last
clear chance)

HELD:
1. NO
Ratio: The doctrine of last clear chance applies only between
the negligent parties. It does not apply in a case wherein a
victim (who is an outsider to the cause of the accident)
demands liability from the negligent parties. Reasoning: The
doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might
have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. In other words, the
doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril,
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.
As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a
third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident (Sangco).
A negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or
even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according
to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity
later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (Am. Jur). As
against 3
rd
persons, a negligent actor cant defend by saying
that another had negligently failed to take action which would
have avoided injury.

Disposition: Petition GRANTED. Defendants Del Pilar and
Montesiano
ordered to pay damages with other defendants

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION INC V IAC
(DIONISIO)
148 SCRA 353
FELICIANO; March 10, 1987
NATURE
PETITION for review of the decision of the IAC

FACTS
- 130AM 15 November 1975 - Leonardo Dionisio,
driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati
from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Crossing the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal,
Makati, not far from his home, when his car headlights (in his
allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on
"bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming
some 21/2meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned
and registered by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked askew
(partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic) on the right hand
side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming traffic.
There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck had
earlier that evening been driven home by Carbonel, its regular
driver. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision,
Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some
permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two
gold bridge dentures.

- Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming
that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate
cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving
fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass.
Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care
in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver. - CFI:
in favor of Dionisio
- IAC: affirmed TC but modified amounts

ISSUE
(obiter) WON last clear chance doctrine should be applied
therefore
exculpating Phoenix from paying any damages

HELD
NO
- We hold that private respondent Dionisio's
negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack
of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may
recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Obiter
- Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they
refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of
petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent,
private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of
avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio
having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own
injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it
is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found
its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical
function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the
harshness of another common law doctrine or rule-that of
contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was
also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively
minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance
permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also
been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it
is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common
law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been
in A2179 CC - Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear
chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under A2179, the
task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose
negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or
proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even
primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the
petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or
"intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent
acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may
be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the
nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the
character and gravity of the risks created by such act or
omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge
that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be
absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence
because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that
increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or
omission, To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for
the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of
living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the
very bonds of society.
Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and
moral damages
Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v CA (LIPANA)
269 SCRA 695
HERMOSISIMA; March 14, 1997 that of private respondent's.

Held:
Nature:
It was the negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the
negligence of
Petition to review decision of CA the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which

was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private
respondent.
Facts:
- There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages
suffered by the
- Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC), represented by its
President and plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for
General Manager Romeo Lipana, filed a complaint to recover from the former whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC), now absorbed by the Philippine between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred
Commercial International Bank, P304, 979.74 representing various deposits by the
plaintiff.
RMC made in its current account with said bank. The amount was not
- Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man,
credited to RMCs account but was instead deposited to the account of one guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of Bienvenido Cotas. human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
- RMC maintained two separate current accounts with the
Pasig Branch of reasonable man would do.
PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances.
- Picart v. Smith. The test by which to determine the
existence of
- From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana
claims to have negligence in a particular case: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged
entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily

secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds
i
n

t
h
e

c
u
r
r
e
n
t

p
r
u
d
e
n
t

p
e
r
s
o
n

w
o
u
l
d

h
a
v
e

u
s
e
d

i
n

t
h
e
same situation? If not, then he is
accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to
occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by
maintains an account with the same bank. reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. - During this
period, petitioner bank had been regularly furnishing private
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the
respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
Unfortunately, it had never been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these
- the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating,
monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and confidence on officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by
petitioner bank.
Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was
not completely
-Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of
the bank with respect
a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and to the proper validation of deposit slips,
original or duplicate.
his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but
also on the
number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and
supervision of Ms.
PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the
Mabayad.
original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case
upon mixed
copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent. Proximate
was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken
would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the
copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent
the act of Ms.
husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number. With the daily
Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy
of the
remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facil ity with
which to
respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latter's perpetrate her fraudulent scheme
with impunity.
name and account number, she made her company believe that all the while

- F
u
r
t
h
e
r
m
o
r
e
,

u
n
d
e
r

t
h
e

d
o
c
t
r
i
n
e

o
f

"
last clear chance" (also referred to, at
the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth times as "supervening negligence" or as "discovered
peril"), petitioner bank
and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence,
states that where
bank in the account of Cotas. both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in
- Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from
petitioner time than that of the other, or when it is impossible
to determine whose fault
bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one
who had the last
collection suit before RTC Pasig, which found petitioner bank negligent and clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed
to do so is
ordered the bank and Mabayad to pay RMC jointly and severally chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated differently, the
rule would P304,979.72, plus damages, attornets fees and costs of suit. also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does
not preclude the - CA affirmed, but modified the award of damages. recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a
defense

against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last
fair chance, Issue: could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Whether the proximate cause of the
loss, to the tune of P304,979.74,
Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting
suffered by the private respondent RMC is petitioner bank's negligence or
cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the
opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the
petitioner, yet it cannot be denied
that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear
opportunity to avert
the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing
their selfimposed validation procedure.
- While it is true that had private respondent checked
the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to
RMC, the latter would have discovered the loss early on, such
cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. This
omission on the part of the private respondent does not change
the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence
of the petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete
duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss
would not have occurred. Considering, however, that the fraud
was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering
various deposits, common human experience dictates that the
same would not have been possible without any form of
collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms.
Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as
bank teller nonetheless. - it cannot be denied that private
respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have
been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against
RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have
ballooned to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo
Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial
affairs. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory
negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be
awarded to the private respondent under Article 2179 of the
New Civil Code

Disposition CA decision modified. The demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio.
Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be
borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60%
needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees
shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.

PADILLA [dissent]
- the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the
negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence
of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the
injury. In short, there must be a last and a clear chance, not a
last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It must
have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably
prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid
the injury and the resulting damage to himself.
- the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending
monthly bank statements to private respondent RMC so that
any error or discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought
to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. Private

respondent failed to examine these bank statements not
because it was prevented by some cause in not doing so, but
because it was purposely negligent as it admitted that it does
not normally check bank statements given by banks. It was
private respondent who had the last and clear chance to
prevent any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only
reviewed the status of its current accounts on the bank
statement sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a sizable amount
of cash was entrusted to Yabut, private respondent should, at
least, have taken care of its concerns, as what the law
presumes. Its negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the
immediate and proximate cause of its injury.

GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE V
IAC (VDA. DE CALIBO and kids)
GR No.70493
NARVASA; May 18, 1989

NATURE
Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court which, it is claimed, ignored or
ran counter to the established facts.

FACTS
- Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and
Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it
approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the
direction of Davao City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July
4,1979. At about that time, the cargo track, loaded with cement
bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y
Infants, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and
bound for Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge.
At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and
the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo
died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries.
Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of
the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,
including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After
the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the
asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the
truck stopped on its wheels on the road.
- On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages
was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late
Engineer Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against
the driver and owners of the cargo truck. - Trial Court
dismissed the complaint (and defendants' counterclaim) "for
insufficiency of evidence." The circumstances leading to the
conclusion just mentioned:
1. Moments before its collission with the truck being
operated by Zacarias, the jeep of the deceased Calibo was
"zigzagging."
2. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to
investigation by the police, Calibo's companions who suffered
injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so investigated
or give statements to the police officers. This, plus Roranes'
waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against
Zacarias, and the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever
instituted in Court against Zacarias, were "telling indications that
they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias'
negligence or fault."

3. Roranes' testimony, given in plaintiffs' behalf, was
"not as clear and detailed as that of Zacarias," and was
"uncertain and even contradicted by the physical facts and the
police investigators Dimaano and Esparcia."

4. That there were
skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene, and none by the
jeep, demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the
brakes and the jeep's driver had not; and that the jeep had on
impact fallen on its right side is indication that it was running at
high speed.
5. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent
negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision, in
that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to the
left of the center of the road, Engr. Calibo had the last clear
chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample
room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could
simply have braked to a full stop.
- IAC reversed TC. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the
basis of the following circumstances, to wit:
1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the
lane of the jeep when the collision occurred,' and although
Zacarias saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters, he
"did not drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision
with the oncoming jeep . . .;" what is worse, "the truck driver
suddenly applied his brakes even as he knew that he was still
within the lane of the jeep;" had both vehicles stayed in their
respective lanes, the collision would never have occurred, they
would have passed "along side each other
safely;"

2) Zacarias had no license at the time; what he handed
to Pfc. Esparcia, on the latter's demand, was the 'driver's
license of his co-driver Leonardo Baricuatro;"
3) the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against
Zacarias should not be taken against "plaintiffs" Roranes and
Patos who had the right, under the law, to opt merely to bring a
civil suit.

ISSUES
WON respondent court is correct in reversing the decision
of trial court. HELD NO.
Ratio The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid
and complete a defense to accident liability. (Picart v Smith)
Reasoning Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had
a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one
hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of
approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The private
respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full
stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to
deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted
the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still
thirty meters away. From these facts the logical conclusion
emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty
meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his
jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time
to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour.
In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the
Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave
him a clear path. -Picart v Smith:
The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an
automobile ahead he improperly pulled his horse over to the
railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however
guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed
until he was only few feet away. He then turned to the right but
passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened,
jumped around and was killed by the passing car. . . . .
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from
fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting
himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and
directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the
two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of
the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that
the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences,
without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED, and the
complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. 3283 of
the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV, is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Voting Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC v CAR
BASCOS
BAESA
179 SCRA 384
CORTES J.: November 1989

FACTS:
At about 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the
spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold
Jim, Marceline and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico
and Fe O. Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons,
were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at
Malalam River, Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding
anniversary of Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa.
-
Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and
proceeded to MaIalam, River at a speed of about 20 kph. While
they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila,

encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve,
and collided with it.
- David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa
and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while
the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. The jeepney was
extensively damaged. After the accident the driver of the
PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and
proceeded to Santiago, Isabela. From that time on up to the
present, Ramirez has never been seen and has apparently
remained in hiding. - Maricar Baesa through her guardian
Francisca O. Bascos and Fe O. Ico for herself and for her minor
children, filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-
delict against PANTRANCO. Other victims settled with Bus
Company.
-PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Ico's
alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident,
invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez -TC ruled against
PANTRANCO and ordered them to pay damages. -Pantranco
appealed the decision. Appeal dismissed for lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON PANTRANCO is liable for damages.
HELD: YES
-Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case, it
was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in
failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then
existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
-petitioner claims that the original negligence of its driver was
not the proximate cause of the accident and that the sole
proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the
jeepney driver David Ico in failing to avoid the accident
- The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means
that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery
for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter,
by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have
avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
negligence.
-The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who
had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed
to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff
- The above contention of petitioner is manifestly
devoid of merit. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the
doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case
- Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of
"last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the
doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person
who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was
aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of
due care, have been aware of it
- In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at
a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his
lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt
shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus
driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the
jeepney approaching from the opposite direction.
- Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco
bus was speeding towards Manila. At the time David Ico must
have realized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it
was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to
prevent an accident.
- This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine
"can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
been discovered"
- Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent
in failing to observe Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of
Republic Act No. 4136** which provides that the driver of a
vehicle entering a through highway or a stop intersection shall
yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching in either
direction on such through highway.
-Petitioner's misplaced reliance on the aforesaid law is readily
apparent in this case. The cited law itself provides that it applies
only to vehicles entering a through highway or a stop
intersection. At the time of the accident, the jeepney had
already crossed the intersection and was on its way to Malalam
River
-On the issue of its liability as an employer, petitioner claims
that it had observed the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage, conformably to the last paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code -When an injury is caused by the
negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption
that the employer has been negligent either in the selection of
his employees or in the supervision over their acts. Although
this presumption is only a disputable presumption which could
be overcome by proof of diligence of a good father of a family,
this Court believes that the evidence submitted by the
defendant to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family iti the case of Ramirez, as a company driver is
far
from sufficient

ANURAN V BUO
17 SCRA 224
BENGZON, May 20, 1966

NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision.
FACTS
- On January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was
parked on the road to Taal, Batangas. Buo, driver of said
jeepney stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his
passengers to alight. But he parked his jeepney in such a way
that of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted
pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of
the said road. A motor truck speeding along, negligently
bumped it from behind, which such violence that three of its
passengers died, even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries
that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for
many days.
- Suits were instituted by the representatives of the
dead and the injured, to recover consequently damages against
the drivers and the owners of the trucks and also against the
driver and the owners of the jeepney. - CFI Batangas absolved
the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck
driver and the owners o make compensation. Plaintiffs appealed
to the CA insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney
should also be made liable for damages.
ISSUE
WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made
liable.
HELD
YES. An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney
from liability. It must be remembered that the obligation of the
carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New
Civil Code requires utmost diligence from the carriers (Art.
1755) who are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
extraordinary diligence (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
presumption of negligence is confirmed by the CAs finding that
jeepney driver in question was at fault in parking the vehicle
improperly. It must follow that the driver and the owners of
the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers. Obiter
on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle
about the last clear chance applies in a suit between the
owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.
This principle does not apply in this case.
DISPOSITION: Judgment modified.

CANLAS V, CA
Purisima; February 28,
2000

Nature
Petition for Review on Certiorari

Facts
-Sometime in August, 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and Vicente
Maosca, decided to venture in business and to raise the
capital needed therefor. The former then executed a Special
Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to mortgage two parcels
of land situated in San Dionisio, (BF Homes) Paranaque, Metro
Manila, each lot with semi-concrete residential house in the
name of the SPS Canlas. Osmundo Canlas agreed to sell the
said parcels of land to Vicente Maosca, for and in
consideration of P850,000.00, P500,000.00 of which payable
within one week, and the balance of P350,000.00 to serve as
his (Osmundo's) investment in the business. Thus, Osmundo

Canlas delivered to Vicente Maosca the transfer certificates of
title of the parcels of land involved. Vicente Maosca, as his
part of the transaction, issued two postdated checks in favor of
Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40,000.00 and
P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out that the check
covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded.
-On September 3, 1982, Vicente Maosca was able to
mortgage the same parcels of land for P100,000.00 to a certain
Attorney Manuel Magno, with the help of impostors who
misrepresented themselves as the spouses, Osmundo Canlas
and Angelina Canlas. On September 29, 1982, private
respondent Vicente Maosca was granted a loan by the
respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of
P500,000.00, with the use of subject parcels of land as security,
and with the involvement of the same impostors who again
introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. When the loan it
extended was not paid, respondent bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. -On January 15, 1983, Osmundo
Canlas wrote a letter informing the respondent bank that the
execution of subject mortgage over the two parcels of land in
question was without their (Canlas spouses) authority, and
request that steps be taken to annul and/or revoke the
questioned mortgage. On January 18, 1983, petitioner
Osmundo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff Maximo O.
Contreras, asking that the auction sale scheduled on February
3, 1983 be cancelled or held in abeyance. But respondents
Maximo C. Contreras and Asian Savings Bank refused to heed
petitioner Canlas' stance and proceeded with the scheduled
auction sale.
-Consequently, on February 3, 1983 the herein petitioners
instituted the present case for annulment of deed of real estate
mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction; and on May 23, 1983, the trial court issued an Order
restraining the respondent sheriff from issuing the
corresponding Certificate of Sheriff's Sale.For failure to file his
answer, despite several motions for extension of time for the
filing thereof, Vicente Maosca was declared in default. Lower
court a quo came out with a decision annulling subject deed of
mortgage and disposing. Asian Savings Bank appealed to the
Court of Appeals and CA reversed the lower court decision.

Issue/s and Held

WON CA erred in holding that the mortgage is valid
Settled is the rule that a contract of mortgage must be
constituted only by the absolute owner on the property
mortgaged;

a mortgage, constituted by an impostor is void.
Considering that it was established indubitably that the
contract of mortgage sued upon was entered into and
signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as
the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas, the
Court is of the ineluctible conclusion and finding that
subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity.

WON ASB must incur the resulting loss
Yes. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, the
respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence,
the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where
both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule
is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence.
In the case under consideration, from the evidence on hand it
can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe
the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real
identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the
spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to
note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by
the said impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the bank
acted on their representations simply on the basis of the
residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match
the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a
certain Atty. Magno, covering the same parcels of land in
question.
Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence
required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family
in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary
care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled
property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest,
holding in trust the money of the depositors, which bank
deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence
or bad faith, by reason of which the bank would be denied the
protective mantle of the land registration law, accorded only to
purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith.
Evidently, the efforts exerted by the bank to verify the identity of
the couple posing as Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell
short of the responsibility of the bank to observe more than the
diligence of a good father of a family. The negligence of
respondent bank was magnified by the fact that the previous
deed of mortgage (which was used as the basis for checking
the genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas
spouses) did not bear the tax account number of the spouses,
as well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas.
But such fact notwithstanding, the bank did not require the
impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity. For not
observing the degree of diligence required of banking
institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest,
respondent Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss sued upon.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 1993, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 25242 SET ASIDE. The Decision of Branch 59 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. M-028 is
hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

CONSOLIDATED BANK V CA (L.C.DIAZ AND
CO.)
GR No. 138569
CARPIO; September 11, 2003

NATURE
Review of the decision of the CA

FACTS
- LC Diaz is a professional partnership engaged in
accounting. On 14 August 1991, LC diaz, thru its cashier,
instructed their messenger, Calapre, to deposit money in
Solidbank. Calapre then deposited in Solidbank. Since the
transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit
for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with
Solidbank. When he came back, the teller told him that
somebody else got the passbook. The next day, it was learned
that 300k was withdrawn from the account.
- An information for estafa was filed against one of their
messengers (Ilagan) and one Roscoe Verdazola. LC Diaz
demanded SolidBank the return of their money. The latter
refused and a case for recovery of a sum of money was filed
against them
- TC applied rules on savings account written on the
passbook. The rules state that possession of this book shall
raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or
payments made by the bank upon the production of the said
book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same
effect as if made to the depositor personally. Also, they applied
the rule that the holder of the passport is presumed the owner. It
was also held that Solidbank did not have any participation in
the custody and care of the passbook and as such, their act
was not the proximate cause of the loss. The proximate cause
was LC Diaz negligence.
- CA revered. It ruled that Solidbanks negligence was
the proximate cause. It applied the provision on the CC on quasi
delicts and found that the requisite elements were present. They
found that the teller made no inquiry upon the withdrawal of
300k. The teller could have called up LC Diaz since the amount
being drawn was significant. The appellate court ruled that while
L.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its
messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the
teller, Solidbank could not escape liability because of the
doctrine of last clear chance. Solidbank could have averted
the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to
verify the withdrawal.

ISSUES
WON Solidbank was liable

HELD

- For breach of the savings deposit agreement due to
negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its
depositor.
- When the passbook is in the possession of
Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on
Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook. Likewise, Solidbanks tellers must
exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return
the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized
representative
- In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a
breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant
was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to
prove that he was not at fault or negligent. Solidbank failed to
discharge this burden. (they could have presented the teller to
whom the passbook was left, but they didnt)
- L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in
the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the
passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion
of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to
return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. SolidBanks negligence in returning
the passbook was the proximate cause.
- The doctrine of last clear chance states that where
both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible
to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the
present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to
L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance
to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability.
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the
plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by
the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his
breach of contract.

DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed, modification only to damages

ENGADA V CA
QUISUMBING, J.: June 20, 2003

NATURE
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the
CA which
affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC of Iloilo City

FACTS
- On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin
Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for
Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of
the Tamaraw. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the
opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pickup, driven by petitioner
Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few meters away from the
Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the
same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of
the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course
with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved
to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the
pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right
front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis
of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown
out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan incurred
P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed at
P80,000.

ISSUES
1. WON petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident

HELD
1. YES. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his
proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear
and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For
failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on
drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be
held liable. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to
avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left. Petitioners acts had
put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act
quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent,
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident. But what has been shown is the presence of an
emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule.
There was no clear chance to speak of. Iran swerved to the left
only to avoid petitioners pick-up, which was already on a head
to head position going against Irans Tamaraw jeepney
immediately before the vehicles collided. No convincing proof
was adduced by petitioner that Iran could have avoided a head-
on collision.

Dispositive
The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

STRICT LIABILITY

VESTIL V IAC (UY)
179 SCRA 47
CRUZ; December 6, 1989

NATURE
Petition to reinstate the decision of the Appellate Court.

FACTS
- July 29, 1975: Theness was bitten by a dog while she
was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the
late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil. She was
rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated
for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead. She was
discharged after nine days but was re-admitted one week later
due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15,
1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as
broncho-pneumonia.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia
broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies
- Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages,
alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors
of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
- Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants. IAC found that the
Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so
should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for
the injuries caused by the dog.
- On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court
finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause
of death has been satisfactorily established.

Petitioners Claim
The Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own
the dog that bit her.
Respondents Comments
The dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was
a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it
bite Theness.

ISSUE
WON the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.

HELD
Ratio The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code
is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause.
Reasoning
ART. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make
use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may
cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damage should come from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the
house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is
no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the
time of the incident in question. - There is evidence showing
that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or
twice weekly.
- Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia
broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a
complication of rabies. The Court finds that the link between the
dog bites and the certified cause of death has been
satisfactorily established.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was
merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not
speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as
long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the
time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever
she might have done to the animal.
- Obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code
is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,

-
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause.

DISPOSITION
The Court approves the time.

DINGCONG vs. KANAAN
72 Phil. 14; G.R. No. L-47033
AVANCEA; April 25, 1941

NATURE
Petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the CA

FACTS
-The brothers Loreto and Jose Dingcong rented the house of
Emilia Saenz (in Jose Ma. Basa Street of the City of Iloilo) and
established the Central Hotel. Among the hotel's guests is
Francisco Echevarria, paying P30 a month, and occupying
room no. 10 of said hotel. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies
the ground floor of the hotel and established his "American
Bazaar" dedicated to the purchase and sale of articles and
merchandise. -Around 11pm of 19 September 1933,
Echevarria, when retiring to bed, carelessly left the faucet open
that with only an ordinary basin without drainage. That time, the
pipes of the hotel were under repair; the water run off the pipes
and spilled to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise
of the "American Bazaar," causing a loss which the CFI sets at
P1,089.61. -The Kanaans (Halim, Nasri and Michael),
representing the establishment "American Bazaar," thereafter
filed this complaint for damages against Loreto Dingcong, Jose
Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria. -CFI held Francisco
Echevarria liable, and acquitted Jose Dingcong. CA reversed
and declared Jose Dingcong responsible, sentencing him to
pay the plaintiffs damages.

ISSUE
WON Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for
damages

HELD
YES.
-Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the
one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open the faucet,
caused the water to spill to the ground and wet the articles and
merchandise of the plaintiffs.
-Jose Dingcong, being a co-renter and manager of the hotel,
with complete possession of the house, must also be
responsible for the damages caused. He failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these
damages, despite his power and authority to cause the repair of
the pipes.
Disposition Appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs
against apellant.

AFABLE V SINGER SEWING MACHINE
COMPANY
58 PHIL 14
VICKERS; March 6, 1933

NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila

FACTS
- Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the
Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San
Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila,
and he was supposed to be residing in his district according to
the records of the company.
- One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan
while riding a bicycle was run over and fatally injured at the
corner of O'Donnel and Zurbaran streets in the City of Manila
by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. - It appears that
Madlangbayan had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila
without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death
he was returning home after making some collections in San
Francisco del Monte. - According to the practice of the
company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were
required to deliver the amount collected to the company the
next morning.
- The widow and children of Leopoldo Madlangbayan
brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation
under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812, P100 for
burial expenses and P1,745.12 for compensation. - Plaintiffs'
complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to
recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428 fifty per cent
of P16.78 for 208 weeks of P1,745.12 plus P100 for burial
expenses.
- Defendant as special defenses alleged that Leopoldo
Madlangbayan at the time that he sustained the injuries
resulting in his death was violating an ordinance of the City of
Manila which prohibits work on Sunday; and that Act No. 3428,
as amended, is unconstitutional and void because it denies the
defendant the equal protection of the law, and impairs the
obligation of the contract between the defendant and Leopoldo
Madlangbayan, and deprives the Courts of First Instance of
their probate jurisdiction over the estate of deceased persons
and nullifies Chapters XXIX, XXX, XXXI, XXXII, XXXIII, and
XXXIV of the Civil Code Procedure and related articles of the
Civil Code.

ISSUE
WON the employer is liable to pay the employees heirs.

RULING
NO.
- As the deceased Leopoldo Madlangbayan was killed
on November 16, 1930 and Act No. 3812 was not approved
until December 8, 1930, it is apparent that the law which is
applicable is Act No. 3428, section 23 of which reads as
follows:
When any employee receives a personal injury from any
accident due to in the pursuance of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such employment
or the result of the nature of such employment, his
employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the
persons hereinafter specified.
- The accident which caused the death of the
employee was not due to and in pursuance of his employment.
- At the time that he was over by the truck Leopoldo
Madlangbayan was not in the pursuance of his employment
with the defendant corporation, but was on his way home after
he had finished his work for the day and had left the territory
where he was authorized to take collections for the defendant.
- The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries
which might happen to an employee while in the course of the
employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled
to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that
befalls him while going to or returning from his place of
employment, because such an accident does no arise out of
and in the course of his employment.
- The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in
section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to
"arising out of and in the course of". Discussing this phrase, the
Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Mueller Construction
Co. vs. Industrial Board, said:
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of
the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the
words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. By
the use of these words it was not the intention of the
legislature to make the employer an insurer against all
accidental injuries which might happen to an employee
while in the course of the employment, but only for such
injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to
the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's
employment of incidental to such employment, and
accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some
risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a
special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to
which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed
and not traceable in some special degree to the particular
employment are excluded.
- If the deceased had been killed while going from
house to house in San Francisco del Monte in the pursuance of
his employment, the plaintiffs would undoubtedly have the right,
prima facie, to recover.
- In the case at bar the deceased was going from work
in his own conveyance.
- Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never
notified the defendant corporation of his removal from San
Francisco del Monte of Manila, and that the company did not

know that he was living in Manila on the day of the accident;
that the defendant company did not require its employees to
work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles.
- These are additional reasons for holding that the
accident was not due to and pursuance of the employment of
the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence
from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a
bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the
defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him
to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do
so in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not
liable for any injury sustained by him.

DISPOSITION The decision appealed from was affirmed, with
the costs against the appellants.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS V CA
(GERONIMO)
227 SCRA 292
DAVIDE, JR.; October 18, 1993

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals

FACTS
- Lydia Geronimo was engaged in the business of
selling food and drinks to children in the Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen located in Dagupan. - August 12, 1989 -
A group of parents complained that they found fibrous material
in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their children bought from
Geronimos store. Geronimo examined her stock of softdrinks
and found that there were indeed fibrous materials in the
unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the
Department of Health office in their region and was informed
that the soda samples she sent were adulterated.
- Because of this, Geronimos sales plummeted with
her regular sales of 10 cases day dwindling to about 2 or 3
cases. Her losses amounted to P200 to P300 a day which later
on forced her to close down her business on December 12,
1989.
- She demanded payment of damages from plaintiff
Coca-Cola but the latter did not accede to her demands.
- The trial court ruled in favor of Coca-Cola, stating that
the complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-delict
because of pre-existing relation between the parties. Thus the
complaint should have been filed within 6 months from the
delivery of the thing sold.
- The trial court however annulled the questioned
orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct further
proceedings in the civil case. According to the CA: the
allegations in the complaint plainly show that it is an action for
damages arising from respondents act of recklessly and
negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be
sol for public consumption. It also noted that the availability of
an action for breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts
in a sale of defective goods.
Petitioners Claim:
- Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
prescription.
- Since the complaint is for breach of warranty (under
A1561, CC), it should have been brought within 6 months from
the delivery of the goods. Respondents Comments:
Geronimo alleges that her complaint is one for damages
which does not involve an administrative action.
- Her cause of action is based on an injury to plaintiffs
right which can be brought within 4 years (based on A1146,
CC).

ISSUE
WON the complaint is founded on a quasi-delict and pursuant
to A1146(12),
CC, the action prescribes in 4 years

HELD
YES
Reasoning
- The vendees remedies against a vendor with respect
to the warranties against hidden defects or encumbrances upon
the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in A1567. The
vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon
proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable.
- Under American law, the liabilities of the
manufacturer or seller of injurycausing products may be based
on negligence, breach of warranty, tort or other grounds.
DISPOSITION The instant petition is denied for lack of merit.

GILCHRIST v CUDDY
29 Phil 542 TRENT;
February 18, 1915

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI

FACTS
-Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the
owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract
whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar for exhibition
in his theatre for a week for P125. - Cuddy returned the money
already paid by Gilchrist days before the delivery date so that
he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and
receive P350 for the film for the same period.
- Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against
Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages
against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract
between Gilchrist and Cuddy.

ISSUE
WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga is liable for interfering with the
contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the
time the identity of the
parties

HELD
YES
- Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with
the contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from
unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce
Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. - Article 1902 of the
Civil Code provides that a person who, by act or omission
causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence,
shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in
this article which requires as a condition precedent to the
liability of the tortfeasor that he must know the identity of a
person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is
required in order that the injured party may recover for the
damages suffered.

DISPOSITION Judgment affirmed

SON PING BUN vs CA (Tek Hua)
GR No. 120554
Quisumbing; September 21, 1999

NATURE
Appeal on certiorari for review of CA decision

FACTS
- In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its Managing
Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement with D.C.
Chuan covering four stalls in Binondo. The contracts were
initially for one year but after expiry of the same, they
continued on a month to month basis. In 1976, Tek Hua was
dissolved with the original members forming a new corporation,
Tek Hua Enterprises with Manuel Tiong as one of the
incorporators.

- So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek
Giok, occupied the same stalls under the business name,
Trendsetter Marketing.

- In 1989, the lessor, DC Chuan sent a letter to Tek
Hua advising it of a 25% increase in rent effective September 1,
1989. A further rent increase of 30% effective January 1, 1990
was implemented. Enclosed in both letters were new lease
contracts for signing. While the letters contained a statement
that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were not
signed, the same were not rescinded.


-
- In 1991, Tiong wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking
him to vacate the four stalls as the same were going to be used
by them. Instead of vacating the stalls, So was able to secure
lease agreements from DC Chuan.

- Tek Hua filed an injunction and an action for
nullification of the contracts between Trendsetter and DC
Chuan. The lower Court ruled in favor of Tek Hua. The CA, on
appeal, upheld the trial court. Both the trial court and the CA
awarded legal fees only.

ISSUE
- WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference
of contract

HELD-
- Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with
is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex
delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one
party of the enjoyment of the other of his private property. In
the case at bar, petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to
execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner
deprived respondent of the latters property right.

Reasoning-
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
injury, and damges are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an
action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if

a) the other has property rights and privileges with
respect to the
use or enjoyment interfered with;

b) the invasion is substantial;

c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the
invasion;

d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable
or unintentional and actionable under the
general negligence rules.
- On the other hand, the elemts of tort interference are
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its
existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal
justification or
excuse

- Since there were existing lease contracts between
Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights
over the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DC
Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful
interference.

- The SC handled the question of whether the
interference may be justified considering that So acted solely
for the purpose of furthering his own financial or economic
interest. It stated that it is sufficient that the impetus of his
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives to conclude that So was not a malicious
interferer. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice
precludes the award of damages.

- The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous
interference is Article 1314 which states that any third party
who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. The Court ratiocinated
that the recovery of legal fees is in the concept of actual or
compensatory damages as provided in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. In this casse, due to defendants action of interference,
plaintiff was forced to seek relief through the Court snd thereby
incur expenses to protect his interests. The Court, however,
found the award exorbitant. It was reduced to Pesos
100,000.00

Disposition
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed subject to the modified
award of attorneys fees.

GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN
171 SCRA 382
SARMIENTO; Mar 21, 1989

Nature:
Petition for Certiorari to review the decision of CA

Facts:

-
on July 25, 1978, Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter,
accidentally fell into a manhole while she was about to board
a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk at Perez Blvd. Her right leg
was fractured, due to which she was hospitalized, operated
on, and confined.
- She averred that she suffered mental and physical pain, and
that she has difficulty in locomotion. She has not yet reported
for duty as court interpreter (at the time of filing of complaint)
and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and she is no
longer her former jovial self. Moreover, she has been unable
to perform her religious, social, and other activities which she
used to do prior to the incident.
- Police confirmed existence of the manhole, which was
partially covered by a concrete flower pot by leaving a gaping
hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide or 42 cm wide by 75 cm
long by 150 cm deep.
- City Engineer of Dagupan Alfredo Tangco admitted that the
manhole is owned by the National Government and the
sidewalk on which they are found along Perez Blvd. are also
owned by the National Government. He said that he
supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it
that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically
done by his subordinates.
- Trial court ordered the city to pay Guilatco actual, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorneys fees. CA reversed the
lower courts ruling on the ground that no evidence was
presented to prove that City of Dagupan had control or
supervision over Perez Blvd.
- City contends that Perez Blvd is a national road that is not
under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan.
Hence, no liability should attach to the city.

Issue
WON control or supervision over a national road by the City of
Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for
damages in accordance with article 2189 CC.

Held
YES
- The liability of private corporations for damages arising from
injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition
of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall
be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or
supervision.
- It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to
belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to
attach. The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
- In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer.
- The charter only lays down general rules regulating that
liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising
from defective streets, public buildings and other public
works.
On Damages awarded
- Actual damages of P10000 reduced to proven expenses of
P8053.65. The trial court should not have rounded off the
amount. The court can not rely on speculation, conjecture
or guess work as to the amount.
- Moral damages of P150000 is excessive and is reduced to
P20000. Guilatcos handicap was not permanent and
disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for one
year.
- Exemplary damages of P50000 reduced to P10000.
- Award of P7420 as lost income for one year, plus P450
bonus remain the same
- P3000 as attorneys fees remain the same

Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set
aside, decision of trial court reinstated with modification.

PERSONS LIABLE

WORCESTER v OCAMPO
22 PHIL 42
Johnson; Feb. 27, 1912

NATURE

FACTS
- Plaintiff Dean Worcester, member of the Civil
Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior of
the Insular Government commenced an action against
defendants Ocampo, Kalaw, Santos, Reyes, Aguilar, Liquete,
Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto and Cansipit
(owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of a
certain newspaper known as El Renacimiento or Muling
Pagsilang) for the purpose of recovering damages resulting
from an alleged libelous publication.
- The editorial Birds of Prey was alleged to have
incited the Filipino people into believing that plaintiff was a vile
despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he
held. The said editorial alluded to him as an eagle that
surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead
and rotten meat, an owl that affects a petulant omniscience,
and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves
it bloodless.
- After hearing the evidence adduced during trial, the
judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of petitioner,
holding all the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and
Liquete who were found to be editors but in a subordinate
position and found to have merely acted under the direction of
their superiors) liable jointly and severally for sustained
damages on account of petitioners wounded feelings, mental
suffering and injuries to his standing and reputation in the sum
of P35,000 as well as P25,000 as punitive damages.
- This judgment prompted defendants to appeal to the
SC, claiming that the CFI committed several errors in rendering
said judgment among which was that the lower court committed
an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against
the defendants.

ISSUE
WON the defendants, regardless of their participation in the
commission of
the actual tort, may be held jointly and severally liable as joint
tortfeasors

HELD
YES.
Ratio Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate
in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it
after it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are
jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. They
are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the
same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves.
***If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or person
injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly,
or one of them separately, because tort is in its nature a
separate act of each individual.
Reasoning Defendants fail to recognize that the basis of the
present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal
doctrine that each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable
for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with
his tortfeasors. The defendants might have been sued
separately for the commission of the tort. They might have sued
jointly and severally, as they were. It is not necessary that the
cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. **note: Ponente
used examples of torts as held under common law** (In a case
of assault and battery committed by various persons, under the
common law, all are principals). So also is the person who
counsels, aids, or assists in any way the commission of a
wrong. Under the common law, he who aided, assisted or
counseled, in any way the commission of a crime, was as much
a principal as he who inflicted or committed the actual tort.
- Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them,
or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole
damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole
damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others
who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in
the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others.

-
- The courts during the trial may find that some of the
alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and that others are not liable.
The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort. And this is true even
though they are charged jointly and severally. However, in this
case, the lower court, committed no error in rendering a joint
and several judgment against the defendants. As recognized by
Section 6 of Act 277 of the Philippine Commission: Every
author, editor, or proprietor * * * is chargeable with the
publication of any words in any part * * * or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
Disposition Judgment of the lower court modified. Ocampo,
Kalaw, Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit
held jointly and severally liable for the sum of P25, 000 with
interest at 6%. Santos absolved from any liability.

ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J. [concurring]
- We concur, except with reference to the liability
imposed upon Lichauco. The real owner and founder, Ocampo,
explicitly stated that the other socalled founders subscribed and
paid sums of money to aid the paper but as to Lichauco, he
offered to contribute, but did not carry out his offer and in fact
paid nothing. It is incomprehensible how one could claim the
right or title to share the earnings or profits of a company when
he had put no capital into it, neither is it comprehensible how
one could share in the losses thereof, and still less incur liability
for damages on account of some act of the said company, an
unrestricted liability to the extent of all his property, as though
he were a regular general partner when he was not such.

TORRES [dissenting in part]
I concur in regard to the defendants Ocampo and Kalaw, but
dissent as regards Palma, Arellano, Jose, Lichauco, Barretto,
and Cansipit for they had neither direct nor indirect participation
in the act that gave rise to the present suit for damages, nor
were they owners or proprietors of the newspaper, its press or
other equipment. They were donors who merely contributed a
sum of money, as a genuine gift, for the purpose of founding,
editing, and issuing the said newspaper, it is improper to
deduce that the contributors formed a company of either a civil
or commercial nature.
- After Ocampo had accepted the various amounts proffered,
the donors ceased to be the owners of and surrendered all right
to the money donated and to the objects that were acquired
therewith. Therefore they can not incur, jointly and severally
with the director and manager.

CHAPMAN V UNDERWOOD
27 Phil 374
MORELAND; March 28, 1914

NATURE
Appeal from the judgment of trial court finding for the defendant

FACTS
- The plaintiff-appellant, Chapman, desired to board a
certain "San Marcelino" car coming from Sta. Ana and bound
for Manila. Being told by his friend that the car was
approaching, he immediately, and somewhat hurriedly, passed
into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the car.
The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or
the rear platform. Plaintiff attempted to board the front platform
but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion,
stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and
waited for it to come abreast of him in order to board. While in
this position he was struck from behind and run over by the
defendant's (Underwood) automobile.
- The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle
Peafrancia in his automobile driven by his chauffeur, a
competent driver. A street car bound from Manila to Sta. Ana
being immediately in front of him, he followed along behind it.
Just before reaching the scene of the accident the street car
which was following took the switch (there was a single-track
street-car line running along Calle Herran, with occasional
switches to allow cars to meet and pass each other)- that is,
went off the main line to the left upon the switch lying alongside
of the main track. Thereupon the defendant either kept straight
ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The car
which the plaintiff intended to board was on the main line and
bound in an opposite direction to that in which the defendant
was going. When the front of the "San Marcelino" car was
almost in front of the defendant's automobile, defendant's driver
suddenly went to the right and struck and ran over the plaintiff.
- The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.

ISSUE
WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.

HELD
NO.
Ratio An owner who sits in his automobile or other vehicle, and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease
therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.
On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence,
and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates
the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present
herein at5 the time the act was committed, is not responsible,
either civilly or criminally, therefore. The act complained of must
be continued in the presence or the owner for such a length of
time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes his drivers act
his own. Reasoning Defendant's driver was guilty of
negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was
passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side.
- The plaintiff needed only to watch for cars coming
from his right, as they were the only ones under the law
permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.
- in the case of Johnson vs. David, the driver does not
fall within the list of persons in Art.1903 of the Civil Code for
whose acts the defendant would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not
present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed
by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is present,
unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for such a
length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. - it
appears with fair clearness that the interval between the turning
out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the
accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge
defendant with the negligence of the driver.

DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

CAEDO V YU KHE THAI
GR NO. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968

NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CFI of Iloilo

FACTS
- Bernardo is the driver of Yu Khe Thai. He was driving
the latters Cadillac along highway 54. On the other
side of the road, Caedo was driving his Mercury car. He
was with his family.
- A carretela was in front of the Cadillac. Bernardo did
not see the carretela from afar. When he approached
the carritela, he decided to overtake it even though he
had already seen the car of the Caedos approaching
from the opposite lane. As he did so the curved end of
his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the
rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as
the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it
collided with the oncoming vehicle.
- The Caedos were injured. They filed a suit for recovery
of damages against Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. The
CFI ruled in favor of the Caedos and held Bernardo and
Yu solidarily liable.

ISSUES
WON Yu Khe Thai should be held solidarily liable as
Bernardos employer

HELD

No.
- Bernardo had no record of any traffic violation. No
negligence of having employed him maybe imputed to
his master.
- Negligence on the employers part, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting,, that is, in his failure to
detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only
gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient
time to act upon it.
- No negligence can be imputed. The car was running at
a reasonable speed. The road was wide and open.
There was no reason for Yu to be specially alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill of his driver. The time
element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved
and warn the driver accordingly.
- The law does not require that a person must possess a
certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the
mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic
rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of
his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is
his omission to do that which the evidence of his own
senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent
a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger
may appear
to be entirely safe and commonplace to another

DISPOSITIVE
Decision modified. Yu Khe Thai is free from liability

CAEDO v. YU KHE THAI
GR No. L-20392
MAKALINTAL; December 18, 1968

FACTS
- Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home
in Quezon
City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to
take a plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo
and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was
the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at
the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack
Wack.
- The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds,
considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic
the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the
Cadillac at approximately 48 to 56 kilometers. Their headlights
were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned
by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another
horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical
post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's
son, Julian Bautista.
- Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig
when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is
the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was
provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should
have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he
claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have
been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must
have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable
while.
- In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from
the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or
stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was
clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the
curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward
rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along
as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided
with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the
Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the
Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to
take a gamble beat the Mercury to the point where it would
be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them
in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk
should have been quite obvious.
- It was already too late to apply the brakes when Bernardo saw
the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had
to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming
car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo
gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper,
as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and
wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected
situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by
going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The
photographs taken at the scene show that the right wheels of
his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the
moment of impact.

ISSUE
1. WON defendant Rafael Bernardo is liable for the
accident.
2. If YES, WON his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai,
is solidarily liable with him.

HELD
1. YES. There is no doubt at all that the collision was
directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he
must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.

2. NO. If the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is
likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by
the exercise of due diligence.
- The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not
respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias.
The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by
him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order
to prevent injury or damage.
- The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of
the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car
owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of
diligence as are professional drivers. - The law does not
require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or
proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the
observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.
The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184,
is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far
as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed
by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to
one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform
standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers
by car owners who, by -their very inadequacies, have real need
of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
- Rafael Bernardo had no record of violation of traffic
laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him
at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of
the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and
circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We
do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car was
not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and
open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no
reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. The
time element was such that there was no reasonable
opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and
warn the driver accordingly.
DISPOSITION Judgment appealed from is modified in the
sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from
liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant
Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.

SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and
DANTE
CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10068-70 June 29, 1957
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS

Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro

-
Caperia and Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna. During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as
mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperia, reserved her right to
bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused.
After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the crime charged
and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Dante Capuno was only fifteen (15) years old when he
committed the crime.

In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present
action against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking
for damages in the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the
death of her son Isidoro Caperia. Defendants set up the
defense that if any one should be held liable for the death of
Isidoro Caperia, he is Dante Capuno and not his father Delfin
because at the time of the accident, the former was not under
the control, supervision and custody of the latter. This defense
was sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence, it
only convicted Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in
the complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeals but the case was certified to the Supreme Court on
the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts
Organization and a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on
March 31, 1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal
in said city upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From
the school Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and
when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and
drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone
far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers,
Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperia, died as a consequence. It
further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not
with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his
son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it
when his son told him after the accident that he attended the
parade upon instruction of his teacher.

Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the
damages in question jointly and severally with his son Dante
because at the time the latter committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not
disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so,
plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father
from liability.

ISSUE

Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable,
jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting
from the death of Isidoro Caperia caused by the negligent act
of minor Dante Capuno.

RULING
YES.
12

RATIO
Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of their minor
children living with them although at the time of the tort, the
children were under the direct control or supervision of an
academic institution. (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE,
WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN AMADORA
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS)

REASONING
The provision Teachers or directors of arts and trades are
liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody", only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution.

Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity,
he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in
connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with
some companions and while driving it, the accident occurred. In
the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that
school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for
the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student
of an institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.

12
The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code,
paragraph 1 and 5, (schools liability versus parental liability) which provides:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody."


The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage
(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This
defendants failed to prove.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense
that defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to
plaintiff, jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as
damages, and the costs of action.

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

I believe we should affirm the judgment relieving the father
of liability. I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of
the old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic ones. What substantial difference is there between
them in so far as concerns the proper supervision and vigilance
over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his
pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise authority and
supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase
"teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in
Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words "arts and trades" does
not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments". The
phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms
"preceptores y artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.

If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear
that where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be
the one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.

I submit that the father should not be held liable for a tort that he
was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to
assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that
he entrusted his child to the custody of school authorities that
were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has
rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof
shifted to the claimant to show actual negligence on the part of
the parent in order to render him liable.

Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.

SALEN V. BALCE

FUELLAS V. CADANO

Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial Court making
defendant therein, now appellant Agapito Fuellas, the father of
the minor who caused the injuries to Pepito Cadano, also a
minor, liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code for
damages.

Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-
appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on
September 16, 1954. They were classmates at St. Mary's High
School, Dansalan City. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepitos
injury, his right arm was broken after Rico pushed him on the
ground.
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages for the
deliberate injury caused by his son; that the said court held the
petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according
to the last article, the act of the minor must be one wherein
"fault or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or
negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but
deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles are not
applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the
commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or
negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that
the appellate Court erred in holding him liable for damages for
the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the criminal act of his
son? Held: Yes. In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, et al.,
G.R. No. L-10132, prom. June 29, 1957), holding the
defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor son Dante
for damages, arising from the criminal act committed by the
latter, this tribunal gave the following reasons for the rule:
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by
the minor children who live with them, is obvious.
This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them in
proportion to their means", while on the other
hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish
them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish
Civil Code). The only way by which they can
relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove
that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage (Art.
1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This,
defendants failed to prove.
In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the
defendant Balce was the father of a minor Gumersindo Balce,
below 18 years of age who was living with him. Gumersindo
was found guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen,
minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the case, stating that the civil liability of the minor
son of defendant arising from his criminal liability must be
determined under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In reversing the
decision, this tribunal held:
It is true that under Art. 101 of the Revised Penal
Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts
committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile,
an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under
15 years of age, who acts without discernment,
unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence
on his part. This is because a son who commits the
act under any of those conditions is by law exempt
from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and
3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the
act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil
liability to the person who has the delinquent minor
under his legal authority or control. But a minor over
15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from
criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent
as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he
stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to
the general law which is our Civil Code. The
particular law that governs this case is Article
2180, the pertinent portion of which provides:
"The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company." To hold that this provision
does not apply to the instant case because it only
covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the
father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for
the damage caused by his or her son, no liability
would attach if the damage is caused with
criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists
in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this
particular provision of our Civil Code, as may be
gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court
which cover equal or identical cases.

Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals
on the basis of the evidence submitted therein by both parties,
independently of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or
negligence under Article 2176 upon which the action in the
present case was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct

from the civil liability arising from fault of negligence under the
Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind
the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor's
criminal responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the decision
appealed from is
affirmed

GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ
MALCOLM; September 23, 1931

Nature: an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against the five defendants, to recover
damages in the amount of P10,000, for physical injuries
suffered as a result of an automobile accident.

Facts:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership
collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge
on the Manila South Road in the municipality of Las Pias,
Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The
automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18
years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother,
Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the
father was not in the car, but the mother, together will several
other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were
accommodated therein. Narcisso Gutierrez was a passenger of
the bus. He had a fracture on his right leg.
It was conceded that the collision was caused by negligence
pure and simple. But, Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus
and the car while the truck blames the car and the car in turn
blames the truck. the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent
chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed,
and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his
head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The
guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a
license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible
for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and
not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages
caused by the minor.

Issue:
1. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is liable.
2. WON the owner of the truck is liable.

Held:
1. Yes. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the
head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who
maintains it for the general use of his family is liable
for its negligent operation by one of his children,
whom he designates or permits to run it, where the
car is occupied and being used at the time of the
injury for the pleasure of other members of the
owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of
the law is that the running of the machine by a child to
carry other members of the family is within the scope
of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the
negligence of the child because of the relationship of
master and servant.
2. Yes. The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of
the truck, and of his chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests
on a different basis, namely, that of contract. The
reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of
the trial court concerning the position of the truck on
the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and
the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. In its
broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers
approaching a narrow bridge from opposite
directions, with neither being willing to slow up and
give the right of way to the other, with the inevitable
result of a
collision and an accident

Disposition
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment
appealed from will be modified, and the plaintiff will have
judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez,
Abelardo Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally,
for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of both instances.

RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242
ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985

NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA

FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was killed in a vehicular
collision (between Luna, driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa,
13 years old, driving a Toyota car without a license) at a gokart
practice area.
Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against Luis and his
father, which the CFI ruled in favor of the Lunas, awarding
P1,650,000 as unearned net earnings of Luna, P12,000
compensatory damages, and P50,000 for loss of his
companionship (come on!!), with legal interest from date of the
decision, and attorneys fees of P50,000 (no interest
mentioned). (Note: father and son solidarily liable for damages.)
The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which affirmed in toto the
RTC. In a MFR filed by the Dela Rosas, the CA modified the
decision, this time reducing the unearned income to P450,000.
Both parties filed separate petitions for review in the SC.
Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of merit. The
instant petition is the one filed by Lunas, contending that the CA
erred in reducing the award for unearned income, and that the
award for attys fees should include legal interest.
Pending the decision, the SC came out with a resolution
ordering the Dela Rosas, in the interest of justice (since the
death took place in 1970, and 15 years after the process of
litigation is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for
unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory damages,
P50,000 for loss of companionship, all with legal interest, and
attys fees of P50,000, within 30 days.
The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts, saying that they had
no cash money. The writ of execution produced only a nominal
amount. In the meantime, Luis is already of age, married, with 2
kids, and living in Spain but only causally employed (His
compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no
assets of his own as yet).

ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned income
2. WON the award for attys fees should have legal interest

HELD:
1. YES
Ratio: The reduction of the award of net unearned earnings had
no basis, thus is void.
Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of the net unearned
earnings on 2 factors: life expectancy of the deceased of
another 30 years, and an annual net income of P55,000
(P75,000 gross income less P20,000 personal expenses).
In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC considered the age
and health of the deceased. However, the CA modified this by
factoring in the engagement of Luna in car racing, thus
lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years. WRT to the gross
income, RTC considered the various positions the deceased
held at the time of his death, and the trend of his earnings over
the span of his last few years, thus coming up with a potential
gross income of P75,000. However, the CA increased the
annual personal expenses to P30,000, due to the escalating
gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net annual unearned
income to P45,000.
CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car racing reduced
the life expectancy. There is nothing on record that supports the
claim that the car racing was a dangerous and risky activity
tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna was
engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then go-
kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-
karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled conveyances. It
was error on the part of the CA to have disturbed the
determination of the RTC which it had previously affirmed.
Also, it was an error to increase the expenses without
increasing the gross income. It stands to reason that if his
annual personal expenses should increase because of the
escalating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto
R. Luna's social standing [a statement which lacks complete
basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income
would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof

2. YES
Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of
damages in a quasi-delict case and under the circumstances,

interest as part thereof may be adjudicated at the discretion of
the court.
(The attys fees should accrue interest from the date of filing of
the
compliant.)

Obiter:
The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v Hilll, where the
court held that A2180 applied to Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of his son, but since the son had
attained majority, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
became merely subsidiarily to that of his son. The Dela Rosas
now invoke that the father should also be held only subsidiarily.
To this contention, the court is unwilling to apply equity
instead of strict law because to do so will not serve the ends of
justice. Luis is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine
Courts. Also, he has no property in the Phils or elsewhere.

Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE, reinstating the
earlier decision with slight modification regarding the award of
attys fees.

LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(SPS
GOTIONG)
214 SCRA 16
REGALADO; September 18,1992

NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court.

FACTS
- respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of
Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident
which took place and from which she died on January 14,1979,
was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the
parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years
of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the
same event on the same date. - More than 2 years before their
deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts
until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell
after she found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
- January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused, prompting him
to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend,
Malou Alfonso
- January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from a
single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed
under Cresencio Libi, father of
Wendell
- both set of parents came up with versions of the story
Gotiongs:
> Wendell caused her death by shooting her and thereafter
turning the gun
on himself to commit
suicide Libis:
> an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased
or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of
the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have
caused Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate
any witness and thereby avoid
identification
- CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter's
vicarious liability under A2180 CC. CFI dismissed the complaint
for insufficiency of the evidence.
- IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis
subsidiarily liable

ISSUE
WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libis liable for
vicarious liability

HELD
YES
Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family required by law
in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of
the instruction and supervision of the child. Had the
defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities
of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach,
they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann
Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180 CC.
Reasoning
- undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the
absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the
point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however,
that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in
the determination of whether it was suicide or not as the body
was cleaned already in the funeral parlor
- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these
petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's
key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to
Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or
using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night
the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. We,
accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good
father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell
could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the
safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had
free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
- A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by A2180 CC
covers obligations wising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.'
- BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT
primary
> if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs of their minor
children is subsidiary, they they can neither invoke nor be
absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damages. But
if the liability id direct and primary, the diligence would
constitute a valid substantial defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF
PARENTS FOR QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS
CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT SUBSIDIARY
> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint tortfeasors) the
parent is also solidarily liable with the child. THE LIABILITY OF
PARENTS FOR FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT
SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS SO > RULES:
+ for civil liability from crimes committed by minors under the
legal authority and control or who live in the company of the
parents: PRIMARY = premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex
delicto by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without discernment
= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with discernment or 15-
21 (now 18)
+ liability effected against father or mother? BOTH PARENTS
AND THOSE
WHO EXERCISE PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE
MINOR
= youth welfare code
= FC: responsibility of parents
+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by minors: same
rules in A2180 and A2182
Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED

TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)
209 SCRA 518
Feliciano, J; 1992

NATURE
Appeal for review of CA decision

FACTS
- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then aged
ten, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries
which resulted in her death. He was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide but was acquitted and
exempted from criminal liability ob the ground that he had acted
without discernment. The adopting and natural parents of
Jennifer filed a civil complaint for damages against the parents
of Bundoc.


- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are not
the indispensable party in the action as their son adopted by the
spouses Rapisura on November 18, 1982 via an adoption
decree granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court agreed
with the respondents and dismissed the complaint.

- The case contained procedural questions which were
raised in the appeal.
The SC however decided to hear the appeal based on
substantial justice.

ISSUE
- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable party
to the tort action under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

HELD-
- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did not
retroactively transfer to and vested in the adopting parents at
the time the shooting incident occurred. The adopting parents
had no actual or physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the
incident as they were then in the US were they live. To do so
and hold them liable for the tortious act when be unfair and
unconscionable.

Reasoning-
- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on
quasi-delict against him under Article 2176. However, because
of his minority, the provision of Article 2180 would be
applicable. Article 2180 reads the obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible The father and, incase of his death or incapacity,
the mother are responsible for the damages caused by the
children who live in their company The responsibility treated
of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

- The principle of parental liability is designated as
vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed liability under the
Anglo-American tort law. Thus, under this doctrine, a person is
not only liable for torts committed by him also torts committed
by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom
he is responsibility. Thus parental liability is made a natural or
logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of the
parents which include the instructing, controlling, and
disciplining of the child. The presumption under law is that when
a child under their care commits a tortuous act the parents were
negligent in the performance of these duties and
responsibilities. As stated, sufficient proof can be presented to
overcome this presumption.

Disposition
Petition granted. Decision set aside.

MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
QUISUMBING
L-14342
LABRADOR; May 30, 1960

NATURE
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the son
of his co-plaintiffappellants Ana Pineda and Manuel L.
Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado is the son of defendant-
appellee Ciriaco L. Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and
Augusto Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes Catholic
School on Kanlaon, Quezon City.
- A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this case,
may be described as an empty nutshell used by children as a
piggy bank. On February 22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a result,
Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right cheek with a piece of
razor.

ISSUES
1. WON the teacher or head of the school should be held
responsible instead of the of the father since the incident of the
inflicting of the wound on respondent occurred in a Catholic
School (during recess time) 2. WON the moral damages fixed at
P2,000 are excessive.

HELD
1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
upon which petitioner rests his claim that the school where his
son was studying should be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
- It would be seem that the clause "so long as they
remain in their custody," contemplates a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control,
direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over
the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father
and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for
the torts of the pupil.
- Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar;
the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go
back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The
situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180
does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which
makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by
their minor children.

2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals may have
considered Augusto Mercado responsible for or guilty, of a
quasi-delict causing physical injuries, within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said court
considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed the
moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that
Augusto's resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried to intervene in
or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from
Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of
the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or
negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get
the pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the Court of Appeals,
we find that none of the cases mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, which authorizes the grant of moral damages, was
shown to have existed.
Consequently, the grant of moral damages is not justified.

PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548
TEEHANKEE; October 4, 1971

NATURE
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of law from a
decision of the CFI Manila.

FACTS
- Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old son,
Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive mechanics at
the Manila Technical Institute filed the action below for
damages arising from the death of their son at the hands of a
fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory
room of the said Institute.
- the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and one afternoon, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the
laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the
classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon
were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was
merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect
that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which
was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc
retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed
him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an
engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but
he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital.
He never regained consciousness; finally he died.
- Defendants were: Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time
when the incident occurred was a member of the Board of
Directors of the institute; Teodosio Valenton, the president
thereof; Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which

the deceased belonged; and Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student
of the deceased.
- At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a
single proprietorship, but lately, it was duly incorporated.
- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
- The trial court, however, absolved from liability the
three other defendantsofficials of the Manila Technical Institute,
in this wise:
In the opinion of the Court, this article(art.2180) of the Code is
not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the
situation where the control or influence of the teachers and
heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by
the pupil supersedes those of the parents...The clause "so long
as they remain in their custody" contemplated a situation where
the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control
or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents...There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived
and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendant officials of the school.

ISSUE
WON the school officials are jointly and severally liable as
tortfeasors with Daffon.

HELD
a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute,
Valenton and Quibulue, respectively)
Ratio The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so
long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis
and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing
principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some student themselves may inflict
willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.
Reasoning
- The lower court based its legal conclusion expressly
on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs. Court of Appeals, that "(I)t
would seem that the clause "so long as they remain in their
custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence. It is true that under the law abovequoted, teachers or
directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody,
but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades
and not to any academic educational
institution"
- phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach
the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and
the dicta in Mercado on which it relied, must now be deemed to
have been set aside by the present decision.
- At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last
paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage." In the light of the factual findings of the lower court's
decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability.
b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of
directors and the school) itself cannot be held similarly liable,
since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant
- the school had been incorporated since and therefore the
school itself, as thus incorporated, should have been brought in
as party defendant.

DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is modified so as to provide as
follows: .
1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue jointly and
severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of the deceased Dominador
Palisoc (a) P12,000.00 for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b)
P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory expenses; (c)
P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d) P10,000.00 for loss of
earning power and (e) P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the
costs of this action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3. dismissing
defendants' counterclaims. .

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
-I would like to clarify that the argument of the dissenting
opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and
school officers under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils
who are minors is not in accord with the plain text of the law.
- Examination of the article shows that where the
responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during
minority, the article expressly so provides, as in the case of the
parents and of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the
law had intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the
other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would
have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so
indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case
of persons under age. Further, it is not without significance that
- finally, that while in the case of parents and
guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and
wards end by law upon the latter reaching majority age, the
authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless
of the age of the latter.

MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
- I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down
by this Court in Mercado v. Court of Appeals. I think it is highly
unrealistic and conducive to unjust results, considering the size
of the enrollment in many of our educational institutions,
academic and non-academic, as well as the temper, attitudes
and often destructive activism of the students, to hold their
teachers and/or the administrative heads of the schools directly
liable for torts committed by them.
- It would demand responsibility without commensurate
authority, rendering teachers and school heads open to damage
suits for causes beyond their power to control.
- one other factor constrains me to dissent. The opinion
of the majority states: "Here, the parents of the student at fault,
defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of
age at the time of the tragic incident." Note that for parental
responsibility to arise the children must be minors who live in
their company...it stands to reason that (1) the clause "so long
as they remain in their custody" as used in reference to
teachers and school heads should be equated with the phrase
"who live in their company" as used in reference to parents; and
(2) that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused
by their children who are no longer minors, so should teachers
and school heads be exempt from liability for the tortious acts of
their students in the same age category.

AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO
DE SAN JOSERECOLLETOS)
160 SCRA 315
CRUZ; April 15, 1988

Facts:
It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes. Alfredo went to the school
to submit his Report in Physic. While they were in the
auditorium of their school, hewas shot to death by his classmate
Pablito Daffon.

ISSUE:
WON Art 2180 is applicable.

Held:
Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or non-
academic. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except
where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade
establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be
answerable.

There is really no substantial difference distinction between
the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance
is expected from the teacher over the student under their
control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school
where

he is teaching. x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at
present. x x x

The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and within
its premises, whether the semester has not ended, or has
ended or has not yet begun. The term custody signifies that
the student is within the control and influence of the school
authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or
sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at
the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present and in a
position to prevent it.

Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the
parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within
the premises of the school at any time when its authority could
be validly exercised over him.

In any event, the school may be held to answer for the acts of
its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of
respondent superior, but it may exculpate itself from liability by
proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus
paterfamilias. Such defense they had taken necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be
exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180.

Basis of teachers vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in
Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However teachers are not
expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that
imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal
in degree. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline
more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so
should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or
the head for the tort committed by the child.

As the teacher was not shown to have been negligent nor the
school remised in the discharged of their duties, they were
exonerated of liability.

(Note the court view on increasing students activism likely
causing violence resulting to injuries, in or out of the school
premises J. Guttierez, Jr concurringly said many student x x x
view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and or reactionary
group whose advice on behavior deportment and other non-
academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. It
seems most unfair to hold teacher liable on a presumption juris
tantum of negligence for acts of students even under
circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco
parentis relationship.

The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this case has
outlived its purpose. The court cannot make law, it can only
apply the law with its imperfections. However the court can
suggest that such a law should be amended or repealed.

PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
160 SCRA 785
PARAS; April 25, 1988

NATURE
Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that judgment be
rendered setting aside the questioned order dismissing the
complaint as against the respondent school and denying the
reconsideration of the questioned order of dismissal.

FACTS
- A group of students walking inside Araneta University
were accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led
by Abdul Karin Madidis alias Teng. Petitioner (Reynaldo)
was subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to be
hospitalized and to undergo surgery.
- Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Teng
and Arante University based on Art 2190 CC
- Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that the
provision only applies to vocational schools and not to
academic institutions. They also claim that the civil liability in
this case arose from a crime, which they did not commit. Since
it was a civil case, respondent school claims that a demand
should have been made by the plaintiff rendering it premature to
bring an action for damages against respondent school. MTD
was granted by the CA. - Petitioner mover to reconsider the
Order of Dismissal. Motion was denied due to insufficient
justification to disturb ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Art 2180 CC
10
applies to academic institutions

HELD
It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the petitioner wants
to know is WON the school or the university itself is liable. The
answer is no since the provision speaks of teachers or
heads

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

YLARDE vs. AQUINO
GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29

NATURE

FACTS

10
"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by
their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."

Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the
Gabaldon Primary School and private respondent Edgardo
Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was
littered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the
old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing
that the huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez
stated burying them all by himself.

Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo
Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to
eleven. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig
beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished.
The following day, also after classes, private respondent Aquino
called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the
digging. These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso, Fransico
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the
excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. At this
point, private respondent Aquino alone continued digging while
the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out the loose soil
that was brought about by the digging.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils
got out of the hole. Then, said private respondent left the
children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he
went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private
respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope. Before leaving,
private respondent Aquino
allegedly told the children "not to touch the stone."

A few minutes after private respondent Aquino left, three of the
four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into
the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down
towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to
scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately for
Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out,
pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result
thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died three (3) days later.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for
damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano.
The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with
their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the
demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence.

ISSUE
WON whether or not under Article 2176 and Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, both private respondents can be held liable for
damages.


Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter."

On the other hand, the applicable provision of Article 2180
states:

"Art. 2180. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody."

HELD
Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable.
Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be
made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the
head of an academic school and not a school of arts and
trades.
Reasoning:
This is in line with the Courts ruling in Amadora vs. Court of
Appeals, wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine
that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher
and not the head of an academic school who should be
answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court
went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the
head of the school who can be held liable.
Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the
children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his
failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury
on their persons. Reasoning:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual
laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to
make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he
knew to be a very hazardous task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even
after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was
lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any
pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation
when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of
falling;
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to check
on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the
excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
(6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident
that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This
should not be the case. The degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered
to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same
degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged
according to the average conduct of persons of his age and
experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion,
knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the
child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.

DISPOSITION
Granted.

SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO)
166 SCRA 274
PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988

FACTS
Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio Colleges
Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed armorer of the BCF
ROTC (under the control of AFP) was convicted of the crime of
Homicide for shooting Napoleon Castro, a student of the
University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in
the parking space of BCF. BCF is both an academic and arts
and trade Union and the ROTC Unit was under the control of
AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC
Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of
the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vice President of
BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education
and Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision, (1)
sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and
Baguio Colleges Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay
private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro; (2) absolving
the other defendants; and (3) dismissing the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of merit.

ISSUE
WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B.
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a
consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.

HELD
NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at
attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he
shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Ratio:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code,
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades are
hable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The
rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains
in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain
extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
[student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 'so long
as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as
they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time."
Reasoning:
a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused by the
CA. According to the CA, while it is true that Abon was not
attending any class or school function at the time of the
shooting incident, which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening;
but considering that Abon was employed as an armorer and
property custodian of the BCF ROTC unit, he must have been
attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening
was just about dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The
time interval is safely within the "recess time" that the trial court
spoke of and envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. In line with
the case of Palisoc,
17
a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the
concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the
school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within call of his
mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the
area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its
nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of
being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more
does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective
and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the
law.
b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working in the
armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC
Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL v
CA(Castillo/Cadiz)
194 SCRA 340
Paras, J.: Feb. 25,
1991

NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CA

FACTS
-Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at St. Francis HS
wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Quezon. His
parents didnt allow him to go due to short notice but directed

him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go straight
home. However, he was persuaded by his teachers to go and
later drowned in an attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.
-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis HS,
represented by its principal, Illumin, and several teachers for
damages incurred from the death of their son, contending that it
occurred due to petitioners failure to exercise proper diligence
of a good father of the family. The TC found against the
teachers as they had failed to exercise diligence by not testing
the waters in which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim.
Also, the male teachers who were to watch over the kids were
not even in the area as they went off drinking. The TC
dismissed the case against the principal and the teacher
Cadorna as the former had not consented to the picnic which
was not school sanctioned, and as the latter had her own class
to supervise then and was not actually invited.
-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of the liability of
St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the CA held that both are liable
under Article 2176 taken together with the 1
st
, 4
th
, and 5
th

paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot escape liability simply
because it wasnt an extra-curricular activity of the HS. From
the evidence, it was shown that the principal had known of the
picnic from its planning stage and merely acquiesced to the
holding of the event. As such, under Article 2180, both are
jointly and severally liable w/ the teachers for the damages
incurred as the negligence of the employees (teachers) gives
rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
owner/manager (St. Francis and the principal). Petitioners
contend that the victims parents failed to prove by evidence
that they didnt give their son consent to join the picnic. The
Court finds this immaterial to the determination of the existence
of their liability. Also, 2 of the teachers who arrived after the
drowning were absolved from liability as they had satisfactorily
explained their lateness and thus could not be said to have
participated in the negligence attributed to the other teachers.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE
(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the defendants
(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is applicable
(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper

HELD
(1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own
negligence or the negligence of people under them. At the
outset, it should be noted that the victims parents allowed their
son to join the picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical
cross examination.
-Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the picnic does
not show acquiescence or consent to it. If the CAs findings are
to be upheld, employers will be forever exposed to the risk and
danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or
omissions of their employees even if such acts or omissions are
committed while they are not in the performance of their duties.
-No negligence can be attributable to the teachers as the
presumption is overthrown by proof that they exercised
diligence of a good father of the family. In fact, 2 P.E. teachers
were invited as they were scout masters and had knowledge in
First Aid and swimming. Life savers were brought in the event
of such an accident. The records also show that the 2 P.E.
teachers did all that was humanly possible to save the victim.
(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180, particularly
par 4. For an employer to be held liable for the negligence of his
employee, the act or omission which caused damage or
prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the
performance of his assigned task. In the case at bar, the
teachers were not in actual performance of their duties as the
picnic was a purely private affair and not a school sanctioned
activity.
(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they had
exercised the diligence required of them, no moral or exemplary
damages under Art. 2177 may be awarded in favor of
respondent spouses.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is SET
ASIDE

PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA)
205 SCRA 729
Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992

FACTS
-Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3
rd
year commerce course of
PSBA, was stabbed and killed while on campus by assailants
who were from outside the schools academic community. This
prompted his parents to file suit with the RTC of Manila w/
Judge Ordonez-Benitez presiding for damages against PSBA
and its corporate officers, alleging negligence, recklessness and
lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during
and after the attack of the victim.
-PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that since they were
presumably sued under Art 2180, there was no cause of action
since academic institutions are not subject to the said provision.
-A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR were denied by
the TC, yielding the same results upon appeal with the CA.
Hence this petition.

ISSUES
(1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles 2176 and
2180

HELD
(1) NO. Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the parties, the rules on quasi-
delict do not really govern; but the court has repeatedly held
that the liability for a tort may still exist even when there is a
contract.
-Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad: the mere fact that a
person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a
breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extracontractual obligation had no contract existed between the
parties -Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to PSBAs liability; hence, any finding of
negligence would generally give rise to a breach of contractual
obligation only.
-When an academic institution accepts a student for enrollment,
a contract is established between them, resulting in a bilateral
obligation. The school is obliged to provide the student with an
education, along with a safe atmosphere that promotes the
undertaking of imparting knowledge. In turn, the student abides
by the schools academic requirements and observes its rules
and regulations. However, a school cannot be an insurer for its
students against all risks; one can only expect it to employ the
degree of diligence required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
- In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as to whether the
contract was breached due to PSBAs negligence in providing
proper security measures. At this stage, the proceedings have
yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents
complaint and the record is bereft of all material facts which
only the TC can determine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of origin is
hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with
this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.

SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON
209 SCAR 47
FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992

NATURE
Civil complaint for damages
FACTS
- On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo
Soliman, Jr., a student of the defendant Republic Central
Colleges (RCC), was in the campus premises thereof, the
defendant, Jimmy Solomon, who was then in the premises of
said school performing his duties as security guard under the
employment of defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., without
any provocation, shot the plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff
was confined in a hospital, and as per doctor's opinion, he may
not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be
incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months. Petitioner, represented by
his guardian, filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC,
RL Security Agency and Solomon,
- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
complaint stated no cause of action against it. It argued that it is
free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner
student for the reason that it was not the employer of the
security guard Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any
wrongful act of Solomon. It further argued that Article 2180, 7th
paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph
holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the school.

- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted RCCs
motion to dismiss.
Petitioners MFR was denied, Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles 2180,
as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code
2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other basis
in law, for the injury
sustained by petitioner
HELD
1. NO
- Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for damage
inflicted by one against another by fault or negligence exists not
only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or
omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible.
Among the persons held vicariously responsible for acts or
omissions of another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helper, acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
- The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for
holding RCC liable for the alleged wrongful acts the of security
guard Solomon inflicted upon Soliman, Jr. RCC was not the
employer of Solomon. The employer of Solomon was the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client of the
latter. It is settled that where the security agency, as here,
recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security
guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or
watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the
security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the
clients of such agency. There being no employer-employee
relationship between RCC and Solomon, petitioner cannot
impose vicarious liability upon the RCC for the acts of
Solomon.
- Since there is no question that Solomon was not a
pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in
fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other
above-quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
similarly not available for imposing liability upon the RCC for the
acts of Solomon.
- The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil
Code invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute
parental authority:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to
apprentices;
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor
and student are fixed by government regulations and those of
each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment
be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student."
- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the owner and
president of a school of arts and trades known as the Manila
Technical Institute responsible in damages for the death of
Palisoc, a student of that Institute, which resulted from fist blows
delivered by Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be
seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly
within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but
those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the
instant case.
- Persons exercising substitute parental authority are
made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by
the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority.
In the instant case, Solomon who committed allegedly tortious
acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no
substitute parental authority over Solomon.
2. YES
- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that Article
2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had
been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom
the school did not exercise any custody or control or
supervision. At the same time, however, the court stressed that
an implied contract may be held to be established between a
school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand,
and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which
contract results in obligations for both parties. It held: When an
academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part,
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On
the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or
'built-in' obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or
explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets
are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms
around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are
taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises
and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
- It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is,
as yet, no finding that the contract between school and Bautista
had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing
proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the
same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence
of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the
contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other
words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs
under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
- In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the
school's motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the
CA and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at
bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by RCC,
upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was
based, and could have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious
or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual or other legal obligation.
Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed
that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge
should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should
have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts
constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege on
the part of RCC.
Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the Petition, to treat the
comment of respondent Colleges as its answer, and to
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to
dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to the court a quo
for further proceedings.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
PARDO, February 6, 2002

NATURE
Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution denying MFR

FACTS
(this case was already assigned in PFR)
-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel II (then 15,
driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva (then in possession and
was driving the jeep, Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the
owner of the jeep) and other companions were on their way to
an enrollment drive for the Petitioner school when the vehicle
turned turtle. It was found out that the steering wheel guide was
detached.
Carpitanos sued the school, James Daniel II, his parents, and
Vivencio Villanueva.
-TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II, held parents and
school liable -CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC, finding
that school was negligent in letting a minor drive the vehicle
without a teacher accompanying them.

ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Marys Academy)

WON St. Marys Academy should be held liable for death of
Sherwin
Carpitanos, and therefore, liable for damages

HELD
NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only
a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and
the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be shown that the
injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.
Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that the negligence
of the school was the proximate cause of the death of the
victim. -The cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of
Vivencio Villanueva.
-Respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the
school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II so
reliance on A219 is unfounded. -There was no evidence that
petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva
was in possession and in control of the jeep, and was in fact the
one who allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.
-Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of
the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents
primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was
only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause
and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors
parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
- It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who
shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the
trial court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner
St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM
FORWARDERS
63 SCRA 231
AQUINO; March 25, 1975

NATURE
Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS
- PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix
PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages in an action
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana against PHIL-
AMERICAN FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT and
the driver, PINEDA.
- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a freight
TRUCK, owned by PhilAm, along the natl highway at Sto.
Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the BUS driven by
Pangalangan, owned by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan suffered
injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for 79
days. This deprived the company of earnings of about P8,600. -
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants was that
Balingit was not Pineda's employer. Balingit moved that the
complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus
company and the bus driver had no cause of action against him.
- CFI dismissed their complaint against BALINGIT on
the ground that he was not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in Art.2180 CC. - In the appeal, the bus company
also argued that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of
Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of
P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40T. This
implied that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and
that Phil-Am and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one
and the same civil personality. But this was not alleged in their
complaint.*

ISSUE
WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise" used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903
OCC) embrace the manager
of a corporation owning a truck (this is
a novel and unprecedented legal
issue!)

HELD
NO
Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers of
Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term "manager"
("director" in the Spanish version) to mean "employer.
- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with
the vehicular accident because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
* This issue was not raised in the lower court so it would be
unfair to allow them to do so now. The case has to be decided
on the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was
assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate and distinct
from that of the Balingit spouses. Dispositive Lower courts
order of dismissal is AFFIRMED.

PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA)
273 SCRA 562
DAVIDE; June 17, 1997

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA

FACTS
-Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein petitioners for
damages instituted by the heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta
-Private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of
gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and
regulations, abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from
a crime
Private Respondents Version
-In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about 6:00 oclock, the
victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle
along the Gomez Street
-On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity) Bus No. 4025 driven by
defendant Manilhig was being pushed by some persons in order
to start its engine.
-The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to Gomez St. and the
said Philtranco bus 4025 was heading in the general direction of
the said Gomez Street.
-As the bus was pushed, its engine started thereby the bus
continued on its running motion and it occurred at the time
when Ramon A. Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was
directly in front of the said bus.
-As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and
suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the said
functioning engine, thereby the subject bus bumped on the
victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell and,
thereafter, was run over by the said bus.
Petitioners Version
-Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to Pasay City, warmed
up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city
proper of Calbayog. -While the bus was slowly and moderately
cruising along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking
towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly overtook two
tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road.
-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig
applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the victim was
bumped from behind and run over by the bus.
-Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent
record as a driver and had undergone months of rigid training
before he was hired.
-Petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the
victim in overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions
such as seeing first that the road was clear, which caused the
death of the victim
**Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents

-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and
denied MFR
-Hence, this appeal

ISSUE
11

WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with Manilhig for
damages

HELD
Yes.
-Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages based on quasi-
delict under Article 2176
12
and 2180
15
of the Civil Code against
petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco,
respectively.
-We have consistently held that the liability of the registered
owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco,
for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is
primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the
driver. As to solidarity, Article 2194 expressly provides: the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.
-Since the employer's liability is primary, direct and solidary, its
only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to
recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the
fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on
quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever
pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in
satisfaction of the claim.

Disposition
Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this issue)

CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ
Dec. 21, 1999. Davide

Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente
Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the
normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective
helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit
to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was
a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation,
registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no.
GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said
company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the
Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the
traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to
Belvic St.

11
(limited to that involved in the outline)

12
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the
pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries
to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to
the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's
Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was
there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible
Party (Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital
bills, professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez
may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the
investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was filed against
Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced
by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the
deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad

15
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry. xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage

and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action, Cebu
Doctor's Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the
medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.

Issue: WON an employer may be held vicariously liable for the
death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial
employee of a company-issued vehicle.

Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The negligence of
ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner CASTILEX
presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously
liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is
not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore
not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph
should apply. Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is
not accurate. The phrase "even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth
paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary
for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to
be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within
the scope of his assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the two
provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions
apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth
paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers negligent
acts of employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth
paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting
within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an
expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts
included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so
long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the branches
nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly,
employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform
functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but
which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.This court
has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer
was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators
and banks. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted
in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
to this case. Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether
or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is
liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of
his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employeremployee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff
must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer
may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager
of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to
whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a
question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals
resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great
respect, and even finality at times. This rule is, however, subject
to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain
in the present case to warrant review by this Court of the finding
of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner's
vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a
manager.
On the issue of whether the private respondents have
sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within the scope
of his assigned tasks, ABAD, who was presented as a hostile
witness, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving
a company-issued vehicle, registered under the name of
petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had
some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done
overtime work for the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast
rule can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the
problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is
engaged in his employer's business in the operation of a motor
vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employee's action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with
each state of facts. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals
were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a
company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned

tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. The SC does
not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said
vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle
within the course or scope of his employment. It used the
principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability
for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an employee in the
use of an employer's motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employer's Motor Vehicle in
Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his
employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he
intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not
ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the
absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the
employer. Evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go
to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-
off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties
supports the findings that an employee is acting within the
scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.
II. Operation of Employer's Vehicle in Going to
or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of
work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the
employee, and not a part of his services to his employer.
Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to the employer
other than the mere performance of the services available at the
place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the
scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's
motor vehicle. 14 cda
The employer may, however, be liable where he
derives some special benefit from having the employee drive
home in the employer's vehicle as when the employer benefits
from having the employee at work earlier and, presumably,
spending more time at his actual duties. Where the employee's
duties require him to circulate in a general area with no fixed
place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to various
outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a
vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied
what has been called the "special errand" or "roving
commission" rule, under which it can be found that the
employee continues in the service of his employer until he
actually reaches home. However, even if the employee be
deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in
going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is
not liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident,
the employee has left the direct route to his work or back home
and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employer's Vehicle Outside Regular
Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an
employee for the latter's personal use outside of regular working
hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use,
even where the employer contemplates that a regularly
assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is some
incidental benefit to the employer. Even where the employee's
personal purpose in using the vehicle has been accomplished
and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle
is normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his
employment, and the employer is not liable for the employee's
negligent operation of the vehicle during the return trip.
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are
applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior, not on the principle of bonus pater familias
as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is
conclusive on his employer as in American law or
jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris
tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer's
business or within the scope of his assigned task. ABAD was
engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a
vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the
normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his
overtime work had already been completed. His being at a
place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to
his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even
for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of
the perks attached to his position.

FILAMER V IAC
212 SCRA 637
GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992

NATURE
Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS
- Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also employed as
a janitor. The president of FCI is Agustin Masa. Agustin has a
son, Allan, who is the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. Allan
lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in the presidents house
free of charge while a student at FCI. - It is the practice of the
driver (Allan) after classes to bring the kids home, then go back
to the school, then go home in the school jeep. He is allowed to
bring home the jeep because in the morning hes supposed to
fetch the kids and bring them to school.
- One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He has a
student license. After a dangerous curb, and seeing that the
road was clear, Allan let Funtecha drive. Then there was a fast
moving truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights. Funtecha
swerved right and hit the pedestrian Kapunan. Kapunan was
walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic (I
think ito yung tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The
jeep had only one functioning headlight that night.
- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC reversed,
saying that FCI is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha
on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for
whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily
answerable.

ISSUE
WON the employer of the janitor driving the school jeep can be
held liable

HELD
YES
- Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the
school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an
act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school.
Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he
can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
day. - It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school
president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven
home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that
the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's
possession of a student driver's license and his desire to
undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms. - In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle
home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was
not, having a joy ride Funtecha was not driving for the purpose
of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the
service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner
school. The act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel
was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act
the petitionerschool cannot deny any responsibility by arguing
that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The
clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of
raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any
act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the
employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act,
the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in
furtherance of his master's business.
- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He need
not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order
that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time
of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the
fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting
with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the
petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family
over its employees Funtecha and Allan. There were no rules
and regulations prohibiting the use of the school jeep by
persons other than the driver. There was thus no supervision on
the part of FCI over its employees with regard to the use of the
jeep. - The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages
for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha

drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the
vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. The
liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against
the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the
heirs of the plaintiff.

NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)
294 CRA 209
ROMERO; August 14,
1998

NATURE

FACTS
- On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks
owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi
City bound for Iligan City. Unfortunately, enroute to its
destination, one of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured
in a head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident
resulted in the death of three persons riding in the Toyota
Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other
passengers. - The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for
damages against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO is
a contractor of NPC with the main duty of supplying workers
and technicians for the latter's projects, but in this case it was
alleged that they own the dump trucks).
- The trial court rendered a decision absolving NPC of
any liability. PHESCO appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the trial court's judgment absolving PHESCO and
sentencing NPC to pay damages.

ISSUE
WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dump truck,
which should
be solidarily liable for the damages to the victims

HELD
YES
- In the provisions of the "Memorandum of
Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC, we are
convinced that PHESCO was engaged in "labor only"
contracting. In a "labor only" contract, the person acting as
contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of
the principal who is responsible to the workers in the same
manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly
employed by him. Finding that a contractor was a "labor-only"
contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor)
and the "laboronly" contractor, including the latter's workers. -
Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
any business or industry." - In this regard, NPC's liability is
direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of
course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall
have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed
the negligence which gave rise to the action.

DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO
ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the
Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
VITUG, J /February 6, 2003
397 SCRA 75

NATURE: APPEAL from CAs DECISION
- 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). - While Navidad was
standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin,
the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. -
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
- No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how
the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first
blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train,
operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad
was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.
- Marjorie Navidad (Nicanors widow), along with their
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of
her husband.
- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent.
Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
security guards.
- The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while
Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a
demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. - TC: Rendered in
favor of the Navidads and against the Prudent Security and
Junelito Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and severally
the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2) Compensatory
damages of P443,520.00; 3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor
Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of
P50,000.00; c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; d) Costs of suit.
- TC: dismissed complaint against defendants LRTA
and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.
-Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and
Roman jointly and severally liable for the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00 as nominal
damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; d) P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of the deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as
and for attorneys fees.
-CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then
as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had
already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and
getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent
from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link
the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad
failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim
and the evidence merely established the fact of death of
Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned
and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.
The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
- CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of 10 October 2000.

ISSUES:
WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO
ROMAN IS AN
EMPLOYEE OF LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH
OF NAVIDAD

LRTAs CLAIMS:
-Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall
on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been
foreseen or prevented. - NO employer-employee relationship
between Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had
testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the
LRTA. Navidads Contention:
- A contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment
Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate
court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed
upon a common carrier.

HELD:
1. NO. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of
carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from
the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers,

a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of
the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake
the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
- PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for tort
under the provisions of Article 2176
12
and related provisions, in
conjunction with Article 2180,
13
of the Civil Code. (But there
wasnt any evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death of
Navidad in this case- SC) The premise, however, for the
employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. - Once such fault is established, the employer can
then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris
families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a
factual matter that has not been shown.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and
when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting
in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194
14
of the Civil Code can well apply.
- In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract
would have itself constituted the source of a quasidelictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.
2. YES.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability
as Prudent is. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his
own fault or negligence.

REASONING:
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy,
is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in
ensuring the safety of passengers. - The Civil Code, governing
the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees
may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a
good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission."

-The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all circumstances.
- Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip
but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage
- The statutory provisions render a common carrier
liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the
negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if
the common carriers employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
- In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed
to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of
injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to
an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident
occurred, which LRTA and Roman, according to the CA, have
failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at
fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must
be proved.
DISPOSITION: CAS DECISION AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal
damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is
absolved from liability. No costs.
______________
12
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
13

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages
caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
any business or industry. The State is responsible in like
manner when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done
properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176
shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
14
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO)
221 SCRA 517
Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992

NATURE
- Petition to review the resolution of the CA
FACTS
- On January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along
MacArthur Highway, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place
between an International cargo truck, Loadstar, owned by
private respondents, Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo, and
driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose
Koh. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim
McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George
McKee, Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee, all passengers
of the Ford Escort.
- Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck,
which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice weighing about
10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San
Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from
San Fernando. When the northbound car was about 10 meters
away from the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane
of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of
whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose
Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered
the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the
car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his
lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The
collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the
opposite lane, on the said bridge. - Please see first Mckee
digest for details on the collision. - Civil cases for damages
based on quasi-delict were filed as a result of a vehicular
accident.
ISSUE
WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and Manalo) are
liable for the
resulting damages

HELD
YES
- The Court rules that it was the truck driver's
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision
which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As
employers of the truck driver, Manalo and Tayag are, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the
resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180
reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in
the selection and supervision of employees.
- The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases Nos.
4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they
attempt to prove it.

VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL,
INC.)
253 SCRA 303
KAPUNAN; February 7,
1996

NATURE

FACTS
- Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she
realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk of
Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car,
and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the
left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who
will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a
car driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name
of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
- Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed,
and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle
of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the
rest of the body. She was confined in the hospital for twenty
(20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She
filed a claim for damages against defendant.
- Lis alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he
was suddenly confronted with a speeding car coming from the
opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to the right to avoid
colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car,
which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with
no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was
poorly lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that plaintiff was the one who was reckless or
negligent.
-RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA absolved
Alexander.

ISSUE
1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the company issued
car
2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence
3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Lis employer

HELD
1. YES
- The average motorist alert to road conditions will
have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling at the
speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the
street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would have had ample
time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were
alert as every driver should be to those conditions. Driving
exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological "fight
or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms
were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.
Li's failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the
accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of
the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as
testified by one of the witneses; and 2) that he was under the
influence of alcohol. Either factor working independently would
have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since
normally he would have slowed down prior to reaching
Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes. - Li was, therefore, negligent in
driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer 2. NO
- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection. Under the "emergency rule"
adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger
and is required to act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
- While the emergency rule applies to those cases in
which reflective thought or the opportunity to adequately weigh
a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required
of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the
suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful
care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both
convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where
she would likely find no one to help her.
- Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct
which creates an undue risk of harm to others. It is the failure to
observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.
3. YES
- Since important business transactions and decisions
may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all
kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a
company car therefore principally serves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private
purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the
managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
providing for a company car for business use and/or for the
purpose of furthering the company's image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or
other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a
company issued car are able to use the company issue capably
and responsibly.
- In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company
car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the
company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain
the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and
unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to
overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be
absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said
company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought
to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries
sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.

MERRITT v GOVERNMENT
34 Phil 311
TRENT; March 31, 1916

NATURE
Appeal from decision of the CFI

FACTS
- E. Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was hit by the
General Hospital ambulance, which turned suddenly and
unexpectedly to Taft Avenue without sounding any whistle or

horn, in contravention of an ordinance and the Motor Vehicle
Act.
- Plaintiff was so severely injured. His leg showed a
contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his
leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture.
Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the
functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was
slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental
condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the
plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he
attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.
- Witnesses testified that plaintiffs physical and mental
condition before the accident was excellent. He was one of the
best contractors of wooden buildings. He could not now earn
even a half of the income that he had secured for his work
because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. He had to
dissolve a partnership that he had with an engineer and give up
a contract for the construction of a building.
- Trial court held that the collision was due solely on
the negligence of the chauffeur and awarded the plaintiff the
sum of P14, 741. - Act No. 2457 was enacted. It states that
E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of
the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages,
if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is
hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the
behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said
Government
at the same.

ISSUES
WON the government is liable for the damages resulting from a
tort
committed by an agent or employee of the government

HELD
NO
Ratio The State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers
and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903.
Reasoning
- In the United States the rule is that the state is not
liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative
enactment. The Government does not undertake to guarantee
to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it
employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in
endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest. - As to the scope of
legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state
where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract,
the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its
immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized.
It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
- Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by
the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article
shall be applicable.
- The obligation to indemnify for damages which a third
person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as
is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the
person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in
the act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It
follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of
law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees
in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on
the part of the state in the organization of branches of public
service and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we
must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in
order that each branch of service serves the general weal an
that of private persons interested in its operation. Between
these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private
nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case
where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations.
- The Civil Code in chap 2, title 16, book 4, regulates
the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and
whereas in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general
principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or
omission causes damage to another through fault or
negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done,
reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who
directly or indirectly cause the damage, the following articles
refers to this persons and imposes an identical obligation upon
those who maintain fixed relations of authority and superiority
over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that
in consequence of such relations the evil caused by their own
fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption
gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the last
paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons
ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to
answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in
addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians
and owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the
state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of
a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the
fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of
objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
- Although in some cases the state might by virtue of
the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the
damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or
resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches
of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression
of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet
said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to
have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official,
acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce
the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of
the property which they hold in sublease.
- The responsibility of the state is limited by article
1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign
to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to
act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law
and the regulations.
- The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where
the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public
official charged with some administrative or technical office who
can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down
by the law of civil responsibility.
- The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an
agent within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903
On the computation of damages
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which
are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award
awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount
allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was
incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find nothing in
the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the
first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so
found, that the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth
P1,000 per month. The court, however, limited the time to
2months and 21 days, which the plaintiff was actually confined
in the hospital. In this we think there was error, because it was
clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for
a period of 6 months. The mere fact that he remained in the
hospital only 2 months and 21 days while the remainder of the 6
months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for
the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is
P18,075.
Dispositive Judgment appealed from reversed. Whether the
Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount
of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by
reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by

legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests
solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

ROSETE v AUDITOR GENERAL
81 Phil 453 FERIA;
August 31, 1948

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the Insular Auditor

FACTS
- Jose Panlilio ignited his lighter near a drum into which
gasoline was being drained causing fire in the warehouse of
Emergency Control Administration (ECA, a government
agency).
- The fire destroyed the building owned by the
petitioner, thereby giving rise to this claim for damages against
Panlilio for his negligence and the officers of ECA for storing
gasoline in said warehouse contrary to the provisions of
ordinances of the City of Manila (ordinance requires a license
for storing flammable substances, which ECA didnt have). -
Insular Auditor dismissed the claim hence this appeal.

ISSUE
WON the government is liable for the damages

HELD
NO
- Art. 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 1903. The obligation imposed in the preceding
article is enforceable not only for personal acts and
omission but also for those persons for whom another
is responsible.

xx

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through
a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom it properly
pertained to do the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.

- In the case of Merritt v. Government, the court held
the following:
The state is not responsible for the damage
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office n relations of a
private nature governed by the civil law can arise
except in a case where the state acts as a juridical
person capable of acquiring rights and contracting
obligations.

xx

That the responsibility of the state is limited by
article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order by the commission,
foreign to the exercise of duties of his office if he is a
special official) so that in representation of the state
and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him.
- There being no showing that whatever negligence
may be imputed to the ECA or its officers, was done by a
special agent, because the officers of the ECA did not act as
special agents of the government within the above defined
meaning of that wod in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing
gasoline in the warehouse of ECA, the government is not
responsible for damages caused through such negligence.
- Although there is an act (Act No. 327) authorizing the
filing of claims against the government with the Insular Auditor,
and appeal by private persons or entities from the latters
decision to the Supreme Court, it does not make any and all
claims against the government allowable, and the latter
responsible for all claims.

DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is affirmed.

MENDOZA V. DE
LEON

FONTANILLA V MALIAMAN and NATIONAL
IRRIGATION
ADMINSITRATION
194 SCRA 486
PARAS; February 27, 1991

NATURE
Resolution

FACTS
- The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains that
it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions, but is an agency of the government tasked with
governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the
tortuous act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special
agent.
o NIA believes this bases this on:
PD 552 amended some
provisions of RA 3601 (the law which created
the NIA)
The case of Angat River
Irrigation System v. Angat River Workers
Union
- Angat Case: Although the majority opinion declares that
the Angat System, like the NIA, exercised a governmental
function because the nature of its powers and functions
does not show that it was intended to bring to the
Government any special corporate benefit or pecuniary
profit, a strong dissenting opinion held that Angat River
system is a government entity exercising proprietary
functions.
- The Angat dissenting opinion:
- Alegre protested the announced termination of his
employment. He argued that although his contract did
stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976,
since his services were necessary and desirable in the
usual business of his employer, and his employment had
lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of regular
employee and could not be removed except for valid
cause.
- The employment contract of 1971 was executed when the
Labor Code of the Philippines had not yet been
promulgated, which came into effect some 3 years after
the perfection of the contract.

ISSUE
WON the NIR is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government, thereby
opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the
damages caused by its driver, who was not its special agent

HELD YES
Reasoning the functions of government have been classified
into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant.
The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered
as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of
proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.

The National Irrigation Administration was not created for
purposes of local government. While it may be true that the NIA
was essentially a service agency of the government aimed at
promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not
make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function"
corporation. NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump
irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a
whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders,
but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the
agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
NIA is a government agency invested with a corporate
personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is
governed by the Corporation Law. Section 1 of Republic Act No.
3601 provides:
Sec. 1. Name and Domicile A body corporate is hereby
created which shall be known as the National Irrigation
Administration. . . . which shall be organized immediately after

the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of
business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in
all provinces, for the proper conduct of its business. (Emphasis
for emphasis).
Besides, Section 2, subsection b of P.D. 552 provides that:
(b) To charge and collect from the beneficiaries of the water
from all irrigation systems constructed by or under its
administration, such fees or administration charges as may be
necessary to cover the cost of operation, maintenance and
insurance, and to recover the cost of construction within a
reasonable period of time to the extent consistent with
government policy; to recover funds or portions thereof
expended for the construction and/or rehabilitation of communal
irrigation systems which funds shall accrue to a special fund for
irrigation development under section 2 hereof;
Unpaid irrigation fees or administration charges shall be
preferred liens first, upon the land benefited, and then on the
crops raised thereon, which liens shall have preference over all
other liens except for taxes on the land, and such preferred
liens shall not be removed until all fees or administration
charges are paid or the property is levied upon and sold by the
National Irrigation Administration for the satisfaction thereof. . . .
The same section also provides that NIA may sue and be sued
in court. It has its own assets and liabilities. It also has
corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of Directors.
Section 2, subsection (f): (f) . . . and to transact such business,
as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to
the attainment of the above powers and objectives, including
the power to establish and maintain subsidiaries, and in
general, to exercise all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
DISPOSITION We conclude that the National Irrigation
Administration is a government agency with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not
a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held
liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver
who was not its special agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated January
26, 1990 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. The decision of this Court
in G.R. No. 55963 and G.R. No. 61045 dated December 1,
1989 is hereby AFFIRMED. DISSENTING: PADILLA: to say
that NIA has opened itself to suit is one thing; to say that it is
liable for damages arising from tort committed by its employees,
is still another thing.
The state or a government agency performing governmental
functions may be held liable for tort committed by its employees
only when it acts through a special agent.

CITY OF MANILA V TEOTICA
22 SCRA 267
CONCEPCION; January 29, 1968

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS
- Genaro N. Teotico, an accountant, was at the corner
of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, waiting for a
jeep. After waiting 5 mins, he hailed a jeep that came to a stop.
As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeep, and took a
few steps, he fell inside a manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due
to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his
eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left
eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the
manhole. One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General
Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was
taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper
eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left
upper arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an
abrasion on the right infra-patella region. These injuries and the
allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered
to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a
private practitioner.
- Teotico filed with CFI Manila, a complaint which was,
subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila,
its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and
chief of police.
- Defense pointed out that because of the lucrative
scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin
covers was rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has
filed complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers;
that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by
constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement
covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these
changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time
whenever funds were available.
- CFI Manila sustained the theory of the defendants
and dismissed the amended complaint, without costs.
- This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned,
which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate
sum of P6,750.00.

Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
- The first issue raised by the Manila is whether the
present case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of
the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries
to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from
negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
- Manila maintains that the former provision should
prevail over the latter, because RA 409, is a special law,
intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil
Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.

ISSUES
WON City of Manila should be held liable for the damages
suffered by Teotica.

HELD
YES.
Ratio RA 409,sec.4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in
general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189,
CC governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective
condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Reasoning The assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a
national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. At any
rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads
or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision"
over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were,
therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City
of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos
Avenue is under the control or supervision of the City of Manila
and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with
the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court
of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of
said Court thereon are not subject to our review. Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. Voting
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

ARANETA v JOYA
57 SCRA 59 CASTRO
J.: May 24, 1974

FACTS:
-An employee of the Ace ADVERTISING Company was sent to
the States to pursue studies in television. When asked about
the expenses of the trip, respondent answered that these were
not shouldered by the company and instead by other parties
-while abroad, he continued to receive his salaries in the form of
vouchers ordered and signed by respondent Joya. The
petitioner signed three of these checks. The others were signed
by either the respondent, or Vicente Araneta (company
treasurer) who put up part of the bill connected with Taylor's trip
and also handed him letters for delivery in the United States.
The Ace Advertising disbursed P5,043.20, all told, on account
of Taylor's travel and studies

-the Ace Advertising filed a complaint with the court of first
instance of Manila against the respondent for recovery of the
total sum disbursed to Taylor, alleging that the trip was made
without its knowledge, authority or ratification. The respondent,
in his answer, denied the charge and claimed that the trip was
nonetheless ratified by the company's board of directors, and
that in any event under the by-laws he had the discretion, as
general manager, to authorize the trip which was for the
company's benefit -Joya also filed a 3rd party complaint against
the two Aranetas proving that they were involved in sending
Taylor abroad
-trial court rendered judgment ordering the respondent to pay
the Ace Advertising "the sum of P5,043.20 with interest at the
legal rate from August 23, 1954 until full payment. 3rd party
complaint dismissed -CA affirmed however dismissal of 3rd
party complaint was reversed stating that Taylor's trip had been
neither authorized nor ratified by the company -CA noted that
based on the facts, both petitioners knew and through their acts
showed that they approved of the trip. were also privy to
the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly
with the appellant; what had happened was in truth and in fact a
venture by them given their stamp of approval; and as it was an
unauthorized act of expenditure of corporate funds, and it was
these three without whose acts the same could not have
happened, the juridical situation was a simple quasi-delict by
them committed upon the corporation, for which solidary liability
should have been
imposed upon all in the first place

ISSUE:
WON petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

HELD: Yes
- The petitioner's assertion that he signed the questioned
payroll checks in good faith has not been substantiated, he in
particular not having testified or offered testimony to prove such
claim. Upon the contrary, in spite of his being a vice-president
and director of the Ace Advertising, the petitioner remained
passive, throughout the period of Taylor's stay abroad,
concerning the unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds
for the latter. This plus the fact that he even approved thrice
payroll checks for the payment of Taylor's salary, demonstrate
quite distinctly that the petitioner neglected to perform his duties
properly, to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer.

-The fact that he was occupying a contractual position at the
Ace Advertising is of no moment. The existence of a contract
between the parties, as has been repeatedly held by this Court,
constitutes no bar to the commission of a
tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages

TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT
CIVIL ACTION

LIM v DE LEON
G.R. No. L-22554
MARTIN; August 29, 1975

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the CFI

FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain Alberto
Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A
year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the
motor launch from him.
- After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal
Francisco Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force
and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha.
- June 15, 1962, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon,
upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan
requesting him to direct the detachment commander in Balabac
to impound and take custody of the motor launch.
- Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the
Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining
that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-appellant Delfin
Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same.
Upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee
Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander of Balabac,
Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
- Plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim pleaded with Orlando
Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused.
Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations
with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return the seized property to
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim but Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused,
on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal
offense.

ISSUES
1. WON defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had
the power to order the seizure of the motor launch in question
without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime
2. WON defendants-appellees are civilly liable to
plaintiffs-appellants for damages allegedly suffered by them
granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful

HELD
1. NO
- Defendant-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela
entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor
launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he
effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and
without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that
without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right
to enter the premises of another without his consent for the
purpose of search and seizure. And since in the present case
defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a
warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-
appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.
2. YES
- Plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages on
Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which provide in
part as follows:

"ART. 32.Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
xxx
"(9)The rights to be secure in one's person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
xxx
"The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated."

"ART. 2219.Moral damages may be recovered in the
xxx
"(6)Illegal search;
xxx
"(1)Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 36."

- Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose
constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to
actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee
responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also
be awarded.

DISPOSITION Decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one entered declaring the seizure illegal and ordering
defendant-appellee Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon to pay to
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim the sum of P3,000.00 as actual
damages, plus P1,000.00 moral damages, and, in addition,
P750.00 for attorney's fees.

ABERCA V VER

G.R. No. L-69866
YAP; April 15, 1988

NATURE: Petition for certiorari
FACTS
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and
other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian
Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports
about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,"
Plaintiffs allegations: That complying with said order of Ver,
elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during
these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a
number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that
plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in
violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men
who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other
forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory
information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all
violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a
concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and
incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass
and punish them, said plans being previously known to and
sanctioned by defendants.
Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages of P39,030;
moral damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M;
exemplary damages of at least P150K each or a total of P3M;
and attorney's fees not less than P200K.
Respondents contentions: A motion to dismiss was filed by
defendants, through their counsel, then Sol-Gen. Estelito
Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial
inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the
present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the
complaint states no cause of action against the defendants.
ISSUES
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. 2. WON a
superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his
subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and
liberties have been violated.
3. WON trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with
respect to (dome of the) plaintiffs on the basis of the alleged
failure of said plaintiffs to file MFR
of the court's resolution granting the respondent's motion to
dismiss
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid
an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is
merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention
through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Reasoning: [a] The purpose Art. 32 CC is to provide a sanction
to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the
Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate
those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or
of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to
yield to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and
liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient
needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. [b] The
invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally
misplaced. It cannot be construed as a blanket license or a
roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint,
to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution.
The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which
all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times. [c] Art. 32 of CC which renders any
public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of
another does not exempt the respondents from responsibility.
Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of
the RPC or other penal statute. [d] Even assuming that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal
arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights
and causes of action for injuries suffered because of
respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the
violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
2. NO
Ratio: Although the doctrine of respondent superior is
applicable to the case, as contended by respondents, the
decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32 CC. The
law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or
"indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional
rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e.
the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to
answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party
Reasoning: [a] The doctrine of respondent superior has been
generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to
master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship.
No such relationship exists between superior officers of the
military and their subordinates. But in this case, Art. 32 governs.
[b] By this provision, the principle of accountability of public
officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and
acquires a larger dimension. A superior have to answer for the
transgressions of his subordinates against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Hence, Art. 32 of CC
makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. [c] To
determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered.
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically
admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. [d] So,
under the above principles, it is difficult to justify the TCs
dismissal for lack of cause of action the complaint against all
the defendants, except Maj.Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba. The
complaint contained allegations against all the defendants
which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish
a cause or causes of action against all of them under Art. 32 of
CC.
3. NO.
The body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion
was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been
also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when
he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies
thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all
the lawyers of plaintiffs In filing the motion to set aside the
resolution, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the
plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The
authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party
can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the
adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in
this case. DISPOSITION: Petition granted. Case remanded to
the respondent court for further proceedings.

SEPARATE OPINION:
TEEHANKEE, C.J ., concurring:
- The Court's judgment at bar makes clear that all
persons, be they public officers or employees, or members of
the military or police force or private individuals who directly or
indirectly obstruct, defeat, violate or in any manner impede or
impair the constitutional rights and civil liberties of another
person, stand liable and may be sued in court for damages as
provided in Art. 32 of CC.
- The case at bar specifically upholds and reinstates
the civil action for damages filed in the court below by
petitioners-plaintiffs for illegal searches conducted by military
personnel and other violations of their constitutional rights and
liberties. At the same time it rejects the automatic application of
the principle of respondent superior or command responsibility
that would hold a superior officer jointly and severally
accountable for damages, including moral and exemplary, with
his subordinates who committed such transgressions. However,
the judgment gives the caveat that a superior officer must not
abdicate his duty to properly supervise his subordinates for he
runs the risk of being held responsible for gross negligence and
of being held under the cited provision of the Civil Code as
indirectly and solidarily accountable with the tortfeasor.
MHP GARMENTS, INC. vs. CA

PUNO; 22 September 1994

Nature
- Petition for Certiorari

Facts
-MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official
Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and insignias. In their
Memorandum Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken the
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and
other scouting supplies."
-Sometime in October 1983, MHP received information that
private respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and
Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. De Guzman, an employee
of petitioner corporation, was tasked to undertake the
necessary surveillance and to make a report of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC). De Guzman, Peafiel, and two (2) other
constabulary men of the Reaction Force Battalion went to the
stores of respondents at the Marikina Public Market. Without
any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses,
and suits on display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused
a commotion and embarrassed private respondents. The items
were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to petitioner
corporation for safekeeping. A criminal complaint for unfair
competition was then filed against private respondents. After a
preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
dismissed the complaint against all the private respondents. He
also ordered the return of the seized items which was not
immediately returned despite demands. Private respondents
had to go personally to petitioners' place of business to recover
their goods. Even then, not all the seized items were turned.
The other items returned were of inferior quality. Private
respondent then filed a Civil Case against the petitioners for
sums of money and damages. The trial court ruled for the
private respondents. The decision was appealed to the
respondent court. It affirmed the decision with
modification
MHP filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.

Issue/s and Held
WON the search and seizure was legal
No. The evidence did not justify the warrantless search and
seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation
received information that private respondents were illegally
selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983.
The specific date and time are not established in the evidence
adduced by the parties. De Guzman then made a surveillance
of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the
Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was
made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed
illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the
receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private
respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and
the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the
sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized
the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk
of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to
violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable
search and seizure. The search and seizure were clearly illegal.
There was no probable cause for the seizure. Probable cause
for a search has been defined as "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched." These facts and circumstances were not in any
way shown by the petitioners to justify their warrantless search
and seizure. Indeed, after a preliminary investigation, the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal dismissed their complaint for unfair
competition and later ordered the return of the seized goods.
WON MHP Garments is liable
Yes. The omission will not exculpate petitioners. The
respondent court correctly granted damages to private
respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in
transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the
raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement
to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of
scouting supplies. The raid was conducted with the active
participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman who did not lift
a finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scouts items. By
standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to
the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the
petitioner corporation which even received for safekeeping the
goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de
Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite
the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition. Secondly,
Letter of Instruction No. 1299 already directs all law
enforcement agencies of the Republic of the Philippines, to
apprehend immediately unauthorized manufacturers and
distributors of Scout paraphernalia, upon proper application by
the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and/or Girl Scouts of the
Philippines for warrant of arrest and/or search warrant with a
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law; and to impound the said paraphernalia to be used as
evidence in court or other appropriate administrative body it
orders the immediate and strict compliance with the Instructions
which the petitioners miserably failed to do. And thirdly, they
should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding
team for contribution or any other relief, in respect of
respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with
Damages. Again, they did not.

WON an award for moral damages should be awarded
Yes. It is consistently ruled that moral damages are not
awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the
plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. Conformably with
our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages
can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt
that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious
anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by
petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment
and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were
supported by their testimonies.
The wantonness of the wrongful seizure justifies the award of
exemplary damages. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all
and sundry that the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a
mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends
against intrusions directly done both by government and
indirectly by private entities.

Disposition
IN VIEW WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. We impose a SIX PERCENT (6%)
interest from January 9, 1987 on the TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000.00) for the unreturned twenty-six (26) pieces of girl
scouts items and a TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu
of SIX PERCENT (6%), on the said amount upon finality of this
Decision until the payment thereof. Costs against petitioners.
MARCIA V CA (PAJE)
205 PHIL 147
RELOVA; January 27, 1983

NATURE
Petition for certiorari

FACTS
- Paje is a driver of a Victory Liner Bus
- His bus collided with the jeep driven by Clemente
Marcia, causing the latters death and physical injuries
to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap
- Paje was charged with homicide and serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence. A civil case was also
instituted against him by herein petitioners for reckless
imprudence and negligence in driving the passenger
bus.
- He was convicted in the criminal case in the RTC.
However, he was acquitted in the CA. The CA ruled
that criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was
not even guilty of civil negligence, for the case was of
pure accident.
- The defendants presented the copy of said criminal
case to the court handling the civil case against them.
The civil case was dismissed.

ISSUES
WON the acquittal in the criminal case would result to a
dismissal in
the civil case


HELD
YES
- The acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge
will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless
the court declares in the judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
- Petitioner also relies on Art 33 CC. However, the said
article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were
alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they
were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent
civil action for damages may be instituted in connection
therewith. Otherwise stated, unless the act from which
the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in
the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability
will not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability

DISPOSITIVE
Decision affirmed

MADEJA V CARO
ABAD SANTOS, J.: December 21, 1983

NATURE
Petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent
judge granting the defendant's motion to dismiss

FACTS
- Dr. Eva A. Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja after an
appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the
deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that:
"The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right to
file a separate civil action for damages."
- The criminal case still pending, Madeja sued Dr. Japzon for
damages in the same court. She alleged that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The
respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
which invoked Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
which reads: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.
- In all cases not included in the preceding section the
following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions
arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but
after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in
the criminal action.". . .

ISSUES
1. WON an independent civil action may be filed during the
pendency of the criminal case

HELD
1. YES. Ratio Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable
provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:
"Sec, 2. Independent civil action. - an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. "
- "Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."
Obiter - There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil
Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be
instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision which
uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal
prosecution."
Tolentino says: "While the State is the complainant in the
criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned
because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be
permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly
affects him."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic
sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.

Dispositive
Petition is GRANTED; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141
is SET ASIDE

ARAFILES v PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC
CARPIO MORALES, J., March 25, 2004

NATURE
Petition for review of CA Deci

FACTS
(Consti II Case)
-Respondent Morales wrote an article for Peoples Journal
Tonight based on the sworn statement in the police blotter and
interview of Emelita Despuig where Despuig alleged that
Arafiles raped her the month before then attempted to rape her
the night she filed a complaint. Morales attempted to contact
Arafiles but since the latters office was still closed at that time
(past 12mn he works for NIAS-PAGASA), he was not able to
do so.
-About a year following the published article, Arafiles filed action
for damages based on the alleged grossly malicious and
overly sensationalized report by Morales which cast aspersions
on his character, being the object of public contempt and
ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial
rapist.
-RTC: in favor of Arafiles
-CA: in favor of Morales, et. al. based on doctrine of fair
comment

ISSUE
WON the CA erred in holding that the publication of the news
item was not
attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for
damages

HELD
NO. Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name
and reputation, but we do not consider that the respondents,
under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or
abused the freedom of the press.
Ratio. The newspapers should be given such leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively
perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have
to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and
reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point
of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words. Reasoning. First discussed applicable
provisions (A33, 19, 21 NCC): Article 33 contemplates a civil
action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated
to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for
libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately
from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or
result of the criminal action because it is governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal
Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil
liability arising therefrom.
-then discussed how to determine if a published work is
libelous: In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that
the published work alleged to contain libelous material
must be examined and viewed as a whole. -then discussed
the petitioners allegation that the news item as a malicious
sensationalization failed: even though the police blotter only
shows 1 count of abduction and rape, respondent was present
when Emelita executed her sworn-statement where she
reported an abduction with rape and an abduction incident
(where no rape occurred, but was about to happen) so
respondents article was not maliciously sensationalized. The
presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint
may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se
illegal. Respondents could of course have been more
circumspect in their choice of words as the headline and first
seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a
certain director of the NIAS actually committed the crimes
complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs (in
which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually
identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the

narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had
reported at the police headquarters.
-then mentioned doctrine: The newspapers should be given
such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously
and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In
the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually
have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with good
faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account,
to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in
the choice of words.
Disposition. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. SO
ORDERED

MVRS V ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL
G.R. No. 135306
BELLOSILLO; January 28, 2003

NATURE
Petition to review decision of CA

FACTS
- The ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL
(IDCP), a local federation of more than 70 Muslim religious
orgs, and some individual Muslims filed in the RTC Manila a
complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in
behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, et.al.
- Complaint alleged that what was published in
BULGAR was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that
these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was
not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt
the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam;
that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only
the Muslims in the Phil but the entire Muslim world, esp. every
Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
- MVRS claimed it was merely an expression of
belief/opinion and was published without malice. Also, it did not
mention respondents as object of the article, hence, were not
entitled to damages.
RTC dismissed: plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of
action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were
not specifically identified. CA reversed: it was "clear from the
disputed article that the defamation was
directed to all adherents of Islamic faith.

ISSUE
1. WON elements of libel exist
2. WON the cause of action should rise from an intentional
tortuous act
causing mental distress

HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning Defamation means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. Words which are merely insulting are not
actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general
abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages.
2. NO.
The cause of action is libel.
Ratio Action arising from an intentional tortuous act causing
mental distress cannot be sustained in this case, for such action
is personal in nature, and since no particular individual was
identified in the disputed article, such cause of action cannot be
sustained.
Torts with independent civil action: DEFAMATION An
"emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil
action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his
emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character.
- The purported damage caused by the published
article falls under principle of relational harm - which includes
harm to social relationships in the community in the form of
defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm
- which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the
form of an infliction of emotional distress. The present case falls
within the application of the relational harm principle of tort
actions for defamation.
- To recover for this the plaintiff must show that: (a)
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless
disregard of plaintiff; (b) conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(c) causal connection between defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) the plaintiff's mental
distress was extreme and severe.
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove
more than mere worry, anxiety, embarrassment, or anger.
(AmJur) Disposition Petition granted. Decision reversed.

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG [concur]
- The present controversy stems from a civil action for
damages and not from a criminal complaint. CC recognizes the
possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Art 26, par. 4,
to the effect that although it may not constitute a criminal
offense, vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs xxx can give rise to a cause of action for
damages, or to Art. 33 which provides that in case of
defamation, a civil complaint for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal case, may be brought by the
injured party.
- In the present case, the article relates to the entire
Muslim population and not just to the IDCP or to any of the
individual respondents. There is no direct reference or allusion
to the federation or any of its members, or to any of the
individual complainants. Respondents scarcely can claim
having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in
damages.

CARPIO [dissent]
- I dissent not because the newspaper article in
question is libelous, but because it constitutes an intentional
tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private
respondent IDCP represents.
- Both RTC and CA found the article insulting and
humiliating to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental
anguish to believers of Islam. This finding of fact establishes
that petitioners have inflicted on private respondents an
intentional wrongful act - humiliating persons because of their
religious beliefs.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ [dissent]
- Focal point of claim for damages: insult caused by
the article that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which
is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that there
is only one God, and, that the greatest sin in Islam is to worship
things or persons other than Allah. - The article is not only an
imputation of irreligious conduct but also a downright
misrepresentation of the religious beliefs of Muslims. Liability
for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on
the fact of defamation.

SALTA V DE VEYRA
202 Phil 527
DE CASTRO; September 30, 1982

FACTS
- Two cases involving the same issue disposed of by
two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. For
a uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable
conflict of opinion, the two cases have been consolidated for a
single decision.
- Salta was an employee of the PNB assigned as
Manager of the Malolos' branch. His duty was to grant loans, or
only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the
amount of the loan applied for.
In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of
the respondent bank, Salta indiscriminately granted certain
loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in manner
characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and
upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the
loans.
- PNB filed two civil actions to recover losses the bank
suffered (Civil Case No. 79583, Civil Case No. 88343). With
this the bank filed a criminal action against Salta, for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. - Salta was acquitted
in the criminal case, and filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the
two civil cases. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss
that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took
diametrically opposing views, the former denying the motion,
the latter granting it.

ISSUE
WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to
dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same
facts as alleged in the criminal case (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act).

HELD
NO.
Ratio The civil action permitted therein to be filed separately
from the criminal action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter."
Acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil
case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a
finding that even civilly, the accused would not be liable.
Reasoning ART 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of

- -
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
- The filing in this case of a civil action separate from
the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of
Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for the
prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud,
one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision.
Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed,
the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as
having given rise to the cause of action averred in the
complaints.
- The offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a
nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that they may be
made the subject of a separate civil action because of the
distinct separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of
action. This is clearly illustrated in the case of swindling, a
specie of an offense committed by means of fraud, where the
civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of
the criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.
- That there was fraud committed by the defendant in
granting the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his
acts, which fraud is positively and easily identifiable in the
manner and scheme aforementioned.
- JUSTICE JBL REYES: in the case of an
independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the
criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely
irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be the spirit of the
law when it decided to make these actions `entirely separate
and distinct' from the criminal action. Hence in these cases, I
think Rule 107 Sec. 1(d) does not apply.
- It is significant to note that under Article 31 [11] of the
New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted
therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
"regardless of the result of the latter."

DISPOSITION
The decision of Justice De Veyra is affirmed.

PRUDENTIAL BANK V IAC (Philippine Rayon
Mills &
Anacleto Chi)
216 SCRA 257
DAVIDE, JR.; G.R. No. 74886 December 8, 1992

NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of IAC, which affirmed in toto
the decision of CFI Quezon City in a civil action instituted by the
petitioner for the recovery of a sum of money representing the
amount paid by it to the Nissho Company Ltd. of Japan for
textile machinery imported by the Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.,
represented by co-defendant Anacleto R. Chi.

FACTS
-August 8, 1962: Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc. entered into a
contract with Nissho Co., Ltd. of Japan for the importation of
textile machineries under a five-year deferred payment plan. To
effect payment for said machineries, Phil. Rayon applied for and
was granted a commercial letter of credit with the Prudential
Bank and Trust Company in favor of Nissho. Against this letter
of credit, drafts were drawn and issued by Nissho, which were
all paid by the Prudential Bank through its correspondent in
Japan, the Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. As indicated on their faces, two
of these drafts were accepted by the Phil Rayon through its
president, Anacleto R. Chi, while the others were not.
-Upon arrival of the machineries, the Prudential Bank indorsed
the shipping documents to the Phil Rayon which accepted
delivery of the same. To enable the Phil Rayon to take delivery
of the machineries, it executed, by prior arrangement with the
Prudential Bank, a trust receipt which was signed by Anacleto
R. Chi in his capacity as president of Phil Rayon.
-At the back of the trust receipt is a printed form to be
accomplished by two sureties who, by the very terms and
conditions thereof, were to be jointly and severally liable to the
Prudential Bank should the Phil Rayon fail to pay the total
amount or any portion of the drafts issued by Nissho and paid
for by Prudential Bank. The Phil Rayon was able to take
delivery of the textile machineries and installed the same at its
factory site at 69 Obudan Street, Quezon City. -Sometime in
1967, the Phil Rayon ceased business operation. On December
29, 1969, Phil Rayon's factory was leased by Yupangco Cotton
Mills for an annual rental of P200,000.00. The lease was
renewed on January 3, 1973. On January 5, 1974, all the textile
machineries in the Phil Rayon's factory were sold to AIC
Development Corporation for P300,000.00.
The obligation of the Phil Rayon arising from the letter of credit
and the trust receipt remained unpaid and unliquidated.
Repeated formal demands for the payment of the said trust
receipt yielded no result Hence, the present action for the
collection of the principal amount of P956,384.95 was filed on
October 3, 1974 against the Phil Rayon and Anacleto R. Chi.
Defendants Defenses lack of cause of action; prescription;
laches
Lower Courts Ruling Both the CFI and the IAC ruled that
Philippine Rayon could be held liable for the two (2) drafts
because only these appear to have been accepted by the latter
after due presentment. The liability for the remaining ten (10)
drafts did not arise because the same were not presented for
acceptance. In short, both courts concluded that acceptance of
the drafts by Philippine Rayon was indispensable to make the
latter liable thereon.

ISSUES:
1. Whether presentment for acceptance of the drafts was
indispensable to make Philippine Rayon liable thereon; 2.
Whether Philippine Rayon is liable on the basis of the trust
receipt;
3. Whether private respondent Chi is jointly and severally liable
with Philippine Rayon for the obligation sought to be enforced
3a. If not, WON he may be considered a guarantor
3b. If he is a guarantor, WON the case should have been
dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action as there was
no prior exhaustion of Philippine Rayon's properties.

HELD:
1. NO. Presentment for acceptance is necessary only in the
cases expressly provided for in Section 143 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL). The parties herein agree, and the trial
court explicitly ruled, that the subject, drafts are sight drafts
which do not require presentment for acceptance. They are,
pursuant to Section 7 of the NIL, payable on demand. And
even if these were not sight drafts, thereby necessitating
acceptance, it would be the petitioner and not Philippine
Rayon which had to accept the same for the latter was not
the drawee.
2. YES.
-And although it is true that the petitioner commenced a criminal
action for the violation of the Trust Receipts Law, no legal
obstacle prevented it from enforcing the civil liability arising out
of the trust, receipt in a separate civil action. Under Section 13
of the Trust Receipts Law, the failure of an entrustee to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of goods, documents or
instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the
amount owing to the entruster or as appear in the trust receipt
or to return said goods, documents or instruments if they were
not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the
provisions of Art.315, par. 1(b) of the RPC.
-Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries. Estafa falls under
fraud.
3. NO. Private respondent Chi's signature in the dorsal portion
of the trust receipt did not bind him solidarily with Philippine
Rayon.
3a. YES. SCs own reading of the questioned solidary guaranty
clause yields the conclusion that the obligation of Chi is only
that of a guarantor.
Reasoning Last sentence of the clause speaks of waiver of
exhaustion, which, nevertheless, is ineffective in this case
because the space therein for the party whose property may not
be exhausted was not filled up.
-The clause "we jointly and severally agree and undertake"
refers to the undertaking of the two (2) parties who are to sign it
or to the liability existing between themselves. It does not refer
to the undertaking between either one or both of them on the
one hand and the petitioner on the other with respect to the
liability described under the trust receipt. Elsewise stated, their
liability is not divisible as between them, i.e., it can be enforced
to its full extent against any one of them.

-Any doubt as to the import, or true intent of the solidary
guaranty clause should be resolved against the petitioner since
the trust receipt, together with the questioned solidary guaranty
clause, is a contract of adhesion which must be strictly
construed against the party responsible for its preparation. -By
his signing, Chi became the sole guarantor. The attestation by
witnesses and the acknowledgement before a notary public are
not required by law to make a party liable on the instrument.
Contracts shall be obligatory in whatever form they may have
been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for their
validity are present; however, when the law requires that a
contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or
enforceable, or that it be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. With respect to a
guaranty, which is a promise to answer for the debt or default of
another, the law merely requires that it, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing. Otherwise, it would be
unenforceable unless ratified. While the acknowledgement of a
surety before a notary public is required to make the same a
public document, under Article 1358 of the Civil Code, a
contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public
document.
-Reading Section 13 of PD No. 115: It is clear that if the
violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership,
association or other juridical entities, the penalty of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the directors, officers,
employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for
the offense. However, it is these corporations, partnerships,
associations, etc, which are made liable for the civil liability
arising from the criminal offense.
-Since that violation of a trust receipt constitutes fraud
under Article 33 of the Civil Code, petitioner was acting well
within its rights in filing an independent civil action to
enforce the civil liability arising therefrom against
Philippine Rayon.
3b. NO. Excussion is not a condition sine qua non for the
institution of an action against a guarantor. There was nothing
procedurally objectionable in impleading private respondent Chi
as a co-defendant in the civil case for the collection of a sum of
money. As a matter of fact, Section 6, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court on permissive joinder of parties explicitly allows it.
-This is the equity rule relating to multifariousness. It is based on
trial convenience and is designed to permit the joinder of
plaintiffs or defendants whenever there is a common question of
law or fact. It will save the parties unnecessary work, trouble
and expense.
-However, Chi's liability is limited to the principal obligation in
the trust receipt plus all the accessories thereof including
judicial costs; with respect to the latter, he shall only be liable
for those costs incurred after being judicially required to pay.
Interest and damages, being accessories of the principal
obligation, should also be paid; these, however, shall run only
from the date of the filing of the complaint. Attorney's fees may
even be allowed in appropriate cases.
Disposition Petition granted. Philippine Rayon Mills, Inc.
declared liable on the 12 drafts in question and on the trust
receipt. Private respondent Anacleto R. Chi declared
secondarily liable on the trust receipt.

CAPUNO V PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY
OF THE
PHILIPPINES
MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1965

FACTS
- The case arose from a vehicular collision.
- Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by
Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno.
- The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his
passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
- Elordi was charged with triple homicide through
reckless imprudence in the CFI of Pampanga. The information
was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by
the heirs of the three victims.
- While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate
Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action,
also for damages, in the CFI of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi.
- Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in
the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs
of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
-In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of
were represented by their respective counsel as private
prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Jose
W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. - In view of the filing of the
civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the
appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminal case.
Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were
concerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the
criminal case since they had already claimed and received
compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on
the part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case
had been abated by the civil action.
The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and
Ilagan was disallowed by the Court and that of Attorney
Navarro was disallowed in an amending order. No appeal was
taken from either of the two orders. - The parties in the civil
case entered into a "Compromise and Settlement." For
P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages,
including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00
previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's
Compensation Act." - The Court approved the compromise and
accordingly dismissed the case. - At that time the criminal case
was still pending; judgment was rendered wherein the accused
Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto,
herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages
against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and
Jon Elordi.
- This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, was
dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960,
from which order the present appeal has been taken.
- The grounds upon which appellees based their
motion for dismissal and which the Court found to be "well
taken" were; (1) that the action had already prescribed; and (2)
that appellees had been released from appellants' claim for
damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the sum of
P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be
recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil Case No.
838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.

ISSUE
WON the action had already prescribed.

RULING
YES.
- There can be no doubt that the present action is one
for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action
must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil
Code).
- Appellants originally sought to enforce their claim ex-
delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when
they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The
information therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely
to include an allegation concerning damages suffered by the
heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi was being
prosecuted. - But appellants' intervention was subsequently
disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to the
effect.
- And when they commenced the civil action on
September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending,
showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy
afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that action would have
been premature and in any event would have been concluded
by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case. -
In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly
considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action,
pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which read:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation
not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily
injuries causing death. In other words, the civil action for
damages could have been commenced by appellants
immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno,

- -
and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the
criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But
the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or
after the lapse of more than five years.
- The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants'
contention that the fouryear period of prescription in this case
was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon
Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor
reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation
was not then necessary; without having made it they could file
as in fact they did a separate civil action even during the
pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, as held in
Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action
cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil
action based on a quasi-delict."
- As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the
Revised Rules of Court which requires the reservation of the
right to institute a separate and independent civil action in the
cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the
Civil Code affects the question of prescription, the said rule
does not apply in the present case.

DISPOSTIION The order appealed from was affirmed, without
costs.

CORPUS V PAJE
28 SCRA 1062
CAPISTRANO; July 31, 1969

NATURE
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal

FACTS
- December 23, 1956 Felardo Paje was driving a
Victory Liner bus. It collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente
Marcia in Lubao, Pampanga. As a result of the collision, Marcia
died while two other people were physically injured.
- An information for homicide and double serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against
Paje. Marcias heirs reserved their right to institute a separate
civil action against Paje. Paje was later found guilty on
November 7, 1960.
- November 21, 1961 Pending Pajes appeal, the
window and children of Marcia instituted the separate civil
action for damages arising from the accident against Paje and
Victory Liner, praying that the defendants be jointly and
severally liable.
- November 9, 1962 Paje was acquitted by the
appellate court, saying that the collision was purely an accident.
- December 29, 1962 Paje filed a motion to dismiss
the civil action on the ground that his acquittal barred the said
action but the motion was denied.
Petitioners Claim
> The petitioners claim that the Lower Court erred in acquitting
Paje and that his acquittal was a bar to the civil action. Quoting
Chantangco vs. Abaroai: It is true that one of the plaintiffs in
the present case reserved whatever right he may have had to
bring a civil action. This was obviously of no avail, inasmuch as
there resulted a judgment for the defendant, and the plain
inference from

- -
the foregoing is that a verdict of acquittal must carry with it
exemption from
civil responsibility.
> At the pre-trial of the civil case, the defendants asked the
court to rule on their special defense that plaintiffs' cause of
action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering
that the complaint was brought four years and eleven months
after the collision and that according to Article 1144 of the Civil
Code an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four years. The lower court ruled that the action had
already prescribed.

ISSUE
WON the civil action against Paje can still prosper despite his
acquittal

HELD
NO
Ratio Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not
one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil
Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil
action, that is, of an entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and shall be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence. Thearticle mentions only the crimes of defamation,
fraud, (estafa) and physical injuries.
Reasoning
- Although in the case of Dyogi vs. Yatco this Court
held that the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 of the
Civil Code includes homicide, it is to be borne in mind that the
charge against Felardo Paje was for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, and not for homicide and physical
injuries. - In People vs. Buan, the Court ruled that the offense
of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that,
if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof.
- Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of
the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability
based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the
injured party reserved.
- With regard to the issue of prescription, the Court
ruled that the action had indeed prescribed because the
prescription period was pegged at 4 years (A1146, CC) and
began to run on the day the quasi-delict was committed.
Disposition PREMISES CONSIDERED, the order appealed
from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

MADEJA V CARO
211 PHIL 469
ABAD SANTOS; December 21, 1983

NATURE
Petition seeking to set aside the order of the CFI dismissing the
civil case against Japzon

FACTS
- DR. EVA A. JAPZON was accused of homicide
through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja
after an appendectomy. - In the information, the offended party
Carmen L. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil
action for damages
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr.
Eva A. Japzon for damages, alleging that her husband died
because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.
- The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the
respondent judge
granted on the basis of Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court
13

ISSUE
WON a civil action for damages may be instituted pending the
resolution of a criminal case

HELD
YES
- Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation
to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. A
- Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the
criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in
the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
- Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil
Code,)
Obiter
- There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil
Code which are worth noting, namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be
instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the provision

13
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed: (a) Criminal and civil actions
arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action. ...

which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal
prosecution."
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic
sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted
homicide.
- The Article in question uses the words 'defamation',
'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in
their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in
the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of
offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation
and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any
technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their
generic sense. With this in mind, it is evident that the terms
'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense
as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult
to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in
the same article-some in their general and another in its
technical sense.
- In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general
terms.
In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil
action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for
assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation
must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved
the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to
establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the
complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as
the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether
the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death" **(end of
obiter)
- Corpus vs. Paje, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in
Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven
justices only nine took part in the decision and four of
them merely concurred in the result.
Disposition Petition is granted; the order dismissing Civil
Case No. 141 is hereby set aside.

DULAY V CA (SAFEGUARD, SUPERGUARD)
243 SCRA 220
BIDIN; April 3, 1995

FACTS
- Benigno Torzuela, , a security guard on duty at the
"Big Bang sa Alabang," and Atty. Napoleon Dulay had an
altercation. Torzuela shot and killed Atty. Dulay.
- Maria Benita Dulay, widow of Dulay, filed an action
for damages against Torzuela and Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., (SAFEGUARD) and/or Superguard Security

-
Corp. (SUPERGUARD), alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela.
Respondent:
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope
of his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was
committed w/ deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability is
governed by Art 100 of the RPC. > that a complaint for
damages based on negligence under Art 2176 (the one filed by
petitioners) cannot lie, since the civil liability under Art 2176
applies only to quasi-offenses under Art 365 of the RPC.
> that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature
considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is
a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability.
> that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to
injuries
intentionally committed (Marcia v CA)
Petitioner
> the incident resulting in the death of Dulay was due to the
concurring negligence of the defendants. Torzuela's wanton
and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by
defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the
negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD
consists in its having failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee
to avoid the injury.
> that their cause of action against the private respondents is
based on their liability under Article 2180
> that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of negligence but also
cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citing Andamo v.
IAC. Thus, Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-
delict actionable under Art 2176
> that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under
Art 33
14

and Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
15

ISSUE
WON civil action can proceed independently of the criminal
action

HELD
YES
- Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides:
"Sec 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal

14
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence
15
Rule 111.Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently - In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil-action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended
party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34,
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the
same act or omission of the accused."
- It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil
action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents
evidence is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of an express reservation. This is precisely what
the petitioners opted to do in this case.
- The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has
already been construed to include bodily injuries causing
death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co;
Carandang v. Santiago). It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only
physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro).
- Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the
crime is the result of criminal negligence, it must be noted
however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is
charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas
the defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33
lies.

INTENTIONAL TORTS

VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
100 PHIL 186
FELIX; October 31, 1956

NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Manila

FACTS
- Since the start of Commercial Air Line, Incs (CALI)
operations, its fuel needs were all supplied by Shell Company
of the P.I., Ltd, (Shell). Desmond Fitzgerald, Shells Credit
Manager was in charge of collecting payment. Any extensions
of term of payment, however, had to be decided by Stephen
Crawford and later by Wildred Wooding
- As of August 1948, Shells books showed a balance
of P170,162.58 in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to
CALI. Shell had reasons to believe that the financial condition
of Shell was far from being satisfactory. Alfonso Sycip, CALIs
President of Board of Directors, offered to Fitzgerald CALIs
Douglas C-54 plane, which was then in California. The offer
was declined by Crawford.
- Aug 6, 1948, management of CALI informally
convened its principal creditors in a luncheon, and informed
them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop
operation. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of Directors
of CALI, explained the memorandum agreement executed by
CALI with Phil Air Lines Inc on Aug 4, regarding the proposed
sale to PAL of the aviation equipment of CALI. Alfredo Velayo,
Auditor of CALI, discussed the balance sheets of CALI. The
balance sheet made mention of the Douglas C-54 plane.
- There was a general understanding among all
creditors present on the desirability of consummating the sale in
favor of PAL. Then followed a discussion on the payment of
claims of creditors and the preferences claimed for the
accounts due to employees, the Government, and the National
Airports Corp. The other creditors disputed such contention of
preference. No understanding was reached on the matter of
preference of payment and it was then generally agreed that
the matter be further studied by a working committee to be
formed. Mr. Fitzgerald of Shell, Atty. Agcaoili of National
Airports Corp., and Atty. Alexander Sycip were appointed to the
working committee.
- Those present in the meeting were of the unanimous
opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits
against CALI but to strive for a fair prorata division of its assets.
The management of CALI announced that in case of non-
agreement of the creditors, it would file insolvency proceedings.
- Aug 9, 1948, working committee discussed methods of
achieving objectives, which were to preserve the assets of CALI
and to study the way of making a fair division of all the assets
among the creditors. However, negotiation on the division of
assets was left pending. - On the same day (Aug 9), Shell
effected a telegraphic transfer of all its credit against CALI to
the American Corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., assigning its credit
amounting to $79,440. This was followed on Aug 10 by a deed
of assignment of credit amounting to $85,081.29.
- Aug 12, 1948 American Shell Oil Co filed a complaint
against CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California,
USA, for the collection of assigned credit of $79,440, and a writ
of attachment was applied for and issued against a C-54 plane.
Sept 17, 1948 an amended complaint was filed to recover
assigned credit of $85,081.29 and a supplemental attachment
for a higher sum against the C-54 plane, plus miscellaneous
personal properties. - Unaware of Shells assignment of credit,
CALI on Aug 12, 1948 approved the memorandum agreement
of sale to PAL, and noted that the Board had been trying to
reach an agreement with creditors to prevent insolvency
proceedings, but so far no definite agreement had been
reached. - First week of Sept 1948, National Airports Corp
learned of Shells action in the US and hastened to file its own
complaint with attachment against CALI in the CFI of Manila.
- Oct 7, 1948 CALI filed a petition for voluntary
insolvency. An order of insolvency was issued by the court on
the same day. Mr. Alfredo Velayo was appointed Assignee in
the proceedings.
Velayo instituted case against Shell for the purpose of
securing writ of injunction restraining Shell from prosecuting

-
against CALI, and as an alternative, that Shell be ordered to
pay damages double the value of the plane if the case in the
US will defeat the procurement of CALI of its plane. - Dec 22,
1948, Court denied petition because whether the conveyance
of Shells credit was fraudulent or not, the Phil court would not
be in a position to enforce its orders as against the American
corporation Shell Oil Co., Inc., which is outside the jurisdiction
of the Phils.
- Plaintiff confined his action to the recovery of
damages against Shell. Lower court dismissed the case.
Defendants Comments
> Assignment of credit in favor of American Shell was for
valuable consideration and made in accordance with
established commercial practices > It has no interest in the
case instituted by American Shell, as they are separate and
distinct corporations.
> Fitzgerald was merely invited to the luncheon-meeting,
without knowing the purpose for which it was called. Fitzgerald
could not have officially represented Shell because authority
resides on Crawford.

ISSUES
1. WON Shell Co., of the P.I. Ltd, taking advantage of
its knowledge of the existence of CALIs airplane C-54 at
California, USA, acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence
and trust of other creditors of CALI present in said meeting by
affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the
American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., thus defeating
the purpose of the informal meetings of CALIs principal
creditors and depriving the plaintiff of the means of obtaining
the plane, or its value, to the detriment and prejudice of other
CALI creditors who were consequently deprived of their share
in the distribution of said value
2. WON by reason of said betrayal of confidence and
trust, Shell may be
made to answer for the damages, and if so, the amount of such
damages

HELD
1. YES, Shell acted in bad faith.
- It is evident that Shell, upon learning the precarious
economic situation of CALI and that will all probability, it could
not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred
claims of other creditors, entirely disregarded all moral
inhibitory tenets.
- The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge
and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and
surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all if not the
entire amount of its credit, but the Court of Justice (SC) cannot
countenance such attitude at all, and much less from a foreign
corporation to the detriment of Philippine Government and local
business. - Shells transfer of credit would have been justified
only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working
committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors
present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that
the latter was to be left free to collect its credit from CALI by
whatever means his principal deemed wise and were available
to it. But then, such information would have dissolved all
attempts to come to an amicable conciliation and would have
precipitated the filing of CALIs voluntary insolvency
proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shells credit
to American Shell.
2. YES, Shell must answer for damages.
- Section 37 of the Insolvency Law states
Sec 37. If any person, before the assignment is made,
having notice of the commencement of the proceedings in
insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency
proceedings are about to be commenced, embezzles or
disposes of ay money, goods, chattels, or effects of the
insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to an action
by the assignee for double the value of the property sought
to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the benefit
of the insolvent estate.
- There are doubts, however, as to the applicability of
this provision, as it is contented that what Shell really disposed
of was its own credit and not CALIs property, although this was
practically the effect and result of the scheme. The same result,
however, may be achieved in applying the provisions of the
Civil Code.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides
Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith.
- While Art 19 contains a mere declaration of
principles, such declaration is implemented by Article 21 of the
Civil Code, which states Art 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
- Code Commission on Article 21: (it) would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes. (It) is a prudent earnest of justice in
the face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all
wrongs which cause damage.
- If Article 23 of Civil Code goes as far as to provide
that Even if an act or event causing damage to anothers
property was not due to the fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the
act or event he was benefited., with much more reason that
Shell should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad
faith and with betrayal of confidence.
- Anent the argument that Civil Code provisions cannot
be applicable as they came into effect only on Aug 30, 1950,
Art 2252 of Civil Code provides by implication that when new
provisions of the Code does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, they may
be given retroactive effect. Shell did not have any vested or
acquired right to betray confidence of CALI or of its creditors.
Moreover, according to Art 2254 of Civil Code, no vested or
acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are
against the law or which infringe upon the right of others.
Disposition Shell is liable to pay plaintiff, for the benefit of
CALI and its creditors, compensatory damages a sum
equivalent to the value of the plane at the time Shell assigned
its credit to American Shell, and another equal sum as
exemplary damages.

VELAYO V SHELL CO OF THE PHILS
RESOLUTION
100 PHIL 207
FELIX; July 30, 1957

Defendant-appellees contentions
- It is not guilty of bad faith, it having done nothing but
to protect legitimately its own interest or credit against the bad
faith of its debtor, the insolvent CALI, under the control of the
latters president Alfonso Sycip
- The transfer of credit to its sister corporation in the
US did not prejudice the Government, because its claims were
fully paid, not caused any loss or injury to other creditors,
except the entities and groups controlled by Alfonso Sycip. It is
not liable for exemplary damages because the provisions of the
new Civil Code on the matter are not applicable to this case
- Plaintiff-appellant has no cause of action against it
and is not the real party in interest
- Plaintiffs right of action was based and prosecuted in
the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and
consequently he is stopped from pursuing another theory and is
not entitled to damages under the provisions of the new Civil
Code.

HELD
- The facts on which Court based its conclusion that
Shell acted in bad faith are not and cannot be denied or
contradicted by defendant. - There is no sensible reason for
disturbing the finding that Shell is liable for exemplary
damages. The amount of the award, however, may be
modified. - According to the Civil Code, exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages, and that the amount of the exemplary
damages need not be proved, for it is left to the sound
discretion of the Court.
- Majority of the Court is of the opinion that the value of
the C-54 plane might result too high, and that exemplary
damages should not be left to speculation but properly
determined by a certain and fixed amount. The amount of
exemplary damages is thus modified, and fixed at P25,000.

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V CA (MORADA)
297 SCRA 469

-
QUISUMBING; October 8, 1998

NATURE
Petition for certiorari to annul and set aside CA resolution and
decision

FACTS
- Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight
attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta,
she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer
and Allah (both surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and had breakfast in
their hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer attempted
to rape her. She was saved by hotel security personnel who
heard her cries for help. She later filed a case against them.
The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When
Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of
petitioner), she was asked to go to Jakarta to arrange for the
release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta but she
refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to
Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian
authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the
intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of detention. They
were put back in service while respondent Morada was
transferred to Manila. - 2 years later, she was asked by her
superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of Saudia,
in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station
where her passport was taken and she was questioned about
the Jakarta incident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put
pressure on her to drop the case against the two men. Not until
she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and
allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah.
A year and a half later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah
to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain Khalid of Saudia
brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary
to close the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
she signed a document to appear before the court a week later.
When the date of appearance came, she complied but only
after being assured by Saudias Manila manager that the
investigation was routinary and posed no danger to her. She
was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi
judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a
plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take
flight. She was later told to remain in Jeddah and her passport
was again confiscated. A few days later, she was again brought
before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her
astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months
imprisonment and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the
Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for
what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of
adultery; going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in
violation of Islamic laws; and socializing with the male crew, in
contravention of Islamic tradition.
- Facing conviction, she sought help from her
employer, petitioner Saudia but she was denied assistance of
any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her. Because
she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed
the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from
the service by Saudia without being informed of the cause.
- She then filed a complaint for damages against
Saudia and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudia filed a
motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action
and lack of jurisdiction. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss
by Saudia, as well as the subsequent MFR. Saudia then filed
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the CA. The CA
issued a TRO prohibiting respondent judge from conducting
any proceeding unless otherwise directed. The CA, however, in
another resolution, denied Saudias prayer for issuance of writ
of preliminary injunction. Saudia then filed to the SC this instant
petition. However, during the pendency of this petition,
respondent CA rendered a decision that the Philippines is an
appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaint's
basis for recovery of damages is Art.21 CC, thus, clearly within
the jurisdiction of respondent Court.

ISSUES
1. WON Morada had a cause of action
2. Which law should govern (Phil. Law or Saudi Law)

HELD
1. YES
- She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19
and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, the aforecited
provisions on human relations were intended to expand the
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.
Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 gives
flesh to its provisions.
Reasoning
- After a careful study of the pleadings, We are
convinced that there is reasonable basis for private
respondents assertion that although she was already working
in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that
she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she
made against the two crew members for the attack on her
person. As it turned out,

she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
- There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim
that in handing over or turning over the person of private
respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted
beyond its duties as employer. Petitioners purported act
contributed to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private
respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest,
detention and prosecution of private respondent under the
guise of petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of
the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged
conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But
these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her
person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as
claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs
done, once duly proven.
2. Philippine Law
Ratio Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual
relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the
res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.

Reasoning
- Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is
one involving torts, the connecting factor or point of
contact could be the place or places where the tortious
conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could
be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged
tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the
Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to
her, she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the
exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act
with justice, give her due and observe honesty and good faith.
Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That
certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another
country is of no moment. For in our view, what is important
here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of
the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing
and human rights of complainant, had lodged according to
the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis to identify
the Phil. as the situs of the alleged tort.
- In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, We find here an occasion to apply the State of the
most significant relationship rule, which should be appropriate
to apply now, given the factual context of the case. In applying
said principle to determine the State which has the most
significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken
into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place
where the injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct
causing the injury occurred; (C) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered. - As already discussed, there
is basis for the claim that the over-all injury occurred and
lodged in the Phils. There is likewise no question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged in
international air carriage business here. Thus, the
relationship between the parties was centered here.
Disposition petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. Civil case
entitled Milagros
Morada v Saudi Arabia Airlines REMANDED to RTC

GLOBE MACKAY V CA
176 SCRA 778
CORTES; August 25, 1989

NATURE
An appeal from the decision of CA

FACTS
- Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was
employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant
to the engineering operations manager.
- GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases
and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several
thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually
discovered the anomalies and reported them to his immediate
superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C.
Hendry who was then the Executive VP and General Manager
of GLOBE MACKAY.
- one day after Tobias made the report, Hendry
confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect,
and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open,
and to leave the office keys.
- when Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
Hendry went up to him and called him a "crook" and a
"swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test.
He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting,
signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
- the Manila police investigators cleared Tobias of
participation in the anomalies.
- Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a
private investigator who submitted a report finding Tobias guilty.
This report however expressly stated that further investigation
was still to be conducted.
- Nevertheless, Hendry issued a memo suspending
Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal charges
against him.
- the Police Chief Document Examiner, after
investigating other documents pertaining to the alleged
anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime
report reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings,
signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other
documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not
those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias
also yielded negative results.
- Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from the anomalies petitioners filed a complaint for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. - Subsequently five other criminal
complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for
estafa while the fifth was for of Art.290 of' RPC (Discovering
Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence).
- All of the 6 criminal complaints were dismissed by the
fiscal.
- In the meantime, Tobias received a notice from
petitioners that his employment has been terminated.
Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
- Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from
the NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision and
dismissed the complaint. Tobias appealed the Secretary of
Labor's order with the Office of the President. - Unemployed,
Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone
Company. However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
- Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. - Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify
during the hearings. - The RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Tobias by ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual
damages, P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.
- CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

ISSUE
WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent

HELD
YES
Ratio Art.19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but
also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are
the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and
to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore,
recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19
must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
Reasoning

-
- One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil
Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings
and for the stability of the social order." Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
- But while Art.19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
- Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a
violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same. - However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim
that they did not violate any provision of law since they were
merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent.
This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief
because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 21. Any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
- In determining whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be
applied. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20
or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on
the circumstances of each case.
- the Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to
private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified.
- An employer who harbors suspicions that an
employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking
the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and
directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the
resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by
petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
- The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern
of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress
the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the
Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with
the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee.
- Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from
work: Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to
just confess or else the company would file a hundred more
cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that,
"You Filipinos cannot be trusted."
- The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the
various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the
scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier
statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are
clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity
- The next tortious act committed by petitioners was
the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974,
stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY
due to dishonesty. Tobias remained unemployed for a longer
period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias,
petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent
with Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
- Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners
of six criminal complaints against Tobias. While sound
principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall
have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and
vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal
prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.
Considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were
filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the
illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the
two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the
anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the
eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other
conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious
intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
- It must be underscored that petitioners have been
guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts.
Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the
Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount
of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.
- Petitioners still insist that the award of damages was
improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is
argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that private
respondent could have suffered was a direct result of his having
been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and
legal act of the defendants-appellants. According to the
principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does
not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal
wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in
this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners
might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the
abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to
a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable.
Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed
but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts
committed by petitioners.
- Petitioners next question the award of moral
damages. However, the Court has already ruled that moral
damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21
of said Code.
- Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned
by petitioners. The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have
been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis
for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
CA is AFFIRMED.

ALBENSON V CA
BIDIN; January 11, 1993

NATURE
Petition assailing the decision of respondent CA which modified
the judgment of the RTC and ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent moral damages and attorney's fees.

FACTS
- Petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation
delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. the mild steel plates
which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson
was given a check in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks. When presented for
payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account
Closed." - From the records of the SEC, Albenson discovered
that the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid
mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further
inquiry, Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and
Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single proprietorship business,
was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In
addition, upon verification with the drawee bank, Albenson was
advised that the signature appearing on the subject check
belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao." After obtaining the foregoing
information, Albenson made an extrajudicial demand upon
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao to replace and/or make
good the dishonored check. However, private respondent has a
namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a
business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, with the very same
business address as Guaranteed. - Assistant Fiscal Ricardo
Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S. Baltao for
Violation of BP 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway
claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to
submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and
therefore, was deemed to have waived his right. Baltao,
claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately
filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for
reinvestigation. Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal
reversed the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated
respondent Baltao. He found that the signature on the check is
not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. - Because of the alleged
unjust filing of a criminal case against him, respondent Baltao
filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against herein
petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and

Benjamin Mendiona, its employee. In its decision, the lower
court observed that "the check is drawn against the account of
"E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries of which
plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been
inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . .
The possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao
III, a son of
plaintiff, that the defendants may have been dealing with . . ."

ISSUE
WON private respondent's cause of action is not one based on
malicious
prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the
CC

HELD
NO
Ratio The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20
and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. The elements of an abuse of right
under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or
duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general
sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone who, whether
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries
suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is
legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that
is, the act must be intentional.
Reasoning
- Petitioners could not be said to have violated the
principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to file the
case for violation of BP 22 against private respondent was their
failure to collect the amountdue on a bounced check which they
honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent.
Private respondent, however, did nothing to clarify the case of
mistaken identity at first hand. In the absence of a wrongful act
or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per
se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the
payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Considering that
Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the
bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner
acted in good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint
before the provincial fiscal. The presence of probable cause
signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the decision of the CA
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

AMONOY V GUTIERREZ
351 SCRA 731
PANGANIBAN; 2001

FACTS
Amonoy was the counsel of therein Francisca Catolos, Agnes
Catolos, Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. He won the
case for them and charged P27600 as attorneys fees. As they
were not able to pay, his clients executed real estate mortgages
on their lands and the house thereon. Asuncion Pasamba died
on 24 February 1969 while Alfonso Fornilda passed away on 2
July 1969. Among the heirs of the latter was his daughter,
plaintiff-appellant Angela Gutierrez.
- Because his attorneys fees thus secured by the two
lots were not paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their
foreclosure before the CFI of Pasig, Rizal. The heirs opposed,
contending that the attorneys fees charged were
unconscionable and that the agreed sum was only P11,695.92.
But on 28 September 1972 judgment was rendered in favor of
Amonoy requiring the heirs to pay within 90 days the
P27,600.00 secured by the mortgage, P11,880.00 as value of
the harvests, and P9,645.00 as another round of attorneys
fees. Failing in that, the two (2) lots would be sold at public
auction.
- They failed to pay. On 6 February 1973, the said lots
were foreclosed. Amonoy was the highest bidder in the
foreclosure sale. The heirs sought the annulment of the auction
sale. The case was dismissed by the CFI on 7 November
1977, and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on 22 July
1981. Thereafter, the CFI on 25 July 1985 issued a Writ of
Possession and pursuant to which a notice to vacate was made
on 26 August 1985. On Amonoys motion of 24 April 1986,
the Orders of 25 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 were issued for
the demolition of structures in the said lots, including the
house of the Gutierrez spouses.
- The Gutierrez spouses sought a restraining order
from the Supreme Court, which was granted by the same. Upon
a judgment on merits later on, Amonoy was ordered to return
said properties to the rightful owners. But by the time the
Supreme Court promulgated the above-mentioned Decision,
respondents house had already been destroyed, supposedly in
accordance with a Writ of Demolition ordered by the lower
court.
- Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with
the destruction of their house was filed by respondents against
petitioner before the RTC on December 15, 1989. In its January
27, 1993 Decision, the RTC dismissed respondents suit. On
appeal, the CA set aside the lower courts ruling and ordered
petitioner to pay respondents P250,000 as actual damages.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
also denied.
Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE
WON Amonoy may properly invoke damnum absque injuria in
this case since
at the time of the demolition he had color of authority over said
properties

HELD
NO
Ratio Damnum absque injuria may not be invoked by a person
who claims to exercise a right but does so in an abusive
manner violative of Article 19 of
the Civil Code. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one
must
Reasoning
- Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he
is not liable for the demolition of respondents house. He
maintains that he was merely acting in accordance with the Writ
of Demolition ordered by the RTC. - We reject this submission.
Damnum absque injuria finds no application to this case.True,
petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on
May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued
by the
RTC. But the records show that a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents house,
was issued by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA
also found, based on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme
Court process server, that a copy of the TRO was served on
petitioner himself on June 4, 1986.
- Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this
Court. We agree with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the
demolition of respondents house well until the middle of 1987.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at
the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO
amounted to an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his
actions were tainted with bad faith. Had he not insisted on
completing the demolition, respondents would not have
suffered the loss that engendered the suit before the RTC.
Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of a right, but an
invalid exercise of a right that had been suspended when he
received the TRO from this Court on June 4, 1986. By then, he
was no longer entitled to proceed with the demolition. - A
commentator on this topic explains:
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears,
and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of
justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept
of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a
right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over
and above the specific precepts of positive law are the
supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates them
violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to
abuse our rights to prejudice others.
- Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights:
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in

-
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible

UE V JADER
325 SCRA 804
YNARES-SANTIAGO; February 17, 2000

FACTS
- Jader was enrolled in the UE College of Law from
1984 up to 1988. He failed to take the regular final examination
in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade
.He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student
.He filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade
but got a grade of five (5).
- In the mean time, his name appeared in the Tentative
List of Candidates for graduation with an annotation regarding
his deficiencies. His name also appeared in the invitation for the
graduation as one of the candidates for graduation. At the foot
of the list of the names of the candidates there appeared
however an annotation saying that it was a tentative list and
that degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated in the University
Bulletin . Jader attended the graduation and brought his family
with him. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his
job and enrolled at the pre-bar review class. Jader later learned
of the deficiency and he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar examination.
Consequently, he sued UE for damages.
- UE denied liability arguing that it never led
respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a
Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the
tentative list of graduating students.
- TC rendered judgment in favor of the Jader and
ordered UE to pay Jader
P35,470.00
- CA Affirmed and added an award of P50,000.00 for
moral damages - UE elevated the case to this Court on a
petition for review arguing that it has no liability to respondent
Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate
cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out
of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor
concerned the result of his removal exam.

ISSUE
WON an educational institution may be held liable for damages
for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not
the case

HELD
YES
- UE had a contractual obligation to inform his students
as to whether or not they have met all the requirements for the
conferment of a degree. Thus, UE in belatedly informing
respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly
at a time when he had already commenced preparing for the
bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for
a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit
for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities
of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief
of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
- Considering that the institution of learning involved
herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it
should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter
for the same. - Article 19 was intended to expand the concept
of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. - In civilized
society, men must be able to assume that others will do them
no intended injury that others will commit no internal
aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and
that those with whom they deal in the general course of society
will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability
is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society.
Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted
and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the former are
useless.

-
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students
of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire
from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the
rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by
his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of
care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with
a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to
produce them would make the erring party liable. Petitioner
ought to have known that time was of the essence in the
performance of its obligation to inform respondent of his grade.
It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare
himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate
concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its students grades
at any time because a student has to comply with certain
deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of
requirements for taking the bar. Petitioners liability arose from
its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that he
had satisfied all requirements for the course.
- Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors
to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties
must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must
bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages
in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not
illicit. If mere fault or negligence in ones acts can make him
liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason
should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but
not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

GARCIANO V CA
212 SCRA 436
GRIO-AQUINO; August 10, 1992

NATURE
dismissing the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner
against the private respondents.

FACTS
- The petitioner was hired to teach during the 1981-82
school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the
Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before the school
year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence
because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her
daughter was employed. The application was recommended for
approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and
approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors.
- On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter
to the petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano (for she
was still abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph
Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of
the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to
terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff
because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of
employment between her and the school due to her refusal to
sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a
temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a
written contract. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of
June, 1982, she received the letter informing her that her
services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been
terminated. She made inquiries from the school about the
matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of
Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz,
signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report
and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective
July 5, 1982," and that "any letter or notice of termination
received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by
the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared
null and void."
- On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president,
secretary, and three members of the Board of Directors, out of
a membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from the
Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to
the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria
F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's
decision".
- On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for
damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against
Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of
the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal.

ISSUE
WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to
the school and thus making them liable for damages

HELD
NO
- The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that
petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice.
While the respondents admittedly wanted her service
terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her
from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of
Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed
with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers
allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not
make them liable to her for damages. They were simply
exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent
from the Board's decision. Their acts were not contrary to
law, morals, good customs or public policy. They did not
"illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her
prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982,
but she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever
loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was
self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria.
Ratio Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts
that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public
policy.

BARONS MARKETING V CA (PHELPS
DODGE PHILS)
286 SCRA 96
KAPUNAN; February 9, 1998

NATURE
Petition for review decision of CA

FACTS
- Phelps Dodge appointed Barons Marketing as one of
its dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such dealer,
Barons was given 60 days credit for its purchases of Phelps
products.
- From Dec1986 to Aug1987, Barons purchased on
credit wires and cables worth P4.1m, which it in turn supplied to
MERALCO. In the sales invoice, it was stipulated that an
interest of 12% would be imposed, plus 25% for attys fees and
collection. On Sept1987, Barons paid P300k (thereby leaving
an unpaid account of P3.8m). Phelps sent several demands,
but Barons still did not pay. It instead wrote Phelps requesting if
it could pay the outstanding account in monthly installments of
P500k plus 1% interest.
- Phelps, instead of responding to the request of
Barons, filed a complaint for recovery of the P3.8m plus
interest, and prayed for attys fees of 25% of the amt, and
exemplary damages amounting to P100k.
- Barons admitted the purchase of the wires and
cables, but disputed the amt claimed by Phelps. The RTC
rendered decision in favor of Phelps, ordering Barons to pay
the debt and interest of 12% and awarding 25% as attys fees.
CA affirmed (with modification, reducing attys fees to 5%)
Barons now assail the CA decision, alleging that Phelps should
have been held guilty of creditors abuse of rights, and
Barons should not be liable for attys fees. *note: Barons
contends that Phelps abused its rights when it rejected Barons
offer to settle the debt in installments
**right involved: right of a creditor to refuse partial fulfillment of
a prestation
due to him

ISSUES
1. WON there was creditors abuse of rights in this case
2. WON Barons should be liable for interest and attys fees
HELD
1. NO
Ratio there is no abuse of rights when there is no bad faith nor
intent to prejudice another. Also, the mere exercise of a right
cannot be said to be an abuse of right.

-
Reasoning
- the law prescribes a "primordial limitation on all
rights" by setting certain standards that must be observed in the
exercise thereof. Thus, the inclusion of Art.19 in the CC: Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
- To constitute abuse of rights, there must be bad faith
or intent to prejudice the plaintiff. Citing Tolentino: There is
undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only
purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective
of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed
under the guise of exercising a right. xxx The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there
must be no intention to injure another. - In this case, bad faith
on the part of Phelps was not proved. More importantly, Phelps
was driven by legitimate reasons for rejecting Barons offer. It
merely wanted to avoid a situation wherein its cash position
would be compromised, making it harder for them to pay its
own obligations.
Clearly, this (the request of Barons) would be inimical to
the interests of any enterprise, especially a profit-oriented
one like Phelps. It is plain to see that what we have here is a
mere exercise of rights, not an abuse thereof.
2. YES
Ratio the penal clause included in the contract should be
complied with in the event of breach.
Reasoning
- the contract expressly provided for the imposition of
the 12% interest plus 25% for attorneys fees and collection, by
way of penal clause. Thus, Barons is bound to pay the said
amounts.
However, since 25% if P4.1m is almost P2m, this should be
reduced to 10% for being manifestly exorbitant. Thus, attys
fees should be reduced to 10% Disposition CA decision
modified WRT attys fees but AFFIRMED in other respects

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION V CA
(MARASIGAN)
296 SCRA 260
KAPUNAN; September 25, 1998

FACTS
- December 8, 1989 - Atty. Ricardo J. Marasigans
credit card was dishonored, the bill amounting to P735.32, by
Caf Adriatico when the he entertained some guests. One of
his guests, Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own
credit card a Unibankard
- MARASIGAN was a complimentary member of
BECC from February 1988 to February 1989 and was issued
Credit Card with a credit limit of P3,000.00 and with a monthly
billing every 27th of the month His membership was renewed
for another year or until February 1990 and the credit limit was
increased to P5,000.00.
- MARASIGAN oftentimes exceeded his credit limits
but this was never taken against him by BPI and even his mode
of paying his monthly bills in check was tolerated.
- October 1989 statement amounting to P8,987.84
was not paid in due time. MARASIGAN admitted having failed
to pay his account because he was in Quezon attending to
some professional and personal commitments. He was
informed that bpi was demanding immediate payment of his
outstanding account, was requiring him to issue a check for
P15,000.00 which would include his future bills, and was
threatening to suspend his credit card.
- MARASIGAN issued Far East Bank Check of
P15,000.00, postdated December 15, 1989 which was received
on November 23, 1989 by Tess Lorenzo, an employee of the
defendant who in turn gave to Jeng Angeles, a co-employee
who handles the account of the plaintiff. The check remained in
the custody of Jeng Angeles. Mr. Roberto Maniquiz, head of the
collection department of defendant was formally informed of the
postdated check about a week later.
- November 28, 2989 - BPI served MARASIGAN a
letter by ordinary mail informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of his credit card and the inclusion
of his account number in their Caution List. He was also told to
refrain from further use of his credit card to avoid any
inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he settles his
outstanding account with the defendant within 5 days from
receipt of the letter, his membership will be permanently
cancelled
- There is no showing that the plaintiff received this
letter before December 8, 1989.
- December 12, 1989 MARASIGAN requested that
he be sent the exact billing due him as of December 15, 1989,
to withhold the deposit of his postdated check and that said
check be returned to him because he had already instructed his
bank to stop the payment because BPI violated their agreement
that when MARASIGAN issued the check to cover his account
amounting to only P8,987.84 on the condition that BPI will not
suspend the effectivity of the card
- December 16, 1989 MARASIGAN sent letter to the
manager of FEBTC requesting the bank to stop the payment of
the check
- March 12, 1990 MARASIGAN sent another letter
reminding the manager of FEBTC that he had long rescinded
and cancelled whatever arrangement he entered into with BPI
and requesting for his correct billing, less the improper charges
and penalties, and for an explanation within five (5) days from
receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8,
1989 despite assurance to the contrary by defendant's
personnel-in-charge, otherwise the necessary court action shall
be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and
embarrassment suffered by him
- March 21, 1990 - final demand by BPI requiring him
to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated fees and
charges, within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action
and also to replace the postdated check with cash within the
same period or face criminal suit for violation of Bouncing
Check Law
- April 5, 1990 MARASIGAN demanded BPI
compliance with his request in his first letter dated March 12,
1990 within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise the plaintiff
will file a case against them
- May 7, 1990 - MARASIGAN filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner before the RTC Makati
- TC: ruled for MARASIGAN finding that BPI abused
its right in contravention of A19 CC ordering BPI to pay P
100,000.00 as moral damages; P 50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and P 20,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
- CA: AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION P50,000.00
as moral damages: P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
P10,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
ISSUES
1. WON BPI abused its right to suspend the credit card
2. WON MARASIGAN can recover moral damages arising from
the
cancellation of his credit card by BPI

HELD
1. NO
Ratio The agreement was for the immediate payment of the
outstanding account. A check is not considered as cash
especially when it is postdated sent to BPI. Thus, the issuance
of the postdated check was not effective payment. BPI was
therefore justified in suspending his credit card. BPI did not
capriciously and arbitrarily canceled the use of the card.
Reasoning
- Under the terms and conditions of the credit card,
signed by MARASIGAN, any card with outstanding balances
after thirty (30) days from original billing/statement shall
automatically be suspended,
Any CARD with outstanding balances unpaid after thirty (30)
days from original billing/statement date shall automatically
be suspended and those with accounts unpaid after sixty
(60) days from said original billing/statement date shall
automatically be cancelled without prejudice to BECC's right
to suspend or cancel any CARD any time and for whatever
reason.
- By his own admission MARASIGAN made no
payment within 30 days for his billing/statement dated 27
September 1989. Neither did he make payment for his original
billing/statement dated 27 October 1989. Consequently as early
as 28 October 1989 thirty days from the non-payment of his
billing dated 27 September 1989, BPI could automatically
suspend his credit card. Ratio To find the existence of an
abuse of right A19 the following elements must be present (1)
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Reasoning
- Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving
bad faith is on the party alleging it. As early as 28 October

-
1989, BPI could have suspended MARASIGANS card outright.
Instead, BPI allowed him to use his card for several weeks.
Ratio The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law.
Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be
awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate
cause of the injury.
Reasoning
- Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the results of
a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque
injuria
- It was petitioner's failure to settle his obligation which
caused the suspension of his credit card and subsequent
dishonor at Caf Adriatico. He can not now pass the blame to
the petitioner for not notifying him of the suspension of his card.
As quoted earlier, the application contained the stipulation that
the petitioner could automatically suspend a card whose billing
has not been paid for more than thirty days. Nowhere is it
stated in the terms and conditions of the application that there
is a need of notice before suspension may be affected as
private respondent claims.

2. NO
- MARASIGANS own negligence was the proximate
cause of his embarrassing and humiliating experience in not
reading the letter of notice of cancellation. The award of
damages by the CA is clearly unjustified.

RUIZ V SECRETARY
PAREDES; 1966

NATURE
Appeal from an order of the Manila CFI

FACTS
- Enrique Ruiz and Jose Herrera, both shareholders of
Allied Technilogists, Inc. filed an action against the Secretary of
National Defense and also against their own company (together
with Pablo Panlilio who is also a shareholder of the company) in
connection with the 15% retention fund withheld by the DND
relating to the construction of the Veterans Hospital. It turned
out that said retention was already released by the DND to the
Company. The Court then proceeded with the other cause of
action which was deemed to be the controversy between Ruiz
and Panlilio over the said 15%.
- As it turned out, the real issue was the credit as to
the architects of the building were. Under the contract and all
other documents relating to the construction of the Veterans
Hospital, the named architect was only Panlilio. Ruiz and
Herrera want to be recognized as architects of the building also
citing Article 21 of the Civil Code as their base for he cause of
action.
The amended complaint of appellants claimed that the non
inclusion of their names as architects resulted in their
professional prestige and standing being seriously impaired.
Hence, they claim that even if the retention fund was in act
released, their pleas for recognition as architects should have
been heard by the lower court.

ISSUE
WON the lower court erred in dismissing the case

HELD
NO
- The sole object of the appellants was to secure for
themselves recognition that they were co-architects of the
Veterans Hospital, together with Panlilio, so as to enhance their
standing and prestige. If this is so, there is no need or necessity
for a judicial declaration. Prestige and recognition are bestowed
on the deserving even if there is no judicial declaration. On the
other hand no amount of declaration will help an incompetent
person achieve prestige and recognition. Article 21, which was
used as basis of the action, states;
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
- While the word injury may also refer to honor or
credit, the article envisions a situation where a person has a
legal right which was violated by another in a manner contrary
to morals, good custom, or public policy. Hence it presupposes
losses or injuries which are suffered as a result of said violation.
The pleadings in this case do not show damages were ever
asked or alleged. - And under the facts and circumstances
obtaining, one cannot sustain the contention that the failure or
refusal to extend recognition was an act contrary to morals,
good custom, or public policy.
Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is affirmed.
he modified award of attorneys fees.

ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)
217 SCRA 16

NATURE
Appeal from decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises Corp. delivered to Guaranteed
Industries Inc. the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As
part payment, Albenson was given a check drawn against the
account of E.L. Woodworks.
- Check was dishonored for the reason Account
closed.
- Albenson discovered that the president of
Guaranteed was one Eugenio S. Baltao and that E.L.
Woodworks was registered in the name Eugenio Baltao. The
signature on the subject check belonged to Eugenio Baltao.
- Albenson made an extrajudicial demand but Balbao
denied issuing the check. Thus, Albenson filed a complaint
against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of BP 22.
- Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information
against Eugenio S. Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22.
- Baltao filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a
motion for reinvestigation. It appears that private respondent
has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages E.L.
Woodworks.
- Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed
the finding of Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated respondent
Baltao.
- Baltao filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against Albenson Enterprises, its owner, and one employee.
- Trial court granted Baltaos claim for actual or
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and costs.
- CA modified by reducing the moral damages and the
attorney's fees awarded.

ISSUES
WON Baltao should be awarded damages (based on malicious
prosecution)

HELD
NO
- A party injured by the filing of a court case against
him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for
damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or
on malicious prosecution. In order that such a case can
prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be
present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further
fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the
action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable
cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice
- To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be
proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately
by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to
the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the institution of

-
the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly
established to entitle the victims to damages
- Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage
results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria.
- Actual and compensatory damages are those
recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade,
property, profession, job or occupation and the same must
be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated,
no damages will be given
- In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of
fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded and that
the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of damages, for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate
- Where there is no evidence of the other party having
acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner,
neither may exemplary damages be awarded
Disposition Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set
aside

WASSMER V VELEZ
12 SCRA 648
BENGZON; December 24, 1964

FACTS
- Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer,
following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married
and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2,
Velez left a note for Wassmer saying that he has to postpone
the wedding because his mother opposes it.
- But the next day, he sent a telegram assuring
Wassmer that nothing has changed and he will return soon.
But Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
- Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer
and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before
the clerk of court as commissioner Judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000 as actual damages;
P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500 as
attorney's fees; and the costs.

ISSUE
WON Velez is liable for the cost of wedding preparations spent
by Wassmer

HELD
YES
- While mere breach of contract is not an actionable
wrong, Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the person
willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom, he shall
compensate the latter for damages. It is the abuse of right
which can be a cause for moral and material damages. - The
record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant
applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued. Their wedding was set. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances.
The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel
for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the
maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial
bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given
and gifts received.
- This is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance
with Article 21 aforesaid.
- Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary
damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New
Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-
narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a
"wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." P15,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
award.

TANJANCO V SANTOS
REYES; December 17, 1966

NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals revoking an
order of the CFI dismissing appellant's action for support and
damages.

FACTS
Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, both being of adult
age; that he expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for her who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings"; that in consideration of his promise of marriage
Araceli consented and acceded to Tanjancos pleas for carnal
knowledge. Regularly until December 1959, through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage, Tanjanco
succeeded in having carnal access to Araceli, as a result of
which she conceived a child. Due to her pregnant condition, to
avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, Araceli had to
resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. She became
unable to support herself and her baby and duer to Tanjanco's
refusal to marry her as promised, she suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was
bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her
support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and
exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees. CFI
dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, entered
judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of
origin to proceed with the case.

ISSUE
WON CS erred in reversing the CFI decision

HELD
YES
- In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action
for damages, under Article 21, the Court of Appeals relied upon
and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code
Commission where it stated, but the Code Commission has
gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined
by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in
the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule: ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage." They gave an example "A" seduces the nineteen-
year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant.
Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of
promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right
of action. The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that
the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law it is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded. To constitute seduction there
must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and
the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction. She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are

-
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in
her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of
her seducer.
- And in American Jurisprudence: On the other hand,
in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover. Accordingly it is
not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire
or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her
the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has
been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would
be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses
would be swift to profit.
- Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the
complaint. Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts
stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Araceli
Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with Tanjanco, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there
is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had Araceli been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would
not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises
of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no
error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the complaint.
Disposition the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed..

BAKSH V CA
219 SCRA 115
DAVIDE JR; February 19, 1993

NATURE
Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the
Court of
Appeals

FACTS
- Private respondent, without the assistance of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that:
she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is
an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August
1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married;
they therefore argued to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then
visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime
in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in
the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began
living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a confrontation
with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day
before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages,
reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney's fees and costs,
and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable. - In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations
either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus
claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent; he neither sought the
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop
coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally,
no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety
and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award for
miscellaneous expenses and moral damages.
- After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was
thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees.
- The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings
and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c)
petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be
deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise,
private respondent and her parents in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for
the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to
marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner
and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation
to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
- Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent Court promulgated
the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling.
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant
petition; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not
Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
- It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not
applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or
injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent;
and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture.
As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable

because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four
wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court
erred in ruling that he does not possess good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his legal
wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies
in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the
private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility
could be pinned on him for the livein relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was
to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the
private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such
acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable.

ISSUE
WON Art. 21 is applicable to the case at bar

HELD
YES
- The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. This notwithstanding, the said Code
contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
- In light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice
or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In
the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest
and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
him preparatory to
their supposed marriage."
Disposition Petition denied

BUNAG V CA (CIRILO)
211 SCRA 441
REGALADO; July 10, 1992

NATURE
Petition for review from the decision of CA

FACTS
- Conrado Bunag, Jr brought Zenaida Cirilo to a hotel
where they had sex. Later that evening, Bunag brough her to
his grandmothers house in Las Pinas where they liver together
as husband and wife for 21 days. During that time, Bunag, Jr.
and Cirilo applied for their respective Marriage Licenses, but
after leaving, Bunag Jr withdrew his application. Cirilo contends
that she was abducted by Bunag Jr along with unidentified man
and brought her to the motel where she was raped. The Court a
quo adopted her evidence. - The Court found that Cirilo and
Bunag Jr were sweethearts but for 2eeks before the alleged
rape, they had a quarrel. On the day of the said rape, Bunag jr
invited her for merienda to talk things over. Bunag Jr came
riding in a car with an unidentified man. Cirilo rode in the
passengers seat while Bunag Jr was driving. When she noticed
they were going the wrong way, Cirilo protested but Bunag
threatened her that he would bump the car against the post if
she made any noise. They never got to the restaurant where
they were supposed to eat.
- She was then dragged by the 2 men in the hotel
where Bunag Jr deflowered her against her will and consent.
- Bunag initially allowed her to go home but later
refused to consent and stated that he would only let her go after
they were married, so much so that she promised not to make
any scandal and to marry him. they proceeded to Bunags
grandmothers house. That night, Bunag Sr arrived and assured
them that they would apply for the ML the next day.
- After filing for the ML, they lived as husband and wife
for 21 days. Bunag then left and never returned. Cirilo was
ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat
because of the deception done against her by Bunag,
Jr.
- A complaint fro breach of promise to marry was filed
against Bunag Sr and Bunag Jr. The RTC upon finding that she
was forcibly abducted and raped Bunag Jr was ordered to pay
for P80K for moral damages, P20K for exemplary damage,
P20K by way of temperate damage, and P10K for attys fees.
Bunag Sr was absolved from liability.
- Cirilo appealed on the disculpation of Bunag Srs
liability. While the Bunags assigned several errors in the TC
decision. CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed judgment of
RTC in toto.
- Bunag filed for the petition for review claiming that CA
failed to consider vital exhibits and testimonies and error in the
proper application of the law.

ISSUE
WON lower courts erred in granting damages for the breach of
promise to marry

HELD
Ratio A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se,
except where the plaintiff incurred expenses for the wedding
and the necessary incidents therrof. However, the award for
moral damages is allowed in cases specified and analogous to
those provided in Art 2219 CC. Under Art 21 CC, in relation to
Art 2219, par10, any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
Reasoning
- The court is constrained with the factual findings of
the lower courts. - A breach of promise to marry has no
standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover for
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise.
- Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the
petitioners promising to marry Cirilo to evade criminal liability
constitutes acts contrary to morals and good customs. These
are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
warrant and justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Art 21 in relation to par 3 and 10, Art 2219, and Art
2229 and 2234 CC.
- Although TC granted damages on the basis of the
forcible abduction and rape even after the criminal complaints
dismissal, the extinction of the criminal liability does not
extinguish civil liability unless there is a declaration of a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case may arise did
not exist. In the case, only the fiscal made such dismissal of the
criminal complaint.
Disposition petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and
the assailedjudgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

CONSTANTINO V MENDEZ
BIDIN; May 14, 1992

NATURE

FACTS
- Petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private
respondent Ivan Mendez. - In her complaint, Amelita
Constantino alleges that she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's
Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she worked as a
waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited
Amelita to dine with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted;
that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita;
that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that
at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to
bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext of
getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room
and through a promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual

intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact, Ivan
confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they
repeated their sexual contact in the months of September and
November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of
which Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support
fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any
other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be
born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of
her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave her work as a
waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City
with a monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief,
Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn child, the
payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's
fees plus costs.

ISSUE
WON Amelita can claim for damages which is based on Articles
19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code on the theory that through Ivan's
promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity

HELD
NO
Ratio Mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for
recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse
is not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire.
Reasoning
- Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she
surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was
informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August,
1974, that he was a married man. Repeated sexual intercourse
only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise of
marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to
Ivan.

QUIMIGUING V ICAO 34
SCRA 132
REYES; July 31, 1970

NATURE
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI

FACTS
- Appellant, Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued
her neighbor Icao with whom she had close and confidential
relations. The latter, although married, succeeded in having sex
with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation and without
her consent. She became pregnant and despite efforts and
drugs (abortion pills?) supplied by defendant, she had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support of P120/mo.
- Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action as
the complaint did not allege the child had been bornthe
motion was sustained. Plaintiff amended the complaint but the
TC ruled such was not allowable as the original complaint
averred no cause of action.
ISSUES
1. WON Quimiguing had a right to the support of the child
2. WON Quimiguing is entitled to damages

HELD
1. YES
- A conceived, unborn child is given a provisional personality by
law and therefore has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly Icao (Art. 40) and may receive donations (Art. 742).
Its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the
death of the testator (Art. 854)
2. YES
- For a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint) constitutes
a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to
claim compensation for damages caused. As stated in Art. 21,
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for damage. This is furthered by
Art. 2219 which provides compensation in cases of seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
- Hence, independent of the right to support of the
child, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages; thus
the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
doubly in error.
Disposition the orders under appeal are reversed and set
aside

PE V PE
5 SCRA 200
1962

FACTS
- Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita
PE, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a
married man, frequently visited Lolitas house on the pretext
that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in
love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents
learned about this, they prohibited defendant from going to their
house. The affair continued just the same. On april 14, 1957,
Lolita disappeared from her brothers house where she was
living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found
inside Lolitas aparador. The present action was instituted under
Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the
action. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs

ISSUE
WON the defendant can be held liable under Article 21

HELD
YES
- The circumstances under which the defendant tried to
win Lolitas affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than
that it was he who, through an ingenious scheme or trickery,
seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with
him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to
the latters family who allowed free access because he was a
collateral relative and was considered as a member of the
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine love affairs. Defendant continued his
love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental
home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this
chain of events than that the defendant not only deliberately,
but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations
with her. The wrong he had caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

QUE V IAC (NICOLAS)
169 SCRA 137
CRUZ; January 13, 1989

NATURE
Petition for review

FACTS
- Magtanggol Que is a dealer of canvass strollers while
Antonio Nicolas orders from him. The two had an amicable
business relation until 1975, when Nicolas ordered strollers
from Que, which were delivered, and then issued 5 postdated
checks in favor of Que. The checks were dishonored, in
accordance with Nicolas order to stop payment. After making
demands for payment, which Nicolas allegedly ignored. Que
filed an estafa case against Nicolas. The case was dismissed
for lack of merit.
- Nicolas then filed a case against Que for malicious
prosecution. He allegedly ordered that payment be stopped
because the goods delivered to him by Que were defective and
that Que allegedly refused to replace them. Que on his part
alleged that the said defective products were only returned after
he filed an estafa case. TC ruled in favor of Que, IAC reversed.

ISSUE
WON Que had instituted a malicious prosecution of the private
respondent
(WON the reversal made by IAC was correct)

HELD
NO

- It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill
feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his his rights when he
filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal's office.
Ratio. One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.
Reasoning
-. 'Under the Spanish Law, the element of probable cause was
not treated separately from that of malice, as under the
American Law. When a complaint was laid and there was
probable cause to believe that the person charged had
committed the acts complained of, although, as a matter of fact,
he had not, the complainant was fully protected, but not so
much on the theory of probable cause as on the ground that,
under such circumstances, there was no intent to accuse
falsely. If the charge, although false, was made with an honest
belief in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable
grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the
accusation could not be held to have been false in the legal
sense.
vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to
the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution (Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 100 SCRA 602)
- Nicolas issued 5 checks which Que cannot encash,
inspite of demands by the latter. Also, the goods which were
allegedly defective were not yet returned to Que before the
filing of the estafa case. Instead, Nicolas kept the goods, did not
demand for its repair. He just stopped payment, without Que
knowing that there were defects in the goods he delivered.
Therefore, from Ques point of view, the circumstances
presented the possibility that Nicolas might cheat him.
Disposition decision of the respondent court dated March 12,
1984, is SET ASIDE and the amended decision of the trial court
dated February 21, 1979, is REINSTATED as above modified.
This decision is immediately executory.

DRILON V CA (ADAZA)
270 SCRA 211
HERMOSISIMA JR; March 20, 1997

NATURE
Petition to reverse CAs Resolutions

FACTS
- Gen Renato DE VILLA, Chief of Staff of the AFP,
requested the DOJ (headed by Sec Franklin DRILON) to order
the investigation of several individuals, including private
respondent ADAZA for their alleged participation in the failed
Dec 1989 coup detat.
- This was then referred for preliminary inquiry to the
Special Composite Team of Prosecutors who issued a
subpoena to the said individuals after finding sufficient basis to
continue the inquiry. The panel assigned to conduct prelim
investigation found that there was probable cause to hold them
for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND
FRUSTRATED MURDER. Information was filed before RTC
QC, with no recommendation as to bail.
- Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these
proceedings against him, ADAZA filed a complaint for damages
and charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful
and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of
rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when
petitioners were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime
in the statute books.
- Petitioners filed MD since there was no valid cause of
action for this complaint for damages.
- RTC denied MD. MFR for Order of Denial was also
denied. - CA also dismissed petition for certiorari and ordered
RTC judge to proceed with the trial of civil case filed by ADAZA.
(In Adazas latest Comment, he maintained that his claim
before the trial court was merely a suit for damages based on
tort and NOT a suit for
malicious prosecution.)

ISSUES
1. WON complaint was a suit for damages for malicious
prosecution
2. WON petitioners are liable for malicious prosecution

HELD
1. YES
Definition of Malicious Prosecution:
- In American jurisdiction, it has been defined as-
One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the
charges can be sustained. Instituted with intention of injuring
defendant and without probable cause, and which terminates in
favor of the person prosecuted. For this injury an action on the
case lies, called the action of malicious prosecution. - In
Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as-
An action for damages brought by one against whom a
criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has
been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after
the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the
putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose
of vexation or injury.
Reasoning
- Nowhere in his complaint filed with the trial court did
respondent Adaza allege that his action is one based on tort.
(Sec 3e of RA 3019) An examination of the records would show
that this latest posture as to the nature of his cause of action is
only being raised for the first time on appeal.
Such a change of theory cannot be allowed.
2. NO
Ratio In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the
plaintiff must prove these elements:
(a) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (b) That in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(c) That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal
malice, that is by improper or sinister motive.
- The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for
malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the NCC
[Art 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8)].
Reasoning
- Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by
Adaza, NONE of these requisites have been alleged, thus
rendering the complaint dismissible on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.
(a) Insofar as Adazas Criminal Case is concerned, what
appears clear from the records only is that respondent has
been discharged on a writ of habeas corpus and granted bail.
This is not considered the termination of the action
contemplated under Philippine jurisdiction to warrant the
institution of a malicious prosecution suit against those
responsible for the filing of the information against him.
(b) It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with
probable cause. The petitioners were of the honest conviction
that there was probable cause to hold Adaza for trial. (c)
Suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies,
as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. Respondent Judge is
DIRECTED to take no further action on civil case except to
DISMISS it.

GLOBE MACKAY V CA
CORTES; August 25, 1989

NATURE
Certiorari

FACTS
- Globe Mackay found out an anomaly that has been
causing them to lose money, to which Tobias was the number
one suspect though he claimed he was the one who reported it.
- The results of the investigations said that the
handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks
and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions
were not those of -Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on
Tobias also yielded negative results.

- Despite being cleared, complaints for estafa were
filed against Tobias. All of the six criminal complaints were
dismissed by the fiscal and MRs of Globe were denied too.
- Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal upon
receiving the notice of his termination.
- LA: dismissed the complaint; NLRC- reversed; the
Secretary of Labor: reinstated the LA's decision which Tobias
appealed to the Office of the President.
- During the pendency of the appeal with said office,
petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a
compromise agreement regarding the latter's complaint for
illegal dismissal.
- Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
- However, Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias
was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
- This led Tobias to file a civil case for damages
anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners.
- RTC: rendered judgment in favor of Tobias by
ordering petitioners to pay him P80,000.00 as actual damages,
P200,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P30,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs. - Both
parties appealed. CA: affirmed the RTC decision in toto, denied
Globes MR.

ISSUE
WON there was malicious prosecution

HELD
YES
- Petitioners were not content with just dismissing
Tobias. There was malicious intent manifested through the filing
of the criminal cases as the case for illegal dismissal was
pending; Hendrys threat of more suits against Tobias; The filing
of the cases despite the police reports exculpating Tobias; and
the eventual dismissal of the cases. SC anchored its findings on
TCs finding (re bad faith of Globe Mackay in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias).
Reasoning
- Although Globe claims that they must not be
penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking
justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who
was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in
the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded
them of substantial sums of money, the right to institute
criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in
bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, 38 SCRA 5871.]
- Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co.,[ 2 SCRA 337]: the
Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be
used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the
function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice.
- Hawpia CA,[20 SCRA 536]: the Court upheld the
judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages
and attorney's fees after making a finding that petitioner, with
persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against
respondent, all of which were dismissed.
*Findings of bad faith (as per the TC):
> After the dismissal of the 4 cases and denial of the MR by
the Ministry of Justice, 2 cases were refiled with the Judge
Advocate General's Office of the AFP to railroad Tobias
arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was
frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases
involving civilians to the civil courts.
> Despite the clearing Tobias of participation or involvement
in the fraudulent transactions complained of, despite the
negative results of the lie detector tests which Globe Mackay
compelled him to undergo, and although the police
investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary
report will be submitted after all the evidence has been
gathered," Globe Mackay hastily filed 6 criminal cases with
the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, 5 for estafa thru falsification
of commercial document and 1 for violation of A290 of the
RPC (all of which were dismissed), with one of the
investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one
case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case was
investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and
haste in the filing of this case against

respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that
defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to
plaintiff.
Ratio To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof
that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and
humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless
[Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly,
the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for
malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, 122 SCRA
576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint
is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious
prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the
complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60].
Disposition CAs decision AFFIRMED.

ALBENSON V CA (BALTAO)

NATURE
Appeal from CA judgment modifying RTCs decision as regards
amount to be
paid

FACTS
- Albenson Enterprises delivered mild steel plates to
3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The delivery was
received by Guaranteed Industries, of which Eugeneio Baltao
was president; a check in the amount of P2,575 was given as
payment. Said check was signed by a Eugenio Baltao, drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks.
- The check bounced. Albenson extrajudicially
demanded payment from Baltao. Baltao denied that it was his
signature on the check. Albenson filed case for violation of
BP22. Investigating fiscal found probable cause and filed info
with the RTC. Baltao appealed to the Provincial Prosecutor. The
provincial prosecutor found out that something was amiss during
the investigation and upon reinvestigation, found no probable
cause. He told the trial fiscal to move for dismissal.
- After the criminal case was dismissed, Baltao filed a
complaint for damages against Albenson because the latter had
unjustly filed a criminal case against him.
- IT TURNS OUT that E.L. Woodworks business
address was the same as Guaranteed Industries. ELW was
owned by Baltaos son, who is his namesake.
- RTC granted actual (P133k), moral (P1M) and
exemplary damages (P200k), and attys fees (P100k). CA
modified by awarding only half of original moral damages and
attys fees.

ISSUE
WON Baltao is entitled to damages

HELD
NO
- An award of damages and attorney's fees is
unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage
results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum
absque injuria.
- ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which
may be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also
in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which
does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Although the requirements of each provision is different, these
three articles are all related to each other.
"With this article (Article 21), combined with articles 19 and
20, the scope of our law on civil wrongs has been very greatly
broadened; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now difficult to
conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could not
be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1
Civil Code of the Philippines 72).
- There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked. The question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in
damages under Articles 20 and 21 or other applicable provision
of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. (Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176
SCRA 778 [1989]).
- The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are
the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
- ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal;
2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.
- Thus, under any of these three provisions of law, an
act which causes injury to another may be made the basis for an
award of damages. - There is a common element under Articles
19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However,
Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either
"willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as well as the
respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three
articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the award
of damages. - Albenson did not abuse its rights. The second and
third elements are not present. All they wanted was to collect
what is owed them. They believed Baltao was really the one
who issued the check because it was his company who ordered
and received the delivery. They wrote to him. He replied by
denying and telling them to check the veracity of their claim. He
didnt tell them that his son was his namesake and that the latter
operated a business in the same building. Albenson acted in
good faith and had probable cause in filing their complaint
against Baltao.
- There was no malicious prosecution. To constitute
malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution
was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. The
presence of probable cause means the absence of malice.
Disposition Petition granted. CA reversed and set aside.

MANILA GAS CORPORATION V CA (ONGSIP)
MAKASIAR; October 30, 1980

NATURE
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA (treated as
a special
civil action)

FACTS
- On May 20, 1964, respondent Ongsip applied for gas
service connection with petitioner Manila Gas Corporation.
- A burner gas was installed by petitioner's employees
in respondent's kitchen at his residence.
- On July 27, 1965, respondent Ongsip requested
petitioner to install additional appliances as well as additional
gas service connections in his 46door Reyno Apartment:
petitioner installed two 20-gallon capacity water storage heaters
and two heavy-duty gas burners and replaced the original gas
meter with a bigger 50-light capacity gas meter. - The
installations and connections were all done solely by petitioner's
employees.
- There was no significant change in the meter reading
despite additional installations, and on May and June 1966, no
gas consumption was registered in the meter, prompting
petitioner to issue a 'meter order' with instructions to change the
gas meter in respondent's residence. - On August 17, 1966,
petitioner's employees went to Ongsip's place. - Without
notifying or informing respondent Ongsip, they changed the gas
meter and installed new tube connections. Private respondent
was then taking a nap, but he was informed afterwards of what
had taken place by his houseboy.
- On that same afternoon, petitioner's employees
returned with a photographer who took pictures of the premises.
Ongsip inquired from Coronel why they were taking pictures but
the latter simply gave him a calling card with instructions to go to
his office. There, he was informed about the existence of a by-
pass valve or "jumper" in the gas connection and that unless he
gave P3,000.00, he would be deported.
- Respondent Ongsip refused to give the money

- By the end of August, a reading was made on the new
meter and expectedly, it registered a sudden increase in gas
consumption. -Thereafter, in October, 1966, a complaint for
qualified theft was filed by petitioner against respondent
Ongsip
- On February, 1967, pending investigation of the
criminal complaint, petitioner disconnected respondent's
gas service for alleged failure and/or refusal to pay his gas
consumptions from July, 1965 to January, 1967.
- Subsequently, the complaint was dismissed
- On July 14, 1967, following the dismissal by the
investigating fiscal of the complaint for qualified theft and
the disconnection by petitioner of his gas service,
respondent Ongsip filed a complaint for moral and
exemplary damages against petitioner Manila Gas
Corporation based on two causes of action, firstly: the
malicious, oppressive and malevolent filing of the criminal
complaint; and, secondly: the illegal closure of respondent
Ongsip's gas service connection without court order and
without notice of warning.
- Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied
- On May 2, 1972, the trial court rendered its decision
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff:(1) P50,000.00 as moral
damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION; (2) P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages in the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION; (3)
P30,000.00 as moral damages in the SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION; (4) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages in the SECOND
CAUSE OF ACTION; (5) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (6)
the costs of the suit.
- Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
- CA affirmed the lower courts decision in toto, hence,
this petition

ISSUE
WON the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by
the trial court
and affirmed by the Court of appeals is excessive

HELD
YES
- Article 2217 of the Civil Code states that "moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission." On the other hand, Article 2229 provides that
"exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition, to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages."
- The first cause of action, for which respondent Ongsip
was awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, is predicated on
Article 2219 of the Civil Code which states that "moral damages
may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: .. . (8)
malicious prosecution; .. .
vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless.
- Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for
malicious prosecution. - In the instant case, however, there is
reason to believe that there was malicious intent in the filing of
the complaint for qualified theft. - As correctly observed by the
trial court in its decisionA significant fact brought about by the
testimony of Coronel himself is the total absence of immediate
accusation against Plaintiff right at the very moment when the
bypass valve was allegedly discovered. Right then and there
Coronel should have told Plaintiff that he was using a by-pass
valve and in effect stealing gas from Defendant. The
circumstance was familiar to that of catching a thief in flagrante
delicto. But the truth is that when Coronel and his men entered
Plaintiff's compound and made changes therein, Plaintiff was
sleeping. When Plaintiff woke up at four o'clock in the afternoon,
Coronel and his men had already made the changes and had
already gone. They returned however at five o'clock, this time
with a photographer. This was the time when Plaintiff met
Coronel. Here was then the opportunity for Coronel to confront
Plaintiff with the allegedly discovered 'by-pass valve' and bluntly,
even brutally, tell him that there was thievery of gas. This,
Coronel did not do. .. .. ." - It bears noting that when he was
informed as to the existence of a 'jumper' in his gas connection,
respondent Ongsip did not show any sign of fear or remorse and
did not yield to the threatening demand of Coronelthis is the
attitude of someone who knows how to take a firm stand where
his principles and rights are concerned. To prove his innocence,
he was even willing to have his place excavated but petitioner
would not dare take the consequences. Besides, Delfin
Custodio, petitioner's own mechanical engineer, testified that the
second gas meter was replaced as being defective because
"some of its parts were worn out and that it was not properly
registering."
- Evidently, petitioner Manila Gas Corporation, in failing
to recover its lost revenue caused by the gas meter's incorrect
recording, sought to vindicate its financial loss by filing the
complaint for qualified theft against respondent Ongsip knowing
it to be false. It was actually intended to vex and humiliate
private respondent and to blacken his reputation not only as a
businessman but also as a person. Qualified theft is a serious
offense indicating moral depravity in an individual. To be
accused of such crime without basis is shocking and libelous. It
stigmatized private respondent causing him emotional
depression and social degradation. The fact that the complaint
for qualified theft was dismissed by the Pasay City fiscal is no
consolation. The damage had been done. Necessarily,
indemnification had to be made.
- The Court gives due consideration to respondent
Ongsip's social and financial status as a businessman and the
mental anguish he suffered as a result of the false imputation.
However, petitioner's financial capability must also be
considered. Petitioner is a public utility corporation whose
primary concern is service to the people, the profit motive being
merely secondary. Under the circumstances, the award of moral
and exemplary damages should be reduced to P25,000.00 and
P5,000.00, respectively. - Petitioner's act in disconnecting
respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes
breach of contract amounting to an independent tort. The
prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause
additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This
is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code.
- The award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article
2220 which provides that "willful injury to property may be a
legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith"
- Respondent Ongsip's default in payment cannot be
utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the claim for damages.
At most, this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating
factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which
respondent Ongsip is entitled. In consequence thereof, We
reduce the amount of moral damages to P15,000.00 The award
of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, on the other hand, is
sustained, being similarly warranted by Article 2234 of the Civil
Code as complemented by Article 2220.
Disposition Decision of CA modified as regards the amount of
damages.

PATRICIO V LEVISTE
PADILLA; April 26, 1989

FACTS
- Rafael Patricio, an ordained Catholic priest, and
actively engaged in social and civic affairs in Pilar, Capiz, where
he is residing, was appointed Director General of the 1976
Religious and Municipal Town Fiesta of Pilar, Capiz. While a
benefit dance was on-going in connection with the celebration of
the town fiesta, petitioner together with two (2) policemen were
posted near the gate of the public auditorium to check on the
assigned watchers of the gate. Private respondent Bienvenido
Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Captains of
Pilar, Capiz and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, who was
in a state of drunkenness and standing near the same gate
together with his companions, struck a bottle of beer on the
table causing an injury on his hand which started to bleed. Then,
he approached petitioner in a hostile manner and asked the
latter if he had seen his wounded hand, and before petitioner
could respond, private respondent, without provocation, hit
petitioner's face with his bloodied hand. As a consequence, a
commotion ensued and private respondent was brought by the
policemen to the municipal building. As a result, Patricio filed a
complaint for Slander by Deed. the court ruled in favor of herein
petitioner (as complainant), holding private respondent liable to
the former for moral damages as a result of the physical
suffering, moral shock and social humiliation caused by private
respondent's act of hitting petitioner on the face in public.

ISSUE

WON Patricio is entitled to damages for the humiliation he
experienced
during the town fiesta

HELD
YES
- As to moral damages, An award of moral damages is
allowed in cases specified or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, to wit:
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3)
Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts.
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30 32, 34, and 35.
- Private respondent's contention that there was no bad
faith on his part in slapping petitioner on the face and that the
incident was merely accidental is not tenable. It was established
before the court a quo that there was an existing feud between
the families of both petitioner and private respondent and that
private respondent slapped the petitioner without provocation in
the presence of several persons.
- The act of private respondent in hitting petitioner on
the face is contrary to morals and good customs and caused the
petitioner mental anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and
social humiliation. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in
relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same Code, "any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
- In addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary
or corrective damages may be imposed upon herein private
respondent by way of example or correction for the public good.
The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it
is shown that plaintiff is entitled to either moral, temperate or
compensatory damages Disposition Decision in favor of
Patricio.

GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET INC V ESPINO
GUERRERO; December 28, 1979

NATURE
Certiorari from CAs decision to grant P75k, P25k and P5k to
Espino for moral damages, exemplary damages and attys fees.

FACTS
- Espino is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from U.P.
Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble
Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of motoring and
warehousing therein; honorably discharged from the Philippine
Army in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the United
States for six months; member of the Philippine Veterans
Legion; author of articles published in the Manila Sunday Times
and Philippines Free Press; member of the Knights of
Columbus, Council No. 3713; son of the late Jose Maria Espino,
retired Minister, Department of Foreign Affairs at the Philippine
Embassy, Washington.
- One morning in 1970, he and his wife and their two
daughters went to shop at South Supermarket (owned by Grand
Union) in Makati. While his wife was shopping for groceries, he
went around the store and found a cylindrical rattail file that
he had wanted to buy for his hobby. Because it was small, he
didnt put it in the grocery cart because it might fall and get lost.
He instead held it in his hand. While still shopping, he and his
wife ran into his aunts maid. While they were talking he stuck
the file in his breast pocket, with a good part of the merchandise
exposed.
- He paid for the items in his wifes cart; but he forgot
about the file in his pocket. On their way out, the guard stopped
him and told him he hadnt paid for the file. He apologized and
said he had forgotten. He started towards the cashier to pay; but
the guard stopped him and said they were to go to the back of
the supermarket. There, a report was made, where Espino said
that he just forgot that he placed it in his pocket while talking to
the maid and his wife. He was then brought to the front of the
grocery, near the cashiers to a Mrs. Fandino. It was around 9am
and the many people were at the store. - Fandino read the
report and remarked: Ano,nakaw na naman ito. Espino said
he was going to pay for it. Fandino replied: That is all they
say, the people whom we cause not paying for the goods say . .
. They all intended to pay for the things that are found to them.
Espino objected, saying he was a regular customer of the
supermarket. Espino took out a P5 bill to pay for the P3.85 file.
Fandino reached over and took the P5 bill and said it was a fine.
Espino and wife objected and said that he was not a common
criminal. Fandino said it was a reward for guards who
apprehend pilferers. People started milling around and stared at
Espino. He was directed to get in line at the cashier to pay for
the file. All the time the people were staring at him. He was
totally embarrassed.
- After paying he and his wife walked out quickly. He
thought about going back that night to throw stones at the
supermarket; but decided to file a case.
The CFI dismissed. CA awarded him damages.

ISSUE
WON Espino is entitled to damages for the humiliation he
experienced at the
supermarket

HELD
YES
- The false accusation charged against the private
respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the
uniformed guards and the mode and manner in which he was
subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine,
threatening to call the police and in the presence and hearing of
many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him
humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the
petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in
relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Petitioners wilfully
caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. It is against
morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass
and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary
damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of such
damages, except liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the
court, according to the circumstances of each case (Art. 2216,
New Civil Code). The whole incident that befell respondent had
arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his own
act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was his forgetfulness in
checking out the item and paying for it that started the chain of
events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation, thereby
causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious
anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of omission contributed to
the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory
negligence is a factor which may reduce the damages that
private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code).
Moreover, that many people were present and they saw and
heard the ensuing interrogation and altercation appears to be
simply a matter of coincidence in a supermarket which is a
public place and the crowd of onlookers, hearers or bystanders
was not deliberately sought or called by management to witness
private respondent's predicament. The Court does not believe
that private respondent was intentionally paraded in order to
humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business
depended for its success and patronage the good will of the
buying public which can only be preserved and promoted by
good public relations.
Disposition Petition denied. CA modified: moral damages =
P5k; attys fees = P2k. no exemplary damages.

CARPIO V VALMONTE
438 SCRA 38
TINGA; September 9, 2004

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals

FACTS

- Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Del
Rosario and Sierra engaged her services for their church
wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m. on that day,
Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her
family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A, several
persons were already there including the bride, the bride's
parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the
official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those
present was petitioner Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.
- After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the
suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the
gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila
Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the
suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went back
to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed the
people staring at her. It was at this juncture that petitioner
allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: Ikaw lang
ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka
pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang
kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search
Valmonte's bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to
attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of
jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag
were lost. The hotel security was called in to help in the search.
The bags and personal belongings of all the people inside the
room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily searched,
interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the
evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all
persons who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them
including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being
interrogated by the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the
words Siya lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Valmonte's car
which was parked at the hotel premises was also searched but
the search yielded nothing. - A few days after the incident,
petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal
letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the
newlyweds' relatives and guests to redeem her smeared
reputation as a result of petitioner's imputations against her.
Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, Valmonte filed a
suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint, Valmonte
prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
- Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having
uttered words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte
during the investigation and claimed that everything that
transpired after the theft incident was purely a police matter in
which she had no participation. Petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the court to adjudge Valmonte
liable on her counterclaim.
- The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing
Valmonte's complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner
sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was merely
exercising her right and if damage results from a person
exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added
that no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner
acted maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the
culprit. The court said that Valmonte failed to show that she
suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, social humiliation, or that
her reputation was besmirched due to petitioner's wrongful act.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging
that the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not slander
her good name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence
she presented. The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined
that Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out
by petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry.
The appellate court held that Valmonte's claim for damages is
not predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search
and interrogation by the police but rather petitioner's act of
publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It
categorized petitioner's utterance defamatory considering that it
imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court concluded
that petitioner's verbal assault upon Valmonte was done with
malice and in bad faith since it was made in the presence of
many people without any solid proof except petitioner's
suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles Valmonte to an
award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for she
was publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and embarrassed.
However, the court found no sufficient evidence to justify the
award of actual damages.
- Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the
appellate court's conclusion that she publicly humiliated
respondent does not conform to the evidence presented. She
adds that even on the assumption that she uttered the words
complained of, it was not shown that she did so with malice and
in bad faith.

ISSUE
WON petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a
manner that is contrary to morals and good customs

HELD
YES
- Petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was
certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account
nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry
inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to
attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely
inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing
respondent as the only person who went out of the room before
the loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein,
and ordering that she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner
virtually branded respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had
the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who
actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or
principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused
injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and
good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her missing
jewelry cannot justify her acts toward respondent. She did not
act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other
purpose in mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 for which she should be held accountable. A person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise
of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith;
but not when he acts with negligence and abuse. - Respondent
is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages. Moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful
act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Though no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
adjudicated, courts are mandated to take into account all the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages
according to their discretion. Worthy of note is that moral
damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant, or to
enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he has undergone, by reason of defendant's culpable
action. In any case, award of moral damages must be
proportionate to the sufferings inflicted. Considering
respondent's social standing, and the fact that her profession is
based primarily on trust reposed in her by her clients, the
seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has greatly
tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other, affect
her future dealings with her clients, the award of P100,000.00 as
moral damages appears to be a fair and reasonable assessment
of respondent's damages.
Disposition Petition denied

QUISABA V STA. INES
CASTRO; August 30, 1974

NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari

FACTS
- Quisaba avers in his complaint that for 18 yrs prior to
his dismissal, he was in the employ of the defendant
corporation.
- That Robert Hyde instructed him to purchase logs for
the company's plant to which he refused on the ground that the
work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his position as
internal auditor
- That on the following day Hyde informed him of his
temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out
immediately the instructions thus given, and he was warned that
his failure to comply would be considered a ground for his
dismissal
- He pleaded for fairness but was instead demoted from
a position of dignity to a servile and menial job; that the
defendants did not reconsider their "clever and subterfugial
dismissal" of him which for all purposes constituted a
"constructive discharge;" and that because of the said acts of
the defendants, he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and

social humiliate on. The complaint does not pray for
reinstatement or payment of backwages.
- Sta Ines et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Davao CFI, asserting that the
proper forum is the NLRC established by Presidential Decree
No. 21.
- Quisaba opposed the motion;the NLRC's authorized
representative in Davao City opined that the NLRC no power to
award damages - CFI granted the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-
employer relationship.

ISSUE
WON a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages,
termination pay and attorney's fees, arising from an employer's
constructive dismissal of an employee, is exclusively cognizable
by the regular courts of justice or by the
NLRC

HELD
NO
- The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil
(not a labor) dispute. It has to do with an alleged violation of
Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not involve
an existing EE-ER relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of
LC. The complaint is thus properly and exclusively cognizable
by the regular courts of justice, not by the National Labor
Relations Commission.
Reasoning
-The jurisdiction of the NLRC is defined by section 2 of PD No.
21(AKA LC) which reads:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the following.
(1) All matters involving employee employer relations
including all disputes and grievances which may otherwise
lead to strikes and lockouts under
Republic Act No. 875;
(2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081; and
(3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations. -
Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to
constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations" as
Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing
employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on
his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for
reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his
dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal.
- Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that
determine or regulate the relations ... that exist between
members of a society for the protection of private interests.
3

- The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba
should not be confused with the manner in which the right was
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
- If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively,
as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article
1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by
either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which
makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral
damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cages:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, ....
Disposition CASE REMANDED to the CFI for further
proceedings in accordance with law.

MEDINA V CASTRO-BARTOLOME
ABAD SANTOS; September 11, 1982

FACTS
- This is a civil case filed by Medina and Ong against
Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsi-cola Bottling. Medina was the
former Plant General Manager and Ong was the former Plant
Comptroller. De Aboitiz is President and CEO of Pepsicola
Bottling.
- Without provocation, De Aboitiz shouted at plaintiffs in
the presence of the plaintiffs subordinates, GOD DAMN IT.
YOU FUCKED ME UP. YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU
ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED! (Medina) YOU
TOO ARE FIRED! (Ong)
- Plaintiffs filed joint criminal complaint for oral
defamation. But after preliminary investigation, complaint was
dismissed allegedly because the expression was not intended to
slander but to express anger. Deputy Minister of Justice issued
resolution sustaining complaint, reversing the resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal.
- It was alleged that the defendants dismissed the
plaintiffs because of an alleged delay in the use of promotional
crowns when such delay was true with respect to the other
plants.
- The dismissal was effected on the very day that
plaintiffs were awarded rings of loyalty to the Company, five
days before Christmas and on the day when the employees'
Christmas party was held in the Muntinlupa Plant, when plaintiffs
went home that day and found their wives and children already
dressed up for the party, they didn't know what to do and so
they cried. - Motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction was filed by the defendants. The trial court
denied the motion because civil damage complaint is not based
on employer-employee relationship but on manner of dismissal.
PD 1367 provides that Regional Directors shall not indorse and
Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral or other forms
of damages, now under courts jurisdiction.
- Defendants filed second motion to dismiss because of
amendments to the Labor Code and PD No 1691. They said the
case arose from such employeremployee relationship, which
under PD No 1691, is under exclusive original jurisdiction of
labor arbiter. The ruling with respect to defendants' first motion
to dismiss, therefore, no longer holds. - Motion to reconsider
was filed but was denied.

ISSUE
WON Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the
plaintiffs

HELD
NO
- Plaintiffs have not alleged any unfair labor practice.
Theirs is a simple action for damages for tortuous acts allegedly
committed by defendants.
Governing statute is Civil Code and not Labor Code.

SEPARATE OPINION

AQUINO [dissent]
- In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for
damages is correct because the claims of Medina and Ong were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC.
- Medina and Ong should not split their cause of action
against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola.

OTHER TORTS

AMARO V SUMANGUIT
G.R. No. L-14986
MAKALINTAL; July 31, 1962

NATURE
Appeal from decision of CFI

FACTS
- October 5, 1958: Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot
at near the city government building of Silay
- The following day he, together with his father and his
witnesses, "went to the office of the defendant but instead of
obtaining assistance to their complaint they were harassed and
terrorized"
-In view thereof, they "gave up and renounced their right and
interest in the prosecution of the crime "

- Upon advice of the City Mayor an investigation was
conducted and as a result the city attorney of Silay was about to
file or had already filed an information for illegal discharge of
firearm against the assailant - Having finished the investigation
of the crime complained of, the defendant chief of police is now
harassing the plaintiffs in their daily work, ordering them thru his
police to appear in his office when he is absent, and he is about
to order the arrest of the plaintiffs to take their signatures in
prepared affidavits exempting the police from any dereliction of
duty in their case against the perpetrator of the crime."
- Appellants filed suit for damages in the CFI of Negros
Occidental against the chief of police of the City of Silay.
Although not specifically alleged in the complaint, it is admitted
by both parties, as shown in their respective briefs, that the
action is predicated on Articles 21 and/or 27 of the Civil
Code.The complaint was dismissed upon appellee's motion in
the court below on the ground that it does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

ISSUE
WON the case should have been dismissed

HELD
NO
Ratio An action should not be dismissed upon mere ambiguity,
indefiniteness or uncertainty, for these are not grounds for a
motion to dismiss, under Rule 8, but rather for a bill of
particulars according to Rule 16.
Reasoning
- The facts set out constitute an actionable dereliction
on appellee's part in the light of Article 27 of the Civil Code,
which states that
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a
public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just
cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice
to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
- That appellants were "harrased and terrorized" may
be a conclusion of law and hence improperly pleaded. Their
claim for relief, however, is not based on the fact of harassment
and terrorization but on appellee's refusal to give them
assistance, which it was his duty to do as an officer of the law.
The requirement under the aforesaid provision that such refusal
must be "without just cause" is implicit in the context of the
allegation. The statement of appellee's dereliction is repeated in
a subsequent paragraph of the complaint, where it is alleged
that "he is about to order the arrest of the plaintiffs" to make
them sign affidavits of exculpation in favor of the policemen.
- All that the Rules require is that there be a showing by
a statement of ultimate facts, that the plaintiff has a right and
that such right has been violated by the defendant.
- Moran: The real test of good pleading under the new
rules is whether the information given is sufficient to enable the
party to plead and prepare for trial. A legal conclusion may serve
the purpose of pleading as well as anything else if it gives the
proper information. If the party wants more he may ask for more
details in regard to the particular matter that is stated too
generally
Disposition THE ORDER APPEALED from is set aside and the
case is remanded to the Court of origin for further proceedings.
Costs against appellee.

ST. LOUIS REALTY V ARAMIL
AQUINO; November 14, 1984

FACTS
- St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the
permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of
Doctor Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December
15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE
THE HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the
residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then
below the photograph was the following write-up:
"Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of MR. AND
MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and their family have been
captured by BROOKSIDE HELLS [note: thats not MY typo
ha]. They used to rent a small 2-bedroom house in a cramped
neighborhood, sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the
needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a more pleasant
place free from the din and dust of city life yet near all
facilities. Plans took shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE
HELLS [again, not MY typo]. With thrift and determination,
they bought a lot and built their dream house . . . for P31,000.
The Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving community
of BROOKSIDE HILLS [whew, there you are, no typo at
last]... a beautiful first-class subdivision planned for
wholesome family living."
- The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday
Times dated January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist
and a member of the faculty of the U.E. Ramon Magsaysay
Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same date, he
wrote St. Louis Realty a letter of protest. - The letter was
received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St. Louis Realty in
charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the
advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his
apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published.
- On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded
from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of
P110,000. St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest
mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification would be
published in the Manila Times. It published in the issue of the
Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the
Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any
apology to Doctor Aramil and an explanation of the error.
- On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages.
St. Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of
April 15,1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in a
space 4 by 3 inches:
"This will serve as a notice that our print ad 'Where the Heart
is' which appeared in the Manila Times issue of March 18,
1969 is a rectification of the same ad that appeared in the
Manila Times issues of December 15, 1968 and January 5,
1969 wherein a photo of the house of another Brookside
Homeowner (Dr. Aramil-private respondent) was mistakenly
used as a background for the featured homeowners the
Arcadio family. The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio
family with their real house in the background, as was
intended all along."
- Judge Jose Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty
should have immediately published a rectification and apology.
He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake,
magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered
mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to
P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right
to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code). The trial court awarded Aramil
P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and
P2,000 as allomey's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed. The CA
affirmed. The CA reasoned that St. Louis Realty committed an
actionable quasi-delict under Articles 21 and 26 of the Civil
Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a
beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor
Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that.

ISSUE
WON the CA erred by ignoring certain facts and resorting to
surmises and
conjectures hence its decision is contrary to law and the rulings
of the SC HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning
- St. Louis Realty argues that the case is not covered
by Article 26 which provides that "every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's
residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another" and "similar acts, " "though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action
for damages, prevention and other relief."
- The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned
by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219
allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article
26. [NOTE: see Art 2219 for the list of cases where moral
damages may be granted.] The acts and omissions of the firm
fall under Article 26.
- St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in
mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose,
it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-
up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification." Persons,
who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence
from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way,
his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He
suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.
Disposition Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.


CONCEPCION V
CA

DAMAGES

PEOPLE V BALLESTEROS 285
SCRA 438
ROMERO; January 29, 1998

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Bangui, Ilocos Norte,
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the RPC.

FACTS
- The information alleged that the accused with the use
of firearms caused the death of Eduardo Tolentino Sr. and Jerry
Agliam and inflicted gunshot wounds to Vidal Agliam, Carmelo
Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel
Tolentino.
- The Supreme Court upheld the RTCs decision as to
the guilt of the three accused, FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR
GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN. This digest will focus on the
RTCs award of damages which is relevant to our recitation.
- As to damages, the RTC further sentenced them to
pay jointly and solidarily:
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in
the amount of P50,000, moral damages in the amount of
P20,000, and actual damages in the amount of P35,755, with
interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr.,
compensatory damages in the amount of P50,000, moral
damages in the amount of P20,000, and actual damages in the
total amount of P61,785, with interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of
P2,003.40, and moral damages in the amount of P10,000, with
interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino,
moral damages in the amount of P5,000 each, with interest.
5. The costs.

ISSUE
WON the trial court erred in the award of damages to the
victims heirs

HELD
1. NO
Ratio Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some
duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense
for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be
invoked when the complainant has experienced mental anguish,
serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth,
and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result
of the offender's wrongful act or omission.
Reasoning
- In granting actual or compensatory damages, the
party making a claim for such must present the best evidence
available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated
by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the
heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same having been
fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and
presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages
is proper.
- However, the order granting compensatory damages
to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be
amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of
P50,000 is given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity,
and not as compensatory damages. - As regards moral
damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury
caused to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, may be
determined by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no
reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
Disposition Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to cost.

CUSTODIO V
CA

ALGARRA V SANDEJAS
27 Phil 284
TRENT; March 24, 1914

NATURE
Civil action for personal injuries received from a collision with
the defendants automobile due to the negligence of the
defendant, who was driving the car.
The negligence is not questioned and this case involves only the
amount of damages which should be allowed.

FACTS
- The accident occurred on July 9, 1912.
- Because of injuries, plaintiff spent 10 days in the
hospital. The first 4-5 days he couldnt leave his bed. After being
discharged, he received medical attention from a private
practitioner for several days. - Plaintiff testified that he had
down no work since the accident, that his earning capacity was
P50/month
- He described himself as being well at the end of July;
the trial took place September 19
- Plaintiff sold distillery products and had about 20
regular customers who purchased in small quantities,
necessitating regular, frequent deliveries - It took him about 4
years to build up the business he had at the time of the accident,
and since the accident, he only kept 4 of his regular customers.
- The lower court refused to allow him any compensation for
injury to his business due to his enforced absence therefrom.

ISSUE
How to determine the amount of damages to award plaintiff

HELD
Reasoning
- Actions for damages such as the case at bar are
based upon article 1902 of the Civil Code: "A person who, by act
or omission, causes damage to another where there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done." Of
this article, the supreme court of Spain, in considering the
indemnity imposed by it, said: "It is undisputed that said
reparation, to be efficacious and substantial, must rationally
include the generic idea of complete indemnity, such as is
defined and explained in article 1106 of the said (Civil) Code."
- Art 1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes
not only the amount of the loss which may have been suffered,
but also that of the profit which the creditor may have failed to
realize, reserving the provisions contained in the following
articles.
- Art 1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor
in good faith is liable, are those foreseen or which may have
been foreseen, at the time of constituting the obligation, and
which may be a necessary consequence of its nonfulfillment.
- The rules for the measure of damages, once that
liability is determined: The Civil Code requires that the
defendant repair the damage caused by his fault or negligence.
No distinction is made therein between damage caused
maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through mere
negligence in so far as the civil liability of the wrongdoer in
concerned. Nor is the defendant required to do more than repair
the damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in the
same position, so far as pecuniary compensation can do so, that
he would have been in had the damage not been inflicted. In
this respect there is a notable difference between the two
systems. Under the Anglo-SAxon law, when malicious or willful
intention to cause the damage is an element of the defendant's
act, it is quite generally regarded as an aggravating
circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to more than mere
compensation for the injury inflicted. These are called exemplary
or punitive damages, and no provision is made for them in
article 1902 of the Civil Code.
- article 1902 of the Civil Code requires that the
defendant repair the damage done. There is, however, a world
of difficulty in carrying out the legislative will in this particular.
The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be determined
from the evidence submitted to the court. The complexity of
human affairs is such that two cases are seldom exactly alike, a
thorough discussion of each case may permit of their more or
less definite classification, and develop leading principles which
will be of great assistance to a court in determining the question,
not only of damages, but of the prior one of negligence. As the
Code is so indefinite (even though from necessity) on the

subject of damages arising from fault or negligence, the bench
and bar should have access to and avail themselves of those
great, underlying principles which have been gradually and
conservatively developed and thoroughly tested in Anglo-Saxon
courts. A careful and intelligent application of these principles
should have a tendency to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the
court on the evidence offered, and should assist in determining
damages, generally, with some degree of uniformity
- The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the
plaintiff for two months, and loss of the greater portion of his
business. As to the damages resulting from the actual incapacity
of the plaintiff to attend to his business there is no question.
They are, of course, to be allowed on the basis of his earning
capacity, which in this case, is P50 per month. the difficult
question in the present case is to determine the damage which
has results to his business through his enforced absence. In
Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this court, citing
numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held that
evidence of damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the
existence in reality of the damages alleged to have been
suffered." But, while certainty is an essential element of an
award of damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty. That
this is true is adduced not only from the personal injury cases
from the supreme court of Spain which we have discussed
above, but by many cases decided by this court, reference to
which has already been made. As stated in Joyce on Damages,
section 75, "But to deny the injured party the right to recover any
actual damages in cases f torts because they are of such a
nature a cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable
parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs; such is
not the law." - As to the elements to be considered in estimating
the damage done to plaintiff's business by reason of his
accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities, has the
following to say: It is proper to consider the business the plaintiff
is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business, the
importance of his personal oversight and superintendence in
conducting it, and the consequent loss arising from his inability
to prosecure it. - The business of the present plaintiff required
his immediate supervision. All the profits derived therefrom were
wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are his damages confined
to the actual time during which he was physically incapacitated
for work, as is the case of a person working for a stipulated daily
or monthly or yearly salary. As to persons whose labor is thus
compensated and who completely recover from their injuries,
the rule may be said to be that their damages are confined to
the duration of their enforced absence from their occupation. But
the present plaintiff could not resume his work at the same profit
he was making when the accident occurred. He had built up an
establishing business which included some twenty regular
customers. These customers represented to him a regular
income. In addition to this he made sales to other people who
were not so regular in their purchases. - But he could figure on
making at least some sales each month to others besides his
regular customers. Taken as a whole his average monthly
income from his business was about P50. As a result of the
accident, he lost all but four of his regular customers and his
receipts dwindled down to practically nothing. Other agents had
invaded his territory, and upon becoming physically able to
attend to his business, he found that would be necessary to start
with practically no regular trade, and either win back his old
customers from his competitors or else secure others. During
this process of reestablishing his patronage his income would
necessarily be less than he was making at the time of the
accident and would continue to be so for some time. Of course,
if it could be mathematically determined how much less he will
earn during this rebuilding process than he would have earned if
the accident had not occurred, that would be the amount he
would be entitled to in this action. But manifestly this ideal
compensation cannot be ascertained. The question therefore
resolves itself into whether this damage to his business can be
so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any
amount whatever.
- When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going
concern with a fairly steady average profit on the investment, it
may be assumed that had the interruption to the business
through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would have
continued producing this average income "so long as is usual
with things of that nature." When in addition to the previous
average income of the business it is further shown what the
reduced receipts of the business are immediately after the
cause of the interruption has been removed, there can be no
manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulted from the
wrongful act of the defendant. In the present case, we not only
have the value of plaintiff's business to him just prior to the
accident, but we also have its value to him after the accident. At
the trial, he testified that his wife had earned about fifteen pesos
during the two months that he was disabled. That this almost
total destruction of his business was directly chargeable to
defendant's wrongful act, there can be no manner of doubt; and
the mere fact that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute
accuracy, is no reason for denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As
stated in one case, it would be a reproach to the law if he could
not recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs. Marquez, 91 Ga., 404)
- We are of the opinion that the lower court had before
it sufficient evidence of the damage to plaintiff's business in the
way of prospective loss of profits to justify it in calculating his
damages as to his item. That evidence has been properly
elevated to this court of review. Under section 496 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, we are authorized to enter final judgment or
direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends of justice. We
are of the opinion that the evidence presented as to the damage
done to plaintiff's business is credible and that it is sufficient and
clear enough upon which to base a judgment for damages.
Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling goods on
commission, it must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild
his business to its former proportions; so that at some time in
the future his commissions will equal those he was receiving
when the accident occurred. Aided by his experience, he should
be able to rebuild this business to its former proportions in much
less time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior to the
accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to do this.
The profits which plaintiff will receive from the business in the
course of its reconstruction will gradually increase. The injury to
plaintiff's business begins where these profits leave off, and, as
a corollary, there is where defendant's liability begins. Upon this
basis, we fix the damages to plaintiff's business at P250.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and
the plaintiff is awarded the following damages; ten pesos for
medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two months of his
enforced absence from his business; and two hundred and fifty
pesos for the damage done to his business in the way of loss of
profits, or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will
be allowed in this instance.

PNOC V CA (MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION)
297 SCRA 402
ROMERO; October 8, 1998

NATURE
Petition for certiorari on a decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS
- In the early morning of September 21, 1977, the M/V
Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia
Fishing Corporation, was navigating the waters near Fortune
Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro
Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the
time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC)
but then subsequently transferred to PNOC, causing the former
to sink.
- Private respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia
XV had an actual value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting
the insurance payment of P200,000.00, the amount of
P600,000.00 should likewise be claimed. The amended
complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the
devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement
value of the hull of the vessel, its equipment and its lost cargoes,
such that there should be a reasonable determination thereof.
Furthermore, on account of the sinking of the vessel, private
respondent supposedly incurred unrealized profits and lost
business opportunities that would thereafter be proven.
- Lower court, on November 18, 1989 disposing of
Civil Case No. C-9457, rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport
Corporation, to pay the plaintiff:
a. The sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of
the fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint at the rate of 6% per annum;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;
and
c. The costs of suit. - The lower court concluded:
Evidently, the quotation of prices submitted by the plaintiff
relative to the replacement value of the fishing boat and its
equipments in the tune of P6,438,048.00 which were lost due
to the recklessness and imprudence of the herein defendants
were not rebutted by the latter with sufficient evidence. The
defendants through their sole witness Lorenzo Lazaro relied
heavily on said witness' bare claim that the amount afore-said
is excessive or bloated, but they did not bother at all to
present any documentary evidence to substantiate such

claim. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of the credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself.
- Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, affirmed
the same in toto on October 14, 1992. On petitioner's assertion
that the award of P6,438,048.00 was not convincingly proved by
competent and admissible evidence, the Court of Appeals ruled
that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert
witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, "it was well
within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine
the equipment installed and the cargoes loaded" on the vessel.

ISSUE
WON respondent courts award for damages is appropriate

HELD
NO
Ratio A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic
is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof.
The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific facts that afford
a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are
borne. A court cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures,
or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages as well as
hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect.
Reasoning
- Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or
in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a
sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong
that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and
not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-
delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are
two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the
loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente),
and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which
would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
- Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the
defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of
destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would
have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar
goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of use during
the period before replacement. In other words, in the case of
profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is the value of
the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the time and place
of the loss, and this means, at least in the case of ships, that
regard must be had to existing and pending engagements,
- If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is
in any case virtually certain of profitable employment, then
nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters
actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate the
plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued
without reference to its actual future engagements and only in
the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be
necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated
profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable to
fulfill
- What the court has to ascertain in each case is the
"capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine
not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances,"
without, of course, taking into account considerations
which were too remote at the time of the loss. - Del Rosario's
claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount
of P6,438,048.00 should be admitted with extreme caution
considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be
supported by independent evidence. Moreover, because he was
the owner of private respondent corporation whatever testimony
he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its
equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-
interest therein. Accordingly, as stated at the outset, damages
may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence. -
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not
mean that it totally deprives private respondent of any redress
for the loss of its vessel.
- Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions
punished by law, and quasidelicts, or in every case where
property right has been invaded. Under Article 2223 of the Civil
Code, "(t)he adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude
further contest upon the right involved and all accessory
questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective
heirs and assigns." - Actually, nominal damages are damages in
name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are
not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in
recognition of the existence of a technical injury. However, the
amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at
least commensurate to the injury sustained by private
respondent considering the concept and purpose of such
damages. The amount of nominal damages to be awarded may
also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case.
- Applying now such principles to the instant case, we
have on record the fact that petitioner's vessel Petroparcel was
at fault as well as private respondent's complaint claiming the
amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat
equipment and cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia
XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged that
the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been
paid insurance in the amount of P200,000.00 and, therefore, it
claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt
of insurance payments should diminish the total value of the
vessel quoted by private respondent in his complaint
considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for
which it claimed compensation. This Court believes that such
allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the
basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages
inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action. Private respondent should be
bound by its allegations on the amount of its claims.
Disposition the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 14, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26680 affirming that
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is
hereby MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual damages to
private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the
amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor.
Considering the fact, however, that: (1) technically petitioner
sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not adequately
and properly proved, and (2) this case has dragged on for
almost two decades, we believe that an award of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) in favor of private respondent as and for
nominal damages is in order.

INTEGRATED PACKING
V CA

DBP V CA (CUBA)
DAVIDE JR; January 5, 1998

FACTS
- Plaintiff Lydia Cuba is a grantee of a Fishpond Lease
Agreement. She obtained loans from DBP. As security for said
loans, plaintiff Lydia P. Cuba executed two Deeds of
Assignment of her Leasehold Rights.
- Plaintiff failed to pay her loan. Without foreclosure
proceedings, DBP appropriated the leasehold Rights of Cuba
over the fishpond in question. After which defendant DBP, in
turn, executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of the Leasehold
Rights in favor of plaintiff Lydia Cuba over the same fishpond.
- In the negotiation for repurchase, plaintiff Lydia Cuba
addressed two letters to the Manager DBP, Dagupan City
thereafter accepted the offer to repurchase in a letter addressed
to CUBA.
- After the Deed of Conditional Sale was executed in
favor of Cuba, a new Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued by
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food .
- Cuba failed to pay the amortizations stipulated in the
Deed of Conditional Sale. After which she entered with the DBP
a temporary arrangement whereby in consideration for the
deferment of the Notarial Rescission of Deed of Conditional
Sale, plaintiff Lydia Cuba promised to make certain payments as
stated in temporary Arrangement.
- DBP thereafter sent a Notice of Rescission thru
Notarial Act and which was received by Cuba. After the Notice
of Rescission, DBP took possession of the Leasehold Rights of
the fishpond in question;
- That after defendant DBP took possession of the
Leasehold Rights over the fishpond in question, DBP thereafter
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of defendant
Agripina Caperal.
- Thereafter, defendant Caperal was awarded Fishpond
Lease Agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food.
- CUBA filed complaint questioning the act of DBP in
appropriating to itself CUBA's leasehold rights over the fishpond
in question without foreclosure proceedings. TC ruled in favor of
petitioner and granted actual damages in the amount of
P1,067,500 representing lost equipment and dead fish due to

DBPs forecloseure of fishpond and ejectment of laborers. - CA
regarding damages granted ruled that CUBA was not entitled to
loss of profits for lack of evidence, but agreed with the trial court
as to the actual damages of P1,067,500. It, however, deleted
the amount of exemplary damages and reduced the award of
moral damages from P100,000 to
P50,000 and attorney's fees, from P100.00 to P50,000

ISSUE
WON the damages granted to CUBA are valid

HELD
NO
- Article 2199 provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is
referred to as actual or compensatory damages
- Actual or compensatory damages cannot be
presumed, but must be proved with reasonable degree of
certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by
the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the
actual amount thereof. - In the present case, the trial court
awarded in favor of CUBA P1,067,500 as actual damages
consisting of P550,000 which represented the value of the
alleged lost articles of CUBA and P517,500 which represented
the value of the 230,000 pieces of bangus allegedly stocked in
1979 when DBP first ejected CUBA from the fishpond and the
adjoining house. - We find that the alleged loss of personal
belongings and equipment was not proved by clear evidence.
Other than the testimony of CUBA and her caretaker, there was
no proof as to the existence of those items before DBP took
over the fishpond in question. As pointed out by DBP, there was
no "inventory of the alleged lost items before the loss which is
normal in a project which sometimes, if not most often, is left to
the care of other persons." Neither was a single receipt or
record of acquisition presented.
- in her complaint dated 17 May 1985, CUBA included
"losses of property" as among the damages resulting from
DBP's take-over of the fishpond. Yet, it was only in September
1985 when she came to know of the alleged loss of several
articles. Such claim for "losses of property," having been made
before knowledge of the alleged actual loss, was therefore
speculative. The alleged loss could have been a mere
afterthought or subterfuge to justify her claim for actual
damages.
- With regard to the award of P517,000 representing
the value of the alleged 230,000 pieces of bangus which died
when DBP took possession of the fishpond in March 1979, the
same was not called for. Such loss was not duly proved;
besides, the claim therefor was delayed unreasonably. From
1979 until after the filing of her complaint in court in May 1985,
CUBA did not bring to the attention of DBP the alleged loss
- The award of actual damages should, therefore, be
struck down for lack of sufficient basis.
- In view however, of DBP's act of appropriating
CUBA's leasehold rights which was contrary to law and public
policy, as well as its false representation to the then Ministry of
Agriculture and Natural Resources that it had "foreclosed the
mortgage," an award of moral damages in the amount of
P50,000
- Exemplary or corrective damages in the amount of
P25,000 should likewise be awarded by way of example or
correction for the public good. 20 There
being an award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees are also
recoverable

FUENTES V CA
323 PHIL 508
BELLOSILLO; February 9, 1996

FACTS
- 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina was at a benefit
dance at Dump Site, Tudela, Trento, Agusan del Sur. Petitioner
called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the
latter saying, "Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you
have a short hair. Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the
abdomen with a hunting knife. After muttering that Fuentes
stabbed him, he died.
- Petitioner claims on the other hand that it was his
cousin Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias "Jonie" who knifed Malaspina.
He said that his cousin directly told him that he stabbed the
victim out of grudge.
- The Regional Trial Court of Prosperidad, Agusan del
Sur, found petitioner guilty of murder qualified by treachery and
imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus
costs. CA affirmed

ISSUE
1. WON appellate court erred when it held that petitioner
was positively and categorically identified as the killer of
Malaspina, in affirming the judgnment of conviction
2. WON CA erred in holding petitioner liable for
damages to the heirs of the
victim

HELD
1. NO
- Petitioner would make much of the alleged confession
of Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., since it is a declaration against penal
interest and therefore an exception to the hearsay rule. One of
the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining
to declarations made against interest
- There are three (3) essential requisites for the
admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant
must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern
a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances
must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. - we
find that the declaration particularly against penal interest
attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not admissible in evidence as
an exception to the hearsay rule
- One striking feature that militates against the
acceptance of such a statement is its patent untrustworthiness.
Zoilo who is related to accusedappellant had every motive to
prevaricate
2. NO
- Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed
the crime it is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as
actual damages on the basis of the mere testimony of the
victim's sister, Angelina Serrano, without any tangible document
to support such claim.
- This is a valid point. In crimes and quasi-delict's, the
defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.
To seek recovery for actual damages it is essential that the
injured party proves the actual amount of loss with reasonable
degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence available.. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages.
- The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual
damages is not supported by the evidence on record. We have
only the testimony of the victim's elder sister stating that she
incurred expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of
Malaspina
- However, no proof of the actual damages was ever
presented in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been
incurred, the Court can only give credence to those supported
by receipts and which appear to have been genuinely expended
in connection with the death of the victim. Since the
actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be
granted

TALISAY SILAY V ASSOCIACION
247 SCRA 361
FELICIANO; August 15, 1995

NATURE
Petition to review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
reducing the award of damages granted by the court a quo from
approximately P15.4 million to
only P1 million


FACTS
- On 15 February 1966, Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc.
("TSMC") and TalisaySilay Industrial Cooperative Association,
Inc. ("TSICA") instituted an action for damages against
defendants Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc.
("AATSI"), et. al.
- On 4 March 1972, the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal rendered its decision condemning the defendants jointly
and severally to pay plaintiff Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative
Association the amount of P6,609,714.32 and to plaintiff Talisay-
Silay Milling Co., Inc. the sum of P8,802,612.89 with legal rate of
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
- The Court of Appeal rendered a decision affirming
with modification the decision of the court a quo by reducing the
amount of damages due plaintiffsappellees TSMC and TSICA
from approximately P15.4 million to only P1 million.

ISSUE
WON the reduction of damages was proper

HELD
- In reducing the amount of damages awarded by the
court a quo to petitioners TSMC and TSICA from roughly P15.4
million to only P1 million, the Court of Appeals, citing Malayan
Insurance Co.. Inc. v. Manila Port Service reasoned that the
reduction was dictated by the failure or TSMC and TSICA to
comply with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rule of Court, i.e., TSMC
and TSICA's failure to amend their complaint to conform to the
evidence presented during trial which showed that TSMC and
TSICA suffered damages amounting to more than P1 million by
virtue of the illegal transfer of export sugar quota from TSMC to
FFMCI. We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeals on
this point.
- A court may rule and render judgment on the basis of
the evidence before it even though the relevant pleading had not
been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is
thereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so
long as the basic requirements of fair play had been met, as
where litigants were given full opportunity to support their
respective contentions and to object to or refute each other's
evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had
been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to
adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it. - The record
of the instant case shows that TSMC and TSICA formally
offered as evidence documents which set out in detail the
estimated unrealized income suffered by TSMC and TSICA
during four (4) consecutive crop years, i.e., (CYs) 1964-1965,
1965-1966, 1966-1967 and 1967-1968, the failure of realization
being attributed to the transfer by AATSI, et al. of their sugar
quota to FFMCI. These documents, along with the corroborative
testimony of one Ricardo Yapjoco, a Certified Public Accountant
and Internal Auditor of TSMC, were the basis of the trial court's
award of P8,802,612.89 to TSMC and of P6,609,714.32 to
TSICA. It is noteworthy that the joint record on appeal reveals
that AATSI, et al. objected to the Offer of Evidence of TSMC and
TSICA not on the basis that such evidence fell outside the scope
of the issues as defined in the pleadings as they then stood, but
rather on the basis that such evidence was "incompetent" and
speculative in character, i.e., as "being mere estimates prepared
by witness Yapjoco" and constituting merely his "opinion." It
should also be noted that the testimony of Mr. Yapjoco was
subjected to extensive cross-examination by counsel for AATSI,
et al. The trial court did not expressly overrule AATSI, et al.'s
objection to the Offer of Evidence of TSMC and TSICA; it is
nevertheless clear that the trial court did not accord much weight
to that objection.
- The point that may be here underscored is that
AATSI, et al., having been given the opportunity and having in
fact been able to register their objections to the evidence
formally offered by TSMC and TSICA were not in any way
prejudiced by the discrepancy between the allegations in the
complaint filed and the propositions which the evidence
submitted by TSMC and TSICA tended to establish. We
conclude that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to treat
the amended and supplemental complaint of TSMC and TSICA
as if such complaint had in fact been amended to conform to the
evidence, and when it limited the damages due to TSMC and
TSICA to the amount prayed for in their original complaint.
- A review of the damages actually awarded to TSMC
and TSICA by the trial court on the one hand and the Court of
Appeals on the other, reveals the need for a more careful and
thorough examination of the matter. As earlier noted, the Court
of Appeals' award of P1 million based simply on the amount set
out in the original complaint of TSMC and TSICA must be
discarded. Upon the other hand, the award by the trial court of
damages to TSMC and TSICA was arrived at merely by totalling
up the unrealized income sustained by TSMC and TSICA over
the relevant four (4) crop year period:
- "Because on the refusal of the defendants planters to
return to TSMC, plaintiff TSMC [and TSICA] suffered an
unrealized profit; of P1,934,847.73 in 1964-65 while for 1965-66
crop year, in the amount of P3,033,301.16, for 1966-67 in the
amount of P4,656,643.20, and for 1967-1968, in the amount of
P4,805,472.12.
- The plaintiff TSMC failed to realize P3,015,077.77 and
plaintiff TASICA failed to realize P6,609,714.32 or a total of
P9,624,792.09. In 1967-68 after the lease to TASICA has
expired, TSMC failed to realize a net income of P4,805,514.12."
- We believe, in other words, that the figures and
computations utilized by the trial court in its award on damages
need further examination and refinement. For instance, the
award of damages rendered by the trial court took into account
the loss of income suffered by TSMC and TSICA when AATSI,
et al. transferred two (2) of sugar quota: the "domestic quota"
and the "export quota." The consent of the sugar central was not
required for the validity of a transfer of the domestic sugar
quota. Accordingly, the transfer by AATSI, et al. of their
domestic sugar quota must be regarded as valid and the loss of
income attributable to the transfer of such domestic sugar quota
from TSMC and TSICA to FFMCI must be deducted from the
aggregate amount of damages due to TSMC and TSICA. A
second example: Exhibits "P-1" and "W-1" embody figures
relating to "molasses." Molasses are a by-product of milled
sugar, whether that sugar be covered by a "domestic quota" or
by an "export quota." The amount of income lost traceable to
molasses that would have been extracted from domestic sugar
must be deducted from the aggregate damages due to TSMC
and TSICA.
Disposition Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
MODIFIED insofar as the award of actual damages due Talisay-
Silay Milling Co., Inc. and Talisay-Silay Industrial Cooperative
Association, Inc. are concerned. Subject to the rulings referred
to herein, this case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
the determination, with all deliberate dispatch, of the amount of
damages due Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. and Talisay-Silay
Industrial Cooperative Association, Inc.

PNOC V CA
297 SCRA 402
ROMERO; October 8, 1998

NATURE
Petition for review on the decision of CA

FACTS
- M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent
Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, collided with the vessel
Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). - After investigation was
conducted by the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast
Guard Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a decision
finding the Petroparcel at fault. Based on this finding by the
Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner private
respondent sued the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo
Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan
City. In particular, private respondent prayed for an award of
P692,680.00, allegedly representing the value of the fishing
nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria Efigenia XV.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in
place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of the
Petroparcel.
- Private respondent later sought the amendment of its
complaint on the ground that the original complaint failed to
plead for the recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV. Accordingly, in the amended complaint, private
respondent averred that M/V Maria Efigenia XV had an actual
value of P800,000.00 and that, after deducting the insurance
payment of P200,000.00, the amount of P600,000.00 should
likewise be claimed. Furthermore, on account of the sinking of
the vessel, private respondent supposedly incurred unrealized
profits and lost business opportunities that would thereafter be
proven.
- The lower court its decision in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation,
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the
value of the fishing boat with interest from the date of the filing of
the complaint at the rate of 6% per annum.


HELD
RE DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
- Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or
in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a
sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong
that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and
not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-
delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are
two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of
what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the
other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante). Thus:
"Where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of the
defendant the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of
destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he
would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially
similar goods, plus in a proper case damages for the loss of
use during the period before replacement. In other words, in
the case of profit-earning chattels, what has to be assessed is
the value of the chattel to its owner as a going concern at the
time and place of the loss, and this means, at least in the
case of ships, that regard must be had to existing and
pending engagements.x x x.
x x x. If the market value of the ship reflects the fact that it is
in any case virtually certain of profitable employment, then
nothing can be added to that value in respect of charters
actually lost, for to do so would be pro tanto to compensate
the plaintiff twice over. On the other hand, if the ship is valued
without reference to its actual future engagements and only in
the light of its profit-earning potentiality, then it may be
necessary to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated
profit on a charter or other engagement which it was unable
to fulfill. What the court has to ascertain in each case is the
`capitalised value of the vessel as a profit-earning machine
not in the abstract but in view of the actual circumstances,'
without, of course, taking into account considerations which
were too remote at the time of the loss."
- Nominal damages are awarded in every obligation
arising from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions
punished by law, and quasidelicts, or in every case where
property right has been invaded. [Arts. 2222 & 1157, Civil Code.]
Under Article 2223 of the Civil Code, "(t)he adjudication of
nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right
involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to
the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns."

RAMOS V CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER, DR.
HOSAKA)
321 SCRA 584
KAPUNAN; December 29, 1999

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

FACTS
- Erlinda Ramos, a 47-year old robust woman, was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in
her gall bladder for occasional complaints of discomfort due to
pains she felt.
- She and her husband, Rogelio E. Ramos, met thru a
mutual doctor friend, Dr. Orlino Hosaka, one of the defendants
on June 10, 1985. The scheduled operation would be on June
17, 1985 9AM at Delos Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). When
asked for an anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka claimed he would get
a good one without giving a name.
- At around 7:30AM of June 17, she was prepared for
the operation by the hospital staff. Her sister-in-law, Herminda
Cruz, Dean of the College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center,
was there and was allowed to be in the operating room to give
moral support. Cruz saw 2 or 3 nurses and Dr. Perfecta
Gutierrez, another defendant, who administered the anesthesia.
At 9:30AM, Dr. Hosaka was not yet in. Erlinda Ramos was
getting impatient. It was at almost 12NN when Dr. Hosaka
arrived. At 12:15AM when the operating room was very busy,
final preparations for the operation were done. - When the
patient was being intubated, Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez say
Aang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan. These remarks made her look at what the
Dr. was doing. She then noticed bluish discoloration of the
nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda even as Dr.
Hosaka approached her. Dr. Hosaka then ordered someone to
call for another anesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon. Dr. Calderon
came and was also trying to intubate the patient. The patient
was placed in a tredelenburg position - a position where the
head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet
which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to
the patients brain.
- Rogelio Ramos who was outside of the operating
room then saw a respiratory machine being rushed into the O.R.
At almost 3PM of that day, the patient was taken to the Intensive
Care Unit (ICU). - Erlinda stayed at the ICU for a month. Four
months later, the patient was released from the hospital. She
has been brain damaged ever since, and comatose.
- Petitioners then filed a civil case for damages in Jan.
1986. Petitioners proved that the damage sustained by Erlinda
was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty
management of her airway by private respondents during the
anesthesia phase. Respondents claimed that the damage was
Erlindas allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental
Sodium (Penthonal). RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. RTC
awarded a total of P632K (should be P616K) in compensatory
damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its being updated" covering
the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15 April 1992, based
on monthly expenses for the care of the patient estimated at
P8K. CA overturned the decision. Hence, this appeal. (NOTE:
See Crim Law 2 Digest re discourse on Res ipsa loquitur and
the negligence of Dr. Gutierrez, and Dr. Hosaka. It was ruled in
here that the surgeon, the anesthesiologist and the hospital
should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of
a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy or
surgical excision of the gall bladder)

ISSUE
WON the damages awarded by lower court was inadequate

HELD
YES
- The amount of actual damages recoverable in suits
arising from negligence should at least reflect the correct
minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care the family
is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
However, the provisions of the Civil Code on actual or
compensatory damages present us with some difficulties.
Actual damages which may be claimed by the plaintiff are
those suffered by him as he has duly proved. (A1299 CC
16
) -
Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally
assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a
consequence of an act of negligence has been completed and
that the cost can be liquidated. But these provisions neglect to
take into account those situations, as in this case, where the
resulting injury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to
occur, are difficult to predict.
Other damages discussed:
- In these cases, the amount of damages which should
be awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to
the injury caused, should be one which compensates for
pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and
one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but
which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with
certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And
because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility
arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
- Moral damages: the actual physical, emotional and
financial cost of the care of petitioner which would be virtually
impossible to quantify. The husband and the children will have
to live with the day to day uncertainty of the patient's illness,
knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They have
fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner,
altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a
comatose patient. They are charged with the moral responsibility
of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and suffering
in this case is clearly a real one.
- Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages are
awarded considering the length and nature of the instant suit.

16
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

Disposition Decision and resolution of the appellate court
appealed from are modified so as to award in favor of
petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the ff: 1)
P1.352M as actual damages computed as of the date of
promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8K up
to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously
survives; 2) P2M as moral damages, 3) P1.5Mas temperate
damages; 4) P100K each as exemplary damages and attorney's
fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.

GATCHALIAN V DELIM
203 SCRA 126
FELICIANO; October 21, 1991

NATURE
Appeal from a decision of CA

FACTS
- In July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded,
as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus and on
the way, while the bus was running along the highway in
Bauang, La Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at
one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a
cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road,
turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including
petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken
the hospital for medical treatment. Upon medical examination,
petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the
leg, arm and forehead.
- While injured. passengers were confined in the
hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and
later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She
also gave petitioner P12 with which to pay her transportation
expense in going home from the hospital. She also had the
injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already
prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things: That
we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil
against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because
it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said
Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated
upon our injuries.
- Despite this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with
CFI La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory
and moral damages. Respondents defense was that vehicular
mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had
already been paid and moreover had waived any right to
institute any action against him and his driver, when Gatchalian
signed the Joint Affidavit.
- TC ruled in favor of respondents because of the
waiver. CA reversed but affirmed TC in denying petitioners claim
for damages. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES
1. WON there was a valid waiver to effect relinquishment
of any right of action on the oart of the petitioner
2. WON private respondent Delim was able to prove that
he had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the mishap
3. WON damages may be awarded petitioner Gatchalian

HELD
1. NO
Ratio A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place
be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be
attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly
and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such
person.
Reasoning
[1] Under the circumstances petitioner was still reeling
from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the
hospital for only 3 days, when the waiver/Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading it, she
experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers
who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too
signed without bothering to read it in its entirety. There is
substantial doubt whether petitioner fully understood it
[2] because what is involved here is the liability of a
common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect
of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary
diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most
strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and
effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or
good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to
claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances
like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken
the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from
common carriers and hence to render that standard
unenforceable. Such waiver is offensive to public policy.

2. NO
Ratio A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting
the safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common carrier.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory
presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or had
acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in A1733 and A1755. To
overcome this presumption, the common carrier must slow to
the court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent
the injuries. The standard of extraordinary diligence imposed
upon common carriers is considerably more demanding than the
standard of ordinary.
Reasoning
- When a "snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of
the bus. One of the passengers cried out, "What happened?"
The driver replied, "That is only normal". The driver did not stop
to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus. The driver's
reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound" had
been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This meant that
the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to
determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had
occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to
it. Force majeure is no defense.
3. YES
- Compensatory and moral damages may be awarded. [1] A
person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if
that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered
for which actual or compensatory damages are due and
assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as
nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman,
resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of
bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration
to her conditio ante. Hence, compensatory damages is awarded,
especially to cover the petitioners expenses for the plastic
surgery.
[2] Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on
the part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have
earlier concluded that respondent common carrier and his driver
had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap
which had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling
the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his wife, to
get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as
they were still
Disposition CFI and CA decisions reversed and set aside.
Respondent ORDERED to pay petitioner Gatchalian the ff.
sums: 1) P15K as actual or compensatory damages to cover the
cost of plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's
forehead; 2) P30Kas moral damages; and 3) P1K as atty's fees,
the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum counting from the promulgation of this decision until full
payment thereof.

PEOPLE V MANGAHAS
311 SCRA 384
GONZAGA-REYES; July 28, 1999

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court

FACTS
- Rodrigo Mangahas alias Mang Rudy was accused of
shooting and killing Rufino Gestala.
- Different witnesses came forward for the prosecution
Police Captain Florante Baltazar, the medico-legal officer at the
PC-INP, QC testified about the post-mortem examination saying
the victim sustained 3 gunshot wounds. He estimated the
distance between the assailant and the victim at more than 24
inches. Diosdado Padios, said that while the two were drinking,
he saw Mangahas suddenly shoot Rufino Gestala, who was
then seated less than one meter away from the former while he
himself, was one meter away from the two when the incident
occurred. Renato Panoso the best friend of Gestala said they
had been conversing for about four (4) minutes when Rudy
Mangahas arrived and offered a beer to each of them. They had
been drinking for only a short time when the accused suddenly
approached Rufino Gestala, pulled out a gun and shot him. After

the shooting and upon seeing Gestala bloodied and clutching
his chest, the witness ran away in the direction of his house and
reported the matter to his uncle.
he saw witness Diosdado Padios but the latter did not drink beer
nor was he offered one as he was just passing by. Trinidad
Balatbat, was likewise presented and she testified mainly on the
expenses their family incurred as a result of the death of the
victim.
- Mangahas admitted that he shot the victim but alleged
that the killing was done in self-defense. Mangahas narrated
that on his way home from work to check up on his lunch. When
he was near the sari-sari store of Tiangco, he was called by
Renato Panoso who was then talking with the victim Gestala.
Gestala was then sitting on the pasimano in front of the store
while Renato Panoso was standing on the other side. When he
approached them, Panoso got a gun from behind his waist,
showed it to the accused and offered it to him saying, Bilihin
mo na lang ito, mahusay ito, to which the accused replied,
mahirap yan. Gestala, who was standing about one (1) meter
away from them suddenly raised his voice and said, Putang-
ina mo mahusay naman yong isinasanla namin sa iyo bat ayaw
mong tanggapin? In order to pacify them, he offered them
bottles of beer. After they had consumed onehalf of the bottles
of beer, Gestala, who was then about two meters away from
him, said, Putang-ina mo bat ayaw mong tanggapin yon ay
mahusay naman. Immediately thereafter, Gestala pulled out a
gun from the right side of his body, poked it at him and
squeezed the trigger. The gun did not fire however. The
accused then moved away from Gestala towards the
pasimano of the store and bumped Panoso. He was able to
take hold of the gun which was on the pasimano of the store
and he fired the same at Gestala. The accused stressed that he
fired only once at Gestala as he was only defending himself and
that he threw away the gun which he used right after the
incident. After he fired at Gestala, the latter, still carrying his
gun, ran away towards the back portion of the store. He himself
ran way after the shooting incident as he was confused and
afraid of the group of Gestala. When he had calmed down, he
went to the barangay hall of Barangay Tungkong Mangga to
surrender himself and explain his side but nobody was there
when he arrived. Upon returning to his house, he was told that
the group of Panoso had been looking for him. Because of this
threat on his life, he left the place and went to his in-laws at Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. Nestor dela Rosa collaborated the accuseds
account of the incident. - SP03 Mario Fernandez who testified
on the procedures undertaken by his police detachment in
investigating the shooting of Rufino Gestala. - The Court a sided
with plaintiff. Defendant filed an MFR which was denied.

ISSUES
1. WON trial court erred in concluding that herein
accused-appellant failed to prove any basic element of self-
defense
2. WON treachery can be appreciated to qualify the
crime into murder
3. What is the correct amount for the indemnity

HELD
1. NO
- The Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter
of assigning value to the declaration of witnesses is best done
by trial courts which, unlike appellate courts, can assess such
testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
the witnesses at the trial stage and thus, unless cogent reasons
are shown, the findings of the trial court are accorded great
respect and credit.
- Accuseds defense is devoid of merit. At first,
accused put up the defense of alibi when the instant case was
being investigated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan. Then, he sets up self-defense at the trial on the merits
of the case. These two defenses are incompatible with each
other. They do not at all provide shield to the accused to ward
off the commission of the crime charged against him. Setting up
such contradictory defenses will lead to the conclusion that the
accused is confused of what defense is for real. This being so,
accuseds testimony is wanting of credence at the outset. When
accused finally he adopts self-defense saying that the victim
pulled out a gun from his right side then poked it to the accused,
squeezed its trigger once but misfired. Reacting to the situation,
accused picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store,
fired it once to the victim and then ran away from the scene of
the incident. Analyzing the testimony of the accused, the
inevitable conclusion would be that such testimony is
unreasonable and improbable. If the victim really intended to kill
the accused, it is natural for him, under the situation, to squeeze
the trigger of his gun not only once if the first squeeze missed,
but for several times until his gun fired or to pick up the gun on
the pasimano of the store and use it instead in shooting the
accused. It is inconceivable also that the victim would have to
kill the accused just because the latter refused to buy or accept
as pledge the gun Renato Panoso was offering to the accused.
Incidentally, the alleged gun of the victim was not presented in
Court. Likewise unbelievable is the claim of the accused that he
picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store then shot
the victim. At the moment of the incident, accused was facing
the store and 1 meter, more or less, away from the victim who
was sitting on the said pasimano indicating that that the
victim was nearer to the gun on the pasimano than him. This
being so, the victim should have picked up the gun from the
pasimano ahead of the accused or should have grappled for
the gun taken by the accused after his gun misfired at first
squeeze of the trigger. This should have been the natural
reaction of the victim when his life was placed in imminent
danger after his gun misfired. Moreover, it is strange why
Renato Panoso a best friend of the victim and who was much
nearer to the gun on the pasimano than the accused and the
victim did not react to the situation when the life of his best
friend was in imminent danger. It is likewise strange why
Renato Panoso should place and leave the gun on the
pasimano and then continued drinking beer while the
transaction on the gun has already been through.
- Another doubt on the testimonies of the accused and
his witness Nestor dela Rosa lies on their claims that the
accused fired his gun only once. The victim sustained 3
gunshot wounds of separate and different entries and exits on
his body. For a single shot to produce those wounds is highly
irreconcilable. Further, the accused claimed as he
demonstrated in open Court, that while he was standing he
pointed his gun towards the victim at the level of his (accuseds)
chest. The accused and the victim were of the same height. If
the accused fired his gun in the position demonstrated, the
wounds would be through and through straight at the level of the
chest from the point of entry to the point of exit. The 2 gunshot
wounds of the victim were through and through from his chest
towards the lower exit at his back, indicating that the position of
the accused was higher than that of the victims when the fatal
shots were fired. In other words, the allege position of the
accused is inconsistent with the location and direction of the
wounds. It is rather consistent with the established facts that the
accused was standing when he shot the victim who was then
sitting and facing him.
- By the same token, the corroborating testimony of
defense witness Nestor dela Rosa likewise lacks credence. The
fact that he could not identify or name the person who pointed a
gun to the accused and squeezed its trigger once but misfired
and other persons in the group, even as he has already
discussed the incident with the accused, indicates that he was
not an eye witness to the incident.
- It is doctrinal that the assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its
opportunity, unavailable to the appellate court, to see witnesses
on the stand and determine by their conduct and demeanor
whether they are testifying truthfully or are simply lying. The
determination of credibility is the domain of the trail court, and
the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of the
witnesses is best performed by it; thus the evaluation by the trial
judge on the credibility of witnesses is well nigh conclusive on
this Court.
- Inconsistent defenses put up by the accused during
the preliminary investigation and trial of the case as seen in the
Sworn Statement and the trial testimony, and again during the
hearing for the MFR. He himself by his own act of giving false
testimony impeaches his own testimony and the court is
compelled to exclude it from all consideration.
- Another factor which contributes further to the
doubtfulness of the veracity of the testimony of the accused and
his witness Nestor dela Rosa is their insistence that accused-
appellant shot the victim only once. As stated by the medico-
legal officer in his direct examination, the victim sustained three
(3) gunshot wounds with three (3) different exit and entry points
on different parts of the victims body. The presence of several
gunshot wounds on the body of the victim is physical evidence
which eloquently refutes accused-appellants allegation of self-
defense. The location, number and gravity of the wounds of the
victim belie appellants pretension that he acted in self-defense.
- A final indication of appellants guilt is his flight after shooting.
His claim that he fled because of the threats allegedly made by
the victims friends and relatives is not sufficient reason for him
not to surrender to the police since the latter could have
adequately protected him if there were really threats to his life.
Indeed, flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience.[58]

2. NO, there is no convincing evidence supports such a
finding. - The eyewitnesses accounts were unclear in details,
and cannot fairly deduce that the means of execution of the
crime used by accused-appellant were deliberately or
consciously adopted or that the person attacked had no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The only proof that the
attack was treacherous is their bare testimonies that the
accused-appellant suddenly shot the victim. However, there is
no treachery where there is no evidence proving that the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of
attack to insure execution without risk to himself - mere
suddenness of attack would not, by itself, constitute treachery.
In fact, the circumstances surrounding the case belie the trial
courts finding that treachery was present. The shooting
occurred in broad daylight. The victim was openly conversing
with accused-appellant for several minutes before the incident.
The victim himself was with his best friend who could have come
to his aid at anytime. Verily, if accused-appellant wanted to
insure that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen
another time and place to shoot the victim. The evidence then
for the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused for the crime of homicide only, not
murder. The penalty imposed for homicide in Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
3. In conformity with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial
court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased. With respect to the
actual damages incurred by the relatives of the deceased, we
have previously held:
Of the expenses allegedly incurred, the Court can only give
credence to those supported by receipt and which appear to
have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death,
wake, or burial of the victim. Thus, the Court cannot take
account of receipts showing expenses incurred before the date
of slaying of the victim; those incurred after a considerable lapse
of time from the burial of the victim and which do not have any
relation to the death, wake, or burial of the victim; those incurred
for purely aesthetic or social purposes, such as the lining of the
tomb of the victim - Thus, from the evidence presented
before the lower court, we affirm the award of P14,590.00 for
funeral and burial expenses as these were properly supported
by receipts and proven during the trial of the case. However, we
reduce the amount awarded as actual damages for food served
during the burial of the victim to P7,285.00 which cover only
those expenses incurred during the wake and vigil of the victim.
The other expenses relating to the 9th day, 40th day and 1st
year death anniversaries are deleted as these were incurred
after a considerable lapse of time from the burial of the victim.
Disposition the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court
is hereby MODIFIED, and the accused-appellant is found
GUILTY OF HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant
is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the death
indemnity of P50,000.00; and actual damages of P21,875.00.

VICTORY LINER V HEIRS OF ANDRES
MALECDAN
MENDOZA; December 27, 2002

NATURE

FACTS
- Andres Malecdan, a 75 yr old farmer, was crossing the
National Highway. A Dalin bus stopped to allow him to pass.
However, a bus of the petitioner overtook the Dalin bus and his
Malecdan. Malecdan died. - A suit was brought for damages
against the bus company. Judgment was rendered in favor of
the heirs of Malecdan. The court awarded them: a. P50,000.00
as death indemnity;
b. P88,339.00 for actual damages;
c. P200,000.00 for moral damages;
d. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. Thirty percent (30%) as attorneys fees of whatever
amount that can be collected by the plaintiff; and f. The costs of
the suit.

ISSUE
WON the court erred in the amount of damages awarded
HELD
YES
- To justify an award of actual damages, there should
be proof of the actual amount of loss incurred in connection with
the death, wake or burial of the victim. We cannot take into
account receipts showing expenses incurred some time after the
burial of the victim, such as expenses relating to the 9th day,
40th day and 1st year death anniversaries.
- The award of P200,000.00 for moral damages should
likewise be reduced. The trial court found that the wife and
children of the deceased underwent intense moral suffering
as a result of the latters death. Under Art. 2206 of the Civil
Code, the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. Under the circumstances of this case an award of
P100,000.00 would be in keeping with the purpose of the law in
allowing moral damages. (they only prayed for 100k in the RTC,
but RTC gave them 200k)
- On the other hand, the award of P50,000.00 for
indemnity is in accordance with current rulings of the Court.
- Art. 2231 provides that exemplary damages may be
recovered in cases involving quasi-delicts if the defendant acted
with gross negligence. In this case, petitioners driver Joson, Jr.
was grossly negligent in driving at such a high speed and
overtaking another vehicle. He did not even help the victim. The
amount of exemplary damages is proper
Disposition Decision affirmed with modification

QUIRANTE V IAC
REGALADO; January 31, 1989

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari seeking to set aside the judgment of the IAC
which found
the petition for certiorari therein meritorious

FACTS
- Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a
contract with a building contractor named Norman GUERRERO.
The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc.
(PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as bondsman for GUERRERO.
In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his part of the
contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio Casasola, thru
his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and
PHILAMGEN before the CFI of Manila for damages, with
PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against GUERRERO for
indemnification.
- The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the
contract; ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay the
plaintiff actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees; ordering Guerrero alone to pay liquidated damages of
P300.00 a day from December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979; and
ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff the amount of the
surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00. In the meantime, on
November 16, 1981, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and
several children as survivors.
- Herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial
court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to
him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr.
Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which was allegedly
confirmed in writing by the widow and the two daughters of the
deceased. The trial court granted the motion for confirmation
despite an opposition thereto.

ISSUE
WON petitioner may claim his attorneys fees

HELD
NO
Ratio Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for
their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination
of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be
held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the
light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as
an incident of the main action may be availed of only when
something is due to the client.
Reasoning
- Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for
attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in
which the services in question have been rendered, or in a
separate action. What is being claimed here as attorney's fees
by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an
item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the CC,
wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his
counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment

creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution.

Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged
contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and
the private respondents as the debtors. In filing the motion for
confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their
claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy under
our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent
court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. We
take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the
respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to
attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories
thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of
damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of
prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of
factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for
consideration by the trial court.
Disposition The decision of the respondent court is hereby
AFFIRMED.

CRISMINA GARMENTS
V CA

CERRANO V TAN
38 Phil 392
FISHER; August 1, 1918

NATURE
An action by plaintiff for damages alleged to have been caused
by the breach of a contract for the hiring of a casco.

FACTS
- During the month of January, 1916, Tan (defendant),
who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to Cerrano
(plaintiff) at a monthly rental of P70. Delivery was made in
Manila.
- Some time during the month of May, 1916, the Tan
notified Cerrano that in the following month it would be
necessary to send the casco to Malabon for repairs. Cerrano
then informed Tan that he would like to rent the casco again
after the repairs had been completed. Defendant indicated that
he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80 a month for it.
- There was no agreement between the parties
concerning the length of time for which the hire of the casco was
to continue.
- One week before the end of the repair period Tan sold
the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. J. Santos, the man who had
been employed by Cerrnao as patron of the casco while it was
in his possession, upon hearing that it had been sold to Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. went to the office of the latter in Manila, and
asked for employment in the same capacity.
- Cerrano, claiming that he was entitled to the
possession of the casco under his contract with Tan regardless
of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse to
take orders from the new owners. Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was
obliged to bring an action of replevin against Santos for the
recovery of the possession of their casco.
- After the casco had been in possession of Santos for
three months, the replevin suit was submitted to the court for
decision upon a written stipulation in which it was admitted that
the casco was the property of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. at the time
of the suit was commenced, and that the "illegal detention" of
the casco by Santos had caused damages to Siy Cong Bieng &
Co. in the sum of P457.98.
- Cerrano testified his average profit from other cascos
rented by him was P60 a month for each casco (P600 for 10
months supposedly).
Petitioners Claim
> It was agreed that he was to take the casco at the increased
rental. > A contract for the rental of a casco, when made by the
owner, is deemed in the absence of an express stipulation to the
contrary, to run from the date of the contract until the casco has
to be docked for its annual overhauling and repair (ten months).
Defendants Comments
> His offer to lease it at the higher rate was never accepted.
> In the absence of an express stipulation regarding the duration
of the hire, duration is deemed to be from month to month when
a monthly rental is agreed upon.
> Cerranos claim of P60 profit does not furnish the proper
measure of damages, and that plaintiff's right is limited to the
recovery of the difference between the contract price at which
the casco was hired by him and such higher rate as he might
have been compelled to pay for the hire of a similar casco in the
open market to take its place.
> It Cerranos responsibility to rent another casco seeing that
the one owned by Tan was already sold to Siy Cong Bieng &
Co. (thus mitigating his liability to pay damages).

ISSUES
1. WON it was agreed between the plaintiff and
defendant that the casco was to be leased to the former again
after it had been repaired
2. What is the duration of the term
3. WON there is liability for damages, and to what extent
(mitigation of liability)

HELD
1. YES, there was an agreement for the subsequent rental.
Reasoning
- It was understood between the parties that Cerrano
was to have it again at the increased rental as soon as the
contemplated repairs had been completed. That such was the
understanding is shown by the fact that plaintiff paid for the
towage of the casco to the dry dock at Malabon; that he left his
equipment in it; and that his patron stayed with the casco in
Malabon during the time it was on the dock.
- The sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. was a breach of
contract between the Cerrano and Tan.
2. The period was for a monthly rental.
Ratio The reasonable presumption that one who agrees to pay
a monthly rent intends that his tenancy is to endure for a like
period, subject to indefinite tacit renewals at the end of each
month as long as the arrangement is agreeable to both parties.
Reasoning
- When no definite agreement has been made regarding its
duration, the lease of a house is deemed to have been made
from day to day, from month to month, or from year to year,
according to whether a daily, monthly, or yearly rent is to be
paid.
3. YES, there is liability for damages, and there is no mitigation
of the liability. Ratio Plaintiff is entitled to recover, as damages
for the breach of the contract by the defendant, the profit which
he would have been able to make had the contract been
performed. HOWEVER, It is a well-recognized principle of law
that damages resulting from avoidable consequences of the
breach of a contract or other legal duty are not recoverable. It is
the duty of one injured by the unlawful act of another to take
such measures as prudent men usually take under such
circumstances to reduce the damages as much as possible.
Reasoning
- By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Tan
broke his contract with Cerrano and is responsible for the
damages caused by his failure to give plaintiff possession of the
casco for the term of one month. - Article 1106 of the Civil Code
establishes the rule that prospective profits may be recovered as
damages, while article 1107 of the same Code provides that the
damages recoverable for the breach of obligations not
originating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have
been foreseen at the time the contract was entered into.
- The injured party must produce the best evidence of
which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the
inference that he has been damaged by the loss of profits which
he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated but for the
defendant's wrongful act, he is entitled to recover. - It is equally
well-settled, however, that the burden of proof rests upon the
defendant to show that the plaintiff might have reduced the
damages. In this case the defendant has made no effort
whatever to show that any other similar cascos were in fact
available to plaintiff, or the price at which he would have been
able to obtain the use of one. In the absence of evidence it will
not be presumed that plaintiff could have secured another casco
at the same price had he looked for one.
Disposition It is decreed that Cerrano recover from Tan P50
as damages, and his costs in the Court of First Instance.

KIERULF V CA (PANTRANCO NORTH
EXPRESS)
269 SCRA 433
PANGANIBAN; March 13, 1997

FACTS
- About 7:45 pm, 28 Feb 1987: a Pantranco bus was
traveling along EDSA from Congressional Avenue towards
Clover Leaf, Balintawak. Before it reached the corner of
Oliveros Drive, the driver lost control of the bus, causing it to
swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island

occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus
bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Porfirio
Legaspi, which was moving along Congressional Avenue
heading towards Roosevelt Avenue. - As a result, the points of
contact of both vehicles were damaged and physical injuries
were inflicted on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf. The
bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing
EDSA.
- Despite the impact, said bus continued to move
forward and its front portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline
station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing
equipment.
- As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered
injuries which required major surgeries and prolonged treatment
by specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries. The front portion of
the pickup truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf was smashed to
pieces. (cost of repair estimated at P107,583.50.) - The victims
of the vehicular mishap pray for an increase in the award of
damages, over and above those granted by the appellate court.
Victor, husband of Lucila, claims compensation/damages for the
loss of his right to marital consortium which, according to him,
has been diminished due to the disfigurement suffered by his
wife.
- Pantranco asks for exoneration by invoking an alleged
fortuitous event as the cause of the mishap. They say that while
bus driven by Jose Malanum was cruising along EDSA, a used
engine differential accidentally and suddenly dropped from a
junk truck in front of the bus. Said differential hit the
underchassis of the bus, throwing Malanum off his seat and
making him lose control of said bus. The bus swerved to the
left, hit the center island, and bumped the pickup of the spouses.
RTC CA request SC
LUCILA
Actual

174,100.7
7

241,861.81
+ amt for
lost
income

241,861.81
Moral 100,00.00 200,000.00 1 Million 400,000.00
Exemplar
y
10,00.00 100,000.0
0
500,000.0
0
200,000.0
0
VICTOR
Actual 96,825.15 96,825.15 107,583.5
0
96,825.15
LEGASPI
Actual 6,328.18 6,328.18 16,000.00
Moral 10,000.00 25,000.00 100,000.0
0
50,000.00
Exemplar
y
50,000.00 50,000.00
attys fees 25,000.00 50,000.00 50,000.00
costs YES YES
+ interest
+6% legal
interest from
date of RTC
decision until
actual
payment

ISSUES
How much moral, exemplary and actual damages are victims of
vehicular accidents entitled to?
1. WON the bus driver was negligent and such
negligence (and not a fortuitous event) was the proximate cause
of the accident
2. WON Victors claim for deprivation of the right to
marital consortium as a factor for the award of moral damages is
proper
3. WON social and financial standing of Lucila can be
considered in awarding moral damages
4. WON exemplary damages should be awarded
5. WON loss of earnings may be a component of
damages in this case 6. WON the 10% reduction of the
estimated actual damages on the pickup was proper

HELD
1. Negligence and proximate cause are factual issues which SC
can not pass upon in the absence of conflict between the
findings of the trial court and the CA.
2. NO
- For lack of factual basis, such claim of deprivation of
the right to consortium cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this
time.
- Petitioners cited a California case, Rodriguez vs.
Bethlehem Steel Corporation, as authority for the claim of
damages by reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e. loss of
conjugal fellowship and sexual relations. In the Rodriguez
case
17
, it was ruled that when a person is injured to the extent
that he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort
and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has
suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate
and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is
personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the
injured person.
- Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to
support the award of moral damages to Victor &/or Lucila Kierulf
for "loss of consortium" cannot be properly considered in this
case. Victor's claim, although argued before CA, is not
supported by the evidence on record.
3. NO

17
Rodriguez involved a couple in their early 20s, who were married for only 16
months and full of dreams of building a family of their own, when the husband was
struck and almost paralyzed by a falling 600-pound pipe. The wife testified how her
life had deteriorated because her husband became a lifelong invalid, confined to the
home, bedridden and in constant need of assistance for his bodily functions; and how
her social, recreational and sexual life had been severely restricted. It also deprived
her of the chance to bear their children. As a constant witness to her husband's pain,
mental anguish and frustration, she was always nervous, tense, depressed and had
trouble sleeping, eating and concentrating. Thus, the California court awarded her
damages for loss of consortium.
- The social and financial standing of a claimant of
moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages
only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct
despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing.
- But, it is still proper to award moral damages to Lucila
for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries
on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to
undergo several corrective operations and treatments. She
suffered sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the
vehicular accident. And it has taken 10yrs to prosecute the
complaint and this appeal!
4. YES
- in view of CAs finding of gross negligence on the part
of Pantranco: "Public utility operators like the defendant, have
made a mockery of our laws, rules and regulations governing
operations of motor vehicles and have ignored either
deliberately or through negligent disregard of their duties to
exercise extraordinary degree of diligence for the safety of the
travelling public and their passengers."
- Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal: "it
is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators
the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the
safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise greater care
in the selection of drivers and conductors." - Exemplary
damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior
that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is
required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an
offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right.
It is based entirely on the discretion of the court. 5. For Lucila,
NO.
- CA already considered this when it stated that the
award of P25k included compensation for "mental anguish and
emotional strain of not earning anything with a family to
support."
- Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been
duly proven with ITRs. The alleged loss must be established by
factual evidence for it partakes of actual damages. A party is
entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty.
- For Legaspi, YES. Pantranco failed to rebut the claim
of Legaspi that he had been incapacitated for 10 months and
that during said period he did not have any income.
6. YES
- SC takes judicial notice of the propensity of motor
repair shops to exaggerate their estimates. An estimate is not an
actual expense incurred or to be incurred in the repair. The
reduction made by respondent court is reasonable considering
that in this instance such estimate was secured by the
complainants themselves.
Epilogue
- In order that moral damages may be awarded, there
must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish,
fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary

in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of
indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is
nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its
causal connection to defendant's acts.
- Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. -Francisco vs. GSIS: there
must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of
mental suffering.
- Cocoland Devt Corp vs. NLRC: additional facts must
be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages
under the Civil Code, these being, social humiliation, wounded
feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom.
- Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason
of the defendant's culpable action. - Its award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante;
thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
- There is no hard and fast rule in determining the
proper amount. The yardstick: amount awarded should not be
so palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it
was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it
rubs salt to the injury already inflicted on plaintiffs.

VISAYAN SAWMILL V CA
219 SCRA 378
CALLEJO; January 17, 2005

NATURE

FACTS
- ON may 1, 1983, Visayan Sawmill and RJH trading
entered into a sale of scrap iron located at the formers
stockyard, subject to the condition that RJH will open a letter of
credit in favor of Visayan in the amount of P250,000. -
Respondentfs men started digging and gather scrap iron in
petitioners premises. On may 30, they were asked to stop by
the plaintiff in view of an alleged case filed against respondent
by a certain Albert Pursuelo. This is howver denied by the
petitioner who alleges that on May 23, 1983, they sent a
telegram to respondent cancelling the contract of sale because
of failure of the latter to comply with the conditions thereof.
- On may 24, respondent informed petitioner that the
letter of credit was opened on may 12, 1983 but then the
transmittal was delayed. - On may 26, the bank sent a letter to
petitioner informing that the letter of credit was opened in their
favor.
- On july 19, respondent sent a series of telegrams
stating that the case against him has been dismissed and
demanding that petitioner comply with the contract. Respondent
filed a complaint against petitioner. RTC and CA ruled in favor of
respondent. (+ P100,000 moral damages )

ISSUE
WON the Visayan Sawmill can be compelled to honor the
agreement

HELD
NO
- There was only a contract to sell, not a contract of
sale. The petitioner corporation's obligation to sell is
unequivocally subject to a positive
suspensive condition, i.e., the private respondent's opening,
making or indorsing of an irrevocable and unconditional letter of
credit. The former agreed to deliver the scrap iron only upon
payment of the purchase price by means of an irrevocable and
unconditional letter of credit. Otherwise stated, the contract is
not one of sale where the buyer acquired ownership over the
property subject to the resolutory condition that the purchase
price would be paid after delivery. Thus, there was to be no
actual sale until the opening, making or indorsing of the
irrevocable and unconditional letter of credit. Since what
obtains in the case at bar is a mere promise to sell, the failure
of the private respondent to comply with the positive
suspensive condition cannot even be considered a breach
casual or serious but simply an event that prevented the
obligation of petitioner corporation to convey title from acquiring
binding force.
- In the instant case, not only did the private
respondent fail to open, make or indorse an irrevocable and
unconditional letter of credit on or before 15 May 1983 despite
his earlier representation in his 24 May 1983 telegram that he
had opened one on 12 May 1983, the letter of advice received
by the petitioner corporation on 26 May 1983 from the Bank of
the Philippine Islands Dumaguete City branch explicitly makes
reference to the opening on that date of a letter of credit in
favor of petitioner Ang Tay c/o Visayan Sawmill Co.
Inc., drawn without recourse on ARMACO-MARSTEEL ALLOY
CORPORATION and set to expire on 24 July 1983, which is
indisputably not in accordance with the stipulation in the
contract signed by the parties on at least three (3) counts: (1) it
was not opened, made or indorsed by the private respondent,
but by a corporation which is not a party to the contract; (2) it
was not opened with the bank agreed upon; and (3) it is not
irrevocable and unconditional, for it is without recourse, it is set
to expire on a specific date and it stipulates certain conditions with respect to shipment. In all probability, private respondent may
have sold the subject scrap iron to ARMACOMARSTEEL ALLOY CORPORATION, or otherwise assigned to it the contract with the
petitioners. Private respondent's complaint fails to disclose the sudden entry into the picture of this corporation. - In relation to the
outline, not really an issue in this case:
This Court notes the palpably excessive and unconscionable moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court to the private
respondent despite a clear absence of any legal and factual basis therefor. In contracts, such as in the instant case, moral damages
may be recovered if defendants acted fraudulently and in bad faith,
16
while exemplary damages may only be awarded if defendants
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
17
In the instant case, the refusal of the petitioners to deliver
the scrap iron was founded on the non-fulfillment by the private respondent of a suspensive condition. It cannot, therefore, be said
that the herein petitioners had acted fraudulently and in bad faith or in a wanton, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. What
this Court stated in Inhelder Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
18
needs to be stressed anew:
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to remind Trial Courts to guard against the award of exhorbitant (sic) damages that are
way out of proportion to the environmental circumstances of a case and which, time and again, this Court has reduced or
eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the Courts in the assessment of damages must always be exercised with balanced
restraint and measured objectivity.
- For, indeed, moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he
has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible,
of the spiritual status quo ante, and it must be The lower court's award of damages, was reversed and set aside. No costs.
proportional to the suffering inflicted.
Disposition Petition granted

MIRANDA-RIBAYA V BAUTISTA
COMPAIA MARITIMA V ALLIED FREE WORKERS UNION
95 SCRA 672
77 SCRA 24
TEEHANKEE; January 28, 1980
AQUINO; May 24, 1977

FACTS
FACTS

- Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged in the pawnshop
business in
- Since the onset in 1954 of litigation between the parties
herein, this is the
1
9
6
8

a
n
d

i
n

t
h
e

b
u
y
i
n
g

a
n
d

s
e
l
l
i
n
g

o
f

j
e
w
e
l
r
y
.

fifth case between them that has been elevated to the Court
- Sometime before April 23, 1968 Josefine Roco Robles, one of her agents, - The trial court awarded to the company of P450,000
as damages. informed her that millionaire logger Marino Bautista was interested to buy big
- The appellants contend that the trial court erred in awarding to the company diamond stones. Miranda-Ribaya went to visit Bautista
and at the sight of his
actual damages, amounting to P450,000, moral damages, of P50,000 and huge house, she became convinced that he indeed was as
rich as Josefina
attorney's Considering of P20,000, and in holding that the four officers of the had portrayed
him to be.
union are solidarily liable for the said damages.
> Miranda-Ribaya then offend to sell to the Bautista ten
pieces of jewelry
- Appellants' counsel assailed the award of actual damages, on the ground for the total amount of P224,000. After some haggling
(But I thought they
that the auditors' reports, on which they were based, were hearsay. were rich!), Miranda-Ribaya settled for P222,000 (Para naman
two

thousand lang!).
ISSUE
> Miranda-Ribaya was paid through two Equitable PCI
cheques, one for WON the appellants assignment of error meritorious
P112,000 and the other for P110,000. In return, she issued
a voucher as

evidence of payment.
HELD
> The next day, Miranda-Ribaya went back to see Bautista to
request him
YES to break up the P110,000 cheque into smaller amounts. She had to share
- The appellants assignment of error is meritorious, the Court found after some of the money with Miss Gisioco who owned some of
the jewelry
analyzing the nature of the damages, awarded, how the same were sold. She was then issued 4 Bank of America cheques with the
following
computed, and the trustworthiness of the company's evidence amounts: P14,000, P84,000, P12,000 and P50,000.
- On the basis of the reports of the two accountants, the damages, claimed by
- April 24, 1968 Miranda-Ribaya sold four pieces of jewelry to Bautista for
the complaint as a matter of simple addition, does not reach the sum of P
P94,000 in Bautistas office. She was then issued four Bank of
America
450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages, shown in the accountants' checks amounting to the total price of the pieces of jewelry.
She again
reports and in the statement made by the consignees. chief clerk (who did not issued another voucher as
proof of payment.
testify) amount to P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000.
- The original owners of some of the jewelry sold by Miranda-Ribaya wanted
- The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in to have them back so Miranda-Ribaya went to Bautistas
house. She brought
evidence because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous with her three pieces of jewelry to be offered in exchange
for some of the
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without jewelry she wanted to take back. Since his wife and
daughter were not

great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from
t
h
e
m

i
s

o
t
h

t
h
e

h
o
m
e
,

B
a
u
t
i
s
t
a

r
e
q
u
e
s
t
e
d

M
i
randa-Ribaya to leave the jewelry with him so he
general result of the whole", the original writings need not be produced (Sec. could show the jewelry to his wife
and daughter first.
2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).
- Bautista did not return the jewelry but instead sent Miranda-Ribaya a
- That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character
P45,000 cheque as payment for the three pieces of jewelry she
left with him.
of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly
She also heard that these pieces of jewelry were given away by
Bautista as
established.
gifts.
- It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and
- Miranda-Ribaya tried to contact Bautista when the post-dated checks
accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the neared their maturity date but she was unable to do so. Worse,
when she
company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination deposited the cheques, the bank dishonored them because the
accounts
- What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the were closed.
testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the
- Following a hunch acquired from years of experience as a pawnshop
original records, books of accounts, reports or the like". dealer, Miranda-Ribaya ran a check on the different pawnshops in Manila
and
- That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company discovered that most of the jewelry she had sold to Bautista
were pledged to
failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility different
pawnshops.
attending the production of the records in court and their examination and
- Bautista promised to settle his obligations with Miranda-Ribaya but was
analysis as evidence by the court. unable to do so despite repeated demands. He eventually surrendered the
Disposition The trial court's judgment declaring the arrastre and stevedoring pawnshop tickets to Miranda-Ribaya who was then
able to regain possession
contract terminated, permanently enjoining the union and its officials from of the pawned pieces of jewelry. She recomputed
Bautistas obligations and
performing arrastre and stevedoring work for the vessels of the
Compaia Maritima, and dismissing defendants' counterclaim was
affirmed.
found that he owed her P125,460.79, not including the amount
she had given to Gisioco.
- The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Miranda-Ribaya
but did not award damages to her for insufficiency of
evidence.

> Bautista claimed he had acted "in utmost good faith" and that
damages in any concept could not be assessed against them
> Neither did the appellate court look favorably upon Miranda-
Ribayas claim for damages, saying that petitioner did not
mention mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and
moral shock in her testimony. Neither could exemplary
damages be awarded because these damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right and the appellate court was not
prepared to disturb the lower court's exercise of discretion in
this regard.

ISSUE
WON the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper

HELD
YES
Ratio In order that moral damages may be awarded, there
must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish
fright and the like. There must be clear testimony on the mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and similar injuries.

Plaintiff must testify to his said injury and this should not merely
be inferred from certain proven facts.
Reasoning
- In her testimony, Miranda-Ribaya established that
due to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of
defraudation, she had suffered "extreme - anguish (without
using the word anguish) and "could not sleep for three months,"
since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her
personal jewelry and borrow money in order to pay off the
owners of the jewelry wrongfully acquired by respondents from
her.
- Even if Miranda-Ribaya failed to use the precise legal
terms, it is sufficient that these exact terms have been pleaded
in the complaint and evidence has been adduced, as cited
above, amply supporting the averments of the complaint.
- Having established the moral damages, petitioners
are also entitled to exemplary damages. The wantonness and
malevolence through which respondents defrauded petitioners,
deceitfully incurring and then evading settlement of their just
liability certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by
way of example and correction for the public good and also to
serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds by
others, even if the transaction were viewed as a breach of civil
contract. Disposition the decision of respondent court insofar
as it denies petitioners' claim for damages is hereby set aside.
In addition to the amounts awarded in the affirmed judgment of
the lower court, petitioners are further awarded moral and
exemplary damages equivalent to twenty-five per cent (25%) of
the principal sum of P125,460.79 adjudged in their favor by the
lower court.

DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP)
NARVASA; January 29, 1997

FACTS
- The Del Rosarios' charged Metal Forming Corp
(MFC) with a violation of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to
Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Mislabeling or Misbranding of
Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc.
- MFC sold to the public roofing materials known as
"Banawe" shingles which they advertised to be structurally
safe and strong. Del Rosarios purchased a quantity and had
installed in their house. However when typhoon Ruping came,
portions of the roof were blown away by strong winds and this
also led to the damage of the interior of their home.
- The spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages
resulting from the events, contending that aside from the
destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to
its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper, wood
parquet flooring and furniture. The plaintiffs reckoned their
actual damages at P1,008,003.00 "representing the estimated
cost of the repair, restoration and/or replacement of the
damaged areas and items in plaintiffs' house and the cost of the
inspection conducted by the independent adjuster..." They
also prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the
sum of P3,000,000,00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00, and attorney's fees in the sum of
P1,000,000.00.

ISSUE
WON the Del Rosario spouses are entitled to moral damages

HELD
YES
- That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in
flagrant breach of its express warranties made to the
general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the
Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequately
demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly
authorizes the award of moral damages "in breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the
psychological and mental trauma actually suffered by the
Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral damages is
warranted. Over a period of about a month. they
experienced "feelings of shock, helplessness, fear,
embarrassment and anger."
- As declared by this Court in Makabili v. Court of
Appeals, among other precedents:
It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the claimant
must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence
of the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection
to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages
though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category
of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer
(Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974.] and are
allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint.
(San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968])
- As reflected in the records of the case, the Court of
Appeals was in agreement with the findings of the trial court
that petitioners suffered anguish, embarrassment and mental
sufferings due to the failure of private respondent to perform its
obligation to petitioners.
- Its grant of moral and exemplary damages was
justified by the Trial Court as follows:
Form the evidence presented, plaintiffs' sufferings have been
duly and substantially proven by the defendant's fraudulent
actuation and breach of warranty, and thereby entitled for the
claim of damages and litigation costs as enunciated by the
testimony of the plaintiff... that the damages to his house
caused sufferings and feelings of shock. helplessness, fears,
embarrassment and anger, thereby entitling him to Moral
Damages which should be assessed at P500,000.00.
"The moral damages. . . . (are awarded) for indemnity or
reparation not punishment or correction, that is, an award to
entitle the injured party to obtain means (of) diversions and
amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings he
has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action.
(RNB Surety and Ins. Co. v. IAC, G.R No. 64515, June 22,
1984,
129 SCRA 745)."
- This Court also agrees with the Trial Court
- However, the same statutory and jurisprudential
standards just mentioned dictate reduction of the amounts of
moral and exemplary damages fixed by the Trial Court. the
moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss
or injury suffered.

RAAGAS v TRAYA
22 SCRA 839
CASTRO; Feb 27, 1968

FACTS
- spouses Raagas filed a complaint with the CFI Leyte
against spouses Traya and Bienvenido Canciller.
- Complaint alleges that on or about April 9, 1958,
while Canciller was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by the
Traya spouses, the vehicle ran over the Raagas' three-year old
son Regino, causing his instantaneous death.
Defendants Comments
> They specifically deny that Canciller was "driving recklessly"
at the time of the mishap, and assert that the truck "was fully
loaded and was running at a very low speed and on the right
side of the road"
> it was the child who "rushed from an unseen position and
bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left rear tire of the
said truck and died", and consequently the defendants are not
to blame for the accident which was "entirely attributable to an
unforeseen event" or due to the fault of the child and
negligence of his parents;
> defendants-spouses have exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their driver Canciller, whom they
hired in 1946 only after a thorough study of his background as a
truck driver; and that each time they allowed him to drive it was
only after a check of his physical condition and the mechanical
fitness of the truck assigned to him.
Lower Court
> plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings, upon the
claim that the defendants' answer not only "failed to tender an
issue" but as well "admitted material allegations" of the
complaint. This motion was set for hearing on June 18. On the
previous day, however, defendants counsel requested for
postponement as he was sick. The lower court denied the
request for lack of "proper notice to the adverse party," and
considered the case submitted for decision upon the filing of the
plaintiffs' memorandum.
- On June 24 it rendered a judgment on the pleadings,
condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay
damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
- The lower court reasoned that the denial of the
charge of reckless driving "did not affect the plaintiffs' positive
allegation in their complaint that the truck . . . did not have a
current year registration plate . . . for the year 1958 when the
accident occurred,"

"this failure . . . has the effect of admitting hypothetically that
they operated . . . the said car without proper license . . . when
the accident occurred," "unless there is proof to the contrary, it
is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation (article 2185 CC)." - The defendants appealed
to CA, which certified the case to SC because the issues raised
are purely of law.
- NOTE: Section 10 of Rule 35 of the old Rules of
Court authorized a judgment on the pleadings where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys
pleading.

ISSUE
WON the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered
judgment on the
pleadings

HELD
YES
- The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral, nominal and
corrective damages, was controverted by the averment in the
answer to the effect that the defendants "have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being
that the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an
unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the small boy Regino
Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect of
tendering a valid issue.
In a long line of cases, SC has consistently held that even if
the allegations regarding the amount of damages in the
complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such
damages are not deemed admitted.
in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved,
and that a court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or
guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend on actual proof that damages had been suffered and
on evidence of the actual amount.
although an allegation is not necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential
that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the
factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to
defendant's acts."
Disposition Case is remanded to the court of origin for trial on
the merits.

ENERVIDA v DELA TORRE
55 SCRA 339
ESGUERRA; January 28, 1974

NATURE

FACTS
- Petitioner Roque Enervida filed a complaint against
defendant spouses Lauro and Rosa dela Torre, praying that the
deed of sale executed by his deceased father over a parcel of
land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void
for having been executed within the prohibited period of 5 years
in violation of Sec.118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (the Public
Land Law). He further prayed that he be allowed to repurchase
said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and sole heir of
his deceased father.
- Defendants filed their answer, stating that the
petitioner has no cause of action against them as his father is
still living; that petitioner is not the only son of Ciriaco and that
the sale of the property in question was well beyond the 5 year
prohibition period.
- During pre-trial, petitioner admitted the claims of the
defendants: his father was still living, that he has siblings, and
that the sale did not take place within the prohibited period. The
CFI, in view of such admissions, dismissed Roques complaint
and held that he had no cause of action, no legal capacity to
sue and that he is prompted with malice and bad faith in
alleging false statements in his complaint. He was also ordered
to pay the defendants P2000 for actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
- Petitioner then filed an appeal to the CA which
certified the case to the SC as it involved purely a question of
law.

ISSUE
WON the award for moral damages by reason of the unfounded
civil action was proper

HELD
NO
Ratio Art.2219 enumerates the cases when moral damages
may be recovered. A clearly unfounded suit is not included in
the enumeration and cannot be basis for an award of moral
damages.
Reasoning
- It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual
damages which are generally recoverable in tort cases as long
as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art. 2202), the Code has
chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages may
be recovered (Art. 2219).
- A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery
of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two
enumerations differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit,
which is expressly mentioned in Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying
an award of attorney's fees, but is not included in the
enumeration of Art.2219 in respect to moral damages.
- Art. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be
awarded in analogous cases to those enumerated, but we
do not think the Code intended a clearly unfounded civil
action or proceedings to be one of these analogous cases
wherein moral damages may be recovered, or it would have
expressly mentioned it in Art.2219, as it did in Art.2208; or else
incorporated Art.2208 by reference in Art.2219.
- Art.2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries, as an instance when moral damages
may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not
resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting, the
special torts referred to in Art.309, par. 9, Art.2219 and in
Arts.21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 on the chapter on
human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
- While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order
that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is, nevertheless,
essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of
the factual basis of the damage (Art.2217) and its causal
relation to the defendants acts because moral damages,
though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of
an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
- The trial court and the CA both seem to be of the
opinion that the mere fact that respondents were sued without
any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral
damages, hence they made no definite finding as to what the
supposed moral damages suffered consist of. Such a
conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which they
are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered,
which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other words,
are not corrective or exemplary damages. Disposition the
dismissal order is affirmed with modification that only attys fees
are awarded to respondents.

PEOPLE V BUGAYONG
PANGANIBAN; December 2, 1998

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of RTC Baguio

FACTS
- Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan were married
and had 3 children, ALBERT, HONEYLET and ARLENE, the
private complainant herein. The spouses separated. Albert and
Arlene stayed with their mother Leticia while Honeylet stayed
with her grandmother Anita Yu. Later, Alberto and Leticia
started living together with another woman and another man
respectively. Leticia cohabited with the accused RODELIO
BUGAYONG and had a child, CATHERINE BUGAYONG.
- the accused RODELIO BUGAYONG had ARLENE
hold his penis inside the room he shared with Leticia. At that
time CATHERINE who was 6yrs. old was also inside the same
room and her father, the accused was letting her sleep.
Bugayong threatened to maim Arlene if she did not hold his
penis. When the penis was already hard and stiff, he placed it
inside the mouth of Arlene and a white substance came out
from the penis. CATHERINE saw this incident.
- Arlene Cauan accompanied by her father Alberto
Cauan and her aunt Marilyn Yu, Carmelita Yu and Rosie Yu
went to the NBI to file a complaint. - Arlene gave her sworn
statement. Alberto Cauan also gave his sworn statement.

- Arlene testified that her stepfather had been doing
the same act when she was still in Grade 3 and was nine years
old. She also said that there were occasions when
BUGAYONG played first with his penis then touched her vagina
with his penis until a white substance came out of it and that
was the time BUGAYONG would pull back his penis. Arlene
said that the penis of BUGAYONG partly entered [her] vagina
and she got hurt.
- The trial court held that the accused raped the victim
in 1993, not in 1994. Notwithstanding the rather encompassing
allegation in the Information that the crime was committed
before and until October 15, 1994, the trial court ruled that it
could legally convict the accused for the crime committed in
1993. The primordial consideration in determining the
sufficiency of the averment in the Information as to time is
whether the accused was accorded the opportunity to prepare a
defense. In this case, the trial court observed that he was not
so deprived. Furthermore, it noted that the Information charged
more than one offense, but that the accused failed to interpose
an opposition.
- The Information charged appellant with statutory rape
committed before and until October 15, 1994 xxx several
times. In the instant appeal, accused asserts that this
allegation regarding the date of the commission of the offense
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
- Appellant claims a violation of his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. He maintains that he was unable to prepare
properly for his defense or to anticipate the evidence to be
controverted

ISSUE
WON accused may be convicted of rape committed in 1993,
under the present Information, which accused him of
committing the said crime before
and until October 15, 1994 xxx several times.
HELD
YES
Ratio Indeed, the determinative factor in the resolution of the
question involving a variance between allegation and proof in
respect of the date of the crime is the element of surprise on
the part of the accused and his corollary inability to defend
himself properly. The records of this case belie appellants
claim of surprise.
Reasoning
- It is doctrinal that the precise time of the commission
of an offense need not be alleged in the complaint or
information, unless time is an essential element of the crime
charged.
- If vagueness afflicted the aforementioned text of the
Information, it was cured by the victims Sworn Statement,
which was expressly made an integral part of the Information.
The victim categorically alleged that she had been raped by
appellant in 1993 when she was in grade three - Furthermore,
appellant could not have been oblivious to the victims Sworn
Statement, for he requested and was given an opportunity to
rebut the same in his Motion for Reinvestigation.
- It will be noted that appellant was charged with rape
committed before and until October 15, 1994 xxx several
times. Said acts are alleged in only one Information which, as
a general rule, is defective for charging more than one offense.
However, appellant failed, within the prescribed period, to file
such motion on the ground of duplicity. He is thus deemed to
have waived the defect in the Information.
- appellant cannot be said to have been deprived of his
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him.
Despite the duplicitous nature of the Information, he did not
object to such defect. Moreover, he was given the chance to
defend himself in court and to cross-examine the complainant.
- the Court rigorously examined the records and
arrived upon the conclusion that his guilt had been established
beyond reasonable doubt. The victims clear, categorical and
straightforward testimony indubitably demonstrated the
culpability of appellant for the dastardly acts committed before
and until October 15, 1994
- The foregoing shows that appellant sexually
assaulted complainant in 1993 when she was 10 years old.
Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of statutory rape
under Article 335 (3) of the RPC. Moreover, appellant is also
guilty of acts of lasciviousness committed on October 15, 1995.
- The trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto, an amount which is automatically granted
to the offended party without need of further evidence other
than the fact of the commission of rape. - Consistent with recent
jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered to pay the
victim the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages. In
People v. Prades, the Court resolved that moral damages
may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal
proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without
the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has
heretofore been the practice.
Disposition The appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant
Rodelio Bugayong is ordered to pay Complainant Arlene Cauan
P50,000 as indemnity and the additional amount of P50,000 as
moral damages.

FRANCISCO V GSIS
7 SCRA 577
REYES JBL; March 30, 1963

NATURE
Appeal by the Government Service Insurance System from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

FACTS
- CFI ordered GSIS to abide by the terms of the
contract created by plaintiff's offer and its unconditional
acceptance, with costs against the GSIS. Trinidad J. Francisco
(plaintiff) appealed separately (L-18155), because the trial court
did not award the P535,000.00 damages and attorney's fees
she claimed. - October 10,1956: Trinidad J. Francisco
mortgaged in favor of Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) a parcel of land containing an area of 18,232 square
meters, with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari
Compound. This was in consideration of a loan in the amount of
P400K, out of which the sum of P336,100.00 was released to
her.
- January 6, 1959: GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage on the ground that up to that date Francisco was in
arrears on her monthly installments in the amount of
P52,000.00. Payments made by the plaintiff at the time of
foreclosure amounted to P130,000.00. GSIS itself was the
buyer of the property in the foreclosure sale.
- February 20, 1959: the plaintiff's father, Atty. Vicente
J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the
defendant corporation, Mr. Rodolfo P. Andal, proposing to
pay said amount of P30,000 to the GSIS if it would agree that
after such payment the foreclosure of my daughter's mortgage
would be set aside. As for the balance, Atty. Francisco
proposed for GSIS to take over the administration of the
mortgaged property and to collect the monthly installments,
amounting to about P5,000, until the balance is paid. - February
20 1959: Atty. Francisco received a telegram containing an
approval of his request. It was signed by Andal.
- February 28 1959: Atty. Francisco remitted to GSIS,
through Andal, a check for P30K. GSIS received the amount of
P30K, and issued an official receipt No. 1209874, dated 4
March 1959. It did not, however, take over the administration of
the compound (as was proposed by Atty. Francisco). -
Remittances, all accompanied by letters, corresponding to the
months of March, April, May, and June, 1960 and totalling
P24,604.81 were also sent by Francisco to GSIS from time to
time, all of which were received and duly receipted for.
- Then the System sent three (3) letters, one dated 29
January 1960, which was signed by its assistant general
manager, and the other two letters, dated 19 and 26 February
1960, respectively, which were signed by Andal, asking the
plaintiff for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness,
since according to the System the one-year period for
redemption had expired. Respondents Comment
> The remittances previously made by Atty. Francisco were
allegedly not sufficient to pay off her daughter's arrears,
including attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in
foreclosing the mortgage.

ISSUES
1. WON the telegram generated a contract that is valid
and binding upon the parties
2. WON Francisco is entitled to damages (moral
damages in the outline)


HELD
1. YES, the contract is binding.
Ratio If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or
any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent
authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing
power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any one
who has in good faith dealt with the corporation
through such agent, be estopped from denying his authority
Reasoning
- GSIS does not disown the telegram, and even
asserts that it came from its offices, as may be gleaned from
the letter, dated 31 May 1960, to Atty. Francisco, and signed
"R. P. Andal, general manager by Leovigildo Monasterial, legal
counsel.
- In remitting the payment of P30,000 advanced by her
father, Trinidads letter to Mr. Andal quoted verbatim the
telegram of acceptance Mr. Andal sent.
- Notwithstanding this notice, the defendant System
pocketed the amount, and kept silent about the telegram not
being in accordance with the true facts, as it now alleges. This
silence, taken together with the unconditional acceptance of
three other subsequent remittances from plaintiff, constitutes in
itself a binding ratification of the original agreement.
2. NO, Francisco is not entitled to damages.
- The court a quo correctly refused to award such actual or
compensatory damages because it could not determine with
reasonable certainty the difference between the offered price
and the actual value of the property. - Without proof the Court
cannot assume, or take judicial notice, as suggested by the
plaintiff, that the practice of lending institutions in the country is
to give out as loan 60% of the actual value of the collateral. -
There was no error in the appealed decision in denying moral
damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the
witness stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded
feelings, anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily
because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being
malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral
damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2220
Disposition The appealed decision if affirmed, with costs
against GSIS.

EXPERT TRAVEL & TOURS INC V CA (LO)
VITUG; June 25, 1999

NATURE
Petitioner, Expertravel and Tours, Inc., seeks in the instant
petition for review on certiorari a modification of the decision,
dated 20 March 1997, of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto
the 07th November 1994 judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 5) of Manila declaring the instant suit DISMISSED, and
ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant Ricardo Lo moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00; attorney's fees in the
amount of P10,000.00, and to pay the costs of the suit.
FACTS
- On 07 October 1987, Expertravel & Tours, Inc.,
("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the travel
agency business, issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four
round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel
accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20.
Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel
caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were
ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery
of the amount claimed plus damages. - Respondent Lo
explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel had
already been fully paid. The outstanding account was remitted
to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de
Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of
Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte de
Piedad Check No. 291559, dated 06 October 1987, for
P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust
Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for the amount of
P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance for Ricardo
Lo, etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on
10 October 1987.
- The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held
that the payment made by Lo was valid and binding on
petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms. de
Vega had not been specifically authorized by Expertravel, both
courts said, the fact that the amount "delivered to the latter
remain(ed) in its possession up to the present, mean(t) that the
amount redounded to the benefit of petitioner Expertravel, in
view of the second paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code
to the effect that payment made to a third person shall also be
valid in so far as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor."

ISSUE
WON moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict
that did not
result to physical injury to the offended party

HELD
NO
Ratio Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury unjustly caused to a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages,
nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or
omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established
by the aggrieved party.
- An award of moral damages would require certain conditions
to be met; to wit:
(1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
OTHER GROUNDS FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases:
"1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
"2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
"3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
"4) Adultery or concubinage;
"5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
"6) Illegal search;
"7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
"8) Malicious prosecution;
"9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
"10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
"The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this Article, may also recover
moral damages.
"The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this Article,
in the order named."
- Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach
of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the
defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence
(amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of
breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in
physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to
Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be
awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a
breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when
an act or omission causes physical injuries, or
(b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, [In this latter
case, moral damages may be recovered even in loss of or
damage to property.] moral damages may aptly be recovered.
- This rule also applies, as aforestated, to contracts
when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could
be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical
injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or
arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation.
Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral
damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article
2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar
to those expressly enumerated by the law. - Although the
institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a
legal justification for an award of attorney's fees, [Article
2208(4), Civil Code; such filing, however, has almost invariably
been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages.
The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered
by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit
would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered
by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself
be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages. If the rule
were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be

awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an
unsuccessful plaintiff.
- The Court confirms, once again, the foregoing rules.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the award of moral
damages to respondent Ricardo Lo under the assailed decision
is DELETED. In its other aspects, the appealed decision shall
remain undisturbed. No costs.

MIJARES V CA (METRO DRUG INC)
271 SCRA 558
KAPUNAN; April 18, 1997

NATURE

FACTS
- Dioscoro Lamenta, salesman/collector of Metro
Manila Drug Inc. - Mijares as owners of Aklan Drug had been
buying pharmaceutical products from Metro Drug since 1976.
They had good record with Metro Drug. - Editha Mijares, aside
from being the operator of Aklan Drug, was also an officer of
the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative, Inc., which
became a concessionaire of a small area right inside the
hospital compound and it operated a drugstore. Said drugstore
had some transactions with the plaintiff as supplier of
pharmaceutical products. Subsequently the Cooperative was
dissolved and it stopped operating. Solomon Silverio, Jr. leased
from the City of Manila the site previously occupied by the
Cooperative and put up a drugstore on the same.
- Lamenta delivered pharmaceutical products to the
said store (8 times). - The first to the seventh deliveries were
received by Luz Espares,the 8th delivery was received by Hilda
Rodrigona. Both were never the employees of the defendants.
- In partial payment of these receivables Solomon
Silverio, Jr. issued a check under the account name Farmacia
delos Remedios in the amount of P14,180.46, which was
subsequently dishonored on the ground of insufficient fund.
- Metro Drug went after Mijares demanding full
redemption of the dishonored check and full payment of
outstanding account for P27,938.06. - When Lamenta tried to
collect from Editha Mijares for the disputed claim, Editha
Mijares referred him to Mr. Silverio as the new operator and
concessionaire of the drugstore. She informed him verbally that
they have no more business inside the Ospital ng Maynila as
the cooperative drugstore has already stopped operations.
Despite said verbal notice, the demand telegram addressed to
Aklan Drug was still sent to Editha Mijares. On Lamenta's
follow-up of said telegram, Editha Mijares again directed
Lamenta to see Solomon Silverio, the new owner of the
drugstore. - RTC: Complaint dismissed; plaintiff ordered to pay
the defendants
P30,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 as attorney's
fees
CA: Reversed

ISSUE
WON moral damages should be awarded to the Mijares
spouses (bec of
malicious prosecution)

HELD
NO
- Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral
damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a
complaint against another in good faith, or without malice or
bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159
SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736 [1984]).
Reasoning
- Mijares spouses failed to show that private
respondent was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the
action for collection.
- In China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals it
was held that Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil
cases, requires the presence of two elements, to wit: a) malice;
and b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately
knowing that the charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]).
- Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable
for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court
of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals,
141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
- Moral damages cannot be recovered from a person
who has filed a complaint against another in good faith, or
without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736
[1984]).
- If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is
damnum absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989]).

DE LA PEA V CA (TAN)
231 SCRA 456
BELLOSILLO; March 28, 1994

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CA dismissing petitioners action for
reconveyance with damages against private respondent.

FACTS
- Pantaleon De La Pena imputes fraud and
misrepresentation to private respondent Herotido Tan in
securing Free Patent No. (XI-6) 1326 and OCT No. P-7923
over the same.
- Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel
of land in Sulongvale, Sulop, Davao del Norte (previously
Padada, Tanwalang, Davao), designated as Lot No. 5714, for
which he filed Homestead Application No. 192495 (E100806)
with the Bureau of Lands.
- However, another party also filed a Homestead
Application for the same.
- Ciriaco transferred his possessory rights over six (6)
hectares (later increased to eight [8]) of Lot 5714 to petitioner
Pantaleon de la Pea who thereafter entered his appearance in
the administrative case when the portion transferred to him
remained included in the homestead applications of Ciriaco
Reducto and Potenciano Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a
field verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire the
portion claimed by him being its actual occupant and cultivator,
the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion
himself within sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose his
preferential right thereto." However, no such application was
filed.
- Meanwhile, on 7 March 1950, Ciriaco transferred his
rights over another 1 1/2-hectare portion of Lot 5714 to Michael
Doble

who in turn sold his rights in 1956 to Ricardo Tan, herein
private respondent's father. The portion sold to Michael Doble,
and later on acquired by Ricardo Tan, became the western
boundary of de la Pea's land.
- On 24 and 25 August 1970, a survey was conducted
and it was discovered that the land occupied by petitioner was
bigger by 3/4 of a hectare than what he actually bought and
paid for from Ciriaco. On the other hand, the land ceded to
Doble (later acquired by Tan) was "very much smaller" than
what he actually bought.
- Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the area
acquired by Doble in 1950, it was petitioner de la Pea who
cultivated the same without objection from Doble. However,
when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot on 2 March 1956, he built a
fence to reclaim the portion, but petitioner kept destroying it;
hence, the start of a boundary dispute.
- On 5 May 1975, Ricardo Tan transferred his rights
over Lot 5714-C to his son, private respondent Herotido Tan, by
means of "Affidavit of
Relinquishment."

But the conflict over the 3/4-hectare portion
continued. In an effort to resolve the conflict, a relocation
survey was agreed upon except that the parties failed to agree
on a common surveyor. Consequently, each party had to hire
his own. Petitioner's surveyor conducted a relocation survey on
18 April 1977, while respondent's surveyor conducted his own
five (5) days later.
After it was determined that the 3/4-hectare portion was
within Lot 5714C of private respondent, the latter built a
fence around the property to prevent petitioner from
entering. The sugarcane and bananas planted by petitioner
were destroyed in the process.
- On 29 April 1977, petitioner filed a complaint for
forcible entry against Ricardo Tan in the Municipal Trial Court of
Sulop. When it was discovered that private respondent Herotido
Tan was the registered owner of Lot 5714-C under OCT No. P-
7923

which was issued pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-6)

1326 dated 15 September 1975, the complaint was accordingly
amended to implead him.
- The MTC and CFI ruled in favor of petitioner and
ordered that possession be restored to the petitioner..
- On 18 July 1977, during the pendency of the forcible
entry case, petitioner instituted the present action for
reconveyance with damages against private respondent in the
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur and Davao City. -
Petitioner alleged that private respondent fraudulently
registered the 3/4hectare portion actually cultivated by him
when the former stated in his free patent application that "the
land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other
person." In addition, petitioner denied that a survey was
conducted in 1970; if at all, it was merely a "table survey."
Incidentally, it was discovered in the survey that the area of
petitioner's actual occupation exceeded that which he bought
from Ciriaco Reducto in 1946.
- After trial, the court rejected petitioner's denial of the
1970 Survey. Since the disputed 3/4-hectare portion was not
part of the area bought and paid for in 1946 by petitioner, the
latter was not entitled to reconveyance. Petitioner was declared
a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith who was "enjoying
freely the use of government property" without even applying
for the same nor paying taxes thereon. His prayer for P5,000.00
as actual damages for the sugarcane and bananas destroyed
on the disputed portion was denied. Instead, private
respondent's counterclaim was granted and petitioner was
ordered to pay P6,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation, P15,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs
of the proceedings.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision
in toto.

ISSUES
1. WON petitioner has legal standing in the suit
2. WON the award for attorney's fees, moral damages and
expenses of
litigation against the petitioner are proper

HELD
1. NO
- Petitioner Pantaleon de la Pea has absolutely no standing to
institute the present suit for reconveyance.
2. NO
Ratio It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted
only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled
in another's name. In the case at bench, petitioner does not
claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what
he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof
by virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947. However,
petitioner's possession is not one that could ripen into
ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be established
through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least
thirty (30) years. It must be noted that the dispute regarding the
3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and OCT
could be issued to private respondent in 1975. As early as
1956, the controversy already began between petitioner and
private respondent's father. Hence, petitioner's possession falls
short of the required period. Not being the owner, petitioner
cannot maintain the present suit.
- An award for attorney's fees and moral damages on
the sole basis of an action later declared to be unfounded in the
absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the other
party is improper. The right to litigate is so precious that a
Penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it
erroneously.
Disposition Affirmed, with the sole modification that the award
for attorney's fees, expenses of litigation, and moral damages is
DELETED.

J MARKETING V SIA
285 SCRA 580
FRANCISCO; January 29, 1998

NATURE
Appeal from decision of CA

FACTS
- J Marketing was company engaged in the business
of appliances and motorcycles. It received from Kawasaki
motors one brand new, color blue motorcycle, which was stored
in the company bodega. However (4 years after receipt), the
company found out that the motorcycle was missing, and
immediately reported this to the police.
- The companys representative, Caludac, tried to trace
the lost motorcycle to Felicidad SIa (defendant herein), who
brought a motorcycle from a Renato Pelande. Allegedly,
Caludac went to the house of Sia and examined the chasis and
motor numbers of the motorcycle in his possession, and found
out that the chasis and motor numbers have been tampered
with to jibe with the chais and motor numbers of a
motorcycle previously purchased by Pelande from J Mktg.
- When Caludac confronted Sia about the questionable
motorcycle, Sia refused to surrender possession of the
motorcycle and instead told Caludac to file a case in court.
Hence, J mktg filed a complaint for replevin against Sia. Sia, in
turn, filed a 3
rd
party complaint against Pelante (which was
subsequently declared in default).
- RTC dismissed J mktgs complaint but awarded
damages (moral and exemplary) and attys fees. CA affirmed
RTCs decision.

ISSUE
WON award of moral and exemplary damages and attys fees
is proper

HELD
1. NO
Ratio No damages can be charged on those who may exercise
their rights in good faith, even if done erroneously. Reasoning
- A person's right to litigate should not be penalized by
holding him liable for damages. This is especially true when the
filing of the case is to enforce what he believes to be his rightful
claim against another although found to be erroneous.
- J mktg precisely instituted the replevin case against
Sia based on the latter's own challenge to the former that if they
really had a right on the motorcycle, then they should institute
the necessary case in court. When J mktg, through Caludac,
did sue Sia, it cannot be said that the institution of the replevin
suit was tainted with gross and evident bad faith or was done
maliciously to harass, embarrass, annoy or ridicule Sia.
- Moreover, the adverse result of an action - dismissal
of petitioner's complaint - does not per se make an act unlawful
and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. It is not
a sound public policy to place a premium on the right to litigate.
- The award of exemplary damages has likewise no
factual basis. It is a requisite that the act must be accompanied
by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent
manner - circumstances which are absent in this case. In
addition, exemplary damages cannot be awarded as the
requisite element of compensatory damages was not present. -
With respect to the attorney's fees, an adverse decision does
not ipso facto justify the award thereof to the winning party.
Everything points to the fact that petitioner honestly thought that
they had a good cause of action, so that notwithstanding the
dismissal of their case, no attorney's fees can be granted to
private respondent.
- Considering that Sia claims to be the owner of the
motorcycle, J mktg was compelled to sue him. When Sia
"necessarily" became a party defendant no attorney's fees and
litigation expenses can automatically be recovered even if he
should win, as it is not the fact of winning alone that entitles
recovery of such items but rather the attendance of special
circumstances - the enumerated exceptions in Article 2208
NCC.
- There being no bad faith reflected in petitioner's
persistence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous
conviction of the righteousness of its cause, attorney's fees
cannot not be recovered as cost.
Disposition Decision of CA AFFIRMED

COMETA V CA (MACLI-ING ET AL)
301 SCRA 459
MENDOZA; December 29, 1999

FACTS
- 1989 > SITI and Cometa filed a criminal case against
Guevara for falsification of Public Documents (State Investment
House, Inc. vs. Reynaldo S. Guevara) The basis of the
aforesaid case is a forged Affidavit of Undertaking with its
application of a License to Sell its townhouse units in the RSG
Condominium-Gueventville II. The signature therein purporting
to be that of Cometa is not Cometas signature.
- Consequently, a criminal information was filed
against Guevara in RTC Makati (People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, vs. Reynaldo s. Guevara, Accused)

- Upon the filing of the information, a Warrant of Arrest
was issued against Guevara. Guevara posted the necessary
bail bond and the warrant for his arrest was lifted.
- After the prosecution had rested its case, Guevara
filed a Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the Evidence,
contending that all the evidence submitted by the prosecution
do not suffice to show that he had committed the crime for
which he has been accused
- March 26, 1992 - RTC Makati issued an order,
granting Guevara's Motion to Dismiss on a Demurrer to the
Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case for
falsification of public documents against him - it is clear that the
defendants had maliciously prosecuted Guevara, to his and
HBI's embarassment, damage and prejudice. The criminal case
filed by the defendants against Guevara had absolutely no
basis in fact and in law. Quite clearly, defendants had filed the
aforesaid case with the sole intent of harassing and pressuring
Guevara, in his capacity as Chairman of GIDC, to give in to
their illicit and malicious desire to appropriate the remaining
unsold properties of GIDC and/or to influence the appellate
courts to decide in their favor, their appeal of the lower court's
decision in the GIDC case.

ISSUE
WON requisites for malicious prosecution are present

HELD
YES
- a complaint for malicious prosecution states a cause
of action if it alleges the following:
(1) that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that
at least the prosecution was instituted at his instance;
(2) that the prosecution finally terminated in the acquittal
of the plaintiff; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecutor
acted without probable cause; and
(4) that the prosecutor was actuated by malice, i.e. by improper
and sinister motives
- first TWO requisites are sufficiently alleged in the
complaint. - the FOURTH requisite malice in which a a
general averment is sufficient in view of Rule 8, 5 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Petitioners filed the criminal case for the
purpose of harassing and pressuring Guevarra, in his capacity
as chairman of Guevent Industrial Development Corporation
(GIDC), to give in to their illicit and malicious desire to
appropriate the remaining unsold properties of the corporation,
may be considered sufficient. - To be sure, lack of probable
cause is an element separate and distinct from that of malice. It
follows, therefore, that one cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with
probable cause. - Obviously, a determination that there was no
probable cause cannot be made to rest solely on the fact that
the trial court, acting on private respondent Guevarra's
demurrer to evidence, dismissed the criminal prosecution, just
as it cannot be made to turn on the fact that the Department of
Justice reversed the fiscal's findings and ordered the criminal
case against private respondent Guevarra to be filed in court.
The first would transform all acquittals into veritable
countersuits for malicious prosecution. On the other hand, the
second would result in the dismissal of all complaints for
malicious prosecutions.
- Accordingly, the inquiry should be whether sufficient
facts are alleged showing that in bringing the criminal action,
the defendant in the civil action for malicious prosecution acted
without probable cause. This Court has ruled that for purposes
of malicious prosecution, "probable cause" means "such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted." Buchanan v. Vda. de Esteban. In
this case, even if we consider the allegations in the complaint
as true, as well as the order of the trial court annexed thereto,
we do not find the same sufficient to establish the absence of
probable cause. - To prove that the subject UNDERTAKING
(Exhibit "N") is falsified, the prosecution presented the
testimony of complaining witness REYNALDO COMETA to
prove that as President of the STATE INVESTMENT he did not
execute the document of undertaking and thus, the subject
document (Exhibit "N") is falsified and his signature thereat is
not his signature. To corroborate the testimony of COMETA,
the NBI handwriting expert LUZVIMINDA C. SABADO,
submitted the questioned Documents Report No. 278-688
dated 21 June 1988 to show that the signature above the name
of COMETA in the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N") and the
specimen signatures of COMETA WERE not written by one and
the same person (Exhibit "Y").
- To prove that accused falsified and/or caused the
falsification of the subject undertaking (Exhibit "N"), the
prosecution presented the records of the HOUSING BOARD
which include the "Official Form" letter-application (Exhibit "J")
submitted by accused together with the required documents
enumerated therein which supposedly included the undertaking
to release mortgage. The testimony of a HOUSING BOARD
official, Ms. Floredeliza Manuel was presented to testify as an
official of the HOUSING BOARD the standard procedure is that
the BOARD requires from applicants for authority such as that
applied for by accused, the following requirements were quoted
by the prosecution in page 5 of their OPPOSITION and
reproduced hereunder: - there is neither direct nor
circumstantial evidence to prove that accused is the author of
this falsified document
- trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution
did not establish "a prima facie case against accused private
private respondent Reynaldo Guevarra." However, prima facie
evidence is different from probable cause. Prima facie evidence
requires a degree or quantum of proof greater than probable
cause. "It denotes evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a prosecution or
establish the facts, as to counterbalance the presumption of
innocence and warrant the conviction of the accused." On the
other hand, probable cause for the filing of an information
merely means "reasonable ground for belief in the existence of
facts warranting the proceedings complained of, or an apparent
state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which
would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to
believe that the accused person has committed the crime."
What is needed to bring an action in court is simply probable
cause, not prima facie evidence. In the terminology of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, what is required for bringing a criminal
action is only such evidence as is sufficient to "engender a well
founded belief as to the facts of the commission of a crime and
the respondent's probable guilt thereof. Disposition petitioners'
motion for reconsideration is GRANTED, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the complaint against
petitioners is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action.

INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE COMPANY V
BONDAD
PANGANIBAN; 2000

NATURE
Petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the
CA

FACTS
- The suit arose from a traffic incident which involved a
Sigma Galant car owned by one Grace Ladaw Morales, a
packed passenger jeepney driven by Ligorio Bondad but owned
by Pablo Bondad, and a BD Tansit bus driven by Eduardo
Mendoza. The incident happened at South Expressway on
December 17, 1984.
- Industrial Insurance brought suit against both the
drivers and owners of the passenger jeep and the bus
contending that they were the sole and proximate cause of the
damages done on their clients Sigma Gallant thru joint gross
and wanton negligence, careless, imprudence of the drivers
and the owners failure to exercise the diligence required from
them by law in the selection and supervision of their respective
drivers.
- In their defense, the Bondads claimed that at the time
of the accident, their jeepney was on full stop on the right
shoulder of the road because of the flat tire. And that there was
therefore no fault or negligence on their part. - The trial court
found in favor of the Bondads and orderedthe petitioner to pay
them actual, moral, and exemplary damages. The CA affirmed
the findings of the trial court citing the investigation report made
by the policeman that the damage on the car of Morales was
caused by the DM bus and not by the jeepney of the Bondads.
It was concluded by the CA that based on the evidence, the
proximate cause of the damage to the car was the negligence
of the driver of the DM bus and that the petitioner had no cause
of action against the Bondads. The CA agreed that the
defendants were entitled to their counterclaims in view of the
fact that the insurance company did not verify the facts before
impleading the defendants. Thus, the action brought against
them resulted not only in inconvenience but also in
unnecessary expenses, including expenses for atorneys fees.
The CA reduced the damages that were awarded.
- The petitioners filed this motion for review by the the
SC.

ISSUE

WON the award of moral and exemplary damages are proper

HELD
YES
- In impleading the defendants, the petitioner clearly
acted in wanton disregard of the facts that were very obvious.
This carelessness and lack of diligence destroyed their claim of
good faith. While the court uphelds the right of any person to
litigate without fear of penalty, this right should be exercised in
good faith.
Reasoning
- As the defendants were compelled to hire the
services of a lawyer to defend themselves against the
unjustified suit, it is only proper that this cost be shouldered by
the petitioner.
- The award of moral damages was affirmed as it was
shown that the defendants suffered injury which sprung from
the unjustified act of the petitioner in bring the suit. The SC
clarified however that mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feeling, social humiliation are not enough to grant
moral damages. It said that it must be shown that the acts, as in
this case, must have been tainted with bad faith or ill motives.
- The Award for exemplary damages, which are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
was likewise affirmed due to the petitioners conduct that
needlessly dragged innocent bystanders into an unfounded
litigation.
Disposition Petition denied. Order appealed from is affirmed.

TRIPLE EIGHT INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC
V NLRC
299 SCRA 608
ROMERO; December 3, 1998

NATURE

FACTS
- In August 1992, private respondent Osdana was
recruited by petitioner for employment with the latters principal,
Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. Under the original employment contract, Osdana
was engaged to work as Food Server for a period of thirtysix
(36) months with a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi rials. -
Osdana claims she was required by petitioner to pay a total of
P11,950.00 in placement fees and other charges, for which no
receipt was issued. She was likewise asked to undergo a
medical examination conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests
System, a duly accredited clinic for overseas workers, which
found her to be Fit of Employment. - Petitioner asked
Osdana to sign another Contractor-Employee Agreement
which provided that she would be employed as a waitress for
twelve (12) months with a salary of two hundred eighty US
dollars ($280). It was this employment agreement which was
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
- Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and
commenced working for GCC. She was assigned to the College
of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and, contrary
to the terms and conditions of the employment contract, was
made to wash dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform
janitorial work and other tasks which were unrelated to her job
designation as waitress. She was made to work a gruelling
twelve-hour shift, without overtime pay.
- Osdana suffered from numbness and pain in her
arms. The pain was such that she had to be confined at a
housing facility of GCC from June 18 to August 22, 1993,
during which period, she was not paid her salaries. - Osdana
was allowed to resume work, this time as Food Server and
Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, where she worked
seven days a week from August 22 to October 5, 1993. Again,
she was not compensated. - Then, from October 6 to October
23, 1993, Osdana was again confined for no apparent reason.
During this period, she was still not paid her salary.
- On October 24, 1993, she was re-assigned to the
Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other menial tasks.
Osdana worked long hours and under harsh conditions. She
was diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a
condition precipitated by activities requiring repeated flexion,
pronation, and supination of the wrist and characterized by
excruciating pain and numbness in the arms.

- Osdana underwent two surgical operations. Between
these operations, she was not given any work assignments
even if she was willing and able to do light work in accordance
with her doctors advice. Again, Osdana was not paid any
compensation for the period between February to April 22,
1994. - Osdana was discharged from the hospital on April 25,
1994. The medical report stated that she had very good
improvement of the symptoms and she was discharged on the
second day of the operation. - Four days later, however, she
was dismissed from work, allegedly on the ground of illness.
She was not given any separation pay nor was she paid her
salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work. -
Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of
petitioner, but to no avail. She was thus constrained to file a
complaint before the POEA.

ISSUES
WON NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion for the
following reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana even if there
was no factual or legal basis for the award and, (b) holding
petitioner solely liable for her claims despite the fact that its
liability is joint and several with its principal, GCC.

HELD
- The decisions of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC
were based mainly on the facts and allegations in Osdanas
position paper and supporting documents. We find these
sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to support the
questioned decisions. Generally, findings of facts of
quasijudicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded great
respect and, at times, even finality if supported by substantial
evidence. This Court, therefore, upholds the finding of herein
public respondents that the facts and the evidence on record
adduced by Osdana and taken in relation to the answer of
petitioner show that indeed there was breach of the
employment contract and illegal dismissal committed by
petitioners principal. - Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on
the matter of termination by reason of disease or illness, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An
employer may terminate the services of an employee who
has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose
continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to
his health as well as the health of his co-employees: x x x.
- Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal Where the
employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or
to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall not
terminate his employment unless there is a certification by
competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or
at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6)
months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment
can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate
the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The
employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position
immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. -
Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the manner by
which Osdana was terminated was clearly in violation of the
Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations.
Osdanas continued employment despite her illness was not
prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well
as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued
after her second operation stated that she had very good
improvement of the symptoms. Besides, Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome is not a contagious disease. - Petitioner has not
presented any medical certificate or similar document from a
competent public health authority in support of its claims. If,
indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her
employment, her employer could have easily obtained a
certification to that effect from a competent public health
authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for
illegal dismissal. The requirement for a medical certificate under
Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with;
otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary
determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the
employees illness and thus defeat the public policy on the
protection of labor.
- As regards the monetary award of salaries for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract, unpaid salaries
and salary differential granted by public respondents to
Osdana, petitioner assails the same for being contrary to law,
evidence and existing jurisprudence, all of which therefore
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
- Although this contention is without merit, the award
for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract must,
however, be reduced. Paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042, applies in this case, thus:

In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less.
- While it would appear that the employment contract
approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve months,
Osdanas actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one
year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred,
therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract
for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of
the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4
months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as
adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.
- As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential
amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months unpaid
salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper
because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the no work, no
pay rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case.
In the first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18
to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994,
was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second,
from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as
food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani
Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said
period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was
confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason
at all.
- With respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced.
Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are
recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended
by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor,
or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if
the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner.

- Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion
on the part of public respondents for holding it solely liable for
the claims of Osdana despite the fact that its liability with the
principal is joint and several. Petitioner misunderstands the
decision in question. It should be noted that contrary to
petitioners interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter which
was affirmed by the NLRC did not really absolve the foreign
principal. Petitioner was the only one held liable for Osdanas
monetary claims because it was the only respondent named in
the complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps
to have its principal included as co-respondent. Thus, the
POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did not acquire jurisdiction
over the foreign principal.

PEOPLE V
PIRAME

ARCONA V CA (PEOPLE)
YNARES-SANTIAGO; December 9, 2002

NATURE
Instant petition for review of the decision of the CA.

FACTS
- Carlos Arcona pleaded not guilty to a murder using
the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The element of
unlawful aggression by the victim was not proven. He was
convicted of murder with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. In this petition, the Court affirmed CA
decision but modified the damages.
- Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother
Benito Arcona y Moban were charged with Murder and
Frustrated Murder in separate informations. Both pleaded not
guilty.
- At around 7:30 in the evening of June 27, 1986,
Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking on their
way home after coming from a birthday party. When they were
near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud. He
turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly,
someone hit Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamboo,
causing him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises
except petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the
house of Cesar Umapas to ask for help.
- Prosecution witness Leo Zaragoza testified that he
was standing in front of Jerry Boston house, about 7 meters
away, when he saw petitioner stab Napoleon.
- Napoleon died on the way to the hospital. The doctor
certified that the cause of death was the stab wound sustained
at the stomach area just above the waistline.
- Carlos voluntarily surrendered go the police.
- In his defense, Carlos alleged that he was walking
alone when he met Napoleon and Edgardo . Without any
provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and shouted,
"Caloy, I will kill you!" Napoleon swung the bolo at him twice but
missed him. Petitioner then drew out his knife and stabbed
Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo rushing towards him, he
grabbed a piece of bamboo from the newly constructed culvert
and hit the former on the left arm. Edgardo ran away. Carlos
also left the premises and went home. On the way, he met his
brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their house. -
TC convicted the Carlos Arcona of homicide, with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, and acquitted him of
attempted homicide. He was ordered to pay indemnity of 30k
for Napoleons death, 10K for actual damages, and 10K as
moral damages.
On the other hand, Benito Arcona was acquitted of homicide
and convicted of attempted homicide. He was made to
indemnify Edgardo the sum of 10K as actual damages.
- Only Carlos appealed. CA affirmed the TC findings
but increased civil liability to 50K. Hence, this petition. He
maintains that it was self-defense.

ISSUES
1. WON all elements of self-defense were present
2. What are the proper damages to be rendered?

HELD
1. NO
- Unlawful aggression was not proven.
- When self-defense is invoked, the defendant has the
burden of proving that the killing was justified. Even if the
prosecution is weak, the case cannot be dismissed because of
the open admission of the killing. - To prove self-defense, the
accused must show with clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;
(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and
(3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the
aggression.
- Self-defense is a question of fact. He failed to prove that there
was unlawful aggression of the part of the victim. Although the
bolo of Napoleon was unsheathed, it does not conclude that
there was unlawful aggression. When Jerry Boston testified to
hearing someone say, Caloy, I will kill you, he did not
categorically say it was Napoleon; and iIt was still possible that
he said it while being assaulted by Carlos. It was not possible
that Carlos escaped his alleged ambush with out a scratch.
2. CA was correct in increasing civil indemnity to 50K in line
with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide,
parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the amount of 50K is
automatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case
of his death, without need of further evidence other than the
fact of the commission of the crime.
- On the other hand, the award of moral damages
(10K) must be increased to 50K. As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily
brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment,
pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a
violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not
only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life,
deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but
often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has
been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be
awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the
heirs emotional suffering. - The award of actual damages in the
amount of 10K was not substantiated. Only those expenses
which are duly proven, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial
of the victim, will be recognized in court. It was deleted.
Disposition petition for review is DENIED. The decision of CA
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner is
further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased moral
damages in the increased amount of 50KThe award of actual
damages is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.

PNB V CA (FLORES)
266 SCRA 136
KAPUNAN; 1997 Jan 6

FACTS
- Flores is a prominent businessman, licensed and
engaged in the real estate business, buying and selling houses
and lots. Flores filed a complaint against PNB when the
appellant bank refused to honor his Manager's Checks worth
P1 Million because of the alleged shortage in appellee's
payment to the effect that he had to go back and forth the bank
to encash said checks and that he lost a deal of a house for
sale in Baguio City worth P1 Million as he could not produce
said amount withheld by the appellant bank. Appellee Flores
further testified as to the effect of the incident on his integrity as
a businessman.
- Flores won in the suit and the LC awarded him P1M
moral damages andt P100,000.00 exemplary damages, but
was later reduced by the CA to P100,000.00 and P25,000.00
respectively.
- PNB appealed from the decision, believing that no or
lower amount of damages should be awarded to Flores. As a
defense, PNB even attacked Flores character by alluding to his
alleged reputation as a gambler and big time casino player.
PNB asserted that Flores used the proceeds of the
managers check on the gaming table and not for purchase of a
house.

ISSUE
WON the moral and exemplary damages should be reduced

HELD
NO
- The SC even increased the moral and exemplary
damages awarded by CA by 50% (P200,000.00 and
P50,000.00 respectively).
Ratio There is no hard and fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each
case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.
- Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral
damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish,
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury, are
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
- As to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil
Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good. While exemplary
damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, they need
not be proved, although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court
may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded.

FULE V CA (CRUZ, BELARMINO)
286 SCRA 698
ROMERO; March 23, 1998

NATURE

FACTS
- Fule, a corporate secretary of the Rural Bank of
Alaminos (the Bank) by profession and jeweler on the side,
acquired a 10-hectare property in Rizal. The former owner,
Jacobe, had mortgaged it to the Bank for a loan of 10k but it
was later foreclosed and offered for public auction upon his
default. - Petitioner asked Dichoso and Mendoza (the Agents)
to look for an interested buyer, and found one in private
respondent Dr. Cruz. At the time, petitioner had shown interest
in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond earrings from Dr. Cruz
but never came to an agreed price. Subsequently, negotiations
for the barter of the jewelry and the property ensued; upon the
request of Dr. Cruz, it was found by Atty. Belarmino that no
barter was feasible because the 1-year period of redemption
had not expired. To get over this legal impediment, petitioner
executed a deed of redemption on behalf of Jacobe.
- Petitioner arrived at Belarminos residence with the
agents to execute a deed of absolute sale while Cruz held on to
the earrings. Petitioner issued a certification stating the actual
consideration of the sale was Php200k and not Php80k as
indicated in the deed. Since the earrings were appraised at only
Php160k, the remaining 40k was to be paid later in cash. This
was done apparently to minimize the capital gains tax that
petitioner would have to shoulder. Petitioner headed for the
bank to meet up with Cruz and pick up the earrings. When
asked if the jewelry was ok, petitioner nodded to express his
satisfaction. Petitioner paid the agents $300 and some pieces
of jewelry, but not half of the pair of earrings in question as
previously promised.
- Later that evening, petitioner arrived at Belarminos
residence complaining the earrings were fake as confirmed by
a tester. Petitioner accused the agents of deceiving him, which
they denied. He nonetheless took back the $300 and jewelry
given them. After another failed testing, the petitioner reported
the matter to the police where the agents also executed their
sworn statements.
- Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC to declare
the contract of sale over the property null and void on the
ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court denied the prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction over the deed as they found
that the genuine pair of earrings had been delivered by Cruz.
The 2 hours before petitioners complaint was considered
unreasonable delay, placing petitioner in estoppel. The Court
furthered that all elements of a valid contract were present,
namely a meeting of the minds, determinate subject matter, and
price certain. As the earrings had been delivered and the
contract of absolute sale executed, the contract of barter or sale
had been consummated.
- The Court also finds that the plaintiff acted in bad,
awarding Cruz P300k as moral damages and P100k as
exemplary damages; Atty. Belarmino P250k as moral damages
and P150k as exemplary damages; and granting both P25k
each as attorneys fees and litigation expenses. A petition with
the CA yielded the same result, hence this petition.

ISSUE
WON the TC erred in awarding damages

HELD
NO
- In the instant case, the TC awarded damages
analogous to malicious prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the
NCC for the following reasons: - The malice with which
petitioner filed the case is apparent. As an experienced jeweler
who thoroughly examined the earrings himself and went so far
as to sketch them earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to exert
extra effort to check its genuineness at the precise moment of
the exchange. His acts thus failed to accord with what an
ordinary prudent man would have done in the same situation.
- As an experienced businessman and banker, he was
shrewd enough to bloat the propertys price from 25k to 75k
only a few days after he had purchased it for a far lower cost,
the value of which still fell short of the diamond earrings price.
- Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before
complaining the earrings were counterfeita period in which
anything could have happened while petitioner was in
possession of the jewelry.
- Given this, it would appear that the cause of action in
the instant case was contrived by the petitioner himself in
hopes of obtaining a favorable outcome in his complaint to take
the real jewelry, return a fake, and get back the property. This is
plain and simple, unjust enrichment. All that considered, the
damages prayed for were reasonably proportionate to the
sufferings they underwent.
- Petitioner filed a malicious and unfounded case all
the while dragging down private respondents, whose
reputations had been soiled by petitioners coming to court with
unclean hands. Because of the falsity, malice and baseless
nature of the complaint, defendants were compelled to litigate
and are thus also entitled to the awarding of attorneys fees
under Article 2208. Disposition decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED. Dr. Cruz, however, is ordered
to pay petitioner the balance of the purchase price of Php40k

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC V CA (PANTEJO)
275 SCRA 621
REGALADO; July 17, 1997

NATURE
Appeal by certiorari

FACTS
- On October 23, 1988, private respondent Pantejo,
then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL plane in Manila
and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take
his connecting flight to Surigao City. However, due to typhoon
Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled.
- To accommodate the needs of its stranded
passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P100.00
and, the next day, P200.00, for their expected stay of two days

in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that he be billeted in a hotel
at PAL's expense because he did not have cash with him at
that time, but PAL refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was
forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger, an
Engr. Andoni Dumlao, and he shared a room with the latter at
Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his share of the
expenses upon reaching Surigao.
- When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo
came to know that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers
were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo informed Oscar
Jereza, PAL's Manager for Departure Services at Mactan
Airport and who was in charge of cancelled flights, that he was
going to sue the airline for discriminating against him. It was
only then that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300
which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the
latter decline. Thereafter, PAntejo filed an action for damages
against PAL.
- The RTC of Surigao City, rendered judgment against
PAL, ordering the latter to pay Pantejo P300 for actual
damages, P150,000 as moral damages, P100,000 as
exemplary damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, and 6%
interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until said
amounts shall have been fully paid, plus costs of suit.
- On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court
a quo, but with the exclusion of the award of attorney's fees and
litigation expenses.

ISSUE
WON the lower courts erred in awarding damages in favor of
plaintiff

HELD
NO
- It must be emphasized that a contract to transport
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation, and this is because of the relation which an
air carrier sustain with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and
advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give
ground for an action for damages.

- In ruling for Pantejo, both the RTC and the CA found
that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to provide hotel
accommodations for Pantejo or to reimburse him for hotel
expenses incurred despite and in contrast to the fact that other
passengers were so favored. Factors considered in computing
damages
> PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common
carrier to its passengers and in discriminating against Pantejo. It
was even oblivious to the fact that PAntejo was exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment especially because of his
government position and social prominence, which altogether
necessarily subjected him to ridicule, shame and anguish. It
remains uncontroverted that at the time of the incident, herein
respondent was then the City Prosecutor of Surigao City, and
that he is a member of the Philippine Jaycee Senate, past Lt.
Governor of the Kiwanis Club of Surigao, a past Master of the
Mount Diwata Lodge of Free Masons of the Philippines,
member of the Philippine National Red Cross, Surigao Chapter,
and past Chairman of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines,
Surigao del Norte Chapter.
- It is likewise claimed that the moral and exemplary
damages awarded to respondent Pantejo are excessive and
unwarranted on the ground that respondent is not totally
blameless because of his refusal to accept the P100 cash
assistance which was inceptively offered to him. It bears
emphasis that respondent Pantejo had every right to make
such refusal since it evidently could not meet his needs and
that was all that PAL claimed it could offer. - His refusal to
accept the P300 proffered as an afterthought when he
threatened suit was justified by his resentment when he
belatedly found out that his co-passengers were reimbursed for
hotel expenses and he was not. Worse, he would not even
have known about it were it not for a co-passenger who verbally
told him that she was reimbursed by the airline for hotel and
meal expenses. It may even be said that the amounts, the time
and the circumstances under which those amounts were
offered could not salve the moral wounds inflicted by PAL on
private respondent but even approximated insult added to
injury.
- The discriminatory act of petitioner against
respondent ineludibly makes the former liable for moral
damages under Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 (10) of the
Civil Code.

Such inattention to and lack of care by petitioner
airline for the interest of its passengers who are entitled to its
utmost consideration, particularly as to their convenience,
amount to bad faith which entitles the passenger to the award
of moral damages.
- Moral damages are emphatically not intended to
enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are
awarded only to allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone due to the defendant's culpable action and
must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
However, substantial damages do not translate into excessive
damages. Except for attorney's fees and costs of suit, it will be
noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the
factual findings of the lower court upon which the award of
damages had been based.

We, therefore, see no reason to
modify the award of damages made by the trial court.
- Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, we are
convinced that the awards for actual, moral and exemplary
damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the
reasons meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its
decision, are just and equitable. It is high time that the travelling
public is afforded protection and that the duties of common
carriers, long detailed in our previous laws and jurisprudence
and thereafter collated and specifically catalogued in our Civil
Code in 1950, be enforced through appropriate sanctions.

VALENZUELA V
CA

SUMALPONG V CA (PEOPLE)
268 SCRA 764
FRANCISCO, February 26, 1997

NATURE
Petition for review

FACTS
- Sumalpong shot the victim Ramos after the former
slapped the latters wife. Before this, Sumalpong called upon
the spouses then inquired regarding the identity of those who
stoned his house, then accused Ramos of stoning his house.
Ramos wife, Leonarda, remarked that he should first confirm
the information he received before accusing anyone, then after
this Sumalpong shot Leonarda at the back of her head (though
apparently, Leonarda was not harmed) then Ramos rushed
towards Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed.
They wrestled and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos ear,
causing its mutilation.
- TC: Sumalpong convicted of attempted homicide.
Ramos awarded with P 16,800.00 for the loss of his crops due
to his failure to attend to his farmwork because of the injuries
inflicted upon him by the petitioner, P2,000.00 for
hospitalization expenses, and P5,000.00 by way of moral
damages. - CA: affirm conviction, removed award for loss of
crops and hospitalization expenses, increased moral damages
to P10,000.00, and awarding nominal damages in the same
amount.

ISSUE
WON the increase in moral damages is warranted

HELD
YES
- Anent the increase in the amount of moral damages
awarded, suffice it to state that the nature of the injuries and the
degree of physical suffering endured by the complainant
warrants the same. The tragic incident caused a mutilation of
complainant's left ear and a permanent scar on his right
forearm. These injuries have left indelible marks on the
complainant's body and will serve as a constant reminder of this
traumatic experience. (more discussion on the modification of
amount of nominal damages and moral damages when it was
not the issue appealed, rationalization for deletion of actual and
compensatory damages)
Disposition the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

LOPEZ V PAN AM WORLD AIRWAYS
16 SCRA 431
BENGZON; March 30, 1966


FACTS
- Sen Fernando Lopez, his wife, his son-in-law, and his
daughter made reservations, through their agency, for first
class accommodations in the Tokyo San Francisco flight of
PAN-AM. PAN-AM's SF head office confirmed the reservations.
First class tickets were subsequently issued, with the total fare
having been fully paid before this.
- As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they
arrived in Tokyo, they contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office
regarding their accommodations. For the given reason that the
first class seats were all booked up, PAN-AM's Tokyo office
informed them that they could not go in that flight unless they
took the tourist class. Due to pressing engagements in the US,
they were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight as tourist
passengers.
- Sen Lopez filed suit for damages alleging breach of
contracts in bad faith by defendant out of racial prejudice
against Orientals. He asked for P500T actual and moral
damages, P100T exemplary damages, P25T attorney's fees
plus costs.
- PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class
accommodations to plaintiffs was due to honest error of its
employees. It interposed a counterclaim for atty's fees of P25T.
- CFI Rizal decision: in favor of plaintiff and granted (a)
P100T, moral damages; (b) P20T, exemplary damages; (c)
P25T, atty's fees, and costs of the action.
- Plaintiffs filed MFR asking that moral damages be
increased to P400T and for 6% interest per annum on amount
to be granted. - CFI modified decision: (a) P150T, moral
damages; (b) P25T, exemplary damages; with legal interest on
both from date of filing of complaint until paid; (c) P25T, atty's
fees; and costs of the action.
- Both appealed: PAN-AM contended that there was
NO bad faith; Lopez et al wanted a total of P650T as award for
damages.

ISSUES
1. WON there was bad faith on the part of PAN-AM
2. WON the amount of damages should be increased

HELD
1. YES
Reasoning
- Defendant through its agents first cancelled
plaintiffs, reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately
and intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent
such information. In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first
class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed
reservations, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and
knowingly placed itself into the position of having to breach its
contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute
cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned
out in this case. Bad faith means a breach of a known duty
through some motive of interest or ill-will.
- At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by
the defendant, there would at least be negligence so gross and
reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith.
2. YES
Ratio Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art.
2220). Exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good, in breach of
contract where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). A
written contract for an attorney's services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, ROC).
- Factors in determining Amount for Moral Damages: The
amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been
determined by adequately considering the official, political,
social, and financial standing of the offended parties on one
hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on
the other. The present rate of exchange and the terms at which
the amount of damages awarded would approximately be in
U.S. dollars has also been considered.
(a) MORAL DAMAGES
- As a proximate result of defendant's breach in bad
faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social
humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental
anguish. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist
passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such,
contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual
undertaking. - Sen Lopez was then Senate President Pro
Tempore. International carriers like defendant know the
prestige of such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper
Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nation's
treatyratifying body. He was also former Vice-President of the
Philippines. (MD = P100T)
- Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his
prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition she suffered
physical discomfort during the 13hour trip; her reason for going
to the US was actually for medical check-up and relaxation. The
fact that the seating spaces in the tourist class are quite
narrower than in first class will suffice to show that she indeed
experienced physical suffering during the trip. (MD = P50T)
- Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling
as immediate members of the family of Sen Lopez. Even if they
initially wanted to change their seat reservations from first class
to tourist class, they eventually paid for first class seats. Hence,
they also suffered social humiliation. (MD = P25T each)
(b) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
- In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount
as to effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future
by defendant or other airlines. (ED = P75T)
(c) ATTORNEYS FEES
- Record shows a written contract of services wherein plaintiffs
engaged the services of their counsel Atty. Francisco and
agreed to pay the sum of P25T upon the termination of the
case in the CFI, and another P25T if case is appealed to the
SC. This is reasonable considering the subject matter of the
present controversy, the professional standing of the attorney
for plaintiffsappellants, and the extent of the service rendered
by him. Disposition Judgment appealed from is hereby
MODIFIED so as to award in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant, the following:
(1) P200T as moral damages, divided among plaintiffs;
(2) P75T as exemplary or corrective damages;
(3) Interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on the moral
and exemplary damages, from date of amended CFI
decision, until said damages are fully paid;
(4) P50T as attorney's fees; and
(5) Costs of action. Counterclaim dismissed.

PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILS V CA
(SPS CHUA)
MELO; September 17, 2001

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision and resolution of
the CA

FACTS
- Sometime in April, 1982, respondent Salvador Chua
was offered by Mr. Jimmy Rojas, manager of Producers Bank
of the Philippines, to transfer his account from Pacific Banking
Corporation to herein petitioner bank.
- Respondent spouses opened and maintained
substantial savings and current deposits with, and likewise
obtained various loans from petitioner bank, one of which was a
loan for P2,000,000.00 which was secured by a real estate
mortgage and payable within a period of three (3) years or from
1982 to 1985.
- On January 20, 1984, private respondents deposited
with petitioner bank the total sum of P960,000.00, which was
duly entered in private respondents' savings account passbook.
- Petitioner bank failed to credit this deposit due to the
fact that its Branch Manager absconded with the money of the
bank's depositors. - Consequently, petitioner bank dishonored
the checks drawn out by private respondents in favor of their
various creditors on the ground of insufficient funds, despite the
fact that at that time, the balance of private respondents'
deposit was in the amount of P1,051,051.19.
- Private respondents requested for copies of their
ledgers covering their savings and current accounts, but
petitioner bank refused. - Private respondents instituted on
January 30, 1984 an action for damages against petitioner bank
- On the other hand, petitioner bank filed with the City
Sheriff of Bacolod a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate
- Private respondents filed a complaint for injunction
and damages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously in
order to harass private respondents. - On April 26, 1988, the
trial court rendered its decision on the latter case, in favor of the
spouses Chua, awarding the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral
damages, and the sum of P250,000.00 as exemplary damages,
among others.

- On October 31, 1991, upon appeal by petitioner
bank, the Court of Appeals modified the decisionone of the
changes was the award of the sum of P500,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages.
- Petitioner moved for a consideration but the same
was denied, hence, this
petition

ISSUE
WON the petitioner bank is liable for moral damages

HELD
YES
- Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded
without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding such damages, the
court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining in the
case and assess damages according to its discretion.
- As borne out by the record of this case, private
respondents are engaged in several businesses, such as rice
and corn trading, cement dealership, and gasoline
proprietorship. The dishonor of private respondents' checks and
the foreclosure initiated by petitioner adversely affected the
credit standing as well as the business dealings of private
respondents as their suppliers discontinued credit lines
resulting in the collapse of their businesses. - In the case of
Leopoldo Araneta vs. Bank of America, it was held that: "The
financial credit of a businessman is a prized and valuable asset,
it being a significant part of the foundation of his business. Any
adverse reflection thereon constitutes some financial loss to
him."
- The damage to private respondents' reputation and
social standing entitles them to moral damages. Article 2217, in
relation to Article 2220, of the Civil Code explicitly provides that
"moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury."
- Obviously, petitioner bank's wrongful act caused
serious anxiety, embarrassment, and humiliation to private
respondents for which they are entitled to recover moral
damages in the amount of P300,000.00 which we deem to be
reasonable.
Disposition The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed
with
modification only as to the award of damages

STREBEL V FIGUERAS
96 PHIL 321
CONCEPCION; December 29, 1954

FACTS
- Strebels side: As a lessee of a lot situated in Santa
Mesa, Manila, plaintiff Strebel subleased part thereof to the
Standard Vacuum Oil Company; that the latter constructed
thereon a Mobilgas Station which was operated by Eustaquio &
Co., a partnership organized by said plaintiff and one Primo
Eustaquio, that, "out of spite and with a view to the eventual
acquisition of the said property for himself and his men,"
defendant Jose Figueras "tried all he could to built a drainage
through" the aforementioned property; that, in order to
accomplish this purpose, and, using his official and political
influence, defendant Figueras, then Under-Secretary of Labor,
caused. his codefendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City
Fiscal of Manila, to prepare an opinion which was signed by the
City Fiscal, holding that the City of Manila has a right to
construct said drainage, and, to this effect, make the necessary
excavations at the boundary line of said lot leased to Strebel
and the lot belonging to Figueras
- Plaintiff Strebel also claims that defendant Figueras
"by making use of his official and political connections," was
able to induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer temporarily,
from the Bureau of Immigration to the Bureau of Prisons, one
Dr. Manuel Hernandez, the husband of plaintiff's step daughter;
- Plaintiff asked Secretary Nepomuceno to mediate between
them and Under-Secretary of Labor to forget about past family
problems.
- Plaintiff later on claims that Figueras still didnt forget
about the past and "making use of his official and political
influence," and with the cooperation of his former secretary,
defendant Cornelio S. Ruperto, an Assistant City Fiscal of
Manila, as well as "in connivance with the Director of Labor"
which office was then held by defendant Felipe E. Jose, "and
other employees in the Department and Bureau of Labor,"
defendant Figueras succeeded in securing the institution,
against plaintiff Strebel, and his partner, Primo Eustaquio, of
Criminal Case No. 11005 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, for allegedly compelling several employees to work
more than eight (8) hours a day, in violation of Commonwealth
Act No. 444, in relation to Commonwealth Act No. 303,
although before the filing of the information "the defendants
collectively and singly knew that the allegations therein are
false;" that said criminal case was subsequently dismissed by
the Court of First Instance of Manila for failure of the
prosecution "to establish even a prima facie case against the
accused";
- Through the foregoing series of acts, the defendants
have "caused moral and mental suffering to the . . . plaintiff, his
wife, and his entire family, and damage to his business in the
amount of P15,000.00 besides actual damages in the amount
of P1,500.00 paid to his attorney in defending himself from the
malicious charge,"

ISSUE
WON Plaintiff may recover damages for moral and mental
suffering

HELD
NO
- The plan to built said drainage was seemingly
abandoned before plaintiff's property rights could be violated.
There was nothing wrong, either legally or morally, in the desire
of Figueras to seek an outlet for the water coming from his
property. On the contrary, it is required by the elementary
principles of health and sanitation. Besides, there is no
allegation that any lot other than that of plaintiff Strebel was
better suited for the purpose. Neither could he have any
arising from the assignment of his wife's sonin-law from the
Bureau of Prisons - to which he had been previously assigned
temporarily to the Bureau of Immigration, for
1.The authority of the Secretary of Justice to make the
assignment in question and the validity thereof, under said legal
provision, are submitted. Hence, it is not claimed that said
officer may be held civilly liable for the aforementioned
assignment. This being the case, how can such responsibility
be exacted from Figueras who, it is urged, merely instigated
said assignment?
2.Even if we assumed the act complained of to be wrong or to
have caused injury, the right of action hypotethically resulting
therefrom, if any on which we need not, and do not, express
any opinion would have accrued in favor of Dr. Hernandez
who is not a party in the present action not plaintiff
herein.
- "As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental
suffering resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the person
who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery
for distress caused by sympathy for another's suffering, or for
fright due to a wrong against a third person. So the anguish of
mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personal
peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration.
- '. . . damages are not recoverable for fright or shock
even when sustained as result of wilful act, unless such act was
directed toward person or property or person seeking recovery;
hence plaintiff is not entitled to recover against administratrix of
sister's murderer for fright or shock caused by viewing mutilated
body of murdered sister. The rule on this point, as stated in the
American Jurisprudence, is: "Injury or Wrong to Another.
In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such
mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or wrong
to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of
mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy
or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises from a
contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of
another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife
cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her
sympathy for the other's suffering." It should be noted that
plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The latter's wife is
a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage. Hence Dr.
Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, but to a
relative by affinity of said plaintiff.
- Another allegation made by plaintiffs in arguing their
cause of action to recover damages, they said that "with a view
to further injuring" him "and besmirching his good name in the
community and waging a cleavage in the harmonious relation
between Eustaquio & Co. and its laborers," defendants Felipe

E. Jose and Cornelio S. Ruperto issued a press statement to
the effect that plaintiff Strebel and his partner, Eustaquio had
flagrantly violated the provisions of the Eight-Hour Law and that
said Criminal Case had been dismissed by the court on a flimsy
ground; and that this statement had "caused moral and mental
suffering to the herein plaintiff and damage to his business in
the amount of P5,000.00," The Supreme Court said that this
news item mentions, neither the number of the case referred to,
nor the names of the persons accused therein. Moreover, it
merely contains a criticism of the action taken by the court. The
reference, therein imputed to the Director of Labor, to the
flagrant violation of the eight-hour labor law by the accused,
was a mere reiteration of the theory of the Bureau of Labor,
which the prosecution had adopted by filing the information in
said case. Being a matter of court record, which had been
taken up at the hearing held publicly, and settled in a decision
already promulgated, said theory was open for public
consumption, and, hence, an allusion thereto or statement
thereof, in order to justify said criticism, is not actionable.
- As regards the malicious prosecution point raised by
Strebel, by specific mandate of Article 2219 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, however, moral damages may not be
recovered in cases of crime or tort, unless either results or
causes "physical injuries," which are lacking in the case at
bar. Although the same article permits recovery of said
damages in cases of malicious prosecution, this feature of said
provision may not be availed of by the plaintiff herein, inasmuch
as the acts set forth in the complaint took place in 1949, or
before said Code became effective (laws shouldnt have
retroactive effect).

ABS-CBN V CA (REPUBLIC BROADCASTING
CORP, VIVA
FILMS)
DAVIDE; January 21, 1999

FACTS
- ABS-CBN, by virtue of contract with VIVA, had an
exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. ABS-CBN had a right
of first refusal. VIVA gave ABS-CBN 3 packages (36 titles) to
choose from. VP for ABS Charo Santos-Concio wrote VIVA that
they are not accepting the list because there were only 10 titles
there that they could potentially purchase. ABS asked for
another list, saying they had quite an attractive offer to make.
- VIVA gave ABS a new list: 52 original movie titles
(never before aired on TV) and 104 reruns. VIVAs proposal
was P60M (P30M cash, P30M TV spots) for 52 originals and 52
reruns.
- Del Rosario (VIVAs rep) and Eugenio Lopez III had a
mtg re this in Tamarind Grill Restaurant. Accdg to ABSCBN, the
mtg culminated in Del Rosario accepting ABSCBNs offer of
P35M for 52 of the films VIVA was selling for P60M plus
Maging Sino Ka Man.
- VIVA said this wasnt their agreement and that they
refuse to sell anything less the 104-movie package for P60M. In
the meantime, RBS bought the 104-film package (which
included Maging Sino Ka Man) for P60M. There were ads in
the newspapers for the airing of the movie on Channel 7. -
ABSCBN filed a case in RTC to enjoin RBS from airing 14 VIVA
films, including Maging Sino Ka Man. RTC granted a
preliminary injunction; but lifted the same after RBS put up a
counterbond.
- ABSCBN filed a petition in the CA to challenge the
RTC decision. CA granted TRO, but eventually dismissed
ABSCBNs petition and made them pay for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attys fees to RBS, and attys fees to
VIVA.

ISSUE
WON RBS may recover damages from ABSCBN

HELD
NO
ACTUAL DAMAGES
- Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The
indemnification shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to
obtain. In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which
may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted
with good faith or otherwise. In case of good faith, the damages
recoverable are those which are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the
time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted with
fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed
to the non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-
delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of, whether or not such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.
- Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss
or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's business
standing or commercial credit. - RBS claims actual damages
based on Arts 19-21 for the injunction for having to put up a
counterbond. The SC said that since ABS had not posted a
bond and was in fact still challenging it, RBS didnt have to put
up the counterbond.
- RBS also claims actual damages for the
advertisements for the airing of Maging Sino Ka Man. The
SC said that ABS is not liable for lack of sufficient basis. The
prelim injunction was lifted by RTC upon RBS paying the
counterbond, and not on any legal and factual basis.
ATTYS FEES
- As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the
absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered as
actual or compensatory damages under any of the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
- The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not
to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when a claimant
is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses
to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded
where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a
party's persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction
of the righteousness of his cause.
MORAL DAMAGES
- Moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered
and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is
not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral
suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within
the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and
should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
- The award of moral damages cannot be granted in
favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and
having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings,
no emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience
physical suffering and mental anguish which can be
experienced only by one having a nervous system. The award
for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
- These are imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated,
or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal
cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts, if
the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts
and quasicontracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
- The claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on
contract, quasicontract, delict, or quasi-delict. The claims for
moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles
19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. - Arts 19-21 have at their
very core the common element of malice or bad faith. Such
intentional design to do a wrongful act must be proved by
evidence. Here, ABSCBN was honestly convinced of the merits
of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations
culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled
is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se
make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right,
it is damnum absque injuria.
Disposition Petition Granted. CA decision reversed, except to
unappealed award of Attys damages of Viva Films.

NPC v PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC
369 SCRA 629

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; November 20, 2001

NATURE
Appeal by certioriari to review and set aside the decision of the
Court of
Appeals

FACTS
- The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued
invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000 metric
tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal
Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers
Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to
participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was
conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. NAPOCOR's
acceptance was conveyed in a letter. PHIBRO sent word to
NAPOCOR that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia,
the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously hamper
PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. PHIBRO again
apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly
informing the latter that the ship owners therein are not willing
to load cargo unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in the
charter party or the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the
transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they
equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR
refused.
- Subsequently, PHIBRO received from NAPOCOR a
confirmed and workable letter of credit. Instead of delivering the
coal on or before the thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of
Credit, as agreed upon by the parties in the July contract,
PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on November 17, 1987.
- Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once
more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal
plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding.
On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved
PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting
the minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO
found that the real reason for the disapproval was its purported
failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the
delay in the delivery of the first coal shipment. - This prompted
PHIBRO to file an action for damages with application for
injunction against NAPOCOR with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 57, Makati City. In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that
NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding
and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with malice and bad
faith. PHIBRO prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
- In its answer, NAPOCOR averred that the strikes in
Australia could not be invoked as reason for the delay in the
delivery of coal because PHIBRO itself admitted that as of July
28, 1987 those strikes had already ceased. And, even
assuming that the strikes were still ongoing, PHIBRO should
have shouldered the burden of a "strike-free" clause because
their contract was "C and F Calaca, Batangas, Philippines,"
meaning, the cost and freight from the point of origin until the
point of destination would be for the account of PHIBRO.
Furthermore, NAPOCOR claimed that due to PHIBRO's failure
to deliver the coal on time, it was compelled to purchase coal
from ASEA at a higher price. NAPOCOR claimed for actual
damages in the amount of P12,436,185.73, representing the
increase in the price of coal, and a claim of P500,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
- Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The trial court
decided in favor of PHIBRO. Unsatisfied, NAPOCOR elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision affirming in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE
WON PHIBRO is entitled to damages

HELD
NO
- NAPOCOR was not bound under any contract to
approve PHIBRO's prequalification requirements. In fact,
NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to reject bids. And
where the government as advertiser, availing itself of that right,
makes its choice in rejecting any or all bids, the losing bidder
has no cause to complain nor right to dispute that choice unless
an unfairness or injustice is shown.
- Owing to the discretionary character of the right
involved in this case, the propriety of NAPOCOR's act should
therefore be judged on the basis of the general principles
regulating human relations, the forefront provision of which is
Article 19 of the Civil Code which provides that "every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." Accordingly, a person will be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is,
when he acts with prudence and in good faith; but not when he
acts with negligence or abuse. 3
- NAPOCOR's act of disapproving PHIBRO's
application for pre-qualification to bid was without any intent to
injure or a purposive motive to perpetrate damage. Apparently,
NAPOCOR acted on the strong conviction that PHIBRO had a
"seriously-impaired" track record. NAPOCOR cannot be faulted
from believing so. We cannot fault NAPOCOR if it mistook
PHIBRO's unexpected offer a mere attempt on the latter's part
to undercut ASEA or an indication of
PHIBRO's inconsistency. The circumstances warrant such
contemplation. - One who acted pursuant to the sincere belief
that another willfully committed an act prejudicial to the interest
of the government cannot be considered to have acted in bad
faith. Bad faith has always been a question of intention. It is that
corrupt motive that operates in the mind. As understood in law,
it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill-will or for
ulterior purpose. While confined in the realm of thought, its
presence may be ascertained through the party's actuation or
through circumstantial evidence. The circumstances under
which NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's prequalification to bid
do not show an intention to cause damage to the latter. The
measure it adopted was one of self-protection. Consequently,
we cannot penalize NAPOCOR for the course of action it took.
NAPOCOR cannot be made liable for actual, moral and
exemplary damages. - Basic is the rule that to recover actual
damages, the amount of loss must not only be capable of proof
but must actually be proven with reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence
obtainable of the actual amount thereof. A court cannot merely
rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact
and amount of damages. Thus, while indemnification for
damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss
suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee failed to
obtain, it is imperative that the basis of the alleged unearned
profits is not too speculative and conjectural as to show the
actual damages which may be suffered on a future period.
- The award of moral damages is likewise improper. To
reiterate, NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover, moral
damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corporation.
While it is true that besmirched reputation is included in moral
damages, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation,
unlike in the case of a natural person, for a corporation has no
reputation in the sense that an individual has, and besides, it is
inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish.
- Neither can we award exemplary damages under
Article 2234 of the Civil Code. Before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damages.
- This Court has also laid down the rule that in the
absence of stipulation, a winning party may be awarded
attorney's fees only in case plaintiff's action or defendant's
stand is so untenable as to amount to gross and evident bad
faith. This cannot be said of the case at bar. NAPOCOR is
justified in resisting PHIBRO's claim for damages.

VENTANILLA V CENTENO
PADILLA; January 28, 1961

NATURE
APPEAL

FACTS
- Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages
against his lawyer, Atty. Centeno for neglecting to perfect within
the reglementary period his (V) appeal from an adverse
judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila. - TCs facts showed
that the required appeal bond was not filed by Atty. Centeno.
The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is the
best evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any
appeal bond. The record on appeal was disapproved because it
was filed out of time and no appeal bond had been filed by the
plaintiff.
- TC: rendered judgment in favor of V; ordered
Centeno to pay V the sum of P200 as nominal damages and
the costs.
- V appealed to the CA which certified the case to this
Court on the ground that only questions of law are raised. The
defendant did not appeal.

ISSUE
WON TC erred in not ordering the Centeno to pay him actual or
compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and exemplary
or corrective damages; in ordering that only the sum of P200
be paid to him, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and in
not ordering that the sum of P500 as attorney's fee be paid as
well.

HELD
NO
Reasoning
AS REGARDS ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES:
- V is not entitled to such damages as his basis is
highly speculative.
- A2199 NCC provides:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation
is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
- Malonzo vs. Galang: He who claims actual or
compensatory damages must establish and prove by
competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.
- Ventanillas allegation that by Centenos negligence
in not paying the appeal bond of P60, V lost his chance to
recover from the defendants therein the sum of P4,000 and
moral and actual damages, which V could have recovered if the
appeal had duly been perfected, indicates that his claim for
actual or compensatory damages is highly speculative.
AS REGARDS MORAL DAMAGES:
- Since the VENTANILLAS cause of action for
recovery of moral damages is not predicated upon any of those
specifically enumerated (under A2219, Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10,
Art. 2219) TC did not err in declining to award moral damages
to him
-V claims that he suffered mental anguish upon learning that his
appeal had not been perfected within the reglementary period
due to the Centeno's negligence; serious anxiety upon learning
that his adversary had won by a mere technicality; besmirched
reputation for losing the opportunity to substantiate his claim
made while testifying in open court that he was entitled to
collect the sum of P4,000 and damages from the defendants in
civil No. 18833; and wounded feelings for the Centenos failure
to remain faithful to his client and worthy of his trust and
confidence. (SEE A2217, 2219 AND 2220 NCC) -Malonzo vs.
Galang:
. . .Art. 2219 specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries," as an instance when moral damages may
be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not
resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs.
Figueras, G.R. L-4722, Dec. 29, 1954), excepting, of course,
the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and
in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter
on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
CONCERNING TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES:
- Considering that he is not entitled to actual or
compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal
damages by the TC, such award precludes the recovery of
temperate or moderate damages, and so TC did not err in
refusing to award temperate or moderate damages to the
Ventanilla
AS REGARDS EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES:
- It cannot be recovered as a matter of right and the
court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated, if
the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. TC didnt err in not giving
any.
NOMINAL DAMAGES
- Considering the circumstances and the degree of
negligence committed by ATTY CENTENO in not depositing on
time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the
extension period granted by the court, which brought about the
refusal by the TCto allow the record on appeal, the amount of
P200 awarded by the TC to VENTANILLA as nominal
damages may seem exiguous.
- Nevertheless, considering that nominal damages are
not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or
recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if the
appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was
not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in
recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, the
amount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominal
damages is excessive.
- A2221 of NCC provides:
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.
- A2216; Del Castillo vs. Guerrero[1960]: The
assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the
court, according to the circumstances of the case.
AS REGARDS ATTORNEY'S FEES:
- since the V's claim does not fall under any of those
enumerated in A2208 NCC, the V may not be compelled to
satisfy it.
Disposition TCs judgment affirmed

ROBES-FRANCISCO REALTY V CFI AND
MILLAN
MUOZ-PALMA; October 30, 1978

FACTS
- Robes-Francisco Realty sold to Millan a parcel of
land. Millan complied and paid. She made repeated demands
to execute final deed of sale and for issuance to her of TCT
over the lot. Parties executed deed of absolute sale. But corp
failed to cause issuance of TCT because title was included
among properties of corp mortgaged to GSIS to secure an
obligation. Hence, a complaint for specific performance and
damages.

ISSUE
WON Robes-Francisco is liable for damages

HELD
YES
- Robes-Francisco is guilty of delay, amounting to non-
performance. It is liable for damages under Art 1170 of CC.
- But Robes-Francisco contends that Millan is bound
by terms of provision and cant recover more than what is
agreed upon. This argument is devoid of merit. We would
agree if the clause were to be a penal clause. But this clause
doesnt convey any penalty.
- Unfortunately, vendee submitted her case below
without presenting evidence on actual damages suffered by
her.
- But it is obvious that right of vendee was violated by
petitioner and this entitles her at least to NOMINAL DAMAGES.
- NOMINAL DAMAGES are not for indemnification of
loss suffered but for vindication or recognition of a right.
- NOMINAL DAMAGES are damages in name only
and not in fact, and are allowed simply in recognition of a
technical injury.
- P20,000.00 is excessive. The admitted fact that
petitioner corporation failed to convey a transfer certificate of
title to respondent Milian because the subdivision property was
mortgaged to the GSIS does not in itself show that there was
bad faith or fraud. Bad faith is not to be presumed. Moreover,
there was the expectation of the vendor that arrangements
were possible for the GSIS to make partial releases of the
subdivision lots.

PEOPLE V GOPIO
346 SCRA 408
MENDOZA; November 29, 2000

NATURE
Appeal from Decision of RTC

FACTS
- Princess Millano, 10 years old, went to Agustin
Gopios store to buy cooking oil. However, it was closed. As
Millano was about to leave, Gopio called her. When she came
near him, he seized her, brought her inside his empty house,
brought her to his bedroom and raped her. As she would not
stop crying, he eventually let her go.
- The victim rushed home. Although she felt intense
pain and was actually bleeding, she did not inform her mother
of what happened to her. - Victim related that she was
molested by Gopio in 2 other occasions in the same year. The
first happened when she went to her godsisters house and
found the accused playing cards. She was about to leave when
she saw her godsisters brother crying inside the room. She

went inside and the accused followed him, locked the door and
caressed her private parts. The second instance was when the
accused followed her on her way to her grandfathers house to
get the pail requested by her aunt.
- The victim did not confide to her family about these
incidents because she was very afraid of accused-appellant
and of what her parents would do to her. Likewise, the victim
was ashamed and worried that her friends would spread the
news regarding her unfortunate experience. - Victims mother
testified about victims age. She also said that after the incident,
her daughter became inattentive and withdrawn. Her daughters
grades even dropped. Subsequently, she brought the victim to
the Municipal Health Center because the latter has been
experiencing navel pains. This is when she discovered that her
child got raped. She presented receipts covering medical,
transportation, food, and other expenses which she allegedly
incurred on account of the incident.
- Gopio denied allegations and said that he was in
Novaliches in May and June 1995 to sell fish. He claims that
there was animosity between their families which started when
she failed to bring along victims mother to the market to sell
fish.
- RTC found Gopio guilty of statutory rape and ordered
him to pay P3,727 as actual damages and P30,000 as moral
damages.

ISSUES
1. WON accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
2. WON award of damages was correct

HELD
1. YES
- On alibi: Victim positively identified accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime and categorically testified that
she had been raped by accusedappellant. When a rape victims
testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid
cross-examination and unflawed by inconsistencies or
contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full
faith and credit.
- On victims failure to immediately report incident: The
victims delay in reporting the offense is not an indication of a
fabricated charge. Victim feared that accused-appellant would
hurt her and her family and that her friends would spread the
news about her plight. Had it not been for that medical
examination, the victim would not have told them about the
rape committed by accused-appellant. This explains the delay
in reporting the crime in this case.
- On failure of the information to indicate the
approximate time of the commission of the offense: The phrase
in the information, that sometime in 1995. . . has sufficiently
apprised accused-appellant of the crime which he allegedly
committed in 1995. It bears stressing that, in the case of rape,
the date of commission is not an essential element of the
offense, what is material being the occurrence thereof and not
the time of its commission. In any event, it is now too late in the
day to question the form or substance of the information
because when he entered his plea at his arraignment, accused-
appellant did not object to the sufficiency of the information
against him.
- On irregularity of arrest: He failed to raise objections
to his arrest at the earliest possible opportunity. The record
shows that he voluntarily entered a plea of not guilty when he
was arraigned, thereby waiving his right to question any
irregularity in his arrest.
2. NO
- The award of actual damages must be deleted in the
absence of proof required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code. To be
entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be
competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount
thereof, such as receipts showing the expenses incurred on
account of the rape incident. In this case, only the laboratory
fee issued by the hospital amounting to P350 was duly
receipted. The rest of the documents were merely a doctors
prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses.
- Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,
nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the right of
the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him. As has been held, whenever there has been a
violation of an ascertained legal right, although no actual
damages resulted or none are shown, the award of nominal
damages is proper.

In this case, the victims family clearly
incurred medical expenses due to the rape committed by
accused-appellant. The victim suffered from pains in her navel
which required her physical examination. An award of P2k as
nominal damages is thus appropriate under the circumstances.
- Based on current rulings, the award of moral
damages should be increased to P50k irrespective of proof
thereof.
- In addition, the victim is entitled to the award of P50k
as civil indemnity which must be given even if there is neither
allegation nor evidence presented as basis therefore.
Disposition RTC decision modified. Accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the victim the amounts of P2k by way of nominal
damages, P50k as moral damages, and the additional amount
of P50k as civil indemnity, plus the costs of the suit.

ARMOVIT V CA (NORTHWEST AIRLINES)
184 SCRA 476
GANGAYCO; April 20, 1990

FACTS
- In October 1981, Dr. Herman Armovit and his family
decided to spend their Christmas holidays with relatives and
friends in the Philippines so they purchased from Northwest
Airlines 3 round trip airline tickets from the US to Manila and
back, plus 3 tickets for the rest of the children, though not
involved in the suit. Each ticket of the petitioners which was in
the handwriting of Northwests tickets sales agent contains the
following entry on the Manila to Tokyo portion of the return
flight:
"from Manila to Tokyo, NW flight 002, date 17 January, time
10:30 AM Status, OK"
- On their return trip from Manila to the US scheduled
on January 17, 1982, they arrived at the check-in counter of the
airline at the Manila International Airport at 9:15 in the morning,
which is a good one hour and fifteen minutes ahead of the
10:30 AM scheduled flight time recited in their tickets. They
were rudely informed that they cannot be accommodated
inasmuch as Flight 002 scheduled at 9:15 am was already
taking off and the 10:30 AM flight time entered in their plane
tickets was erroneous.
- Previous to the date of departure Armovit re-
confirmed their reservations through their representative
Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the 3 tickets at the
airlines Roxas Boulevard office. The departure time in the 3
tickets was not changed when re-confimed. Their names
appeared in the passenger manifest and confirmed as
Passenger Nos. 306, 307, and 308, Flight 002.
- Dr. Armovit protested in extreme agitation that
because of the bump-off he will not be able to keep his
appointments with his patients in the US. They suffered
anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night
of January 17th until the morning of January 18th when they
were finally informed that seats will be available for them on the
flight that day. - The RTC ruled in favor of the Armovits and
ordered Northwest to pay actual (P1,300), exemplary
(P1,100,000) and moral (P1,100,000) damages as well as
attorneys fees. The CA affirmed but eliminated the moral
damages on the ground that petitioners did not take the witness
stand to testify on their social humiliation, wounded feelings and
anxiety, and that the breach of contract was not malicious or
fraudulent. It also reduced the exemplary damages to
P170,000. Armovits motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE
WON the CA erred in deleting the award of moral damages

HELD
1. NO.
Ratio A contract to transport passengers is quite different in
kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this is
because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the
public. Its business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites
people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty, Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for
damages Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have the right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is that any rude or

discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. [Citing Air France v Carrascoso]
Reasoning
- The gross negligence committed by Northwest in the
issuance of the tickets with entries as to the time of the flight,
the failure to correct such erroneous entries and the manner by
which petitioners were rudely informed that they were bumped
off are clear indicia of such malice and bad faith and establish
that Northwest committed a breach of contract which entitles
petitioners to moral damages.
- The CA observed that the Armovits failed to take the
witness stand and testify on the matter. It overlooked however,
that their failure to appear in court to testify was explained by
them. The assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. on
August 21, 1983 following the year they were bumped off
caused turmoil in the country. This turmoil spilled over to the
year 1984 when they were scheduled to testify. However, the
violent demonstrations in the country were sensationalized in
the U.S. media so they were advised to refrain from returning to
the Philippines at the time.
- Nevertheless, Atty. Raymund Armovit, brother of Dr.
Armovit, took the witness stand as he was with the petitioners
from the time they checked in up to the time of their ultimate
departure. He was a witness when the check-in officer rudely
informed the Armovits that their flight had already taken off,
while Dr. Armovit remonstrated that their tickets reflected their
flight time to be 10:30 AM; that in anger and frustration, Dr.
Armovit told the said check-inofficer that he had to be
accommodated that morning so that he could attend to all his
appointments in the US; that Jacqueline Armovit also
complained about not being able to report for work at the
expiration of her leave of absence; that while the Armovits had
to accept Northwest's offer for hotel accommodations at the
Philippine Village Hotel so that they could follow up and wait for
their flight out of Manila the following day, they did not use their
meal coupons because of the limitations thereon so they had to
spend for lunch, dinner, and breakfast in the sum of P1,300
while waiting to be flown out of Manila; that Dr. Armovit had to
forego the professional fees for the medical appointments he
missed due to his inability to take the January 17 flight; that the
petitioners were finally able to fly out of Manila on January 18,
1982, but were assured of this flight only on the very morning of
that day, so that they experienced anxiety until they were
assured seats for that flight. - No doubt Atty. Raymund
Armovit's testimony adequately and sufficiently established the
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation that
petitioners suffered upon having been bumped off. However,
considering that Northwest took care of their accommodations
while waiting and boarding them in the flight back to the US, the
following day, the Court finds that the petitioners are entitled to
moral damages in the amount of P100,000 each. - To provide
an example for the public good, an award of exemplary
damages is also proper. The award of the CA is adequate.
Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the CA is
well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal
damages cannot co-exist with actual or compensatory
damages.
Disposition Petition is granted. The judgment of the CA is
hereby modified such that Northwest shall pay the following:
(a) actual damages in favor of Dr. Armovit in the sum of
P1,300 with interest at the legal rate from January 17, 1982;
(b) moral damages at P100,000 and exemplary
damages and P100,000 in favor of Dr. Armovit;
(c) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary
damages of P50,000 in favor of Mrs. Dora Armovit;
(d) moral damages of P100,000 and exemplary
damages in the amount of
P20,000 in favor of Miss Jacqueline Armovit; and
(e) attorney's fees at 5% of the total awards, plus the
cost of suit.

FRANCISCO V
FERRER

PLENO V CA (PHILIPPINE PAPER PRODUCTS
INC ET AL)
307 SCRA 675
GUTTIERREZ JR; May 9, 1988

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision which modified
the CFI decision in a vehicular accident case and reduced by
one half the award for temperate damages, moral damages,
and attorneys fees from P430,000 to P215,000. the awards for
actual damages in the amount of P48,244 and
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000 were affirmed

FACTS
- Philippine Paper Products is the owner of a delivery
truck, and one of their drivers, Florante de Luna, in a reckless
and imprudent manner, by driving the vehicle at a great speed,
without taking any precautions to avoid accidents, hit, bumped,
and sideswiped plaintiffs Volkswagen Delivery Van, driven by
plaintiff, causing the Van to swerve and ram into the rear part of
another truck - As a result of the accident, plaintiff was
hospitalized, suffered injuries affecting his brain, acted beyond
normalcy at times
- Petitioner questioned the set off since there was no
call or notice for the payment of the unpaid subscription, and
that the alleged obligation is not enforceable.
- The NLRC held that a stockholder who fails to pay
his unpaid subscription on call becomes a debtor of the
corporation and that the set-off of said obligation against the
wages and other due to petitioner is not contrary to law, morals,
public policy

ISSUES
1. WON the employer's liability in quasi-delict is subsidiary
2. WON the appellant court was correct in reducing the amount
of damages
awarded to the petitioner

HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- We sustain the view of the petitioner that the ability of an
employer in quasidelict is primary and solidary and not
subsidiary. This, we have ruled in a long line of cases.
2. NO
Reasoning
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the awards of
damages. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, the appellate court
reduced the amount of temperate and moral damages as well
as the amount of attorney's fees on the ground that the awards
were "too high" .The award of temperate damages was reduced
by the appellate court on the ground that the amount of
P200,000.00 is rather "too high" especially considering the fact
that the driver De Luna is a mere driver and defendant-
appellant Corporation is only subsidiarily liable thereof. The
award was reduced to P100,000.00.
- The award of temperate, moral, and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees lies upon the discretion of
the court based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
- The court's discretion is, of course, subject to the
condition that the award for damages is not excessive under
the attendant facts and circumstance of the case.
- Temperate damages are included within the context
of compensatory damages.
- In the case of moral damages, the yardstick shaould
be that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result
of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court.
The actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the
gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving at
reasonable levels
- The lower court's awards of damages are more
consonant with the factual circumstances of the instant case.
21

The trial court's findings of facts are clear

21
The trial court based the amounts of damages awarded to the petitioner on the
following circumstances:
Coming now to the damages suffered by plaintiff Maximo Pleno, it is not controverted
that Pleno was hospitalized for about five months beginning December 21, 1971, the
day of the incident, up to May 9, 1972. While in the hospital, he underwent several
major operations on his legs and in spite of Id operations, a deformity still resulted
and that his left leg is shorter than the right. The medical expenses, hospital bills and
doctor's fees were properly exhibited and not rebutted by defendants. This being the
case, actual expenses of P48,244.08 may be awarded.
As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that Pleno is an
enterpreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the Mayon Ceramics
Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and resourceful person with
several projects in line and were it not for the incident, might have pushed them
through. On the day of the incident, Pleno was driving homeward with geologist
Langley after an ocular inspection of the site of the Mayon Ceramics Corporation. His
actual income however has not been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot
award actual damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still
be made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a
permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers from double
vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he suffers from some
inferiority complex and is no longer active in business as well as in social life. In

similar cases as in Borromeo v. Manila Electric Railroad Co., 44 Phil 165; Cordage, et
al. v. LTB Co., et al., L-11037, Dec. 29,1960, and in Araneta, et al. v. Arreglado, et
al., L-11394, Sept. 9, 1958, the proper award of damages were given. There is also
no doubt that due to the incident, Pleno underwent physical suffering, mental
anguish, fight, severe arudety and that he also underwent several major operations.
As previously stated, Pleno is the founder of Mayon Ceramics Corporation,
manufacturer of the now famous Crown Lynn ceramic wares. He is a mechanical
engineer and the topnotcher of the professional examination for mechanical
engineering in 1938. From the record, most if not all of his children excelled in
academic studies here and abroad. The suffering, both mental and physical, which he
experienced, the anxiety and fright that he underwent are sufficiently proved, if not
patent. He is therefore entitled to moral damages. Pleno is also entitled to exemplary
damages since it appears that gross negligence was committed in the hiring of driver
de Luna. In spite of his past record, he was still hired by the corporation. As regards
de Luna, the very fact that he left the scene of the incident without assisting the
victims and without reporting to the authorities entitles an award of exemplary
damages, so as to serve as an example that in cases of accidents of this kind, the
drivers involved should not leave their victims behind but should stop to assist the
victims or if this is not possible, to report the matter immediately to the authorities.
That the corporation did not also report the matter to the authorities and that their
lawyer would attempt to bribe the police officers in order that the incident would be
kept a secret shows that the corporation ratified the act of their employees and such
act also shows bad faith. Hence, Id corporation is able to pay exemplary damages.
The award of attorney's fees is also proper in this case considering the circumstances
and that it took more than five years of trial to finish this case. Also, plaintiffs counsel
prepared lengthy and exhausive memorandum. (pp- 48-50, Amended Joint Record
on Appeal)

and well-developed. Each item of damages is adequately
supported by evidence on record. On the other hand, there are
no substantial reasons and no references to any
misimpressions of facts in the appellate decision. The Court of
Appeals has shown no sufficient reasons for altering factual
findings which appear correct. We, therefore, affirm the lower
court's awards of damages and hold that the appellate court's
reduction of the amounts of temperate and moral damages is
not justified. However, we modify the award of attorney's fees to
P20,000.00 which we deem to be just and equitable under the
circumstances.
Disposition instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned
decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) in Civil Case No. 16024
is AFFIRMED in all respects, except for the award of attorney's
fees which is reduced to P20,000.00.

PEOPLE V SINGH
360 SCRA 404
BUENA; June 29, 2001

NATURE
Appellants Balwinder, Malkit, Mohinder and Dalvir, all
surnamed Singh, were convicted of the crime of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 8683 for killing Surinder Singh, and
Frustrated Murder in Criminal Cases No. 8682 for stabbing
Dilbag Singh. Each of them were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder, and the indeterminate
penalty of 8 years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum for frustrated murder.

FACTS
- Dilbag Singh, private complainant for frustrated
murder in Criminal Case No. 8682, recounts that on November
26, 1993, at around 7:30 in the morning while he was cleaning
his motorbike in front of the Mendiola Apartment in Barangay
Canlalay, Bian, Laguna, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail,
Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip- all surnamed Singh-Johander
Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foul
remarks in their native language and demanding Surinder
Singh to come out of the apartment. When Surinder Singh
came out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but
Surinder Singh was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his
companions to hold Surinder Singh as he will kill him.
Thereafter, Dial Singh and Johinder Singh each held the right
and left arms of Surinder Singh, with
Kuldip Singh pushing Surinder Singh on his back. Dalvir Singh
then stabbed Surinder Singh, hitting him on the right side of his
stomach, and causing him to fall on the ground. Dial Singh
remarked that Surinder Singh failed to give money and if others
will likewise refuse, the same fate will befall them. As Surinder
Singh tried to get up, Malkit Singh Dhillon and Jarnail Singh
started hitting him with lead pipes all over his body, while
Johinder Singh and Dial Singh punched and kicked Surinder.
Amarjit Singh, who was holding a gun, warned everyone not to
help Surinder Singh or else he will shoot. Thereat, when all
these things were going on, private complainant Dilbag Singh
tried to stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on the left
side of his back. Gurmok Singh likewise stabbed him with a
bolo, but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side.
After that, the ten (10) accused Indians left. Dilbag Singh and
Surinder Singh, both injured, were brought to the Perpetual
Help Hospital, Bian, Laguna, by Jaswinder Singh, Johinder
Singh Gill, Balwinder Singh Gill and Alwan Singh, for treatment.
There, Surinder Singh was pronounced dead on arrival.
- The events, according to appellants, happened in this
wise. Appellant Dalvir Singh testified that on November 26,
1993, at around 7:30 in the morning, he was conducting his buy
and sell business along Brgy. Canlalay, Bian, Laguna. While
collecting from his customers, he was accosted by Jaswinder,
Dilbag and Surinder Singh to stop at the corner of the street.
When he stopped, he alighted from his motorcycle. Jaswinder,
Dilbag and Surinder Singh accused him of squealing their
status to the immigration authorities. Then, Jaswinder Singh
punched him. Appellant Dalvir Singh retaliated by slapping
Jaswinder Singh afterwhich, Jaswinder Singh, went inside his
apartment to get a pipe. When Surinder Singh was about to
stab him, he wrestled the knife from him and, in the process,
private complainant Dilbag Singh was stabbed on his back with
the same knife. As Dalvir Singh grappled for the possession of
the knife from Surinder Singh, both of them fell down, with him
landing on top of Surinder Singh and that was the time when
Surinder Singh was stabbed on the right portion of his stomach.
Then, Surinder Singh lost his grip and appellant Dalvir Singh
was able to get hold of the knife. Appellant Dalvir Singh was so
nervous that he left the place on his motorcycle while holding
the knife. He threw the knife along the highway of Bian,
Laguna.
- After trial, appellants were convicted of the crime
charged, thus "WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused Balwinder
Singh, Malkit Singh Dhillon, Mohinder Singh, Dalvir Singh and
Dial Singh having been established beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 8282
and murder in Criminal Case 8683 defined and penalized in
Articles 248 and 250 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court
hereby sentences them (except Dial Singh who died during the
presentation of defense evidence on the main case) as follows:
"Criminal Case No. 8682
"1. each to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum; "2. jointly and severally, to pay private
complainant Dilbag Singh the amounts of P16,000
representing his hospitalization and medical expenses, and
P30,000 for and as attorneys fees; and "3. jointly and
severally, to pay the costs of suit.
"Criminal Case No. 8683
"1. each to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
"2. jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of Surinder Singh
the following sums:
a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) P41,500.00 representing funeral, wake and
transportation expenses;
c) P5,760,000.00 for lost earnings/income;
d) P400.00 for hospitalization expenses;
e) P50,000.00 for moral damages; and
f) P500,000.00 for and as attorneys fees; and "3. jointly
and severally, to pay the costs of suit.
"Since accused Jarnail Singh, Gurmok Singh, Amarjit Singh,
Johinder Singh and Kuldip Singh have remained at-large to
date, in order not to clog the docket of this court, let the
records of these two cases be sent to the files and warrant
be issued for their immediate arrest.

ISSUE
WON the court a quo erred in awarding excessive damages
against accusedappellants

HELD
YES
Reasoning
- In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated murder, the
trial court awarded private complainant Dilbag Singh the
amount of P16,000.00 representing his hospitalization and
medical expenses, and P 30,000.00 as attorneys fees. For his
hospitalization and medical expenses, the receipts submitted to
support said claim amounted only to P370.50. Hence, private
complainant Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the said amount.
The award of attorneys fees is hereby deleted. Nonetheless,
private complaint is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 for the suffering he endured from appellants
felonious acts.
- In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, the following
amount of actual damages were duly proven P16,500.00
funeral expenses and air ticket/freight of the cadaver $600.27.
The amount of P400.00 for hospitalization expenses should be

deleted for not being supported by evidence. The trial courts
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 moral
damages are affirmed. The award of P500,000.00 as attorneys
fees and P5,760,000 as compensation for loss of earning
capacity, are likewise deleted for lack of basis. Awards for loss
of earning capacity partake of damages which must be proven
not only by credible and satisfactory evidence, but also by
unbiased proof. The testimony of Balwinder Singh Gill, first
cousin of the deceased, on the alleged income of the deceased
while in the Philippines, is not enough. The best evidence to
substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the
Philippines is the payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allegation is insufficient.
Nevertheless, considering that the definite proof of pecuniary
loss cannot be offered, and the fact of loss has been
established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh
temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00.
Obiter
- In lieu of actual damages which was not proven or
documented, temperate damages may be awarded in a
murder case. (People vs. dela Tongga) Disposition in
accordance with the foregoing disquisition, the decision
appealed from is hereby affirmed subject to the following
modifications- 1. In Criminal Case No. 8682 for frustrated
murder, appellants shall only be liable to pay
a. P370.50 for hospitalization expenses;
b. P50,000.00, as moral damages, plus costs; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. 8683 for murder, in addition to the civil
indemnity, moral damages and attorneys fees awarded by the
trial court, appellants shall pay-
a. P16,500.00, as funeral expenses;
b. $600.27, as air ticket/freight of the cadaver, to be
computed at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of the
promulgation of this decision; and,
c. P200,000.00, as temperate damages, plus costs.

PEOPLE V PLAZO
350 SCRA 433
QUISUMBING; January 29, 2001

FACTS
- Leonor Fabula went out of her house to buy sugar
from a nearby store. There she saw her son Romeo being
beaten by Plazo for allegedly disclosing the whereabouts of his
(Plazo) brother who was wanted for robbery in Manila. - She
tried to intervene but this was to no avail. Eventually Romeo
was able to escape. But he was chased down by Plazo and
stabbed many times the last being a stab to the chest which led
to his death. Leonora then told people not to move her son as
she was going to ask for help from policemen.
- on the other hand, Plazo stated that it was an act of
self defense. He said that a he and his friend were lpaynig
billiards when Romeo suddenly disrupted he game. He was
drunk and when being pacified got angry and chased Plazo
with a bolo. Thy both fell and the bolo suddenly was imbedded
in Romeos chest.
- Court found Plazo guilty of murder and made to pay
50,000 for moral
damages, 15,712 for actual damages, and 10,000 for moral
damages

ISSUES
1. WON Plazo is guilty of murder.
2. WON the 15,712 amount for actual damages is valid

HELD
1. NO
- Plazo avers that the killing of Romeo Fabula was an
act of self defense. He also questions the inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the police and Leonora Fabula
- Court held that inconsistencies were not substantial
enough as to affect the validity of the testimony. Testimonies
arent expected to be error-free. The inconsistencies pointed
out by Plazo were not enough to disprove the testimonies of the
witnesses.
- his claim of self-defense was likewise unsupported.
He wasnt able to fulfill all the elements necessary for self-
defense. The number of stab wounds was indicated that the
means employed was not necessary to repel the aggression.
- However the circumstances qualifying the crime as
murder were unsubstantiated. Premeditation and treachery
were not proven as the elements for such were not present.
therefore the crime committed was not murder but homicide.
2. NO
- The trial court correctly awarded the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the award of actual
damages in the amount of P15,712.00 was based solely on the
bare assertions of the mother of the victim. The Court can only
grant such amount for expenses if they are supported by
receipts. In the absence thereof, no actual damages can be
awarded. However, in lieu of actual damages, temperate
damages under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered
where it has been shown that the victims family suffered some
pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with
certainty
- We find the award of P15,000.00 as temperate
damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded in
the absence of any evidence to support its award

PNB V
CA

DEL ROSARIO V CA (METAL FORMING CORP.)
267 SCRA 158
NARVASA; January 29, 1997

NATURE
An appeal of a Decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS
- The Del Rosarios' complaint, filed on November 21, 1990,
charged Metal Forming Corp. (MFC) with violation of Section 3 of
Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising,
Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc.
The complaint alleged that:
1) "in selling to the public roofing materials known 'Banawe'
shingles,** (MFC) made representations on the durability of the
product and sturdiness of its installation through massive
advertisements in print media and television (and) brochures ;"
2) the representations -- particularly those characterizing the
shingles as
"STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE
METAL
TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure
due to the strong hook action on its overlaps"-- "prompted the Del
Rosarios to buy the 'Banawe' shingles and have them installed at their residence;" 3) "(b)arely two (2) months after
completion of the installation, portions of the roof of the Del Rosarios were blown away by strong wind brought about
by typhoon "Ruping." - The Office of the President found that:
one cannot efface the fundamental fact that MFC acted in bad faith and/or with gross negligence in falling to deliver
the necessary accessories for the proper installation of the structure and actually installed inferior roofing materials at
Del Rosarios residence, in violation of the proper installation procedure expressly specified in the former's brochures
and advertisements for installation, i.e., the metal tile attached to the roof panels should be two (2) self-drilling screws
for one (1) metal cleat. However, instead of conforming with this procedure, MFC attached some of the metal cleats
with this one (1)inch ordinary nail each and others were fastened with only one (10) wood screw each.
- MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario Spouses to
have been caused to the interior of their home. This prompted the latter to commence a civil action against MFC. The
spouses sought to recover from MFC damages resulting from the events just narrated, contending that aside from the
destruction of the roof of their house, injury was also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, fixtures, walls, wall paper,
wood parquet flooring and furniture. The Del Rosarios reckoned their actual damages at P1,008,003. They also
prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the sum of P3,000,000; exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000,000; attorney's fees in the sum of P1,000,000.
- Trial Court awarded P500K as moral damages and P300K as exemplary damages.
- CA reversed decision of the trial court, holding that there was no privity of contract.


ISSUES
1. WON there is a privity of contract between the parties
2. WON upon the facts established by the evidence, MFC is
answerable to the Del Rosarios for the damage caused to the
latter's residence when its roof, made of shingles purchased from
and installed by the former, was blown away by a typhoon (this case
is under EXEMPLARY DAMAGES in the
outline)

HELD
1. YES, there is privity of contract between the Del Rosarios and
MFC.
Reasoning
- At all
times and with
regard to the
acquisition and
installation of
the metal tiles
or shingles,
Puno was in
truth acting as
contractor of
the Del
Rosarios and
on their
instructions.
Ascertainment
of the definite
identity of the
person who
actually
ordered the
shingles from
MFC is utterly
inconsequential
-- it might just
as well have
been a
construction
foreman, a
trusted
domestic, or
any friend or
acquaintance
of the Del
Rosarios.
- The
tiles were
delivered to the
Del Rosarios
and used in
fabricating the roof of their home; it was the employees and
workers of MFC who (a) delivered the shingles or metal tiles to
the construction site of the Del Rosarios' home, and (b)
undertook and completed the installation thereof.
2. YES , the Del Rosarios are entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
Re: Actual damages
- Actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed,
but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable
degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculations,
conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that
they have (been) suffered and on evidence of the actual
amount thereof.
- The report of Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc.
contains no statement whatever of the amount of the
damage. Indeed, the testimony of Engineer Abril, the
representative of the Esteban Adjusters and Valuers, Inc.,
is that his firm had been retained only to determine the
cause of the damage, not to estimate and assess it.
Moral damages
- Moral damages are awarded for indemnity or reparation
not punishment or correction, that is, an award to entitle
the injured party to obtain means (of) diversions and
amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable
action.
- That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach
of its express warranties made to the general public and in
wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who
relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by
the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the
award of moral damages "in breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
- Award of trial court of moral damages is reduced from
P500K to P100K.
Exemplary damages
- Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good. While exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved,
although plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court
may consider the question of whether or not exemplary
damages should be awarded Exemplary damages are
imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but
to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive
to curb socially deleterious actions.
- Award of trial court of exemplary damages is reduced
from P300K to P50K.
Disposition Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
November 18, 1991 is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the award of actual damages and

attorney'
s fees is
deleted,
and the
moral
and
exemplar
y
damages
awarded
are
reduced
from
P500,00
0.00 to
P100,00
0.00,
and from
P300,00
0.00 to
P50,000.
00,
respectiv
ely.

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torts & damages A2010 - 1 - prof.

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