Thecontinuedupholdingof the dignity and honor of the law

professioninorder tokeepvibrant andaflametherespect ~ndtrust

of thepeopleintheadministration of justiceisasolemndutyincum-
bent uponall and every lawyer for as longas heis a part of the
profession. Henry S. Drinker sums up suchduty in this wise:
"To his client he owesabsolutecandor, unswerving fidelity and un-
dividedallegiance, furthering his cause with entire devotion, warmzeal,
andhis utmost ability and learning but without using means other than
thoseaddressedtoreasonandunderstanding; employingandcountenancing
no formof fraud, trickery or deceit, which if brought to light would
shamehis conscienceor bring discredit to his profes,sion."1
Thepractice of lawis a privilegeaccordedonlyto thosewho
measureupto certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness.
For theadmissionof acandidateto thebar the Rulesof Court not
onlyprescribes atest of academicpreparation but requires satisfac-
tory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are
neither dispensedwithnor loweredafter admission; thelawyer must
continueto adhereto themor elseincur the risk of suspensionor
remova1.
2
A. PARTY BOUNDBY ACTS OF COUNSEL
It iswell settledthat aparty isboundbytheacts of hiscounsel,
evenif thelatter hadbeennegligent inthe dischargeof his duties.
ThusheldtheSupremeCourt inthecaseof Beatriz et oJ,v. Cederia.
3
Inthis case,theCourtturned downthedefendant's motionfor relief
of judgment holding that the allegation made in said motio~of
fraud, collusion, accident and excusable.negligenceon the part of
their former counsel is but a mere conclusionof the defendants,
without anyfact tosubstantiate it. Moreover,it appears that coun-
sel for plaintiffs met defendant Martin Cederiaabout ten (10) days
* Member, Student Editorial Board, Philippt"ne Law Journal, 1962-63.
1DRINKER, HENRY S., LEGAL ETHICS, 3-7.
2In re Gutierrez, Adm. CaseNo. 363,July 31, 1962.
3 G.R. No. L-17703,February 28, 1962.
after receipt of copyof thedecisionandinformedhimof therendi-
tion of said decisionagainst the defendants.
B. LIABILITY OF COUNSEL FOR FAILURE OF HIS CLIENT TO
COMPLY WITH ORDER OF COURT
In Special Proceedings No. Q-453entitled Intestate Es"bate -of
Marcelo de Castro, the respondent judge issuedan order requiring
theexecutrixto explainwhyshehadsecuredasmall loanfromthe
DevelopmentBankof thePhilippineswithout previouscourt author-
ity, andwhyshe'hadfailedto includeinher accountingtheincome
fromsomeproperties of theestate. Not satisfiedwiththeexplana-
tiongivenby theexecutrix inconnectiontherewith, therespondent
judge, inopencourt,foundher guiltyof contemptandorderedtocom-
plystrictly withtheorder. Theexecutrix,t'hroughher counsel,peti-
tioner herein, filedher "compliance"with theorder. Therespond-
ent judgeruledthat thesamewasnot inconformitywithhis order,
without, however, specifying in what respects the statement was
defective. In viewof this, petitioner, as counsel for the executrix
inquired fromthe respondent judge in what particulars the com-
pliancewas defective, to which the judge replied that petitioner
had no right to makesuchan inquiry and heldhimguilty of con
tempt for which'hewas orderedto pay aline of twenty (P20.00)
pesos. Hence,petitioner filedapetitiontoset asidetheorder declar-
ing himin contempt. H etd: It is thus obviousthat the oneunder
obligationto complywith the order of the Court requiring thead-
ministratrix (petitioner's client) to explainwhy shehad secureda
loanwithout previouscourt authority andwhyshehadnot included
inher accountingthe incomefromcertain properties of theestate
was not petitioner but his client who had already beenfinedfor
contempt. Hence, counsel cannot beheld liablefor contempt for
failure of his client to complywith the order of the Court.
4
C. LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM REPRESENTING CONFLICT-
ING INTEREST IN A CASE
In Mejia et al. v. Reyes,S respondent, apracticing lawyer, was
in 1947appointedbank attorney and notary publicfor the Baguio
Branch of the Philippine National Bank. Whilestill holdingsuch
position, his professional services were engaged by complainants,
residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the
Philippine National Bank and the Rehabilitation Finance Corpora-
tion for the cancellationof a mortgage ona parcel of land. The
4Consulta v. Yatco et al., G.R. No. L-15964, January 30, 1962.
5Adm. Case No. 378, March 30, 1962.
Court held: Lawyers are prohibited fromrepresenting conflicting
interests in a case. Sotherespondent's act of appearing and act-
ing as counsel for the complainants in the civil caseagainst the
PhilippineNational Bankthat hadappointed'himbankattorney and
notary public, constitutesmalpractice.
D. BREACH OF PROFESSIONAL DUTY
Asalreadyaforesaid, totheclientalawyer owes"absolutecan-
dor, unswerving fidelity and undividedallegiance." This duty, a
lawyer shouldholduphighif heweretoenjoythecontinuedrespect
andtrust, hencepatronage, of hisclients. But inonecase,6thelaw-
yer-respondentdisregardedandviolatedthisduty. It thus'happened
that petitioner engagedthe services of respondent lawyer to find
waysbywhichthelandsshehadsoldcouldberedeemed. Respond-
ent succeededin redeemingthe lands but the salewas executedin
his name. Afterwards, hesoldeight lots at a profit and kept the
two lots for himself as his attorney's fees. He.ld: Respondent is
guilty of malpractice. It isnot onlyirregular but abreachof pro-
fessional duty towards petitioner client whose trust respondent-
lawyer disregarded and violated.
E. PROHIBITION AGAINST COUNSEL TO BUY CLIENT'S PROP-
ERTY.
Theconveyanceof the property in litigation madeby the liti-
gant tohis counsel during theexistenceof attorney-and-client rela-
tionshipisvoid,thereasonbeingthat becauseof their client-attorney
relationship, petitioner-counsel wasdisqualifiedtobuyunder Article
1941of theNewCivil Code. Insuchacase, perhaps theperiodof
prescriptionshouldbecountedonlyfromtheseveranceof theattor-
ney-clientbond,becauseit isonlythenthat thecontrollinginfluence
of the attorney has ceased. Nonetheless, the litigant may not be
allowedto unjustly profit at the expenseof her attorney by retain-
ingtheconsiderationof thesale. Whenasaleisavoided,theseller
shall return the purchaseprice, together with interest.
7
A. SUBSTITUTION
Whenalawyer voluntarily withdraws as counsel after another
lawyer had entered his appearance for the sameclient, the filing
almost simultaneouslyby the former of a motionfor the payment
of his attorney's fees, amountstoanacquiescencetotheappearance
6Imbuido v. Mafigonon, Adm. Case No. 200, March 31, 1962.
7 Sotto v. Samson, G.R. No. L-169.17, July 31, 1962.
of the latter as counsel for the client. This consideration came up
in one administrative case.
S
In said case petitioner was retained
by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle the settlement of the
testate estate of her husband. Preparatory to the closing of the
administration proce~dings, petitioner prepared two pleadings but
Mrs. Barrera refused to countersign said pleadings and instead ad-
vised petitioner not to filethem. Sometime later, petitioner found
that respondent Atty. Patalinghug had filedon January 11, 1955 a
written appearance as newcounsel for Mrs. Barrera. OnFebruary
7, 1955, the other respondent Atty. Remotigue entered his appear-
ance. Held: Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal as counsel for Mrs.
Barrera after Atty. Pa1alinghug had entered his appearance, and
his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the
payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescense to the
appearance of respondent, Atty. Patalinghug, as counsel for Mrs.
Barrera. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that
the appearance of Atty. Pataling1lUgwas unprofessional. Moreover,
the Solicitor General found that before respondent Attorney Pata-
linghug entered his appearance, Mrs. Barrera had already filedwith
the court a pleading discharging petitioner. If she did not furnish
petitioner with a copy of said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty.
Patalinghug but that of Mrs. Barrera. It appears that the reason
why Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner was that she did not trust
him any longer. Much less could respondent Atty. Remotigue be
held guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his
appearance only onFebruary 7, 1955, and after petitioner hadvolun-
tarily withdrawn appearance on February 5, 1955.
B. WITHDRAWAL
An attorney retained in a case the trial of which is set for a
date which he knows he cannot appear because of his engagement
in another trial set previously on the same date, has no right to
presume that the court will necessarily grant himcontinuance. The
most ethical thing for him to do in such a situation is to inform
the prospective client of all the facts so that the latter may retain
another attorney. If the client, having full knowledge of all the
facts, still retains the attorney, heassumes the risk and cannot com-
plain of the consequences if the postponement is denied and finds
himself without attorney at the trial. But an attorney who has not
made any formal withdrawal from the case is still considered his
client's attorney.9
S La.put v. Remotigue, Adm. Case No. 219, September 29, 1962.
9 Gutierrez v. Medel, G.R. No. L-14455, April 26, 1962.
IV. ATTORNEY-TO-ATTORNEYRELATIONSHIP
In Administrative CaseNo. 434
10
-a sequel to Administrative
Case No. 219
11
-an original complaint was filed with the court
charging the respondent lawyer with malice, bad faith, and mis-
representation whenthe latter allegedlyfiledmotionsincourt with-
out notice to the complainant lawyer, thereby committing unfair
andunethical practices bordering ondishonesty, all totheprejudice
of said complainant. Thecomplainant alleges that by virtue of a
duly recorded "Attorney's Lien," he has in his lawful possesion
transfer certificatesof titletoall real properties of theestateunder
administration; that therespondent, without noticetothe complain-
ant, filedwith theprobatecourt motionspraying that thecomplain-
ant bedirectedto surrender the aforementionedcertificatesof title,
andanother motionprayingthat hebeissuedowner'sduplicatecopies
of the certificates of title on the ground that the samewere lost.
Therespondent knowingall alongthat thecomplainant is inlawful
possessionof said certificatesof title; and that with the duplicate
titles, therespondentandhisclientMrs. Barrera (formerlytheclient
of the complainant) soldwithout noticethe lots coveredthereby,
all of which, asidefrombeingunfair andunethical, wereprejudicial
tothecomplainant'srecordedlientothe saidlots. Onthequestion
whether the respondent had committedunfair and unethical prac-
ticesborderingondishonesty,theCourt .heZd: TheSolicitor General,
towhomthis casewasreferred tofor investigationfoundthat since
January 11, 1955, Mrs. Barrera had askedthe complainant herein
toturn over all therecords andpapers of theestateunder adminis-
tration toher but despitemotionsandorders of thecourt, thecom-
plainant stubbornly kept tohimself thetransfer certificates of title
inquestion. It wouldseemthat thecomplainantwastheoneat fault.
Hence,therecommendationof theSolicitor General for therespond-
ent's completeexoneration shouldbe approved.
A. ATTORNEY'S LIENS
Incidental to and as a measure of protection of the right of
lawyerstorecover professional feesfor servicesrendered, theRules
of Court
12
provides for two kinds of liens: (1) general, retaining,
or possessinglien; and (2) charging lien. Theformer istheattor-
ney's right to retain the funds, documentsand papers of his client
whichcomeintohispossessionandcontrol anduntil his lawful fees
10 Laput v. Remotigue, September 29, 1962.
11Supra, note No.8.
12Rules of Court, Rule 127, Sec. 33.
and disbursements havebeenpaid and to apply suchfunds to the
sa.tisfactionthereof. Thelatter isthat whichtheattorney has upon
all judgment for thepayment of moneyandexecutionissuedinpur-
suance of such judgment.l.'l These liens are deemednecessary to
preserve the decorumand respectability of the profession,14and
courts, in the exerciseof their exclusiveand supervisory authority
over attorneys, are boundto respect and protect them.
15
ChJarging lien; partakes of the nature of collateral s,ecurity wh.en
established on the property of the deceased in litigation to
secure payment of attorney's fees.
Tosecurepayment of attorney's feesfor servicesrenderedtoa
deceasedduring his lifetime, which court shall entertain the pay-
ment of theclaimfor attorney's fees, theprobatecourt or theordi-
nary courts? Thisquestioncameupfor determinationinthecaseof
T~stamentariJ(J,de Don Amadeo MaJtute Olave v. Paterno R. Canlas,
et alY:; It appears that AmadeoMatuteOlavediedin the City of
Manilain 1955 and forthwith testamentary proceedingswereinsti-
tuted beforetheCourt of First Instanceof saidcityfor theprobate
of his will and the settlement of his estate. During his lifetime
Matutewasmadeparty defendant inacivil caseandto defendhim
heengagedtheservicesof respondent Paterno R. Canlas,theformer
agreeing to pay the latter twenty per cent (20%) of the market
value of the property in litigation. After the termination of the
case, Atty. Canlasfiledin saidcivil caseamotionpraying that his
claimfor attorney's fees beestablishedas a charging lien onthe
properties under litigation. The court granted themotion. Coun-
sel was able to secure fifty thousand (P50,OOO.OO) pesos partial
payment. Whenhefiledan urgent motionfor thepayment to him
of the balanceof eighty-fivethousand (P85,OOO.OO) pesos remain-
ing in posessionof the clerk of court in full payment of his fees,
the administrator of the estate filedan oppositionthereto alleging
lackof jurisdiction onthepart of thetrial court andclaimingthat,
it, involvingmoneyclaim,thesameshouldbesubmittedtotheprob-
atecourt. 'Thetrial court sustainedits jurisdiction. Henceapeti-
tion for certiorari was filed. TheCourt held: Under the Rulesof
Court,l7a creditor holdinga claimagainst the deceasedsecuredby
mortgage or other collateral security may foredose his mortgage
or realizeuponhis securityby ordinary actionincourt makingthe
13
5 Am. Jur. 387.
14Rustia v. Abeto, 72Phil. 133 (1941).
15 DeJesus-Alano v. Tan and Hoxas, G.R. No. L-9437,November28, 1939.
16 G.R. No. L-12709,February 28, 1962.
1\7 Rulesof Court, Ruk 87, Sec. 7.
executor or administrator a party defendant, and neednot filehis
claimbeforetheprobate court to share in the general distribution
of the assets of the estate. Under the sametheory, an action to
recover real or personal property fromthe estate or to enforcea
lien thereon, may be prosecutedby the interested person against
theexecutor or administrator independentlyof thetestate or intes-
tate procedings. And it Ctannot be gainsaid that a charging lien
established on the property in litigation to secure the paymem;,tof
the attorney's fees partakes of the nature 'Ofa (JQllateralsecurity or
of a lien on real or persorl!alproperty w'ithin the mooning of the
provisions of the rules. The reason behindthis rule is that such
claimscannot beconsideredclaimsagainst theestate, but theright
tosubject specificproperty to theclaimarises fromthecontract of
thedebtor wherebyhehas duringhislifetimeset asidecertainprop-
ertyfor itspayment,andsuchproperty doesnot, exceptinsofar asits
valueexceedsthedebt belongtotheestate, andtheinstrument being
of record or the property being in the possessionof the creditor
is noticeto all the world of the contract.
1S
Moreover, a probate
court, beingof limitedjurisdiction, has no authority to enforcea
lienunlessconferredby a statute. Thestatutory jurisdiction of a
probatecourt isexclusive,19andsincethelienreferred to inSection
1, Rule88is not amongthosementionedin Section5, Rule87, all
moneyclaimssecuredwithalienareoutsidethejurisdiction of the
probate court. Petition dismissed.
B. WHEN ORDER TO ANNOTATE LIEN CONSTITUTES ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
In Candelario v. Caiiizares et al.,2 oneAttorney Canlas pre-
senteda motionbeforethe court praying that a charging lienfor
attorney's feesbecreatedonwhatever property, right, and interest
petitionerswill receiveintheestateof thedeceased. Petitioners ob-
jectedtothemotionalleging,amongother things, that respondentat-
torneyshadalreadybeenoverpaidandthey hadalready presenteda
motionto stopfurther payment of attorney's fees. Thecourt over-
ruledtheoppositionandorderedthat thecharginglienof Atty. Can-
lasberecorded. Onthepetitionfor certiorari, theCourt held: The
lowercourtabuseditsdiscretioninorderingtheannotationof thelien
in favor of respondent attorneys notwithstanding the apparently
validclaimthat the attorney's fees havebeenfully paid and with-
out previoustrial findingthat the claimof petitioners of full pay-
ment of feesisnot true or correct.
18
34 C.J.S. 175-177.
19Ibid., 72l.
20 G.R. No. L-17688, March 30, 1962.
A. DISBARMENT; CONVICTION OF CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TUR-
PITUDE; EFFECT OF ABSOLUTE PARDON
Although onehas already been admitted to the practice of law,
he does not cease to bebound by the rigid standards of mental and
moral fitness required of those accorded the privile.ge to practice
law. On the contrary, these standards are neither dispensed with
nor lowered after admission. The lawyer must continue to adhere
to them or else incur the risk of suspension or removal.21
In order that a pardon granted an attorney after conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude can operate to bar any pro-
ceeding for his disbarment, the pardon must beabsolute. This was
the holding of the court in In r.e Gutierrez.
22
Respondent Diosdado
Q. Gutierrez, a member of the Philippine Bar, was convicted of the
murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan,
and was sentenced to the penalty of death. The judgment of con-
viction was affirmed by the Supreme Court but the penalty was
reduced to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sen-
tence, respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the Presi-
dent. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted on
condition that heshall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the widow of the deceased Samaco fileda
verified complaint before the Supreme Court praying that respond-
ent beremoved fromtheroll of lawyers pursuant to Rule127, Section
5. Respondent pleaded the conditional pardon in defense, onthe au-
thority of the decisIonof the Court inthe caseof In re Lontok.
23
The
Court rejected respondent's plea and .held: Reliance is placed by
respondent on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was con-
victed of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General.
In a subsequent proceeding for his disbarment onthe ground of such
conviction, the Court held that a pardon operates to wipe out the
conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted. This ruling does not
govern the question at bar. In making it, the Court proceeded on
the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was
absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, par-
ticularly in the citations to support it. Thus, the portion of the
decision in Ex Parte Garland,24 quoted with approval in the Lontok
caseisas follows: "A paraon reaches both the punishment prescribed
21In re Gutierrez, supra, note No.2.
22Ibid .
23 43 Phil. 293.
24
4 Wall. 380.
PHILIPPINE LAW JOlJ1t.NAt
nLECOPY
for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon
is full, it releases the punishment and blolts out of existence Ithe
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction,
it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent UPOy;
conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes
the penalties and disabilities, and restores himto all his civil rights;
it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit
and capacity." In the instant case, the pardon granted to respond-
ent is not absolute but conditional. So it does not reach the offense
itself, unlike that in Ex Parte Garland,25 which was a fuIl pardon.
Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his convic-
tion for murder without regard to the pardon heinvokes in defense.
The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having
been committed in band, by taking advantage of his official position
(respondent being amunicipal mayor at the time) and with the use
of a motor vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such
as to justify his being purged from the profession.
B. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; COHABITATION EVEN WITH CoNSENT OF
COMPLAINANT, IMMORAL
As a high government official in the community of his assign-
ment, aJustice of the Peace ought to beaperson of exemplary char-
acter, if not a model citizen.2'6 In the case of Vwj,ron v. Duranr a
petition for disbarment was filedby the complainant against Resti-
tuto M. Duran, Justice of the Peace of Basey, Samar. The com-
plainant claims that Duran had carnal knowledge with her by force.
After investigation, the district judge of Samar found that Duran
did not commit rape on the complainant because the sexual inter-,
course which Duran had with the latter was with her consent.
Nevertheless, the district judge found himguilty of immorality and
recommended his suspension from the service. Said finding was
affirmed by both the Secretary of Justice and the President. In
consequence thereof, Duran was suspended from the service without
pay for six (6) months. The complainant, however submits that
said punishment is too lenient and that Duran ought to be dis-
barred from the practice of law. The Solicitor General, on the
other hand, recommends dismissal of these proceedings but with a
~5Ibid.
26 Viojan v. Duran, Adm. Case No,. 248, February 26, 1962.
27 Ibid.
warning, onthegroundthat respondenthas already beensufficient-
ly punished. H,eld: Undoubtedly, respondent's immorality is con-
demnable. Heis a Justice of the Peaceand, as such, heis consi-
deredahighgovernmentofficialinthecommunityof hisassignment.
He ought to be a person of exemplary character, if not a model
citizen. By committingthe immoralityin question,the respondent
violatedthe trust reposedin his high Qffice,and utterly failedto
liveupto thenobleidealsandthe strict standards of morality re-
quired of the law profession. However, considering that the
respondent had already undergonethe penalty of suspension,and,
furthermore, the immorality committedby himwas madepossible
partly by the rather equivocal conductof complainant herself, the
present disbarment proceedingis dismissed, with a warning that
a repetition of a similar offenseby himwouldbedealt witli more
severelyby the Court.
C. JUDGES; SERIOUS INEFFICIENCY AND IGNORANCE OF LAW
In an administrative case/
8
oneAtty. CandidoSan Luis filed
a complaint, against Judge GregorioD. Montejoof the Court of
First Instanceof ZamboangaCity chargingthe latter with serious
inefficiency,ignoranceof the law, and falsificationof publicdocu-
ments allegedlycommittedin connectionwith the performanceof
his official duties. Justice Juan P. Enriquez of the Court of Ap-
peals, whowas designatedto investigatethecharges, madethefol-
lowingfindings: In Civil CaseNo. 256, the defendant therein filed
amotionfor bill of particulars but respondent failedto resolveit
until after thelapseof seven(7) monthsandthis inactionnotwith-
standing, respondent Judgefiledhiscertificateof serviceevery15th
day and end of eachmonth. RespondentJudgeexplainedthat he
laboredunder the belief that amotionfor bill of particulars is not
submitted for resolutionevenafter the filingof plaintiff's objec-
tions and defendant's reply thereto until the motionis reset for
hearing. In Criminal Case No. 8100for rape, respondent Judge
madethis findingin his decision: "The court . . . believesthat
there was an attempt madebythe accusedto disrupt thevirginity
of the offendedparty, but an attempt is not a crimeof rape as
stated in the information," and so he acquitted the accused. In
another criminal casefor murder andtriplefrustrated murder, the
accusedtherein werefoundguilty as chargedand yet the penalty
imposedonthemwasnot theoneprescribedbylaw. Fromthefore-
goingfindings,the Court held: That the respondent Judge didnot
observethe careand diligencerequiredof a judgeof first instance
in the performanceof his duties whichaccount for the errors he
has committedin the disposal of the cases subject of the present
administrative complaint. For this reason, the Court resolvedto
admonishhimto bemorecareful in the future with the warning
that a repetition of similar errors will not be countenanced, and
will bethesubject of a stern disciplinaryaction.