Process Counterplans - Northwestern 2013 6WeekSeniors

NDI 2013 6WS Process Counterplans
**Negative**
OAS CP
1NC Shells

1NC Mexico

Text: The United States federal government should propose to the Organization of
American States a multilateral effort to __________________________.

Only the counterplan solves the Aff and only the counterplan bolsters the OAS as a
key regional institution
IAD 12 (Inter-American Dialogue, US center for policy analysis, exchange, and communication on issues
in Western Hemisphere affairs, the Dialogue brings together public and private leaders from across the
Americas to address hemispheric problems and opportunities, fourteen Dialogue members served as
presidents of their countries and more than two dozen have served at the cabinet levelRemaking the
Relationship: The United States and Latin America, Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, p. 17-18,
April 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important that the United States and the region
increase their attention to reshaping regional institutions to better align them with current realities
and challenges and to make them more effective. The hemispheres institutional architecture is in great flux, and there is
growing need for decisions about priorities and objectives. The Organization of A merican S tates, the worlds oldest regional institution,
has come under enormous stress as a result of the rapidly shifting political and economic context of
hemispheric relations. It is still the regions main political organization, with legitimacy to work across
a spectrum of issues, but it is badly in need of institutional reform, perhaps even a re-launching. For all its
problems, the OAS has a singular capacity to take on critical issues, including human rights, press freedom, and
democracy, that other, newer multilateral mechanisms seem years away from being able to handle
adequately. New groupingslike UNASUR and CELACmay have key roles to fulfill, but no institution can yet match the
normative frameworks developed over decades in the OAS. Regional organizations focused on finance and development
have emerged from the transformations stronger than their political counterparts. This may be because there is greater consensus on economic
management than political questions. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has gone through a difficult reform process, while the CAF
Development Bank of Latin America, with only Latin American members, has expanded considerably in recent years and extended its lending
throughout the region. Although not strictly a regional institution, Brazils National Development Bank has sharply increased its funding outside
Brazil, chiefly to support foreign investments by Brazilian companies on infrastructure and energy projects in neighboring countries. It is
encouraging how constructively Washington has responded to Latin Americas growing independence
and greater assertiveness in regional and global affairs. It has readily accommodated the hemispheres emerging
institutional landscape even though that includes new regional groupings from which the United States is excluded. Less encouraging,
but indicative of its shrinking political and diplomatic profile in the region, is the reduced US commitment to and active
engagement in some regional arrangements to which it does belong, among them the OAS and the Summit of the Americas. As the
OAS goes through a troubled period, it must have stronger engagement from member governments, including
effective involvement by the United S tates, in order to regain a central role in inter-American
affairs.

And Mexico is more likely to agree to the plan than the CP
OAS 12 (Organization of American States, OAS and Mexico Agree to Implement Technical Cooperation
Activities for the Benefit of other Countries, press release, OAS, April 25, 2012, http://go-
jamaica.com/pressrelease/item.php?id=509)
The Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Jos Miguel Insulza, and the Executive Director of
the Mexican Agency for International Development, Roger Granguillhome today signed a memorandum of
understanding for the implementation of technical cooperation activities such as assistance, expert exchange and
training seeking to foster the economic and social development of other countries. The Secretary General Insulza
stressed how the nature and definition of international cooperation has changes in recent decades. "Before, cooperation in the hemisphere
was almost entirely limited to the North-South cooperation, and not conceived in a different way of that which came from more developed
countries to the less developed. Over the years, the countries of the region have gradually acquired a knowledge and technical capacity that
can be transferred to other countries in the developing world, "he said. The OAS representative also stressed the
willingness of the more developed member countries to cooperate with the most vulnerable, and
welcomed the initiative of the Mexican International Cooperation Agency to sign an agreement that
will "substantially strengthen our work in the area of cooperation, especially in institutional
strengthening and human resource training." At the signing ceremony, the representative of the Mexican
Agency welcomed the OAS' willingness to create opportunities to strengthen the ties of cooperation
between the countries of the region and said that the government of his country attaches "a role of
fundamental importance to international organizations in the new global architecture for
development , given their representativeness and their ability to mobilize and articulate collective joint efforts. " In this regard,
Granguillhome said that the OAS "plays an important role among the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Mexico," either as a partner in the deployment of cooperation or as a benchmark of best practices in the hemisphere. The
Mexican representative noted that the memorandum of understanding signed today "will open new avenues of interaction in an area of
??growing importance such as triangular cooperation", adding that the agreement will allow the sum of interagency strengths to maximize the
human, technological and budget resources allocated to cooperation, which will result in more effective support for the various subregions of
the continent. Prior to the signing, held at OAS headquarters in Washington, DC, OAS Secretary General and the Agency's Executive Director
held a private meeting during which they talked about the role of Mexico as current president of the G20, cooperation in Haiti and the ways in
which the OAS will provide a bridge for triangular cooperation with Caribbean countries.

1NC Venezuela

Text: The United States federal government should propose to the Organization of
American States a multilateral effort to __________________________.

Only the counterplan solves the Aff and only the counterplan bolsters the OAS as a
key regional institution
Relationship: The United States and Latin America, Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, p. 17-18,
April 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
Even as Latin America expands its global reach and presence, it is important that the United States and the region
increase their attention to reshaping regional institutions to better align them with current realities
and challenges and to make them more effective. The hemispheres institutional architecture is in great flux, and there is
growing need for decisions about priorities and objectives. The Organization of A merican S tates, the worlds oldest regional institution,
has come under enormous stress as a result of the rapidly shifting political and economic context of
hemispheric relations. It is still the regions main political organization, with legitimacy to work across
a spectrum of issues, but it is badly in need of institutional reform, perhaps even a re-launching. For all its
problems, the OAS has a singular capacity to take on critical issues, including human rights, press freedom, and
democracy, that other, newer multilateral mechanisms seem years away from being able to handle
adequately. New groupingslike UNASUR and CELACmay have key roles to fulfill, but no institution can yet match the
normative frameworks developed over decades in the OAS. Regional organizations focused on finance and development
have emerged from the transformations stronger than their political counterparts. This may be because there is greater consensus on economic
management than political questions. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has gone through a difficult reform process, while the CAF
Development Bank of Latin America, with only Latin American members, has expanded considerably in recent years and extended its lending
throughout the region. Although not strictly a regional institution, Brazils National Development Bank has sharply increased its funding outside
Brazil, chiefly to support foreign investments by Brazilian companies on infrastructure and energy projects in neighboring countries. It is
encouraging how constructively Washington has responded to Latin Americas growing independence
and greater assertiveness in regional and global affairs. It has readily accommodated the hemispheres emerging
institutional landscape even though that includes new regional groupings from which the United States is excluded. Less encouraging,
but indicative of its shrinking political and diplomatic profile in the region, is the reduced US commitment to and active
engagement in some regional arrangements to which it does belong, among them the OAS and the Summit of the Americas. As the
OAS goes through a troubled period, it must have stronger engagement from member governments, including
effective involvement by the United S tates, in order to regain a central role in inter-American
affairs.

And Venezuela is much more likely to be receptive to the counterplan than the plan
AVN 11 (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, Venezuelan national news agency, Venezuela reiterates to
OAS commitment with inclusive democracy, November 21, 2011,
http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/venezuela-reiterates-oas-commitment-inclusive-democracy)
Caracas, 21 Nov. AVN.- Ten years after having signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Venezuela's delegation to the
Organization of American States (OAS) reiterated its political commitment against poverty and in favor of equality because "a
democracy without social inclusion is not democracy." Diplomat Maria Eugenia De los Rios said the statement in the OAS ordinary session held
Monday in Washington, United States, to hold a conversation among member states over the efficiency of implementing the Inter-American
Charter. De los Rios remarked that in Venezuela exists a participatory democracy which goes beyond the
representative model because it involves directly people's power. She also reminded to all member
states Venezuela's commitment to "respect the democratic path chosen by all nations," ahead of
threats constantly posed against "States which are not subject to a single version of democracy or to a
single model." "We have seen that some States are determined to destabilize democracy and have attempted against people's will," De
los Rios stated after expressing her support to Nicaragua, whose representative to the OAS denounced US meddling in its domestic affairs.
After congratulating the Central American country for their democratic exercise on he elections held last November 06, in which was reelected
Daniel Ortega as president, De los Rios denounced that factors seeking to destabilize Nicaragua's peace "are the same who were in charge of
destabilizing Venezuela's democracy."

Say yes
Neg Oas says yes

The OAS will say yes Latin American countries want the US to prioritize their
opinions consultation solves
Erickson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, associate for US policy and director of Caribbean programs at the Inter-
American Dialogue, taught Latin American politics at Johns Hopkins-SAIS, is frequently interviewed in
US and international media, and has testified before the US Congress, his past positions include
research associate at Harvard Business School and Fulbright scholar in US-Mexican business relations,
he is also a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, The Obama Administration and Latin
America: Towards a New Partnership? Working Paper No. 46, The Centre for International Governance
Innovation, April 2010, pg. 27, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Working_Paper%2046.pdf
Although the early hopes for momentous change have begun to dissipate, the presidency of Barack Obama
still has the potential to bring about an important restructuring of inter- American relations. In
retrospect, the initial warm glow of good feelings was always destined to give way to a more pragmatic understanding on both sides of the
relationship regarding the possibilities and limits of what the US and Latin America can expect of each other. But throughout the
Americas, the desire remains that Barack Obama will be attentive and respectful to the regions
concerns. The 44th president of the United States has already pledged to keep an open mind and
demonstrate a willingness to listen. The next step is to advance the strategy of substantive, issue-
oriented engagement that can sustain the goodwill that so much of the hemisphere felt upon his election to the White
House.

Majority
Say no args dont apply OAS only needs a majority to make decisions
OAS Charter, no date (Charter of the Organization of American States,
http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_Organization_of_American_States.htm#ch9)
Chapter IX THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY Article 54 The General Assembly is the supreme organ of the Organization of
American States. It has as its principal powers, in addition to such others as are assigned to it by the Charter, the following: a)
To decide the general action and policy of the Organization, determine the structure and functions of its organs, and
consider any matter relating to friendly relations among the American States; b) To establish measures for coordinating the
activities of the organs, agencies, and entities of the Organization among themselves, and such activities with those of the other
institutions of the interAmerican system; c) To strengthen and coordinate cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
d) To promote collaboration, especially in the economic, social, and cultural fields, with other international organizations whose purposes are
similar to those of the Organization of American States; e) To approve the program-budget of the Organization and
determine the quotas of the Member States; f) To consider the reports of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and the observations and recommendations presented by the Permanent Council with regard to the reports that should be
presented by the other organs and entities, in accordance with the provisions of Article 91.f, as well as the reports of any organ which may be
required by the General Assembly itself; g) To adopt general standards to govern the operations of the General Secretariat; and h) To
adopt its own rules of procedure and, by a twothirds vote, its agenda. The General Assembly shall exercise its powers in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter and of other inter-American treaties. Article 55 The General Assembly shall establish the bases for fixing the quota
that each Government is to contribute to the maintenance of the Organization, taking into account the ability to pay of the respective countries
and their determination to contribute in an equitable manner. Decisions on budgetary matters require the approval of two thirds of the
Member States. Article 56 All Member States have the right to be represented in the General Assembly. Each
State has the right to one vote. Article 57 The General Assembly shall convene annually during the period determined by the rules
of procedure and at a place selected in accordance with the principle of rotation. At each regular session the date and place of the next regular
session shall be determined, in accordance with the rules of procedure. If for any reason the General Assembly cannot be held at the place
chosen, it shall meet at the General Secretariat, unless one of the Member States should make a timely offer of a site in its territory, in which
case the Permanent Council of the Organization may agree that the General Assembly will meet in that place. Article 58 In special
circumstances and with the approval of two thirds of the Member States, the Permanent Council shall convoke a special session of the General
Assembly. Article 59 Decisions of the General Assembly shall be adopted by the affirmative vote of an
absolute majority of the Member States, except in those cases that require a twothirds vote as provided in the Charter or as may
be provided by the General Assembly in its rules of procedure. Article 60 There shall be a Preparatory Committee of the General Assembly,
composed of representatives of all the Member States, which shall: a) Prepare the draft agenda of each session of the General Assembly; b)
Review the proposed program-budget and the draft resolution on quotas, and present to the General Assembly a report thereon containing the
recommendations it considers appropriate; and c) Carry out such other functions as the General Assembly may assign to it. The draft agenda
and the report shall, in due course, be transmitted to the Governments of the Member States.

Say yes mexico

Mexico says yes for economic engagement empirically proven
OAS 12 (Organization of American States, OAS and Mexico Agree to Implement Technical Cooperation
Activities for the Benefit of other Countries, press release, OAS, April 25, 2012, http://go-
jamaica.com/pressrelease/item.php?id=509)
The Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Jos Miguel Insulza, and the Executive Director of
the Mexican Agency for International Development, Roger Granguillhome today signed a memorandum of
understanding for the implementation of technical cooperation activities such as assistance, expert exchange and
training seeking to foster the economic and social development of other countries. The Secretary General Insulza stressed
how the nature and definition of international cooperation has changes in recent decades. "Before, cooperation in the hemisphere was almost
entirely limited to the North-South cooperation, and not conceived in a different way of that which came from more developed countries to the
less developed. Over the years, the countries of the region have gradually acquired a knowledge and technical capacity that can be transferred
to other countries in the developing world, "he said. The OAS representative also stressed the willingness of the more
developed member countries to cooperate with the most vulnerable, and welcomed the initiative of
the Mexican International Cooperation Agency to sign an agreement that will "substantially
strengthen our work in the area of cooperation, especially in institutional strengthening and human
resource training." At the signing ceremony, the representative of the Mexican Agency welcomed the OAS'
willingness to create opportunities to strengthen the ties of cooperation between the countries of the
region and said that the government of his country attaches "a role of fundamental importance to
international organizations in the new global architecture for development, given their representativeness and
their ability to mobilize and articulate collective joint efforts. " In this regard, Granguillhome said that the OAS "plays an important
role among the priorities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico," either as a partner in the deployment of
cooperation or as a benchmark of best practices in the hemisphere. The Mexican representative noted that the memorandum of
understanding signed today "will open new avenues of interaction in an area of ??growing importance such as triangular cooperation", adding
that the agreement will allow the sum of interagency strengths to maximize the human, technological and budget resources allocated to
cooperation, which will result in more effective support for the various subregions of the continent. Prior to the signing, held at OAS
headquarters in Washington, DC, OAS Secretary General and the Agency's Executive Director held a private meeting during which they talked
about the role of Mexico as current president of the G20, cooperation in Haiti and the ways in which the OAS will provide a bridge for triangular
cooperation with Caribbean countries.

Mexico and Latin America cooperate with the OAS
OAS 12 (Department of Sustainable Development, Organization of American States, Mexico and the
OAS announce ReefFix: An Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) Ecosystem Services Valuation
and Capacity Building Project for the Caribbean, press release, OAS, October 18, 2012,
http://openchannels.org/sites/default/files/news/Pressrelease_Mexico%20and%20the%20OAS.pdf)
" Recognizing the priority given by the Caribbean Countries to preserve marine areas, Mexico and the OAS, within the framework of the
Memorandum of Understanding signed between the OAS and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico through the Mexican Agency for
International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID), announced the Project "ReefFix: An Integrated Coastal Zone
Management (ICZM) Ecosystem Services Valuation and Capacity Building Project for the Caribbean".
Mexicos Permanent Representative to the OAS, Amb. Joel Hernndez, highlighted that this project seeks to
enhance the capacity of participating countries to value and measure ecosystem services and
strengthen frameworks for coastal zone management. It will also complement initiatives for the conservation and
sustainable use of the Mesoamerican Barrier Reef System. The ReefFix project has been designed to be replicated throughout
the Caribbean by providing the building blocks for stakeholder involvement, socio-economic and bio-physical analysis, and lessons
learned. This project has the objectives to complete (i) Ecosystem Services Valuation: Countries will generate data on the value of ecosystem
services of selected sites utilizing ecosystem valuation methodologies, (ii) Capacity Building: Civil society, coastal communities stakeholders,
and government officials will be trained in ecosystem valuation methodologies and marine protected area management and (iii) Dissemination
of Results and Lessons Learned: Conclusions and lessons learned will be disseminated to a wide audience throughout the Americas. The
Executive Secretary for Integral Development, Jorge Saggiante, noted the importance of these efforts to
promote triangular cooperation and underlined that the recently signed Agreement between the OAS
and Mexico is a model for these types of mechanisms. Moreover, he recognized Mexicos extensive experience on
coastal management both the Caribbean and Pacific Coasts. The representatives of the Caribbean countries celebrated Mexicos initiative and
highlighted that protecting vital ecosystems in marine areas as well as coral reefs is a priority for the Caribbean region. The project will build
upon an earlier effort supported by the Government of Chile to improve technical capacity for ecosystem valuation of Caribbean countries to
collect and manage data on their protected areas. This project also counts with the participation of the Princely Government of Monaco.
Mexico's Permanent Representative to the OAS, was joined by his counterparts from Antigua and Barbuda,
Barbados, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, St Kitts Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad Tobago and
by Representatives from Colombia and the United States at the OAS headquarters in Washington D.C.

Mexico wants the OAS to be involved organized crime summit proves
OAS 12 (Organization of American States, Mexico and OAS to Hold Hemispheric Meeting against
Transnational Organized Crime, press release, OAS, February 27, 2012,
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-062/12)
The Organization of American States ( OAS ) will serve as the framework for the High-Level Hemispheric Meeting
against Transnational Organized Crime convened by the Mexican government , to be held March 1st and 2nd,
2012, in Mexico City, and to be inaugurated by the President of Mexico, Felipe Caldern. The regional meeting will also feature
the participation of OAS Secretary General Jos Miguel Insulza, Mexicos Foreign Affairs Minister, Ambassador Patricia
Espinosa, and Minister Marisela Morales Ibez, the host countrys Attorney General, among other officials. Jos Miguel Insulza assessed
the importance of the thematic agenda of the Mexico gathering, noting that transnational organized crime is the
principal continental source of activities such as drug trafficking, the illicit trafficking of firearms and immigrants, human trafficking, money
laundering, corruption, kidnapping, and cybercrimes. He placed emphasis on the danger of the organization capabilities of transnational crime,
adding that when control of organized crime over neighborhoods, communities or broader geographical areas impedes or substitutes for the
work of public institutions, we are before a full threat to democratic governance. The meeting in the Mexican capital will
convene attorneys general and prosecutors from the countries of the Technical Group against
Transnational Organized Crime (GTDOT), organized within the OAS with the purpose of elaborating concrete
proposals to optimize the activities of governments against the organized crime phenomenon. It will be an important complement to the
Meeting of Ministers of Justice or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA), also held in the framework of the hemispheric organization.
Among the issues to be discussed in Mexico City are the importance of effectively combating
organized crime through legal and institutional modernization; progress in the region on penalizing criminal activities
set in the Palermo Convention; and the strengthening of institutions in the fight against transnational organized crime in the Caribbean, among
other things. The meeting will feature numerous brief presentations on various issues, followed by open dialogue between the delegations.

Say yes Venezuela

Venezuela says yes - empirics
AVN 11 (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, Venezuelan national news agency, Venezuela reiterates to
OAS commitment with inclusive democracy, November 21, 2011,
http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/venezuela-reiterates-oas-commitment-inclusive-democracy)
Caracas, 21 Nov. AVN.- Ten years after having signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, Venezuela's delegation to the
Organization of American States (OAS) reiterated its political commitment against poverty and in favor of equality because "a
democracy without social inclusion is not democracy." Diplomat Maria Eugenia De los Rios said the statement in the OAS ordinary session held
Monday in Washington, United States, to hold a conversation among member states over the efficiency of implementing the Inter-American
Charter. De los Rios remarked that in Venezuela exists a participatory democracy which goes beyond the
representative model because it involves directly people's power. She also reminded to all member
states Venezuela's commitment to "respect the democratic path chosen by all nations," ahead of
threats constantly posed against "States which are not subject to a single version of democracy or to a
single model." "We have seen that some States are determined to destabilize democracy and have attempted against people's will," De
los Rios stated after expressing her support to Nicaragua, whose representative to the OAS denounced US meddling in its domestic affairs.
After congratulating the Central American country for their democratic exercise on he elections held last November 06, in which was reelected
Daniel Ortega as president, De los Rios denounced that factors seeking to destabilize Nicaragua's peace "are the same who were in charge of
destabilizing Venezuela's democracy."

They go to the OAS to try and promote energy interests
Universal 7 (El Universal, Venezuelan news source, Venezuela proposes energy integration and
cooperation at OAS, April 10, 2007, http://www.eluniversal.com/2007/04/10/en_pol_art_venezuela-
proposes-e_10A853795.shtml)
Energy integration and cooperation based on solidarity and reciprocity to fight poverty, attain
peoples' economic and social development, and build democratic societies upon social equality was
proposed at the Organization of American States (OAS) by Jorge Valero, the Venezuelan Foreign Vice-Minister for North American
and Multilateral Affairs and OAS permanent representative. Valero made such a request during his first speech acting as chair of the OAS Permanent
Council, during a regular meeting held in Washington D.C. As quoted by official Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias (ABN), Valero told OAS representatives that there is
need to consider whether energy can be used to attain a sustainable development or, on the contrary,
to increase foreign debt and dependence. Valero explained that the most vulnerable countries in the
hemisphere, that lack hydrocarbons, should have a fair, equitable and universal access to energy for
the purposes of comprehensive development to the benefit of their peoples.

Solvency

Democracy
OAS solves your democracy internal links
Meyer 4-8 (Peter J. Meyer, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service,
Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service,
p. 8-10, April 8, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42639.pdf)
Democracy Promotion The OAS has taken a much more active role in promoting and defending democracy
since the end of the Cold War and the return to civilian governance in most of the hemisphere. Member states approved a series
of instruments designed to support democratic governance,25 culminating in the adoption of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter on September 11, 2001. The charter asserts that the peoples of the
Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend
it.26 The OAS has sought to uphold these commitments through a number of activities, which include support for, and
observation of, elections; technical assistance and other programs to foster institutional development and good
governance; and the coordination of collective action when democratic institutions are threatened. While many analysts assert that the OAS
has played an important role in normalizing democratic governance in the region,27 some scholars maintain that the organization is selective in
its defense of democracy.28 Electoral Observation Missions One of the primary ways in which the OAS promotes
democracy is through electoral observation missions. Since its first observation mission in 1962, the OAS has
observed more than 200 electoral processes in 27 countries in the hemisphere.29 Over the years, the OAS has earned a
reputation for impartiality and technical competence, playing an important role in the legitimization of electoral processes as many Latin
American and Caribbean countries transitioned from authoritarian rule to representative democracy.30 Some analysts have been critical of OAS
observation missions in certain instances, however, maintaining that the organization has occasionally offered legitimacy to flawed elections.31
Today, the objectives of OAS electoral observation missions include observing electoral processes; encouraging citizen participation; verifying
compliance with election laws; ensuring electoral processes are conducted in impartial, reliable, and transparent manners; and making
recommendations to improve electoral systems. The OAS observes several electoral processes every year, but each mission must be invited by
the country holding the election and must solicit separate funding from the international donor community. In 2012, the OAS monitored
electoral processes in six countries: the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico.32 Institutional
Strengthening The OAS also promotes democracy by providing technical assistance to member states
designed to strengthen institutions and improve good governance. Among other activities, the organizations
Secretariat for Political Affairs conducts research, provides training in public management, analyzes risk factors for democratic instability, and
promotes cooperation among government officials. It also supports conflict resolution efforts. The OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in
Colombia, for example, provides verification and advisory support to the Colombian government regarding the demobilization and
reintegration into society of illegal armed groups.33 In 1996, OAS member states adopted the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption.34 The convention is designed to improve government transparency by strengthening anti-corruption laws and facilitating
cooperation among member states. Under the follow-up mechanism on the implementation of the convention, member states submit
themselves to a reciprocal review process that evaluates how well they are implementing the convention, formulates recommendations for
improving anti-corruption efforts, and facilitates the exchange of information to harmonize the regions anti-corruption legal frameworks.35
Collective Defense of Democracy In addition to supporting elections and institutional strengthening activities,
the OAS undertakes diplomatic initiatives designed to protect and restore democracy. As noted above, by
adopting the Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS member states accepted an obligation to promote and defend democratic governance.
However, disagreements among member states regarding when it is appropriate for the OAS to apply the provisions of the Democratic Charter
have limited the organizations actions. Article 20 of the Democratic Charterwhich allows for collective action in the event of an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member statehas been invoked by
the OAS on only three occasions,36 each of which followed the ouster of a president. In other instances, such as conflicts between branches of
government or the erosion of liberal democratic institutions by democratically elected leaders, member states generally have been unwilling to
support bold OAS actions, deferring instead to the principle of nonintervention.37 (For more discussion of the charter and its application, see
Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter below).

Drug trafficking

OAS solves drug trafficking in Latin America
Anti-drug Efforts Concerns that the production, trafficking, and consumption of illegal narcotics posed a
serious threat to the entire Western Hemisphere led OAS member states to establish the Inter-
American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD by its Spanish acronym) in 1986.54 The commissions primary
purpose is to develop and promote a comprehensive anti-drug policy for the region. CICADs most recent
hemispheric drug strategy was adopted in May 2010. It defines the world drug problem as a complex, dynamic and multi-causal phenomenon
that requires shared responsibility among all states.55 The strategy includes over 50 guidelines for member states in
the areas of institutional strengthening, demand reduction, supply reduction, control measures, and
international cooperation. It also includes some policy shifts from the previous strategy, such as calling on member states to treat
drug addiction as a public health matter and explore treatment and rehabilitation as alternatives to criminal prosecution. In addition to
formulating strategy, CICAD assists OAS member states in strengthening their antidrug policies . It conducts
research, develops and recommends legislation, and provides technical assistance and specialized training. CICAD also conducts assessments of
member states progress through its multilateral evaluation mechanism. Each member state is required to submit reports documenting their
efforts to combat drug trafficking and related activities, which are then evaluated by a multidisciplinary group of experts who are appointed by
each of the member states but do not evaluate their own countries. The experts identify strengths and weaknesses and
offer recommendations.56 For example, each of the five evaluations of the United States conducted since the 1999-2000 review
period has noted that the country has yet to ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials (CIFTA by its Spanish acronym), and has recommended that it do so.57 Although some
analysts contend that CICAD reinforces Washingtons hardline approach to illicit narcotics,58 others assert that the commission and
its multilateral evaluation mechanism have been instrumental in building trust and establishing
common ground for cooperation between the United S tates and other OAS member states .59 For
example, several regional leaders expressed frustration with the results of U.S.-backed counternarcotics policies in the lead up to the April 2012
Summit of the Americas. The heads of state attending the Summit called for the OAS to analyze the results of current policies and explore new
approaches that may be more effective. The policy review is occurring within CICAD and is intended to ensure that the
hemisphere moves forward with a unified approach.60

Economy general

Solves Latin American growth
Economic and Social Development Although the region has made considerable strides in terms of economic growth and social inclusion,
poverty and inequality levels remain high in many countries, and the OAS continues to support development efforts. The
organizations Department of Economic Development, Trade and Tourism, for example, supports efforts to
enhance the productivity and competitiveness of economic actors in the region, with particular emphasis on
micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs). It provides assistance to MSMEs designed to strengthen their
capacities to take advantage of trade and tourism opportunities, and encourages the use of science
and technology to foster sustainable growth .50 The Special Multilateral Fund of the Inter-American Council for Integral
Development (FEMCIDI) also supports development efforts. It was established in 1997 to address the most urgent needs of
member states, especially those with smaller and more vulnerable economies. FEMCIDI projects are designed to strengthen
institutions, build human capacity, and act as a seed fund for more far-reaching development
programs. During the 2011-2012 funding cycle, projects receiving FEMCIDI support were focused in the areas of education, culture, and
science and technology. The fund also supports development efforts related to trade, labor, tourism, the
environment, and economic diversification.51 The Inter-American Social Protection Network is one of the more recent efforts
by the OAS to foster economic and social development in the hemisphere. It was launched in September 2009 as a forum for member states to
share experiences and best practices with regards to social protection systems. Over the past two decades, several countries in the region have
implemented conditional cash transfer programs52 or other innovative initiatives that have proven successful at reducing poverty and
inequality. Through the Inter-American Social Protection Network, the OAS intends to facilitate the introduction of such programs to countries
that have yet to establish effective social protection policies.53

Human Rights

OAS solves human rights promotion better than the aff
Human Rights Protection
Many analysts consider the inter-American human rights system to be the most effective part of the
OAS.38 Unlike most of the organizations bodies, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights are autonomous, allowing them to execute their mandates to
promote and protect human rights39 without needing to establish consensus among member states on every
action. Consequently, advocates maintain, the two bodies are able to take on the pivotal role of condemnation
and early warning in response to situations that undermine the consolidation of democracy and rule
of law in the hemisphere.40 In the first decades after its 1959 inception, the IACHRs documentation of human rights violations
brought international attention to the abuses of repressive regimes. Although the human rights situation in the hemisphere has improved
significantly as countries have transitioned away from dictatorships to democratic governments, the IACHR continues to play a significant role.
Among other actions, the IACHR receives, analyzes, and investigates individual petitions alleging human rights
violations. In recent years, it has received roughly 1,500 such petitions annually.41 It also issues
requests to governments to adopt precautionary measures in certain cases where individuals or
groups are at risk of suffering serious and irreparable harm to their human rights. The IACHR receives several
hundred petitions for precautionary measures annually, and in 2012, it issued requests to governments in 26 cases.42 Additionally, the
IACHR observes the general human rights situations in member states, conducting on-site visits to
carry out in-depth analyses; publishing special reports when warranted; and noting in its annual report which countries human
rights situations deserve special attention, follow-up, and monitoring. In its most recent annual report (issued in April 2012 and covering 2011),
the IACHR made special note of the human rights situations in Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, and Venezuela.43 (For information on potential
reforms of the IACHR, see Reform of the Inter-American Human Rights System below). Since 1990, the IACHR has created rapporteurships to
draw attention to emerging human rights issues and certain groups that are particularly at risk of human rights violations due to vulnerability
and discrimination. There are currently ten rapporteurships, which focus on freedom of expression, human rights defenders, economic, social
and cultural rights, and the rights of women, children, indigenous peoples, afro-descendants, prisoners, migrant workers, and lesbian, gay,
trans, bisexual and intersex persons. These rapporteurships have been rather effective at drawing attention to
potential abuses. In February 2012, for example, the Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression immediately expressed deep
concern after Ecuadors National Court of Justice affirmed criminal and civil judgments against three newspaper executives and a journalist that
had been found guilty of criminal defamation of an authority for publishing a column critical of President Rafael Correa. The Rapporteurs
vocal criticism helped initiate a wave of international outcry, which likely contributed to President Correas decision not to enforce the
sentences.44 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, created in 1978, is an autonomous judicial institution charged with interpreting and
applying the American Convention on Human Rights. Currently, 21 of the OAS member states accept the courts jurisdiction; the United States
does not.45 According to a number of analysts, the Inter-American Court has played an important role in the
development of international human rights case law, securing justice for individual victims while
facilitating structural changes to prevent future violations.46 For example, the court has issued landmark rulings
requiring states to investigate human rights violations and punish those responsible, regardless of any amnesty laws that they may have
adopted. In February 2011, the court maintained this principle when ruling on the case of Mara Claudia Garca Iruretagoyena de Gelman. Ms.
Gelman was an Argentine citizen who was detained by the Argentine military, transferred to Uruguay during the countrys dictatorship, had her
daughter taken from her shortly after giving birth, and then disappeared while in the custody of the Uruguayan security forces. In addition to
awarding monetary damages to the daughter of Ms. Gelman, the court ordered Uruguay to carry out a full investigation of the case, and comply
with its obligations under inter-American human rights treaties by ensuring that the countrys amnesty law is not an obstacle to investigating
and punishing human rights violations.47 In October 2011, the Uruguayan Congress passed legislation48 to amendand effectively overturn
the countrys amnesty law, with proponents arguing that it was necessary in order to comply with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ruling.49

Terrorism
Empirical support OAS anti-terror efforts succeed
Anti-terrorism Efforts In the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the OAS took action to strengthen
hemispheric cooperation against terrorism.61 The OAS was the first international organization to formally condemn the
attacks of September 11, adopting a Permanent Council resolution on September 19 that called the terrorist actions an attack against all States
of the Americas.62 It also adopted a resolution, at Brazils request, to invoke the Rio Treatythe collective security pact of the Western
Hemisphere.63 A Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs64 adopted another resolution on September 21, which included
provisions that called on OAS member states to pursue, capture, prosecute, and punish...the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the
terrorist acts; deny terrorist groups the ability to operate within their territories; and strengthen anti-terrorism cooperation.65 In June 2002,
OAS member states adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, through which they
committed to take action against the financing of terrorism, ratify U.N. anti-terrorism instruments,
improve cooperation among law enforcement, and deny asylum to suspected terrorists.66 Cooperation
on terrorism issues has continued through the reinvigorated Inter-American Committee on Terrorism
(CICTE by its Spanish acronym). CICTE was established in 1999 and serves as the primary forum for cooperation on terrorism issues within the
hemisphere. It provides a range of programs to assist member states in preventing, combating, and
eliminating terrorism, and meeting their commitments under the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. These programs
support efforts in five areas: border controls, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism legislative assistance, crisis management
exercises, and promotion of international cooperation and partnerships.67 In 2011, CICTE conducted 117 training courses, technical assistance
missions, and other activities that benefited more than 5,800 participants.68

US key

OAS solves and promotes US interests
CFR 8 (Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Latin America Relations: A New Direction for a New Reality,
Independent Task Force Report No. 60, pg. 4, published 2008,
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/LatinAmericaTF.pdf )
In pursuing its objectives through the concrete policy recommendations laid out in this report, the United States must focus its
efforts and resources on helping Latin America strengthen the public institutions necessary to address
the challenges identified in this report. In doing so, Washington should work in partnership with Latin American
nations through multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, Inter- American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary
Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation, and Organization of American States (OAS). It should also continue to work closely with civil
society organizations and domestic and international businesses to create more inclusive economic, social, and political opportunities for Latin
American countries and their citizens, which will benefit U.S. policy goals. Achieving the ambitious goals of strengthening
institutions and improving the lives of Latin Americans will require long-term efforts on the part of many
participants, most importantly Latin American governments and societies themselves. Nevertheless, there is a significant
supporting role for the United States. Expanding its policy framework and concentrating on strategic
regional partnerships will best promote U.S. interests , enhancing stability, security, and prosperity
throughout the hemisphere.

OAS is key most effective body in Latin America
Rettig 12 (Jessica Rettig, freelance journalist, World Politics Review, previously worked in Washington,
D.C., as a politics and policy reporter for U.S. News & World Report, OAS Still Relevant Amid Rising Latin
American Regionalism, article, World Politics Review, April 12, 2012,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11838/oas-still-relevant-amid-rising-latin-american-
regionalism)
CARTAGENA, Colombia -- The Organization of A merican S tates prides itself on being the worlds oldest regional
organization. Yet, as its members prepare for the Sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, this weekend, its relevance in
todays world, especially amid Latin Americas recent wave of regionalism, will be called into question. The OAS remains the best-
organized and most inclusive body in the Western Hemisphere, and apart from bilateral relationships, it is
considered the prominent link between the United S tates and Latin America . Nevertheless, the regions
increasingly diversified global engagement and a growing sense of autonomy among Latin American nations has raised existential questions
about the long-standing body, and by the same token, about the influence of the United States in Latin America. Perhaps the most visible
challenge today comes in the form of alternative regional groupings, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), created by Brazil
in 2008, or the smaller and more radical Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), which began as an agreement between Cuba and Venezuela in 2004. In
addition, just this past December, in Caracas, Venezuela, regional leaders established the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC) as their newest multilateral mechanism. Taking care to exclude the United States and Canada from its membership, certain regional
leaders, notably Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez, hailed CELAC as an outright rebuff of the OAS and its North American members role in the
affairs of Latin America. For Chvez and his fellow leftist counterparts in the region, such as Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, CELACs
creation marked a point of arrival and a point of departure" for Latin America, as Chvez put it, a symbol of its success and a break from its
dependence on the United States. By contrast, other states in the region have adopted a more pragmatic, less political view of the newer
regional forums. According to Sandra Borda, international relations professor at the University of the Andes in Bogot, more-centrist countries
such as Colombia simply see these new entities as additional forums to address the regions problems, particularly those in which the United
States does not necessarily need to play a role. *Theres a growing perception that+ this region is powerful enough at this point in the story,
Borda says. The U.S. is not in a position to intervene or exercise a lot of power over Latin American
countries. So whats the purpose of having the U.S. in these organizations? Indeed, Borda argues that rather than representing a rejection
of the United States or a Cold War-like dynamic of picking sides, the rise of these new organizations may simply reflect a practical recognition
that the United States has been increasingly less inclined -- and for domestic political and economic reasons, less able -- to intervene in Latin
American matters. Though the United States has in some ways worked to increase economic partnerships with many Latin American nations --
most notably through the trade agreements with Colombia and Panama approved last year -- it has been preoccupied elsewhere. Internally,
debates over burgeoning federal deficits and a slow-going economic recovery limit its capability to deliver foreign or military aid. Likewise, even
as its wars draw down in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States will continue to keep a close eye on the Middle East. Moreover, the Obama
administrations much-hyped pivot toward Asia makes it even less likely that Washington will prioritize Latin America among its list of
geopolitical concerns. Still, what some have called a lack of attention to Latin America may, in the end, be a blessing, as the region continues to
seek solutions internally. The region has matured significantly, and though its nations still look to the United States for assistance on certain
issues -- such as the lasting drug-trafficking problem in Colombia and Central America, for instance -- there are others where regional powers
are now more confident in their own autonomy. They have been used to having the U.S. around for such a long time; its very difficult just to
conceive the idea of solving a crisis without the U.S., Borda says. But I think they are going to get used it. Partly as a result of the weakening
impact of the United States, new regional groupings, particularly UNASUR, have become especially attractive for Brazil, which has emerged as
Latin Americas standout global power. As it solidifies its economic potential as one of the so-called BRICS nations and seeks a permanent seat
on the United Nations Security Council, Brazils reach throughout the rest of South America could be an important selling point. Such regional
organizations could help to consolidate that influence, while also embedding it in a multilateral context that reassures Brazils neighbors. That
said, given the conflicting national interests, lack of trust and stark ideological differences among member states, its unlikely that any
of these new organizations will make significant progress toward economic or political integration.
Rather, in the foreseeable future, experts agree that these groups -- which fall significantly short of the OAS in
structure -- will remain additional avenues for monitoring issues, defusing conflicts and fostering discussion within
the region. Even with its own limitations, the OAS is still much better-equipped financially and
organizationally to encourage solutions on issues such as poverty, human rights and democracy than
the other regional groups. And despite calls for its replacement, the OAS will continue to be a valuable nexus for
both its North and South American members.

OAS Good
Oas good general

Cooperative engagement is key and resolves your solvency deficits about US action
Forman et al 2 (Shepard Forman, Director Emeritus and Senior Fellow of the Center on International
Cooperation at New York University, research professor, NYU Department of Politics, Princeton Lyman,
former US ambassador to Nigeria and South Africa, Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director of the
International Institutions and Global Governance Program, The United States in a Global Age: The Case
for Multilateral Engagement, policy paper, Center on International Cooperation at New York University,
published 2002, http://www.centroedelstein.org.br/PDF/US_Global_Age.pdf)
THE CASE FOR COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT The rise of global challenges to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda makes
multilateral cooperation an increasingly indispensable vehicle for the pursuit of U.S. national
interests and objectives . The country has little choice but to collaborate with foreign governments and
international institutions in order to grapple with todays pressing transnational challenges, whether these involve managing the
global commons, keeping peace in troubled regions, ensuring global financial stability, or curbing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
In each of these realms and so many others multilateral frameworks for international cooperation permit the
United States and its partners to consult, resolve differences, design solutions, share burdens and
risks, coordinate action, and monitor and enforce commitments. A strategy of multilateralism recognizes that the
vigorous pursuit of U.S. national interests is often best accomplished through international institutions and
partnerships. It recognizes that there are limits to going it alone, particularly in dealing with challenges that transcend national borders and
elicit global concern. In most cases, multilateralism expands rather than restricts U.S. options, permitting the
United States to achieve otherwise unreachable goals, to share burdens in pursuing these objectives, and not least to
win legitimacy for its policies. One of the dilemmas that the United States confronts in a unipolar
world is how to exercise its overwhelming power in ways that neither threaten other countries nor encourage their
resistance. Multilateralism provides a partial solution to this quandary. By exercising its leadership through consensual
institutions that give voice and satisfaction to the less powerful while placing only modest constraints on its own policy autonomy and
sovereign prerogatives, the United States can reassure weaker states that fear exploitation or abandonment,
increase their willingness to follow the U.S. lead, and consolidate a productive and peaceful world that
will advance long-term U.S. interests .

US cooperation through the OAS solves
Hoose 7 (Matthew S Hoose, Major, US Air Force, US OPPORTUNITY IN VENEZUELA: A 21ST CENTURY
GOOD NEIGHBOR STRATEGY, Research Report Submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the
Graduation Requirements, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2007,
http://dtlweb.au.af.mil///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18xL2FwYWNoZV9t
ZWRpYS8yNTUzMQ==.pdf)
The UN has repeatedly urged an end to the US embargo of Cuba and its repeal and acceptance of Cuba could be a major turning point for US
diplomacy and popularity throughout the region, much like its repeal of the Platt Amendment in the early 20th Century71. Countries
posing no real threat shouldnt be contained, but accepted and cooperated with. Unlike Iran and N. Korea,
which require containment because of their support to terrorism and development of nuclear weapons, countries like Cuba and
Venezuela pose no immediate danger. Isolating and punishing these countries only results in lost
economic opportunities, world resentment and an external enemy for their leaders to focus blame on.
If the US reverses its course and adopts a modern day Good Neighbor policy, anti-US leaders will lose a significant
platform from which they retain popularity and power. The power of a sincere apology can affect
people to the core, and regardless of what anti-US media response follows, there will be Latin Americans that give the US another look
following such an apology. The State Department should make immediate and frequent trips to continue engagement in establishing free trade
agreements and economic ties with countries like Brazil as they work toward agreements to expand research, share technology, stimulate new
investment, and develop common international standards for biofuels72. This engagement should be inclusive of all of Latin
America, and overtures toward Venezuela should be made regardless of whether they accept them. The US should also work
through the Organization of A merican S tates and create a commission to determine how best the US can help
economically instead of only proposing its neoliberal policy of free trade and market economy as the
only economic solution.

2nc a2: US key (these arent in our compiled file for whatever reason)

OAS solves and promotes US interests
In pursuing its objectives through the concrete policy recommendations laid out in this report, the United States must focus its
efforts and resources on helping Latin America strengthen the public institutions necessary to
address the challenges identified in this report. In doing so, Washington should work in partnership with Latin
American nations through multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, Inter- American Development Bank (IDB),
International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation, and Organization of American States (OAS). It should also
continue to work closely with civil society organizations and domestic and international businesses to create more inclusive economic, social,
and political opportunities for Latin American countries and their citizens, which will benefit U.S. policy goals. Achieving the
ambitious goals of strengthening institutions and improving the lives of Latin Americans will require
long-term efforts on the part of many participants, most importantly Latin American governments and societies themselves.
Nevertheless, there is a significant supporting role for the United States. Expanding its policy framework
and concentrating on strategic regional partnerships will best promote U.S. interests , enhancing
stability, security, and prosperity throughout the hemisphere.

OAS is key most effective body in Latin America
Rettig 12 (Jessica Rettig, freelance journalist, World Politics Review, previously worked in Washington,
D.C., as a politics and policy reporter for U.S. News & World Report, OAS Still Relevant Amid Rising Latin
American Regionalism, article, World Politics Review, April 12, 2012,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11838/oas-still-relevant-amid-rising-latin-american-
regionalism)
CARTAGENA, Colombia -- The Organization of A merican S tates prides itself on being the worlds oldest regional
organization. Yet, as its members prepare for the Sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia, this weekend, its relevance in
todays world, especially amid Latin Americas recent wave of regionalism, will be called into question. The OAS remains the
best-organized and most inclusive body in the Western Hemisphere, and apart from bilateral relationships, it is
considered the prominent link between the United S tates and Latin America . Nevertheless, the regions
increasingly diversified global engagement and a growing sense of autonomy among Latin American nations has raised existential questions
about the long-standing body, and by the same token, about the influence of the United States in Latin America. Perhaps the most visible
challenge today comes in the form of alternative regional groupings, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), created by Brazil
in 2008, or the smaller and more radical Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA), which began as an agreement between Cuba and Venezuela in 2004. In
addition, just this past December, in Caracas, Venezuela, regional leaders established the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
(CELAC) as their newest multilateral mechanism. Taking care to exclude the United States and Canada from its membership, certain regional
leaders, notably Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez, hailed CELAC as an outright rebuff of the OAS and its North American members role in the
affairs of Latin America. For Chvez and his fellow leftist counterparts in the region, such as Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, CELACs
creation marked a point of arrival and a point of departure" for Latin America, as Chvez put it, a symbol of its success and a break from its
dependence on the United States. By contrast, other states in the region have adopted a more pragmatic, less political view of the newer
regional forums. According to Sandra Borda, international relations professor at the University of the Andes in Bogot, more-centrist countries
such as Colombia simply see these new entities as additional forums to address the regions problems, particularly those in which the United
States does not necessarily need to play a role. *Theres a growing perception that+ this region is powerful enough at this point in the
story, Borda says. The U.S. is not in a position to intervene or exercise a lot of power over Latin American
countries. So whats the purpose of having the U.S. in these organizations? Indeed, Borda argues that rather than representing a
rejection of the United States or a Cold War-like dynamic of picking sides, the rise of these new organizations may simply reflect a practical
recognition that the United States has been increasingly less inclined -- and for domestic political and economic reasons, less able -- to
intervene in Latin American matters. Though the United States has in some ways worked to increase economic partnerships with many Latin
American nations -- most notably through the trade agreements with Colombia and Panama approved last year -- it has been preoccupied
elsewhere. Internally, debates over burgeoning federal deficits and a slow-going economic recovery limit its capability to deliver foreign or
military aid. Likewise, even as its wars draw down in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States will continue to keep a close eye on the Middle
East. Moreover, the Obama administrations much-hyped pivot toward Asia makes it even less likely that Washington will prioritize Latin
America among its list of geopolitical concerns. Still, what some have called a lack of attention to Latin America may, in the end, be a
blessing, as the region continues to seek solutions internally. The region has matured significantly, and though its nations still look to the United
States for assistance on certain issues -- such as the lasting drug-trafficking problem in Colombia and Central America, for instance -- there are
others where regional powers are now more confident in their own autonomy. They have been used to having the U.S. around for such a
long time; its very difficult just to conceive the idea of solving a crisis without the U.S., Borda says. But I think they are going to get used it.
Partly as a result of the weakening impact of the United States, new regional groupings, particularly UNASUR, have become especially
attractive for Brazil, which has emerged as Latin Americas standout global power. As it solidifies its economic potential as one of the so-called
BRICS nations and seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, Brazils reach throughout the rest of South America could be
an important selling point. Such regional organizations could help to consolidate that influence, while also embedding it in a multilateral
context that reassures Brazils neighbors. That said, given the conflicting national interests, lack of trust and stark ideological differences
among member states, its unlikely that any of these new organizations will make significant progress
toward economic or political integration. Rather, in the foreseeable future, experts agree that these groups -- which
fall significantly short of the OAS in structure -- will remain additional avenues for monitoring issues,
defusing conflicts and fostering discussion within the region. Even with its own limitations, the OAS is still much
better-equipped financially and organizationally to encourage solutions on issues such as poverty,
human rights and democracy than the other regional groups. And despite calls for its replacement, the OAS will
continue to be a valuable nexus for both its North and South American members.

2nc a2: oas fails

Cooperative engagement is key and resolves your solvency deficits about US action
THE CASE FOR COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT The rise of global challenges to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda makes
multilateral cooperation an increasingly indispensable vehicle for the pursuit of U.S. national
interests and objectives . The country has little choice but to collaborate with foreign governments and
international institutions in order to grapple with todays pressing transnational challenges, whether these involve managing the
global commons, keeping peace in troubled regions, ensuring global financial stability, or curbing terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
In each of these realms and so many others multilateral frameworks for international cooperation permit the
United States and its partners to consult, resolve differences, design solutions, share burdens and
risks, coordinate action, and monitor and enforce commitments. A strategy of multilateralism recognizes that the
vigorous pursuit of U.S. national interests is often best accomplished through international institutions and
partnerships. It recognizes that there are limits to going it alone, particularly in dealing with challenges that transcend national borders and
elicit global concern. In most cases, multilateralism expands rather than restricts U.S. options, permitting the
United States to achieve otherwise unreachable goals, to share burdens in pursuing these objectives, and not least to
win legitimacy for its policies. One of the dilemmas that the United States confronts in a unipolar
world is how to exercise its overwhelming power in ways that neither threaten other countries nor encourage their
resistance. Multilateralism provides a partial solution to this quandary. By exercising its leadership through consensual
institutions that give voice and satisfaction to the less powerful while placing only modest constraints on its own policy autonomy and
sovereign prerogatives, the United States can reassure weaker states that fear exploitation or abandonment,
increase their willingness to follow the U.S. lead, and consolidate a productive and peaceful world that
will advance long-term U.S. interests .v

US cooperation through the OAS solves
Hoose 7 (Matthew S Hoose, Major, US Air Force, US OPPORTUNITY IN VENEZUELA: A 21ST CENTURY
GOOD NEIGHBOR STRATEGY, Research Report Submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the
Graduation Requirements, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, April 2007,
http://dtlweb.au.af.mil///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18xL2FwYWNoZV9t
ZWRpYS8yNTUzMQ==.pdf)
The UN has repeatedly urged an end to the US embargo of Cuba and its repeal and acceptance of Cuba could be a major turning point for US
diplomacy and popularity throughout the region, much like its repeal of the Platt Amendment in the early 20th Century71. Countries
posing no real threat shouldnt be contained, but accepted and cooperated with. Unlike Iran and N. Korea,
which require containment because of their support to terrorism and development of nuclear weapons, countries like Cuba and
Venezuela pose no immediate danger. Isolating and punishing these countries only results in lost
economic opportunities, world resentment and an external enemy for their leaders to focus blame on.
If the US reverses its course and adopts a modern day Good Neighbor policy, anti-US leaders will lose a significant
platform from which they retain popularity and power. The power of a sincere apology can affect
people to the core, and regardless of what anti-US media response follows, there will be Latin Americans that give the US another look
following such an apology. The State Department should make immediate and frequent trips to continue engagement in establishing free trade
agreements and economic ties with countries like Brazil as they work toward agreements to expand research, share technology, stimulate new
investment, and develop common international standards for biofuels72. This engagement should be inclusive of all of Latin
America, and overtures toward Venezuela should be made regardless of whether they accept them. The US should also work
through the Organization of A merican S tates and create a commission to determine how best the US can help
economically instead of only proposing its neoliberal policy of free trade and market economy as the
only economic solution.

Permutation/Competition
A2: Perm
Binding commitment to the OAS is key
presidents of their countries and more than two dozen have served at the cabinet level, Responding To
The Hemispheres Political Challenges: Report of The Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on the
Organizatio n of American States, June 2006, pg. 21,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/OAS_2006.pdf)
The task force was unanimous in urging support for a more active and robust OAS to engage the hemispheres political and governance
challenges. The OAS could and should be playing a far more influential role in hemispheric affairsbut, in
order to do so, it will need greater unity and cooperation among its member states. To be sure, there are
organizational changes that would strengthen the OAS and it certainly needs a larger budget and more reliable financial support. But what
most constrains the OAS are the divisions and antagonisms in inter-American relations and the resulting disagreements among member
states on the key issues and what needs to done about them. The multiple challenges affecting the nations of the hemisphere provide the
OAS an ample agenda of work. At the same time, however, the strained relations among the hemispheres
governments make it more difficult for the organization to act. The secretary general has considerable room for
initiative on his own, and he should certainly take that initiative when the member states are unable to reach decision, and then do his best
to get their support. Indeed, at all times, the effectiveness of the OAS critically depends on the imaginative and energetic leadership of the
secretary general, and his ability to mobilize governments to take action. It is the secretary general who must drive the OAS. But, the
OAS cannot be a strong and effective regional organization if its member states are unwilling to put
aside their differences and use the organization to advance their common interests and values.

Perm links to the net benefit unilateral action undermines the OAS
Durrett 6-25 (Jessie McCamant Durrett, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,
Open support for OAS is imperative for productive partnership, Voxxi News, June 25, 2013,
http://www.voxxi.com/open-support-for-oas-imperative/)
U.S. politicians and diplomats routinely deride the effectiveness of the Organization of American States (OAS), while appreciation of its efforts is rarely heard.
These negative critiques, which regularly come from public officials as prominent as Secretary of State John Kerry and Senator Marco Rubio (FL-R), are misdirected and
hinder the potential for collaboration and progress within the most inclusive multilateral body
operating in the Americas. Secretary Kerrys comments reflect U.S.-centric thinking and the lack of U.S.
prioritization of Latin America in its diplomacy. As senator, Kerry once described the OAS as a forum made up of
third-string diplomats. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he authored a particularly scornful editorial about OAS failures and the need for reform before proposing legislation
that would impose significant budget restrictions on the organization. While testifying before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee as Secretary of State, Kerry labeled Latin America as Washingtons backyard, an insulting
categorization of the region. This time, however, the comments caused particularly significant consequences for U.S.-Latin American relations. Specifically, Bolivian President Evo Morales disdainfully cited this remark while
justifying his expulsion of the U.S. Agency for International Development from his country. The backyard mindset has always been unpopular in Latin America and has recently sparked particular aggravation, exemplified by
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correas assertion that we are no longer anyones backyard, in his May inaugural address. However, Kerry attempted to quickly move past these verbal blunders and towards a more polite and
constructive engagement with the hemisphere by attending the OAS General Assembly in Antigua, Guatemala from June 5 to June 7. During his remarks, Kerry affirmed the Obama administrations full commitment to
partnership. Nevertheless, the Obama administration has yet to formulate a coherent Latin American policy and
doubts about U.S. devotion to the multilateral purpose of the OAS persist. While Washington appoints well-regarded and politically
influential diplomats to the United Nations (UN) and often discusses its work at the UN Security Council, it tends to not send top diplomats or high profile political figures as *its+ permanent representatives to the OAS, according
to former Mexican Ambassador to the UN and the OAS, Claude Heller. Understandably, the United States prioritizes the UN over the OAS, but its disregard for the imperative role of
the OAS and the region it attempts to unite is all too apparent in its approach to the organization. Public
criticism of the OAS weakens Washingtons ability to engage in meaningful diplomacy. As the role of regional organizations
like the Union of South American States continues to grow, the United States has even more reason to reiterate its public support for the only inter-American organization that includes representatives from North, Central, and
South America, as well as Caribbean states. Additionally, condemnation of the OAS is misguided because the organizations relevance
and value depend on the political and financial contributions of its member states. Ambassador Heller asserts, The financial
crisis *within the OAS+ will not be resolved without a renewal of member states commitment to politically strengthening the organization. U.S. policymakers often complain about OAS working methods and dwindling U.S.
influence at the organization, but Jorge Heine, retired Chilean ambassador, argues that attempting to return to the days when Washington gave the OAS its marching orders poses the greatest risk of condemning it to
irrelevance. Similarly, many U.S. policymakers and scholars suggest utilizing the OAS further to advance government accountability and human rights. However, the United States is not currently in the best position to press
these agendas due to Washingtons own flawed human rights record in Latin America and its age-old, persistent tendencies to try to dominate OAS machinery. Generating progress on issues ranging from
corruption to drug-related violence at the OAS requires consistently investing political capital , which calls for vocalizing
greater prioritization of the organization and demonstrating an eagerness to work in equal
partnership with rising hemispheric powers. In order to move beyond harmful comments and set the stage for more meaningful and productive cooperation, Secretary
Kerry must utilize his new leadership position by directing U.S. diplomats to boldly support the OAS and work collaboratively with
their Latin American counterparts.

Unconditional Support for multilateral institutions is key sends a signal that the US is
committed the plan sends a signal of ambivalence
Despite the growing linkages between the United States and the rest of the world and the rise of global challenges not amenable to unilateral
action, the United S tates remains deeply ambivalent about multilateral cooperation and international
institutions. A more constructive attitude is required, beginning with a renewed appreciation of the
indispensability of multilateral frameworks in achieving the countrys most important national objectives. At this critical
juncture in world history, the United States must again step forward to lead the international community in shaping an effective institutional
architecture to address global problems. More effective multilateral engagement will require a practical
reorientation of U.S. foreign policy , with leadership coming from both the White House and Congress. It will require a
restructuring of the Executive Branch to match current global realities; greater involvement of the Legislative Branch on transnational issues;
innovative partnerships between the U.S. government and private actors; and greater public awareness about Americas interest in multilateral
cooperation. While precise recommendations regarding institutional reform and policy orientations will await further study, we propose a
number of initial steps to improve the nations capacities for multilateral engagement. Specifically, we recommend that: The
Administration and Congress recognize that a foreign policy fundamentally oriented toward
strengthening multilateralism provides the most promising means for advancing U.S. interests in an interdependent world; The
Administration articulate to our allies and to other nations a policy framework that assures them of our intention to build an international
system of cooperation and burden-sharing, one that preserves our ability to act alone where vital US interests or major humanitarian concerns
demand but also ensures that any such action will proceed with the maximum practical level of consultation and coalition building;

Only the FTAA alone will solve --- the US will be perceived as undermining the
negotiation and taking the lead --- that fails and links to the unilateralism net benefit.
Crandall 11 (Russell Crandall, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S.
Department of Defense in 2009, Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an
Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs 90.3, May-June, 2011, pg. , http://worldview.unc.edu/files/2012/02/Reading-1.pdf)

Across the region in recent years, the United S tates has seen its influence decline. Latin American countries
are increasingly looking for solutions among themselves, forming their own regional organizations that exclude the
United States and seeking friends and opportunities outside of Washington's orbit. Some U.S. allies are even reconsidering
their belief in the primacy of relations with the United S tates. Much of this has to do with the end of the Cold War, a
conflict that turned Latin America into a battleground between U.S. and Soviet proxies. Washington has also made a series of mistakes in the
years since then, arrogantly issuing ultimatums that made it even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America. At the same time as U.S.
influence has diminished, Latin America's own capabilities have grown. The region has entered into an era of unprecedented
economic, political, and diplomatic success. Most visibly, Brazil has emerged as an economic powerhouse, attracting foreign investment with an
economy that grew 7.5 percent last year. (Regionwide, average GDP growth last year was 5.6 percent.) Regular free elections and vibrant civil
societies are now commonplace in Latin America, and the region's diplomats are more visible and confident in global forums than ever before.
After decades on the receiving end of lectures from Washington and Brussels, Latin American leaders are eager to advertise their recent gains.
Santos has been known to tell visiting foreign counterparts that this will be "Latin America's century." Although star performers such as Brazil
and Chile have recently surged ahead, Latin America has yet to realize its full collective diplomatic and political capacity. The problems that
have plagued the region in the past--income inequality, a lack of law and order, illicit trafficking networks--still exist, threatening to derail its
hard-earned successes. Guatemala, to take just one example, not only ranks among the world's poorest countries; it also has one of the highest
homicide rates in the world, with 6,000 people murdered each year in a population of only 13 million. Ironically, moreover, Latin
America's entry into a "post-hegemonic" era, a product of its own advancements, could undermine its past
progress. As the balance of power in the region is redistributed, unexpected alliances and enmities could arise. Many observers have
assumed that less U.S. involvement would be an inherently positive development, but that may be too optimistic. No one should underestimate
the capacity of the Venezuela-led bloc of quasi-authoritarian leftist governments to stop the regional trend toward greater openness and
democracy--values that the bloc sees as representing a capitulation to the U.S.-controlled global system. Nonetheless, Latin America's
emerging democratic consensus seems inevitable, and as its strategic posture finally matures, the region will be more
directly responsible for its own successes and failures. Long Latin America's master, the United S tates must adapt to the new
realities of this post-hegemonic era, lest it see its influence diminish even further . It must
demonstrate an ability to quietly engage and lead when appropriate--an approach that will allow
Washington to remain actively involved in the region's affairs without acting as though it is trying to
maintain its legacy of hegemony . Given how accustomed the United States is to dominating the region, this project will be harder
than it sounds. FROM HEGEMONY TO AUTONOMY The era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America began over a century ago, when the United
States started flexing its emerging economic and military might in Central America and the Caribbean. In the jungles and mountains of
Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, American soldiers and diplomats used persuasion, coercion, and force to advance U.S. political
and economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington sought to stem the threat of Soviet and Cuban communism, acting directly, for
example, when it invaded Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, and indirectly, as when it provided covert funding to undermine Chilean
President Salvador Allende's leftist government in the 1970s. Sometimes these efforts worked, as in Chile and Grenada, but often they did not;
both the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961 and U.S. efforts to overthrow by proxy the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s were outright
failures. For much of the twentieth century, there was a disconnect between Washington's lofty rhetoric of
democracy and regional harmony and its demonstrated willingness to jettison these principles when
its economic or geopolitical interests were at stake. Even after the Cold War, the United States was accused of peddling its
"Washington consensus" of laissez-faire economic policies, such as the privatization of state-owned assets and free-trade agreements, as a sort
of neoimperialism. Instead of U.S. marines or CIA agents, blame for doing the empire's bidding was now pinned on the "technocratic
imperialists" from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Treasury Department. Yet over the past decade or so, the
United S tates' willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This has occurred in part
because more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin America down the policymaking food chain. But
there is also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given
the end of external and local communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin
America's greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence.
the perm fails --- modest support undercuts soft power --- only a full engagement can
solve
Forman et al 2 (Shepard Forman, Director Emeritus and Senior Fellow of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, research
professor, NYU Department of Politics, Princeton Lyman, former US ambassador to Nigeria and South Africa, Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director of the
International Institutions and Global Governance Program, The United States in a Global Age: The Case for Multilateral Engagement, policy paper, Center on
International Cooperation at New York University, published 2002, http://www.centroedelstein.org.br/PDF/US_Global_Age.pdf)
In the recent past, the United S tates has sometimes acted alone or opted out of multilateral initiatives to pursue
immediate gain or avoid short-term pain, without due consideration of the long-term ramifications for
its own national interests, the broader global interest in which it shares, or the sustainability of international institutions. Such
uncritical ambivalence and shortsighted selectivity carries risks. Among other costs, it can: Thwart the pursuit of
coherent and effective policies toward particular global problems. Internally divided about the merits of the
International Criminal Court, for example, the Clinton Administration failed to propose a compelling alternative or launch a timely initiative to
build support for its preferences. Now the United States faces the creation of a Court that could well come into conflict with U.S. objectives and
complicate our security arrangements overseas. Undermine collective responses to pressing transnational challenges. The U.S. decision to
repudiate the Kyoto Protocol without charting an alternative course, for example, has hindered prospects for a solution to the problem of
global warming. (It also threatens to block American companies from participating in some economic opportunities available to firms from
countries that have adopted the treaty). Weaken international institutions critical to U.S. national interests: By
resisting a rigorous verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, for example, the United States may send an unfortunate signal
to potential proliferators and increase its risk of eventual exposure to biological weapons. Slow the spread of international
norms and regimes: By failing to ratify major human rights instruments, the United States may delay the formation of robust norms and
undermine its own human rights advocacy abroad. Likewise, by rejecting the CTBT, the United States may jeopardize a longstanding bargain
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby the non-nuclear states have foresworn such weapons in return for a commitment by
nuclear states to eventual nuclear disarmament. Undermine cooperative security: In the 1990s, the United States limited the
UNs capacity to engage in peacekeeping by holding back U.S. dues, insisting on zero nominal growth of the UN budget, and opposing UN
nation-building efforts. As a result, the UN has struggled to respond to U.S. requests for major peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, where the United States wants the UN and other nations to share the burden. Hinder U.S. ability
to mobilize the support of other countries: Perceived U.S. high-handedness and selectivity toward international
obligations can carry diplomatic costs, making it more difficult to forge coalitions or build support
within international institutions. The prolonged crisis over U.S. arrears to the United Nations, for instance, undercut Washingtons
leadership position within the UN. As a result, the U.S. lost its seat on the influential budget oversight committee for several years in the late
1990s and, in May 2001, its seat on the Human Rights Commission. Similar resentment contributed to U.S. difficulties in
rallying needed support for the U.S. position at the Durban Conference on racism, forcing the United
States to withdraw from the gathering.vi Jeopardize the values which the American public believes
should be a major part of U.S. foreign policy and which gives the United States moral credibility with
other nations. Both the U.S. public and peoples around the world look to the United States to pursue policies consistent with its ideals.
By providing only modest levels of political and financial support to important international
institutions, the U.S. government jeopardizes domestic support for U.S. engagement abroad and risks
undercutting the soft power that helps to sustain its global leadership in the eyes of foreign
partners. Given the drawbacks and limitations of acting alone, we believe that departures from multilateralism should be
the exception rather than the rule.
Only the cp resolves suspicions and causes the topic country to say yes --- also perm
do both destroys the CP
Malone and Khong, 2003 (David international security and development, as well as a career diplomat former president of the
International Peace Institute expert on international affairs, Yuen, Professor of IR Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: International
Perspectives https://www.rienner.com/uploads/47d832b1257af.pdf)

A variant of how unilateral behavior can undermine ones reputation relates to U.S. approaches to Latin America and
Africa. A priori, the hegemonic status of the United States makes many observers in those two regions suspicious of U.S.
intentions. U.S. inconsistency, as well as coercive and nonconsultative behavior, makes it even more
difficult for many to trust the United States, even when the latters intentions are benign. In areas such as
nuclear policy, the use of force, the United Nations, climate change, international crime, human rights, and the ICC, all the authors agree that the particular
multilateral regime is dealt a serious, though not necessarily fatal, blow when the United States opts out of the
agreement . The contributors agree that a more multilateral U.S. approach to global and regional
challenges will better serve the international community as well as U.S. interests. Thus, Thakurs analysis of
peacekeeping shows that a United States more deeply engaged with the United Nations is able to get more done. Similarly, Gelson Fonseca advocates an Inter-
American future that moves away from the frequent U.S. unilateral military interventions of the past to a more multilateral approach that is more likely to serve
long-term U.S. interests

Random Card Aff or neg?

Threaten to cut funding CP? Or the cp doesnt solve
OAS budget constraints offer an opportunity for Members of Congress to reflect on the utility of U.S.
participation in the organization. Those who support the organizations activities and would like the OAS to be as effective as
possible might consider steps to shore up the organizations finances and protect its human capital. In a November 2012 letter, for example,
four U.S. Senators called on the OAS to be more selective about the mandates it adopts, consider spinning off entities that are currently part of
the organizations institutional structure but outside its primary areas of focus, and adopt transparent and fair human resources policies to
strengthen the recruitment and retention of top quality personnel.135 On the other hand, those who think the United States receives few
benefits from its participation in the OAS may question why the United States continues to provide the largest portion of the organizations
budget. They might suggest that the OAS look to other member states for funding increases, and consider directing U.S. appropriations to
institutions or programs that they believe are better able to advance U.S. interests. The current constraints on the OAS budget
also could provide significant leverage to Congress. According to some analysts, the organizations reliance on
voluntary contributions has resulted in the OAS increasingly prioritizing its efforts based on the
preferences of donors.136 By directing contributions to programs that advance U.S. objectives in the hemisphere, Congress
could provide incentives for the OAS to prioritize activities that Members support. However, the organization
could lose some of its legitimacy in the region if other member states believe it is no longer addressing their concerns and is simply advancing
U.S. policy. In addition to directing appropriations to certain OAS activities, Congress could utilize its
leverage by threatening to withhold funding for the organization. As noted above, Members of the 112th Congress
introduced several measures that would restrict funding for the OAS under various circumstances. While such actions could put
considerable pressure on the OAS to act, they also carry substantial risk to ongoing OAS activities. As Brazil demonstrated in
2011, even temporarily withholding funding could force the organization to take drastic actions or bring its operations to a halt. Moreover,
unless the United States chooses to renounce its membership in the OAS, it has an obligation under the OAS Charter, which it signed in 1948
and ratified in 1951, to pay its assessed dues.

FTAA CP
Top Level

1NC Shell --- Democracy Clause
Text: The United States federal government should initiate negotiations over the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas with the individual member countries of Latin
America (Including Cuba) and the Secretary General of the Organization of American
States. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas should include a democracy clause
that is clearly defined as outlined by our Feinberg and Bates evidence. The
negotiations should include __plan__ as a part of the built in agenda to encourage
further engagement outside of the FTAAs core elements.

Democracy clauses builds support for engagement, LA will say yes, and the cp doesnt
link to ptx
Feinberg and Bates, 2001 (Richard, Professor of International Political Economy at the Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies, University of California special assistant to President Clinton and senior director of the National Security Council s Office of Inter-American Affairs.
Jenny, former international economist with the Progressive Policy Institute, Why the FTAA Needs a Democracy Clause
http://www.dlc.org/print472e.html?contentid=3056)

In sum, a democracy clause is not a universally applicable model for all trade agreements. In some cases it may be irrelevant, while in bilateral
deals it may smack of U.S. unilateralism. It should certainly not become a blueprint for all future trade deals. However, in the case
of the FTAA , where the United States' primary long-term goal is the promotion of economic development and
democracy in the region, a strong commitment by all the parties to the protection of democracy is both
relevant and desirable. It would be supported by most Latin American governments , who would
welcome the implicit praise and signal of external support for their own democratic systems. The inclusion of a
democracy clause will also help sustain and advance U.S. values in Latin America and rebuild support for
the policy of economic engagement among the American public. By placing the FTAA in a broader political and
security framework, a democracy clause could be critical to building a congressional majority behind freer
trade with the Western Hemisphere.

Latin America would agree -- the democracy clause is crucial to forge support for the
FTAA --- MERCOSUR proves.
Pacific Studies, University of California special assistant to President Clinton and senior director of the National Security Councils Office of Inter-American Affairs.

Yet, even when convinced of the need for a democracy clause as part of the FTAA, skeptics might argue that such a clause will be
ineffective in practice. They might suggest that there are too many technical problems in defining democracy and deciding when to take action,
that it would never be invoked, and that such a linkage between trade and democracy will be opposed by our Latin American
trading partners. The problems associated with designing a democracy clause, though real, are not insurmountable. Most other examples
(such as the European Union and MERCOSUR) simply refer to the protection of democracy and leave it to leaders to decide themselves if and when democracy is
under threat in practice. Since democracy is a difficult concept to define, some flexibility in interpreting when democracy is under threat is useful. However, to
guard against the trap of formalism -- where simply holding periodic elections becomes synonymous with democracy -- the FTAA
partners should adopt a more elaborate definition of democracy in this context. It could include broad
principles such as universal suffrage, regular free and fair elections (with independent monitoring), a
plurality of political parties, and freedom of speech and association. In addition, those with standing to bring a
case under the FTAA clause might include individual member countries, the Secretary General of the
Organization of American States (OAS), and, more controversially, certain nongovernmental organizations. Cases might be reviewed by
whatever management structure is eventually established for the FTAA, or by the OAS Permanent Council (composed of OAS member
states), perhaps advised by an independent body such as the prestigious Inter-American Human Rights Commission. It would also seem sensible
to allow for a continuum of actions once a threat to democracy has been established, ranging from
consultations , to the suspension of voting rights and expulsion from meetings , to the withdrawal of
trade preferences in an extreme case. (The removal of trade preferences granted under a regional trade deal, rather than the imposition of import bans or
prohibitively high tariffs, is also legal under WTO rules as long as all WTO members are fully informed in advance of any changes.5) On the question of invoking the
clause, there is already some precedent in similar clauses in other economic agreements. For example, following Paraguay's
recent political instability, Paraguay's MERCOSUR trading partners, led by Brazil, threatened to
invoke the agreement's democracy clause . Brazilian President Cardoso warned the Paraguayan authorities that the interruption of the
constitutional order would result in Paraguay's expulsion from MERCOSUR. This pressure was a key factor in the resignation of
then-President Cubas and his replacement with the leader of the Senate, as mandated by the
Paraguayan constitution. Finally, the objection that Latin American countries will oppose a democracy
clause seems unlikely in practice. Many of the countries in the region have struggled with democracy and
recognize the benefit of external support during crises. For example, at a summit of the South American heads
of state held in Brasilia in September 2000, the presidents agreed that "maintenance of the rule of law and
strict respect for the democratic system in each of the twelve countries of the region are at once a
goal and a shared commitment and are henceforth a condition for participation in South American meetings." They also agreed to
" conduct political consultations in the event of a threat of disruption of the democratic system in South America." Indeed, existing
regional economic deals -- such as MERCOSUR -- already contain democracy clauses; the FTAA would simply be
modeling itself on steps already taken in Latin America independently of the United States.

The plan can be done through the FTAA --- itll be incorporated into the built-in
agenda.
Inter-American Development Bank, 2003 (Main source of development financing in Latin America Creating The Free Trade
Area of the Americas: Pragmatic Engagement for 2005 http://www.iadb.org/en/news/speeches/2003-11-19/creating-the-free-trade-area-of-the-americas-
pragmatic-engagement-for-2005,2216.html)

My message today is Engagement with a capital E. We need an FTAA agreement for all 34 countries . We need an agreement
that is WTO consistent, comprehensive in scope and with special attention to market access, including
important agricultural liberalization. We need an agreement with balanced concessions, but coupled with
instruments and modalities to level the playing field among countries that range from the richest to some of the poorest in the
world. This would include weighing the benefits and costs of adopted trade disciplines in light of the level of development and the stage of structural reform of the
participants. I think that many of those interested in freer trade, especially those in the business community, would like to achieve the pristine
ideal of the FTAA. However, perfection can be the enemy of progress. Engagement in 2005 may require adjustments to immediate ambitions,
as the political and economic realities of today must ultimately shape any FTAA agreement -but engage we must. After all, the FTAA is much
more than business. Rather it is a grand regional public good that will contribute to binding our hemisphere together in a venture that can
make our neighborhood more stable and prosperous and contribute the same to the world economy. How to engage? Rather than talk
about an ambitious or light FTAA we should focus on a pragmatic FTAA, remembering that such an agreement
among so many heterogeneous countries will likely be a living process of intra-hemispheric relations rather than a one-off event. A
pragmatic FTAA would involve a variable geometry that incorporates core obligations for all with a
scope that allows for some critical tradeoffs: the possibility to engage bilaterally or plurilaterally beyond the
core elements of an FTAA. This could be accompanied by a post-2005 built-in agenda to provide opportunities
to expand the core obligations of the FTAA as advances are made in the Doha Round and some of our economies and subregional agreements
recover from several difficult years. Another component of a pragmatic FTAA is to combine the proven technical prowess of our delegations
with more direct political leadership in the process at the highest levels. As mentioned, the FTAA is much more than business; it is
ultimately a grand political decision that will affect our countries articulation with the hemisphere and
world economy for decades to come.

1NC Shell --- Generic
Text: The United States federal government should initiate negotiations over the Free
Trade Agreement of the Americas with the individual member countries of Latin
America (Including Cuba). The negotiations should include __plan__ as a part of the
built in agenda to encourage further engagement outside of the FTAAs core elements.
Latin American Countries will say yes and the plan can be done through the
FTAA --- itll be incorporated into the built-in agenda.

My message today is Engagement with a capital E. We need an FTAA agreement for all 34 countries . We need an agreement
that is WTO consistent, comprehensive in scope and with special attention to market access, including
important agricultural liberalization. We need an agreement with balanced concessions, but coupled with
instruments and modalities to level the playing field among countries that range from the richest to some of the poorest in the
world. This would include weighing the benefits and costs of adopted trade disciplines in light of the level of development and the stage of structural reform of the
participants. I think that many of those interested in freer trade, especially those in the business community, would like to achieve the pristine
ideal of the FTAA. However, perfection can be the enemy of progress. Engagement in 2005 may require adjustments to immediate ambitions,
as the political and economic realities of today must ultimately shape any FTAA agreement -but engage we must. After all, the FTAA is much
more than business. Rather it is a grand regional public good that will contribute to binding our hemisphere together in a venture that can
make our neighborhood more stable and prosperous and contribute the same to the world economy. How to engage? Rather than talk
about an ambitious or light FTAA we should focus on a pragmatic FTAA, remembering that such an agreement
among so many heterogeneous countries will likely be a living process of intra-hemispheric relations rather than a one-off event. A
pragmatic FTAA would involve a variable geometry that incorporates core obligations for all with a
scope that allows for some critical tradeoffs: the possibility to engage bilaterally or plurilaterally beyond the
core elements of an FTAA. This could be accompanied by a post-2005 built-in agenda to provide opportunities
to expand the core obligations of the FTAA as advances are made in the Doha Round and some of our economies and subregional agreements
recover from several difficult years. Another component of a pragmatic FTAA is to combine the proven technical prowess of our delegations
with more direct political leadership in the process at the highest levels. As mentioned, the FTAA is much more than business; it is
ultimately a grand political decision that will affect our countries articulation with the hemisphere and
world economy for decades to come.

Politics
1NC --- Generic
CP resolves political backlash
Godinich, 2011 (Andrew, Columbia Political Review Reviving Free Trade in the Americas http://cpreview.org/2011/12/anyone-remember-the-ftaa/)

Anyone remember the FTAA? Probably not. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) was supposed to be revolutionary. Lowering or eliminating
tariffs on thousands of goods in every country between Canada and Argentina, the treaty was heralded as a breakthrough in Western relations when first
announced at the 1994 Summit of the Americas. But today, the FTAA is dead in the water. Instead, as a result of domestic and international hand-wringing, multiple
bilateral agreements have been negotiated and then subsequently postponed. Why? As any first-year student of economics could tell you, the logic of free trade
agreements is sound. Increased competition and access to resources, coupled with a decrease in job-killing tariffs and protectionist policies lead to increased
economic growth and employment. NAFTA the trilateral trade agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico since its inception has resulted in a
threefold increase in trade between the US and Canada and a quadrupling of trade between the US and Mexico. While environmental and human rights concerns
are important and need to be addressed, it is undeniable that NAFTA and other free trade agreements are vital in an increasingly interconnected Western
Hemisphere. So why am I writing about this now? Quite simply, free trade with our neighbors is the fastest and surest way to
ensure economic growth in the US. With the American Jobs Act and its financial stimulus politically untenable and with the Federal Reserve unwilling
to put its legitimacy further on the line, new avenues for economic growth must be negotiated. Furthermore, free trade remains one the few
issues where both American political parties find common ground , reducing the risk of political
deadlock when passing legislation.

2NC --- Business Lobbies
The business community would push for the CP --- empirically proven
Multi National Monitor, 2001 (NAFTA for the Americas Q&A on the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas)
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/01april/corp3.html)

The United States is the country pushing most aggressively for adoption of an FTAA. The United States began the process at a
1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, following Congressional passage of the NAFTA implementing legislation. The process gained
momentum with the Santiago Summit in 1998. The business community , in the United States and elsewhere throughout the
Americas, is the social force driving the agenda forward .

1NC --- Democracy Clause
Avoids the link to politics
Pacific Studies, University of California special assistant to President Clinton and senior director of the National Security Councils Office of Inter-American Affairs.

In sum, a democracy clause is not a universally applicable model for all trade agreements. In some cases it may be irrelevant, while in bilateral
deals it may smack of U.S. unilateralism. It should certainly not become a blueprint for all future trade deals. However, in the case
of the FTAA , where the United States' primary long-term goal is the promotion of economic development and
democracy in the region, a strong commitment by all the parties to the protection of democracy is both
relevant and desirable. It would be supported by most Latin American governments , who would
welcome the implicit praise and signal of external support for their own democratic systems. The inclusion of a
democracy clause will also help sustain and advance U.S. values in Latin America and rebuild support for
the policy of economic engagement among the American public. By placing the FTAA in a broader political and
security framework, a democracy clause could be critical to building a congressional majority behind freer
trade with the Western Hemisphere.

Say Yes
2NC --- Bargaining Chip
CP acts as a bargaining chip to forge an agreement.
Hornbeck, 2011 (J. F., Specialist in International Trade and Finance, U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues, 2-8-11,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-840.pdf)

The result in the Western Hemisphere has been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral agreements.
The United States has implemented FTAs with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Peru, but Congress has not acted on the proposed FTAs
with Panama or Colombia, despite changes agreed to even after the formal negotiations concluded. Currently, congressional reticence awaits further
commitments in areas that fall outside the negotiated text of the FTAs, such as tax law in Panama and human rights improvements in Colombia, raising questions
for some over the ability of the United States to consummate trade negotiations.8 The prospects are limited at best for exploring reciprocal FTAs with Brazil,
Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil, as the major regional economy not in a unilateral preferential arrangement with the United States, has
abandoned the FTAA model and moved ahead separately by adding associate members to Mercosur, supporting Venezuelas accession to Mercosur as a full
member, and leading in the formation of broader economic and political integration pacts in South America. Venezuelas Presi dent Hugo Chvez has taken a
decidedly more confrontational approach in establishing the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA), enticing Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Dominica, and
Honduras to join with subsidized oil trade.9 Although these are neither deep nor comprehensive trade arrangements, they do signal a
political will to consolidate regional bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-designed FTAA. Three clear challenges
emerge from this picture. First, Brazil and the United States have demonstrated a prolonged reluctance to move off their respective positions, which bodes poorly
for resurrecting the FTAA.10 The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic attitudes toward the United States as full Mercosur
members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations of key industries and other efforts to increase the role of the state in managing the economies of Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening support for market-based trade solutions. Second, multiple FTAs, by definition, promote an inefficient
and cumbersome trading system with each FTA having its own rules of origin (to deter non-member transshipment of goods) and related customs administration
and enforcement requirements that can complicate trade and investment decisions. It is not without reason, therefore, that many interest groups wish to find a
way to rationalize such a convoluted system. Third, Latin America is expanding its trade to other countries in the world. China, in particular, has increased its trade
and investment relationship with the region. From 2000 to 2009, total trade has grown by a factor of ten, and investment has poured into the region. In both cases,
China is in search of long-term, reliable sources of basic commodities. In 2009, over 70% of Latin American exports to China were in basic ores, copper, grains, and
mineral fuels. While this trade structure is currently lucrative, it does nothing to diversify Latin Americas exports into more value added goods, and leaves the
fortunes of these countries to the often volatile commodities markets. Reconciling the disparate trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere will be difficult
and perhaps impossible in the absence of a complementary multilateral solution. For example, conventional wisdom argues that without advancement in
agricultural issues at the WTO, action on a comprehensive FTAA (or something like it) is unlikely. Further, a less comprehensive FTAA has so far been
rejected and offers a far less compelling alternative to a multilateral agreement on economic grounds. Therefore, the FTAA may not emerge in the
near future, despite the logical solution that a hemispheric-wide agreement presents to improving the
flow of trade (and investment ) over existing arrangements.

2NC --- Democracy Clause
UNASUR proves a democracy clause will be agreed upon.
Ruttenberg and Fuchs, 2011 (Tara, International Peace Studies @ the University of Peace, Summit Manager @ the Summit of Global
Alliance for Ministries and departments of peace. Gustavo, United Arab Emirates Business development,
http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=801)

Responding to the September 2010 attempted coup against Rafael Correa, Ecuadoran President and then-acting President Pro
Tempore of UNASUR, an emergency conference was held in Buenos Aires, where UNASUR released a statement strongly condemning the
rebellion and emphasizing the importance of institutional order and democracy in the region.*16+ Argentinas Nestor
Kirchner, then-Secretary General of UNASUR, took the opportunity to express the regional blocs commitment and most
absolute solidarity with the democratically elected President of Ecuador.*17+ Events in Ecuador strengthened support for earlier calls to include a
democracy clause in UNASURs founding treaty, to demonstrate UNASUR's determination to place its full weight in ostracizing any
South American regime if ever it seizes power by non-constitutional means.*18+ In late November 2010, UNASUR succeeded in adopting a
democratic charter calling for sanctions against non-democratic regimes, particularly in response to attempted coups
and coup regimes.*19+ UNASURs response in Ecuador mirrored its statements a year earlier condemning the illegal coup in Honduras in June 2009, expressing that
it would not recognize any de facto election or government in Honduras and calling for the restitution of constitutional order in the country.[20] Despi te original
statements condemning the coup, however, UNASUR has since been unable to reach consensus over formal non-recognition of the post-coup Honduran
government, reflecting the realities of a regional bloc comprised of divergent political and ideological players.[21]
The democracy clause builds support for the negotiations.
Ortiza and Tajesb, 2009 (Jaime, Division of International Programs and A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business at Texas A&M International
University, Maria, Department of Languages and Cultures, College of Humanities and Social Sciences at William Paterson University of New Jersey The SLEPT
Aspects of the Free Trade Area of the Americas http://www.craig.csufresno.edu/International_Programs/JC/IJB/Volumes/Volume%2014/V143-3.pdf)

Lauredo (2004) warns that a varied ideological spectrum poses problems for consolidating the entire FTAA. Political ideologies strongly
determine actions of each individual nation. Outlining the importance of institutional governance requires invoking the
democracy clause which recognizes that values and practices of democracy are fundamental to the
advancement of all objectives. Hence, any unconstitutional alteration or interruption of the democratic order becomes an insurmountable obstacle to the
participation of a government in the FTAA. Nations need to make significant progress democratizing their political
institutions into the multi-party political systems they are today. This is largely due to the general consensus that multi-party systems reduce both
discretion and the need for oversight.
2NC --- Economic Incentives
Economic gains shifts political rationales for engagement.

As for the Latin American countries, economic gains provide the overriding rationale for entering into an
FTA with the United States. The United States is by far their largest export market and the primary investor in the
region, particularly in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin region (Central America, Panama, and the Caribbean Islands). For these countries, moving to a
reciprocal FTA provides permanent rules of trade that do not require periodic reauthorization by the U.S.
Congress, as do the unilateral preferential arrangements. This feature of FTAs and its rules-based framework provide a greater incentive
for foreign investors and gives the Latin American countries more control over their trade relationship with
the United States. Many see FTAs as anchors to broader economic reform and providing greater opportunity
for production-sharing technology transfer that can improve economic competitiveness. Lower costs of imports from the
United States is another tangible benefit.
Latin American nations will agree -- trade liberalization
Hrinak, No Date Given (Donna, Ambassador for Latin American Nations, president of Boeing Brazil, Op-ed for Folha de So Paulo FTAA
Opportunity to Use
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGUQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Firc.embaixadaamericana.org.br%2Fdownload%2F
Oped.doc&ei=m4XyUcL7EPPCyAHa5AE&usg=AFQjCNHle5bwNDwgadXs_t1UezOMOUi-WA&sig2=tzqY7isgMaObGpgnYerEFw)

Despite widespread conjecture on the impact of our presidential elections in November, our trade policy remains fully engaged in promoting trade liberalization.
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has led the way to re-energize the Doha Round so that substantive progress in the WTO can be made this year. In the last
several months, the United States concluded comprehensive, high-ambition free trade agreements with Australia,
Morocco, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. These add to already-completed accords with our NAFTA partners,
Chile and others outside the hemisphere. We are or will soon be conducting free trade negotiations with Bahrain, Panama, Colombia and, we expect, other Andean
countries. Protectionist pressures exist in the United States as in other countries, but support for trade liberalization has
lasted long and will endure. It is worth noting that all our bilateral free trade agreement partners have had
significant agricultural issues among their priorities with the United States. They and we have been able to expand mutual
market access in agriculture while meeting each others non-agricultural interests and sensitivities , as well as
laying the basis for greater economic integration. A similar pragmatic and balanced approach can make
the FTAA succeed , as well.

Trade
Blake, 2009 (Charles, Law review THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN VENEZUELA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FTAA PROCESS
http://studentorgs.law.smu.edu/getattachment/International-Law-Review-Association/Resources/LBRA-Archive/15-1/SMB107.pdf.aspx)

What are the implications of the above public opinion and electoral trends for the FTAA agenda? First and foremost, one can
see the potential support for hemispheric free trade. In concept, most Latin Americans embrace the idea
that trade is beneficial. This has buoyed the considerable and sustained liberalization of tariff rates in Latin America.48 In 1985
the average tariff rate was 49 percent, but by 1995 it had fallen to 13 percent. In 2003 it was 10 percent.49 Venezuela mirrored these
trends with the average tariff falling from 30 to 13 to 12 percent over the same period.50 In 2006, following several years in which the
economic role of the state expanded in Venezuela, the average tariff remained steady at 13 percent.51

2NC --- Obama
Obamas stance on globalization solves anti-FTAA sentiment --- hell get it through
Godinich, 2011 (Andrew, Columbia Political Review Reviving Free Trade in the Americas http://cpreview.org/2011/12/anyone-remember-the-ftaa/)

Aside from the Cuban embargo, the biggest fault lines at the upcoming summit are likely to emerge around economic policy and trade. "The Free Trade
Area of the Americas is the law of the jungle, only the strongest survive," Evo Morales told me back in 2003, before he became Bolivia's
fist indigenous president, and was still a union organiser and coca farmer. "From the point of view of the indigenous people here, the FTAA is an agreement to
legalise the colonisation of the Americas." Obama shares some of Morales' sentiments. The new US president has been a
critic of the free trade agreement with Colombia because of that country's violations of labour rights and its repression of unionised
workers. In a newspaper column in June 2005, Obama explained his stance against the Central American free trade
agreement, citing its lack of environmental and labour regulations, and said that "the larger problem is what's missing from our
prevailing policy on trade and globalization - namely, meaningful assistance for those who are not
reaping its benefits." Such views will be warmly received by the region's presidents , many of whom see the
alleviation of poverty as way to curtail organized crime and narco-trafficking two topics sure to be discussed at the summit, and were part of the discussions
between Obama and Mexico's president Felipe Caldern during Obama's brief stop there yesterday. To make progess at the summit, Obama should withdraw
US support and financing for the disastrous Plan Colombia, stress non-military solutions in the drug war, and develop economic relations with Latin America than
benefit a majority of its population. Doing so would make a clean break from the Bush years, and show that the US is interested in being a
neighbour, not an empire.

Obamas built support
Luxner, 2009 ( Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat, What the World Wants From Barack Obama,The Washington Diplomat
February 2009, http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6304:what-the-world-wants-from-barack-obama&catid=974:february-
2009&Itemid=259

Jaime Daremblum, director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, says its important for
Obama to capitalize on the unprecedented enthusiasm hes generated throughout the region, where Bush has
been deeply unpopular for years. The incoming administration can do very positive things for Latin America, said
Daremblum, Costa Ricas former ambassador to the United States. The first is to support initiatives in countries that have been successful
in strengthening democracy, education, transparency in elections and the rule of law. The other area is free trade which is key for
many of our countries because thats the only way of offering real opportunities to a more educated population. Daremblum disagrees with
those who say Washingtons concept of a hemisphere-wide FTAA is dead. Quite the contrary, he said. All this financial turmoil in
the world has opened up the eyes of Latin America that they need export markets, and they need to
increase mechanisms to access those markets. The protective little niches of Mercosur here and ALBA there are
not going to work. Thats why we need to look toward an FTAA.
2NC --- Brazil

Brazil will agree --- seen as US reciprocation.
Schott, 2005 (Jeffrey, Senior Fellow @ the Institute for International Economics, Does the FTAA Have a Future?
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/schott1105.pdf)

The basic problem is twofold: whether Brazil will open its market to foreign competition in goods and services and
whether the United States will reciprocate by increasing market access, for Brazilian agriculture and competitive
manufactures. In both cases, prospective liberalization is contentious and subject to a fractious domestic debate. In both cases, electoral and legislative
considerations probably will constrain negotiations through much of 2006, if not longer. In Brazil, recent political scandals have weakened President Lula da Silva
and cast doubts about his reelection. Under these circumstances, the PT regime seems unlikely to risk further dissension within its own ranks by considering
controversial policy reforms. Until the October 2006 election, Brazilian negotiators may thus resist negotiating over reforms
of important regulatory barriers (including those tor the services industries), strengthening protection of IPRs, and opening of some public
procurement tenders to bidding by foreign suppliers. Such reforms are supported by some parts of the Brazilian business community but staunchly opposed by
protectionist interests A FTAA deal could provide large inducements to undertake such reforms, but only if the
United States commits in turn to provide concrete new trading opportunities in the US market tor Brazilian farmers
and industrialistsespecially by slashing subsidies and committing to liberalization in politically sensitive areas such as cotton, sugar, tobacco,
and citrus. In his speech to the United Nations in September 2005, President George W. Bush pledged that "the United States is ready to eliminate all tariffs,
subsidies and other barriers to free flow of goods and services as other nations do the same" [emphasis added]. Loosely translated, this means that he will ask
Congress to authorize trade and subsidy reforms commensurate with liberalization undertaken by the European Union and other major trading nations in the Doha
Round. The success of this negotiating gambit will turn, however, on what Congress legislates in the new US farm bill that will be dratted in 2006.

Brazil will agree --- trade importance
US Embassy, 2002 (IIP Digital Allgeier, Barbosa, Dooley examine FTAA-related obstacles and goals
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2002/10/20021008180031smiller@pd.state.gov0.9141504.html#axzz2aMmvjuBU)

Brazil is just as committed as the United States to creating the FTAA, the Brazilian ambassador pointed
out. Barbosa said that the FTAA is of great importance to his nation , as over 50 percent of Brazil's trade is with its
hemispheric neighbors. He added that trade will also be a "top priority" in Brazil's efforts to offset lower foreign direct
investment.

2NC --- Plan Inclusion Ensures Agreement
The plan ensures leverage for negotiations.
Inter-American Development Bank, 2002 (US Source for development financing for Latin America Beyond Borders: The New
Regionalism in Latin America http://issuu.com/idb_publications/docs/book_en_66478)

Alternatively, the hub-and-spoke approach could be geared primarily to achieving the countrys narrow commercial interests
through sheer leverage in the bilateral negotiations --or through inclusion in some of them of issues that may not
entail important concessions for the bilateral counterpart - and then using them as precedents to forge similar FTAA
agree-ments. In this way, the agenda setter would obtain an agreement that is closer to meeting its own goals, with-out having to make many concessions in
return. Such an approach could stifle the formation of an FTAA-leaving a less efficient hub-and-spoke system in place - or even create a welfare decreasing one,
which would be politically conflictive and probably not sustainable. Finally, while the formal 34 country negotiations and the hub-and-spoke roads are presented
here as polar strategies, in reality they are parts of the same process of negotiations , in which actions on one dimension
influence actions and the progress in the other.
FTAA Good/Solvency Advocates
2NC --- Agriculture Aff
The CP can increase agriculture investments
Multi National Monitor, 2001 (NAFTA for the Americas Q&A on the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas)
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/01april/corp3.html)

The FTAA is likely to contain a number of provisions that are not included in the WTO, and which push a deregulatory agenda
even beyond that embodied in the WTO. The FTAA is likely to contain important new provisions in the area of investments , intellectual property,
services and agriculture , to take a few examples, that are more favorable to corporate interests than those in the WTO.

2NC --- Broader Cooperation
The CP spills over to broader economic cooperation.
Estevadeordal, 2012 (Antoni, manager of the Integration and Trade Sector of the Vice-Presidency of Sectors and Knowledge at the InterAmerican
Development Bank and the Brookings Institute Economic integration in the Americas: an unfinished agenda
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/7/07%20summit%20of%20the%20americas/07%20economic%20integration%20estevadeordal.pd
f)

The recent global economic downturn has accentuated the importance of trade and economic
integration as engines of growth and development in the Americas. As was true in past times of turmoil, exports
have served as a countercyclical force in the regions economies, propelling growth and economic stability. Further connecting
countries via trade would help to set the entire region on a more prosperous plane and ignite
cooperation in other areas.
2NC --- Border Cooperation
Counterplan solves
f)

Through good times and bad, trade has been the anchor of the LAC regions economies throughout the postwar era.
Since the 1990s, trade integration has also fueled hemispheric cooperation. It has created trust , built
crossborder networks of stakeholders, and developed demands for further openness and interaction
regarding everything from cross-border infrastructure projects to regional environmental protection
and security cooperation . Trade integration has also been integral for solidifying alliances and for the heady gains
in democracy in our hemisphere.
2NC --- Economic Growth
The CP drives economic growth and cooperation in the region.

Why then bother with a FTAA? The short answer is that an FTAA would yield both economic and foreign policy benefits . First,
the FTAA would have beneficial effects on the conduct of overall economic policy in and economic
relations among the participating countries. Second, the FTAA initiative covers the one big gap in the free
trade matrix of the Western Hemisphere, linking the major economies of North and South America, whose bilateral trade-as projected by the
gravity models-could expand two or threefold in response to FTA-type reforms. At the same time, the hemisphere wide FTA would help
harmonize over time the separate free trade regimes that have been negotiated among regional trading partners. Third, and perhaps
most important, t he FTAA is the economic engine that drives hemispheric cooperation on more than 20
initiatives undertaken by leaders at the Summit of the Americas involving a number of political, socio-economic, and
cultural issues (e.g., promoting education, strengthening the rule of law, and protecting the rights of
indigenous peoples). Progress on the FTAA is critical to sustain efforts in these other areas.

FTAA catalyzes exports and trade within Latin America

Within the context of North-South agreements the FTAA is conceptually very relevant for Latin America. It would intersect with Latin
Americas subregional agreements in ways described above and serve as an instrument for deepening rules-based commerce and
institutional modernization. It also could absorb many simpler bilateral free trade agreements, eliminating less efficient
hub and spoke FTA arrangements in the hemisphere and ameliorate the so-called Spaghetti Bowl of norms and
regulations emerging from the myriad of regional agreements now in place in the hemisphere and those being contemplated. Furthermore, the potential
for an FTAA to create an enabling environment help to our countries to compete in a globalizing world
economy should not be overlooked in light of increasing competition from Asia and elsewhere. The FTAA would moreover
facilitate trends already underway. Parallel to the forces of globalization we are observing increasing regionalization of world trade, investment and
even migration. The Western Hemisphere is no exception. The percentage of exports of FTAA countries that stays within the hemisphere has grown from 48% at the
beginning of the 1990s to over 60% as we enter the 21st century. Since the early 1990s, the highest annual average rate of hemispheric export growth for Latin
America has been with the North American market and secondly in the respective subregions. An FTAA, in conjunction with the recovery
of the US economy already under way and signs of better growth performance in Latin America and the Caribbean, may be a powerful tool of
export expansion and stimulus for investment. Indeed, most economic models of the FTAA suggest that it would be a very
important catalyst for exports , a significant part of which would be intra- Latin American and Caribbean trade since there are still high
commercial barriers between the subregions.

The CP builds resiliency within Latin Americas Market
Hrinak, No Date Given (Donna, Ambassador for Latin American Nations, president of Boeing Brazil, Op-ed for Folha de So Paulo FTAA
Opportunity to Use
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CGUQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Firc.embaixadaamericana.org.br%2Fdownload%2F
Oped.doc&ei=m4XyUcL7EPPCyAHa5AE&usg=AFQjCNHle5bwNDwgadXs_t1UezOMOUi-WA&sig2=tzqY7isgMaObGpgnYerEFw)

Trade negotiations are never easy. Few have been so glorified and vilified as those to establish the Free Trade Area of the Americas. While no panacea for all
problems the hemisphere faces, the FTAA will open up new opportunities for commerce moving from south to north,
north to south, east to west and back. Those opportunities for Brazil, the United States and all the
regions 800 million people mean exports, jobs, investment, global competitiveness , and, therefore, growth
and prosperity . For the United States, the benefits of open markets are not just rhetoric. The dynamism and resilience of the
U.S. economy have been forged through trade liberalization. New export markets have created high-
paying jobs; millions of American consumers and businesses benefit through lower-cost imports; billions in
foreign investment dollars has flowed into our country; and the U.S. economy has grown to $11 trillion in size. Trade is no zero-
sum game, and it offers the same opportunities to Brazil and others.

2NC --- Include the Aff --- Generic
The plan should be brought to the negotiation table --- acts as a crucial building block

Under the most favorable scenario, the agenda-setting nation would approach bilateral negotiations with
a balanced view of the longer-term political and economic interests of the hemisphere, as well as the real
capacities and specific development needs of all its trading partners. In this case, its bilateral agreements could become an
effective building block for an FTAA that enhances the welfare of all.
2NC --- Mexico Reforms
Obama would be able to work with Nieto through FTAA --- NAFTA proves
Carlsen, 2013 (Laura, Center for International Policy, B.A. in Social Thought and Institutions from Stanford University and a Masters degree in Latin
American Studies, also from Stanford. Obama Downplays Drug War, Recasts Mexico, Central America as Economic Allies
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/9600)

It was easy for Obama and Mexican president Enrique Pea Nieto to come together on trade and integration
issues. Pea Nieto comes from the historically nationalist Institutional Revolutionary Party. Within the party hes connected to the former president Carlos
Salinas, the architect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Like his predecessor Felipe Calderon, Pea Nieto has a strong
commitment to the neoliberal reforms that the U.S. government and multilateral banks have been imposing on Mexico for years. Unlike his
predecessor, however, he has a chance of pushing them through. During his visit to Mexico, Obama and Pena Nieto committed to
deepening NAFTA , although they avoided calling the controversial trade agreement by name. Both are acutely aware that nearly twenty years since its
ratification, NAFTA has a decidedly tarnished image among the publics of all three countries involved. Instead, they announced a binational high-
level commission to make both nations more competitive, increase efficiency and security at the border, and further integrate industry. Obama
also put in a plug for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a geographically rearranged version of the F ree T rade A greement of the A mericas killed
by South American nations in 2005. In some aspects, the TPP goes even further in binding governments to corporate agendas than NAFTA. Obama threw his weight
behind Pea Nietos reforms, referring obliquely to the education reform that has provoked thousands of teachers to take to the streets in defense of their jobs and
the public education system. He also mentioned the crown jewel for U.S. oil companies and Pentagon plannersthe privatization of the national oil company
PEMEX.

2NC --- Venezuela
The CP initiates engagement with Venezuela --- that solves the reasons why they
opposed the FTAA in the past and ensures the negotiations would be successful.
Griffin, 2013 (Harvard University, Engage with Venezuela
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thecrimson.com%2Farticle%2F2013
%2F4%2F3%2FHarvard-Venezuela-Chavez-
death%2F&ei=2oP1Uc2IMMiIqQGd5oGADw&usg=AFQjCNGOfRPNquExIUvy3fpNWevlBiL6qw&sig2=Wb8eggvNU39HYCtJOuFNUg)

Engagement with Venezuela would also lead to stronger economic cooperation with the entirety of Latin America. It was mostly through Venezuelas
efforts that the United States was unable to create a F ree T rade A rea of the A mericas, an endeavor that would have
eliminated most trade barriers among participant nations, thereby leading to more lucrative trade. In a world where the United States and
Venezuela were to enjoy normalized relations, all nations involved would benefit from such
agreements . For both diplomatic and economic reasons, then, positive engagement is the best course of action for the
United States. As it stands, the negative relationship between the countries has created an atmosphere of animosity in the hemisphere,
hindering dialogue and making economic cooperation nearly impossible. While there is much for which the Venezuelan government can rightly be
criticizedauthoritarian rule, abuse of human rights, lack of market-friendly policiesnothing that the United States is doing to counter those drawbacks is having
any effect. The United States should stop playing tough guy with Venezuela, bite the bullet, and work toward stability and
prosperity for the entire hemisphere. We arent catching any flies with our vinegarits high time we started trying to catch them with honey.

2NC --- CP Doesnt Link to Cred DA--- Id be careful because its a
reason why the perm shields the link
CP doesnt link to the international politics da --- ensures that structural incentives
exist to make reforms successful

One of the most important immediate objectives of the regional integration strategy of the countries of Latin America is to complete
the F ree T rade A rea of the A mericas in a way that balances the interests of all parties. This is important for several reasons. First, guaranteed reciprocal
access to the markets in the Americas matters greatly to all the countries in the region, which at present face barriers or insecure access to these markets.
Particularly important is access to the U.S. market, although there are also substantial opportunities for increased trade among existing sub-regional groups that still
trade little with each other. Second, the FTAA may contribute to locking in the structural reforms carried out by the
countries in the region, some of which are being called into question in the current uncertain international and
regional economic environment. Indeed, experience has shown that sub-regional initiatives among developing countries
cannot always provide the same incentives for avoiding a reversal of the reforms as are found in
agreements in which an industrialized country participates. Third, the FTAA may help consolidate political links at the
hemispheric level, reducing the likelihood of potential conflicts and, perhaps, serving to strengthen and lock in
U.S. cooperation with the countries of the region. In effect, increased trade and investment in the hemisphere, and their contribution to the competitive-
ness of U.S. firms in the global economy, increase that countrys stakes in the prospects of Latin America.
2NC AT: Environment Turn
FTAA negotiations will include environmental protection
Colyer, 2002 (Dale, Department of Agricultural Resource Economics ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE FTAA
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/agswvucps/19107.htm)

Abstract: Paper presented at the 24th West Indies Agricultural Economics Conference, Granada, July 19-12, 2002. Environmental issues have
become important in trade agreement negotiations. NAFTA explicitly includes environmental provisions and they are affecting
ongoing WTO and FTAA negotiations. The final role of the environment in the FTAA is uncertain, given opposition by most of the members. The draft FTAA
agreement does not contain a separate section on the environment, but a U.S. position paper indicates that environmental
provisions are important and that U.S. negotiators will seek to incorporate environmental concerns
into specific chapters such those on investment and agriculture. The large number and varied economic and environmental condi tions of the 34 countries in the
FTAA, make it difficult to include meaningful environmental provisions in the agreement, but environmentalists are seeking them and the
inclusion of such provisions in the NAFTA and WTO agreements will tend to make it difficult to get approval of future agreements that do not address
environmental issues or at least that do not guard against creating pollution havens or that encourage laxness in environmental protection. This paper examines
environmental and trade issues in the context of the FTAA negotiations including analyses of environmental conditions in the region and the pros and cons of their
inclusion in the FTAA and other trade agreements.
And itll allow for future protection
f)


2NC AT: Democracy
1. Specifics of the CP solve --- incorporation of a democracy clause ensures a check on
abuse and authoritarian actions through pressure and appeasement. - thats Feinberg
and Bates. It also results in further democracy spread
f)

Theory/Perms
2NC Clear/Honest Intentions/Commitment Is Key
Clear commitment and binding contributions is crucial for negotiations to be
successful and ensure that nations dont backlash.
Segger, 2003 (Marie-Claire, Fordham International Law Journal Director of the Centre for International Sustainable Development Law ("CISDL"); Senior
Manager of the CISDL / IISD / U.N. EP / OAS Americas Sustainable Development Capacity Portfolio. Sustainable Development in the Negotiation of the FTAA
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2272&context=ilj)

The issue of financing deserves special emphasis. For negotiations to be successful, they must start with a clear
commitment of new and additional resources to finance the result. Serious attention must be given to the establishment of
mechanisms for new and additional resources to properly finance the agenda in a realistic, cost-effective manner which the
parties to the accord control to themselves in ajust and equitable way. A new environmental cooperation mechanism in
the Americas should not burden already over-extended environmental ministries, particularly in smaller economies. 246 The NACEC, with binding
contributions from each member government of CAD$3 million per year, has a budget of CAD$9 million annually to address environmental cooperation in
North America. 2 " 7 A realistic estimate of the costs involved in administering environmental cooperation for the Western Hemisphere, involving governments with
very diverse resources, must take into account the needs of each subregion. A comprehensive study of this issue, with budgets and comparative analysis of other
international environmental institutions, would be very valuable. At a minimum, it can be estimated that a serious provision for hemispheric environmental
cooperation, at U.S.$9 million annually per sub-region, would cost U.S.$45 million. This amount seems quite reasonable compared to the sums committed for the
FTAA Hemispheric Cooperation Program, to build trade technical assistance. In the interest of stability and consistency, such funds may need to be dedicated from
government budgets, with all governments making an assessed contribution on a scale and taking into account both the common and the distinct
responsibilities of the parties involved. Further project funds would also be necessary and could be raised in innovative ways.2 48

Negotiations will only be successful if its transparent and irreversible.
Lamy, 2001 (Pascal, European Trade Commissioner, Regionalism and Multilateralism in Latin America
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&ved=0CGMQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.londoncanadianstudies.org%2FJo
urnal%2F19%2F19-4.pdf&ei=tIj2UdnJF-HOyAGO_IGwCg&usg=AFQjCNGuMDJ2iHTnccFyU95fvXwGcG5XvQ&sig2=kJbWY5WK9j9DOdvVggn9_w)

Unilateralism is the prerogative of a superpower, which none of our countries is. It belongs to another era, that of bilateral
agreements in which the strong imposed their will on the weak, that of extra-territorial decisions, employing economic sanctions, that of
arbitrary protectionism. Today unilateralism would result in an unstable , inefficient and unjust international
economic order. Our increasingly interdependent world needs predictable and objective rules and
policies. Only international rule of law can guarantee these. What are, then, the two routes actually open to us ? Regionalism and
multilateralism. These are not mutually exclusive but complementary. They are not equivalent: one is subordinate to the other. Regionalism is
governed by the multilateral rules and disciplines of the WTO. A country, like Brazil or any other one, can no longer pursue a national project
without integrating it into a regional project and multilateral dimension. Regionalism may be a European invention, but it is not protected by
copyright laws ! No need for compulsory licensing here. Regionalism is a global public good that the EU has developed over half a
century of integration, the benefit of which it is ready to share with its partners. The principles are simple: a single market; harmonisation of
standards and regulations affecting the free movement of goods, services, people and capital; solidarity through financial mechanisms; and,
where necessary, common policies, among them trade and competition policies. Integration has even led to a single currency, the Euro,
which will gradually acquire the international status worthy of its 300 million consumers and savers. For twenty or thirty years Europe has
been pioneering ways of harnessing globalisation. The benefits of regional integration are considerable: a
single market attractive to foreign investors; increased but fair competition; and far greater clout in international
negotiations. Of course, securing these benefits requires economic operators to place their faith in
integration, something they will only do if they judge the process to be transparent and irreversible .
And irreversibility entails both an institutional framework for pooling sovereignty and sufficient convergence of economic policies, including
currency stability.

The permutation results in an undermining of Latin American Authority --- causes
backlash against the FTAA
Nelson, 2008 (Marcel, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Studies Queens University, Kingston, Ontario THE FTAA AND THE CONTESTATION OF
NEOLIBERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Nelson.pdf)

Negotiations for the FTAA occurred both while neoliberal policies were being implemented in Latin America
and the consequences of these policies were being felt. For leaders like Hugo Chavez Frias of Venezuela, one of a wave of leaders
in Latin America who had been elected on a platform hostile to neoliberalism, the FTAA came to be associated with the
continuation of the neoliberal policies.22 This did not bode well for the FTAA as neoliberalism was in many cases
continually contested in a manner that prevented it from ever being truly hegemonic. In fact, the states often had to rely on coercive
mechanisms or outright deception to implement neoliberal policies. Furthermore, in many cases, the legitimacy
of neoliberal policies was being contested, even among sectors of society that had originally supported it, as a result of an
increasing number of crises and disappointing economic growth. Soederbergh explains that this has led to a crisis of authority of the structural
power of the United States and financial capital in the South as ruling classes there find it increasingly difficult to promote and pursue neoliberal policies.23
Clear commitment is key --- it was what caused the FTAA to fail in the past
Nelson, 2008 (Marcel, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Studies Queens University, Kingston, Ontario THE FTAA AND THE CONTESTATION OF
NEOLIBERALISM IN LATIN AMERICA http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2008/Nelson.pdf)

An example of the second approach to explaining the failure of the FTAA is I.M. Destlers chapter entitled The United States and a Free Trade Area of
the Americas, which emphasizes the importance of Congress in passing trade agreements.10 Historically, Congress has
tended to be more protectionist than the executive branch because of electoral sensitivity to regional economic interests. Destler explains that
the economic sectors most important for Latin America, such as agriculture and textiles, are those that are the
most protected and consequently the most difficult sectors for which to gather support for liberalization in Congress. Furthermore, he argues that the
FTAA did not have the solid political base that NAFTA had, which makes it difficult for free trade proponents in
Congress to gain momentum and counter protectionist interests. Destler concludes that support for the FTAA has declined
throughout the Americas as a result of the failure of liberal economic policies to bring about welfare gains, but does not explore
the concept further. Destlers approach is interesting, particularly regarding the role of interest groups and Congress in the negotiation of trade agreements. He
points to the fact that there had been a renewed emphasis on protectionism in the House of Representatives, which suggests a delegitimization of liberal economic
policies in the United States, but, again does not elaborate the point. Though Destler touches upon discontent with trade liberalization in both the United States
and Latin America, he does not explore possible links between both phenomena.

Competition
Perm severs economic engagement --- the democracy clause is a form of pressure and
sanctions --- Thats Feinberg and Bates
Forcese, 2002 (Craig, associate professor at the University of Ottawa, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration,
2002, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LawJournals/Craig_Forcese_YHRDLJ.pdf)

While the conclusions noted above are strongly critical of the constructive engagement position, they cannot be read as necessarily supporting
the disengagement view. To conclude that constructive engagement and economic growth are no guarantee of political liberalization and
that trade and investment can prop up repressive regimes is not to say that measures designed to reduce economic growth and investment
lead dictatorships to tumble. Evaluating the capacity of disengagement specifically, of economic sanctions
to induce political liberalization is a separate question. This Article follows the Congressional Research
Service in defining economic sanctions as . . .the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or
threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations,76 via measures such as trade
embargoes; restrictions on particular exports or imports; denial of foreign assistance, loans, and
investments; or control of foreign assets and economic transactions involving citizens in the
sanctioning country.77
And the counterplan is conditional --- the plan has to be unconditional
Smith, No Date Given (Karen, http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:8-
3RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14)

First, a few definitions. Engagement is a foreign policy strategy of building close ties with the government
and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The intention of this strategy is to undermine
illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of
engagement entail primarily building economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular.
Some observers have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of oxygen: economic activity leads to positive political
consequences.19 Conditionality, in contrast, is the linking , by a state or international organisation, of perceived
benefits to another state(such as aid or trade concessions) to the fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions .
Positive conditionality entails promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; negative
conditionality involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the
conditions (in other words, applying sanctions, or a strategy of asphyxiation).20 To put it simply, engagement implies
ties, but with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings . In another way of looking at it,
engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more of a top-
down strategy
Severs Should - means binding and immediate
Summer 94 (Justice, Oklahoma Supreme Court, Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"
13
in the May 18 order connotes
futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.
14
The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of
grammar;
15
it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language
usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an
expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be
garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and every part of the text, with a
view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the
document's signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons
impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v.
Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True minutes20 of a court neither call
for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by
the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national
jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. [Continues To Footnote] 14 In praesenti means literally
"at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes
that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become
effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed.
201 (1882).

Permutation Do the Plan and Initiate FTAA.
Only the FTAA alone will solve --- the US will be perceived as undermining the
negotiation and taking the lead --- that fails and links to the unilateralism net benefit.
Crandall 11 (Russell Crandall, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S.
Department of Defense in 2009, Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and Politics in an
Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs 90.3, May-June, 2011, pg. , http://worldview.unc.edu/files/2012/02/Reading-1.pdf)

realities of this post-hegemonic era, lest it see its influence diminish even further . It must
demonstrate an ability to quietly engage and lead when appropriate--an approach that will allow
Washington to remain actively involved in the region's affairs without acting as though it is trying to
maintain its legacy of hegemony . Given how accustomed the United States is to dominating the region, this project will be harder
than it sounds. FROM HEGEMONY TO AUTONOMY The era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America began over a century ago, when the United
States started flexing its emerging economic and military might in Central America and the Caribbean. In the jungles and mountains of
Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, American soldiers and diplomats used persuasion, coercion, and force to advance U.S. political
and economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington sought to stem the threat of Soviet and Cuban communism, acting directly, for
example, when it invaded Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, and indirectly, as when it provided covert funding to undermine Chilean
President Salvador Allende's leftist government in the 1970s. Sometimes these efforts worked, as in Chile and Grenada, but often they did not;
both the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961 and U.S. efforts to overthrow by proxy the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s were outright
failures. For much of the twentieth century, there was a disconnect between Washington's lofty rhetoric of
democracy and regional harmony and its demonstrated willingness to jettison these principles when
its economic or geopolitical interests were at stake. Even after the Cold War, the United States was accused of peddling its
"Washington consensus" of laissez-faire economic policies, such as the privatization of state-owned assets and free-trade agreements, as a sort
of neoimperialism. Instead of U.S. marines or CIA agents, blame for doing the empire's bidding was now pinned on the "technocratic
imperialists" from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Treasury Department. Yet over the past decade or so, the
United S tates' willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This has occurred in part
because more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin America down the policymaking food chain. But
there is also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given
the end of external and local communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin
America's greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence.
the perm fails --- modest support undercuts soft power --- only a full engagement can
solve
institutions, the U.S. government jeopardizes domestic support for U.S. engagement abroad and risks
undercutting the soft power that helps to sustain its global leadership in the eyes of foreign

intentions. U.S. inconsistency , as well as coercive and nonconsultative behavior, makes it even more

The perm fails --- engagement solely through a robust trade agreement can solve.
Wagner and Parker, 2013 (Daniel, CEO of Country Risk Solutions, a cross-border risk advisory firm, and Nicholas, research analyst with CRS, Is
the Trans-Pacific Partnership the Solution to Latin America's Fractured Trade Regime? http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/is-the-transpacific-
partn_b_3284797.html)

The derailment of negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the Doha Development Round had a significant
impact on the perceived realism of regional trade agreements, while negatively effecting Latin America's ability to uniformly
and robustly engage with its largest trading partners. The radically different trade policy paths that have emerged - pitting the notion of
collaboration against economic nationalism -- have given rise to a region divided over how, and whether, it should approach trade liberalization going forward.
Within Latin America, only Chile, Mexico and Peru are currently party to the TPP. The three formed the Pacific Alliance (PA) in 2012, along with Colombia, which also
hopes to join the Partnership. All four have made significant commitments towards trade liberalization. The PA members have concluded FTAs with one another
and with the U.S., have implemented numerous bilateral trade agreements, and share a number of overlapping trade agreements that include several Asian
countries. Membership in the TPP would facilitate increased integration with one another and offer a more coordinated approach to expanding trade with Asia. In
conjunction with the members of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), it should one day be possible to create a supply chain running up the Pacific
coast from Chile to Mexico. On the other side of the spectrum are Latin America's "Atlantic" countries, whose approach to regional and global integration has taken
a dramatically different course. Mercosur, the once promising common market, now includes the protectionist wing of Latin America that has come to include
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, along with socialist Bolivia and Venezuela. Between them, the ability to make genuine progress along regional trade lines has proven
challenging. During the commodities boom these countries prospered, but as a result of the global recession, growth waned and a
propensity toward protectionism became common. The customs union that in the 1990s united its members to reduce trade barriers, forge a common trade policy,
and actively participate in the FTAA negotiations has been transformed into one of the most protectionist blocs in Latin America, with its members routinely
employing tariffs, taxes, and trade restrictions against one another. This has limited Mercosur's general appeal in and outsi de of Latin America. Mercosur has largely
withdrawn from pursuing FTAs altogether, and its policies over the past decade have failed to consolidate meaningful partnerships with any of its primary trading
partners. In order to mitigate the impact of a divided Latin America and prevent the schism from
intensifying , robust multilateral negotiations must be reconstituted . Much of what happens next will
be influenced by the actions of the U.S., given its leadership role in the TPP. A primary obstacle that must be overcome is the Brazil/US
relationship, which was a major impediment during the Doha round. Brazil is not currently party to any major multilateral trade initiative, and two of the principal
agreements it has signed in recent years -- CELAC and UNASUR -- specifically exclude the U.S. Additionally, Mercosur requires that its members negotiate trade
agreements in unison, meaning Brazil will need to find a way to compromise, as will its neighbors. The U.S. has scored notable trade-related achievements in the
past several years, mostly in the form of bilateral trade agreements, but these took far too long to accomplish and were highly politicized. Given this, it seems
unrealistic to hope for any near term breakthroughs in future multilateral negotiations that rely on the U.S. for leadership. If the region continues to
be a secondary priority of U.S. foreign and economic policy, large segments of Latin America will
continue to be left out of the broader trade integration picture .

The CP alone is necessary to ensure continual growth --- multiple different forms of
engagement halt growth - the perm would exasperate this problem.

The United States and Latin America have pursued trade liberalization through multilateral, regional, and
bilateral negotiations, with mixed results. In part this reflects divergent priorities that have been difficult to fully reconcile. For many Latin American
countries, reducing barriers to agricultural trade is top of the list for a successful agreement. This goal includes reducing market access barriers (peak tariffs and tariff rate quotasTRQs),
domestic U.S. subsidies, and nontariff barriers (administrative rules, antidumping provisions). Although there are many other issues, agriculture policy has played a big part
in slowing progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round and halting the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).7 The United States has made clear its
unwillingness to address most agricultural and antidumping issues in a regional agreement like the FTAA to preserve its bargaining leverage in the WTO against other subsidizing countries such
as the European Union and Japan. Latin American counties have their own sensitive issues and a particular concern in some countries for easing its
subsistence agricultural sectors slowly toward trade liberalization. In addition to market access, the United States has focused its trade negotiating goals on areas
where it is most competitive such as services trade (e.g., financial, tourism, technology, professional); intellectual property rights (IPR); government procurement; and investment. Not
surprisingly, these are areas where many Latin American countries are more reluctant to negotiate. Hence, there is a near reversal of priorities that has slowed the progress of comprehensive
agreements at the multilateral and regional levels, reflecting inherent differences between many developed and developing countries. The result in the Western Hemisphere has
been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral agreements. The United States has implemented FTAs with
Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Peru, but Congress has not acted on the proposed FTAs with Panama or Colombia, despite changes agreed to even after the
formal negotiations concluded. Currently, congressional reticence awaits further commitments in areas that fall outside the negotiated
text of the FTAs, such as tax law in Panama and human rights improvements in Colombia, raising questions for some over the ability of the United States to consummate
trade negotiations.8 The prospects are limited at best for exploring reciprocal FTAs with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil, as the major regional economy not in a
unilateral preferential arrangement with the United States, has abandoned the FTAA model and moved ahead separately by adding associate members to Mercosur, supporting
Venezuelas accession to Mercosur as a full member, and leading in the formation of broader economic and political integration pacts in South America. Venezuelas President Hugo Chvez has
taken a decidedly more confrontational approach in establishing the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA), enticing Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Dominica, and Honduras to join with
subsidized oil trade.9 Although these are neither deep nor comprehensive trade arrangements, they do signal a political will to consolidate regional
bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-designed FTAA. Three clear challenges emerge from this picture. First, Brazil and the United States have demonstrated a
prolonged reluctance to move off their respective positions, which bodes poorly for resurrecting the FTAA.10 The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic
attitudes toward the United States as full Mercosur members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations of key industries and other efforts to increase the role of the state in managing the
economies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening support for market-based trade solutions. Second, multiple FTAs, by definition,
promote an inefficient and cumbersome trading system with each FTA having its own rules of origin (to
deter non-member transshipment of goods) and related customs administration and enforcement requirements that can complicate
trade and investment decisions. It is not without reason, therefore, that many interest groups wish to find a way to
rationalize such a convoluted system. Third, Latin America is expanding its trade to other countries in the world. China, in particular, has increased its trade
and investment relationship with the region. From 2000 to 2009, total trade has grown by a factor of ten, and investment has poured into the region. In both cases, China is in search of long-
term, reliable sources of basic commodities. In 2009, over 70% of Latin American exports to China were in basic ores, copper, grains, and mineral fuels. While this trade structure is currently
lucrative, it does nothing to diversify Latin Americas exports into more value added goods, and leaves the fortunes of these countries to the often volatile commodities markets. Reconciling
the disparate trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere will be difficult and perhaps impossible in the absence of a complementary multilateral solution. For example, conventional
wisdom argues that without advancement in agricultural issues at the WTO, action on a comprehensive FTAA (or something like it) is unlikely. Further, a less comprehensive FTAA has so far
been rejected and offers a far less compelling alternative to a multilateral agreement on economic grounds. Therefore, the FTAA may not emerge in the near future, despite the
logical solution that a hemispheric-wide agreement presents to improving the flow of trade (and
investment) over existing arrangements.

The permutation imposes substantial costs on the ability of Latin America to manage
economic policies --- that prevents the ability for effective growth.
Gallagher, 2012 (Kevin, Department of International Relations @ Boston University, Trading Away the Ladder? Trade Politics and Economic
Development in the Americas, New Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2008, http://www.relooney.info/0_New_5306.pdf)

Over the past two decades there has been a six-fold increase in the number of regional or bilateral trade
agreements (RBTAs) in the world economy. Nowhere has this proliferation been more prevalent than in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where 33 of
the 39 countries belong to at least one RBTA.1 Figure 1 depicts what has been termed the spaghetti bowl of RBTAs in the region a tangled web of trade
agreements like none other in the world. Since the early 1980s, the majority of the most important RBTAs in the region have been agreements with the USA. The
USA had completed agreements with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. Discussions for a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) commenced in 1993 and included all LAC nations except for Cuba. These discussions have been put on hold and perhaps even put
away forever. There is a puzzle regarding Latin Americas engagement in these numerous trade agreements with the USA. Nations in the region tend to spend the
majority of their international economic diplomacy on these agreements despite the fact that the economic gains from such agreements
are much smaller than they would be under world trade liberalisation. The costs of these agreements are seen as
signicant , both in terms of trade diversion and the loss of policy space . Policy space is dened as the
extent to which trade rules provide nationstates with an optimal degree of openness that allows them
to be integrated with the world economy as well as pursue domestic development policy. It has been argued that developed
nations are kicking away the ladder, whereby they are not permitting developing countries the ability to deploy many of the same policies that developed
countries used at earlier periods in their development history.2 This article acknowledges that developed country power is a key variable, but, like others, it asks
whether developing countries are also trading away the ladder. It examines the gains from various RBTAs in the hemisphere and juxtaposes them with the costs. In
addition, the article examines the extent to which interests, power and ideas, as well as collective action issues, play a role in spurring Latin American governments
to favour economic integration with the USA over alternative trade and development paths.

Unilateralism Bad
A lot of the impacts and more work is already in other files, such as the Obama Cred advantages and the
Appeasement DA. Sorry if I didnt include it here.
Generic Unilat Bad
1NC --- Insert in either CP
Unilateralism is bad causes backlash to US policy and turns the case --- also means
the perm fails --- modest support undercuts soft power

institutions , the U.S. government jeopardizes domestic support for U.S. engagement abroad and
risks undercutting the soft power that helps to sustain its global leadership in the eyes of foreign

2NC --- UQ
Were at a critical juncture hemispheric relations are fundamentally changing its
only a question of unilateralism or multilateralism
Relationship: The United States and Latin America, Inter-American Dialogue Policy Report, p. 1-2, April
2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)
By most historical measures, changes over the last half dozen years in the Western Hemispherein Latin America,
the Caribbean, the United States, and Canadahave been far-reaching. Some of the changes, including sustained economic
growth and reduction in poverty and inequality in many Latin American countries, have been favorable. Others, such as the spread of criminal
violence that poses a risk for democracy in some nations, have been deeply troubling. Still others, such as the emergence of
several new regional organizations, are in early stages of development. Their longterm significance is
uncertain. All these changes taken together are transforming the nations of the hemisphere and
their relations with one another . What is at stake is the future of inter-American relations , which
today are generally cordial but lack vigor and purpose. Efforts at hemispheric integration have been disappointing.
Effective cooperation in the Americas even on widely shared problems like energy security, organized crime and the drug
trade, and international economic volatilityremains limited and sporadic. It is the good news of Latin Americas
progress that has most altered hemispheric relations. In the past decade, the region has posted its best economic
performance in a generation and managed largely to sidestep the world financial crisis in 20082009. The ranks of the middle classes have
swelled. The regions political structures have also opened up, giving way to growing participation by women, indigenous and Afro-
descendant populations, and other once-excluded groups. All Latin Americans across a broadening spectrum have greater access to
education and health services, consumer goods, and foreign travel. They now have real and rapidly expanding stakes in their societies. These
advances have also led to new social stirrings which, along with demands and expectations, are notably on the rise. There are more and more
pressures for further change and improvements. Impressive economic, political, and social progress at home has, in turn, given Brazil,
Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and many other countries greater access to worldwide opportunities. Indeed, the regions most salient
transformation may be its increasingly global connections and widening international relationships. Brazils dramatic rise on the world stage
most visibly exemplifies the shift. But other countries, too, are participating actively in global affairs and developing extensive networks of
commercial and political ties. China is an increasingly prominent economic actor, but India and other Asian countries are intensifying their
ties to the region as well. The United States has also changed markedly, in ways that many find worrisome. The 2008
financial crisis revealed serious misalignments in and poor management of the US economywhich, four
years later, is still struggling to recover. Inequality has significantly widened in the United States, while much-needed improvements in
education and infrastructure are ignored. The most ominous change in the United States has taken place in the
political realm. Politics have become less collaborative. It is increasingly difficult to find common ground on which to
build solutions to the critical problems on the policy agenda. Compromise, the hallmark of democratic governance, has become an ebbing
art, replaced by gridlock and inaction on challenges that would advance US national interests and well-being. In part as a result of
these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown more distant. The quality and intensity of ties
have diminished. Most countries of the region view the United States as less and less relevant to their
needsand with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them. In the main,
hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred relations in the past have subsided.
But the US-Latin America relationship would profit from more vitality and direction. Shared interests
are not pursued as vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are
being missed. Well developed ideas for reversing these disappointing trends are scarce.

Hemispheric policy is fundamentally changing new Latin American autonomy and
post-hegemonic transition its a question of how the US engages only multilateralism
fits for the new hemispheric landscape
For over 150 years, the Monroe Doctrine provided the guiding principles
for U.S. policy toward Latin America, asserting U.S. primacy in the foreign affairs of the region. Over the past two decades,
those principles have become increasingly obsolete. Washingtons basic policy framework, however, has
not changed sufficiently to reflect the new reality. U.S. policy can no longer be based on the
assumption that the United States is the most important outside actor in Latin America. If there was
an era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America, it is over. In most respects, this shift reflects positive
developments within Latin America itself. The region has undergone a historic transformation politically, with military-
authoritarian rule giving way to vibrant, if imperfect, democracy in almost every nation. Economically, Latin America is now one of the more
open market regions in the world and a crucial global provider of energy, minerals, and food. None of this is to say that Latin America has
entirely overcome its history of political tumult or done enough to alleviate poverty, improve competitiveness and human capital, or correct
extreme inequality. But it does mean that U.S. policymakers must change the way they think about the region.
Latin America is not Washingtons to lose; nor is it Washingtons to save. Latin Americas fate is largely in Latin Americas hands. A failure
to acknowledge how Latin Americans define their own challenges has created new political strains in
recent years. It has also caused U.S. policymakers to overlook the ways in which the United States
can meaningfully contribute to Latin Americas progressfurthering the United States own interests in the process. By
truly beginning to engage Latin America on its own terms, Washington can mark the start of a new
era in U.S.-Latin America relations. It is a cliche to bemoan Americans lack of interest in Latin America. Still, this
disinterest remains vexing given the regions proximity to the United States and the remarkable
interconnectedness of U.S. and Latin American economies and societies. In recent years, as Washingtons
attention has been focused on crises elsewhere in the world, the connections have only deepened. From 1996 to 2006, total U.S.
merchandise trade with Latin America grew by 139 percent, compared to 96 percent for Asia and 95 percent for the European Union (EU).1 In
2006, the United States exported $223 billion worth of goods to Latin American consumers (compared with $55 billion to China).2 Latin
America is the United States most important external source of oil, accounting for nearly 30 percent of imports (compared with 20 percent
from the Middle East), as well as its main source of illegal narcotics. And as a result of both conditions in Latin America and demand for
workers in the United States, migration from the region has accelerated. Latinos now account for 15 percent of the U.S. population, nearly 50
percent of recent U.S. population growth, and a growing portion of the electorate allowing Latino voters increasingly to shape the U.S.
political agenda. Cross-border community and family ties, as well as the Spanish language media, mean that Latin America remains part of
many Latinos daily lives and concerns. For all of these reasons, Latin Americas wellbeing directly affects the United States. But even with
such integration, the opening of Latin American economies and the globalization of Latin American societies means that U.S. policy is now but
one of several competing factors capable of influencing the region. Latin American states, especially the larger ones, do not consider their
interests to be primarily determined by diplomatic, trade, or security ties with the United States. Brazil has made inroads into groupings such
as the South-South Dialogue with South Africa and India and the Group of 20 (G20), while countries such as Chile and Mexico have struck
trade and investment agreements with the EU and a number of Asian countries, China most prominently. The economic and political
diversification of Latin America is reflected in Latin American attitudes as well. Esteem for U.S. global and hemispheric leadership is at its
lowest level in the region in recent memory. In 2002, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, 82 percent of Venezuelans, 34 percent of
Argentineans, and 51 percent of Bolivians had a favorable view of the United States; those numbers had fallen to 56, 16, and 43 percent by
2007. The percentage of Latin Americans who approved of U.S. ideas on democracy decreased from 45 percent in 2002 to 29 percent in
2007.3 This general distrust of the United States has allowed Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Evo Morales of Bolivia,Rafael Correa of
Ecuador, and even FelipeCalderon of Mexico to bolster their domestic popular support by criticizing Washington. Most Latin
Americans still prefer a mutually respectful and productive relationship with the United States, but
the factors driving Latin Americas desire for greater independence are likely to shape the regions
posture toward the United States well into the future.

2NC --- Obama Influence
Obamas restoring international order now -- but unilateral actions prevent his ability
--- causes economic crisis, and global conflicts.
Yu, 2012 (Shiyu, Watching America scholar, Obamas Neo-Unilateralism http://watchingamerica.com/News/163526/obamas-neo-unilateralism/)

Unilateralism, which led to the decline of the United States reputation and moral authority, is the most significant feature of the Bush
administrations foreign policy. It not only worsened the U.S. debt crisis through the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, but it also intensified
antagonism between the United States and Islamic countries, aggravating a global clash of civilizations.
Ostensibly, Obama is trying to bring order out of chaos, emphasizing international cooperation , restoring alliances
with Americas European allies and adopting friendly diplomacy toward the Islamic world. Suddenly, Obama garnered many international
accolades and even received his undeserved Nobel Peace Prize. Unlike the Bush administration, the Obama administration recognizes the
limitations of U.S. power and influence and always emphasizes cost-effectiveness, a way that helps America acquire the greatest
international interests at the least cost. This is the most significant feature of the so-called Obama doctrine, which affects the White Houses policy-making and
priorities and that revealed itself especially in the promotion of the strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region. Nevertheless, on the anti-terrorism front, even
some American conservatives hold that there is no substantial difference between policies adopted by Obama and Bush, except in how they are implemented.

2NC --- Working through multilateral institutions key
US influence is declining now unilateral involvement triggers backlash working
through the cps key.
Crandall 11 (Russell Crandall, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College,
Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009, Director for
Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere: Power and
Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs 90.3, May-June, 2011, pg. ,
http://worldview.unc.edu/files/2012/02/Reading-1.pdf)

realities of this post-hegemonic era, lest it see its influence diminish even further. It must demonstrate
an ability to quietly engage and lead when appropriate--an approach that will allow Washington to
remain actively involved in the region's affairs without acting as though it is trying to maintain its
legacy of hegemony . Given how accustomed the United States is to dominating the region, this project will be harder than it sounds.
FROM HEGEMONY TO AUTONOMY The era of U.S. hegemony in Latin America began over a century ago, when the United States started flexing
its emerging economic and military might in Central America and the Caribbean. In the jungles and mountains of Nicaragua, Haiti, and the
Dominican Republic, American soldiers and diplomats used persuasion, coercion, and force to advance U.S. political and economic interests.
During the Cold War, Washington sought to stem the threat of Soviet and Cuban communism, acting directly, for example, when it invaded
Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989, and indirectly, as when it provided covert funding to undermine Chilean President Salvador Allende's
leftist government in the 1970s. Sometimes these efforts worked, as in Chile and Grenada, but often they did not; both the Bay of Pigs
operation in 1961 and U.S. efforts to overthrow by proxy the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in the 1980s were outright failures. For much of
the twentieth century, there was a disconnect between Washington's lofty rhetoric of democracy and
regional harmony and its demonstrated willingness to jettison these principles when its economic or
geopolitical interests were at stake. Even after the Cold War, the United States was accused of peddling its "Washington
consensus" of laissez-faire economic policies, such as the privatization of state-owned assets and free-trade agreements, as a sort of
neoimperialism. Instead of U.S. marines or CIA agents, blame for doing the empire's bidding was now pinned on the "technocratic imperialists"
from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. Treasury Department. Yet over the past decade or so, the United
S tates' willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This has occurred in part because
more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin America down the policymaking food chain. But there is
also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given the end
of external and local communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin America's
greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence.
Insert heg/Obama cred impact

2NC --- Link
Continued unilateralism kills Obamas credibility in Latin America
Dangl, 2009 (Benjamin, Latin American philosopher, editor of Toward Freedom
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2009/apr/17/obama-summit-americas)

While George Bush was the most unpopular president ever in South America, Barack Obama could end up
being the most popular. To that end, much hinges on this weekend's fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, where all of the
hemisphere's heads of state minus Ral Castro of Cuba will be in attendance. In order to break with Bush's disastrous legacy in
Latin American relations, Obama would do well to follow the strategy set out by his vice president, Joe Biden, during his recent
visit to Chile: "The time of the United States dictating unilaterally , the time where we only talk and don't listen, is over ," Biden said.

2NC --- Causes Topic Country to Agree to the Plan and Answer to the
Perm

intentions. U.S. inconsistency, as well as coercive and nonconsultative behavior, makes it even more
2NC AT: CP Isnt Multilateral Action
Yes it is.
Bouchard and Peterson, 2010 (Caroline and John, University of Edinburgh, Multilateralism: Dead or Alive?
http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/39526/Conceptualising_Multilateralism_dead_alive.pdf)

Multilateralism is three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (more or less) institutionalised
international cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (more or less) equally to all. We have
reflected carefully on the choices that inevitably must be made in arriving at a truly modern, functional definition. All competing definitions
agree that multilateralism, at minimum, involves a minimum of three actors (almost always states). Critics might say that
this is to set the bar too low, especially given debates about mini- v. multilateralism and k group v. n group multilateralism. But there are many imaginable cases
of multilateralism that could have major impacts on IR involving only a few actors, which need not all be states. We have seen that
major international agreements on emissions reductions, regulatory cooperation, and rights for workers might involve, even necessarily, non-state actors.
Consider, just as one example, what might be accomplished in terms of industry retrenchment and the embrace of green technologies, between just 3 actors
(only 1 of which is a state): the US, the EU, and the motor industry.
Impact Scenarios
2NC --- Obama Cred
Obamas strength is uniquely key to solve conflict
Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romneys
successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 & author, The disease of a weak president,
The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/
The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles heel all politicians are born with the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences,
people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and
respect of friends and foes alike. In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do
whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both
word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldnt bet against the
soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces. But Obamas weakness could in other places have
implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot
of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is
built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and
nuclear weapons. If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about
this one. Here are a few unsettling facts to think about: First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947.
All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to
wipe each other off the map many times over. Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when
not if Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no
mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
and a single nuclear device. Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is
strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets Indias natural resources. Over the
years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory,
appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world. In my book, Coup DEtat, I
consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions
on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and
introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader
through a coup dtat. I wish it was that simple. The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must
be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on
behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India. There are many threats out there Islamic
radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter
people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest
threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesnt have to be this way. President Obama could
if he chose develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status
quo is simply not an option.

Engagement is inevitable the only question is effectivenessstrong Obama foreign
policy stops Syrian instability, Iran nuclearization, South China Seas conflict, and
Russian resurgence
Ghitis 13 (Frida, world affairs columnist for The Miami Herald and World Politics Review. A former CNN
producer and correspondent, she is the author of The End of Revolution: A Changing World in the Age of
Live Television. World to Obama: You can't ignore us, 1/22,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/22/opinion/ghitis-obama-world)
President Obama made it very clear: The second term is all about the domestic agenda. If only the world
would cooperate. Obama outlined his goals for the next four years, sketching above all a progressive vision of a country with less
inequality and more justice. And, judging by his inaugural speech, he plans to put his shoulder to the wheel. After all, much of the first term was
consumed with averting a national economic catastrophe. Now he can get on with building a legacy, reviving that hope and change he
promised back during the 2008 campaign. But the most subtly striking part of Obama's inauguration speech was how it largely ignored the
rest of the globe. In his 20-minute address, he dedicated perhaps one minute to foreign policy. America, he said, will "try and resolve our
differences with other nations peacefully." He vowed the country "will remain the anchor of strong alliances" and it will support democracy. He
also declared the United States "must be a source of hope for the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice..." and stand for
"human dignity and justice." Beyond that, he did not spare a single word for tens of thousands killed by dictators, as they have
been in Syria; nothing about the struggle for liberal democratic rights in places like Egypt, which sets the tone for the Middle East.
Nothing about repression and thwarting of freedom of expression, the rollback of democratic rights, or the push to destroy existing
democracies, statements that could have come as welcome words of encouragement for people who share American values of freedom and
justice in places like Egypt, China, Iran, Russia or Mali. The president should keep in mind that millions around the world
yearn to know they have the backing of the most powerful country on Earth. As he surely knows, even his
words make a big difference. And while Obama plans to dedicate his efforts to the domestic agenda, a number of brewing
international crises are sure to steal his attention and demand his time . Here are a few of the foreign
policy issues that, like it or not, may force Obama to divert his focus from domestic concerns in this new term. Syria
unraveling: The United Nations says more than 60,000 people have already died in a civil war that the West has, to its shame,
done little to keep from spinning out of control. Washingtonhas warned that the use of chemical or biological weapons might force its hand.
But the regime may have already used them. The West has failed to nurture a moderate force in the conflict. Now
Islamist extremists are growing more powerful within the opposition. The chances are growing that
worst-case scenarios will materialize. Washington will not be able to endlessly ignore this dangerous
war. Egypt and the challenge of democracy: What happens in Egypt strongly influences the rest of the Middle East -- and hence world peace --
which makes it all the more troubling to see liberal democratic forces lose battle after battle for political influence against Islamist parties, and
to hear blatantly anti-Semitic speech coming from the mouth of Mohammed Morsy barely two years before he became president. Iran's
nuclear program: Obama took office promising a new, more conciliatory effort to persuade Iran to drop its nuclear enrichment
program. Four years later, he has succeeded in implementing international sanctions, but Iran has continued enriching
uranium, leading United Nations inspectors to find "credible evidence" that Tehran is working on nuclear weapons. Sooner or later the
moment of truth will arrive. If a deal is not reached, Obama will have to decide if he wants to be the president
on whose watch a nuclear weapons race was unleashed in the most dangerous and unstable part of
the world. North Africa terrorism: A much-neglected region of the world is becoming increasingly difficult to disregard. In recent days,
Islamist extremists took American and other hostages in Algeria and France sent its military to fight advancing Islamist extremists in Mali, a
country that once represented optimism for democratic rule in Africa, now overtaken by militants who are potentially turning it into a staging
ground for international terrorism. Russia repression: As Russian President Vladimir Putin succeeds in crushing
opposition to his increasingly authoritarianrule, he and his allies are making anti-American words and policies their
favorite theme. A recent ban on adoption of Russian orphans by American parents is only the most vile example. But Washington needs
Russian cooperation to achieve its goals at the U.N. regarding Iran, Syria and other matters. It is a complicated problem with
which Obama will have to wrestle. Then there are the long-standing challenges that could take a turn
for the worse, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Obama may not want to wade into that morass
again, but events may force his hand . And there are the so-called "black swans," events of low probability and high impact.
There is talk that China and Japan could go to war over a cluster of disputed islands. A war between two of
the world's largest economies could prove devastating to the global economy, just as a sudden and dramatic reversal in the fragile Eurozone
economy could spell disaster. Japan's is only the hottest of many territorial disputes between China and its
Asian neighbors. Then there's North Korea with its nuclear weapons. We could see regions that have garnered little attention come back
to the forefront, such as Latin America, where conflict could arise in a post-Hugo Chavez Venezuela. The president -- and the country -- could
also benefit from unexpectedly positive outcomes. Imagine a happy turn of events in Iran, a breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians,
the return of prosperity in Europe, a successful push by liberal democratic forces in the Arab uprising countries, which could create new
opportunities, lowering risks around the world, easing trade, restoring confidence and improving the chances for the very agenda Obama
described in his inaugural speech. The aspirations he expressed for America are the ones he should express for our tumultuous planet.
Perhaps in his next big speech, the State of the Union, he can remember America's leadership position and devote
more attention to those around the world who see it as a source of inspiration and encouragement. After all, in this second
term Obama will not be able to devote as small a portion of his attention to foreign policy as he did
during his inaugural speech. International disengagement is not an option. As others before Obama have
discovered, history has a habit of toying with the best laid, most well-intentioned plans of American
presidents.
South China Sea conflicts cause extinction
Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of
eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he
edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)
While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries
national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current
deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another
example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is
clear enough. Disturbed by Chinas growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged Chinas
claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military
ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was asserting our own
position as a Pacific power. But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it
could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The
U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later,
during the conflict over the future of Chinas offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter
confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or
anything else. Of course, China didnt have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the
loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the
military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between
nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there havent been very manyat least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between
nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case,
the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistans foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to
use any weapon in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles
for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, dont nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO
leaders didnt feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATOs strategy was to respond to a Soviet
conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the
nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear
deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing Star Wars and its modern variant, national
missile defense. Why are these vastly expensiveand probably unworkablemilitary defense systems needed if other
nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those
Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be
that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government
possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these
Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would win any nuclear war with China. But what would that victory entail? A
nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and
fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far
higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive
debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a nuclear
winter around the globedestroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos
and destruction.
Russia expansionism causes nuclear war
Blank 9 (Dr. Stephen, Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College, March, Russia And Arms Control: Are There Opportunities For The Obama Administration?,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub908.pdf)
Proliferators or nuclear states like China and Russia can then deter regional or intercontinental attacks either by denial or by threat of
retaliation.168 Given a multipolar world structure with little ideological rivalry among major powers, it
is unlikely that they will go to war with each other. Rather, like Russia, they will strive for
exclusive hegemony in their own sphere of influence and use nuclear
instruments towards that end. However, wars may well break out between major powers and weaker
peripheral states or between peripheral and semiperipheral states given their lack of domestic legitimacy, the absence of the means of crisis
prevention, the visible absence of crisis management mechanisms, and their strategic calculation that asymmetric wars might give them the victory
or respite they need.169 Simultaneously, The states of periphery and semiperiphery have far more opportunities for political maneuvering. Since
war remains a political option, these states may find it convenient to exercise their military power as a means for achieving political objectives.
Thus international crises may increase in number. This has two important implications
for the use of WMD. First, they may be used deliberately to offer a decisive victory (or in Russias
case, to achieve intra-war escalation control author170) to the striker, or for defensive purposes when imbalances in
military capabilities are significant; and second, crises increase the possibilities of inadvertent or
accidental wars involving WMD.171 Obviously nuclear proliferators or states that are expanding their
nuclear arsenals like Russia can exercise a great influence upon world politics if they chose to defy
the prevailing consensus and use their weapons not as defensive weapons, as has been commonly
thought, but as offensive weapons to threaten other states and deter nuclear powers. Their
decision to go either for cooperative security and strengthened international military-political norms of action, or for individual national
egotism will critically affect world politics. For, as Roberts observes, But if they drift away from those efforts [to bring about more cooperative
security], the consequences could be profound. At the very least, the effective functioning of inherited mechanisms
of world order, such as the special responsibility of the great powers in the management of the interstate system, especially problems of armed
aggression, under the aegis of collective security, could be significantly impaired. Armed with the ability to defeat an
intervention, or impose substantial costs in blood or money on an intervening force or the populaces of the nations marshaling that force, the
newly empowered tier could bring an end to collective security operations,
undermine the credibility of alliance commitments by the great powers, [undermine
guarantees of extended deterrence by them to threatened nations and states] extend alliances of their own, and perhaps make wars of
aggression on their neighbors or their own people.172
Iran prolif causes nuclear war
Jeffrey Goldberg 12, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the Atlantic, January
23, 2012, How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon, online:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddon-
commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html
The experts who study this depressing issue seem to agree that a Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear
weapons would be dangerously unstable and prone to warp-speed escalation. Heres one possible scenario for
the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Irans Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with
conventional rockets. Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense of its
proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand. Dennis Ross, who until recently
served as President Barack Obamas Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollahs political importance to Tehran. The only place to
which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ross told me. If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy
Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be
like Guns of August on steroids. Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Irans rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does
Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have
no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first,
knowing that it has no second chance? Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear
strategy, told me that in a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each abandon traditional peacetime
safeguards, making an accidental exchange more likely. A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to
a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles
and preparing to fire on short notice, he said. Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously increase the danger of their
launch and release on false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack. Then comes the
problem of misinterpreted data, Blair said. Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that
the other side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike. Cognitive Bias Blair notes that in a crisis it isnt
irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into
incomplete intelligence. This predisposition is a cognitive bias that increases the danger that one side will jump the
gun on the basis of incorrect information, he said. Ross told me that Irans relative proximity to Israel and the total absence of
ties between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesnt recognize is far-fetched --
make the situation even more hazardous. This is not the Cold War, he said. In this situation we dont have any
communications channels. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We were much
closer than we realized. The answer to this predicament is to deny Iran nuclear weapons, but not through an attack on
its nuclear facilities, at least not now. The liabilities of preemptive attack on Irans nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits, Blair said. But certainly
Irans program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.
Indo-Pak war escalates quickly to extinction---no checks
Greg Chaffin 11, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, July 8, 2011, Reorienting U.S. Security
Strategy in South Asia, online:
http://www.fpif.org/articles/reorienting_us_security_strategy_in_south_asia
The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that
increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear
exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and
Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war. Due to an Indian
preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear
arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistans only
chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian
targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally
likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear
weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, as more
damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving
individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and
decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces
would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such conflict would
likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its
nuclear arsenal. A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a
whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon
forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies
conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would
result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the human
race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and
Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic
rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers
in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million. The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited
to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million
metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than
a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade,
during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat
from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earths ozone layer. The
inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees
Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and
widespread political upheaval. Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire
enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep
animus held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the
successful U.S. raid on bin Ladens compound, several members of Indias security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued
that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either
preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly
escalate.

2NC --- Turns Hegemony
DA turns hegemony
Hoffman, 2002 (Stanley, Foreign Affairs Buttenwieser University Professor at Harvard University and a regular book reviewer for Foreign Affairs, Clash
of Globalizations http://www.cfr.org/history-and-theory-of-international-relations/clash-globalizations/p4763)

Finally, the unique position of the United States raises a serious question over the future of world affairs. In the
realm of interstate problems, American behavior will determine whether the nonsuperpowers and weak states will
continue to look at the United States as a friendly power (or at least a tolerable hegemon), or whether they are provoked
by Washington's hubris into coalescing against American preponderance. America may be a
hegemon, but combining rhetorical overkill and ill-defined designs is full of risks . Washington has yet to
understand that nothing is more dangerous for a "hyperpower" than the temptation of
unilateralism. It may well believe that the constraints of international agreements and organizations are not
necessary , since U.S. values and power are all that is needed for world order. But in reality, those same
international constraints provide far better opportunities for leadership than arrogant demonstrations
of contempt for others' views, and they offer useful ways of restraining unilateralist behavior in other states. A
hegemon concerned with prolonging its rule should be especially interested in using internationalist
methods and institutions, for the gain in influence far exceeds the loss in freedom of action.

2NC --- Soft Power
Soft power is good --- allows for de-escalation of conflicts.
Nye, 2004 (Joseph, the Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University The
Benefits of Soft Power http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html)

Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others . In the business world, smart executives know that
leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do
what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police
sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives .
Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I
want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Soft power is a staple of daily
democratic politics . The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets
such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as
legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.

2NC --- Instability
Unilateralism specifically in Latin America results in unstable economic conditions ---
only the CP can solve.
Lamy, 2001 (Pascal, European Trade Commissioner, Regionalism and Multilateralism in Latin America
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=10&cad=rja&ved=0CGMQFjAJ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.londoncanadianstudies.org%2FJo
urnal%2F19%2F19-4.pdf&ei=tIj2UdnJF-HOyAGO_IGwCg&usg=AFQjCNGuMDJ2iHTnccFyU95fvXwGcG5XvQ&sig2=kJbWY5WK9j9DOdvVggn9_w)

Unilateralism is the prerogative of a superpower, which none of our countries is. It belongs to another era, that of bilateral
agreements in which the strong imposed their will on the weak, that of extra-territorial decisions, employing economic sanctions, that of
arbitrary protectionism. Today unilateralism would result in an unstable , inefficient and unjust international
economic order. Our increasingly interdependent world needs predictable and objective rules and
policies. Only international rule of law can guarantee these. What are, then, the two routes actually open to us ? Regionalism and
multilateralism. These are not mutually exclusive but complementary. They are not equivalent: one is subordinate to the other. Regionalism is
governed by the multilateral rules and disciplines of the WTO. A country, like Brazil or any other one, can no longer pursue a national project
without integrating it into a regional project and multilateral dimension. Regionalism may be a European invention, but it is not protected by
copyright laws ! No need for compulsory licensing here. Regionalism is a global public good that the EU has developed over half a
century of integration, the benefit of which it is ready to share with its partners. The principles are simple: a single market; harmonisation of
standards and regulations affecting the free movement of goods, services, people and capital; solidarity through financial mechanisms; and,
where necessary, common policies, among them trade and competition policies. Integration has even led to a single currency, the Euro,
which will gradually acquire the international status worthy of its 300 million consumers and savers. For twenty or thirty years Europe has
been pioneering ways of harnessing globalisation. The benefits of regional integration are considerable: a
single market attractive to foreign investors; increased but fair competition; and far greater clout in international
negotiations. Of course, securing these benefits requires economic operators to place their faith in
integration, something they will only do if they judge the process to be transparent and irreversible .
And irreversibility entails both an institutional framework for pooling sovereignty and sufficient convergence of economic policies, including
currency stability.
2NC --- Solves Terror, Warming, Diseases, Economic Growth
Multilateralism solves warming, terrorism, disease, and economic growth

If any or all of these views are valid, then perhaps multilateralism deserves to remain ill defined, under-conceptualised, and under-theorised. IR
scholars might be advised to focus their research elsewhere. Yet, we find evidence to suggest growing interest, even amongst
major powers, in multilateral solutions to the transnational problems such as global warming , international
terrorism, and disease control that are the externalities of globalization. The 2008-10 financial crisis suddenly made
the Group of 20 (G20) most systemically important industrialized and developing economies3 an previously obscure and young
(less than 10 years old) configuration with no permanent staff the main forum for debates about how shared policy
commitments might restore global economic growth. Chinas commitment to multilateral economic cooperation within
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has become a prominent feature of its 21st century foreign policy (Klein et al 2010). After the
(allegedly) relentless unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration, the US elected an untested multilateralist in foreign affairs
(Delbanco 2008): Barack Obama. The European Union (EU) equipped with a new and stronger foreign policy machinery after ratification of
the Lisbon Treaty (2009) is funding multiple, large research programmes into multilateralism as part of its doctrinal commitment to effective
multilateralism.4 Academic interest in multilateralism is by no means confined to Europe: Robert Keohane and colleagues (2009: 28) have
recently urged that IR scholars make multilateralism a major focus of research that is deeply empirical and based on comparative
institutional analysis.
2NC --- Multilateralisms K2 Global Institutions
Now is key --- US Unilateral influence is being tempered, only shifts to multilateralism
will solve global conflicts.
McNally, 2013 (Kyle, a researcher and PhD candidate at Durham University, has a Masters degree from the London School of Economics in
Development Studies and has previously worked as a Congressional Aide in the United States House of Representatives, Obama, American Power and Global
Security http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/08/02/2013/obama-american-power-and-global-security)

Last month Barack Obama celebrated his second inauguration as the President of the United States. His inaugural speech has been lauded for its strength and
progressive declarations. It should be noted, however, that with only narrow qualification, President Obama presented an image of American strength when
relevant in foreign policy concerns, while devoting most of his focus to the mounting political challenges pervading domestic US politics: ranging from the debt
ceiling, fiscal cliff, and now also gun control and immigration. With regard to foreign policy his comments were brief but significant. While stressing American power
and superiority, Obama emphasized his administrations commitment to engagement and diplomacy as a means to achieve enduring peace. On this point he
remarked that America would renew those institutions established to manage crisis abroad, explicitly stating the need to respect the rule of law. This statement
warrants closer consideration, especially with respect to Obamas track record in his first term, the prospects for the next four years and American power in the 21st
century more generally. Relative to Americas hegemonic dominance in the (later) 20th century, its position in world
politics today continues to be influential but is significantly tempered in key respects. This necessarily has, some
heretofore untold, effects on multilateral governance and world politics. Turning to the institutions responsible for managing global crisis,
the United Nations stands out as a prominent example of an institution desperately in need of renewal. At the San Francisco United Nations conference in 1945 US
President Truman warned that We still have a choice between the alternatives: the continuation of international chaos--or the establishment of a world
organization for the enforcement of peace. Given the current turmoil throughout the world it is hard to reach any conclusion other
than that what we have now is, indeed, chaos. The Arab Spring has produced critical and protracted conflicts, most notably in Syria where more
than 60,000 people have already died; Israeli military actions against Palestine and now Syria threaten to catalyze more diffuse crisis, potentially
drawing Iran into a conflict ; state authority in Libya remains tenuous, and the unintended consequences of the NATO intervention
there are now seen across Northern Africa, particularly with emboldened and well armed rebel groups threatening regional peace in Mali; not to
mention any number of ongoing conflicts throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, or regional instability stemming from
North Koreas nuclear programme , etc. Even if one can argue that many conflicts seen today involve state actors directly, the effects and
legacy of these conflicts is not bound by national borders. In the aggregate, global security is fundamentally a transborder, global
collective action problem. The United Nations was designed explicitly to address this type of global bad, but it is failing in remarkable ways.
Obamas call for renewal, should it be met in any measure, would serve the United Nations well; however, this is a call typically limited to principle and seen less in
practice. US foreign policy under President Obama has, with some exceptions, been more tempered than under his predecessor. Additionally, there are key
instances in which Obama has exercised restraint of US power where others may not have been so inclined to. This is perhaps most evident by his commitment (to
date) to a diplomatic solution to Irans upgrading of nuclear technologies. Recently, there has been a signal of diplomatic hope between the US and Iran when US
Vice President Biden spoke at the Munich Security Conference expressing an openness to direct, though highly conditional, dialogue between the two states. His
remarks were quickly matched by Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, who cautiously welcomed Bidens remarks as a step forward and said, We take these
statements with positive consideration. Elsewhere, Obama has ceded leadership on military interventions to countries like France (in the NATO intervention in
Libya), and has abided the restraints placed on US power by multilateral institutions (such as the UN Security Council vetoes on intervention in Syria from China and
Russia). These actions, or instances of inaction, reveal a very different American foreign policy disposition than that experienced
by the world at the turn of the 21st century when, in the wake of 9/11, the US returned to unilateralism with brute force and
patent disregard for multilateral cooperation (see Ikenberry 2004). However, this tempered disposition should not be overstated.
Instances of US cooperation in multilateral governance are off-set by Obamas continuation of unilateral tendencies a continued theme of American power into
the 21st century; Obama is expanding the US drone operations in the War on Terror in spite of growing criticism from the world community at large; furthermore,
indefinite, and ostensibly illegal, detentions have continued unabated in Guantanamo Bay, to name a couple of examples. While abiding some
multilateral constraints placed on American power may serve to further legitimize and entrench current
multilateral processes, this does very little to renew the institutions so desperately needed to manage the current global insecurity crises. Rather,
ongoing unilateral actions of the US serve to undermine the legitimacy of multilateral governance mechanisms, and
generally lowers the expectation that other states will, or ought to, participate in sincere fashion.

CP Specific
FTAA Crucial to maintaining Regionalism
Free trade agreements ensure regionalism
Pizarro, 1999 (Ramiro, International Trade and Development Finance Division, comparative Analysis of regionalism in Latin America and Asia-Pacific
http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/5/4285/lcl1307i.pdf)

The ECLAC document (1994) on open regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean defines accurately the transition
from a first unilateral liberalization stage to a second one characterized by preferential trade agreements . In this way, open regionalism
articulates what countries have been doing individually in terms of unilateral openness and economic deregulation in order to boost their outward-
looking, export-led growth strategies, and the political process of regional integration. Therefore, open regionalism defined by ECLAC
embraces the two trends which are predominant in Latin American economies during the 1990s: the openness and
deregulation of Latin American economies and the growing number of preferential trade agreements that seek a greater international competitiveness for the
entire region
Working through OAS Crucial
Absent working through the OAS its going to decline --- CPs crucial to sustain it.
Walser 11 [June 2, 2011, Ray, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, Time for U.S.
Leadership at the Organization of American States, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/time-for-us-leadership-at-the-
organization-of-american-states]

The 41st General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) will take place in San Salvador June 57. The OAS will convene all
members with the exception of Cuba and tackle a 103-item agenda over the course of three meeting-filled days. Since taking office, the
Obama Administration has expressed strong support for multilateralism as a corrective for past sins of U.S.
unilateralism. It designated the OAS as the foremost multilateral organization of the hemisphere. Yet, without real U.S.
leadership and collective actions to defend democracy, rule of law, human rights, and in-depth
security, the OAS may continue its current decline into irrelevance . The OAS: From Cooperation to Decline An offshoot
of the Pan-American Union, the OAS dates back to the 19th century, which makes it the worlds oldest regional organization. Its stately and
aging headquarters near the White House is a historic Washington fixture. Refashioned in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the OAS
was once believed to embody the Western Hemispheric Ideal and was useful in promoting solidarity among neighbors. The end of the Cold
War opened a door for renewed inter-American solidarity as Washingtons viewpoints appeared to converge with its Latin American neighbors.
The 1990s witnessed the first Summit of the Americas, serious discussion of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and broad cooperation
on drugs, security, democracy, and development. In the same period, OAS members undertook to enshrine liberal, democratic governance at
the core of the regions identity. Adoption of the Inter-American Democratic Charter in September 2001 seemed to make the democracy
project in the Americas nearly irreversible. Unfortunately, the amity of the1990s has given way to the fractiousness of
the 21st century. In the past decade, the OAS became an arena for diplomatic jousting on issues
ranging from democracy and human rights to Cubas readmission and terrorism. U.S. influence and
leverage in the region has continued to decline. Does the OAS Really Stand for Democracy? In the 2009 Honduras
governance crisis, the OAS swiftly condemned the removal of President Manuel Zelaya as a coup and expelled
Honduras from its ranks. The OAS did so without a careful evaluation of President Zelayas constitutional
violations, a serious effort at diplomacy, or mediation with the interim government. The U.S. supported this action. Yet critics of
the OAS were quick to note that Honduras was not the only nation in the Americas where the democratic constitutional order was under siege.
Members like Venezuela and Nicaragua are routinely in violation of fundamental commitments to preserve meaningful checks and balances
and political freedom also covered by the Democratic Charter. On June 1, following Manuel Zelayas return to Honduras free of criminal charges
and with the right to participate again in politics, the OAS restored Honduras to full membership. Other vital freedoms remain under assault. In
Venezuela, Hugo Chvez continues to attempt to asphyxiate the opposition through the use of decree powers, curtailments of rights and
freedoms, and a net of regulations and prohibitions. The preponderance of the state makes Venezuela a candidate
for regular OAS censure. Press and political freedoms are under siege in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Corruption and
routine violations of the rule of law persist. The Obama Administration has acknowledged several flaws in the OAS. These include an excess of
mandates, deviation from core missions, and failure to support representative democracy. The Administration has proposed modest fixes that
range from budget reform to reducing the number of OAS mandates. It would like to refocus the OAS on its core responsibilities and bolster
democratic monitoring, perhaps creating the position of special democracy rapporteur. Yet given current divisions, rescuing the
OAS will remain a challenge. The U.S. has been unable to develop the political will necessary to make
the OAS an effective defender of democratic institutions and practices. Sadly, as veteran Latin American watcher
Abraham Lowenthal noted, [T]he OAS has often been ineffectual and the Inter-American Democratic Charter,
which is intended to strengthen democratic institutions in OAS member countries, has produced few
meaningful results. It is possible that Chvez, who once declared the OAS to be a corpse that must be buried, may be proven right in
the long run. Hold Tough on Basic Freedoms and Hemispheric Security The June 57 General Assembly has as its central theme Citizen Security
in the Americas, and the U.S. and others will need to concentrate on the range of threats the Americas face, from transnational criminal
organizations and drug trafficking to international terrorism. The U.S. must prevent insertion of statements that focus
on alleged imperialism or foreign bases as the causes of security vulnerabilities. The U.S. will also need to
resist efforts by anti-democrats to justify cracking down on legitimate opposition and dissent. The U.S. should reaffirm the
central principles of democratic governance and rule of law. To achieve these ends, the U.S. must
assume a leadership role at the OAS to: Support Freedom of Expression. With the backing of Panama and Mexico,
the U.S. will sponsor the first-ever resolution on Freedom of Assembly and of Association. That text will undoubtedly encounter opposition
from Venezuela and others who will introduce qualifiers and justifications aimed at abridging freedom of assembly and association, so as to
make the resolution meaningless. The U.S. must press the OAS to deliver a clear message of support for individual rights and freedom against
government encroachments. Support Representative Democracy. The U.S. and its key allies will need vigilance to thwart Venezuelan
and other efforts to undermine basic human rights and democracy language and attempts to equate popular democracy with representative
democracy. The U.S. must be prepared to recognize that it is time to abandon the tired assertion that all members of the OAS are
democracies. Stronger Hemispheric Security. In the face of complex criminal, drug, and terrorism threats, the U.S. must keep the focus
on building stronger security cooperation via civilian and military means, reminding all members that security against criminal violence and acts
of terrorism is not an ideological issue or a tool for U.S. intervention. It must address directly threats arising from the complicity and criminal
actions of anti-U.S. members such as Venezuela. Continued Institutional Reform. The U.S. must press for ways to limit costs, reduce mandates
and non-essential functions, and ensure competitive, merit-based hiring at the OAS. The Obama Administrations investment
of increased diplomatic capital in strengthening the OAS has borne scant fruit. Short of withdrawing
from the regional bodyan option that merits serious debatethe Obama Administration must
continue focusing on democratic development, institutional reforms, cooperation against
transnational threats, and strategies to foster accelerated channels of commerce and enhanced
economic freedom. The Obama Administration should cease overselling the benefits of hemispheric multilateralism and seek
opportunities to work with our remaining hemispheric friends to advance mutual interests and values.

Reviving its crucial.
Einaudi 12 [December 6th, 2012, Luigi, distinguished visiting fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University, a member of the Wilson Centers Brazil Institute Advisory Board, former Permanent Representative
of the United States at the Organization of American States, and former Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, On Multilateralism,
Sovereignty and the Western Hemisphere: Concepts in Jeopardy, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/multilateralism-sovereignty-and-the-
western-hemisphere-concepts-jeopardy]

The Organization of American States is a multilateral organization of the sovereign nation states of
the Western Hemisphere. This apparently simple definition combines three concepts, all of them now
unfortunately in jeopardy First, Multilateralism Multilateralism is more than the temporary agreement of two or more countries on a specific problem; it is
cooperation based on generalized principles of conduct. When generalized principles of conduct are
given treaty form, they become international law. The United Nations Charter and the World Court are today the cornerstones of global order based on law. If age
were the gold standard, the OAS and many of its constituent entities would be recognized among the precursors of multilateralism. But todays world is increasingly disorderly
and fragmenting. Multilateral institutions are much criticized and associated more often with inefficiency than with order. International law has been weakened by repeated failures to ratify treaties or abide
by their obligations. Which leads to a question: is multilateralism being reduced to an idealistic illusion in an increasingly Hobbesian world? Second, Sovereignty The OAS Charter is based on
the sovereign equality of states. Every state has one vote. Unlike the United Nations, democracy among nations at the OAS is not conditioned by a Security
Council or members with vetoes. Respect for the principle of non-intervention means that individual states are essentially free to determine their participation in any particular activity. In recent years, however,
it has become increasingly clear that many of the problems of this globalizing age require cooperation.
Illegal drugs, small arms transfers, migration and a host of other matters cross borders and cannot be
addressed by any one state acting alone. Which leads to a second question: Is the sovereign nation
state becoming obsolete? Third, the Western Hemisphere The OAS Charter declares that the historic mission of America
is to offer to man a land of liberty. In reality, of course, the Americas have never been united except in the
western mythology of the New World. Its countries have shifting relationships, sometimes drifting
apart, other times coalescing sub regionally. It is nearly sixty years since the historian Arthur Whitaker declared that the Western Hemisphere Ideal, the proposition that the
peoples of this Hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another which sets them apart from the rest of the world was in irreversible decline. So a third question arises: Do hemispheric relations still have a unique place in
this globalizing world? What does accumulated experience tell us? First, Multilateralism Practice reveals that multilateralism matters: Multilateralism is the basis of the
common standards that make possible everything from world trade to operating safe flights across
borders; Multilateral agreements are often more effective than bilateral ones. The 1977 Panama Canal Treaties were signed upstairs, in the Hall of the Americas, in the presence of the hemispheres heads of state and
government, because all countries concerned, large and small, believed this increased the likelihood of compliance. Multilateral cooperation is also an instrument for
institutional development and stability. Its legitimacy rests on embodying world opinion and
impartiality acting without favor toward any country or private interest. I believe the OAS has two important comparative advantages:
One, a fundamental contribution, is enabling the development of common legal standards and the
harmonization of national laws. I would cite human rights, electoral observation, and civil identity among many others. Another contribution, perhaps less appreciated, is that OAS
meetings, the General Secretariat, and seminars help forge a cadre of diplomats and public servants who learn how
to turn a difficult world to mutual advantage. The graduates of Inter-American Course in International
Law in Rio de Janeiro and the Inter-American Defense College at Fort McNair have enviable records of
public service. Second, Sovereignty Nongovernmental actors, new technologies, global finance and more new
issues, all challenge sovereignty. But the key is not to abandon sovereignty. It is to organize more effectively and develop
personnel knowledgeable about the new issues and how to reconcile different national interests.
Most foreign ministries have one chain of command for international organization affairs and a
separate one for bilateral relationships. The capacity of foreign ministries to represent their entire
government varies greatly from country to country and issue to issue. Without more effective whole of government organization and
knowledgeable personnel, sovereignty risks becoming an obstacle to needed cooperation more than a protection against foreign impositions. Third, the Western Hemisphere Two points suggest that
the OAS is both more and less than a simple reflection of geography. First, Western Hemisphere
jurisprudence on human rights and democracy exceeds world practice. Unlike the United Nations Human Rights Commission,
members of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights serve in their own right rather than as
representatives of governments. In 1991, Resolution 1080 made history in calling for an automatic convening of this Council if there was an interruption of the democratic process in a
member state. The UN Charter does not contain the word democracy. Second, the OAS is the only forum that brings the United States and
Canada together with the rest of the hemisphere. The entrance of Canada and the independent Commonwealth Caribbean between 1967 and 1991 was a welcome step
toward full regional participation. The United States and Canada together contribute more than two thirds of the regular
quota funds of the OAS. These payments are essential to the functioning of the Secretariat and its
programs. Asymmetries like these differences in funding breed illusions and distrust. These obstacles can be reduced by respect for different views and fair administration of available resources. But symbolism also
matters. Cubas sovereignty and OAS commitments to human rights and democracy will have to be satisfied before the government of Cuba returns to the OAS. But the continued absence of Cuba weakens the OAS claim to
represent the entire hemisphere and gives credence to those who say the OAS is the U.S. Ministry of Colonies. Not entirely by coincidence, the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) includes Cuba and
excludes the United States and Canada. Multidimensional Security Defense and security matters are intimately related to geography. They also
have a history even longer and more controversial than multilateralism and sovereignty. The League of Nations was created to end war but had no military capacity. To remedy this failing, Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter
authorized the use of force by member states. The 1948 OAS Charter, however, quite purposely conveyed no coercive authority. This was partly due to the separate existence of the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (the Rio Treaty) but partly also to a desire to avoid legitimizing any new U.S. military interventions. The first forty years of the OAS were marked by
tension between U.S. fears of Communist penetration and Latin American fears of U.S. intervention
and unmet aspirations for economic cooperation. The 1954 covert intervention by the United States in
Guatemala went unchallenged by most governments, which, however, increased pressure on the
United States to provide aid that ultimately led to the founding of the Inter-American Development
Bank. The Cuban revolution spawned the Alliance for Progress, which in turn facilitated the exclusion of the government of Cuba from the OAS in 1962 -- although the Alliance itself later foundered on differing perceptions
and lack of resources. In 1965 the OAS supported -- after the fact -- the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic, but this became the last time the OAS would approve any form of military intervention. In 1979, the Ministers
rejected an informal U.S. proposal for a peace force in Nicaragua. The OAS was largely marginalized from the subsequent Central American conflicts, and peace efforts there fell to ad hoc sub regional groups. In 1982 the U.S. failure
to back Argentina against the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas war was interpreted regionally as a repudiation of Rio Treaty obligations. The OAS was sidelined when the U.S. invaded Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989,
and yielded to Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States in the settlement of the Ecuador-Peru war of 1994-5. Times have changed. Armed conflict among states in the Americas has become almost unthinkable. The end of the
Cold War reduced fears of extra-hemispheric aggression. The peace between Peru and Ecuador resolved the last active territorial conflict on the South American mainland and removed the arms race contagion. Residual interstate
differences, mostly in the Caribbean basin, are largely contained. Building on this positive new environment, Mexico in 2003 took the initiative to convene a Special Conference on Security. Implicitly discarding the obligatory
collective security paradigm of the Rio Treaty from which it had just withdrawn, Mexico broke with the Cold War past to support a concept championed by the CARICOM countries -- that security should be understood as
multidimensional, not just military. The Declaration adopted in Mexico City set forth a broad and flexible basis for voluntary cooperation. It affirmed a new concept of security in the Hemisphere *that+ is multidimensional in
scope, includes traditional and new threats, concerns and other challenges. This years AG/RES. 2735, entitled Advancing Hemispheric Security: A Multidimensional Approach, is a compendium of these challenges. Its 64
resolutory paragraphs concern traditional defense matters like conventional weapons acquisitions, CSBMs, and nuclear nonproliferation as well as newer challenges like trafficking in persons, drug abuse and the special security
concerns of small island states. Even with this new and consensual approach, security and defense matters have not avoided controversy and are still sometimes burdened by bad memories of the past. The variety and complexity
of contemporary security issues makes clear that no one policy fits all. And each member state has set its own course. Citizen security, to take a pressing example, requires local leadership and cannot be imposed from the outside.
Nor can it be imposed by force. Military forces are trained to defend national sovereignty against external attack by a foreign enemy. They are not trained to engage their fellow citizens. Even if police forces are ineffective, asking
military units to fight drugs or domestic crime automatically raises political concerns, even when military involvement is meant to be temporary and efforts are made to avoid militarization of law enforcement. The Mexico City
Declaration recognized of course that each state has the sovereign right to determine its own strategy and affirmed that bilateral and subregional agreements in the area of security and defense are essential to strengthening
security in the Hemisphere. Sub regional organizations CARICOM, SICA and UNASUR have become increasingly important and deserve recognition and support. Against this general background, I see four imperatives where the
OAS has comparative advantages: First, support common legal standards, international law and respect
for sovereignty . There are red lines that should not be crossed by foreigners even if they think they have the permission of local authorities. This is particularly important for
the United States, the hemispheres most activist power, which has for some years stood aloof from
the commitments of international law. In 2009, every US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs since 1976, all US Ambassadors to the OAS since 1989, all US
Chairmen of the Inter-American Defense Board since 1989, and two thirds of the Commanders of US Southern Command since 1983, joined me in asking the US Senate to ratify CIFTA, the Inter-American Convention against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. It is not as though we do not understand what needs to be done. Second, facilitate a whole of
government approach. Military leaders and institutions cannot be excluded from any whole of
government strategy. What matters, in the language of the 2003 Declaration, is to ensure the subordination of all state institutions
to the legally constituted civilian authority . The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), founded in 1942 to organize against the Axis, was held in diplomatic limbo during the
Cold War and recognized as an OAS entity in 2006 and assigned advisory functions. What needs changing now is less the formal statute than the culture of relations between foreign and defense ministries so as to support needed
civil-military cooperation. Third, forge cadres of competent cooperators . Graduates of the Course in International Law and of the Inter-American Defense College strengthen the
capacity of their respective states as well as their own professionalism. The College now enrolls both civilians and police officers; I believe it should be encouraged to become an Inter-American center for Public Administration. The
European observer states have different experiences and security forces, including constabularies. Their expertise should also be drawn upon. Fourth, provide multilateral support for local institutions willing to accept it. In
Guatemala, the International Commission against Impunity (CICIG) operates under Guatemalan law, in the Guatemalan courts, and follows Guatemalan criminal procedure. It works closely with selected staff from the Public
Prosecutor's Office and the National Civil Police and provides technical assistance to local judicial institutions. CICIG depends on the UN, but mainly because the UN has the funds; if requested and funded, the OAS could respectfully
and effectively extend this support through SICA to other countries of Central America.

Venezuela Specific
1NC --- Multilateralism Key
CP is necessary to resolve political instability in Venezuela
Arnson, 2013 (Cynthia, director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Setting Priorities For U.S.
Policy in Latin America http://www.scribd.com/doc/123773141/Setting-Priorities-for-U-S-Policy-in-Latin-America-A-Wilson-Center-Policy-Brief)

Second, efforts to restore diplomatic recognition at the ambassadorial level should continue. Venezuela expelled the U.S.
ambassador in 2008, the United States responded in kind, and Venezuela subsequently rejected a U.S. diplomat nominated as a replacement. The State Department
has rightly renewed efforts to move the U.S.-Venezuelan relationship out of the deep freeze now that the post-Chvez era
is around the corner. U.S. interests in Venezuela are better served by having a confirmed ambassador in Caracas who is seen as speaking authoritatively for the
administration. There is no guarantee that an ambassador will be able to overcome the many difficult issues on the bilateral agenda --- drug trafficking, the
relationship with Iran, democracy itself --but diplomacy at the highest level is better than its absence. Third, the potential for
instability and prolonged uncertainty about Venezuelas internal politics are also of concern to the region, particularly Venezuelas neighbors,
Colombia and Brazil. In the event of a crisis or to avert simmering political tensions from erupting into
violence , working closely with allies in the hemisphere will be essential.
Cuba Embargo Unilat Bad
1NC Democracy/Vietnamese Model
Plan collapses democracy in the region and causes
Cubhttp://htmlimg3.scribdassets.com/7cftixvdkw24fzz3/images/2-246e30713c.jpga
to follow the Vietnamese model --- cp solves
Castaeda 9 - Jorge G. Castaeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America
Foundation, was Mexico's foreign minister from 2000 to 2003, April 21, 2009, The Right Deal on Cuba,
online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124027198023237151.html
The question of what to do about the embargo has once again cornered an American president. If
President Barack Obama lifts the embargo unilaterally, he will send a message to the Castros and the rest
of Latin America that human rights and democracy are not his bailiwick. Furthermore, he lacks the
votes in the Senate to do so, unless he obtains an explicit Cuban quid pro quo, which Ral Castro cannot grant him, especially
with his brother back in charge. Conversely, if Mr. Obama limits change to the recently announced freer flow of remittances and family
visits to the island, Democrats in the House, Latin American leaders, and the Castros will remain unsatisfied. And if he insists on political
change as a precondition for lifting the embargo, Mr. Obama would be pursuing the policy that his last 10 predecessors have fruitlessly
followed. There might be a way to square the circle. It begins with a unilateral end to the embargo:
Nothing is expected from Cuba . But in exchange for eliminating the embargo, key Latin American
players would be expected to commit to actively seeking a normalization process between
Washington and Havana, and to forcing Cuba to establish representative democracy and respect
for human rights. As democrats who experienced authoritarian rule and sought international support in their struggle against it,
leaders like Brazilian President Lula da Silva, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, and Mexican President Felipe Caldern
have been incredibly cynical and irresponsible about Cuba. Mr. Caldern and Ms. Bachelet have forsaken their
commitment to democracy and human rights in order to accommodate the left wing. Mr. da Silva, despite having been jailed by the
military dictatorship in the early 1980s, has pursued the traditional Brazilian policy of avoiding controversy. By nudging the Latin
leaders toward a principled stance, Mr. Obama would turn the tables. This policy would give the
Cubans what they say they want: an unconditional end to the embargo, the beginning of a
negotiation process, and perhaps even access to international financial institutions' funds. The Latin American leaders
would get a major concession from the new administration on a highly symbolic issue. And human-
rights defenders in Latin America and elsewhere would see their concerns regarding free elections,
freedom of the press, freedom of association, and the liberation of political prisoners addressed as a
demand from Cuba's friends -- not as an imposition from Washington. Mr. Obama would look great,
since U.S. policy would shift in exchange for Latin leaders' dedication to principles like democracy and
human rights that he and they espouse. A clear commitment from Latin leaders to a normalization
that would not follow the Vietnamese course (economic reform with no political change) would be
a major foreign policy victory for Mr. Obama.4
1NC Democracy DA
Unilaterally cooperating with Cuba destroys the credibility of all Latin American
democracy---causes authoritarian backsliding
Castaeda 8 - Jorge G. Castaeda, professor at New York University and fellow at the New America
Foundation, was Mexico's foreign minister from 2000 to 2003, September-October 2008, Morning in
Latin America, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 5
Realpolitik and fear of another exodus of Cuban refugees across the Straits of Florida may tempt Washington to pursue a
"Chinese," or "Vietnamese," solution to the relationship with Cuba: that is, normalizing diplomatic relations in exchange for
economic reforms while leaving the question of internal political change until much later. It should not do
this, chiefly because of the regional implications. Over the past few decades, the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Latin
America have patiently constructed a regional legal framework to defend and encourage democratic
rule as well as respect for human rights in the hemisphere. These values have been enshrined in conventions,
charters, and free trade-agreements, from the Inter-American Democratic Charter, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the American Convention on Human Rights and the labor and
environmental chapters of flee-trade agreements, as well as in the democratic clauses of the economic agreements between Chile and the
EU and between Mexico and the EU. These mechanisms are not perfect, and they have not truly been tested. But to waive
them in the interests of simply guaranteeing stability in Cuba and ensuring an exodus-free succession instead of a
democratic transition--that is, creating once again a "Cuban exception" for reasons of pure pragmatism--would
be unworthy of the enormous efforts every country in the hemisphere has made to deepen and
strengthen democracy in the Americas. Cuba must return to the regional concert of powers, but
accepting this concert's rules. To allow it to proceed otherwise would weaken democracy and
encourage authoritarian traditions in the hemisphere--and lay the groundwork for other exceptions
that would justify their existence by invoking the Cuban precedent.
Latin American democracys a key model for democracy globally
Fauriol & Weintraub 95 Georges Fauriol, director of the CSIS Americas Program, and Sidney
Weintraub, the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS and the Dean Rusk Professor at the
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, Summer 1995, U.S.
Policy, Brazil, and the Southern Cone, The Washington Quarterly, lexis
The democracy theme also carries much force in the hemisphere today. The State Department regularly parades the fact
that all countries in the hemisphere, save one, now have democratically elected governments. True enough, as long as the definition of
democracy is flexible, but these countries turned to democracy mostly of their own volition. It is hard to determine if the
United States is using the democracy theme as a club in the hemisphere (hold elections or be excluded) or promoting it as a goal. If as a club, its efficacy is limited to this hemisphere, as
the 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Indonesia demonstrated in its call for free trade in that region, replete with nondemocratic nations, by 2020. Following
that meeting, Latin Americans are somewhat cynical as to whether the United States really cares deeply about promoting democracy if this conflicts with expanding exports. Yet this
triad of objectives -- economic liberalization and free trade, democratization, and sustainable
development/ alleviation of poverty -- is generally accepted in the hemisphere. The commitment to the latter two
varies by country, but all three are taken as valid. All three are also themes expounded widely by the United States, but
with more vigor in this hemisphere than anywhere else in the developing world. Thus, failure to
advance on all three in Latin America will compromise progress elsewhere in the world.
Extinction
Diamond 95 - Larry Diamond, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting
Democracy in the 1990s, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former
Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through
increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted
the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of
these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness
or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern
themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their
neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse"
their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one
another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic
countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for
investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens,
who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal
obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own
borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on
which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
2NC Internal Link
Political reforms in Cuba would send a hemispheric democratic signal---inspires reform
movements across Latin America
Arias-King 8 Fredo Arias-King, founder of the academic quarterly Demokratizatsiaya: The Journal of
Post-Soviet Democratization, analyst with two regional think tanks: CEON (Miami) and CADAL(Buenos
Aires), June 20, 2008, Latin America and European Soft Power Geopolitics, Documentos, Year VI, No.
86, online: http://www.cadal.org/pdf/download.asp?id_nota=2399
Cuba to the rescue? Paradoxically, but quite realistically, Cuba could become a source of inspiration for Latin
America. But instead of inspiring misguided Rousseauean romantics, corrupt demagogues and guerrillas, this time the island
nation could give hope to those forces attempting to reform the hemisphere. It could also be the main conduit
of European soft power into the rest of the region. So far, only Chile has provided (albeit reluctantly) a model for the reformist forces of the
region. Costa Rica is also oftentimes touted as an example of a socially sensitive democracyalthough its still basically poor. All the
other examples are too deeply flawed to offer any kind of model. Cuba could use its pending
transition from communism to escape the cultural pathologies of latinoamericanismo, just as several other nations did
with the even more pernicious Central Europeanism of interethnic conflict, militarism, poverty and war. The only
democracy east of Switzerland in the interwar period was Tom Masaryks Czechoslovakia. However, today there are over a dozen
functioning democracies in the regioncountries that took advantage of good leadership and a social consensus to dramatically reinvent
themselves. The transition from communism provides this opportunity, if the elites take advantage of
what Leszek Balcerowicz calls the window of opportunity, before the honeymoon of extraordinary politics
gives way to the restraining humdrum of ordinary politics. If a post-authoritarian Cuba decides to go further
than a mediocre status-quo antetransition and finds the courage to model itself as a Caribbean Estonia, then the
implications for the rest of the hemisphere will be profound. A Cuba with a Havel or a Mart Laar as president,
that implements administrative reform, lustration, a flat tax, open trade, rigorous banking reforms, fiscal discipline, low
indebtedness, property rights and fair privatisation, that maybe even joins NATOas a way to reform its bloated militarythis
Cuba could see Asian-style growth rates and a dramatically better rank in the UNs Human
Development Index (as happened with Estonia), thereby catapulting it from pariah to messiah status in the rest
of the hemisphere. This is not to say that only in this exceptional case can a Latin American country reinvent itselfthere are also
cases worldwide of dramatic improvement through ordinary politics, such as Ireland in the 1990s. However, the type of political figures
necessary to achieve something akin to the Irish miracle are few and far between here. Nevertheless, we should have faith in the domino
effect a Caribbean Estonia could have. Probably the most constructive EU policy toward Latin America would be to use the soft power of its
successful democratic transitions to train a cadre of dissidents in Cuba and Venezuela. The decisive economic reforms undertaken by
several post-communist countries will be more relevant than those of Spain, whose reforms were mostly implemented during Franco.
2NC Biodiversity Impact
Latin American democracy key to environmental protection
Jacobs 2 - Jamie Elizabeth Jacobs, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at West
Virginia University, 2002, Community participation, the environment, and democracy: Brazil in
comparative perspective, online:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4000/is_200201/ai_n9031315/print?tag=artBody;col1
In Brazil and other Latin American countries attempting to strengthen democracy, the mobilization of civil society
forms a widely recognized part of that democratization. Part of this mobilization may be participation in ecological
movements and other social movements and civic organizations. Though environmentalism cannot be relied on as a driving
factor for democratization in general, it can be seen as an important component of the changes taking place in
the politics and society of transitional democracies (Hicks 1996). Political participation and interest in
environmental policy at the grassroots involves people in the struggle for citizenship, rights, and
government accountability in the democratic process. This article focuses on several aspects of the link
between environment, community, and citizenship in Latin America, specifically in low-income metropolitan areas of
Brazil that face grave environmental and social challenges. What is it that leads the residents of Brazil's urban periphery to think and act in ways that defy our
expectations about environmental activism? How is it that the environment assumes importance on the political agenda
when such issues are seemingly beyond the scope of limited political resources? How do low-income communities maintain levels of involvement sufficient to
achieve their goals? And is there a relationship between participation in environmental arenas and the strengthening of citizenship? Through
comparative surveys of Brazilian and European respondents, this study attempts to uncover some of the roots of the awareness
and activism on environmental issues encountered in areas of the urban periphery in Brazil. The conclusions suggest that this
type of activity is related to a broader phenomenon of community-level participation; specifically, that
higher levels of community participation are associated with environmental participation.
Thats half of global biodiversity
WWF 8 - World Wildlife Fund, 10-21, 2008, Problems in the Latin America and Caribbean, online:
http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/where_we_work/latin_america_and_caribbean/problems/
The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region embraces almost half of the world's diversity of plant and
animal species and half of the world's tropical forests. Yet the rate of destruction of freshwater,
marine and especially forest habitat could seriously impact both biodiversity and forest cover. According
to various sources, Brazil loses around 1% of its forests annually, while Paraguay, if it continues at its present
rate of forest destruction, will have virtually no native forests left in 25 years from now.
Extinction
Tonn 7 - Bruce E. Tonn, Urban Planning Prof @ Tennessee, November 2007, Futures v. 39, no. 9,
Futures Sustainability, ln
The first principle is the most important because earth-life is needed to support earth-life. Ecosystems are
composed of countless species that are mutually dependent upon each other for nutrients directly as
food or as by-products of earth-life (e.g., as carbon dioxide and oxygen). If the biodiversity of an ecosystem is
substantially compromised, then the entire system could collapse due to destructive negative nutrient cycle feedback
effects. If enough ecosystems collapse worldwide, then the cascading impact on global nutrient cycles
could lead to catastrophic species extinction. Thus, to ensure the survival of earth-life into the distant future
the earth's biodiversity must be protected.
1NC Vietnamese Model DA
Cubas transition is up for grabs---hardliners want a Vietnamese model of
authoritarian capitalism, which causes civil war and U.S. military intervention---quid
pro quo reforms empower moderates to implement a successful democratic transition
Ratliff 6 - William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of the Americas Collection at the Hoover
Institution, research fellow of the Independent Institute, 2006, Cubas Struggle to Awake, The Hoover
Digest, 2006 No. 2, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/4587466.html
No government bureaucrat wants to be unemployed, particularly if he has worked for a dictator whose death will leave the majority of the
population looking for big changes, probably including the replacement and maybe punishment of the dictators surviving cronies. Thus
top Cuban leaders today are grasping for a survival strategy, as the 2004 report by the presidential Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba put it, which will enable them to stay in power after Fidel. Indeed current leaderswith
varying ideas on the relative importance of ideology, power, and economicsare looking at several possible survival
strategies, which may be summarized as (1) batten down the hatches and (2) significant reform. The
first approach is favored by the hard-liners in the current government, who prioritize ideology and power over economic
reform, in the best Fidelista tradition. They may take power after Fidel goes, but they have little hope of
surviving for long without heavy levels of repression and global begging. The main benefactor of the hard-liners
will be Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez, assuming he survives in power until then. Rapidly expanding ties with China suggest that that
country may be an important player as well. The Chinese have no use for Fidels nonsensical economic ideas, but they do have an interest
(particularly as long as the status of Taiwan is an issue) in a Cuba that is critical of the United States. Then there are the
reformers, the more moderate leaders and bureaucrats, who, in the immediate post-Fidel period, are likely to be the only
ones in Havana with a potentially viable game plan. Knowing that the Cuban people have put up with abject poverty
under Fidel but that they are unlikely to tolerate that kind of life under any other leader, the reformers are convinced that serious
economic reform is the survival strategy of choice. These probable successors to Fidel know that near-term objectives, such as food,
housing, and opportunities, will require significant step-by-step reforms. And they know that real progress in these
reforms is the only thing that will justify their continuing roles in the national government. These more-
moderate leaders are likely to take power within a relatively short time. If they do not, or if the island doesnt opt quickly for
democracy, which is desirable but unlikely, the country may well plunge into civil war and the United States
may end up intervening militarily. Hugo Chvez would prefer hard-line Fidelistas to reformers, at least in the short term, but
he will support moderates if/when they take power. The Chinese will likewise support either type of successor government, seeing
advantages and disadvantages for themselves in each. TRANSITION EXPERIENCES One way to ponder and plan for the things that may
happen in Cuba after Fidel is to examine what has occurred during recent transitions in other formerly authoritarian countries. Clearly
there are no exact parallels, but aspects of these experiences will indeed be relevant to Cuba in the immediate post-Fidel period. In time,
Cuba certainly will develop a market-oriented economy and some form of democratic government, and thus it is both appropriate and
useful to examine experiences from countries that have recently taken the democratic route, from Asia to Spain and the formerly
communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe. But how quickly will a market economy and democracy come about and will the
economic and political changes occur simultaneously? Judgments on this vary, but I believe that economic reforms will likely precede
democratic governance. But absolute lines cannot be drawn: Although economic reforms are only part of the pie of Cubas future, they will
be crucial in bettering the lives of the Cuban people quickly and they will contribute much in the medium term toward opening the door
more smoothly to democracy. If this speculation proves to be even fairly correct, the immediate applicability of the European transitions is
reduced and that of the two Asian countries is enhanced. Fidel Castro will leave Cuba in a terrible economic mess, just as Mao Zedong left
China and Le Duan left Vietnam, when they finally died, 30 and 20 years ago, respectively. And Castro, like Mao and Le Duan, will leave his
people with an authoritarian government and heritage. Not surprisingly, there is considerable evidence that many of the reform-
inclined leaders in Cuba today are studying the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences closely in planning
for the post-Fidel period. Last year former Cuban U.N. ambassador Alcibiades Hidalgo and I wrote that Ral Castro, Fidels
designated successor, has sympathized for many years with change in the Chinese or Vietnamese stylethat is, capitalism (or something
like it) in the economy, which is still called socialist but with a single party and repression of politics. In an interview, former Cuban
intelligence official Domingo Amuchastegui added that the Chinese approach is useful in many ways and has considerable influence in
Cuba. Once Fidel is gone, he said, many aspects of the Chinese experience will most probably be implemented rather quickly. Several
years ago, in a study for the Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, the dean of Cuba-watching
economists, wrote that Cuba could follow the path of China and Vietnam and move toward a
socialist market economy. Mesa-Lago ticked off many specific, basic reforms, including the right of individuals to establish and
run private businesses, which is one of the market practices Fidel most detests. Several years ago, a Cuba specialist at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing told me that he thinks the most important thing Cubans have to do to develop economically is to
change their way of thinking and then change the institutions that derive therefrom. The current governing ideas in Cuba come from Fidels
fanatical rejection of all forms of markets, from the central management schemes of the Soviet bloc experience, and from the centuries-
long heritage of Iberian paternalism. Another scholar in Beijing added that the key to Cubas future is recognizing the power of the market:
Cuba must deepen its reforms . . . establish the mechanisms of the socialist market economy and . . . smash egalitarianism. Cuba, China,
and Vietnam are all burdened by very heavy baggage from the past, ranging from skewed economic thinking to politically twisted legal
systems to resource-sucking bureaucracies to disillusioned youth and corruption. Still there are several very important and encouraging
differences between Cuba and China/Vietnam. First, Cuba will begin its reforms with a much better-educated populace and thus a more
capable labor force. These people are gagged and grossly underutilized in Cuba today, but they are there as soon as Fidel is out of the way
and globalization begins. Also, although some noneconomic freedoms have emerged in China and Vietnam, there are few signs of
movement toward genuine democratic governance. But Cuba, because of its history and its proximity to the United States and the Western
world, will almost certainly move much more easily and completely to a significantly more democratic government, unintentionally
promoted most likely in the early reform years by market-oriented economic change. THE U.S. RESPONSE For decades Cubans have eaten
bitterness, as the Chinese put it, but when Fidel goes they will have a chance to change all that. If Fidels successors move in
the reformist direction outlined above, which I believe they are likely to do, how should the United States and other nations
respond? One approach, which has been the U.S. line in recent years, would be to resist the reformers unless all
the Castros are gone and major political changes are included, which they almost certainly will not be. The
other, broader, approach would be to support much that happens, even if undertaken by Ral and
his comrades. This need not mean conceding everything to Havana and expecting nothing in return.
Indeed, calls for a quid pro quo , which are shamefully disingenuous as long as Fidel survives, have a chance of
actually working with his insecure, reform-oriented successors, if handled constructively. One major
obstacle over time to following a broad approach has been the anti-Fidel rhetoric more related to the past than to the emerging interests
of the Cuban people on either side of the Strait of Florida. Indeed, there is some hope that the broader approach will become politically
possible as increasing numbers of embargo supporters begin making conciliatory noises. Many Cuban Americans and others seem to be
objectively weighing just how much the Cuban people will lose if U.S. policy remains rigid or ideological during a period of significant, if far
from complete, post-Fidel reform. For example, Edward Gonzalez, a longtime analyst at the Rand Corporation and supporter of the
embargo, wrote several years ago: Were a successor regime under communist reformers to come to power, the United States would shift
to a strategy of engagement for the purpose of gaining optimal leverage in pressing for further regime change. . . . The application of
maximum pressures against the reformist-led regime in order to install a democratic transition regime in power might not be possible
because the reformers may enjoy domestic support from the populace. Thus, in the end, the reality inside Cuba may
require that the United S tates not only deal with but also actively engage a reformist-led successor
regime as the best alternative for speeding Cubas ultimate democratic transition. The vanguard Cuban
American National Foundation has been more moderate in recent years. Even one of the outspoken authors of the Helms-Burton Law,
Miami Republican congressman Lincoln Daz-Balart, took a great leap toward moderation in March 2006 when he reportedly said that
under certain circumstances we should deal with Ral. Of course the monkey wrench may still be hidden in the details, but change is under
way in the United States as well as in Cuba.
Cuba intervention collapses other foreign policy priorities---terrorism, Iraq, Iran and
North Korea proliferation, and Israeli security---peaceful transition is key
Wong-Diaz 6 - Francisco Wong-Diaz, attorney and professor of law, political science and international
relations at the City College of San Francisco, Member of the Committee on the Present Danger, the
World Association of International Studies (WAIS), and the State Bars of California and Florida,
December 2006, CASTROS CUBA: QUO VADIS?, online:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB744.pdf
The global war on terror, Iraq, nuclear proliferation issues raised by Iran and North Korea, and the
current terrorist attacks against Israel are the hot foreign policy priorities of the Bush administration.
The United S tates would need to feel directly threatened before considering the use of force against
Cuba. So despite U.S. Government rhetoric in the July 5, 2006, report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) about
liberating Cuba, Castro knows that he will retain power as long as he lives. A peaceful transition to democracy and a free
market economy is also unlikely as long as Fidel is alive. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there was hope that
Cuba might undergo something similar to the color or flower revolutions that transformed many of the former Warsaw Pact countries.
Unlike the Europeans, however, Cubas Communist party and security services remain loyal, and there is no solidarity movement or
opposition leader with a credible plan. Cuban civil society is rather weak, and dissidents are unable to work openly and in full coordination.
More importantly, the main reason why no color, flower, or cedar revolution will ever occur in Cuba is that Castro and his closest
lieutenants have studied those events very closely, identified and anticipated the relevant contingencies, and learned how to deal with
them. A dynastic succession based on collective leadership is the unfolding Cuban scenario. Castro wants to retain personal power for as
long as he can to protect his dominant position and interests. To accomplish this, first, he has sought close commercial and security ties
with China, Venezuela, Bolivia, and even the mullahs of Iran. Next, he organized a succession process. Under Cuban law, the first
Vicepresident of the Council of State, his brother Raul, assumes the duties of the president. Raul, who turned 75 on June 3, assumed
provisional power on Monday, July 31, following an announcement that Fidel was ill and would undergo surgery. Raul has physical
ailments, too, and there is no clear indication that anyone else has been groomed to replace him. So at age 80, the Cuban dictators place in
history, for better or for worse, already has been established. For almost 50 years, the Cuban people have suffered political repression and
tyranny under his one-man rule. Castros eventual passing, the so-called biological solution, would constitute good
and transformative news for Cuba if progress is made along a range of issues from development of
true and honest representative institutions of governance to improvement of the Cuban peoples
quality of life. The overarching American foreign policy objective should be to pressure the successor
regime while encouraging a strong bias among Cuban elites for internally generated democratization,
the rule of law, and transparency in reciprocity for graduated normalization of relations with the island.
Nuclear terror causes extinction
Ayson 10 [Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies:
New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington,After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging
Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to
Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld]
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily
represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded
as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a
massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst
terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would
have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have
hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful
nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds a non-state
actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily separable . It is
just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of
events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess
them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to
new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the
superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear
proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where
an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear
attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be
brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of
terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily
threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was
thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason
Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case
of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a
wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from
its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came
from.41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe
that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling
out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would
be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage
would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism
occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time
when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to
assume the worst ? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in
some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely
as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or
China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that
might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washingtons early
response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear
aided) confrontation with Russia and /or China . For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate
aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its
nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of
reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use
force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might
grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial
response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or
nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that
group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action
as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence
and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of
the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the
Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise
alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to
provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that
special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend
immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance,
albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if
the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found
the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also suspect
that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a
major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which
Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what
conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear
weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious
nuclear exchange . They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a
strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the
nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia
and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the
United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by
states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it
may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and
that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear
terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of
nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to
support Russias use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible,
what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed
likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere
immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from
other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase how dare they tell us what to do
immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of
sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint. Nuclear Terrorism
Against Smaller Nuclear Powers There is also the question of what lesser powers in the international system might do in response to a terrorist
attack on a friendly or allied country: what they might do in sympathy or support of their attacked colleague. Moreover, if these countries are
themselves nuclear armed, additional possibilities for a wider catastrophe may lie here as well. For example, if in the event of a terrorist nuclear
attack on the United States, a nuclear armed ally such as Israel might possess special information about the group believed to be responsible
and be willing and able to take the action required to punish that group. If its action involved threats of the use of nuclear force, or the use of
nuclear force itself (perhaps against a country Israel believed to be harboring the nuclear terrorists), how might other nuclear armed countries
react? Might some other nuclear powers demand that the United States rein in its friend, and suggest a catastrophic outcome should this
restraint not take place? Or would they wait long enough to ask the question? Alternatively, what if some states used the nuclear terrorist
attack on another country to justify a majorand perhaps even nuclearattack on other terrorist groups on the grounds that it was now clear
that it was too dangerous to allow these groups to exist when they might very well also be planning similar nuclear action? (Just as Al Qaedas
attacks on 9/11 raised some of the threat assessments of other terrorist groups, the same and more might occur if any terrorist group had used
a nuclear weapon,) If a nuclear armed third party took things into its own hands and decided that the time for decisive action had now come,
how might this action affect the nuclear peace between states? But it needs to be realized that a catalytic exchange is not only possible if the
terrorists have exploded a nuclear device on one of the established nuclear weapons states, including and especially the United States. A
catalytic nuclear war might also be initiated by a nuclear terrorist attack on a country that possesses a nuclear arsenal of a more modest scale,
and which is geographically much closer to the group concerned. For example, if a South Asian terrorist group exploded a nuclear device in
India, it is very difcult to see how major suspicions could not be raised in that country (and elsewhere) that Pakistan was somehow involved
either as a direct aider and abetter of the terrorists (including the provision of the bomb to them) or as at the very least a passive and careless
harborer of the groups perpetrating the act. In a study that seeks to reduce overall fears of nuclear terrorism, Frost nonetheless observes that
if one of the nuclear powers in South Asia was thought to be behind a terrorist nuclear attack in
the region, the risks of the incident escalating into a full nuclear exchange would be high . 43 Kapur is
equally denite on this score, observing that if a nuclear detonation occurred within India, the attack would be undoubtedly blamed on
Pakistan, with potentially catastrophic results. 44
Iranian proliferation causes nuclear war
Bar 13 Shmuel Bar, director of studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel,
February 2013, The Dangers of a Poly-Nuclear Mideast, Hoover Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/139416
Even ideologically, or religiously, highly charged leaderships may be aware of the dangers inherent in
nuclear war and behave rationally. However, such awareness and rational decision-making processes are a
necessary but not a sufficient condition. Nuclear confrontation may not be the result of some irrational
but premeditated decision by leaders to initiate a nuclear strike, but of faulty intelligence, command,
and control in escalatory situations . In such situations, it appears that the c ommand and c ontrol structures
that may develop in new nuclear states in the Middle East are likely to exacerbate the dangers
inherent in escalation and brinkmanship, and to result ultimately in perennial nuclear instability or even
nuclear war .
2NC Internal Link
A Chinese model would fail in Cuba---a failed transition causes societal collapse and
external military intervention
Backer 5 - Larry Cata Backer, Professor of Law at Penn State, 2005, CUBAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AT THE CROSSROADS: CUBAN MARXISM, PRIVATE ECONOMIC COLLECTIVES AND FREE MARKET
GLOBALISM, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 14, No. 5
Is it possible for a state to remain true to its Marxist-Leninist principles of political and economic organization,1 and simultaneously
embrace the emerging system of economic globalization?2 The answer from the former Soviet Union and its allied states would appear to
be no. The Russian Federation3 and former Warsaw Pact nations4 each have abandoned Marxist-Leninist state organization in favor of so-
called neo-liberal economic organization.5 In each case, the state has effectively privatized the economic sphere and implemented a
transition to democracy, evidenced by the adoption of a Western-style political organization grounded in a democratically elected
representative government.6 On the other hand, the Peoples Republic of China and Vietnam have sought to embrace,
with some success, the emerging system of economic globalization while remaining true to the
fundamental political norms of Marxist-Leninist state organization. Cuba has yet to confront the
question. Its moderate size,7 the advantages of its geography,8 and its unique historyparticularly its relationship with the United
States9 have permitted Cuba to remain aloof from the current push to economic globalization. Cuba has avoided the fate of other
developing nations only because it has stubbornly (and successfully) managed to remain isolated from the world community.10 But
Cubas isolation may be coming to an end. Cubas current leadership is aging. No potential successor appears as charismatic
as the current President, Fidel Castro.11 None appear as committed to the precise form of Marxist-Leninist state system to which Fidel
Castro has devoted his efforts in the last half-century. There are great internal pressures to end Cuban isolation.12
There are even greater external pressures to bring Cuba into the emerging global economic system.13
From this vantage point, Cuba looks on the world with a certain amount of fear. Globalization on terms acceptable to Cubabased on
principles of communist internationalism14 has been replaced by a free market globalization at the service of its greatest political
enemy, the United States.15 Increasingly isolated and insular in their view, Cuban leaders understand globalization as a
potent weapon in the battle for control of the character of the nation, and ultimately, of its sovereignty.
In Miami and Washington they are now discussing where, how, and when Cuba will be attacked or the problem of the Revolution will be
solved.16 For Cuba, this sort of interference in globalized clothing must be resisted. But friends and foes of the regime increasingly
understand this position as anachronistic.17 Commentators outside of Cuba have been critical of Cubas reform efforts because they have
failed even to appear to attempt a broad harmonization with international commercial and enterprise practices.18 Many contrast Cubas
isolation with Chinas much more successful efforts to engage with the world community.19 The general consensus outside of
Cuba is that, in the absence of significant reform, significant instability is likely within the decade.20
This instability may range from a rapid breakdown in the socio-political order to rapid liberalization on
an Eastern European model, increasing the possibility of anarchy or the rise of a criminal state. Either of
these extremes would require internal or external military intervention.21 The champions of a middle course
envision the emergence of a unity government that would embrace a Chinese-style model of global economic engagement. This would
permit the continuation of some form of Marxist-Socialist state apparatus while to some extent harmonizing economic practice with global
expectations.22 The Chinese model is certainly alluring. China seems to offer a blueprint for non-violent structural change focusing on
economic transformation that might also offer the possibility of social and political change.23 It provides a blueprint for how nations that
choose a more collectivist approach to state organization can engage the emerging economic community on its own terms using the
language of private economic collectives as the primary vehicle for the development of the means of production of the state and reserving
to states a secondary role as regulator and shareholder.24 To some extent, this is a particularly American spin. The primary characteristic
of that spin is to proclaim any change within Cuba (or any Marxist-Leninist state system) as a signal for the perhaps inevitable
transformation from Marxist-Leninism to democratic, free-enterprise state organization.25 But the Chinese model for Cuba is also alluring
for those who believe there is something worth preserving from Cubas experiment in Marxist-Leninist governance. China, it appears, has
managed to preserve the best of a Marxist-Leninist state system by essentially partitioning the hard disk of stateoperating a virtual
global economic system on top of a collectivist state system.26 China has joined the world economic community without, for the time
being, losing its soul to it. Perhaps Cuba could do the same and preserve its system of education, universal health care, and those other
aspects of its provision of services that are the subject of praise among elements of global civil society.27 In a world in which geo-
political28 and economic 29 realities suggest a global expectation of transition (whether forced or otherwise) rather than adaptation away
from its current Marxist-Leninist and isolationist stance, the Chinese model provides the least destabilizing alternative. Indeed, adaptation
may make it far more difficult for the world community to justify more forceful intervention to help Cuba overcome its isolation. There
are a number of other factors that make the Chinese model potentially useful. First, the Chinese model provides a blueprint for successful
communication across systems of economic and political organization. It permits Cuba to communicate more effectively with the rest of
the world by substituting the globally understood idiom of economics (particularly the idiom of trade through private, autonomous
economic collectives), for the more isolating language of politics, and particularly the language of Marxist-Leninist collectivist action.
Second, the Chinese model provides a means of privatizing economic activity by changing the character of state involvement in economic
activity but not necessarily limiting the extent of that involvement. Third, the Chinese model provides a structure for avoiding issues of
transition by implementing a viable and proven blueprint for perpetuating a more stable socialist system in Cuba in accordance with
fundamental Cuban constitutional norms.30 In this last, and important, respect, the Chinese model provides a means of appearing to
deepen a rule of law norm within Cuba.31 As a consequence, embrace of Chinese- style engagement could have the effect of making it
harder for other states to justify transition regimes or regime change. This might be especially true for the United States, which has based
much of its rhetoric of transition on the current regimes lack of respect for the rule of law.32 Despite this rather rosy picture, and for all of
its potential benefits to Cuba, a number of factors may make it impossible for Cuba to successfully implement
a Cuba-appropriate version of the Chinese model of engagement with globalization. First, it is not clear that
the Chinese model of global economic engagement has actually worked as advertised in China.33 Second, the Chinese model may
not translate well to the Cuban context. 34 The sort of engagement consistent with Maoist understandings of Marxist-
Leninist theory may be impossible in the context of Cubas more Stalinist system of politico-economic organizationat least without what in Cuba
would be viewed as a substantial shift in the nature of the governing ideology. Third, neither Cuba nor China has solved the core
foundational problem of economic development through independent collectives, legal entities that are not an
integral part of the state apparatus controlled by the Communist party.35 Neither Chinas Maoist Marxist-Leninist theory, nor Cubas Stalinist version have
satisfactorily solved the central contradiction of Marxist-Leninist engagementthe privatization of economic activity essentially directed by autonomous
economic collectives, which in turn are regulated by the state. Fourth, Cuba continues to actively resist integration into global patterns of capital.36 Fifth,
Cuba is in a poor position to compete globallyits labor is expensive, its products overpriced, and its infrastructure in need of
development in comparison to other developing states.37 Last, and most perversely, the subjective and highly emotional speci al relationship between Cuba
and the United States limits objective consideration of alternatives and thereby constrains choice.38 This paper works through fundamental issues affecting
the future of Cuban approaches to economic regulation. Part I sets the contextthe shift in the thrust and nature of globalization from one based on Marxist-
Leninist revolution to one grounded in the establishment of a unitary system of norms for economic organization and regulation. This context explains Cubas
predicament: since its system of economic organization is increasingly at odds with that of the rest of the world, should it or must it change in order to conform
to evolving international standards and expectations? An examination of this predicament is grounded in the context of existi ng Marxist-Socialist state systems
engaging with the world in the twenty-first century, and particularly with global economic and legal harmonization centering on the modern engine of
economic activity, the independent corporation. Parts II and III examine the current state of Cuban and Chinese attempts to deal with the emerging system of
global economic activity. The proxy for measuring this engagement will be the Western-style corporation. The Cubans remain suspicious, tentative, and oddly
old-fashioned in a rapidly changing world, while the Chinese appear to have embraced globalism on their own terms. Yet both have resisted a wholesale
adoption of a western-style corporate political economy. Cuba has intensified its resistance to the emerging global system of economic norms. Yet Cuba has
not been able to isolate itself completely from the system it so actively appears to disdain. Instead, it has sought to pursue a policy of containment and
quarantine by attempting to create an indigenous version of Stalinism. All global economic activity is contained geographically and engaged in only by or
through government agencies. China, on the other hand, has sought to engage the emerging system by experimenting with modifications to the Chinese
economic system. It has succeeded, to some extent, in adopting the language and symbols of economic globalism such as economic activity in corporate form,
markets in securities, and some ownership rights in property. It has also extended these rights to its own citizens. But at the same time, the vocabulary of
global norms has been folded into the basic normative structure of a political community grounded in principles of Marxist Leninism. As a result, it is still not
clear whether the changes in China run only skin deep and simply mask a system that has changed very little. At the same time, the system has appeared to
change enough to permit China entry into the world economic community, while Cuba remains an economic pariah. The paper thus arrives at the heart
of the problem: could Cuba adopt the Chinese approach with the same degree of success, or is there
something unique about either the Cuban or Chinese experience that makes emulation impossible?
Part IV suggests the difficulties of emulation in the six critical respects identified above: First, the question of Cuban emulation may be
beside the point if the Chinese approach does not work in the first place.39 There is some evidence that suggests that Chinas success is no
more than skin deep. But the fact that Chinas reforms may be more successful in the abstract than in practice has not been an impediment
for other nations to treat the reforms as if they had worked. And that may be an important consideration in evaluating the success of the
reforms. Second, neither Maoism nor Stalinism have overcome the contradictions growing out of the privatization of economic activity in a
state committed to Marxist-Leninist organization.40 Neither Cuba nor China has solved the core foundational problem of economic
development through collectives, independent of the state and not controlled by the Communist party. China has ignored the issue for the
most part, attempting to work around it in theory and treating corporations as traditional parts of the state apparatus in practice. Cuba has
yet to confront the issue, but as a matter of Cuban constitutional law, the issue will prove to be difficult, especially given the changes to the
constitution in 2002 declaring the current Marxist-Leninist system irrevocable.41 Third, even if Chinese Maoism has overcome
the contradictions of socialist economics grounded in private economic activity, Cuban Stalinism may be
incapable of the same feat.42 Cuban Stalinism is incompatible with the Maoist theories critical to the Chinese model. The
inflexibility of Stalinist bureaucratization and the fear of contamination inherent in the Cuban
governments approach to opening up significantly distinguish Cuba from China. Fourth, Cubas ability
to successfully emulate China may be defeated because of the difficulty of accessing global capital
markets.43 Cuba may find it difficult to emulate China so long as it remains unable and unwilling to access global capital flows. Engagement would require
a fundamental shift in thinking about the conditions under which Cuba would will itself to become dependent on global capital. But that willingness may be a
condition precedent to engagementthe world economic community may view dependence of global capital as a form of insurance of Cubas good behavior.
Fifth, current American policy makes it impossible, as a practical matter, for Cuba to emulate the Chinese approach.44 At the time China opened to
globalization, the world community, including the United States, was eager for the engagement. The West provided substantial encouragement to the Chinese.
The same is not true with respect to Cuba. The subjective and highly emotive special relationship between Cuba and the United States limits objective
consideration of alternatives and constrains choice. American policy is geared toward substantial change in both the political and economic ordering of the
Cuban state. Sixth, even if all other impediments disappeared, Cuba may not be in a position to successfully engage with the global economy without massive
economic aid.45 Cuba may not yet be able to compete in the global market place. Even in the absence of the serious problems faced by Cuba, the country is in
a poor position to compete globally. Cuba is smaller and more resource poor than China. That difference may make emulation, even if theoretically possible,
unrealistic in fact. The focus of the paper shifts in Part V. Part IV suggested the difficulties of engagement, and the dangers of emulation. Part V looks at the
other side of the cointhe pitfalls of resistance. On the one hand, a refusal to embrace global economic organization in the form adopted by a substantial
segment of the global community can produce an isolation that might be economically and politically disastrous. On the other hand, isolation may be
impossible to maintain over the long run. Change can come from outside the community as well as from within. Like
China and Japan in the 19th century, and whether the current state apparatus likes it or not, Cuba will be forced
to open its ports to the world. Whether that process will produce a re-colonized Cuba or an
independent participant in the global economy will depend on the approach taken by this and
subsequent Cuban regimes. Part V offers both a conclusion and tentative steps toward a resolution of the problem.
The US will intervene if a democratic transition doesnt happen naturally---classified
plans
Bush formed the U.S. Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba to explore ways we can help hasten
and ease Cubas democratic transition. 31 Yet, on December 4, 2004, Assistant Secretary of State Robert F. Noriega announced
that Bush is committed to the liberation of Cuba during the next 4 years. What did he mean by liberation? Certainly not a military
intervention or covert operation to achieve regime change while Cuba is under Castro. Noriega stated that Washington had a blueprint of
plans for providing social, economic, and other types of assistance to Cuba in the post-Castro era to prevent Castros supporters from
retaining control of the country after his death. He said that Washington wants to ensure that vestiges of the regime dont hold on. In July
2005, Secretary Rice, who now co-chairs the Commission together with Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, announced the appointment
of Caleb McCarry, a former Republican staff member of the House International Relations Committee, as Cuba transition coordinator--or point man on regime
change in Cuba. McCarry has a $59 million budget to hasten the transition and prevent Raul Castro, Carlos Lage, Perez Roque, and other leaders from
continuing the current system. On July 5, 2006, the Commission issued a second updated report that indicates
extensive strategic planning on the part of the U.S. Government to promote a full transition to
democracy after Castro dies or is ousted. It is based on the expectation that the Cuban transition government would be inclined
to request American assistance and unrealistically assumes that pro-democracy forces within the island would be bolstered and
emboldened by U.S. willingness to provide assistance. The report considers the first 6 months after Castros demise to be
critical if a democratic transition is going to succeed. A whole range of assistance programs are included in the planning,
ranging from $80 million for a democratic fund for 2 years to help strengthen civil society to legal experts for election and judicial
training, an aid package, and technical and health assistance. The report also includes a classified annex of measures
to destabilize the regime which begs the crucial question of what specific actions might be
undertaken to prevent Raul and others from succeeding Fidel. The reports credibility is weakened by the underlying
assumption that Castro will not survive within the next years, the hope for popular protests and demonstrations in the future, and the
presumption of an American readiness to intervene directly in internal Cuban affairs upon his death.
Failed transition and economic collapse in Cuba ensures instability and US military
intervention
In a post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), post-Saddam Hussein world, the United States can ill afford a Cuban collapse
and attendant instability. An authoritarian successor regime might be preferable to a failed state. This
is the reason why an American military intervention to depose Castro or his successor is neither advisable nor likely. While Castro is alive,
American foreign policy toward Cuba will remain the choreographed pas de deux of the past 5 decades. An uncomfortable and conflictual
relationship is one whose organizing principle is Cuban anti-Americanism and American isolation of Cuba encouraged by Fidel Castros
dictatorial kakistocracy (rule of the worst citizens). The inevitable passing of Castro will constitute good and
transformative news for Cuba if progress is made along a range of issues from development of true
and honest representative institutions of governance to improvement of the Cuban peoples quality
of life. Cubans will have to overcome the long shadow cast by a culture of authoritarian one-man-rule where, for decades, individual
initiatives have not been allowed to surface and prevail because Castro, the micromanager par excellence, had to either approve or direct
them all. The overall post-Castro American foreign policy objective should be to engage the succession
regime and encourage a strong bias among Cuban elites for internally-generated democratization, the
rule of law, and transparency in exchange for an across-the-board normalization of relations with the island. U.S. military command will
need to perform regular and timely updating of contingency planning to interdict vessels to and from the island and to protect and
evacuate American diplomatic personnel and tourists in case of violent unrest. 78 As the 2006 report of the Commission for Assistance to a
Free Cuba reflects, we must be at the ready to propitiate the process, since in the final denouement, the vested
military and civilian elites will inexorably begin a struggle for power postponed by Castros longevity,
and they will seek powerful allies. When that time arrives, in cauda venenum, preventing a bloodbath,
avoiding a total economic collapse, foreign intervention, and massive uncontrolled migration to Florida
will be the biggest challenges we will face from Cuba since January 1, 1959.
High probability major powers have huge interests in Cuba
External actors with significant interests in the ongoing succession process that will be contesting their
agendas in a post-Castro regime include both states and nonstate actors. The main stakeholder in Cubas future
is the United States. China, Venezuela, and Iran are countries with strategic, security, commercial, and
ideological interests; the European Union, in particular Spain and England; as well as Canada, Mexico, Bolivia, and
Brazil also have important commercial and financial interests on the island. Beyond their bilateral
foreign policy considerations with Cuba, these countries also partake in the global competition for
natural resources, markets, and access to a skilled labor force. Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela also are joined by the
Bolivian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a trade and cooperation agreement in opposition to the unsuccessful U.S. Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA). Nonstate American groups with direct or indirect interests in Cuba include the exiles, business, educational, artistic,
and agricultural groups; NGOs like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch; think tanks like the Center for Defense
Information; and news media outlets.

Consult Brazil
Top Level

Notes
This was research that was originally vetted for the CP. After a few sessions of
research, my assignment and focus was shifted to the other CPs and this is work that
has not been completely finished, but will act as a supplement to the file that the jr
labs will be putting out, they too are working on a consult brazil cp.
Consultation Good
Consultation is crucial to maintaining regional stability and strong relations with Brazil
LeoGrande, 2011 (William M, Dean, School of Public Affairs, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University Latin
America Policy in the Next Two Years: The Obama Administration and the Next Congresshttp://www.american.edu/spa/gov/upload/LeoGrande-Harvard-DRCLAS-3-
15-11-Final.pdf)

By this unilateral shift in policy, Washington split the Latin American consensus and belied its
commitment to multilateralism. The result was to damage relations with Brazil , and to encourage the
far right elsewhere in Latin America to think they might be able to overthrow democratic ally elected progressive governments with
the acquiescence of the United States. In August 2009, the United States and Colombia announced a Defense Cooperation Agreement providing the
U.S. military with access to Colombian military bases. The agreement was announced without prior
consultation with other Latin American countries, and both Venezuela and Brazil had strong negative reactions. Once again, the
unilateralism represented by this lack of consultation reminded Latin Americans of Washingtons
interventionist past rather than heralding a multilateral partnership
Generic Solvency Advocate
The US should consult brazil --- economic issues are crucial
Inter-American Dialogue, 2012 ( Inter-American Dialogue PolIcy report: sebastin Acha is a national deputy in the lower house of the Congress of Paraguay and second vice president of his party, Patria Querida . Previously, Acha was founder and executive director of
the non-profit organization, Tierra Nueva, which works on rural development . nicols Ardito-barletta was president of Panama from 1984 to 1985 and minister of economic policy . He was World Bank vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean and founder and president of the Latin American Export Bank . He is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . scar
Arias is founder of the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress . He served as president of Costa Rica from 1986 to 1990 and again from2006 to 2010 . Arias received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1987 . michelle bachelet was president of Chile from 2006 until 2010 . Previously, she served as minister of defense and minister of health . A pediatric physician, Bachelet
currently serves as executive director of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) . She is Latin American co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue . Alicia brcena is executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) . She previously served as under-secretary-general for
management for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and acting chef de cabinet for Secretary-General Kofi Annan . roberto baquerizo is managing director of ProVentures, a New York-based consulting and investment firm . He was governor of the Central Bank of Ecuador . sergio bitar has served as a senator as well as minister of energy and mines, education, and public works in
three separate administrations of Chile . He is a non-resident fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, where he directs the global futures and Latin America initiative . Jos octavio bordn was governor of the Province of Mendoza in Argentina . He was a presidential candidate in the 1995 national elections and served as ambassador to the United States . F. Carl braun is chairman
and CEO of UNIBANK, a Haitian commercial bank, and of Groupe Financier National, a financial services and investment group .epsy Campbell barr is an economist . In 2009, she was a presidential candidate with the Citizen Action Party, of which she was president from 2005 to 2009 . Formerly, she was a representative in the Costa Rican National Assembly and a vice-presidential
candidate . Lzaro Crdenas batel is former governor of Michoacn State in Mexico with the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) . Previously, he represented his home state in the federal Chamber of Deputies and the Senate . Fernando Henrique Cardoso was two-term president of Brazil . He was also a senator fromSo Paulo and served as both finance and foreign minister .
Cardoso is a founding member chair emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue . Fernando Cepeda is a professor of political science at the University of the Andes . He previously served as Colombias permanent representative to the United Nations and to the OAS, minister of government, minister of communications, and ambassador to France, to Canada and to the United Kingdom
. Violeta Chamorro was president of Nicaragua from 1990 to 1997 . She is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . eugenio Clariond reyes-retana is retired chairman and CEO of Grupo IMSA, S .A . He previously served as vice-chairman of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and vice-president of the Mexican chapter of the Latin American
Business Council (CEAL) . Joe Clark is former prime minister of Canada . Elected eight times to the House of Commons, he was secretary of state for external affairs and also served as minister of constitutional affairs . oliver F. Clarke is chairman of The Gleaner Company, Jamaica, where he was managing director from 1976 to 2011 . He has served as president of the Inter American
Press Association and of the Commonwealth Press Union . Jonathan Coles Ward was president of Venezuelas Institute for Advanced Management Studies (IESA), where he is currently a professor . He was minister of agriculture and livestock . He is also on the PREAL advisory board . Jos mara dagnino pastore has served as minister of finance, minister of economy and labor, head
of the National Development Council, and ambassador-at-large in Europe . Currently, he is the dean of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Catholic University of Argentina Remaking the Relationship the United states and Latin America http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

Many of the issues on the hemispheric agenda carry critical global dimensions . Because of this, the United States
should seek greater cooperation and consultation with Brazil , Mexico, and other countries of the region
in world forums addressing shared interests . Brazil has the broadest international presence and influence of any
Latin American nation . In recent years it has become far more active on global issues of concern to the United States. The
United States and Brazil have clashed over such issues as Irans nuclear program, non-proliferation, and the Middle East uprisings, but they have
cooperated when their interests converged, such as in the World Trade Organization and the G-20 (Mexico, Argentina, and Canada also
participate in the G-20), and in efforts to rebuild and provide security for Haiti . Washington has worked with Brazil and other Latin American countries to
raise the profile of emerging economies in various international financial agencies, including the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund . In addition to economic and financial matters, Brazil and
other Latin American nations are assuming enhanced roles on an array of global political, environmental, and security issues .
Several for which US and Latin American cooperation could become increasingly important include:

The US should consult brazil --- crucial for energy and trade issues
Einaudi, 2011 (Luigi, Distinguished Visiting fellow in the Center for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense
University, Member of the advisory Council of the Brazil institute at the Woodrow Wilson international Center for Scholars Brazil and the Uni ted States: The Need
for Strategic Engagement http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf)

A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular policy-level consultations , increase exchanges of
information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters . This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which
Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of
trade , the environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and
ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S.
Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving
functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach
and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government.
Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of
the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.
The US should consult brazil --- k2 maintain peace
University, Member of the advisory Council of the Brazil institute at the Woodrow Wilson international Center for Scholars Brazil and the United States: The Need

The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazils continuing democratic and marketoriented success, which improves its will and capacity to help address
pressing global problems. We are in a rapidly changing period of international relations, in which a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy in order to provide a measure of
management to situations that could spin out of control. We are still haunted by nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, Brazil plays an important role . It is in the U.S.
interest to find as many ways as possible not only to cooperate with Brazil, but also to engage with
Brasilia as a regional and global partner in the maintenance of peace and prosperity

The US should consult brazil --- influence
Meyer, 2013 (Peter, Analyst in Latin American Affairs @ Congressional Research Service Brazil-U.S. Relations
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)

Brazils foreign policy is a byproduct of the countrys unique position as a regional power in Latin America, a
leader among developing countries in economic cooperation and collective security efforts, and an emerging
center of global influence . Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been based on the principles of
multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement, and nonintervention in the affairs of other countries.45 Adherence to these
principles has enabled Brazil to maintain peaceful relations with all 10 of its neighbors46 and to play a
larger role in global affairs than its economic and geopolitical power would otherwise allow. Building on its traditional principles,
Brazilian foreign policy under the PT administrations of Presidents Lula and Rousseff has emphasized three areas of action: (1) reinforcing
relations with traditional partners such as its South American neighbors, the United States, and Europe; (2) diversifying relations by forging
stronger economic and political ties with other nations of the developing world; and (3) supporting multilateralism by pushing for the
democratization of global governance.4
Security Aff Solvency Advocate
Consultation over the plan is crucial --- Brazil will backlash
Meiman and Rothkopf, 2009 (Kellie, Brasil/Southern Cone and trade practices of McLarty Associates worked at the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) in the Executive Office of the President as Director for Brasil and the Southern Cone, Foreign Service Officer with the U.S.
Department of State, and David, President and CEO of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm specializing in transformational global trends, notably those
associated with energy, security, and emerging markets; a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; chairman of the National Strategic
Investment Forum Dialogue a member of the advisory board of the U.S. Institute of Peace, the John Hopkins/Bloomberg School of Public Health, the Center for
Global Development, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency. The United States and Brazil Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf)

The United States should collaborate with Brazil on security matters both bilaterally and multilaterally, particularly when they reinforce Brazilian
interests as well, and our interests are more often in synch than is considered by either side. We need not be in perfect agreement on the desired solution to dialogue meaningfully
on security threats. Brazils voluntary decision not to pursue nuclear weapons makes it a potential ally not only on regional,
but global security questions, including those involving Iran and nuclear non-proliferation writ large. We have opportunities to improve our
communication on military matters as well. For instance, the decision in April 2008 to reinstate the Fourth Fleet of the U.S. Navy in the South Atlantic
Ocean was publicly announced without prior formal diplomatic consultation with our regional allies, including Brazil. In the existing highly-charged
hemispheric security environment, this surprise led to an exaggerated negative reaction from the Lula administration and the
Brazilian Congress, and gave Chavez an easy rally cry. Had the United States consulted Brazil and other key allies first, explaining the focus of
the policy change and highlighting the collateral benefits, the conflict createdby the Fourth Fleet reinstatement could have been diminished . Efforts in this area have
improved, and we should seek to maintain consistent communication with regional allies like Brazil on military and
security matters.
Venezuela Solvency Advocate --- Maduro Moderation -- Problem due
to the Colombia
Consultation over brazil is crucial for solvency --- its necessary for Venezuela to reform
and say yes
Pagano, 2013 (James, Contributing writer to the Truman Doctrine a Washington think tank Moving Venezuela to the Center
http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/)

The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a greater role in international and regional
politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela, and touting the recent successes of his center-left government in Brazil could help
persuade Maduro to moderate his government. Brazil has made huge societal gains without suffering
the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. Friendly cajoling , along with the promise of closer economic ties
could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic reform necessary to extend certain Chavista social programs. Colombia,
Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest in improving Venezuela n security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on
the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug related crimes skyrocketed. Violence is the number one concern of Venezuelans, and
significant reductions would be a major political victory for whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together
should pressure Venezuela to accept sorely needed D.E.A assistance with the tacit acceptance of
modest political reforms , most importantly freer press. The death of Chavez is a critical juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important
the United States not miss this opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would allow the United States to continue to draw down operations in the ever-
volatile Middle East, fight narcotrafficking and expand trade. Careful, well thought-out overtures and policy changes will help
quell lingering anti-Americanism while also improving regional stability. Ending the Cuban embargo would provide
absolute economic gain for all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States and receive aid to stop uncontrollable violence.
Strategic engagement with regional allies could help spur the economic and institutional reforms
necessary for Venezuela to prosper moving forward.

Brazil Will Say Yes
Brazil will say yes
Inter-American Dialogue, 2012 ( Inter-American Dialogue PolIcy report: sebastin Acha is a national deputy in the lower house of the Congress of Paraguay and second vice president of his party, Patria Querida . Previously, Acha was founder and executive director of
the non-profit organization, Tierra Nueva, which works on rural development . nicols Ardito-barletta was president of Panama from 1984 to 1985 and minister of economic policy . He was World Bank vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean and founder and president of the Latin American Export Bank . He is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . scar
Arias is founder of the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress . He served as president of Costa Rica from 1986 to 1990 and again from2006 to 2010 . Arias received the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1987 . michelle bachelet was president of Chile from 2006 until 2010 . Previously, she served as minister of defense and minister of health . A pediatric physician, Bachelet
currently serves as executive director of the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) . She is Latin American co-chair of the Inter-American Dialogue . Alicia brcena is executive secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) . She previously served as under-secretary-general for
management for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and acting chef de cabinet for Secretary-General Kofi Annan . roberto baquerizo is managing director of ProVentures, a New York-based consulting and investment firm . He was governor of the Central Bank of Ecuador . sergio bitar has served as a senator as well as minister of energy and mines, education, and public works in
three separate administrations of Chile . He is a non-resident fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, where he directs the global futures and Latin America initiative . Jos octavio bordn was governor of the Province of Mendoza in Argentina . He was a presidential candidate in the 1995 national elections and served as ambassador to the United States . F. Carl braun is chairman
and CEO of UNIBANK, a Haitian commercial bank, and of Groupe Financier National, a financial services and investment group .epsy Campbell barr is an economist . In 2009, she was a presidential candidate with the Citizen Action Party, of which she was president from 2005 to 2009 . Formerly, she was a representative in the Costa Rican National Assembly and a vice-presidential
candidate . Lzaro Crdenas batel is former governor of Michoacn State in Mexico with the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) . Previously, he represented his home state in the federal Chamber of Deputies and the Senate . Fernando Henrique Cardoso was two-term president of Brazil . He was also a senator fromSo Paulo and served as both finance and foreign minister .
Cardoso is a founding member chair emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue . Fernando Cepeda is a professor of political science at the University of the Andes . He previously served as Colombias permanent representative to the United Nations and to the OAS, minister of government, minister of communications, and ambassador to France, to Canada and to the United Kingdom
. Violeta Chamorro was president of Nicaragua from 1990 to 1997 . She is an emeritus member of the Inter-American Dialogue . eugenio Clariond reyes-retana is retired chairman and CEO of Grupo IMSA, S .A . He previously served as vice-chairman of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, and vice-president of the Mexican chapter of the Latin American
Business Council (CEAL) . Joe Clark is former prime minister of Canada . Elected eight times to the House of Commons, he was secretary of state for external affairs and also served as minister of constitutional affairs . oliver F. Clarke is chairman of The Gleaner Company, Jamaica, where he was managing director from 1976 to 2011 . He has served as president of the Inter American
Press Association and of the Commonwealth Press Union . Jonathan Coles Ward was president of Venezuelas Institute for Advanced Management Studies (IESA), where he is currently a professor . He was minister of agriculture and livestock . He is also on the PREAL advisory board . Jos mara dagnino pastore has served as minister of finance, minister of economy and labor, head
of the National Development Council, and ambassador-at-large in Europe . Currently, he is the dean of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Catholic University of Argentina Remaking the Relationship the United states and Latin America http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

Brazils RiseBrazil is now Latin Americas dominant economic power . Its influence in regional affairs, especially in
South America, rivals that of the United States . Its economy, the worlds sixth largest, coupled with effective political
leadership and assertive and skilled diplomacy, underpins the countrys expanding global role . Brazil, one of the
BRICS (along with Russia, India, China, and South Africa), has made clear its aspiration for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and is
considered one of the two or three leading candidates . Although the United States and Brazil disagree on some critical
regional and global issuesand have openly clashed in a few instancestheir relationship is largely cordial and non-
conflictive . Both regularly call for deeper and more extensive bilateral cooperation, although both also seem
leery about taking the required initiative
Relations Net Benefit
Relations Net Benefit
Consultation is crucial to create new relations --- now is key --- Brazil is emerging as a
new power.
Noriega and Crdenas, 2012 (Roger, former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs (Canada, Latin America, and the
Caribbean) and a former U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States. He coordinates AEI's program on Latin America and writes for the Institute's Latin
American Outlook series, Jose, an associate with the consulting firm VisionAmericas, based in Washington working on inter-American relations, including in the U.S.
Department of State, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, a Senior Advisor at the Organization of American States and
as a senior professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. An action plan for US policy in the Americas American Enterprise Institute
http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/latin-america/an-action-plan-for-us-policy-in-the-americas/)

A reinvigorated US policy in the Western Hemisphere cannot proceed without a fundamental reevaluation of
bilateral relations with Brazil. With a population of some 200 million, a $2.5 trillion economy (the worlds sixth largest), and a recent history of
steady political and economic management, Brazil is beginning to realize its enormous potential . Much as China used the 2008
Beijing Olympics to unveil its economic progress and modernity, Brazil will be the focus of global attention in 2014 and 2016 as it hosts the World Cup and Olympics,
respectively. Strengthening and expanding US relations with Brazil should be a US presidential priority . Specifically,
it is in both countries interests to deepen the developing partnership, namely in the areas of trade ,
security, and energy. Yet, though there are opportunities in a more modern US-Brazil relationship, there are also
challenges. It will be a test of US diplomacy to convince some sectors in Brazil that relations with the United States are not a zero-sum game, and that significant
benefits can accrue for both populations as a result of deeper cooperation. Some recommendations for US-Brazil cooperation: Invigorate presidential-level
engagement; Establish a jointly funded US-Brazil foundation (modeled on the German Marshall Fund) to institutionalize broad cooperation; focusing on information
and communications technology (the so-called e-economy); student, political, cultural, and other grassroots exchanges; and language training; Charge an
interagency team with developing strategies to overcome the zero-sum approach in bilateral relations adhered to by some in the Brazilian foreign policy
establishment; Institutionalize a bilateral defense ministerial on global security challenges, defense cooperation, military modernization, and regional security
challenges; Incentivize US ventures with Brazils aviation and aerospace industries and overcome technology-transfer issues to create opportunities for US
manufacturers; Offer working-level cooperation with World Cup and Olympics planning teams. Conclusion The potential opportunities and mutual benefits have
never been greater for intrahemispheric cooperation. But US policymakers must aggressively seize initiative in turning that potential
into reality. Certainly there are challenges and obstacles ahead, but increased economic relationships will take on a dynamic
and momentum of their own, and once and for all render obsolete some of the retrograde populist
agendas in the Americas. Geographic proximity, cultural and family ties, shared values, and growing
prosperity are powerful incentives to drive a fundamental reassessment of US relations in the
Western Hemisphere. It is essential that US policymakers demonstrate the political will to take
advantage of this unprecedented opportunity .

Relations Good --- Latin America Instability
Relations Solve Latin American stability
Erikson, 2010 (Daniel, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs, Inter-American Dialogue, The Centre for International
Governance Innovation, The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?, Working Paper No. 46)

The need to manage the increasingly complex relationship with South American countries will be a critical US policy
priority. The early effort to enhance the US-Brazil agenda was especially vital , because strong US-Brazilian ties
could help the Obama administration handle festering tensions in countries including Colombia, Venezuela
and Bolivia. However, such an outcome may be overly optimistic, given that Brazil and the US soon diverged in their responses to the coup against
President Jose Manuel Zelaya in Honduras, where initial unity in opposing the constitutional breach quickly gave way to divisions over whether the international
community should recognize the Honduran elections scheduled for November 2009 in the absence of Zelayas restoration (see Sheridan, 2009). The US provided
its tacit support to the elections while Brazil, whose embassy in Tegucigalpa provided Zelaya sanctuary, disagreed.

Instability causes extinction.
Manwaring 5 adjunct professor of international politics at Dickinson (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel, Venezuelas Hugo Chvez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric
Warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

President Chvez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge
facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground
for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and
major refugee flows. They can host evil networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business
enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all
kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and
persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease , the recruitment
and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and
WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy . At the same time, these actions are
usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict .62
Perus Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure armed propaganda. Drug cartels operating
throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities business
incentives. Chvez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism
for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors strategic efforts are aimed at
progressively lessening a targeted regimes credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chvezs intent is to focus his
primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption,
disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its
government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of
subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage
of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed
states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new peoples democracies. In connection
with the creation of new peoples democracies, one can rest assured that Chvez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given
opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and peoples democracies persist, the more they and their associated
problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity .65

Relations Good --- Amazon
Solves amazon deforestation and ecological shocks
Zedillo et al, 2008 (Rethinking U.S.Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission The
Brookings Institution November 2008 Ernesto Zedillo Commission co-chair; Former President of Mexico Thomas R. Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Memb e r s o f the Par t n e r s h i p for t h e Ame r i cas Commi ssi o n Mauricio Crdenas Director of the Commission; Senior Fellow and Director, Latin America Initiative,
Brookings Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Director of the Commission; Political Economy Fellow, Global Economy and Development)

The link between carbon-intensive activities and changes in the worlds climate is now well established, and the
consequences will be felt across the hemisphere. According to figure 2, if current human activity remains unchanged, the hemisphere will likely
suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including declines in agricultural yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more
frequent and destructive storms in the Caribbean Basin. These extreme weather events could bring devastation to Central Ameri ca, the Caribbean, and the
southeastern United States, imposing a heavy human and material toll. As we know from recent storms, the costs of replacing homes, businesses, and
infrastructurealong with the higher costs of energy if refineries and offshore rigs are damagedwill be vast. Hemispheric Solutions Addressing the challenge of
energy security will require making energy consumption more efficient and developing new energy sources, whereas addressing the challenge of climate change will
require finding ways to control carbon emissions, helping the world shift away from carbon-intensive energy generation, and adapting to some aspects of changing
ecosystems. Potential solutions to these problems exist in the Americas, but mobilizing them will require a
sustained hemispheric partnership . Latin America has enormous potential to help meet the worlds growing thirst for energy, both in terms of
hydrocarbons and alternative fuels. Latin America has about 10 percent of the worlds proven oil reserves. Venezuela accounts for most of these, though Brazils oil
reserves could increase from 12 to 70 billon barrels if recent discoveries can be developed. Bolivia is an important producer of natural gas, Mexico has great
potential in solar energy generation, and several countries in the region could potentially produce much more hydroelectric power. Brazil is a world leader in
sugarcane-based ethanol production, and the United States is a leader in corn-based ethanol (figure 3). Solar and wind power, particularly in Central America and
the Caribbean, remain underdeveloped. To expand the hemispheres energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil
production 13 (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the regions potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will
cost $70240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support
liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with
Mexicos. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power
integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow
because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a
variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America
have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines,
remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering
protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated.
Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners. In addition to developing
carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change.
The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other
regions. However, minimizing the LAC regions future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also,
deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin
contains one of the worlds three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very
significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information
technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.

Relations Good --- Economy
Solve economy
Bonoma, 2012 (Diego, 8-9-12, U.S.-Brazil Energy Partnership Offers Great Potential, http://www.freeenterprise.com/us-brazil-energy-partnership-
offers-great-potential)

The U.S.-Brazil energy partnership has the potential to foster energy security, economic growth , and job creation
priorities for both countries. Reflecting this shared vision, President Barack Obama and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff last year
launched the U.S.-Brazil Strategic Energy Dialogue (SED), a presidential-level mechanism to strengthen bilateral cooperation in this
area. We at the Brazil-U.S. Business Council applaud this effort towards a bold bilateral partnership in energy. We have been vigorously engaged in energy
cooperation to deepen the commercial pillar of the U.S.-Brazil partnership, with an emphasis on trade and investment promotion. In this
context, we worked closely with the White House, the U.S. Department of Energy and other federal government agencies to launch the SED in August 2011. On that
occasion, deputy secretary of energy Daniel Poneman met with private sector representatives in both So Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and officially launched the
dialogue in Braslia. Further recognizing the importance of our energy partnership, this week, I moderated a panel featuring key U.S. and
Brazilian government officials at the 13th edition of the Federation of Industries of the State of So Paulos Annual Energy Conference Brazils largest energy-
related event. During the panel, the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy, along with the U.S. Department of Energy, announced the next meeting of the SED in
Washington, D.C. this coming October. The Ministry also announced that the private sector will be, for the first time, officially incorporated in the dialogues
program of work a longstanding request of the Brazil-U.S. Business Council and our partners in the U.S. and Brazil. The Brazil-U.S. Business Council also
launched this week its latest report: The U.S.-Brazil Energy Partnership: Bolstering Security, Growth, and Job Creation. In this report, we talk about the state of the
partnership and offer recommendations for both countries to take advantage of the benefits it could bring. The potential is there for
this energy partnership to develop into one of the worlds greatest and bring real benefits for the citizens and economies of both countries. Its great to see the
governments and private sectors of both countries taking steps toward it.

**Affirmative**
OAS CP --- Defense
No Solvency
Doesnt solve, countries say no, and links to the net benefit seen as an extension of
US interests, not multilateral commitment
Policy Considerations The rise of regional alternatives to the OAS presents both potential opportunities and challenges for the United States.
One potential benefit of such organizations might be an increase in burdensharing in the hemisphere. As the newer organizations evolve, they
may be able to take on more responsibility for maintaining peace and stability in their sub-regions, which could enable Congress to dedicate
scarce U.S. resources to other priorities. A division of labor among various organizations might also enable the OAS to better concentrate its
efforts on its core agenda and thereby carry out its mandates more effectively. At the same time, an increasing role for other
multilateral organizations could lead to a weaker, more divided OAS. If other organizations take on larger roles in
the hemisphere, the role of the OAS would likely decline. Some Members of Congress argue that such a development
could weaken U.S. influence in the hemisphere since the OAS is the only multilateral organization in which the United
States is a member and shapes policy decisions.122 Moreover, the proliferation of regional organizations could further weaken the
hemispheres ability to speak with one voice. For example, Mercosur and Unasur determined that the rapid June 2012 impeachment of
Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo constituted a break in the democratic order and sought to isolate the country by suspending it from
participation.123 The OAS, on the other hand, concluded that the impeachment did not constitute a coup dtat, and member states decided
not to suspend Paraguay from participating in the organization.124 The impetus behind the creation of some of the new regional
organizations also has implications for the United States. Latin American leaders have established new multilateral
institutions for a number of reasons, one of which is the lingering view of many in the region that the
OAS is an institution dominated by the United S tates. Even as some Members of Congress assert that the organization
acts against U.S. interests, a number of policymakers in the broader region argue that the OAS imposes U.S. policies . Given these
views, some analysts maintain that any reform to the OAS that begins in Washington, especially in the U.S.
Congress, can have the potential to backfire and provoke opposition in the hemisphere.125

Oas fails
OAS fails funding and internal divisions
Lee 12 (Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor, Council on Foreign Relations, The Organization of
American States, April 13, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/latin-america-and-the-caribbean/organization-
american-states/p27945)
Questions of Effectiveness and Relevance CFR's Shannon K. O'Neil says the OAS's role as a forum for regular, high-level discussions on issues
facing the hemisphere is one of its major strengths. Several other analysts have praised the Inter-American Human Rights Commission as a
crucial, objective platform for human rights litigation. However, many state leaders and policymakers have also heavily
criticized the OAS for its institutional weakness. Christopher Sabatini, senior policy director for the Americas Society/Council
of the Americas, says the OAS as a political entity "has declined precipitously in recent years." One of the
OAS's major administrative constraints is its consensus model, which requires a unanimous vote to
make many of its decisions. As political ideologies have diversified within the region, this has made it
difficult for the OAS to make quick, decisive calls to action. The polarization between American states
has also led to one of the OAS's other major shortcomings: its many mandates unrelated to the core
mission. In 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the OAS to streamline its processes (VOA) from what she called a "proliferation
of mandates," noting that the expansion of mandates without proportional expansion of funding made for an "unsustainable" fiscal future.
Election monitoring, one of the OAS's major functions in light of its commitment to democracy, is also restricted by its inability to send election
observers without the invitation of state governments. "They can't condemn a country unless that country wants to be condemned," CFR's
O'Neil says. Nevertheless, she adds, it has become a norm in many member countries to accept OAS monitors, which she says has been helpful.
Within the hemisphere, conflicting views on the OAS's loyalties abound. In the summer 2011 issue of Americas Quarterly, Anthony DePalma
sums up the range of mistrust: "Insulza and the OAS itself are widely seen as being bullied by Venezuela (he denies it), as catering to
[Venezuelan President] Hugo Chavez's friends in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua (evidence suggests otherwise) and, strangely, still beholden to
the U.S., even though Washington seems to have lost interest." Chavez has called the OAS a puppet of the United States; at the same time, in
July 2011, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs passed a Republican-sponsored bill to defund the OAS (ForeignPolicy), on the charge
that the organization supported anti-democracy regimes in Latin America. Various efforts have been made to create organizations to act as
alternatives to the OAS. In 2010, Latin American leaders formed the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), an
organization that excludes the United States. Chavez and Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa have expressed the desire for CELAC to
eventually supplant the OAS, although Sabatini argues that CELAC is "nothing more than a piece of paper and a dream." Many consider another
regional organization, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), to be a useful counterweight to the OAS. UNASUR is
regarded by many observers as a means for Brazil to assert its power in the region. O'Neil argues the organization has been able
to fulfill some duties that the OAS has been less effective in doing, such as successfully mediating between Ecuador
and Colombia during their diplomatic crisis in 2008. Despite the OAS's shortcomings and questions over its continued relevance in the region,
there is a strong call to reform the organization rather than eliminate it altogether.

Say no - cuba

Cuba says no 2009 proves
BBC 9 (British Broadcasting, Co. Cuba rejects OAS readmission, June 8, 2009,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/caribbean/news/story/2009/06/090608_cubaoasupdate.shtml)
The Cuban government has formally rejected a decision of the Organisation of American States
allowing it to rejoin the group. Last week the OAS voted overwhelmingly to end the communist island's suspension from the organisation. The Cubans are claiming the vote as a victory over
the US, but after years of demonising the organisation they are unwilling to rejoin. Formal confirmation that Cuba will not return to the
Organisation of American States came in a Declaration of the Revolutionary Government published in communist party newspaper Granma. Cuba thanked Latin American and Caribbean countries for defending its right to rejoin.
But, it said the organisation had long supported Washington's hostility towards Cuba and that the country
preferred to retain its independence. OAS: The door is still open OAS Assistant Secretary General, Albert Ramdin, told BBC Caribbean that " the door still remains open for when Cuba
is ready to engage." He said the Cuba rejection of the OAS readmission offer was not a slap in the face, in response to a question put by BBC Caribbean. "I think its important for Cuba to realise that the OAS is different today from
what is was in 1962," Ambassador Ramdin said. Cuba was suspended from the OAS in 1962, at the height of the Cold War. US relations The US had initially wanted any change dependent on movement on human rights and
democracy. In the end it supported what was a compromise vote lifting the ban but calling for talks over readmission. There have been some improvements in US Cuban relations with new presidents in both countries. President
Barak Obama has lifted restrictions on Cuban Americans visiting and sending money home. His Cuban counterpart, Raul Castro, recently agreed to a US request to resume direct talks on migration issues and offered to extend these
to include anti narcotics and hurricane disaster preparedness. But, according to a BBC correspondent, it is proving a slow process and on the major issue of lifting the decades old trade embargo Washington is still insisting that
Cuba must first show signs of reform.

Cuba hates the OAS seen as a tool of us imperialism
BBC 12 (British Broadcasting, Co. Cuba eyes Americas Summit place, but not OAS return, February
15, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17053827)
Cuba has said it will attend the Summit of the Americas in Colombia in April if it is invited, but has no desire to rejoin the Organisation of American States (OAS). The
Summit usually involves only OAS members, and Cuba was suspended from the organisation in 1962 because of its communist system. But other left-wing Latin American countries say it should be invited. The US says Cuba
should remain excluded because it is not a democracy. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla said at a meeting of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (Alba) - a left-wing regional group - that Cuba was willing to
attend the summit. "We know that this summit cannot be for the Americas if it unfairly excludes Cuba," Mr Rodriguez said. But he added that Cuba would not return to the OAS,
calling it "an organisation that has served to promote domination, occupation and aggression," and "a
platform for the US to attack and plunder Latin America and the Caribbean". The US has said Cuba's non-participation in the OAS is not
necessarily a barrier to taking part in the Americas Summit. But it insists Cuba should only be invited if it agrees to implement democratic reforms.

Say no Venezuela

Venezuela says no and cp links to net benefit cp is seen as interventionist embassy
statement proves
Venezuelan Embassy 5-2 (Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Venezuela Rejects
Interventionist Statements by OAS Secretary Insulza, press release, May 2, 2013, http://venezuela-
us.org/2013/05/02/venezuela-rejects-interventionist-statements-by-oas-secretary-insulza/)
The government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela roundly rejects the disproportionate and interventionist
statements made by the Secretary-General of the Organization of A merican S tates Jos Miguel Insulza, that were
offered in clear and broad coordination with spokespersons of the Department of State and the White
House, and through which, based on exaggerations of the lamentable brawl that occurred some days ago in the Venezuelan parliament as a
result of provocations by the opposition, the attempt is made to generate the perception of a political crisis in
Venezuela that would merit their mediation. The Bolivarian government considers these attempts
absolutely cynical and immoral , particularly when they come from those who have minimized or ignored the grave acts of fascist
violence that occurred on April 15 of this year and in subsequent days as a consequence of the failure to recognize the electoral results by the
losing candidate and his call to rage and violence after the April 14 elections. These spokespersons have said little or nothing about the political
assassinations of Venezuelan citizens, all of them supporters of the Bolivarian revolution: Jos Luis Ponce, Rosiris Reyes, Hender Bastardo, Luis
Eduardo Garca, Rey David Snchez, Johan Antonio Hernndez, Henry Rangel, Keller Guevara and Johnny Alberto Pacheco. The same is true
regarding the more than 70 wounded Venezuelan men and women that were the victims of political and social intolerance by opposition
leadership. It should be recalled that even deputy Julio Borges, secretary-general of the opposition party Primero Justicia, on April 15 called to
bring death to the revolution, the consequence of that statement being the burning of seven houses of the principal democratic political party
in Venezuela, which is the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Spokespersons have said little or nothing about the promotion on behalf
of opposition leaders of a xenophobic policy against Cuban doctors and health professionals that offer services to the most humble people of
Venezuela. Despite this complicit and immoral silence by some governments and international
organizations, Venezuelas democratic institutions, together with the conscience and political
maturity of the people developed by the eternal commander Hugo Chvez, were able to exorcise the
anti-democratic and violent behavior by of the opposition, so that today we enjoy a country full of political and
institutional stability with a legitimate and legal government directed by the president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro
Moros, which has gone out into the streets to attend to the social demands of our people. Finally, the government of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela firmly rejects any attempt to promote any mediations that are not required, and is willing to
confront with all the force it is permitted as an independent country any intervention by those who
do not possess the moral authority to speak of dialogue, democracy and peace, for they have plagued the world
with war, violence and death in the 20th and 21st century. The immense democratic majority of the Venezuelan people and the institutions of
the state have the legal and moral force to guarantee the political stability, peace and independence of the nation of Simn Bolivar.

Venezuela says no see the OAS as a tool of American dominance Chavez example
proves
Forero 10 (Juan Forero, Washington Post's correspondent for Colombia and Venezuela, Organization
of American States report rebukes Venezuela on human rights, Washington Post Foreign Service,
February 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/24/AR2010022401884.html)
Chvez has railed against the OAS as beholden to the interests of the United S tates. Venezuela
declined to cooperate with the commission, its members said, prompting commissioners -- jurists and rights activists from
Antigua, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador and the United States -- to hold hearings and seek out Venezuelan activists and politicians to
compile information about the suspected abuses. The report asserts that the state has punished critics, including anti-government television
stations, demonstrators and opposition politicians who advocate a form of government different from Chvez's, which is allied with Cuba and
favors state intervention in the economy. The report outlines how, after 11 years in power, Chvez holds tremendous influence over other
branches of government, particularly the judiciary. Judges who issue decisions the government does not like can be fired, the report says, and
hundreds of others are in provisional posts where they can easily be removed. The commission said some adversaries of the government who
have been elected to office, such as Caracas Mayor Antonio Ledezma, have seen their powers usurped by Chvez. "The threats to human rights
and democracy are many and very serious, and that's why we published the report," Paulo Srgio Pinheiro, a member of the commission who
specializes in Venezuela, said by phone from his home in Brazil. Chvez did not have an immediate response to the report. But in a phone
interview Wednesday morning, Roy Chaderton, Venezuela's ambassador to the OAS, said the commission had
become a " confrontational political actor instead of an advocate for defending human rights."
Chaderton said the commission had shown support for a failed 2002 coup against Chvez -- an accusation denied by the commission -- and
charged that its members had dedicated themselves to weakening progressive social movements in Latin America. "They have become a mafia
of bureaucrats who want to play a bigger role in the efforts against Venezuela's government," Chaderton said. The commission, in compiling
the report, incorporated responses from Venezuelan authorities to written questions. The government says it permits protests and opposition
groups, while focusing much of its energy on improving Venezuelans' standard of living. Pinheiro said the commission recognized the
government's progress in areas such as reducing poverty. But Pinheiro said that there can be "no trade-off" between political and economic
progress. He said the commission's hope is that the Venezuelan government will make improvements based on the report's recommendations.
"This report, instead of isolating Venezuela, is a call for Venezuela to come on board," Pinheiro said. Others who track developments in
Venezuela, though, said Chvez is prone to a disproportionate response when criticized. After releasing a critical report about Chvez two years
ago, Jos Miguel Vivanco, the Americas director for Human Rights Watch, and a fellow investigator for the group were detained at their Caracas
hotel and escorted by armed agents onto a Brazil-bound flight. "It would be nice to think the Chvez government would pay attention to the
report," Vivanco said. But he noted that the president had "responded to all such criticism by attacking its critics,
often using conspiracy theories and far-fetched allegations to distract attention from their own
human rights practices."

Links to ptx

Links to ptx OAS funding debate ignites a firestorm GOP and dem backlash is
guaranteed
Rogin 11 (Josh Rogin, columnist, The Cable, a Foreign Policy blog, his columns appear bi-weekly in The
Washington Post, House committee votes to defund OAS, column, The Cable, July 20, 2011,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/20/house_panel_votes_to_defund_the_oas)
The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted Wednesday to end funding for the Organization of A merican
S tates, with Republicans lambasting the OAS as an enemy of freedom and democracy. The one-hour exchange over the GOP
proposal to cut the entire $48.5 million annual U.S contribution to the OAS was the beginning of what
promises to be a long and contentious debate over the fiscal 2012 State Department and foreign operations authorization
bill written by Chairman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.). Democrats accused the Republicans of isolationism and retreat
because of the proposal, and the Republicans accused the OAS of being an ally of anti-U.S. regimes in Cuba and
Venezuela. The OAS Charter was signed in 1948 at a conference led by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall. Lets not continue to
fund an organization thats bent on destroying democracy in Latin America, said Rep. Connie Mack (R-Fla.), the
head of the subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and the sponsor of the amendment. You will support an organization that is destroying
the dreams of the people of Latin America. Other Republicans piled on, accusing the OAS of supporting Cubas Fidel
Castro, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. The OAS
is an enemy of the U.S . and an enemy to the interests of freedom and security, said Rep. David Rivera (R-Fla.). He compared
U.S. support of the OAS to a scene from the movie Animal House in which a fraternity pledge is being
paddled on his rear end and asks for more punishment. How much longer will we say to the OAS, Please, sir, may I
have another? Rivera said. Panel Democrats expressed frustration with the GOP for forcing a vote that they said would signal Americas
retreat from multilateral engagement around the world. I might offer an amendment to pull out of the world, to build a moat around the
United States and put a dome over the thing, said Rep. Gary L. Ackerman (D-N.Y.). This is getting ridiculous . Ackerman added:
Here we are, for a lousy $48 million, willing to symbolically turn our backs on our own hemisphere.
... This is folly . Its more than folly, its dangerous. And youve got the votes to do it, thats the frightening thing. But what we should be
looking at are opportunities to reach out to the world. Ranking Democrat Howard L. Berman (D-Calif.) pointed out that the United States has
a treaty obligation to pay its dues to the OAS, and he argued that the body has made a positive contribution to progress toward democracy
since the 1960s. The OAS is an enemy? We are really living in two different worlds , Berman said. The defunding
amendment passed 22-20 along party lines.

FTAA CP --- Offense
Human Rights DA
FTAA causes human right violations
Soto, 2003 (Gustavo, The Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C. CIEPAC the Movement for Democracy and Life (MDV)
of Chiapas, the Mexican Network of Action Against Free Trade (RMALC) Millions of Reasons to Say No to the FTAA
http://www.organicconsumers.org/corp/ftaa2.cfm)

The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is planned to be signed in the year 2005. However, by means of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the countries
of the American Continent and even the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP), the implementation of the FTAA is already moving forward. The FTAA will combine
all of the negative effects of the FTAs , and represents the sharp tooth of savage neoliberalism, by
which huge multinational corporations promote and legalize their interests. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the
frame of the rules imposed on the worlds economy, the FTAA is the continental expression, the PPP the regional and a FTA the bi- or trilateral. But none of this
could happen if it werent for the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), who impose structural adjustment measures on the governments of
poor countries that are becoming more and more impoverished. Saying No to the FTAA is not a demand that comes exclusively from the working and rural classes of
the continent. Nor is it just Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) or indigenous people or women. Nor is it the youth or the unemployed alone, or the gay or
lesbian community; nor the defenders of human rights or ecological groups; unions, academics or professionals; political parties that have a l ittle bit of common
sense, a few lucid bishops, other churches or even business-people that also find themselves affected. It is a demand of the whole of society. Arent more than 200
million poor people in Latin America and the Caribbean, a number that keeps growing, sufficient to say Enough Already (Ya Basta)? No single group can
monopolize this cause, because it is the cause of millions of poor people across the entire continent.
What is at stake are the human rights of the continental population. With the FTAA, we all lose . Even
the inhabitants of Canada and the United States, their workers, farmers, students and whichever other sector. Today they try to make us
believe that these neoliberal trade policies are a natural part of human evolution, of the process known as
globalization, and not as the product of the imposition of certain interests against which the world social movement is developing, living and forming alternatives
of inclusive, social and ecologically inclusive and responsible development. The proposals are there, they exist and may have come from the Continental
Social Assembly. Successful alternatives are being carried out and lived today, however some people do not want to admit that another
world is possible and they end up adoring the neoliberal god, or free trade. They also do not want to admit that there
are millions of reasons to reject the FTAA . In this bulletin we outline some of these reasons:
Democracy DA
CP destroys democracy

DESTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY The FTAA takes Chapter 11 of NAFTA to its fullest, granting foreign companies the right to sue
a government if it does not follow the rules of the game, or blocks investment for any reason. That is, even if a restriction is for the benefit or protection of public,
social or environmental health and even if the supposed investment does not comply with the necessary growth requirements,
does not generate jobs, or lead to the purchase of local goods, or generate local or regional
development, etc. All sanitary or environmental regulation, all governmental acts that a U.S. company decides goes against
their potential profits, allows the company to sue that government before an international court
where national laws dont apply. There have already been many lawsuits by companies against governments under NAFTA. The following examples show
us the norm of what will go on under the FTAA if it is not stopped. The funeral chain of the Lowen group sued the United States government for
US$750 million for fraud. The U.S. Ethyl-Corporation sued the government of Canada for US$13 million in damages, since the government had demanded that the company stop using the dangerous gasoline additive MMT, a
known toxin that attacks the human nervous system. A Canadian company, Methanex, is trying to get rid of the prohibition of MTBE, another toxic additive for gasoline, in California, and is demanding that the government pay
US$970 million in damages. Metalclad, a U.S. company, sued the Mexican state government of San Luis Potos for prohibiting them to keep using a toxic waste dump that was damaging both the environment and public health.
They demanded US$10 million from the Mexican government in compensation for the profits that they could have made. In this way, state, departmental, provincial and national laws are becoming
ineffective facing the undemocratic imposition of transnational laws that are dic tated by the very
companies that stand to gain . Even international laws and agreements between states are relegated to the background
by these laws imposed by corporations. Thus, the People are losing juridical sovereignty . In spite of constant calls to open and democratize the politics of trade, FTAA
negotiations have been conducted in secret since the beginning of the negotiation process in 1994. Representatives from hundreds of corporations are involved in the process,
advising the U.S. negotiators and helping them to write the rules. However, neither the People nor civil society are being taken into account in
the FTAA negotiations. This same structure of negotiation-imposition occurs at the Summit of the Americas, where the presidents of the continent meet. Then there are the Ministerial Meetings where
Trade Ministers meet to develop a work plan. At another level we find the Vice-Ministerial Meetings of Trade, which take place every 18 months as a Committee of Trade Negotiations (CTN) and have the job of directing,
evaluating and coordinating the Work Groups and advising the government Trade Ministers. Finally, there are the Trade Group Meetings or negotiations established by the Trade Ministers that collect information about the
current status of trade relations across the American Continent and that take place every 18 months. In total, there are 12 Work Groups: Access to Markets, Public Sector Purchases (which, by the way, is coordinated by the U.S.
and Canadian governments), Small Economies, Investments, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Norms and Technical Trade Barriers, Politics of Competition, Border Proceedings and Rules of Origin, Intellectual Property Rights,
Services, Solution of Controversies and Subsidies, Antidumping Measures and Compensatory Rights. Through these institutions, the business sector has
become the most powerful sector of the continent, and it is the sector that meets with the governments to design
the FTAAs laws behind societys back. NGOs have demanded work groups on the issues of democracy , human and workers
rights, consumer protection and the environment be incorporated, but have repeatedly been denied .

Environmental DA
FTAA Accelerates environmental destruction -- prevents the ability for protection
programs.

The policies imposed by the WB and IMF have, over several decades, caused environmental destruction around the
world. The incorporation of natural resources into the world market has caused overexploitation or these
resources. In 15 years of NAFTA, 15 U.S. logging companies have established operations in Mexico, and
cutting and transportation activities have increased dramatically. In the Mexican state of Guerrero, 40% of
the forests have been devastated in the last eight years, and mass felling of trees has led to soil erosion , which is
destroying the regional habitat . But this is not happening in Mexico alone it is also happening in Canada and the United States. In
Chiapas, the jungles are being rapidly deforested. NAFTA and now the PPP allow immense plantations of monoculture farming of
forest resources, specifically for exportation, which produce climactic change , privatize natural protected areas
and pollute rivers and underwater reservoirs. The experience of Costa Rica, where the government privatized natural protected areas by
selling them to multinational corporations is a scandal that we should be alarmed about. The FTAA will accelerate the degradation of
the environment , by eliminating the right of the governments to pass rules that protect it. It will
place investment over concerns about environmental harm. In the cities of Central America as well as the border zone between
Mexico and the United States, pollution from residues of the maquiladoras and the careless discarding of
chemicals, solvents and other products have increased not only environmental degradation but also
health problems in the local population.

Race To the Bottom DA
CP results in exploitation of workers and devastates small farms

The effort to bind the economies of the Western Hemisphere into a single free trade agreement began at the Summit of the Americas, in December of 1994 in
Miami, Florida. It was at the Summit that heads of state and governments of 34 countries in the region- all nations in North, Central and South America and the
Caribbean except Cuba- agreed to complete negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005. Unfortunately, the public and most Members of Congress
are only vaguely aware this agreement is being negotiated, and their input has not been taken into account. Corporate interests, however, are
actively involved; under the trade advisory committee system, over 500 corporate representatives have security clearance and access to FTAA documents
while only a handful of civil society representatives have been given clearance. The FTAA would accelerate the global race to the
bottom initiated under NAFTA: with the FTAA, exploited workers in Mexico would be forced to compete
with even more desperate workers in Haiti, Bolivia or Guatemala, as multinational corporations
move in and out of the region with ease. This race to the bottom would also be mirrored for small farmers
throughout the hemisphere as the devastating effects of NAFTA on commodity prices and
concentration are amplified.
Small farms prevent extinction
Altieri 8 [Professor of agroecology @ University of California, Berkeley. [Miguel Altieri (President, Sociedad Cientifica LatinoAmericana de
Agroecologia (SOCLA), Small farms as a planetary ecological asset: Five key reasons why we should support the revitalization of small farms in
the Global South, Food First, Posted May 9th, 2008, pg. http://www.foodfirst.org/en/node/2115+
The Via Campesina has long argued that farmers need land to produce food for their own communities and for their country and for this
reason has advocated for genuine agrarian reforms to access and control land, water, agrobiodiversity, etc, which are of central
importance for communities to be able to meet growing food demands. The Via Campesina believes that in order
to protect livelihoods, jobs, people's food security and health, as well as the environment, food production has
to remain in the hands of small- scale sustainable farmers and cannot be left under the control of large
agribusiness companies or supermarket chains. Only by changing the export-led, free-trade based, industrial agriculture
model of large farms can the downward spiral of poverty, low wages, rural-urban migration, hunger and
environmental degradation be halted. Social rural movements embrace the concept of food sovereignty as an alternative to the
neo-liberal approach that puts its faith in inequitable international trade to solve the worlds food problem. Instead, food sovereignty
focuses on local autonomy, local markets, local production-consumption cycles, energy and technological sovereignty and farmer to
farmer networks. This global movement, the Via Campesina, has recently brought their message to the North, partly
to gain the support of foundations and consumers, as political pressure from a wealthier public that increasingly depends
on unique food products from the South marketed via organic, fair trade, or slow food channels could marshal the sufficient political will to
curb the expansion of biofuels, transgenic crops and agro-exports, and put an end to subsidies to industrial farming and dumping practices that
hurt small farmers in the South. But can these arguments really captivate the attention and support of northern consumers and
philanthropists? Or is there a need for a different argumentone that emphasizes that the very quality of life and food security of the
populations in the North depends not only on the food products, but in the ecological services provided by small farms of the South. In fact, it is
herein argued that the functions performed by small farming systems still prevalent in Africa, Asia and Latin Americain the post-peak
oil era that humanity is enteringcomprise an ecological asset for humankind and planetary survival . In fact, in
an era of escalating fuel and food costs, climate change, environmental degradation, GMO pollution
and corporate- dominated food systems, small, biodiverse, agroecologically managed farms in the Global
South are the only viable form of agriculture that will feed the world under the new ecological and
economic scenario. There are at last five reasons why it is in the interest of Northern consumers to support the cause and struggle of
small farmers in the South: 1. Small farmers are key for the worlds food security While 91% of the planets 1.5 billion
hectares of agricultural land are increasingly being devoted to agro-export crops, biofuels and transgenic soybean to feed cars and cattle,
millions of small farmers in the Global South still produce the majority of staple crops needed to feed the planets rural
and urban populations. In Latin America, about 17 million peasant production units occupying close to 60.5 million hectares, or 34.5% of the
total cultivated land with average farm sizes of about 1.8 hectares, produce 51% of the maize, 77% of the beans, and 61% of the potatoes for
domestic consumption. Africa has approximately 33 million small farms, representing 80 percent of all farms in the region. Despite the fact that
Africa now imports huge amounts of cereals, the majority of African farmers (many of them women) who are smallholders with farms below 2
hectares, produce a significant amount of basic food crops with virtually no or little use of fertilizers and improved seed. In Asia, the majority of
more than 200 million rice farmers, few farm more than 2 hectares of rice make up the bulk of the rice produced by Asian small farmers. Small
increases in yields on these small farms that produce most of the worlds staple crops will have far more impact on food availability at the local
and regional levels, than the doubtful increases predicted for distant and corporate-controlled large monocultures managed with such high
tech solutions as genetically modified seeds. 2. Small farms are more productive and resource conserving than
large-scale monocultures Although the conventional wisdom is that small family farms are backward and unproductive, research
shows that small farms are much more productive than large farms if total output is considered rather than yield from a single crop.
Integrated farming systems in which the small-scale farmer produces grains, fruits, vegetables, fodder, and animal products out-produce yield
per unit of single crops such as corn (monocultures) on large-scale farms. A large farm may produce more corn per hectare than a small farm in
which the corn is grown as part of a polyculture that also includes beans, squash, potato, and fodder. In polycultures developed by
smallholders, productivity, in terms of harvestable products, per unit area is higher than under sole cropping with the same level of
management. Yield advantages range from 20 percent to 60 percent, because polycultures reduce losses due to weeds, insects and diseases,
and make more efficient use of the available resources of water, light and nutrients. In overall output, the diversified farm produces much more
food, even if measured in dollars. In the USA, data shows that the smallest two hectare farms produced $15,104 per hectare and netted about
$2,902 per acre. The largest farms, averaging 15,581 hectares, yielded $249 per hectare and netted about $52 per hectare. Not only do small to
medium sized farms exhibit higher yields than conventional farms, but do so with much lower negative impact on the environment. Small farms
are multi-functional more productive, more efficient, and contribute more to economic development than do large farms. Communities
surrounded by many small farms have healthier economies than do communities surrounded by depopulated, large
mechanized farms. Small farmers also take better care of natural resources, including reducing soil erosion
and conserving biodiversity. The inverse relationship between farm size and output can be attributed
to the more efficient use of land, water, biodiversity and other agricultural resources by small farmers. So in
terms of converting inputs into outputs, society would be better off with small-scale farmers. Building strong rural economies in the Global
South based on productive small-scale farming will allow the people of the South to remain with their families and will help to stem the tide of
migration. And as population continues to grow and the amount of farmland and water available to each person continues to shrink, a small
farm structure may become central to feeding the planet, especially when large- scale agriculture devotes itself to feeding car tanks. 3.
Small traditional and biodiverse farms are models of sustainability Despite the onslaught of industrial farming, the
persistence of thousands of hectares under traditional agricultural management documents a successful indigenous agricultural strategy of
adaptability and resiliency. These microcosms of traditional agriculture that have stood the test of time, and that can still be found almost
untouched since 4 thousand years in the Andes, MesoAmerica, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, offer promising models of sustainability as
they promote biodiversity, thrive without agrochemicals, and sustain year-round yields even under marginal environmental conditions. The
local knowledge accumulated during millennia and the forms of agriculture and agrobiodiversity that this
wisdom has nurtured, comprise a Neolithic legacy embedded with ecological and cultural resources of
fundamental value for the future of humankind. Recent research suggests that many small farmers
cope and even prepare for climate change, minimizing crop failure through increased use of drought tolerant local
varieties, water harvesting, mixed cropping, opportunistic weeding, agroforestry and a series of other traditional techniques. Surveys
conducted in hillsides after Hurricane Mitch in Central America showed that farmers using sustainable practices such as mucuna cover crops,
intercropping, and agroforestry suffered less damage than their conventional neighbors. The study spanning 360 communities and 24
departments in Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala showed that diversified plots had 20% to 40% more topsoil, greater soil moisture, less
erosion, and experienced lower economic losses than their conventional neighbors. This demonstrates that a re-evaluation of indigenous
technology can serve as a key source of information on adaptive capacity and resilient capabilities exhibited by small farmsfeatures of
strategic importance for world farmers to cope with climatic change. In addition, indigenous technologies often reflect a worldview and an
understanding of our relationship to the natural world that is more realistic and more sustainable that those of our Western European heritage.
4. Small farms represent a sanctuary of GMO-free agrobiodiversity In general, traditional small scale farmers grow a wide variety of cultivars .
Many of these plants are landraces grown from seed passed down from generation to generation, more genetically heterogeneous than
modern cultivars, and thus offering greater defenses against vulnerability and enhancing harvest security in the midst of diseases, pests,
droughts and other stresses. In a worldwide survey of crop varietal diversity on farms involving 27 crops, scientists found that considerable crop
genetic diversity continues to be maintained on farms in the form of traditional crop varieties, especially of major staple crops. In most cases,
farmers maintain diversity as an insurance to meet future environmental change or social and economic needs. Many researchers have
concluded that this varietal richness enhances productivity and reduces yield variability. For example, studies by plant pathologists provide
evidence that mixing of crop species and or varieties can delay the onset of diseases by reducing the spread of disease carrying spores, and by
modifying environmental conditions so that they are less favorable to the spread of certain pathogens. Recent research in China, where four
different mixtures of rice varieties grown by farmers from fifteen different townships over 3000 hectares, suffered 44% less blast incidence and
exhibited 89% greater yield than homogeneous fields without the need to use chemicals. It is possible that traits important to indigenous
farmers (resistance to drought, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities
which may not be important to farmers (Jordan, 2001). Under this scenario, risk could increase and farmers would lose their ability to adapt to
changing biophysical environments and increase their success with relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs while supporting
their communities food security. Although there is a high probability that the introduction of transgenic crops will enter centers of genetic
diversity, it is crucial to protect areas of peasant agriculture free of contamination from GMO crops, as traits important to indigenous farmers
(resistance to drought, food or fodder quality, maturity, competitive ability, performance on intercrops, storage quality, taste or cooking
properties, compatibility with household labor conditions, etc) could be traded for transgenic qualities (i.e. herbicide resistance) which are of
no importance to farmers who dont use agrochemicals . Under this scenario risk will increase and farmers will lose their ability to produce
relatively stable yields with a minimum of external inputs under changing biophysical environments. The social impacts of local crop shortfalls,
resulting from changes in the genetic integrity of local varieties due to genetic pollution, can be considerable in the margins of the Global South.
Maintaining pools of genetic diversity, geographically isolated from any possibility of cross fertilization or genetic pollution from
uniform transgenic crops will create islands of intact germplasm which will act as extant safeguards against potential
ecological failure derived from the second green revolution increasingly being imposed with programs such as the Gates-Rockefeller
AGRA in Africa. These genetic sanctuary islands will serve as the only source of GMO-free seeds that will be needed to repopulate the organic
farms in the North inevitably contaminated by the advance of transgenic agriculture. The small farmers and indigenous communities of the
Global South, with the help of scientists and NGOs, can continue to create and guard biological and genetic diversity that has enriched the food
culture of the whole planet. 5. Small farms cool the climate While industrial agriculture contributes directly to
climate change through no less than one third of total emissions of the major g reen h ouse g ase s Carbon dioxide
(CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), small, biodiverse organic farms have the opposite effect by
sequestering more carbon in soils. Small farmers usually treat their soils with organic compost materials that absorb and
sequester carbon better than soils that are farmed with conventional fertilizers. Researchers have suggested that the conversion of 10,000
small- to medium-sized farms to organic production would store carbon in the soil equivalent to taking 1,174,400 cars off the road. Further
climate amelioration contributions by small farms accrue from the fact that most use significantly less
fossil fuel in comparison to conventional agriculture mainly due to a reduction of chemical fertilizer
and pesticide use, relying instead on organic manures, legume-based rotations, and diversity schemes to enhance
beneficial insects. Farmers who live in rural communities near cities and towns and are linked to local markets, avoid the energy wasted and the
gas emissions associated with transporting food hundreds and even thousands of miles. Conclusions The great advantage of small
farming systems is their high levels of agrobidoversity arranged in the form of variety mixtures, polycultures, crop-
livestock combinations and/or agroforestry patterns. Modeling new agroecosystems using such diversified designs are extremely valuable to
farmers whose systems are collapsing due to debt, pesticide use, transgenic treadmills, or climate change. Such diverse systems buffer against
natural or human-induced variations in production conditions. There is much to learn from indigenous modes of production, as these systems
have a strong ecological basis, maintain valuable genetic diversity, and lead to regeneration and preservation of biodiversity and natural
resources. Traditional methods are particularly instructive because they provide a long-term perspective on
successful agricultural management under conditions of climatic variability. Organized social rural movements in
the Global South oppose industrial agriculture in all its manifestations, and increasingly their territories constitute isolated areas rich in unique
agrobiodiversity, including genetically diverse material, therefore acting as extant safeguards against the potential ecological failure derived
from inappropriate agricultural modernization schemes. It is precisely the ability to generate and maintain diverse crop genetic resources that
offer unique niche possibilities to small farmers that cannot be replicated by farmers in the North who are condemned to uniform cultivars
and to co-exist with GMOs. The cibo pulito, justo e buono that Slow Food promotes, the Fair Trade coffee, bananas, and the organic products
so much in demand by northern consumers can only be produced in the agroecological islands of the South. This difference inherent to
traditional systems, can be strategically utilized to revitalize small farming communities by exploiting opportunities that exist for linking
traditional agrobiodiversity with local/national/international markets, as long as these activities are justly compensated by the North and all the
segments of the market remain under grassroots control. Consumers of the North can play a major role by supporting
these more equitable markets which do not perpetuate the colonial model of agriculture of the poor for the rich, but rather a model
that promotes small biodiverse farms as the basis for strong rural economies in the Global South. Such
economies will not only provide sustainable production of healthy, agroecologically-produced,
accessible food for all, but will allow indigenous peoples and small farmers to continue their millennial work of
building and conserving the agricultural and natural biodiversity on which we all depend now and
even more so in the future.

Water Scarcity DA

CP results in water privatization

The FTAA will accelerate the process of privatization of water sources, as well as their distribution
and commercialization systems. This will raise service costs and expel the rural and urban population from
water-rich lands. Access to water will be more difficult for the poor of the continent. When the government
of Cochabamba, Bolivia privatized the water in favor of the U.S. company Bechtel, prices rose between
200 and 300%, causing protests and demonstrations during which protesters were killed and
wounded . The FTAA tries to introduce the logic of the market, merchandise and profits into all aspects
of life. The agreement will produce large extensions of monocultures that use up water, rivers and
water sources and turn jungles and forests into deserts. Eucalyptus and African palm plantations already abound throughout
the region. Privatization of irrigation districts is already being threatened. At the same time, treating investment
as an end will keep governments from impeding the construction of hydroelectric dams by
multinational corporations, which will speed up the destruction of rivers . Many dam-building
projects are being planned all over the continent: Mexico, Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, etc. The
paper industry and others require lots of water to be able to produce, which is why they are looking
for ways to move to regions where there is an abundance of this resource that all of us need in order
to live. International Paper, Kimberly Clark, Coca Cola and other multinational corporations are also behind water privatization.

FTAA CP --- Defense
2AC Say No --- Status Squo Divisions
Status squo governmental development strategies ensure say no.
Higginbottom, 2013 (Andy, principal lecturer of international politics and human rights at Kingston University in the UK. He is also secretary of the
colombia Solidarity campaign. Latin American Perspectives http://www.neiu.edu/~dgrammen/2013HIGGINBOTTOM.pdf)

At the turn of the millennium it was fitting to present Latin America as a continent poised at the crossroads, trying to decide the direction it
would take. At issue was whether countries would accept, reject, or accommodate the United States grand plan, the Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas (FTAA). The agreement was defeated, but the strategic threat behind it has taken on new
forms . While the specific indecision of that historical moment has passed the rift that it fostered has
continued to grow as each government determines its development strategy
2AC Say No --- Generic
Political opposition throughout LA too the FTAA
Blake, 2009 (Charles, Law review THE DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN VENEZUELA AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FTAA PROCESS
http://studentorgs.law.smu.edu/getattachment/International-Law-Review-Association/Resources/LBRA-Archive/15-1/SMB107.pdf.aspx)

Yet, regarding the FTAA agenda, it is also important not to overstate the shift away from the market in Latin
America. A slim majority of the regions citizens continue to favor the market as the best option for the irrespective countries. Furthermore, the current
presidents that have emerged from Latin Americas leftward swing have decidedly diverse economic
platforms . Some welcome a substantial role for market forces, while others (like Hugo Chavez) stridently criticize the
market at most opportunities. And still others position themselves somewhere in the middle between those two poles. One
characteristic, however, is shared by all of these leaders, a ferocious critique of the inadequacy of the social safety
nets in place when Latin American economies shifted from state capitalism toward market capitalism during the
1980s and 1990s
2AC Say No --- Argentina
Argentina --- Theyll use it as a scapegoat
Daremblum, 2011 (Jaime, Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson's Center for Latin American Studies, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the United States,
professor at the University of Costa Rica, Has Argentina Joined the Chvez Bloc?, March 2011 http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ArgentinaFinal.pdf)

Nstor Kirchner took office at a precarious moment in Argentine history. The country was still recovering from a disastrous financial crisis and currency
devaluation that had occurred in 2001 and 2002. Like other Argentine leftists, Kirchner blamed the economic implosion on neoliberal,
free-market policies implemented during the 1990s. But this argument was totally unpersuasive. As journalist Michael Reid explained in his book
Forgotten Continent, What killed Argentinas economy in 2001 was not neoliberalism or the free-market reforms, but a fiscal policy incompatible with the
exchange-rate regime, and a lack of policy flexibility. Indeed, Contrary to many claims, Argentinas policy mix was in direct
contravention of the Washington Consensus. Moreover, the reforms that helped pull the country out of crisis were actually neoliberal
initiatives championed by Roberto Lavagna, who served as Argentine economy minister from 2002 until 2005. The New York Times correctly described Lavagna as
the main architect of the Argentine recovery. Nevertheless, Kirchner promoted a false storyline about the crisis, and he fired
Lavagna in 2005. For Kirchner and his supporters, the Argentine default was attributable to U.S. style policies, and the solution was
massive government spending and heavy-handed intervention in the economy. Kirchner borrowed heavily from the Chvez playbook, with its
emphasis on populism, class warfare, and fierce denunciations of private enterprise. He nationalized the postal
service, the largest water utility, telecommunications, and railways, among other things. Kirchner also took a somewhat authoritarian approach to
Argentinas legal institutions and independent media. Meanwhile, he pursued warmer relations with Caracas and remained cool toward Washington. The 2005
Summit of the Americas left no doubt about his hostility toward free-market economics and the
United States, or about his willingness to indulge the antics of his Venezuelan counterpart. Held in the Argentine resort city of Mar del Plata, the summit
became a carnival of violent anti-U.S. demonstrations and Chvez-led rallies. The Venezuelan radical addressed tens of thousands of supporters at a soccer stadium
close to the summit. He brazenly declared that the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would be buried in Mar del
Plata. (Each one of us brought a shovel, a gravediggers shovel, Chvez said.) Celebrity protesters included the former Argentine soccer star Diego Maradona. As
the Washington Post reported, Hundreds of protesters had traveled through the night from Buenos Aires in a mass pilgrimage l ed by Maradona. Carrying signs
comparing Bush to Adolf Hitler, the protesters chanted in unison as they filed into the stadium: Bush, the fascist! Bush the terrorist! During the formal
summit negotiations, Kirchner strongly opposed the FTAA and helped scuttle its adoption . His role in torpedoing
the free-trade plan drew criticism from Mexican president Vicente Fox, a robust FTAA advocate. Kirchner responded to this criticism by suggesting that Fox was a
U.S. lackey. Chvez also called him a puppet of the empire. Later that month, the Argentine and Venezuelan presidents held unity 3 talks and signed multiple
energy pacts, with Kirchner agreeing to support Venezuelas entry into Mercosur, the South American trade bloc. Kirchner and Chvez also discussed future energy
projects and the creation of a Latin American investment fund.

2AC Say No --- Brazil
Brazil --- 2005 proves they were crucial in causing the FTAAs demise.
Erikson, 2010 (Daniel, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs, Inter-American Dialogue, The Centre for International
Governance Innovation, The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?, Working Paper No. 46)

Brazil, with the worlds fifth largest population and tenth largest economy, is similarly interested in a realignment of global power that recognizes its political and
economic heft. Unlike Venezuela, however, it has been careful to ensure that its pursuit of this goal does not veer into open conflict with the US. Indeed, Brazilian
President Lula enjoyed one of the warmest relationships with President Bush of any Latin American leader, and the personal rapport between Obama and Lula has
been even warmer (see Marinis, 2010). Still, Brazilian opposition to the FTAA helped fuel its demise in 2005, and the
country has clashed with the US in world trade talks as a leader of the G77 group of developing countries that includes China, India
and South Africa. Brazils aggressive bid to win a permanent seat on the UN Securiy Council has led Lula on a global tour to garner support for the countrys global
aspirations. Brazilian diplomacy has focused on positioning Brazil as a leader in world affairs ready to hold the US
at arms length when necessary (see Simpson, 2010).
1AR Say No --- Brazil
Brazil will rally opposition to prevent South American involvement in the FTAA
Ramirez, 2005 (Shana, COHA Research Associate, The FTAA: A Recipe for Economic Disaster? http://www.politicalaffairs.net/the-ftaa-a-recipe-for-
economic-disaster/ The FTAA: A Recipe for Economic Disaster?)
Since then, both internal and external opposition have threatened the progress of the FTAA as industrialized
countries, such as the U.S., and underdeveloped countries, like many of those to be found in Latin America, continue to clash over
pivotal trade issues. While developed nations, namely the U.S., advocate greater protection of intellectual
property rights and expanded trade in services to better protect their economic interests, less developed nations have
concentrated on ending U.S. agricultural subsidies and freer trade in farm produce. Both questions could
have significant consequences in Latin American countries since they can neither afford to pay the
royalties attached to intellectual property rights, nor can they compete with U.S. government-subsidized agricultural
products. While the U.S. has acted as the de facto spokesman for servitor nations such as Chile and multiple Central American countries in advocating
ratification of the FTAA, Brazil continues to challenge these efforts through its own perceived role as a regional leader. Rather than
succumbing to Washingtons enticements, Brazil has used its political and economic clout to thwart
efforts to incorporate South America into the FTAA. The emerging regional superpower has done so by focusing much of its
attention on MERCOSUR, a free trade agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, that stands to expand further as some of its rapidly
widening base of associate members may become full members in the near future. The 2004 agreement between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community of
Nations (CAN), comprised of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, to end all import tariffs among member nations for the next fifteen years
demonstrates the strengthening bond between Latin American countries and the growing influence of MERCOSUR as a
regional power. This bond created further obstacles for FTAA ratification at the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in
Cancun, Mexico. There, Argentina and Brazil led a group of developing nations against the U.S. and its supporters in
advancing an alternative WTO agricultural proposal that called for more concessions on subsidies from wealthier nations, without requiring increased access to their
own agricultural markets. As a result of trade discrepancies, the Cancun talks collapsed, and in 2004, FTAA negotiations were suspended, spurring a division that has
and will likely continue to inhibit the Bush administrations ratification efforts.

2AC Say No --- Venezuela
Venezuela
Pelzman, 2011 (Joseph, Department of Economics @ George Washington University US-Regional Agreements with Latin America - The Long and
Unsuccessful Saga of CAFTA and the FTAA http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/jpelzman/Working%20Papers/US_Regional_Agreements%20with%20Latin-
America_01_2011.pdf)

Most Latin American leaders generally support the establishment of a hemispheric free trade area, believing that an FTAA will help bring about
greater prosperity, competition, and entrepreneurial activity. But there are a number of critics like Venezuela , which is
one of the main opponents to globalization and free trade agreements. They claim that the United States
will benefit the most from the arrangement by demanding further opening of Latin American markets to U.S. goods while
following a protectionist course43 for politically sensitive U.S. industries such as steel and agriculture.
2AC Say No --- 2013 Summit
2013 Summit of the Pacific Alliance proves
Galardy, 2013 (Anubis, Editor in Chief @ Digital Granma International, Pacific Alliance: Return of the FTAA?
http://www.granma.cu/ingles/ouramerica-i/6jun-Pacific.html)

THE Summit of the Pacific Alliance, comprising Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Peru, which took place May 23 in Cali, Colombia, left clear its
pretension to become the new economic and development organization for Latin America and the Caribbean, within
a framework of the free circulation of goods, services, capital and persons among its member states. The idea of former Peruvian
President Alan Garca, formalized in Chile in 2012, the implementation of this new regional mechanism has generated rejection, criticism
and distrust . Argentine political analyst Atilio Born defined it as a political-economic maneuver on the part
of Washington to retrieve its lost influence in the region , after the 2005 defeat in Mar del Plata of its grand
strategic project, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In other words, the plan is to build a kind of contra-insurgency or reactionary corridor to
counterbalance the radical or moderate left in the region, Born emphasized. Peruvian researcher Carlos Alonso agrees with this perception. For him, the
Alliance is also a resurgence of the failed FTAA, this time in an undisguised neoliberal version .

2AC Say No --- Anti-FTAA
Anti-FTAA
Bello, 2005 (Walden, professor of sociology and public administration at the University of the Philippines Diliman, as well as executive director of Focus on
the Global South, ORIGINAL FTAA VISION SCRAPPED AS PEOPLE POUR INTO MIAMI FOR ANTI-FREE TRADE PROTEST http://focusweb.org/node/193)

Miami, Nov. 20. The United States will try to paint the Miami meeting of the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) as a success, but the
reality is that the anti-FTAA side has pulled off a victory. This was the assessment of movement leaders as
thousands of protesters from all over the Americas converged on this city for Friday's March for Global Justice and the Miami-Dade Country police
mounted a massive show of force to intimidate the opposition. Protesters not Intimidated That the people were not cowed was evident at the
"Gala for Global Justice" on the evening of Wednesday, November 19. Opposition to the FTAA and people coming together for "another world" was the
theme of event, which featured a program of music and speeches from activists from throughout the Americas. Representing the US
labor movement in the program, Leo Girard, president of the United Steelworkers Union, declared, "We will not let them steal our
sovereignty. This is not just about trade but also about investment and privileges for greedy investors and financiers. This fight is a fight for our children and
grandchildren." He singled out the contribution of student activists against sweatshops, telling the story of how earlier in the afternoon, "on the way to
Guzman Park to attend the People's Forum, we saw a group of students surrounded by cops and searched. And guess what, hundreds of steelworkers
surrounded the cops and told them to let the students go. And they did." And that brought the crowd to its feet.

2AC Say No --- Suspicion
Countries will say no --- suspicion of US intentions
Luxner, 2009 ( Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat, What the World Wants From Barack Obama,The Washington Diplomat
February 2009, http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6304:what-the-world-wants-from-barack-obama&catid=974:february-
2009&Itemid=259

Latin America U.S. relations with Latin America, currently at an all-time low, have nowhere to go but up with the
inauguration of Barack Obama as president, although the area of free trade may be a notable exception . In late 2008, both
Venezuela and Bolivia expelled the U.S. ambassadors to those countries as Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez
continued to heap verbal abuse on Bush and the United States in general. Washington has also seen its historic
influence in the region decline substantially , with inroads by new economic powers such as Russia, China
and even Iran. In late November, Russian warships arrived in Venezuela for a series of military exercises, marking Moscows first show of naval force in the
region since the Cold War. At the same time, the regional powerhouse Brazil remains deeply suspicious of Obamas
views on free trade. The president-elect supports taxing Brazils sugarcane-derived ethanol, which is
more competitive than U.S. corn-based biofuels, and Obama has been openly critical of pending free
trade deals with countries such as Colombia and Panama a position that will probably be hardened by the
current economic crisis. Furthermore, chances that negotiations over President Bushs long-cherished dream of a Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) will be resumed are minimal , because few South American countries seem to be
interested in that process. The Mercosur trade bloc, led by Brazil and Argentina, has proven to be far more popular
and effective yet another sign of Washingtons diminishing influence throughout the region.

1AR Say No --- Suspicion
There is zero support for the CP --- Fear of losing sovereignty.
Ribeiro, 2008 (Gilberto, Centro de Estudios Econmicos para America Latina BRAZIL AND THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA))

The opposition to the FTAA has not only existed in South American nations, but is evident in the
United States as well . Jasper (2004) contends that the opposition exists because of the belief that the creators of the FTAA document have the
intention of building an international plan that would override the governments and national independence of all nations under the
umbrella of the FTAA (p. 21). Jasper (2004) states that the ministers of the FTAA have prepared plans that would allow the FTAA governing body to preside over such issues as environment, labor, wages, health care, education,
foreign aid, welfare, housing, taxation, investment, agriculture, narcotics control, immigration, border control, counter-terrorism (p. 21). Essentially, this would mean that all elements
of society in the countries that participate in FTAA would cease to be governed by their own constitutions and cultural beliefs, but
rather would be subjected to the governance of an international board that would control the lives of people
within each nation signing the FTAA agreement (Jasper, 2004, p. 21). Jasper (2004) voices his thoughts that the scope of the FTAA is challenged because it impacts the sovereignty of nations and the
identity of populations that have struggled to create their own way of life and their own cultural independence (p. 21). If FTAA is ever implemented, it is believed, there will be a new rule within these
nations that obliterates sovereignty and provides for world domination by powers unknown (Jasper, 2004, p. 21)

Ideological opposition to the FTAA
Ortiza and Tajesb, 2009 (Jaime, Division of International Programs and A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business at Texas A&M International
University, Maria, Department of Languages and Cultures, College of Humanities and Social Sciences at William Paterson University of New Jersey The SLEPT
Aspects of the Free Trade Area of the Americas http://www.craig.csufresno.edu/International_Programs/JC/IJB/Volumes/Volume%2014/V143-3.pdf)

Furthermore, FTAA negotiations have basically stalled since 2003 due to a rising ideological opposition at national and
hemispheric levels for outlining a process that would redefine multilateralism. Lately, countries like Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Venezuela have made clear that conditions for establishing the FTAA are not simply there and have rather
pursued their own alternative regional schemes. Others which include Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have entertained themselves in
more conventional strategic bilateral deals until the World Trade Organization (WTO) completes its round of negotiations. Hence, the broader
debate on regional integration requires advancing a more holistic approach to contextualize the significance of the FTAA in a multidimensional fashion.

2AC CP Links to the Net Benefit
The CP links to unilateralism --- they dont want the FTAA
Getz, 2011 (Matt, International Arbitration Paralegal at Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP Acknowledging the Americas
http://cpreview.org/2011/10/acknowledging-the-americas/)

Nevertheless, the United States no longer possesses the political capital to act without regard to each nations
interests and political environment. In the past, the Latin American countries were viewed as junior partners; the US would
paternalistically exploit the regions perceived weaknesses to make policy demands. The seniorjunior partner
dynamic is now a relic of the past . Recent history offers an illuminating negative example: the Bush administrations failure to
bring the FTAA to fruition. The proposed agreement ignored the rejection of boundless
neoliberalism throughout Latin America, disregarded the regions existing institutions of economic
integration, and paid no attention to fundamental differences in the conditions between countries.
For the US to maintain a contribution to policymaking in the Americas and to counteract the steady emergence of new actors like
China in the region, its diplomacy must be smarter.

2AC Links to Politics
CP Links to politics

However, such harmonization would require inter alia augmenting Canadian obligations in NAFTA and
unraveling politically sensitive compromises on FTA origin rules for textiles, clothing, and agricultural products. Such a
result is highly unlikely. While it is conceivable that a more limited outcome could balance US and LAC
interests, the trade benefits resulting from such a modest undertaking would not seem sufficient to justify the
political cost /risk of going back to Congress for another vote on these pacts. For Congress to approve
changes in existing US trade barriers of interest to Brazil and other Latin American countries, US negotiators need to receive concrete
commitments that open access to those markets for US exporters and investors. In short, the FTAA has to be a big deal, or the deal wont fly.
2AC They Wont do the Plan
Latin American countries wont agree to do the plan --- they dont want to give any
concessions.
Saguier, 2012 (Marcelo, FLACSO-Argentina, Relaciones Internacionales / International Relations, Faculty Member Free Trade Area of the Americas
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9780470670590.wbeog221/abstract;jsessionid=A15A97C578EC290CFACD584A7A8AC48B.d01t02?deniedAccessCustomi
sedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated=false)

This trade integration project raised a series of concerns which explains why it could not be materialized. First , FTAA
negotiations stumbled over the reticence of the U.S. to commit to the liberalisation of its agricultural
subsidies and antidumping measures , and of some Latin American countries (particularly those of MERCOSUR) to
agree on rules in the areas of government procurements , intellectual property rights , investments
and services. In both cases, the U.S. and the MERCOSUR countries were reluctant to give concessions in these
sensitive areas in the context of an FTAA agreement, preferring in turn to negotiate these issues in the WTO. Second, the FTAA project
faced great domestic opposition in most countries among trade unions and various social sectors that
represented the would-be losers of trade liberalization. The FTAA did not contemplate a compensation mechanism to mitigate the negative
distributional effects on vulnerable sectors. Trade integration could exacerbate the extreme asymmetries in the levels of
development that already exist between and across countries of the continent. Only the largest and most competitive sectors and
companies in the region, mainly from the U.S., could benefit from this kind of integration. In this sense the FTAA would have reinforced
the control of a small number of firms over most sectors of the continents economies, undermining the rule of law and
the policy autonomy of states to promote sustainable forms of development (Barenberg and Evans 2004, Gill 2002). Resistance to the FTAA project was
bolstered with the formation of a broad-based continental transnational coalition that pursued alternative approach to integration (Saguier 2007).

Consult Brazil --- Defense
2AC --- No Relations Net Benefit
CP isnt sufficient --- Brazils interests extend beyond consultation
Sweig, 2013 (Julia, Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies Global Brazil Initiative
http://www.cfr.org/projects/world/global-brazil-initiative/pr1471)

The Global Brazil initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) addresses the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of Brazil's emergence as a world
power. Brazil's rise is today well established. Yet even as global challenges increasingly form part of the U.S.-
Brazil agenda, the United States faces a glaring deficit in its understanding of Brazil's interests and
influence . The scope and importance of Brazil's emergence extends well beyond the U.S.-Brazil relationship.
To enhance the quality of public and policy debate on the bilateral and global dimensions of Brazil's rise, the program includes research, consultation, publication,
and outreach exploring Brazil's international agenda.

1AR --- No Relations DOHA/UN
Relation Collapse inevitable --- DOHA, subsidies, and the UN
Meyer, 2013 (Peter, Analyst in Latin American Affairs @ Congressional Research Service Brazil-U.S. Relations
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)

Although Brazil and the United States share a number of common goals, the countries occasionally divergent national
interests and independent foreign policies have led to disagreements on trade and political matters. Some
long-running disputes include the stalled Doha trade negotiations and Brazilian opposition to U.S.
cotton subsidies . Additional differences have emerged in recent years, many of which have centered on the countries
approaches to foreign policy. In 2010 and 2011, for example, Brazil used its temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council to
advocate engagement with internationally isolated regimes like Iran, Libya, and Syria, rather than sanctions, which it views
as a prelude to armed conflict. Some analysts and policymakers assert that Brazils increasing global prominence and involvement
on an array of issues will inevitably lead to disputes with the United States and that managing those disputes in a transparent and
respectful manner will be crucial to maintaining friendly relations moving forward.86
1AR --- No Relations Net Benefit --- Iran
Iran tanks relations
Hakim, 2011 (Peter, Foreign Service Journal Brazil and the U.S.: Remaking a Relationship
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2679)

The most serious clashes between the U.S. and Brazil are likely to arise over global, not regional, issues. What
has most exasperated Washington and unsettled bilateral relations in recent years is Brasilias close, supportive
relationship with Iran, including strong and growing economic ties. U.S. officials were encouraged that President Rouseff swiftly changed Brazilian
policy in one crucial area: Her government will no longer ignore or downplay Tehrans repression, and she has instructed her United Nations ambassador to endorse
an investigation of human rights abuses in Iran. However, it remains uncertain how Brasilia will deal with other U.S. concerns,
such as Irans support of terrorist groups and its unrelenting threats toward Israel.

CP Doesnt Solve
Brazil wont engage --- too many structural differences.
Univ ersity, Member of the advisory Council of the Brazil institute at the Woodrow Wilson international Center for Scholars Brazil and the United States: The Need

The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably
out of the question for both countries . In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention
with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States.
Moreover, despite Brazils importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical
assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazils interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the
need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic
agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences
even when interests are similar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of permanent consultation in an effort to
coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies
often may differ.

Unilateralism
2AC --- Unilateralism Inevitable
US unilateral action is inevitable ideology committing to multilateralism in one
instance doesnt solve
Bass 9 (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, Unilateral vs. Multilateral Engagement: A Scenario-Based
Approach to Guiding Americas Future Foreign Policy, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p.
3-6, April 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)
According to Stewart Patrick of the Center on International Cooperation, Americas preference for unilateral engagement is
explained by three inherent characteristics. First, a sense of exceptionalism that evolved from
Americas founding principles has had major influence on US policy goals and engagement.5 As a champion
for liberal principles the US is motivated to cooperate with others to promote universal prosperity and security. Nevertheless, American
exceptionalism also motivates the US to protect its values, and avoid any engagement that might
infringe upon its sovereignty.6 In fact, Americas preoccupation with safeguarding sovereignty yielded a predilection for
unilateralism throughout the 1900s.7 Not until it attained great power status, did the US consent to multilateralism. Specifically, after World
War II, the US employed multilateralism to rebuild a favorable international framework that would counter the strategic threat posed by the
Soviet Union. The Cold War dominated foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the Cold War period foreign policy
was dictated by the executive branch and focused primarily on the threat of nuclear war. The President committed to multilateral agreements
where it served national security.8 Second, the system of checks and balances built into the US Constitution
produced a separation of powers that limits the governments ability to endorse multilateral
commitments. Specifically, two-thirds of the Senate must support a treaty for ratification to occur. This construct makes it
possible for political minorities to hinder multilateral engagement.9 For example, during World War I the
Republican-controlled Senate rejected US membership in the League of Nations despite President Wilsons support.10 Third, Americas
current hegemonic status provides incentive to act unilaterally because multilateral engagement is
based on rules and norms rather than power. As a consequence, the weaker power is strengthened from the benefits of
multilateral cooperation, while the stronger power endures the costs of restraint.11 For example, a given UN convention limiting freedom of
action with regard to national instruments of power could severely hamper achievement of US strategic objectives putting vital interests at risk.
On the same note, such a convention could embolden a weaker adversary to hold US interests at risk without fear of retribution assuming that
the US will limit its response within the restraints of the convention. Here it is helpful to note specific instances in which the
three inherent characteristics aforementioned have guided US action on foreign policy issues. To begin
with, the US has used military force without United Nations (UN) approval. While the US did attain UN approval for
coalition intervention to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Americas frustrations with the impediments of multilateralism lead it to act without
UN approval in the 1998 bombing of Iraq and the 1999 ousting of Serbian forces from Kosovo. These interventions set a
precedent for the future unilateral use of force.12 Indeed, the US demonstrated its most dramatic
disregard for international institutions in March of 2003 when President Bush unilaterally issued Saddam Hussein an
ultimatum despite a lack of UN support. While the US made an effort to gain UN authorization for the war in Iraq, there is little doubt that the
administration had already determined its intended course of action prior to submitting the UN proposal for use of force in February of 2003.
Americas praiseworthy efforts to gain UN support was a multilateral endeavor that initially suppressed anti-American sentiments.13 However,
the Bush Doctrine and Americas failed efforts to restore stability in post-war Iraq proved US policy to be shortsighted resulting in
international opposition to US policy and calling into question traditional east-west alliances.14 At the same time, the US has increasingly
restricted support for UN peacekeeping operations since its failures in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.15 In addition to declining
peacekeeping assistance, the US is also to blame, in part, for the shortcomings in UN effectiveness due to its neglectful financial provisions. In
fact, the UN case is only one of several instances in which the US demonstrated a disregard for international institutions through its waning
financial support during the 1990s.16 The US has also shown disregard for multilateral cooperation on global
security issues. Regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, the US Senate approved the Chemical Weapons Convention in
1997 only after insisting on exemptions that diluted its impact, and in 1999 the Senate weakened nonproliferation efforts and snubbed allies
when it rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.17 Also in 1999, the US upset international order by espousing support for a national
missile defense (NMD) system that violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Risking global strategic stability, in 2001 the Bush
administration pushed Moscow for modification of the ABM Treaty, and subsequently withdrew unilaterally in 2002 after failing to secure
Russias cooperation.18 Yet another example of US indifference to multilateral cooperation with regard to WMD threats involves the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Ineffective due to the absence of a compliance scheme, international efforts to implement verification
procedures were rejected by the Bush administration in 2001on the grounds that they did not coincide with US national interests.19 US lack
of interest in multilateral cooperation on global security issues extends beyond WMD threats. For
example, in 1997 the Clinton administration refused to sign the Ottawa Convention banning antipersonnel land mines. Despite the fact that the
convention has been signed by 156 countries, the US still declines accession arguing that land mines are a critical component of its Korea
strategy.20 Also in 2001, a draft UN convention to limit small arms trafficking was singularly opposed by the Bush administrations insistence on
curtailment of the conventions terms. The US was uncompromising on limits to civilian small arms ownership and advocated several other
changes that weakened the draft convention.21 The US has held many countries to high standards on international issues such as human rights,
technology transfers, antiterrorism, and narcotics interdiction, imposing punishment on those that fail to meet US standards.22 Nevertheless,
the US has frequently been wary of taking on international commitments. For example, the US has declined to ratify the International Criminal
Court and the UN conventions on the Rights of the Child and Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. While the US was a major
contributor to the growth of multilateral free trade initiatives in the 1990s, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World
Trade Organization, it engaged in unilateralism to gain market concessions.23 The US has also been reluctant to embrace
conventions that address world-wide issues such as global warming, evidenced by the Bush administrations refusal
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change in 2001.

2AC --- Unilateralism Kills Heg
Multilateralism kills heg and doesnt solve the case solutions are watered down
Bass 9 (James E Bass, Major, US Air Force, Unilateral vs. Multilateral Engagement: A Scenario-Based
Approach to Guiding Americas Future Foreign Policy, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, p.
8, April 2009, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA539615)
Proponents of unilateralism note a number of problems with multilateral cooperation. First, multilateral arrangements limit the
power that the US derives from its hegemonic status by restricting the range of options available to
act on issues of national interest. The argument follows that a unilateral engagement policy affords the US full sovereignty and
the freedom to pursue courses of action devoid of outside interference. Second, multilateral institutions subject the US to
free-riding and buck passing.28 In the first instance, the US is subject to the costs of participation as an
endowed contributor, while free-riding members benefit from the resources supplied by the US,
incurring no costs of membership. In the second case, inefficiencies in the institution develop when responsibilities are not clearly
delegated. Often a key contributor in multilateral institutions, the US bears the burden of responsibility because lesser
members neglect to assume a contributing role. Third, practicing multilateralism usually requires
consent of all members when engaging institutional issues. This course of action not only prevents
members from acting swiftly, it also results in watered down policy that limits goals and restricts
means for implementation. Lastly, opponents of multilateralism suggest that involvement in international institutions weakens US
sovereignty by subjugating it to institutional governance.29 Unilateralists fear this arrangement could mandate US
engagement on issues which the US has no interest.

2AC --- Multilateralism Fails --- NPT
Multilateralism Fails --- Nuclear prolif proves its ineffective

A slightly different, but compatible reason for the paucity of theory concerning multilateralism is that there may be so little multilateralism in
practice (Caporaso 1992: 600). Nam (2009b: 135) asks, when was the last time you heard that a large number of
countries agreed to a major international accord on a pressing issue? His answer: Not in more than a decade .
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is now a teenager. The same is true of the last major multilateral security agreement: the extension
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And even it has not deterred India, Pakistan and North Korea joined soon
by Iran? from becoming nuclear powers. Equally compatible is the view that multilateralism is now an historical
artifact of the Cold War. By many accounts, interest in multilateralism first developed when it came to be
seen as a solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It also became a battle cry for the non-aligned
movement, led by Nehrus India, which sought to develop a 3rd way alternative to alignment with one or the other superpower. The Cold
War is now history. Attempts at multilateral arms control have been, on balance, ineffective . Indias desire to
promote multilateralism seems a rather low priority of its foreign policy.
1AR --- Multilateralism Fails --- Non-State
Nonstate actors prevent effective multilateral efforts

Alternatively, non-state actors may act as roadblocks to new multilateral agreements, such as on climate
change , or even seek to scupp er existing cooperation as, for example, on whaling. In any event, there is widespread consensus that non-
state actors have become progressively more assertive in demanding a voice at the top decision-
making tables (Thakur 2002: 270). Research on multilateralism thus may need to depart from the time-honoured, state-centric assumptions of IR
scholarship
1AR --- Multilateralism Fails --- Leaders
Multilateralism fails --- Latin American distinct political scenarios prevent
effectiveness.

What's more, research must investigate political space beyond the structural features of the international
order. Politics at the domestic level of individual states especially great powers historically have facilitated or
debilitated multilateralism. As Ruggie (1992: 592) argues, a pronounced shift toward multilateralism in economic and security
affairs requires a combination of fairly strong international forces and compatible domestic environments
2AC AT: Soft Power
Soft Power fails and rival nations solve the impact
Neu, 2013 (Richard, senior economist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch
http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-punch.html)

The way America flexes it economic muscle around the world is changing dramaticallyand not necessarily for
the better. In 1997, facing a wave of sovereign debt defaults, the International Monetary Fund asked its member states to pledge lines of credit to support
Fund rescue efforts. The United States and other nations did as asked. In 2009, the United States responded again to a call for expanded credit lines. When the Fund
sought yet another expansion of these credit lines last April, 39 countries, including China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, and Saudi Arabia, stepped up. Even cash-
strapped Italy and Spain pledged support. But the United States was conspicuously absent. A pledge from the United States requires
congressional authorization. In the midst of last spring's contentious debate over U.S. government deficits and debts, support for an
international body was a political nonstarter . Where the United States had previously demonstrated international leadership, other
countriessome of them America's rivals for international influencenow make the running. This is a small example of what may be a
troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming inability of its political system to resolve these
matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S. soft power and on the country's ability to
shape international developments in ways that serve American interests. The most potent instrument of U.S. soft
power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics
profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or
90 percent of GDP. The United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a bad time.
The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's
GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for
international trade. And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the University of Chicago have
demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policyon the rise as a result of political squabbling over U.S. fiscal policy
typically foreshadows slower economic growth. Investors may be growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state
of U.S. fiscal policymaking. From the beginning of 2002, when U.S. government debt was at its most recent minimum as a share of GDP, to the end of 2012, the
dollar lost 25 percent of its value, in price-adjusted terms, against a basket of the currencies of major trading partners. This may have been because investors fear
that the only way out of the current debt problems will be future inflation. The dollar has also given up a bit of its dominance as the preferred
currency for international reserves among advanced economies. And the renminbi appears to have replaced the dollar as the reference currency for most of East
Asia. (The good news is that in recent years U.S. banks have increased their share of deposits from foreigners, mostly at the expense of banks in London.) More
troubling for the future is that private domestic investmentthe fuel for future economic growthshows a strong negative
correlation with government debt levels over several business cycles dating back to the late 1950s. Continuing high debt does not bode well in this regard.
But perhaps the worst consequences of U.S. debt are actions not taken. U.S. international leadership has been based, in part, on
contributionspolitical and financialto major institutions and initiativesInternational Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world
better. But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts at coordinated international action on climate change.
Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new free-trade area. And warnings from the
U.S. treasury secretary to his European counterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get your own
house in order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent that it can no longer
lead? And what about unmet needs at homehealthcare costs, a foundering public education system, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A
strained fiscal situation that limits resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot
be helping with any of these matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified action abroad or the
moral authority to lead other nations by example? America's fiscal predicament is serious. The problem has become obvious in the last few years, but it has been
building for decades, largely the result of promises of extensive social benefits without a corresponding willingness to pay for them. Putting U.S. government
financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a number of yearsincreased government revenue and painful reductions in government
outlays, almost certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal adjustment and constrained government
resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet further.

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