Crime, Law & Social Change 38: 239266, 2002.

2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

239

From Cali to Rotterdam: Perceptions of Colombian cocaine

traffickers on the Dutch port
DAMIN ZAITCH
Department of Criminology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
(e-mail: zaitch@frg.eur.nl)
Abstract. This article explores the subjective perceptions of Colombian traffickers on the
port of Rotterdam. I identify those factors that, from their perspective, make Rotterdam (and
the Netherlands) a low-risk area for cocaine import into Europe. It is argued here that while
economic factors and human resources have a central impact on their key decisions, law
enforcement risks tend to be secondary or to vary very much regarding actor and type of
intervention. The article is based on my recently completed ethnographic (PhD) research on
Colombians involved in the cocaine business in the Netherlands, and on my current research
on cocaine smuggling through the port of Rotterdam.

Introduction
The port of Rotterdam is considered to be, at least by academic researchers, law enforcement agencies and drug traffickers themselves, one of the
main entrance doors for South American cocaine into the European market
(Bovenkerk, 1995; Fijnaut et al., 1996; Farrell, 1998; DIC, 2000; Zaitch,
2002). While cocaine export-import operations through this port involve various business modalities (regarding initiative, financial risks and human resources), several smuggling methods (in ship, containerised and so on) and a
variety of infrastructure arrangements (collusion with legal/illegal firms), the
import of large quantities of cocaine in the Netherlands has been mainly organised by Dutch, Colombian, Surinamese and Antillean drug entrepreneurs
(Zaitch, 2002).
In contrast with the other 3 groups, Colombian drug traffickers (traquetos)
do not belong to a large, local (native or immigrant) social group.1 So the
question arises: why is it that Colombian traquetos manage to keep an important share of the import business? In other words, why do they venture
to go to the Netherlands? In this article, we intend to tackle these questions
by exploring their subjective perceptions on local conditions, in particular on
those around the port of Rotterdam. How do different actors involved differ
in their views? More important, to what extent do these perceptions influence
their decisions?

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D. ZAITCH

Tracing their views on a number of issues concerning the port of Rotterdam, we aim to describe how Colombian traffickers assess risks, opportunities
and obstacles. An attempt is finally made to establish their main reasons to
use (or avoid) the port of Rotterdam to import cocaine into Europe.

Entrepreneurs and employees perceptions

Cocaine traffickers are illegal entrepreneurs that trade their illegal goods in
innovative ways, investing capital and choosing amongst available means to
maximise profits and minimise risk (Arlacchi, 1986; Haller, 1990: 208; Van
Duyne et al., 1990; Krauthausen and Sarmiento, 1991: 37). Also seeking
status and recognition, they tend to use symbolic and material resources in
a rational fashion. The same can be claimed about their employees: though
much more constrained, their actions reflect the tension between skills and
opportunities, potential incomes, and the high risks involved in their performances.
Thus, as rational actors, their perceptions about particular resources or
business environments in this case the port of Rotterdam can be regarded
to a certain extent as risk assessments (Cornish and Clarke (eds), 1986; Bruinsma and Van de Bunt, 1993). Even when they manage limited or false
information that eventually lead them to make wrong decisions, or even
if they face risk in fateful moments by appealing to fortuna (Giddens, 1991:
113), cocaine entrepreneurs and employees do calculate chances of success
and failure and deploy strategies to minimise risk. Their views on particular
issues can be revealing to understand their performances.
However, we should be cautious about taking for granted a simplistic relationship between perceptions and action, certainly in a research involving
non-systematic ethnographic material in which traffickers reflect about past
operations and other people.
While asking people about the port of Rotterdam, we came across with at
least three dilemmas that attest a complex relation between traffickers views
and actions. Firstly, in many cases these views were post hoc rationalisations (fabrications, justifications, self-aggrandizement, exaggerations) rather
than actual reasons in a decision making process. This seems particularly
evident, as we will illustrate, in some risk-taking traffickers views on law
enforcement and controls. Secondly, some informants who posed their views
about the port had no choice to do otherwise, their views having a limited
impact on the course of action they undertook. This is, for example, the case
of unskilled employees who only follow orders and have no say in operational
decisions. Finally, we found a couple of cases in which perceptions of high

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241

risks were actually loaded with positive connotations, actions reflecting both
risk enjoyment and risk minimising strategies.
In what follows, perceptions will be, as much as possible, presented in
their interaction with performances, so they can reveal more about the traffickers social world.
Another problem refers to the diversity of people interviewed. Colombians involved in the cocaine business in the Netherlands do not form a
single, homogeneous social or cultural group. Either performing as entrepreneurs, intermediaries or employees, they vary very much in terms of social
backgrounds, economic resources and criminal involvement, facing of course
different personal and financial risks.2
Their views about the port reflect, to a certain extent, these differences.
Some people performing as mulas (air couriers), boleros (body-packers) or
cocaine importers only engaged in air operations were unfamiliar with it, so
they are not addressed here. Others involved as local wholesalers or peripheral helpers did have statements about Rotterdam despite their experience
with the harbour was superficial or second-hand. Still others in Colombia
referred to the port, but were actually never there.
In general, and partially in line with earlier research findings in Britain
(Dorn et al., 1998: 547), we can conceive three groups of Colombian traffickers that differ a great deal in terms of risk perceptions:
a) Capitalised exporters (cut out numbers 1)
These are Colombian cocaine entrepreneurs who can decide on key logistic
and operational matters (including destinations); who do not travel to the
Netherlands; and who count with enough financial resources to pay others
to perform the most risky tasks, and to cover costs in cases of eventual loses.
In that sense, they can be considered risk-adverse.
b) Non-capitalised exporters, importers and distributors
(hands on numbers 1)
These risk-taking entrepreneurs lack enough capital or contacts to remain
well insulated. They make decisions and operate in the Netherlands (temporally or permanently), but still are able to transfer risk to more vulnerable
employees or subordinates. However, they are often close to the cocaine
loads, and can run into trouble if the operation is busted.
c) High-risk employees (hands on numbers 2 or 3)
These are potentially expendable employees who take the most risky tasks,
including smuggling, unload, stashing or money handling in the Netherlands.
They do not make key decisions on destinations, run very high personal risks

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Economic Infrastructure
Logistics

D. ZAITCH

l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l

Human Resources

l
l

Strategic Enforcement
Risk (planner/organiser
capture)

Tactical Enforcement
Risk (drug seizure and
capture)

l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l

Goods transported
Transport and communication
Import-Export arrangements
Use of legal companies
Financial situat ion of export er
Facilities for money laundering
Entrepreneurial mentality

In ternational meeting point

Availability of partners / clients
/ employees
Importer/Wholesaler at unload
point
Access to corruption (police,
customs, harbour personnel)

Police investigation
Border controls
Sent ence length and prison
condi tions
Profits forfeiture

Police controls
Customs controls
Sent ence length and prison
condi tions
Social climate (toleration,
indiff erence, levels of violence)

Figure 1. Accumulative list of aspects handled in Colombian discourses and performances.

and have no room for mistakes or failure. They depend on others, are often
misinformed and constantly feel at the edge of the sward.
Although all informants addressed in this article belong to groups b) and
c), we will present whenever possible more general and secondary material
collected in Colombia about the port.3

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243

The issues considered

Colombian cocaine traffickers referred to many issues, which we have organised under four categories: Economic Infrastructure, Human Resources,
Strategic and Tactical Enforcement Risks.4
Figure 1 should be regarded as an accumulative list of (interdependent)
aspects handled in Colombian discourses and performances. The list has only
a heuristic value: each informant often referred to only some of the listed
topics, neglecting or claiming ignorance about others. Moreover, no attempts
have been made to operationalise or quantify the answers. The fact that these
issues are interdependent (for example positive experiences regarding logistics or human resources are often translated into less fear against drug
enforcement) also encourages keeping some arguments rather descriptive.
However, some trends and striking agreements are perceivable throughout
the traffickers accounts.

Economic infrastructure and logistics

In general, all sorts of informants stressed the large volume of the port
in terms of traffic and capacity as a main reason to use it for smuggling
cocaine. A recurring argument pointed out that larger settings and trade movement decreased the risk of interception, since the illegal merchandise was
easier to conceal. Informant #4:
Yes, I know about the scanner, but there are thousands of containers
going everyday. Do you know why drug trafficking goes through Rotterdam? It is very efficient. They do not want to control more; no, they
say that they are investing in making things easier for those using the
port. When the things arrive, the machines put them very fast on boats
or whatever. In other places, the boat has to wait, and while waiting,
anything can happen. And now they want to make it even faster (laughs)!
The port was well known in Colombia, even by people who were never
abroad. Amongst peripheral connoisseurs of the illegal business circuit in
Colombia, it had a good reputation and was usually referred as thoroughly
praiseworthy. Most believed it to be the largest port in the world, which was
not actually the case. Informant #12:
I dont know the Netherlands to tell you why [cocaine goes to the Netherlands], but as far I heard, looks like there are more containers than
people there.

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Hands on importers and distributors in the Netherlands, and also drug couriers imprisoned tended to share this picture.5 Let us see some of the specific
issues referred by informants.
Goods transported
If the cocaine is exported along/hidden in legal merchandise, the nature and
packaging of the traded legal good influences decisions about destination
points. This is clear for example in cases involving South American fresh
fruits, deep-freeze juice, dehydrated food or containerised cargos, especially
in the modalities of rip-off (cocaine inside the legal cargo, but disconnected
from thus misusing the legal importer or carrier) and when legal exporters
or transporters offer their infrastructure to illegal exporters to move cocaine
aside their cargo. In both cases, it is the routing and handling procedures
of legal goods what actually determines how, when and where the cocaine
should be rescued or unloaded. Informant #3:
This man in Ecuador was exporting frozen fruit juice to Germany, so he
said he could bring some coca, but he wouldnt do it for less than 100
kg. . .
Everybody agreed that all sorts of goods have been used to smuggle cocaine
by sea, but that a key issue is the way in which the goods are handled when
entering or staying in the port (Bill of Lading, type of container, and so on).
Some informants claimed that the traditional exports (especially containerised food, fruits and frozen juice) are a safe option if they are handled by
established shipping lines or container groupage services. Not only containerised cargo (especially in reefer containers) but also dry bulk (e.g. coal,
asphalt, aluminium and agro-bulk from various South American ports) is
considered useful as potential carrier, especially to Rotterdam. Others had
however a different opinion. One informant explained us that you have to
avoid both using
too obvious goods such as tropical fruits and too ridiculous things such
as microchips from Peru. . . The safest way is to move it around so you
dont know that that container comes from Colombia. And if you move
around, there is a good chance you pass by Rotterdam.
In some smuggling modalities, the good transported is not so relevant in determining the routing. This is the case for example of shippers-own containers
controlled by cocaine exporters or importers: they are primarily concerned
about disguising routes and adulterating container contents, outlook and bill
of lading. The goods transported are only adapted to other circumstances

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(contacts in transshipment areas, etc.) as they are in the cases of cocaine sent
by post or air cargo. Finally, some modalities involve no legal shipment at all,
for example, when the cocaine is hidden in/under the ship, liner or smaller
vessel.
Transport and communication facilities
A second issue mentioned by drug traffickers is the good transport and communication infrastructure connected to the port of Rotterdam. The port is well
known for its efficient and quick handling. Informant #5 explains:
Yes, you can say that a small place is better, but they just keep sending
to Rotterdam. Sometimes you loose something, as a month ago when
the divers did not find it and I had to pay. I also take risks. Nobody
knows what happened, but the thing disappeared. See, what is good in
Rotterdam is that it goes fast, you take the thing and you sleep elsewhere
[the cocaine container or load can be quickly moved to stash, DZ]. The
mess is often made before, but if you follow the rules, the papers are in
order and nobody sold you, man, you crown [safe arrival of cocaine
shipment, DZ].
Trans-oceanic smugglers (mala fide ship owners) adapt their routes (which
they offer to cocaine entrepreneurs) to risk minimising considerations, targeting for example ports and transshipment areas with a long tradition of
contraband, especially where they can buy authorities and harbour employees, or have access to strong local groups. In this way, Rotterdam does not
seem to be the best option for this type of smuggler (Spain far ahead).
However, local cocaine traffickers considered that good communication
infrastructure (train connections, good highways, public and mobile telephone
facilities, and so on) are central for business performance, especially since the
cocaine trade consists of connecting people who live and work far from each
other. Informant #1 explains about local communication facilities:
X goes to Antwerp very easy, he goes and comes back the same day.
Public transportation here, no, you cant complain, the train and the tram
are safe. One is accustomed to larger distances, and the routes there
[in Colombia] are like hell. Here you know what you can expect, for
example, yesterday they announced the train delay.
One person mentioned that in the Netherlands it was very easy to buy mobile phones and throw them later to the channels. The most important
remarks were however on the excellent network of intermodal (sea-rail), inner shipping (sea-river) and especially TIR truck (sea-road) transportation,

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which allows to easily move the illegal merchandise to further destinations in

Europe. Since most cocaine passes Rotterdam in transit, this infrastructure
is vital for traffickers.
When asked about the geographical position of the Netherlands for establishing cocaine lines through the port of Rotterdam, nobody seemed to take
this factor into serious account. The Netherlands is objectively well placed for
receiving cocaine on a sea coast, close to other centres and markets, halfway
between West and East extremes although other neighbouring places share
the same features, and countries such as Spain or Russia have even longer and
wilder coasts, with larger non populated and inaccessible areas better suited
for smuggling and concealing cocaine loads. However, these considerations
were absent in illegal entrepreneurs discourses. Distance does not seem to
play an important role for cocaine exporters, for whom transportation costs
are very small regarding the potential benefits. All efforts are devoted to reduce risks, and if that implies a particular shipment should enter through a
remote port in Russia before returning to Germany, so be it. Of course, some
Colombians living legally in the Netherlands enjoyed the fact that they could
easily move to other parts of Europe, but in general, geography seemed to
play a secondary role in Colombian dealers minds. One informant explained
in this regard that Spain was far better positioned for cocaine import from
South America.
Some people emphasised the many options and routes available to smugglers. Informant #12:
You know all the possible methods, you can go everywhere. The cocaine
gets sick before getting there, it travels all over.
Import-Export arrangements
Cocaine lines to Rotterdam are often shaped by the possibilities to construct
or use import-export firms located in South-America and the Netherlands. Although they can vary from actual up- and unload spots, cocaine entrepreneurs
positively regard places with more facilities to set up these firms. We should
not forget however that for many of them, import-export arrangements are
again a difficult and far away option: they smuggle the cocaine on the ship
with or without supervision.
Colombians use and set up import-export firms to enter cocaine through
the port. They either construct tapaderas (import-export front stores) or rely
on existing firms.
Informants indicated several pros and cons regarding the first option. On
the one hand, own front stores allow for a better operational management
in terms of timing and unload. They can also be easily adapted to cocaine

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exporters and importers needs, especially in terms of goods transported,

routing and storage. Moreover, some people claimed to lack contacts with
existing firms, so they were forced to set up their own bridgeheads. One
informant explicitly argued that the conditions imposed by the local Chamber
of Commerce to open up a firm are not very restrictive.
On the other hand, they also indicated various problems and risks. The
first limit refers to visibility. The volume of Colombian firms6 or legal
businesses run by Colombians engaged in import-export in the Netherlands
is extremely small, therefore fake companies cannot be so easily concealed
behind other legal Colombian affaires. The main Colombian imports passing
through Rotterdam coal, coffee, food and fruits are mainly in the hands
of non-Colombian enterprises, so new, small companies run by Colombians
are priority and easy targets for customs and the police. In fact, most people
claimed to recognise front stores straight away. Informant #25:
There was a paisa [Colombian from Antioquia] playing football a couple
of years ago, he lived in The Hague and every day he took the train to
Rotterdam. He said he worked in the import-export firm of his father, I
think that was true. He said that the business was doing well, that they
were very glad, and so. Well, he was detained between Brussels and
Rotterdam with 10 kg and one million floros [gilders] (. . .) Look, when
somebody tells me that he has an import-export, I smell dirty business.
I also know another paisa, and he said he was importing blue-jeans
[laughs]. . . he worked for people in Medelln. . . he got 8 years and is
now in Leeuwarden but he keeps denying, he wont talk to you.
Next to visibility by outsiders, tapaderas are often considered a source of
problems. Since they hardly handle the legal good they are supposed to be
importing, they often attract the attention of trade partners, neighbours, customs or tax authorities for obvious omissions, mistakes and irregularities.
The people running these companies are usually either short-term minded
disappearing overnight, letting small problems grow, always improvising
or just not the best candidates for the job. In this way, these firms can hardly
cope with the informality and degree of improvisation required in the cocaine
business. Informant #1:
I told you before, people do not think too much in advance. They only
worry if problems arise, and they arrange almost everything along the
way. It can go wrong, but that is the only way in which things can also
end OK.
The use of existing legal import-exports firms, on the contrary, was usually
regarded as a much safer and successful option. Established, active bona fide

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D. ZAITCH

companies are certainly more interesting since they do not catch the law
enforcement eye. Non-Colombian enterprises trading with South America
are usually targeted, especially those importing food, coffee, fruits, flowers,
clothing, minerals or industrial raw materials. In some cases, only special
employees or managers are involved, and the operation is performed behind
the companys back. In other cases, small enterprises in financial need are
approached by drug importers, who tempt the owners with overnight profits.
Informant #19 claimed that the local import-export infrastructure is perfectly
suited for engaging in criminal activities:
Its not just cocaine. Look what happens here with under and overinvoicing, or with ghost subsidised products. They can do what they
want with import-export infrastructure. They talk about us, but they have
a longer experience in doing business, all sort of business.
One Colombian observer also commented that although cocaine entrepreneurs might find it difficult to use large leading import-export companies (relying more often on small firms with a single office and few employees), their
presence and activities in the Netherlands functions as a protective shield:
controls of any sorts become difficult and undesired.
Use of other legal companies
Next to transport and import facilities, a whole range of other legal businesses
whether they are close to the port or not provides cocaine entrepreneurs
with additional services. We can think here not only of freight forwarding,
stevedoring, ship repair, bunker service, storage and warehousing (some companies offering many of these services), but also of car, van and truck rentals,
container rentals and repair, and even hotels or internet cafes. Informant #9
explained that
You dont need corruption with so many legal business around.
Finally, some under-capitalised drug distributors regarded local businesses,
especially some restaurants, bars, retail-shops and coffee-shops in the hands
of Dutch nationals, as suitable enough for covering illegal activities around
cocaine import and distribution.
Financial situation of exporter
The financial capacity of cocaine exporters certainly influences the smuggling
method and the destination of the shipment. Many exporters cannot afford
sea transportation and can only send cocaine by air couriers or post, these

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actors being excluded from the port of Rotterdam. However, the port not
only attracts big players with large investment capacity. Under-capitalised
exporters handling only few kilos and taking greater risks can also find the
port relatively convenient, especially if they bring the cocaine on the ship
(with only a couple of crewmembers/employees involved) or if they rip-off
a legal cargo from South America.
Facilities for money laundering
Several informants indicated that the Netherlands counts with good banking and financial facilities, which without being exceptional or extraordinary
largely fulfil Colombian importers and distributors needs for moving or
sending money away. Despite the fact that the port of Rotterdam offers various financial services, we could not find any Colombian trafficker making
use of them. They stay away from real estate speculation, local investments
and too obvious conspicuous consumption, all this reserved for their performances in Colombia. They also showed serious doubts about using their
local tapaderas to launder money. Cash transportation and money remittances, informant #5 argued, were enough resources well available in the
Netherlands.
We also asked informants about the influence of wholesale prices in deciding destinations. We wandered if higher prices in more remote European
regions (also with sea coasts) did not tempt exporters to change routes. Informant #1:
I dont think the price influences the destination. US$ 24,000 per kilo is
enough when you think about the US$ 1,500 you pay in Colombia. The
price is also arranged in advance, you see. . . If in Finland the kilo costs
more, they are not going to send there if they dont know people. There
are better chances here, more chances to crown in Rotterdam than in
Finland.
However, others claimed that cocaine entrepreneurs react against price
changes or local saturation by re-localising trade activities. Both interviewed
Colombians as well as drug experts agreed that although compared with other
countries Dutch kilo prices are moderate, the Netherlands shows a remarkable
price stability i.e. mild bottle-necks, no over-stocking with a fast
circulation of the incoming cocaine.
Business mentality
Remarks by Colombian traffickers about the economic infrastructure surrounding the port were not only limited to the material dimension. They also

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referred to the long merchant tradition and to general cultural features such
as the existence of a strong business mentality in the Netherlands. Even when
Colombians were negative or derogatory about Dutch people, stressing for
example notions of distance, indifference, meanness or materialist interest,
they also stressed other more positive values around professionalism, efficiency and pragmatism. They were not confined to describe entrepreneurs
only, but seemed to be broader and generalising statements about ordinary
native Dutch people in their daily environment and social interaction. Pragmatism, for example, is a useful attribute for an illegal business based on
flexible arrangements, changing people and strong uncertainties.
While we do not believe that this dimension plays a central role for Colombian exporters, it is traceable in some Colombian importers and distributors
active in The Hague and Amsterdam.

Human resources
Next to the economic infrastructure, proper human resources and social contacts are essential in the cocaine business.7 In the European cocaine trade,
even at national level, individuals and groups from many countries are involved. Countries or regions either with strong local groups that are able to articulate upper and lower business levels for example Galician organisations
as middlemen between Colombian exporters and European distributors or
with a local palette of multinational groups and individuals able to operate
and get in contact with each other for example the Amsterdam international
legal and illegal business scene have good chances to host a significant share
of cocaine transactions.
The cocaine business has experienced during the, 1990s further internationalisation (geographical dispersion, new routes); more integration with
other legal and illegal activities (other drug markets, the weapons industry and
the legal economy); professionalisation (more expertise, strategic management, re- and de-qualification in a dual tendency) and flexibilisation (multiple
tasks, entrepreneurs without enterprises, increased sub-contracting, temporary and unskilled workers) (Zaitch, 2002). These processes only reinforce the
role of social relations in business performances.
Cocaine entrepreneurs and employees were certainly positive about the
social environment found in the Netherlands. They had many remarks on the
nature of these social links.

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International meeting point

The Netherlands offers an international meeting point for potential partners,
operations and intermediations to arise: native Dutch, British, Colombians,
Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks, Yugoslavs, Russians, Israelis, Chileans, Italians, all nationalities likely to be found and linked in the Netherlands. They
manage in various forms privileged access to source, transit or destination
areas, to heroin or weapons trade and routes, or to international financial
resources.
In line with what has been earlier described in other local studies based
on in-depth interviewing with cocaine entrepreneurs (Korf and Verbraeck,
1993; Bovenkerk, 1995) or in more general surveys on the nature of organised
crime, mainly based on judicial files (Fijnaut et al., 1996; Kleemans et al.,
1998), we also found that cocaine traffickers stress the international nature
of the Dutch cocaine scene. Colombian importers, for example, were often
explicitly enthusiastic about the Netherlands as a market place for meeting
people from all over. Informant #27 explains from prison:
Its nice to do business with Italians. Here in prison we get along very
well, we eat together.
In addition, informant #1 claims that
I meet people from places I never imagined before. The owners of the
coffee-shop are Dutch, they did time in Spain. X is from Venezuela.
Then you find Surinamese, Antilleans and Moroccans, all trying to get
something when you enter and tell you are a Colombian. Y sells to
Germans, and so on. It is fantastic, so different people, I learnt a lot
in Amsterdam, I dont want to leave.
Opportunities to meet and establish business relations, for example between
Colombians and Dutchmen, can also develop far from the polders. The Dutch
Antilles, for example, has been repeatedly indicated as a major meeting point
for drug entrepreneurs. Many informants stressed the fact that the place is
strategically located as transshipment area, that a large Colombian community
is living in Aruba, and that mostly Aruba and Curaao are frequented by
Colombian drug entrepreneurs, either for holidays, for family visits or for
business. Many deals are closed there, mostly all Colombian cocaine targeting
the United States and the Netherlands.
Many Colombians liked the fact that English and Spanish were widely
spread business languages in the Netherlands. Although speaking Dutch was
considered an advantage, many transactions are conducted in Spanish, especially with Dutch and Antillean individuals.

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Trust on partners, clients and employees

The degree of trust placed in a particular overseas business partner even
independently of his/her actual position, skills or level of protection is
often essential for transactions and operations to arise or abort. Cocaine entrepreneurs devote time and efforts in trying to reduce the risk of dirty play,
a very common feature in the cocaine business. This risk can include being
stolen, ripped-off, injured or killed by partners, competitors, employers or
employees. Places (countries, cities, ports, neighbourhoods, bars) with trusted
individuals (by reputation, social or ethnic closeness, and so on) are positively
regarded by cocaine traffickers. In fact, many operations are shaped around a
trusted individual overseas. Informant #1:
They sent to Switzerland because they knew that woman there.
Some informants indicated that the Netherlands combines reliable potential buyers and partners (native, local minorities and foreign nationals) with
a large pool of illegal employees and service providers, often Colombian
friends and relatives of cocaine exporters. Working with reliable partners and
employees is essential for Colombian traffickers: it lowers risks concerning
stash, cross-border transportation and cash collection. The port of Rotterdam
is thus not regarded as a mere entrance door, but more generally as a social
setting for business with people living in the Randstad (round formed by the
4 major cities).
Some well-positioned Colombian distributors argued that it was difficult
to find strong and reliable local Dutch partners from the same level. They
often regarded the native drug milieu as polarised between a truly Dutch
mafia, as they call it, with experience in illegal business, locally and internationally well connected, but more interested in less risky soft and synthetic
drugs than in cocaine, and those individuals ready to become business partners, often belonging to the criminal underworld with no connections, no
experience and no infrastructure and capability to handle multi-kilo import
transactions by themselves. Even when a family tie exists between a Colombian and one of these entrepreneurs, they are portrayed as unreliable, coward
and ready to talk with the police if necessary. In other words, it is difficult
for some Colombians to identify native Dutch individuals or groups willing
to engage in large import operations who are neither vulnerable members
of the so called penose,8 or drug enforcers trying to get a grip on them.
The contrast is always made with regions such as Galicia or Southern Italy,
where native illegal entrepreneurs do count with the protection of local power
brokers. However, this gap is solved by the existence of a very dynamic local
market place for multi-ethnic and multi-national groups in which Colombian
entrepreneurs can compete and operate keeping a low profile.

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Importer/Wholesaler at unload point

Operations are often constructed or co-financed by importers, making cocaine lines a matter of decisions at source and destination points. In fact,
many smuggling operations through the port of Rotterdam are organised and
performed by people or groups already active in the Netherlands.
The same can be argued for cocaine wholesalers. Although most of them
engage in transactions already disconnected, even geographically, from the
actual import operation, Colombian first hand distributors are in some cases
involved in the import-export line as co-financers.
Corruption
Passive or active corruption of law enforcement officials, controllers or legal
employees can play a central role in shaping a smuggling operation. Access
to corruption at source (South America) is wide and often not a problem for
illegal entrepreneurs, but corruption at destination points is a scarce precious
resource. Entire operations can be organised around a single contact that
guarantees access to the port.
All informants insisted on the key role of corruption, especially individuals who look the other way around. However, answers were evasive and
vague when they had to come up with concrete details. Some informants
claimed that corruption was there, but Colombians were excluded from the
game. Informant #5:
They wouldnt accept my money. The Dutch mafia, because there is
a Dutch mafia, they can bribe whomever they want. For Surinamese
people it is also easier, but nobody wants to get involved directly with
Colombians, its too hot. When somebody tells me that he has a cop in
his pocket I really doubt, I tell him to watch out.
Others argued that customs and policemen were both unnecessary for the
operation and difficult to bribe, but harbour employees were on the contrary
easily involved. Informant #1:
They dont need anybody in the harbour if the coke is sent for example in deep-freeze or within food through a legal firm. If the businesses involved are tapaderas (front stores), they have a bad reputation
or the route is very hot, then they need to pay people to look the other
way around. How this is done I dont know, but everybody says that it
happens all the time.

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D. ZAITCH

Informant #16, for example, controlled several lines, usually paying baggage handlers, chauffeurs, stevedores and terminal operators. Informant #1
explained the safe position of these employees involved in passive corruption:
If you are only paid to look the other way around, you are safe. If the
thing crowns, you get a lot of money. If it falls down, lets say that
other person found something strange or controlled before, you change
side and nothing can happen to you. You get nothing but you are never
made responsible. They even pay them something anyway to keep the
connection.
In this sense, it might well be that corruption is for some informants a taboo subject: they talk about it in general, but carefully protect their contacts
avoiding any particular finger pointing. However, we believe that in the vast
majority of Colombian related cases, no corruption of Dutch customs and
police takes place, their strategies being primarily oriented to evade harbour
controls.9 Despite this fact, two reasons prompted Colombians to nevertheless
emphasise police and customs corruption. Firstly, claims of access to officials
enhance the reputation, power and status of cocaine traffickers. They impressed others by claiming to have contacts in the harbour. The second reason
for Colombians to stress corruption had more to do with a technique of neutralisation: they reacted against stigmas and bad reputation by condemning
the condemners (Sykes and Matza, 1957).
Informant #3 was a cocaine exporter who came to the Netherlands to
arrange import details and cash handling. He behaved as if he was still in
Colombia. While doing expensive shopping, he always had money ready
to bribe the police. His companion tried to convince him that Dutch police
officers were not the same than in Colombia, but he would not listen. He had
no clue about local customs and police strategies. He regarded every cocaine
shipment as very much based on luck.
All informants agreed that other countries such as Russia, Spain or Italy
have better conditions for the development of collusion between the State,
local powers and illegal enterprises.
Strategic enforcement risks
Strategic enforcement risk is the personal risk of planners/organisers to be
caught, receive a criminal conviction and lose their illegal profits (Dorn et
al., 1998). Many decisions are made in order to avoid being captured or
expropriated. In practice, many well-insulated bosses (cut out exporters or
importers) can transfer this risk to their subordinates, especially regarding
smuggling and unload operations.

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255

All informants in Colombia and the Netherlands agreed that numbers

1 do not hang around the port. They consider it too risky and unnecessary,
sending employees, intermediaries or envoys to either negotiate with harbour
personnel, supervise operations or perform the most risky tasks (especially
the recovery of the cocaine load). Informant #1:
I was yesterday with two traquetos [Colombian cocaine traffickers]. We
didnt know each other. They didnt want to go to pick up something
because they thought it was too risky. They were going to pay somebody
to do it.
Most Colombian exporters do not even cross the ocean, so they have little
strategic risks to fear. Even exporters and importers closer to the action prefer
to stay far from the port. Informant #1 explained about informant #4:
Yes, he gathers information about the port. He has people that go to the
harbour to take pictures for him. He knows some timetables and many
things about the traffic there. Other people do it for him. He wants to
know everything because he is investing a lot of money.
Those who did show concern about strategic risks mentioned four issues of
distress: long-term police investigations, border controls, sentence lengths
and prison conditions, and profit forfeiture.
Police investigation
Undoubtedly, many decisions concerning a smuggling operation (selection
of partners and employees, modus operandi or even daily routines) are based
on the principle of avoiding or neutralising police detection. Attitudes towards the police were rather divergent amongst Colombian cocaine entrepreneurs. Some hands on risk-acceptors operating in Amsterdam and The
Hague seemed to be more concerned about routine, unexpected controls than
elaborated, long term investigation. These people would take extra measures to avoid hot places and conspicuous behaviour, being on the contrary
rather floppy with phone-calls or strangers. Some claimed that the police only
intervened if violence or large amounts of money were involved.
Others felt truly smarter than the Dutch police, playing down their enforcement capacity. Informant #4, for example, believed that he was always
one step head. He felt comfortable with replacing his set of mobile phones
every two weeks. Informant #1:
#2 is now in a comfortable position to measure risks. He is no going
to join operations to gain less than 150,000. He was in jail in Spain,
where his family still lives. He is wanted there and in Colombia, but in

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D. ZAITCH

Amsterdam, he feels like a master in his castle. I myself remember a

spot on television, years ago, after the fall of the big capos.
Still others were more paranoid about possible police infiltration, but they
usually suspected earlier from the DEA than the Dutch authorities. Informant
#5 was far more impressed by the German police.
At this level of strategic risk, both cut out and hands on Colombian
cocaine traffickers always considered the Dutch police as a unity. They had
no idea about differences between the Fluvial police, the Prisma Team, or
even the Foreign police. It can be argued that, in general, planners/organisers
showed either no or a limited concern about being caught in the Netherlands
by the police.
Border controls
Cocaine entrepreneurs took extra-measures when entering or leaving the EU,
what they considered especially risky. However, none of our informants (excluding crewmembers) entered the country through the port of Rotterdam,
which they neither regarded as an entrance for people. Therefore, all perceptions referred to airports. By far, Colombians (involved and not involved
in cocaine trafficking or prostitution) preferred Frankfurt as the airport to
enter the Netherlands. In contrast with Schiphol, a visa was not required for
Colombian visitors with no EU residence permit. Even those traffickers who
travelled clean took several precautions. Some used false passports; others
resorted to various alibis to be regarded as simple tourists or visitors. Informant #10, for example, arrived with a large video camera, tourist information
about Germany, and reservations in an exclusive hotel in Frankfurt.
The car is considered the safest mean to cross the Dutch border by land,
especially from/to Germany.
Sentence lengths and prison conditions
Another variable that can hypothetically influence business decisions is the
risk of facing long prison sentences. People with international capture orders avoid leaving safe countries or areas, and caught or suspected traffickers
spend lots of money in lawyers.
All informants agreed that prison conditions in the Netherlands are less
bad than in countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany and the UK,
let along Colombia or the US. Some also argued that real prison lengths for
Colombians in the Netherlands are shorter than in other EU countries, a fact
that is difficult to attest.10
However, no evidence was found that fear for sentences had any impact
on key decisions regarding operations through the port of Rotterdam. Cocaine

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT

257

entrepreneurs seem again to transfer this strategic risk to their subordinates.

For people organising cocaine export in Colombia, sentences in the Netherlands were not a matter of personal concern. Informant #20, criminal lawyer
from Cali:
Many of the big guys are already imprisoned here [in Colombia]. They
send people with balls in their stomachs, they tip European airports
about their own couriers, they hardly help them with a lawyer or with
money. These people are disposable for them. It doesnt matter what
happens after arrest. They only care about the merchandise, and if somebody is caught, about peoples silence.
Some informants in Colombia declared that exporters only fear extradition
and imprisonment in the US, Europe remaining as a less hostile and threatening environment.
Profit forfeiture
Informants considered the Netherlands a low risk country concerning profits
forfeiture, which mainly has to do with the fact that Colombians do not invest
locally but immediately send the money abroad, either back to Colombia or
to the international financial circuit. In our opinion, Colombians prefer to
invest in places where they either live (Colombia, US), can enjoy conspicuous
holidays and living standards (Caribbean, Southern Spain) or can protect their
businesses from state action (Eastern Europe).
Stronger controls on banks, money exchange and remittance houses are
easily evaded by smurfing smaller quantities or transporting cash. In this
way, Dutch money laundering legislation and enforcement does not seem to
jeopardise the position of the port. Some cocaine importers and distributors
(and their employees) claimed to be more worried about protecting cash from
being stolen by partners, competitors or thieves.

Tactical enforcement risks

Tactical enforcement risk is the risk to the drugs (seizure) and to subordinate
persons (helpers, employees, contractors, and so on, so called numbers 2
and 3). Many decisions of planners/organisers (numbers 1) are aimed
to protect or sacrifice cocaine loads and employees. Risk-accepting subordinates are thus easily confronted with capture as they are paid to do so.
Indeed, whatever the intentions and manifest priorities are, drug enforcement
efforts mainly hit drug shipments, risk-taking entrepreneurs (group b) and
dispensable employees (group c).

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D. ZAITCH

In contrast with strategic risks, which do not seem to play an important

role in Colombian perceptions on the port of Rotterdam, tactical risks are
a main concern for shaping smuggling, unload and transport arrangements
around the port. Daily life is also shaped by their efforts to avoid detection.
Risk-taking informants were certainly worried about police and customs
controls, and about going to prison. Moreover, those operating in the Netherlands had many (positive) remarks on the local social climate.
Police controls
Cocaine loads and employees have to be protected from police intervention.
However, cocaine entrepreneurs can afford being more risk-tolerant regarding their employees. In the case of hands on importers and distributors,
strategies to avoid capture are mixed with all sorts of mistakes and risk-taking
behaviour.
Indeed, a rather ambiguous and paradoxical attitude seemed to prevail
amongst risk-taking entrepreneurs and employees towards police controls. On
the one hand, they either claimed to feel unthreatened by police investigation,
or they accepted or ignored it as a given, natural risk inherent to the illegal
business. Some informants let clear that they feared more the possibility of
being killed or ripped-off by people within the circuit. They all knew and
enjoyed the fact that the Dutch police was invisible on the streets and that
razzias on illegal foreigners were exceptional. Others insisted that the Dutch
police was friendly and nave. Informant #11 explained:
Yea, I laugh about the tombos [police]. I never saw anything more coward, compare it with Colombia! They cant cross the line so easily. They
take their time to build their case, to observe, to follow people for months
before doing anything. It is just gambling to know the space you have to
move, but they just let you work. I dont give a shit about the cops.
Still others supported the idea that many risk-taking actors did not even know
or feel a difference in police enforcement between EU countries. Informant
#1:
They move around Europe and do not change attitudes regarding the
country in which they move. You couldnt believe the stupid mistakes
they do all the time. They only worry when they have the cocaine with
them, otherwise they couldnt care less. They talk openly through the
phone, the same mobile phone all the time!
He also argued:

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT

259

Look #10 for example, for him the Netherlands, France or Germany are
all the same. I told him about the differences, but for him is all the same.
On the other hand, they did take many measures to avoid detection, like talking through secure phones, avoiding hot places or behaving with low-key
profiles. These measures were often aimed to avoid accidental, unnecessary
police control rather than to neutralise long-term, complex, strategic police
investigation. Explanations for this go in two different directions.
First, they were in many cases unable to undertake complicated intelligence counter-measures: they lacked contacts with law enforcers, they simply
ignored the details of police surveillance or they lacked the infrastructure to
neutralise police efforts. Regular claims that professional drug dealers commit amateurish mistakes such as passing sensible information through the
phone, working with the wrong people, and so on should not surprise
anyone: in many cases, risk-taking employees cannot do otherwise.11
Second, they seemed to underplay the existence of pro-active police activities, and did as if the only thing to fear was unexpected detection. Some even
feared that they were followed, but would surprisingly underplay the fact
all together.
Customs controls
Although police controls were in general considered mild regarding personal
capture, police and customs surveillance in the port aimed to intercept cocaine was more seriously taken into account. Smuggling routes and packaging
modalities are shaped to avoid customs or police interception. Depending on
the quantities smuggled, the logistic support and the organisational skills of
smugglers, the chances for interception vary and so the risk perception of
traffickers involved.
Cocaine importers and smugglers were rather puzzling when talking about
their chances to successfully crown shipments. Some tended to exaggerate
risks. For people who failed, exaggeration was a way of legitimising their
situation. For others, it was a good opportunity to gain status or credibility in
front of partners and employers, or to present their turnovers as a deserved
price. Informant #27:
#27: For every 10 people loaded only one can get away with it.
DZ: You mean, the other way around. . .
#27: "No, no, it is extremely dangerous. I mean. . . sooner or later you
fall.

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D. ZAITCH

While most informants agreed that containerised shipments had the best chances
to pass through, some thought that it was easier to enter the cocaine by a
crewmember. Informant #11:
Nobody controls your baggage on ships, you can easily enter whatever
you want. A friend of mine arrived in a big ship, and he could have
entered with a bag full of cocaine.
Most people knew about new techniques to scan suspected containers, but
attitudes were divided regarding their power. Informant #1:
The police invest millions in scanners, and traquetos only 5 in carbon
paper, you see, the one everybody can buy on the corner. Yes, they
research a little bit, but then they solve the problem cheaply and creatively. Well, maybe some really invest a lot in that (packaging and
control avoidance) but most of them just go for the carbon paper, or
other home-made tricks.
Others, such as informant #2, acknowledged that the port was becoming dangerous with this container scanner. However, he ignored how many were they,
where were they installed, and how did they work.
Everybody considered unload operations the most dangerous task, especially when no corruption or import-export firms were involved. If the
operation was tipped-off, many feared the police to intervene at that time. An
unload attempt can easily fail by unexpected controls or, as it is often the case,
by practical and technical mistakes. Problems regarding the unload were also
evidenced by the frequent delays: there were often some days between the
ship arrival and the actual cocaine unloading. Delays were seen as increasing
the chances of detection. They were caused by bureaucratic problems, by mistakes (personnel not showing up or targeting the wrong ship or container) or
by cautious handling (employees discovering police surveillance and waiting
for a safe move). In some cases, fear could delay cocaine unload indefinitely.
Informant #5:
Can you believe that the thing [cocaine freight] arrived to France but
nobody wants to take it out? It is there, and somebody has to go and get
it but it looks like a tough one, I think they will abandon it.
It was repeatedly argued that some cocaine seizures are provoked by cocaine
exporters as sacrifices. Informant #9 explained:
They catch only a small amount. In many containers with bananas from
Colombia or Ecuador, they sneak in some aparatos (cocaine kilo blocks).

COLOMBIAN COCAINE TRAFFICKERS ON THE DUTCH PORT

261

They put some, lets say 4 or 5, to entertain the police and they send
much more after or through another place.
While personal risks during unload can be easily transferred to employees
or subcontracted personnel, the organisers run the financial risks in case of
seizure. Informant #1:
If somebody controls the bajada (unload) he means that he has the contacts to enter the thing and he is fully responsible if the thing se cae
(falls down, is seized).
It can be finally argued that meanwhile cut out cocaine exporters were
not concerned about capture and had many ways to reduce interception risks
(through transshipments, corruption, new routes and modalities, sacrifices,
and so on), hands on entrepreneurs and employees were directly confronted with both securing the merchandise and avoiding capture. For this second
group, Rotterdam was often regarded as hostile.
Sentence lengths and prison conditions
While cut out traffickers only care that their vulnerable subordinates and
employees get a fair trial or keep loyal while serving time, the latter have a
closer experience with the prison system.
Some imprisoned informants claimed to had been fooled, misinformed
about the chances to be caught, or directly double-crossed. Two divers for
example were told that the job was simple and safe. Other employees argued
that they had no choice but acting as they did, feeling the victims of injustice
or desperate situations. One informant claimed that he could not disobey and
he had to move the best he could. In general, all these informants were not
effectively deterred by possible punishments and only realised what did they
imply after going to prison.
However, most employees connected with operations through the port of
Rotterdam were well aware about the possible sentences they faced if caught.
Those who also experienced other prisons outside the Netherlands, clearly
stated that Dutch prison conditions were by far a better option. Informant
#27:
I was three years in Portugal and it was the law of the jungle. Esserheem
looks like a luxury hotel, even compared with De Koepel.
Informant #11:
I survived two years in the famous Section 3 of the Palmira prison, so I
survive anything.

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D. ZAITCH

Most informants also agreed that sentence lengths in the Netherlands for subaltern, unskilled personnel who are not regarded as belonging to a criminal
organisation are shorter than in other places.
Social climate
Many remarks about a less repressive, more tolerant environment to conduct
illegal businesses did not refer to formalised social control agencies (police,
customs, prison), but to the Dutch social climate in a broader sense. Many
Colombians noticed, especially in cities as Amsterdam, a local attitude of indifference regarding what others do, choose or even trade. Cocaine traffickers
positively regard the fact that business conversations can openly take place in
restaurants and bars with few or no reaction from surrounding visitors.
Sometimes, cocaine operations became a matter of public and open celebration. In these cases, fear and secrecy around an incoming ship contrasted
with joy and publicity after the load made it through. When a large shipment crowned successfully, even peripheral people around the local Latino
street circuit would get the news. Nobody would know dangerous details,
but gossips about the quantity and the celebrations would circulate very fast.
Informant #28:
Two months ago it was a big one. There was lots of money for many
people. . . they are still spending the money. You see it everywhere: with
the girls, at the restaurants and at the rumba. We sell more food, some
people close their debts, see, an endless hangover. . .
Finally, the low levels of (street, police or interpersonal) violence in the Netherlands were considered beneficial by several informants. Some had the feeling that cocaine was just another business. Another informant explained
that lower levels of violence allowed people like you and me to traffic
cocaine.

Conclusion: Pondering containers, contacts and control

From most views presented above, the port of Rotterdam seems to be positively considered by Colombian cocaine traffickers. However, their perceptions on particular issues seem to vary according to their position in the
business (organisers or employees) and the degree of insulation they enjoy (cut out or hands on). We argue that the three groups identified in
page 2 i.e. (a) risk-adverse exporters; (b) risk-taking exporters, importers
and distributors; and (c) risk-taking employees tend to stress and perceive
differently the various aspects considered above.

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263

Earlier research has pointed out that the Dutch comparative advantage
for illegal drug import is heavily based on its economic infrastructure and
international business environment.12 While our material supports for a large
extent such a claim, it is clear that human resources (social contacts) and law
enforcement activities (tactical and strategic risks) play an important role for
some cocaine traffickers, shaping their operations through the port and their
daily routines in the Netherlands.
Capitalised Colombian exporters who do not come to the Netherlands
and can invest in large cocaine shipments (group a)13 tend to stress logistic,
economic or human resource considerations when sending a shipment to
Rotterdam. We should keep in mind that they are often those taking the crucial decisions about operational matters. Import/export arrangements often
form the basis for their choices. While they transfer personal risks to others, they only care about tactical enforcement risks attached to the shipment.
They manage to minimise these risks by investing in a particular smuggling
modality, sacrificing cocaine, or even sharing with others the financial risks.
For a second group (b) of Colombian traffickers, that of exporters and
importers taking personal risks and coming to the Netherlands, decisions
seem also mainly based on logistic considerations and on human resources.
Informant #3 explained:
When it happened I was in Colombia, other people bought it and sent the
cash. That fruit company is very reliable and they arrange everything. . .
I know they have new scanners [in plural], yea, nevertheless they did not
find anything. . . See, I think it is too big [the port].
DZ: Why did you send to Rotterdam?
#3: Only because this firm had to put their fruit in Rotterdam. It can be
anywhere, I dont give a shit.
DZ: Do you know anybody there?
#3: No.
However, since many of these people often handle smaller quantities in a
more risky fashion (using less credible firms and limited operational resources),
many informants of this group often put business (social) contacts above logistic factors. This group regards the business environment around the port as
very positive, but complains about a limited access to corruption. In contrast
with the first group, they are not able to transfer strategic risks, so they do
take into account local drug enforcement strategies, moves and possible punishments. In general, this group tends to consider police and customs controls
in the harbour as dangerous (tactical risks to the drugs) but feel rather safe
in the Netherlands. Indeed, many express that the Dutch law enforcement is
tolerant and mild, that police controls are relaxed, prison sentences are shorter

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D. ZAITCH

and prison conditions are better. Many refer to a tolerant social climate with
low levels of violence as very apt to conduct illegal businesses.
Despite this positive assessment on law enforcement that obviously shapes
social behaviours, no informant of this group claims to have considered it
as a reason to use the port of Rotterdam. The way in which enforcement is
experienced is often paradoxical. Routine controls and border surveillance are
often more feared than long-term, pro-active investigation. Paranoid attitudes
coexist with conspicuous and hazard behaviour.
Finally, the many risk-taking employees such as unloaders, divers, chauffeurs or other helpers (group c), operate around the port of Rotterdam exclusively following human resource considerations: they go to work with/for
people who offers them attractive sums of money to take all the personal
risks. They are neither in a position to decide destinations nor to ponder
many alternatives or choices. While they might have a positive view on the
economic position of the port, their primary concern is to do their job, to
protect the drugs and to avoid capture. Law enforcement is for them (from
police controls to prison sentences) a matter of (hard) fact, and they are well
prepared to run far more tactical risks than in the present.
These diverging perceptions can be finally summarised as follows:
Table 1. Perceptions of Colombian cocaine traffickers

cut out
exporters
hands on
exp., imp. &
distributors
hands on
employees

Infrastructure

Human
resources

Strategic
risks

Tactical
risks

++

neutralised

++

++

transferred to
others
not transferred
feel rather safe
not decisive
n/a

feel unsafe
do react to
enforcement
feel unsafe
no choice

Notes

Paper originally presented at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the American Society of
Criminology, Atlanta, 710 November, 2001. This research has been possible with the
financial support of the WODC (Organised Crime Monitor, Dutch Ministry of Justice).
I thank Henk van de Bunt for supervising the project and Hans Nelen, Frank Bovenkerk
and Francisco Thoumi for their fruitful commentaries.

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265

1. There are around 10.000 Colombian immigrants in the Netherlands, from which 2/3 are
women. They are dispersed, disorganised and do not develop visible forms of ethnic
economy typical of other larger minority groups. This, in open contrast with the situation
in the US.
2. See Zaitch (2002) for a detailed description of the several types of drug dealers involved.
In many cases, reality blurs strict boundaries between them. In other cases, the distinctions
are purely analytical.
3. Although it was beyond the possibilities of the present study to conduct direct fieldwork at
the level of large cocaine exporters, some relevant material collected in two research visits
to Colombia in 1996 and 1997 is used here. It includes interviews with criminal lawyers,
businessmen, Dutch authorities, friends/employees of cocaine entrepreneurs, and various
drug experts.
4. The latter two categories refer to the activities of law enforcement agencies. However,
from the point of view of drug traffickers, a key distinction should be made between
strategic and tactical risks. Strategic risks are the risks to the planners/organisers, numbers
1 of groups a) and b). Tactical risks are the risks to the drugs and to helpers/employees,
numbers 2 or 3 of group c). See Dorn et al. (1998).
5. See also the testimony of the drug entrepreneur B. Gordon (Bovenkerk, 1995: 166).
6. The few formal or informal Colombian businesses restaurants, bars and shops and
the Colombian community in the Netherlands hardly depend on or consume Colombian
imports.
7. For the centrality of social bonds in organised crime, see a.o. Ianni (1972), Gambetta
(1996); Kleemans et al. (1998) and Hobbs (2001).
8. The Dutch word penose comes from the Yiddish (occupation, livelihood) and refers to the
criminal, not powerful underworld.
9. See also Van de Bunt et al. (1999, 2001).
10. For international cocaine trafficking, prison sentences in the Netherlands can go up to a
maximum of 12 years. Adding punishments for belonging to a criminal organisation or
for violent offences, the sentence can vary very much according to the cocaine amount
involved, the personal background, the organisational aspects and other circumstances.
It can range from the 1 year given to the vulnerable, first-time mula (air courier), to the
16 years imposed upon a leading, well-known and badly defended violent cocaine
entrepreneur. Medium and large Colombian importers would normally receive an average
of between 4 and 6 years, apparently less than in countries such as Spain or Italy. However,
these countries know a larger gap between judicial and real sentences.
11. Van de Bunt et al. (1999) argue that the arms race view on the interaction between
drug dealers and law enforcement often departs from misleading assumptions: neither
law enforcement is so seriously taken or even known by drug dealers, nor the power of
drug dealers is as large as claimed by law enforcers (Van de Bunt et al., 1999: 400401).
12. See for example Bovenkerk (1995); Fijnaut et al. (1996); Farrell (1998: 30) and Van de
Bunt et al. (1999: 403).
13. As explained before, perceptions of these traffickers have only been transmitted by various
key informants in Colombia close to them in one way or the other.

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D. ZAITCH

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