Eisenberg V City of Miami Beach Complaint 2013

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 13-23620-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton

ROD EISENBERG, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,

Defendant.
_________________________/

ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Court for oral argument on January 22, 2014 on
Defendant, City of Miami Beachs (the City[s]) Motion to Dismiss or Strike Plaintiffs
Complaint (Motion) [ECF No. 16], filed November 22, 2013. The undersigned has carefully
considered the parties written submissions, the record, oral arguments, and applicable law.
I. BACKGROUND
1

This case involves various claims in connection with the Sadigo Court Apartment Hotel
(the Sadigo) located at 334 20th Street in Miami Beach, Florida. (See Compl. 1). Eisenberg
is the president of Eisenberg Development, doing business as the Sadigo. (See id. 12).
Eisenberg Development is a Florida corporation, with its principal place of business in Miami
Beach, Florida. (See id. 1). The City is a Florida municipal corporation. (See id. 3).
Eisenberg Development purchased the Sadigo in 1988 and continues to own and operate
it. (See id. 6, 9). Built in 1936, the Sadigo is a contributing historic structure in the Citys
Museum Historic District. (Id. 6).

1
The facts, taken from the Complaint [ECF No. 1], are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs
and are accepted as true.
Case No. 13-23620-CIV-ALTONAGA/Simonton

2
A. Relationship Between Eisenberg and the City
In 1993, Eisenberg discovered the Citys bid selection process was corrupt. (See id.
10). The City requested bid proposals to lease space in the Old City Hall. (See id.) The City
rejected Eisenberg and the Miami Design Preservation Leagues joint bid without any
consideration, selecting a competing bid instead. (See id.). Eisenberg sued the City to reopen
the bid process. (See id. 11). Through discovery, Eisenberg learned the winning bidder was
receiving free rent in the Old City Hall during the bid challenge. (See id.). Eisenberg also
discovered a City commissioner and his son had received what amounted to an illegal brokerage
commission on a $10 million real estate transaction. (Id.).
Eisenberg subsequently disclosed these instances of City corruption to the media. (See
id.). As a result of [] Eisenbergs disclosures, a scandal ensued which ultimately led to the City
manager resigning, and the City attorney being forced out . . . . [T]he Florida Department of
Business and Professional Licensing subsequently brought an eleven-count administrative
complaint against the City commissioners son, [the] sons company, and the winning bidder
. . . , alleging kickbacks and illegal profits on the real estate transaction. (Id. 12). The
winning bidder agreed to pay fines. (See id.).
In 1995, Eisenberg challenged the City and Miami-Dade Countys creation of a
redevelopment area related to the Miami Beach Convention Center. (See id. 11). City officials
claimed Eisenberg was taking revenge after losing his earlier lawsuits challenging the bid
selection process. (See id.). Plaintiffs do not allege any intervening events between 1995 and
2004.
Between 2004 and 2009, Plaintiffs and others in the neighborhood voiced many
complaints about the health and safety risks and Code compliance violations of an abandoned

3
hotel in the neighborhood. (See id. 20). The City investigated some of these complaints but
did not resolve the problems with the building. (See id.). In 2009, Eisenberg urged the Citys
Zoning Board of Adjustment to handle the Code violations more quickly and deny the building
owners request for a one-year extension to comply with the Code. (See id.). The Zoning Board
ultimately required the owner to board the building and remove loose debris before granting the
extension. (See id.). In light of this, Eisenberg withdrew his objection, and the Zoning Board
later approved the extension. (See id.).
Between 2006 and 2012, multiple City officials were investigated and prosecuted for
corruption. In 2006, a City electrical inspector was arrested for soliciting bribes (see id. 14); in
2008, a City fire protection analyst was fired after reporting suspicions of kickbacks (see id.
15); also in 2008, a City planner, examiner, and inspector were all caught accepting bribes (see
id. 16); in 2012, City procurement director, Gus Lopez, was charged with sixty-three felony
counts, including racketeering, bid-tampering, and illegal compensation (see id. 17); and also
in 2012, seven City Code compliance and fire department inspectors, including the Citys lead
code compliance officer, Jose Alberto (Alberto), were arrested for extortion and accepting
bribes in June 2011 to bypass City Code enforcement inspections and fines (see id. 1819).
B. The Sadigo
The Sadigo originally opened in 1936 as an apartment with transient rentals, and it has
continued operating in this fashion without objection from the City. (See id. 22). The Sadigo
is located in an RM-2 zoning district, where the main permitted uses include apartments,
apartment hotels, and hotels. (Id. 23 (quoting CITY OF MIAMI BEACH LAND DEV. CODE (the
City Code) 142212)). According to the City Code, hotels are only intended for
occupancy by transient residents, and apartments require cooking facilities. (Id. (quoting City

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Code 114-1)). The City Code permits transient rentals for apartment hotels and apartments in
RM-2 zones. (See id. 24). The Sadigos original City-issued certificates of use and occupancy
(CO[s]) were for use as apartments, and the Sadigo has maintained this status. (See id. 22).
For a period of time, the Sadigo rented units on an annual basis. (See id. 25).
In 2006, after obtaining a state transient public lodging establishment license from the
Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulations Division of Hotels and
Restaurants, the Sadigo resumed transient rentals. (See id. 2526). The Sadigo is licensed for
transient apartment rentals. (See id. 26). Plaintiffs verified with the City that transient
apartment rentals are legally permissible for the zoning district and the COs applicable to the
Sadigo. (See id. 27). Plaintiffs obtained a City Resort Tax Registration Certificate for the
Sadigo, required for transient (six months or less) rentals of hotel and apartment units. (See id.
(citing City Code 102306)).
Upon renting to transient guests in late 2006, the Sadigo constructed a cold food
preparation area in the Sadigos interior courtyard pursuant to a City-approved and issued
building permit. (Id. 29). After construction was completed and signed[-]off [] by the City,
the City informed Plaintiffs that it was a hotel[,] not an apartment . . . . (Id.). The City
required the Sadigo to obtain a new CO as a hotel because it rented apartments to transient
guests and operated a food preparation area that was actually a restaurant. (Id.). Plaintiffs
complied and applied for a CO as a hotel (id. 31), and afterward, were told the Sadigo must
comply with the fire protection standards applicable to brand new hotel structures (id. 32
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
From 2006 to 2012, Plaintiffs received numerous notices of violation and cease and desist

5
orders
2
from the City citing the Sadigo for violating City fire safety codes by allowing transient
rentals of its apartments. (See id. 50). The City Building Official issued a decision requiring
the installation of a fire sprinkler system and refused to accept an Engineers Equivalency Report
from the Sadigo explaining why a fire sprinkler system was unnecessary. (See App. Exs., Ex. 8
[ECF No. 17-8]). On April 15, 2010, the City Board of Rules and Appeals (the BORA)
considered the Sadigos appeal of the Building Officials decision. (See id.). The BORA
affirmed the Building Officials determination and notified Eisenberg of its decision in an April
21, 2010 letter. (See id.).
Plaintiffs objected to the Citys classification of the Sadigo as a new hotel and attended a
City Commission meeting on January 19, 2011. (See id. 29). At the meeting, Plaintiffs
submitted a letter and materials explaining the various reasons the Sadigo should not be treated
as a new hotel. (See id.). The Mayor, City Commissioners, City Manager, and City Attorney
were indifferent and the City Fire Chief took offense to Plaintiffs claims of unfair treatment.
(See id.). Plaintiffs believe the City Fire Marshall told the Sadigos mortgagee the Sadigo was
illegally operating as a hotel. (See id. 38). On January 21, 2011, the Sadigos mortgagee
advised it would not renew its loan after previously encouraging Plaintiffs to renew the Sadigos
loan. (See id. 37). Plaintiffs were left with no choice but to refinance the Sadigo at a higher
interest rate an enormous additional cost. (See id.).

2
The City issued the Sadigo: a November 5, 2007 Fire Inspection Report and Cease and Desist Notice
(see App. Exs., Ex. 1 [ECF No. 17-1]); a June 27, 2011 Fire Inspection Report and Cease and Desist
Order (see id., Ex. 5 [ECF No. 17-5]); a September 23, 2011 Cease and Desist Order and Fire Inspection
Report and a September 29, 2011 Notice of Fire Violation (see id., Ex. 6 [ECF No. 17-6]); and October
20, 2010, April 5, 2011, and September 27, 2011 Notices of Violation and October 23, 2007 Fire
Inspection Report (see id., Ex. 7 [ECF No. 17-7]). The City also issued a March 15, 2010 response letter
(see id., Ex. 9 [ECF No. 17-9]) by the Fire Marshall regarding the Sadigos engineering report, and a June
28, 2011 Plans Processing Approvals notice (see id., Ex. 10 [ECF No. 17-10]). These exhibits are in the
public record and are attached to the Citys Motion. (See generally App. Exs. [ECF No. 17]). They can
therefore be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See infra, Part II (discussing legal standard).

6
In 2011, Eisenberg Development filed a petition in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of
Florida seeking a temporary injunction against the City.
3
(See App. Exs., Ex. 4 at 2 [ECF No.
17-4]); see also Eisenberg Dev. Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, No. 11-20234 CA 15 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 2012). On January 5 and 6, 2012, the state trial court held an evidentiary hearing
regarding compliance with the Florida Fire Prevention Code (Fire Code). (See id.). On
January 10, 2012, the trial court denied the temporary injunction for failure to satisfy the
requirements for injunctive relief. (See id. 5).
In April 2011, the City informed the Sadigos longstanding client, the Art Basel
Foundation, the Sadigo was illegally operating as a hotel. (See Compl. 39). The Foundation
then severed its business relationship with Plaintiffs. (See id.). In June 2011, the City sent
undercover police officers to the Sadigo to verify the Sadigo was renting to transient guests.
(See id. 40). After observing transient rental activity, the Citys police officers shut down the
Sadigo for noncompliance with City fire codes, evicting the Sadigos tenants and guests. (See
id.). This shutdown caused the Sadigos largest client, responsible for over $100,000 in annual
revenue, to sever its business relationship with Plaintiffs. (See id. 41).
In December 2011, fifteen police offers, ten code enforcement officers, including
Alberto, and five fire officials forcibly shut down the Sadigo for a second time for violations of
City fire codes. (See id. 42). The shut down occurred while the Sadigo was hosting the
Poo[l] Art Fair during the renowned Art Basel Miami Beach art show, forcing guests to vacate
the premises in one hour. (Id. 4243). Alberto offered to solve Eisenbergs problems by

3
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, per curium, the trial courts non-final, January 10,
2012 Order. See Eisenberg Dev. Corp. v. City of Miami Beach, 100 So. 3d 702, 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).
The City only provided the January 10, 2012 Order, and most of the record is not readily available to the
Court. As the judicial record provided is incomplete, the Court is unable to take notice of relevant
documents.

7
using his people, insinuating a bribe would be due from [] Eisenberg. When [] Eisenberg
refused by stating he already had legal counsel working on it, Alberto stated . . . Eisenberg would
not get far using legal means. (Id. 44). Eisenberg was then arrested. (See id. 45). In April
2012, Alberto and other code compliance officers and fire department inspectors were arrested
for bribes they accepted in June 2011. (See id. 46). Since these arrests, the Sadigo has not
received any further code compliance notices or violations. (See id. 47).
In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege the following claims: violation of Plaintiffs right to
equal protection of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
(Count I) (see id. 6370); First Amendment retaliation against Plaintiffs (Count II) (see id.
7178); violation of due process of law under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988 (Count III) (see
id. 7986); violation of due process of law under Articles I and X of the Florida Constitution
(Count IV) (see id. 8794); violation of Florida Statute section 509.013 (Count V) (see id.
95102); violation of Florida Statute section 633.202 (Count VI) (see id. 103110); and
declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2201 and Florida Statute section 86.021 (Count VII)
(see id. 11112). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. (See id.
63119). The City moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), or alternatively to strike the Complaint as a sham pleading. (Mot. 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although
this pleading standard does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than
an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550

8
U.S. at 555). Pleadings must contain more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Indeed,
only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To meet this plausibility standard, a
plaintiff must plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and take the factual allegations therein as true. See Brooks v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). The Court is not,
however, bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Dhillon v.
Zions First Nat. Bank, 462 F. Appx 880, 883 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Likewise,
[c]onclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact are not admitted as true, especially
when such conclusions are contradicted by exhibits or other disclosed facts. Id. (alteration in
original) (footnote call number omitted) (quoting Assoc. Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505
F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974)).
Although a district court must generally convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment if the court considers materials outside the complaint, a court may consider
documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference without converting the motion
into a motion for summary judgment if the documents are: (1) central to the complaint, and (2)
the documents authenticity is not in dispute. Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 127576 (11th Cir.

9
2005). In particular, the Court may take judicial notice of and consider documents which are
public records, [and] that are attached to the motion to dismiss, without converting the motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. Where the documents are in the public
record, they are not subject to reasonable dispute because they [are] capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy [can]not reasonably be questioned.
Horne v. Potter, 392 F. Appx 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010) (alterations added) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 201(b)). Courts may likewise take [judicial] notice of a another courts order . . . for the
limited purpose of recognizing the judicial act that the order represents or the subject matter of
that litigation. Id. (alternations in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553
(11th Cir. 1994)).
III. ANALYSIS
The City moves to dismiss all counts in the Complaint, or in the alternative to strike the
Complaint as a sham pleading.
4
(See generally Mot.). The City first argues the doctrine of
collateral estoppel precludes Plaintiffs from re-litigating issues already adjudicated in prior
proceedings. (See id. 712). As to Counts III and IV, respectively, the City contends Plaintiffs
were afforded procedural due process under federal and state law and failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. (See id. 15). The City also asserts Plaintiffs do not state plausible
claims for a violation of equal protection (Count I) or First Amendment retaliation (Count II).
(See id. 1215). According to the City, Plaintiffs state law claims in Counts V and VI,
respectively, fail as Plaintiffs misconstrue Florida Statutes, sections 509.032(7) and 633.202(6).

4
The City urges the Court to strike the Complaint as a sham pleading pursuant to the Courts inherent
authority. (See generally Mot.). Plaintiffs contention the Complaint is not a sham and was not submitted
in bad faith (see Response (Resp.) 17 [ECF No. 24]) is described by Defendant as a fraud upon the
Court. (Reply 1 [ECF No. 33]). While the City argues in favor of striking the pleading as a sham, it
does not provide any legal support for its argument. Accordingly, the Court only considers whether the
Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).

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(See id. 1518). Last, the City asserts the equitable relief sought in Count VII is inappropriate
where Plaintiffs have adequate remedies at law. (See id. 18).
Plaintiffs assert prior, non-final adjudications do not collaterally estop them from
bringing the claims in their Complaint. (See Resp. 4). As to Count I, Plaintiffs claim they
sufficiently plead a class of one equal protection violation. (See id. 7). Regarding Count II,
Plaintiffs insist the Citys enforcement actions were pretextual and in retaliation for Plaintiffs
protected free speech. (See id. 1213). As to Counts III and IV, Plaintiffs assert they state
claims for substantive due process under federal and state law. (See id. 1315). And Plaintiffs
explain Counts V and VI state claims against the City for exceeding its authority by
unconstitutionally acting in contravention of Florida statutory law. (See id. 15).
As further support for its arguments, the City insists its actions to enforce the City Code
were legitimate, rational, and non-discretionary. (See generally Reply). The City explains the
Plaintiffs change in use from non-transient to transient rentals unquestionably required
[P]laintiffs to apply for and acquire a new CO. (Id. 2). According to the City, the application
for a new CO triggered a non-discretionary review by administrative agencies regarding
whether the Sadigo complied with governing law[,] including applicable fire and building
codes. (Id.). The City cannot permit occupancy where a building lacks required fire safety
measures. (Id.). And here City officials concluded the Sadigo did not meet the necessary fire
and safety standard . . . [and lacked] a proper fire sprinkler system . . . , [so] a new CO never
issued.
5
(Id. 34).

5
While the Citys position is simple enough, the City repeatedly makes statements about the correct
statutory interpretation of the City Code, the Florida Building Code, and the Florida Fire Code, among
others, without citing any authority regarding those interpretations. The Court will not consider
unsupported legal conclusions in the Courts analysis of the Motion. See Solis-Ramirez v. U.S. Dept of
Justice, 758 F.2d 1426, 1429 (11th Cir. 1985) (observing a district court is not required to accept as true

11
The Court first addresses the collateral estoppel and exhaustion of remedies arguments
before turning to Plaintiffs equal protection, First Amendment, and due process claims against
the City. Last the Court addresses Plaintiffs Florida statutory claims, followed by the claim
for declaratory relief.
A. Collateral Estoppel
The affirmative defense of collateral estoppel may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, where the existence of the defense can be judged on the face of the complaint.
Haddad v. Dudek, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1324 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Concordia v.
Bendekovic, 693 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1982); Stephens v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No.
1:03CV3094JTC, 2004 WL 5546250, at *1 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2004)). Under Florida law,
for Plaintiffs claims to be precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel: (1) an identical
issue, (2) [must have] been fully [and fairly] litigated, (3) by the same parties or their privies, and
(4) a final decision [must have] been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Wingard v.
Emerald Venture Florida, LLC, 438 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006) (alterations added;
citations omitted) (quoting Quinn v. Monroe Cnty., 330 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003). The
litigated issue must also have been a critical and necessary part of the prior determination. Id.
(citations omitted).
According to the City, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of
essential issues of fact and law adjudicated in prior proceedings. (See Mot. 11). The City asserts
the following underlying issues were previously litigated:
(i) whether a new CO was required; (ii) whether operation of the Sadigo for
transient use without a new CO was permissible; and (iii) whether it was

[a partys] conclusions of law when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (citing Associated
Builders, Inc. v. Alabama Power Co., 505 F.2d 97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974))).

12
necessary for [P]laintiffs to bring the Sadigo into compliance with Building and
Fire Code (through, among other things, installation of a sprinkler system) before
[Plaintiffs] could lawfully conduct the transient use.

(Reply 4).
Although the City never expressly requests the Court take notice of any records or
proceedings, the City cites case law to support its contention that the Court must take judicial
notice of the public record related to the instant action. (See Mot. 11). Yet the City largely fails
to include as exhibits those public records it seeks the Court to judicially notice. Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 201(c)(2), the court must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the
court is supplied with the necessary information. FED. R. EVID. 201(C)(2) (emphasis added).
The City submits only two exhibits regarding the prior judicial history related to the instant
action: the January 10, 2012 Order Denying Petitioners Amended Motion for Emergency
Temporary Injunctive Relief (see App. Exs., Ex. 4), and the April 2010 Board of Rules and
Appeals decision (see id., Ex. 8).
6

Many of the facts and prior findings relevant to the issue of collateral estoppel are outside
the pleadings. Because questions relating to the affirmative defense[] of . . . collateral estoppel
require consideration of matters beyond the four corners of the Complaint in this case [and the
exhibits attached to the Citys Motion], the Court cannot resolve this disputed issue on a motion
to dismiss. Steinberg v. Alpha Fifth Grp., No. 04-60899-CIV, 2008 WL 906270, at *2 n.1 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 31, 2008); see generally Concordia, 693 F.2d 1073. The Court is not in a position to

6
For example, the City references the following public records, but does not provide them: records or
minutes of a series of hearings before the State of Floridas Historic Building Task Force; transcript of
a multi-day evidentiary hearing resulting in a July 11, 2011 Order by the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
Court of Florida; and transcript of an evidentiary hearing held on January 5 and 6, 2012 (corresponding to
the January 10, 2012 Order supplied by the City (see App. Exs., Ex. 4)).

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make an informed determination
7
regarding the Citys argument that dismissal is warranted
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. It is not apparent from the face of the Complaint that
Plaintiffs are estopped from bringing their claims. To the extent the Citys Motion relies on the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, it is denied.
B. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs claim in Count I the Citys enforcement of the City Code regarding the
Sadigos CO and compliance with the Fire Code violated Plaintiffs rights to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Compl. 64). The City argues Plaintiffs fail to
sufficiently plead an equal protection violation because they do not identify any comparators
who were treated differently from Plaintiffs. (See Mot. 1213). And even assuming Plaintiffs
were treated differently from others similarly situated, the Citys actions are supported by a
rational basis. (See id. 1314; Reply 56). Plaintiffs explain they bring this claim under a class
of one theory. (Resp. 7). Further, Plaintiffs insist the Citys actions were ill-motivated and
constitute harassment. (See id. 9).
The Equal Protection Clause provides that [n]o State shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S.
Const., amend. XIV, 1. In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000), the
Supreme Court explained, [t]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to secure every person within the States jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper
execution through duly constituted agents. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
As a result, the Supreme Court has recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a

7
The Court likewise cannot make an informed determination regarding the issue of exhaustion of
remedies.

14
class of one, where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Id.
(citations omitted) (recognizing plaintiffs class of one equal protection claim where the
defendant village demanded a thirty-three-foot easement to connect plaintiffs property to the
municipal water supply, when the village required only a fifteen-foot easement for other property
owners). As the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized, [t]o prove a class of one claim, the plaintiff
must show (1) that he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2)
that the defendant unequally applied a facially neutral [regulation] for the purpose of
discriminating against him. Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comn, 558 F.3d 1301,
1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Class of one equal protection claims generally require plaintiffs to identify comparators
in the pleading in order to show intentional, discriminatory treatment different from others
similarly situated. See generally Olech, 528 U.S. 562; Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306
(11th Cir. 2006); Glover v. Mabrey, 384 F. Appx 763 (10th Cir. 2010). Indeed, in the context
of class of one claims, the similarly situated requirement must be rigorously applied.
Leib, 558 F.3d at 1307 (citing Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.
2008); Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1207 (11th Cir. 2007)). The purpose of the
similarly situated requirement is to avoid subject[ing] nearly all state regulatory decisions to
constitutional review in federal court and deny[ing] state regulators the critical discretion they
need to effectively perform their duties. Leib, 558 F.3d at 1307 (alteration added) (quoting
Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1203). And [e]ven in run-of-the-mill discrimination cases, [the Eleventh
Circuit has] emphasized that plaintiffs are not permitted simply to rely on broad generalities in
identifying a comparator. Id. (alteration added) (quoting Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1204 (analyzing

15
whether comparators were prima facie identical in all relevant respects (citation omitted))).
8

The Seventh Circuit, writing extensively on class of one equal protection issues, has
developed an exception to the traditional requirement that plaintiffs must identify comparators to
state a claim. See Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013). The Seventh
Circuit recognizes class of one claims in cases where illegitimate governmental conduct or
animus is easily demonstrated[,] but similarly situated individuals are difficult to find. Id. If
animus is readily obvious based on treatment received by plaintiff, he does not need to show
unequal treatment by comparison to others similarly situated. Id. (finding the defendants
animus was readily obvious from the fact that the defendant bore [the plaintiffs] ill will,
caused an investigation against [one plaintiff], interrupted meetings of the plaintiffs and building
inspectors and angrily informed building inspectors that no permit should be granted); see also
Fenje v. Feld, 398 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing a campaign of official
harassment driven by malice, vindictiveness, or malignant animosity would state a claim for
relief under the Equal Protection Clause) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs rely in particular on Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012).
In Geinosky, plaintiffs unequal treatment was obvious from the pattern of deliberate, official
harassment that had no conceivable legitimate purpose[,] where the plaintiff received twenty-
four bogus parking tickets within one year from the same police unit. Id. at 748 (noting plaintiff

8
The Eleventh Circuit has stated that the similarly situated requirement will be more difficult to
establish for class of one cases with multi-dimensional, governmental decision-making over a period of
time. Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1203 (involving varied decisionmaking criteria applied in a series of
discretionary decisions made over an extended period of time). In Griffin the court explained the equal
protection claim must be evaluated in light of the full variety of factors that an objectively reasonable
governmental decisionmaker would have found relevant in making the challenged decision. Id.; see also
Campbell, 434 F.3d at 1314, 1316 (considering factors relevant to an objective decisionmakers approval
of a building project, including development size, impact on the community, zoning variances, and type
of approval sought, and observing a similarly situated building project would be prima facie identical in
all relevant respects).

16
did not need to identify a similarly situated comparator, specifically a person who did not
receive twenty-four bogus parking tickets in 2007 and 2008[,] as the general public could serve
the same purpose). The Seventh Circuit also observed that even where a plaintiff may need to
identify others who are similarly situated, the pleading requirements under Iqbal and Twombly
do not require a plaintiff to identify specific comparators in a complaint. Id. at 748 n.3; see also
Cahn v. City of Highland Park, No. 11 CV 06082, 2012 WL 4483480, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25,
2012) (denying defendants motion to dismiss the equal protection claim after finding plaintiffs
allegations of being targeted by the City in a spiteful manner[,] wherein plaintiff was the
only individual that Highland Park ha[d] prosecuted[,] were sufficient to plead a class-of-one
claim).
While much of the Eleventh Circuits case law reiterating the demanding similarly
situated standard predates Geinosky, since then, the Eleventh Circuit required in Apothecary
Development Corp. v. City of Marco Island, Florida, more than [b]are allegations that others
similarly situated were treated differently. 517 F. Appx 890, 892 (11th Cir. 2013) (Plaintiffs
complaint baldly asserts that the alleged harassing behavior is being directed at and executed
against Plaintiffs and their customers only, and not against similarly situated pharmacies,
employees and customers in the Marco Island area . . . . This is insufficient. (internal citation
omitted)). Still, since Geinosky, the Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed the
contention that certain factual scenarios, including actions evincing obvious animus or
harassment by a defendant, may not require a plaintiff to identify a comparator to state a claim
for unequal treatment at the pleading stage. Even assuming the Eleventh Circuit recognized a
class of one claim without the requirement of pleading a similarly situated comparator, the
threshold standard for conduct so obviously harassing or malicious is a challenging one.

17
Plaintiffs do not identify any comparators in the Complaint and only generally allege the
treatment received by Plaintiffs was different from that of others similarly situated.
9
But for
Plaintiffs to state a class of one claim, they need to allege at least one similarly situated
comparator.
10
While the Seventh Circuits analysis is persuasive, under that Circuits standard
Plaintiffs still fail to state an equal protection claim as they have not sufficiently pleaded such
obviously harassing or malicious conduct on the Citys part so that unequal treatment may be
inferred. See Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748 (explaining the defendants conduct had no
conceivable legitimate purpose); Fenje, 398 F.3d at 628 (requiring plaintiff plead an obvious
pattern of deliberate, official harassment driven by malice, vindictiveness, or malignant
animosity); see also Swanson, 719 F.3d at 784.
Admittedly, Plaintiffs allege a pattern of pretextual regulat[ion] (Compl. 59)
motivated by the Citys malice and ill will (id. 57). Plaintiffs claim the numerous notices of
violation or cease and desist orders[,] citing the Sadigo for fire safety code violations related to
transient occupancy and use (id. 50), constitute an actionable pattern of discriminatory
actions by the City (id. 59). But the Sadigos citations and two shutdowns by City officials
(see id. 40, 42) over a period of six years, do not sufficiently demonstrate an obvious
campaign of malicious harassment against Plaintiffs. Cf. Swanson, 719 F.3d at 785 (explaining
the plaintiff only needed to show harassment, yelling, arbitrary denials and frivolous litigation
do not normally follow requests for fence permits[,] particularly where defendants hostility and

9
As Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the first prong of identifying similarly situated comparators under the class of
one equal protection standard in the Eleventh Circuit, the Court does not consider the second prong as to
whether a rational basis existed for the alleged unequal treatment of Plaintiffs. See Griffin, 496 F.3d at
120708.
10
Plaintiffs failure to do so is particularly inexcusable when Plaintiffs could have sought the required
information from the City through public records requests under the Florida Public Records Act, chapter
119, Florida Statutes.

18
personal hatred were readily apparent from defendants alleged statements and behavior).
Moreover, the Citys actions are not arbitrary or irrational on their face, as in Geinosky. Rather,
the Citys conduct has a conceivable legitimate purpose to obtain compliance with the City
Code and protect the health and safety of the public. Consequently, Plaintiffs have failed to
sufficiently state a claim for a violation of their equal protection rights.
C. First Amendment Retaliation
In Count II, Plaintiffs claim the City violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and seek equitable relief. (See Compl. 72). Plaintiffs
contend the Citys enforcement actions were pretextual and undertaken with improper and
retaliatory motives, adversely affecting Plaintiffs protected speech. (See Resp. 1213). The
City argues Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for First Amendment retaliation as the City acted to
properly enforce applicable local laws. (See Mot. 14). The City also insists it acted within its
discretion and was not motivated by ill-will, citing the significant lapse in time between
Plaintiffs protected conduct and the Citys purported retaliation. (See Reply 7).
To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) his speech or act was
constitutionally protected; (2) the defendants retaliatory conduct adversely affected the
protected speech; and (3) there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and the
adverse effect on speech. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted); see also Abella v. Simon, 522 F. Appx 872, 873 (11th Cir. 2013). A plaintiffs claim
depends not on the denial of a constitutional right, but on the harassment [] received for
exercising [his] rights. Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1253.
Regarding the first prong, the First Amendment protects the rights of [free] speech and
to petition for redress. Abella, 522 F. Appx at 873 (citing U.S. Const. amend. I; United Mine

19
Workers of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Assn, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)). Plaintiffs allege they
engaged in protected activity by petitioning the City and its elected officials and by publically
commenting on their dispute with the City regarding [the] Sadigo . . . . (Compl. 73; see also
Resp. 12). Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs activities constitute protected speech.
As to the second prong, a plaintiff suffers adverse action if the defendants allegedly
retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First
Amendment rights. Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254 (finding retaliatory acts, including a prolonged
and organized campaign of harassment by local police officers[,] where defendants repeatedly
followed, pulled over, cited and intimidated plaintiffs, as well as allegedly attempted to obtain
arrest warrants against plaintiffs without probable cause and disseminated flyers depicting
plaintiffs as criminals); cf. Thompson v. Hall, 426 F. Appx 855, 85960 (11th Cir. 2011)
(finding the level of harassment and intimidation alleged, including intimidation of non-parties
and allegations against unnamed police deputies who followed plaintiffs and patrolled their
neighborhood, would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected
speech). In applying the objective test of ordinary firmness, courts liberally construe whether the
alleged conduct had an adverse effect, so while [t]he effect on freedom of speech may be small,
. . . there is no justification for harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights.
Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254 (alteration in original) (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th
Cir. 1982)). The adverse effect need not be great in order to be actionable. Id; see also Garcia
v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining the retaliatory issuance of
parking tickets totaling $35 in less than two months to punish plaintiff for speaking out would be
sufficient to chill the speech of a person of ordinary firmness).
Plaintiffs claim the Citys retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary

20
firmness from exercising free speech, even though Eisenberg himself was not deterred.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege: the City misled Plaintiffs through the code compliance processes
(Compl. 2735, 4856); the City repeatedly cited Plaintiffs for code violations (see id. 50);
the City told Plaintiffs mortgagee and clients the Sadigo was operating illegally as a hotel (see
id. 3639, 43); the City shut down the Sadigo twice, including once during a peak weekend
(see id. 4044); and Eisenberg was arrested after his refusal to pay the City a bribe during the
second shutdown (see id. 4245; Resp. 13). This conduct, improperly motivated as alleged,
would likely be sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness, especially as the adverse effect
need not be substantial.
Regarding the third prong, to establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show his
protected conduct was a motivating factor behind the alleged retaliatory misconduct. See
Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1250. Plaintiff must identify a sequence of events from which a retaliatory
motive can be inferred[,] notwithstanding other non-retaliatory motives the defendant may
harbor. Lippman v. City of Miami, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (footnote call
number omitted); see also id. n.4.
To determine if the protected conduct is a motivating factor, courts rely on the burden-
shifting formula set forth in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008) (resolving
the subjective motivation issue pursuant to Mt. Healthy). Under the Mt. Healthy formula,
[o]nce the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected conduct
was a motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant. If the defendant can show that he would have taken the same action in
the absence of the protected activity, he is entitled to prevail . . . on summary
judgment.

Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278 (alterations added; footnote call number omitted) (quoting Thaddeus-X

21
v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287)). In
conjunction with the burden-shifting formula, courts also consider the temporal proximity
between a plaintiffs exercise of free speech and the adverse effect in gauging the causal
connection. See Ranize v. Town of Lady Lake, Fla., No. 5:11cv646Oc32TBS, 2012 WL
4856749, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012).
Significantly, this burden-shifting analysis is not appropriate at the motion to dismiss
phase. Johnson v. Conway, No. 1:13-CV-0524-RWS, 2013 WL 5493380, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 30, 2013); see generally OBryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (decided on
summary judgment); Smith, 532 F.3d 1270 (same); Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d 378 (same). A
determination as to whether a defendant would have taken the same action in the absence of the
protected activity is premature when the parties have not conducted discovery. See Johnson,
2013 WL 5493380, at *4 n.3 (explaining discovery may reveal whether defendants conduct
conformed with the county jails general policy). As a result, the Court addresses only whether
Plaintiffs have met their burden in alleging their protected conduct was a motivating factor, and
not whether the City has shown under the burden-shifting formula it would have taken the same
actions absent Plaintiffs protected conduct.
Plaintiffs must allege a causal connection between the adverse action and the exercise of
free speech to establish Plaintiffs protected conduct was a motivating factor. As the City
observes, a substantial temporal gap exists between Plaintiffs protected speech and when the
alleged misconduct by the City commenced. (See Mot. 1415). It was not until late 2006, when
Plaintiffs began renting units to transient guests, that the City instructed Plaintiffs to apply for a
new CO to operate the Sadigo as a hotel. Well before this, in 1993, Eisenberg lost a bid for a
City proposal, and in 1995, Eisenberg challenged a City development project. (See Compl.

22
1011). This exercise of Plaintiffs First Amendment rights is exceedingly attenuated from the
time the City required the Sadigo obtain a new CO. While Plaintiffs allegations regarding
events more than ten years before the Citys alleged retaliatory conduct fail to persuade, the
allegations concerning more recent conduct are somewhat more compelling.
Plaintiffs allege they, along with unnamed parties, made complaints about an abandoned
hotel between 2004 and 2009. (See id. 20). The Complaint contains few details about the
nature and frequency of these complaints between 2004 and 2009 and to whom they were
made. These allegations, although nearer in time, are relatively bare. Without more factual
detail, the Court cannot assess whether a sufficient causal connection and thereby a retaliatory
motive can be inferred prior to the Citys requirement that the Sadigo apply for a new CO and
undergo review as a new hotel for compliance with local and state laws.
However, Plaintiffs allegations from 2009 and later identify protected conduct
supporting a causal connection. In 2009, Eisenberg complained to the Citys Zoning Boarding
regarding the same abandoned hotel; he later withdrew his objection after the City addressed the
neighborhoods concerns with the building. (See id.). Then, on January 19, 2011, Plaintiffs
challenged the classification of the Sadigo as a new hotel at a City Commission meeting. (See
id. 29). After Plaintiffs complained at the January 19, 2011 meeting, the City told Plaintiffs
mortgagee the Sadigo was operating illegally, and on January 21, 2011, the mortgagee decided
not to renew the loan. (See id. 3638). Plaintiffs also assert their refusal to pay the City a
bribe was a motivating factor behind Eisenbergs arrest during the Citys second shutdown of the
Sadigo. (See id. 4245; Resp. 13).
A retaliatory motive can be inferred from the Citys alleged misconduct, which continued
from roughly 2006 to 2012. See Lippman, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 1374. While the Complaint does

23
not contain many facts particularly prior to 2006 illustrating the City acted in retaliation to
Plaintiffs exercise of free speech, the allegations taken as a whole are sufficient to infer a
retaliatory motive. Therefore, the Motion is denied as to this count.
D. Due Process
Plaintiffs allege federal and state law claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and seek
damages for due process violations (Counts III and IV, respectively). (See Compl. 7994). In
the Motion the City argues Plaintiffs were afforded procedural due process under federal and
state law and failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. (See Mot. 15). Plaintiffs clarify
they are not making procedural claims, and assert they sufficiently allege substantive due process
claims instead. (See Resp. 1314).
To state a claim for a violation of substantive due process under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
a plaintiff must allege: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest, and (2) such
deprivation was the result of an abuse of governmental power sufficient to raise an ordinary tort
to the stature of a constitutional violation. Executive 100, Inc. v. Martin Cnty., 922 F.2d 1536,
1541 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Deprivations of constitutionally protected interests may
include diminutions in property value, see Parker v. Leon Cnty., No. TCA 91-40133-WS, 1992
WL 209626, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1992) (citing Executive 100, 922 F.2d at 1541); and
interference with the goodwill of plaintiffs business or injury to plaintiffs business without due
process, see Marrero v. Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 515 (5th Cir. 1980). Florida law recognizes a
lawful business, including tangible property, monetary investments, and business reputation, in
every sense of the word[, as] property . . . that is entitled to protection from all unlawful

24
interference.
11
Id. at 514 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Espanola
Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding plaintiff stated a section 1983
claim where city commissioners harassed hotel to drive it out of business, effecting a taking of
plaintiffs hotel without due process, because Florida law considers business reputation/good will
a constitutionally protected interest). A deprivation is of constitutional stature if it is
undertaken for improper motive and by means that were pretextual, arbitrary and capricious, and
without rational basis. Executive 100, 922 F.2d at 1541 (noting, in a zoning context, the issue is
whether the defendants action bore any substantial relation to the public welfare) (citation
omitted). State law substantive due process claims must satisfy the same standard. See Gardens
Country Club, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 712 So. 2d 398, 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiffs allegations satisfy the first prong. Plaintiffs were denied their constitutionally
protected right to utilize their property and engage in a legitimate rental business at the Sadigo.
(See Resp. 14; Compl. 2225, 3545, 8186). The City does not contest Plaintiffs have a
constitutionally protected property and business interest in the Sadigo. Plaintiffs allege they had
to refinance the Sadigo at enormous additional cost after the mortgagee decided not to renew the
loan upon being informed the Sadigo was operating illegally as a hotel. (See Compl. 37).
Plaintiffs also lost the Art Basel Foundation as a business client after the City informed the
Foundation the Sadigo was operating illegally. (See id. 39).
Regarding the second prong, the Citys improper and pretextual motivations may be
inferred from the allegations of City corruption, as well as the sequence of events after 2006,

11
Under Florida law, a plaintiff may recover actual damages for defendants disparaging comments
about the plaintiffs business[, including comments intended] . . . to prevent others from dealing with the
plaintiff. Marrero, 625 F.2d at 515 (citations omitted).

25
which when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, tend to show the City specifically
targeted the Sadigo. Not only did the Citys second shutdown of the Sadigo coincide with peak
rentals during the Art Basel Festival (see id. 1819), but Eisenberg was arrested after refusing
to pay a bribe to the Citys then lead Code Compliance Officer (see id. 42, 4445). Based on
these allegations, it is plausible the Citys actions were undertaken with an improper motive and
were an abuse of discretion. Thus, Plaintiffs state a substantive due process claim for diminution
in value, injury to the Sadigos reputation, and interference with operating a legitimate business,
resulting from the Citys repeated cease and desist orders, targeting of the Sadigos clients, and
two forced shutdowns of the Sadigo.
E. State Law Claims
In Counts V and VI, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of
Florida Statutes sections 509.032
12
and 633.202, respectively. Plaintiffs request the Court find
that the City is liable for violating the Plaintiffs rights under section[s] 509.032 [and 633.202],
Florida Statutes. (Compl. 102, 110). The City makes three arguments in support of
dismissal of these state law claims: (1) City officials are not preempted from inspecting
[P]laintiffs property or enforcing local and state ordinances requiring [P]laintiffs to comply with
applicable fire and safety codes (Mot. 16); (2) Plaintiffs are not entitled to a private right of
action under the statutes (see id. 17); and (3) Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their available
administrative remedies (see id. 18). In response, Plaintiffs assert the City exceeded its authority
because it unconstitutionally acted in contravention of and in avoidance of state law[,] namely
Florida Statutes sections 509.032 and 633.202. (See Resp. 15). Moreover, Plaintiffs clarify they
seek only equitable relief and do not make any claims requiring a private right of action. (See id.

12
Plaintiffs have clarified they plead a violation of section 509.032, not 509.13 as stated in the caption of
Count V. (See Resp. 15; Compl. 9597).

26
1617). Finally, Plaintiffs insist the City has not demonstrated other administrative remedies are
available for Plaintiffs to pursue regarding violations of these state statutes. (See id. 17).
It is unclear precisely what claims Plaintiffs attempt to bring in Counts V and VI. The
titles given to Counts V and VI reference violations by the City of both statutes, and Plaintiffs
Response characterizes the claims as requests for equitable relief from the Citys violations of
state statutes, namely sections 509.032 and 633.202. (Resp. 15). The Court first reviews
Florida Statute section 509.032(7), followed by section 633.202(6).
1. Florida Statute Section 509.032(7)
Florida Statute section 509.032(7) regarding Public Lodging and Public Food Service
Establishments states in part:
(7) Preemption authority
(a) The regulation of public lodging establishments and public food service
establishments, including, but not limited to, sanitation standards,
inspections, training and testing of personnel, and matters related to the
nutritional content and marketing of foods offered in such establishments,
is preempted to the state. This paragraph does not preempt the authority
of a local government or local enforcement district to conduct inspections
of public lodging and public food service establishments for compliance
with the Florida Building Code and the Florida Fire Prevention Code,
pursuant to ss. 553.80 and 633.206.

(b) A local law, ordinance, or regulation may not restrict the use of vacation
rentals, prohibit vacation rentals, or regulate vacation rentals based solely
on their classification, use, or occupancy. . . .

FLA. STAT. 509.032.
Plaintiffs allege the City applied, interpreted[,] and enforced its Code and [] unwritten
policies and practices [against the] Sadigo . . . to regulate it as a public lodging establishment . . .
[and] restrict the use of vacation rentals . . . based solely on [] classification, use, or occupancy
in contravention of section 509.032. (Compl. 99). Plaintiffs reliance on subsection
509.032(7)(b), however, is misplaced. This subsection refers to vacation rentals, which the

27
statute defines as any unit or group of units in a condominium, cooperative, or timeshare plan or
any individually or collectively owned single-family, two-family, three-family, or four-family
house or dwelling unit that is also a transient public lodging establishment. FLA. STAT.
509.242(1)(c).
While the Sadigos status as an apartment or a hotel may be at issue, Plaintiffs do not
allege the Sadigo is condominium, cooperative, or timeshare plan, nor do they allege the Sadigo
is an individually or collectively owned single-family or multi-family housing that is also a
transient public lodging establishment. Yet, inexplicably, the Complaint states the Sadigo
offers vacation rentals, as defined by chapter 509, Florida Statutes. (Compl. 98). Nothing in
the Complaint supports this allegation. The Courts duty to accept the facts in the [C]omplaint
as true does not require [the Court] to ignore specific factual details of the pleading in favor of
general or conclusory allegations. Griffin, 496 F.3d at 120506. Based on the plain language
of the statute and the facts alleged, the Sadigo cannot be classified as a vacation rental. As
subsection (b) is inapplicable to the Sadigo, the Court does not consider the parties arguments
relating to that subsection.
In Count V, Plaintiffs also state regulation of public lodging establishments is
preempted to the state. (Compl. 97 (citing FLA. STAT. 509.032(7))). Plaintiffs further
explain the City acted in contravention of and in avoidance of (Resp. 15) the statute by
unconstitutionally exceed[ing] its authority to Plaintiffs detriment (id. 1516). The Court
construes Plaintiffs arguments as clarifying Count V states a claim for preemption. The City
contends Plaintiffs same statutory allegations were raised and rejected by both the Circuit
Court and the Third District Court of Appeal in [P]laintiffs previous litigation against the City.
(Mot. 1516). Again, the City has not provided the necessary documentation for the Court to

28
review to make this determination. The parties also do not cite any legal authority other than the
statute itself on the issue of preemption.
In determining whether local laws and the actions of local government are in
contravention of a state statute, courts look to whether the statute expressly preempts that area.
See Tallahassee Meml Regl Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d 826, 831
(Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Shands Teaching Hosp. & Clinics, Inc. v. Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla.,
97 So. 3d 204, 210 (Fla. 2012) (In construing a statute, [courts] should give effect to legislative
intent, which is discovered primarily through the plain language of the statute. (citing BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. Meeks, 863 So. 2d 287, 289 (Fla. 2003))). [W]here the Legislature
expressly or specifically preempts an area, there is no problem with ascertaining what the
Legislature intended. Tallahassee Meml Regl Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So. 2d at 831. If the
statutory intent is not expressly clear from the statute, courts may analyze the statutes implied
intent. See id. (Implied preemption should be found to exist only in cases where the legislative
scheme is so pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the particular area, and where strong
public policy reasons exist for finding such an area to be preempted by the Legislature.
(citations omitted)).
Here, the statute expressly states it does not preempt the authority of a local government
or local enforcement district to conduct inspections of public lodging and public food service
establishments for compliance with the Florida Building Code and the Florida Fire Prevention
Code, pursuant to [sections] 553.80 and 633.206.
13
FLA. STAT. 509.032(7)(a). The legislative

13
Under the statute, public lodging establishment includes both transient and non-transient
establishments comprised of any unit, group of units, dwelling, building, or group of buildings within a
single complex of buildings which is rented to guests. FLA. STAT. 509.013(4)(a). A transient rental is
one rented to guests more than three times in a calendar year for periods of less than 30 days or 1
calendar month, whichever is less, or which is advertised or held out to the public as a place regularly
rented to guests. Id. 509.013(4)(a)(1). A nontransient rental is rented to guests for periods of at least

29
intent is clear from the face of the statute. While the statute generally preempts regulation of
public housing establishments, it exempts certain regulation by local government. The statute
does not preempt the City from conducting inspections of public lodging establishments such as
the Sadigo
14
to ensure compliance with the Florida Building Code and Fire Code. As a result,
Plaintiffs do not state a claim for preemption under section 509.032.
2. Florida Statute Section 633.202(6)
The second statute Plaintiffs cite is Florida Statute section 633.202 regarding the Florida
Fire Prevention Code. That law provides:
(6) The Florida Fire Prevention Code does not apply to, and no code enforcement
action shall be brought with respect to, zoning requirements or land use
requirements. Additionally, a local code enforcement agency may not administer
or enforce the Florida Fire Prevention Code to prevent the siting of any publicly
owned facility, including, but not limited to, correctional facilities, juvenile justice
facilities, or state universities, community colleges, or public education facilities.
This section shall not be construed to prohibit local government from imposing
built-in fire protection systems or fire-related infrastructure requirements needed
to properly protect the intended facility.

FLA. STAT. 633.202(6).
In Count VI, Plaintiffs allege the City impermissibly enforces the City Code, making
determinations related to particular land uses (including uses as hotels or apartments, as well as
transient or non-transient uses) in contravention of the Fire Code section 633.202. (See Compl.
10507). As stated, the statute plainly provides, [t]he Florida Fire Prevention Code does not
apply to, and no code enforcement action shall be brought with respect to, zoning requirements
or land use requirements. FLA. STAT. 633.202(6). The statute expressly exempts zoning and

30 days or 1 calendar month, whichever is less, or which is advertised or held out to the public as a place
regularly rented to guests for periods of at least 30 days or 1 calendar month. Id. 509.013(4)(a)(2).
14
Plaintiffs allege the Sadigo is a public lodging establishment holding a valid license issued under
chapter 509, Florida Statutes, by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. (Compl.
98).

30
land use requirements. The Fire Code does not define land use requirements, and Plaintiffs
employ a liberal construction of the term. Based on a plain reading of the statute, the Court finds
Plaintiffs argument unpersuasive.
In the field of land use regulation, land use encompasses: (1) the type of use, such as
whether it will be used for agricultural, commercial, industrial, or residential purposes; (2) the
density of use, manifested in concerns over the height, width, bulk, or environmental impact of
the physical structures on the land; (3) the aesthetic impact of the use, which may include the
design and placement of structures on the land; and (4) the effect of the particular use of the land
on the cultural and social values of the community . . . . Land-use Regulation, BLACKS LAW
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (quoting Peter W. Salsich Jr., Land Use Regulation, 1 (1991)).
Furthermore, section (6) utilizes the term land use, rather than the terms use or occupancy,
terms found in other provisions of the Fire Code. FLA. STAT. 633.302(6); see generally id.
633.206(3) (occupancy levels, specialized use); id. 633.218(3)(a) (construction or
renovation, alteration, or change of occupancy). The Court is not convinced this statutory
exemption applies as Plaintiffs claim it does, because no zoning or land use requirements are
actually in question.
15

More importantly, the last sentence in section (6) provides, [t]his section shall not be
construed to prohibit local government from imposing built-in fire protection systems or fire-
related infrastructure requirements needed to properly protect the intended facility. Id.
633.202(6). To the extent Plaintiffs claim preemption regarding Florida Statute section 633.202

15
In Count VI, Plaintiffs attempt to claim the City impermissibly applied the Fire Code when making
determinations regarding zoning and land use (see Compl. 10607), areas exempted from Code
enforcement. Plaintiffs argument regarding zoning makes little sense as the Sadigos zoning is not in
question. Plaintiffs allege the Sadigo is located in an RM-2 zoning district (see id. 23), and transient
rentals are permitted in apartments, apartment hotels, and hotels in RM-2 zoning districts (see id. 24).

31
in Count VI of the Complaint, the statute expressly states local government has the authority to
regulate built-in fire protection systems or fire-related infrastructure requirements. Likewise, the
Florida legislature intended the Fire Code to be interpreted by fire officials and local
enforcement agencies in a manner that reasonably and cost-effectively protects the public safety,
health, and welfare . . . . Id. 633.212. On a plain reading of both statutes, Plaintiffs have
failed to state claims for preemption under sections 509.032 and 633.202. As Plaintiffs do not
state any claims under Florida law upon which relief can be granted, the Court need not address
the type of equitable relief Plaintiffs seek in the Complaint or the Citys arguments regarding a
private cause of action or injunctive relief.
F. Declaratory Judgment
In Count VII, Plaintiffs seek equitable relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2201 and
Florida Statute section 86.021 in the form of a declaratory judgment construing the parties rights
and obligations. (See Compl. 11119). Although the City does not comment on whether
Plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory relief (see Mot. 18; Reply 910), in Count VII, Plaintiffs fail
to allege a separate cause of action, and accordingly, do not state a claim upon which
independent relief can be granted.
The equitable relief Plaintiffs seek is a remedy, not a separate cause of action. See Perret
v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (dismissing
count pleading injunctive and declaratory relief for failure to state a separate cause of action);
Tara Prods., Inc. v. Hollywood Gadgets, Inc., No. 09-CV-61436, 2010 WL 1531489, at *10
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2010) (dismissing count pleading remedy of equitable lien for failure to state
separate cause of action); see also Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1127
(11th Cir. 2005) ([A]ny motion or suit for either a preliminary or permanent injunction must be

32
based upon a cause of action . . . There is no such thing as a suit for a traditional injunction in the
abstract.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, [A] court should not
entertain an action for declaratory relief when the issues are properly raised in other counts of the
pleadings and are already before the court. Perret, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 1346 (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs already seek equitable relief in the other counts of the Complaint. Accordingly, Count
VII is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant, the City of Miami Beachs Motion to
Dismiss [ECF No. 16] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Counts I, V, VI, and VII
are DISMISSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida this 3rd day of March, 2014.

__________________________________
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: counsel of record
Case 1:13-cv-23620-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10108/2013 Page 1 of 28
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ROD EISENBERG, and EISENBERG
DEVELOPMENT CORP., aFlorida
Corporation, d/b/a SADIGO COURT
APARTMENT HOTEL,
Case No.:
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH,
Defendant,
COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs, Rod Eisenberg andEisenberg Development Corp. ("Eisenberg Development"),
by andthrough theundersigned counsel, hereby suethe City of Miami Beach ("City"), aFlorida
municipal corporation, Defendant, andallege as follows:
The Parties, J urisdiction, and Venue
1. Eisenberg Development is a Florida corporation, d/b/a Sadigo Court Apartment
Hotel, with its principal placeof business intheCity, at 334 20th Street, Miami Beach, Florida.
2. Rod Eisenberg isthepresident of Eisenberg Development.
3. TheCity isaFloridamunicipal corporation.
4. This is anaction for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to
thePlaintiffs' real property andcivil rights. This Court has original andsupplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to 28V.S.C. sections 1331, 1343and 1367, and 42V.s.c. sections 1983and 1988.
5. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 V.S.C. section 1391(b) because the real
property that is the subject of this action is located within the boundaries of the Miami Division
of theSouthern District of Florida.
TheSadigoCourt Property
6. Eisenberg Development owns and operates the historic Sadigo Court Apartment
Hotel ("Sadigo Court"). Built in 1936, Sadigo Court is a"contributing historic structure" in the
City's Museum Historic District, established to protect andpreserve theCity's Art Deco District.
7. TheArt Deco District was developed during and following the Great Depression,
and is known worldwide today as South Beach. This area was listed on theNational Register of
Historic Places in 1979 as the largest collection of Art Deco architecture in the world. By that
time, however, much of theareahadbecome blighted andcrime-ridden.
8. Committing to the redevelopment and improvement of the Art Deco District, Mr.
Eisenberg and his family pooled their resources and, over nine months in the late 1980s,
purchased four apartment buildings, including Sadigo Court. They would spend approximately
$3.5million infirst purchasing andthen renovating thesebuildings.
9. Plaintiffs acquired Sadigo Court in 1988 for $725,000. At that time, the
neighborhood was so blighted that the intersection one block away was known as "Crack
Comer." Since then, the Plaintiffs renovated Sadigo Court and made significant investments of
both time and money inefforts to revitalize theneighborhood.
TheCity's Culture of Corruption Unjustly Ensnares Mr. Eisenberg
10. In 1993, Mr. Eisenberg uncovered conuption inthe City's government. In 1993,
the City announced plans to lease space in the Old City Hail and publically solicited bids. Mr.
Eisenberg and the Miami Design Preservation League submitted abid, as did acompetitor. The
City rejected Mr. Eisenberg's bidwithout even considering it andthen declared thecompetitor to
bethe sole-and winning-bidder.
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11. Mr. Eisenberg sued the City to force reopening of the bidding process so his bid
would be considered. During the course of the litigation, he discovered that the City was giving
thewinning bidder thousands of dollars in free rent inthe Old City Hall, during thependency of
the bid protest. He also discovered that a City commissioner had received what amounted to an
illegal brokerage commission ona$10million real estatetransaction. Inthat transaction, theCity
purchased a 10-acre parcel that the City commissioner, his son, and the City attorney held a
mortgage on, which was in default. Most of that commission was paid to the City
commissioner's son, who then gave a large gift to his father, the City commissioner. Mr.
Eisenberg informed the media of his discoveries describing themas reflective of a corrupt City
"old-boy network."
12. As aresult of Mr. Eisenberg's disclosures, a scandal ensued which ultimately led
to the City manager resigning, and the City attorney being forced out. The State Attorney's
public corruption prosecutor concluded that there was insufficient evidence to bring criminal
charges. However, the Florida Department of Business and Professional Licensing subsequently
brought an eleven-count administrative complaint against the City commissioner's son, his son's
company, andthewinning bidder to thepublic bid Mr. Eisenberg challenged, alleging kickbacks
and illegal profits on the real estate transaction. The complaint was settled with winning bidder
agreeing topay fines.
13. In 1995, Mr. Eisenberg challenged the City's and Miami-Dade County's creation
of a redevelopment area related to the Miami Beach Convention Center. When City officials
were interviewed about Mr. Eisenberg's claims, rather than comment onthemerits, they accused
Mr. Eisenberg of being vengeful after losing his previous lawsuits related to the bid protest case.
Mr. Eisenberg, however, had merely argued that even though the area was undergoing an
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Case 1:13-cv-23620-CMA Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/08/2013 Page 4 of 28
economic resurgence, the City's finding that the area was blighted was pretextual and a scheme
tousethepower of tax-increment financing for unnecessary "redevelopment" purposes.
The City's Culture of Corruption Continues
14. The City's culture of corruption would continue. In 2006, a City electrical
inspector was arrested for soliciting bribes. Hepleaded guilty and servedjail time.
15. In 2008, aCity fire protection analyst was fired after alerting his superiors of his
suspicions that building renovations were being purposely undervalued to lower permitting fees
inexchange for kickbacks.
16. Also in 2008, aCity planner, aCity building plans examiner, and aCity building
inspector werecaught accepting bribes. All three plead guilty and servedjail time.
17. In 2012, the City's procurement director, Gus Lopez, was arrested and charged
with 63 felony counts, ranging fromracketeering to bid-tampering to illegal compensation. Mr.
Lopez had been heading the City's search for developer to carry out a$1.1 billion renovation of
theMiami Beach Convention Center.
18. Also in 2012, seven City code compliance and fire department inspectors were
arrested by theFederal Bureau of Investigation for extorting abusiness owner by demanding and
then accepting bribes in J une 2011 to forego City code enforcement inspections and fines. All
seven plead guilty to federal crimes. Inthewakeof this scandal, theCity manager resigned.
19. Oneof these inspectors, J oseAlberto, was theCity's lead code compliance officer
responsible for managing and overseeing all Miami Beach code compliance officers. Hepleaded
guilty andwas sentenced to aprison termof more than four years.
20. From 2004 through 2009, the Plaintiffs and others in the neighborhood made
many complaints about the health and safety risks and code compliance violations of a
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neighboring building that was an abandoned hotel. The City investigated some of these
complaints but never took action to resolve the problems with the building. In 2009, Mr.
Eisenberg pleaded with the City's Zoning Board Of Adjustment to deny the building owner's
request for aoneyear extension to begin construction toresolve its code violations. TheBoard of
Adjustment did not grant the extension until the property owner promised to properly board up
and clean up all the loose debris from building. Once Mr. Eisenberg saw the work being
performed inatimely fashion hewithdrew his objection, andthe Board approved therequest.
21. During this same general time period, and as is more particularly described
hereafter, Plaintiffs were subjected to arbitrary, malicious, and intentional discrimination by
various City code compliance and fire department officials and inspectors. including Mr.
Alberto.
The City Arbitrarily and Maliciously Deems the Historic Sadigo Court aHotel to Prevent
the Plaintiffs from Renting Its Apartments to Transient Guests
22. Sadigo Court opened in 1936as anapartment with transient rentals andcontinued
operating in this fashion for many years thereafter. The City never objected to this practice.
Sadigo Court's original City certificates of useand occupancy were for anapartment and Sadigo
Court has always maintained this status.
23. Sadigo Court is located in an RM-2 zoning district, where the "main permitted
uses" include apartments, apartment hotels, and hotels. City of Miami Beach Land Development
Code ("Code") 142-212. The main differences between apartments and hotels are that
apartments must include cooking facilities and hotels are only intended to be occupied by
transient residents. See Code 114-1.
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24. Under the Code, transient rentals areallowed inapartments, apartment hotels, and
hotels in RM-2 and other zoning districts. Therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled, as amatter of right
under theCity's Code, to rent Sadigo Court's apartments to transient guests.
25. In 2006, after renting on an annual basis for a period of time, the Plaintiffs
resumed transient rentals of rooms in Sadigo Court.
26. Before resuming transient rentals, Sadigo Court obtained a state transient public
lodging establishment license from the Florida Department of Business and Professional
Regulation's Division of Hotels and Restaurants, which preemptively regulates public lodging
establishments across the state. Sadigo Court at first mistakenly was licensed as ahotel; later the
mistake was resolved, andtoday Sadigo Court is licensed as atransient apartment.
27. Before resuming transient rentals, Plaintiffs also verified with the City that
transient rentals of its apartments were legally permissible by confirming that the zoning district
and certificates of use and occupancy allowed transient rentals. Plaintiffs also applied for and
were granted aCity Resort Tax Registration Certificate, which is required for transient rental of
hotel andapartment units (defined asrentals of six months or less). Code 102-306.
28. Since 2006, the Plaintiffs have collected and paid the appropriate resort taxes to
theCity, County and Stateeach month as required by law. These transient rental taxes arebased
on the amounts Sadigo collects monthly fromits guests and include a3% City resort tax, a 3%
Miami-Dade County resort tax, and a 7% state resort tax. The City, County, and State have
consistently accepted these payments.
29. Inlate2006, thetransient guests began to arrive. Thereafter, Plaintiffs, pursuant to
a City-approved and issued building permit, constructed a cold food preparation area in Sadigo
Court to serve their transient guests in its interior courtyard, which cannot be seen from the
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street. After construction was completed and signed off on by the City, the City informed
Plaintiffs that it was a"hotel" not an"apartment" because it rented apartments to transient guests
and that the preparation area was actually a "restaurant," which only a hotel could have in the
RM-2 zoning district. Therefore, the City said Sadigo Court was required to obtain a new
certificate of use and occupancy as a"hotel."
30. The City has not deemed other similarly situated apartment buildings tobehotels,
nor has the City required the owners and operators of those apartment buildings to obtain anew
certificate of occupancy as a"hotel" before renting their apartments to transient guests. Rather,
the City has permitted such similarly situated apartments buildings to rent to transient guests
without obtaining acertificate of occupancy as a"hotel."
The City Arbitrarily and Maliciously Deems the Historic Sadigo Court aNew Hotel to
Prevent Plaintiffs from Renting Its Apartments to Transient Guests By Imposing
Unreasonable and Unnecessary Fire Protection Renovation Reguirements
31. The Plaintiffs complied with the City's request, believing their only option to
engage intransient rental activity at Sadigo Court was to apply for acertificate of occupancy as a
"hotel."
32. After Sadigo Court applied for a certificate of occupancy as a "hotel", the City
then arbitrarily and maliciously declared that, under its fire protection standards, Sadigo Court
was a "new" "hotel" that must meet the fire protection standards applicable to brand "new"
"hotel" structures.
33. In doing so, the City arbitrarily, maliciously, and knowingly refused to
acknowledge what it knew to betrue, namely: (1) that Sadigo Court was ahistoric structure in a
historic district and, as such, was not required to meet fire protection standards applicable to
brand "new" structures; (2) that, as ahistoric structure, Sadigo Court was allowed to prove that
its fire protection methods provide a reasonable level of life safety to its occupants; (3) that
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Sadigo Court complied with said standards; and (4) that Sadigo Court did not present an
unreasonable fire safety risk to its occupants or to the public in generaL The City was and is
awareof these facts because it hasbeen presented with competent substantial evidence, including
expert reports, establishing these facts on various occasions.
34. Instead of acknowledging these facts, the City arbitrarily and maliciously ignored
them and arbitrarily and maliciously required Plaintiffs to comply with fire safety regulations
applicable to brand "new" hotels knowing that, by doing so, it was imposing anunnecessary and
severefinancial burden on Plaintiffs' ability to continue renting to transient guests.
35. The City has not deemed other similarly situated historic apartment structures to
be subject to the fire safety requirements applicable to brand "new" structures; nor has the City
required the owners and operators of other similarly situated historic apartment structures to
make the same fire protection improvements that brand "new" hotel structures are required to
make. Rather, the City has permitted such similarly situated apartments to engage in transient
rental actions without having to comply with the fire protection standards applicable to brand
"new" hotel structures.
The City's Culture of Corruption Unjustly Ensnares Mr. Eisenberg Again
36. Sadigo Court attempted-repeatedly and unsuccessfully-to convince City staff
that Sadigo court should not be treated as a "new hotel" and that instead it should be treated at
worst as a historic structure that satisfied the fire protection standards applicable to historic
structures. Finally, Plaintiffs appeared at a City Commission meeting on J anuary 19, 2011,
seeking relief fromthe City officials' arbitrary actions fromtheMayor andCity Commission and
explaining what they felt was unfair treatment they had suffered at thehands of City staff. At this
meeting, Plaintiffs submitted a letter and materials detailing why Sadigo Court should not be
8
treated as a"new hotel" andhow it met fire safety requirements applicable to historic structures.
TheMayor, City Commissioners, City Manager, and City Attorney were indifferent to Plaintiffs'
claims. Indeed, theCity FireChief took great offense to Plaintiffs' claims of unfair treatment.
37. Two days later, on J anuary 21, 2011, Sadigo Court's mortgagee advised Plaintiffs
that it would not renew its loan on Sadigo Court, despite the fact that just months earlier, the
mortgagee had encouraged the Plaintiffs to renew the loan. Consequently, the Plaintiffs were
forced to refinance Sadigo Court at enormous unnecessary additional cost and at ahigher interest
ratethan they otherwise would have.
38. Based on information and belief, the City Fire Marshal had told Sadigo Court's
mortgagee that thePlaintiffs wereoperating Sadigo Court as anillegal hotel.
39. Soonthereafter, inApril 2011, the City told thePlaintiffs' longstanding client, the
Art Basel Foundation, that theSadigo Court was being operated as anillegal hotel. Traditionally,
the Foundation had rented about 200 room-nights per year. After being told by a City official
that Plaintiffs were illegally operating a hotel, the Foundation immediately severed its business
relationship withthePlaintiffs.
40. Then, in J une 2011, the City sent undercover police officers to Sadigo Court to
establish that Sadigo Court was renting to transient guests. After observing transient rental
activity, the City's police officers shut down Sadigo Court, and its tenants and guests were
evicted on thepretextual ground that Plaintiffs were violating City fire codes. The City's actions
attracted media attention. When interviewed by the media, the Plaintiffs chastised the City and
characterized their dispute with theCity as a"David andGoliath" battle.
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41. The City's shutdown caused the Plaintiffs' largest client, from whom Plaintiff
earned over $100,000 per year inrevenue, to immediately sever its business relationship with the
Plaintiffs.
42. InDecember 2011, theCity stormed Sadigo Court with at least 15police officers,
10 code enforcement officers, and 5 fire officials. They shut down Sadigo Court for a second
time, on the same pretextual grounds that Plaintiffs were in violation of City fire codes. This
second closure of Sadigo Court was maliciously timed by theCity to coincide with theextremely
high-profile City-wide weekend "Art Basel Miami Beach," one of the largest art shows in the
country. In connection with this art show, Sadigo Court was hosting the PooL Art Fair, one of
many area showcase events tobeheldthat weekend.
43. During the opening party for the three-day PooL Art Fair, Sadigo Court was
forcibly shut down by City police and code compliance personnel. All of the artists participating
inthe event and staying at Sadigo Court weredispossessed and forced to fmd lodging elsewhere.
All guests were only given onehour to retrieve their valuable art fromtherooms they had rented
andvacate.
44. J ose Alberto, the City's lead code compliance officer, accompanied the police.
While observing the closure, Alberto offered to solve Mr. Eisenberg's problems by using "his
people," insinuating abribe would be due fromMr. Eisenberg. When Mr. Eisenberg refused by
stating he already had legal counsel working on it. Alberto stated that Mr. Eisenberg would not
get far using legal means.
45. Mr. Eisenberg was then arrested.
46. Alberto, along with other code compliance and fire department inspectors. would
belater arrested inApril 2012 for bribes they accepted inJ une 2011.
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47. Since the arrest of these City code compliance and fire department inspectors,
Sadigo Court has not received any further codecompliance notices or violations.
The City's Application of Its Unwritten Customs, Policies. and Practices
48. The foregoing actions of City officials were taken pursuant to various unwritten
interpretations of City Codes and policies and practices promulgated and applied to Plaintiffs to
prevent Plaintiffs from renting apartments within Sadigo Court to transient guests without first
making very costly fire protection improvements to Sadigo Court that are neither necessary nor
legally required.
49. The unwritten interpretations, policies, and practices include: (1) while Sadigo
Court is zoned RM-2, which allows rental of apartments to transient guests, Plaintiffs are not
allowed to rent Sadigo Court to transient guests unless they agree to be classified as a hotel
rather than as an apartment; (2) where Plaintiffs engage innon-transient rentals of Sadigo Court,
they must also change its occupancy anduseto a"hotel" before engaging intransient rentals; (3)
where Plaintiffs change the occupancy and use of Sadigo Court to a "hotel" to engage in
transient rentals, it becomes a "new" hotel; (4) Sadigo Court, which has been designated as a
historic use or structure and has been reclassified as a "new" hotel because Plaintiffs seek to
engage in transient rental activities may not be considered a historic use or structure for fire
safety purposes no matter its age, designation as a historic use or structure, or actual historic
characteristics; and(5) Sadigo Court, which has been designated as ahistoric useor structure and
has been reclassified as a "new" hotel because Plaintiffs seek to engage in transient rental
activities must be treated as a newly-built structure for fire safety purposes no matter its age,
designation as a historic use or structure, or actual historic characteristics; (6) the City's fire
protection code applies to Sadigo Court's transient rental activities and code enforcement
activities may be brought against Plaintiffs on grounds that they are renting apartments within
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Sadigo Court to transient guests; and (7) the City may restrict transient rentals of Sadigo Court
solely based onits classification, useandoccupancy for transient rental purposes.
50. During the 2006-2012 period, the City posted numerous notices of violation or
cease and desist orders. All or nearly all of these notices and orders stated that the Plaintiffs had
violated fire safety codes because Sadigo Court was engaging intransient occupancy and useof
its apartments.
51. Chapter 509, Florida Statutes, establishes comprehensive regulatory oversight of
public lodging establishments "for the purpose of safeguarding the public health, safety, and
welfare." Fla. Stat. 509.032(1). Public lodging establishments include hotels, motels, vacation
rentals, nontransient apartments, and transient apartments. Under the statute, local governments
may conduct inspections of public lodging establishments for compliance with the statebuilding
code and fire prevention code. Fla. Stat. 509.032(7). However, all other regulation of public
lodging establishments ispreempted tothestate. Id. Further, alocal law, ordinance, or regulation
may not restrict the use of vacation rentals, prohibit vacation rentals, or regulate vacation rentals
based solely ontheir classification, use, or occupancy. Id.
52. The City has acted directly contrary to this legislative preemption and this
proscription, and it has further cynically attempted to evade them. Sadigo Court is licensed by
the State of Florida as atransient apartment, and Sadigo Court also offers vacation rentals. The
City, however, has developed its own unwritten, unadopted system of regulating public lodging
establishments. Using this system, theCity has deemed Sadigo Court as ahotel, directly contrary
to the State of Florida's determination. The City has done so in order to apply provisions of the
fire prevention code that would not otherwise apply were it not for the City's arbitrary
determination. Furthermore, using this unadopted regulatory scheme, the City has restricted,
12-----------------------
prohibited, and regulated Sadigo Court's vacation rentals based solely on their transient
classification, use, andoccupancy.
53. The City has applied and enforced its Code and its unwritten customs to Sadigo
Court in order to regulate it as apublic lodging establishment. Further, the City has applied its
Code and its unwritten customs to Sadigo Court in order to restrict the use of vacation rentals,
prohibit vacation rentals, and regulate vacation rentals based solely ontheir classification, use, or
occupancy. These unwritten customs werenot adopted onor before J une 1,2011.
54. Chapter 633, Florida Statutes, develops acomprehensive statewide systemof fire
prevention and control. Section 633.202, Florida Statutes, provides for a statewide fire
prevention code and its application "to protect public health, safety, and welfare for fire safety
issues. It governs the "design, construction, erection, alteration, modification, repair, and
demolition of public and private buildings, structures, and facilities." Fla. Stat. 633.202(1). It
allows local governments to impose "fire-related infrastructure requirements." It provides,
however, that the fire prevention code "does not apply to, and no code enforcement action shall
be brought with respect to, zoning requirements or land use requirements." Fla. Stat.
633.202(6).
55. Once again, not only has the City acted directly contrary to this legislative
proscription, but it has cynically attempted to evade it. The City applied the fireprevention code
to the Plaintiffs to deem Sadigo Court's land use status to be a hotel rather than an apartment,
even though the City's zoning and land use requirements allow apartments to offer transient
rentals. The City then relies on the fire prevention code to initiate the code enforcement actions
described above.
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56. The City has not and does not apply these interpretations and unwritten customs
to the owners and operators of other similarly situated apartments who rent their apartments to
transient guests.
The Consequences of the City's Arbitrary and Malevolent Actions
57. As described above, the City has engaged in a pattern of discriminatory actions
against thePlaintiffs motivated by theCity's malice and ill will resulting from: (1) thePlaintiffs'
past exposure of corrupt City practices, (2) the Plaintiffs' refusal to participate in such practices,
(3) the Plaintiffs' petitioning of elected officials for relief against the practices of City officials
and staff, (4) the Plaintiffs' public speech questioning the motives and actions of City officials
and staff, (5) thePlaintiffs' past efforts to thwart the City's declaration that properties owned by
Plaintiffs' and their related entities were "blighted" and must be redeveloped, (6) the Plaintiffs'
past lawsuits against the City related to its public bidding process and its tax-increment financing
processes, (7) the Plaintiffs' requests that the City enforce its code against neighboring property
owners (8) the City's desire to punish or "get" the Plaintiffs, and (9) for other unknown and
arbitrary reasons.
58. These policies andactions were intended to "get" Plaintiffs aspunishment for Mr.
Eisenberg having previously exposed City corruption, for Plaintiffs' refusal to "play along to get
along" with a corrupt City code compliance and fire inspection regime, and for publically
challenging the City's discriminatory conduct inthemedia andbefore theCity Commission.
59. These policies and actions reflect a pattern of pretextual regulatory legerdemain
intended to: (1) prevent Plaintiffs fromlawfully renting Sadigo Court unless they either "paid to
play" or acquiesced in City official's extortionate demands that they make costly fire safety
improvements to Sadigo Court that said officials knew were neither necessary nor legally
required; and (2) deprive Plaintiffs of the protections of the City's zoning and land use
14
regulations and state statutes that not only authorized Plaintiffs to rent Sadigo Court to transient
guests but expressly preempted or prohibited the City fromregulating or interfering with such
classification, use, andoccupancy of Sadigo Court based onits firecodes.
.
60. The City's actions have damaged the Plaintiffs. These damages include, but are
not limited to: loss of business; loss of customers; the cloud on Plaintiffs' title to the subject
property; the reduction inthevalue of Sadigo Court andthereal property it is located on; costs of
forced refinancing at ahigher rate and under undesirable terms; costs of attempting to comply
with the City's arbitrary and malicious demands; City fines, fees, and liens; impairment to
reputation; personal humiliation; mental anguish and suffering; emotional distress; a chill on
rights to freespeech andtopetition government; and costs and attorney's fees of this lawsuit and
of pursuing various City administrative andjudicial remedies which haveproved and continue to
befutile.
61. All the City's actions were by City policymakers, at their behest, or because of
their deliberate indifference. These policymakers include, but are not limited to, the Mayor, the
City Commissioners, the Fire Marshal, the Fire Chief, the code compliance director and the
building department director.
62. The Plaintiffs have retained the undersigned attorneys and are obligated to pay
themandtheir lawfirmareasonable fee.
COUNT I
Claim For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief And Damages Under The Federal
Constitution For Violation Of Equal Protection of Law
63. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1-62as if fully sort forth herein.
15
64. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988 and seeks
equitable relief and damages against the City for violating thePlaintiffs' right to equal protection
of law guaranteed under theFifth and Fourteenth Amendments totheU.S. Constitution.
65. The City intentionally treated Plaintiffs differently than similarly situated owners
of apartments that rent to transient guests, and there is no rational basis for the different
treatment. The City also intentionally treated Plaintiffs differently than similarly situated owners
of historic structures, andthere is norational basis for thedifferent treatment.
66. The City has arbitrarily and maliciously applied and enforced its Code and its
unwritten customs, policies, and practices unequally to discriminate against Plaintiffs without
natural basis.
67. The City's actions violate the Plaintiffs' rights to equal protection of law, for
which the City isliable.
68. The Plaintiffs are being irreparably harmed by the City's unequal and
discriminatory application of its Codeand its unwritten customs, policies andpractices.
69. It is in the public interest to protect owners and operators of a business that acts
and operates inthesamemanner asother lawful businesses within theCity.
70. The Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to secure meaningful prospective
relief fromthe City's unequal and discriminatory application andenforcement of its Code andits
unwritten customs.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following
relief:
a. Findthat theCity's unequal and discriminatory application andenforcement of its
Codeand its unwritten policies violated Plaintiffs' equal protection rights;
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b. Find that theCity is liablefor violating thePlaintiffs' equal protection rights;
c. Invalidate the City's interpretations of its Code and its unwritten policies and
practices that prevent thePlaintiffs fromrenting apartments at Sadigo Court totransient guests;
d. Enjoin the City frominterfering with thePlaintiffs' rental of apartments at Sadigo
Court to transient guests and from requiring Plaintiffs to make fire protection improvements
demanded bytheCity;
e. Award the Plaintiffs damages, pre-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs against theCity for having violated thePlaintiffs' equal protection rights;
f. Grant such other and further relief that this Court determines to beequitable, just,
proper, or necessary under thecircumstances.
COUNTn
Claim For DeelaratoD' And Injunctive Relief And Damages Under Tbe Federal
Constitution For Violation Of First Amendment Rigbts
72. This action is brought pursuant to 42 V.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988 and seeks
equitable relief anddamages against the City for violating thePlaintiffs' First Amendment rights
guaranteed under theFirst andFourteenth Amendments totheU.S. Constitution.
73. The Plaintiffs engaged in protected activity under the First Amendment by
petitioning the City and its elected officials and by publically commenting on their dispute with
theCity regarding Sadigo Court.
74. The City retaliated against the Plaintiffs, and the Plaintiffs' protected activities
were the sole, substantial, or motivating cause of the retaliation. The City would not have
undertaken its retaliatory actions inthe absence of thePlaintiffs' protected activities.
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75. The City's actions violate the Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to petition
government and for freespeech, for which theCity isliable.
76. ThePlaintiffs arebeing irreparably banned by theCity's retaliation.
77. It is in the public interest to protect citizens from government retaliation when
citizens exercise their constitutional rights.
relief fromtheCity's retaliation.
relief:
a. Find that theCity's retaliatory actions violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights;
b. Find that the City isliable for violating thePlaintiffs' First Amendment rights;
c. Invalidate City actions violative ofthe Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights;
g. Enjointhe City frominterfering with thePlaintiffs' rental of apartments at Sadigo
Court to transient guests; and from requiring Plaintiffs to make fire protection improvements
demanded by theCity;
h. Award the Plaintiffs damages, pre-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys'
fees andcosts against theCity for having violated thePlaintiffs' First Amendment rights;
d. Grant such other and further relief that this Court determines to beequitable, just,
COUNTm
Claim For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief And Damages Under The Federal
Constitution For Violation Of Due Process of Law
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80. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988 and seeks
equitable relief and damages against theCity for violating the Plaintiffs' rights of dueprocess of
lawguaranteed under theFifth and Fourteenth Amendments to theU.S. Constitution.
81. ThePlaintiffs haveproperty rights and liberty interests intheir real property, their
rights to usetheir real property for renting apartment units to transient guests. and their rights to
engage inthebusiness of renting apartment units to transient guests.
82. The City's interpretation of its Code and the unwritten policies and practices
promulgated and applied by City officials to prevent Plaintiffs from renting Sadigo Court to
transient guests without first making very costly fire protection improvements that are neither
necessary nor legally required are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and motivated by
malice and ill will toward Plaintiffs.
83. These policies. interpretations. and practices violate the Plaintiffs' rights to due
process of law, for which theCity is liable.
84. ThePlaintiffs arebeing irreparably harmed by the City's policies andactions.
85. It is in the public interest to protect owners and operators of a business that
operateinthesamemanner asother lawful businesses within theCity.
relief fromtheCity's policies interpretations andpractices.
relief:
a. Find that the City's policies interpretations, practices and actions regarding
Plaintiffs' rental of Sadigo Court apartment units to transient guests and regarding the fire
19
protection improvements necessary for historic structures have violated the Plaintiffs' due
process rights;
b. Find that theCity is liablefor violating thePlaintiffs' dueprocess rights;
c. Invalidate the City's unwritten interpretations and policies and practices that
prevent thePlaintiffs fromrenting apartments at Sadigo Court totransient guests;
d. Enjoin theCity frominterfering with thePlaintiffs' rental of apartments at Sadigo
Court to transient guests; and fromrequiring Plaintiffs to make the fireprotection improvements
f. Grant such other and further relief that this Court determines to be equitable, just,
COUNT I V
Claim For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief And Damages Under The Florida
Constitution For Violation Of Due Process of Law
87. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1-62as iffully sort forth herein.
88. This is anaction for equitable relief and damages against the City for violation of
the Plaintiffs' rights of due process under the law guaranteed by article I, sections 2 and 9 and
article X, section 6of the Florida Constitution, over which this Court hasjurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.s.C.section 1367; article V, section 5, of the Florida Constitution; and sections 26.012(2)
and 86.011, Florida Statutes.
89. ThePlaintiffs have property rights and liberty interests intheir real property, their
rights tousetheir real property for theuseof renting apartment units totransient guests, and their
rights to engage inthebusiness of renting apartment units to transient guests.
20
90. The City's interpretation of its Code and the unwritten policies and practices
promulgated and applied by City officials to prevent Plaintiffs from renting Sadigo Court to
transient guests without first making very costly fire protection improvements that are neither
necessary nor legally required are arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and motivated by
malice and ill will toward Plaintiffs.
91. These policies interpretations and practices violate the Plaintiffs' rights to due
process of law, for which theCity is liable.
92. ThePlaintiffs arebeing irreparably harmed by theCity's policies and actions.
93. It is inthe public interest to protect owners and operators of business that operate
inthe samemanner asother lawful businesses within theCity.
relief fromthe City's policies interpretations andpractices.
relief:
a. Find that the City's policies, interpretations, practices and actions regarding
Plaintiffs' rental of Sadigo Court apartment units to transient guests and regarding the fire
protection improvements necessary for historic structures have violated the Plaintiffs' due
process rights;
b. Find that theCity isliable for violating thePlaintiffs' dueprocess rights;
c. Invalidate the City's unwritten interpretations and policies and practices that
prevent thePlaintiffs fromrenting apartments at Sadigo Court to transient guests;
d. Enjoin theCity frominterfering with the Plaintiffs' rental of apartments at Sadigo
Court to transient guests; and fromrequiring Plaintiffs to make the fireprotection improvements
21
COUNT V
Claim For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief For Violation Of
Section 509.013, Florida Statutes
96. This is an action against the City for equitable relief for the City's violation of
section 509.032, Florida Statutes, over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 V.S.C.
section l367 andsection 86.011, Florida Statutes.
97. Section 509.032(7), Florida Statutes, provides that regulation of public lodging
establishments is preempted to the state. Section 509.032(7), Florida Statutes, provides that a
local law, ordinance, or regulation may not restrict the use of vacation rentals, prohibit vacation
rentals, or regulate vacation rentals based solely ontheir classification, use, or occupancy.
98. Sadigo Court is a public lodging establishment holding a valid license issued
under chapter 509, Florida Statutes, by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation.
Sadigo Court offers vacation rentals, as defined by chapter 509, Florida Statutes.
99. The City has applied, interpreted and enforced its Codeand its unwritten policies
and practices to Sadigo Court in order to regulate it as a public lodging establishment. Further,
the City has interpreted, applied and enforced its Code and its unwritten policies andpractices to
Sadigo Court in order to restrict the use of vacation rentals, prohibit vacation rentals, and
22
regulate vacation rentals based solely on their classification, use, or occupancy. These unwritten
interpretations andpolicies andpractices werenot madeor adopted on or before J une 1,2011.
100. The Plaintiffs are being irreparably harmed by the City's application
interpretation, andenforcement of its Code anditsunwritten policies andpractices.
101. It is in the public interest to protect landowners who operate their businesses in
themanner prescribed by statelaw.
relief fromthe City's application and enforcement of its Codeandcustoms.
relief:
a. Find that the City's interpretation, application and enforcement of its Code and
unwritten policies and practices regarding the rental of apartment units in Sadigo Court to
transient guests andregarding the fireprotection improvements necessary for historic structures,
violates section 509.032, Florida Statutes;
b. Find that the City is liable for violating the Plaintiffs' rights under section
509.032, Florida Statutes;
c. Invalidate the City's interpretation, application and enforcement of its code and
unwritten policies andpractices that violate section 509.032, Florida Statutes;
d. Award thePlaintiffs costs against theCity for this action;
e. Grant such other and further relief that this Court determines to be equitable, just,
proper, or necessary under thecircwnstances.
COUNT VI
Claim For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief For Violation Of
Section 633.202(6), Florida Statutes
23
103. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1-62asif fully sort forth herein.
104. This is an action against the City for equitable relief for the City's violation of
section 633.202, Florida Statutes (formerly section 633.0125), over which this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28V.S.C. section 1367andsection 86.011, Florida Statutes.
105. Section 633.202, Florida Statutes, provides that the Florida Fire Prevention Code
does not apply to, and no code enforcement action shall be brought with respect to, zoning
requirements or land userequirements.
106. Whether an apartment may be rented to transient guest in a particular zoning
district such as the RM-2 zoning district directly relates to zoning and land use requirements to
which the Florida Fire Protection Code does not apply, and on account of which no code
enforcement actions may bebrought.
107. By interpretation of the City Code, and its unwritten policies and practices, the
City applies the Florida Fire Prevention Code to determine if particular land uses are hotels,
apartments, and transient uses and to make other determinations. The City then relies on the
Florida FirePrevention Code for code enforcement actions related tothese determinations,
108. The Plaintiffs are being irreparably harmed by the City's interpretations, and by
theapplication of itsunwritten policies andpractices.
109. It is in the public interest to protect landowners who operate their businesses in
themanner prescribed by statelaw.
relief fromtheCity's application and enforcement ofits customs.
Wherefore, thePlaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant thefollowing relief:
24
a. Find that the City's interpretation of its Code and its application and enforcement
of itsunwritten policies andpractices violates section 633.026(6), Florida Statutes;
b. Find that the City IS liable for violating the Plaintiffs' rights under section
633.026(6), Florida Statutes;
c. Invalidate the City's interpretation, application and enforcement of its code and
unwritten policies andpractices that violate section 633.026(6), Florida Statutes;
d. Award thePlaintiffs costs against theCity for this action;
e. Grant such other and further relief that this Court determines to beequitable, just,
COUNT VII
Claim For Declaratory Relief Under
28 U.S.c. Section 2201 and Section 86.021, Florida Statutes
111. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1~62as if fully sort forth here.
112. This is an action against the City for declaratory relief under 28 D.S.C. section
2201 and section 86.021, Florida Statutes, over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. sections 2201 and 1367and section 86.011, Florida Statutes.
113. Theissues before this Court are:
a. Whether Sadigo Court is anapartment building with apartment units;
b. Whether the Plaintiffs may rent and lease Sadigo Court's apartments to both
transient andnon-transient guests, and whether the Plaintiffs need any permits or approval from
the City when they transition the renting and leasing of Sadigo Court's apartments from non-
transient guests to transient guests, or viceversa.
25
c. Whether Sadigo Court qualifies as a historic structure under all applicable fire
safety codes and provisions, and whether such status is or can be lost when Plaintiffs applied or
applies for any permits or approvals fromtheCity.
d. Whether Sadigo Court meets all equivalency standards under all applicable fire
safety codes and provisions, and whether such status is or can be lost when Plaintiffs applied or
applies for any permits or approvals fromtheCity.
114. A bona fide, actual, and present practical need exists for this Court to consider
anddeclaretherights and obligations of theparties, including therights of thePlaintiffs.
115. By engaging in the arbitrary, malicious, and discriminatory actions described in
detail above, the City is in violation of federal and state law, and the City is creating a present
ascertained or ascertainable stateof facts or apresent controversy about astateof facts.
116. Given the City's conduct in this matter, the Plaintiffs are in doubt as to their
rights. They areaffected by the City's failure to follow federal and statelaw. They areentitled to
a declaratory judgment construing the rights, obligations, and relationship of and between the
City andthePlaintiffs.
117. The Plaintiffs are being irreparably harmed by the City's actions. No calculable
monetary damages canbeascertained that would compensate for the City's actions.
118. It is in the public interest to protect owners and operators of businesses that
operatetheir businesses inthemanner prescribed by federal, state, and local law.
119. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs arein need of adeclaratory judgment construing their
legal status andthelegal constraints andobligations of theCity.
Wherefore, thePlaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant the following relief:
26
a. Find and declare that Sadigo Court is an apartment building with apartment units,
andthat Sadigo Court isnot ahotel;
b. Find and declare that the Plaintiffs may rent and lease Sadigo Court's apartments
to both transient and non-transient guests, and that the Plaintiffs do not need any permits or
approval fromtheCity when they transition therenting andleasing ofSadigo Court's apartments
fromnon-transient guests to transient guests, or viceversa.
c. Find and declare that Sadigo Court qualifies as a historic structure under all
applicable fire safety codes andprovisions, andthat such status is not and shall not be lost when
Plaintiffs applied or applies for any permits or approvals fromthe City.
d. Find and declare that Sadigo Court meets all equivalency standards under all
applicable fire safety codes and provisions, andthat such status is not and shall not belost when
Plaintiffs applied or applies for any permits or approvals fromtheCity.
e. Award thePlaintiffs costs against theCity for this action;
DEMAND FOR J URy TRIAL
ThePlaintiffs hereby demands trial byjury onall issues sotriable.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
IHEREBY CERTIFY that on October ~~013 Ielectronically filed the foregoing with
the Clerk of the Court by using the CMlECF systemwhich will send anotice of electronic filing
totheparties of record.
By:
SM~~TLETT,SCHLOSSE~
LO~~
David Smolker, Esq., (FB #349259)
Ethan J . Loeb, Esq. (FB #0668338)
27
J acob T. Cremer, Esq. (FB #0083807)
500East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite200
Tampa, Florida 33602
Phone: 813-223-3888
Facsimile: 813-228-6422
Counsel for Plaintiffs

Eisenberg V City of Miami Beach Complaint 2013

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Eisenberg V City of Miami Beach Complaint 2013

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

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