Monsanto vs.

Factoran,
G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
FACTS:
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three
other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsifcation of public documents and
sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay a fne of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of
the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently afrmed
the same. She then fled a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was
pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute
pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that
she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still
vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance. In its 4th Indorsement
dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her
position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was
extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the
amount of P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnifed in favor
of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfed.
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April
17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the
date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension
which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her
suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50.
ISSUE:
The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public
ofcer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
RULING:
Pardon is defned as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with
the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inficts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
ofcial act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose beneft it is
intended, and not communicated ofcially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive
declared her not guilty of the crime for which she was convicted. In the case of State v.
Hazzard, we fnd this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number of
pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our
judicial system, but requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The
very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been
established by the most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may
relieve from the disability of fnes and forfeitures attendant upon a conviction, but they
cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been defnitely fxed.
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to
concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if
only to give meaning to the fat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should
not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fctitious belief
that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should
be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the
past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a
pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the
mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the
person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the
true character and purpose of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and efusive language of the Garland case, we are
in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto
restore a convicted felon to public ofce necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason
of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for
appointment to that ofce.
The rationale is plainly evident Public ofces are intended primarily for the collective
protection, safety and beneft of the common good. They cannot be compromised to
favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the ofense of estafa would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing
power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualifcation or
ineligibility from public ofce forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsifcation of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her
pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may
apply for reappointment to the ofce which was forfeited by reason of her conviction.
And in considering her qualifcations and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her ofense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated
diferently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualifcation from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising
from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service
of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and
novation.
The assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.