NAZARETH VS VILLAR

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC

G.R. No. 188635 January 29, 2013
BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX,
ZAMBOANGA CITY, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., (COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR.
KHEM M. INOK, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J.:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
1
A violation of this constitutional edict warrants
the disallowance of the payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment of a benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of
the Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of the recipient.
Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is
the decision rendered on June 4, 2009 by the Commission on Audit (COA) in COA Case No. 2009-045 entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth,
Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology, Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and Adjudication Office
(LAO)-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 and LAO-National Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006 on disallowances
of subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits in the total amount of P3,591,130.36,
2
affirming the issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by the
Audit Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City against the payment of benefits to covered officials and employees of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001 out of the savings of the DOST.
The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision dated June 4, 2009 "null and void," and prays for the lifting of the
disallowance of the payment of the benefits for CY2001 for being within the ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on
the strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora dated April 12, 2000 authorizing the use of the savings for the purpose.
Antecedents
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to provide a program for human resources development in
science and technology in order to achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive for total science
and technology mastery.
3
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8439 grants the following additional allowances and benefits (Magna Carta benefits) to the covered
officials and employees of the DOST, to wit:
(a) Honorarium. - S & T personnel who rendered services beyond the established irregular workload of scientists, technologists, researchers
and technicians whose broad and superior knowledge, expertise or professional standing in a specific field contributes to productivity and
innovativeness shall be entitled to receive honorarium subject to rules to be set by the Department;
(b) Share in royalties. - S & T scientists, engineers, researchers and other S & T personnel shall be entitled to receive share in royalties subject
to guidelines of the Department. The share in royalties shall be on a sixty percent-forty percent (60%-40%) basis in favor of the Government
and the personnel involved in the technology/ activity which has been produced or undertaken during the regular performance of their
functions. For the purpose of this Act, share in royalties shall be defined as a share in the proceeds of royalty payments arising from
patents, copyrights and other intellectual property rights;
If the researcher works with a private company and the program of activities to be undertaken has been mutually agreed upon by the
parties concerned, any royalty arising therefrom shall be divided according to the equity share in the research project;
(c) Hazard allowance. - S & T personnel involved in hazardous undertakings or assigned in hazardous workplaces, shall be paid hazard
allowances ranging from ten (10%) to thirty (30%) percent of their monthly basic salary depending on the nature and extent of the hazard
involved. The following shall be considered hazardous workplaces:
(1) Radiation-exposed laboratories and service workshops;
(2) Remote/depressed areas;
(3) Areas declared under a state of calamity or emergency;
(4) Strife-torn or embattled areas;
(5) Laboratories and other disease-infested areas.
(d) Subsistence allowance. - S & T personnel shall be entitled to full subsistence allowance equivalent to three (3) meals a day, which may be
computed and implemented in accordance with the criteria to be provided in the implementing rules and regulations. Those assigned out
of their regular work stations shall be entitled to per diem in place of the allowance;
(e) Laundry allowance. - S & T personnel who are required to wear a prescribed uniform during office hours shall be entitled to a laundry
allowance of not less than One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) a month;
(f) Housing and quarter allowance. - S & T personnel who are on duty in laboratories, research and development centers and other
government facilities shall be entitled to free living quarters within the government facility where they are stationed: Provided, That the
personnel have their residence outside of the fifty (50)-kilometer radius from such government facility;
(g) Longevity pay. - A monthly longevity pay equivalent to five percent (5%) of the monthly basic salary shall be paid to S & T personnel for
every five (5) years of continuous and meritorious service as determined by the Secretary of the Department; and
(h) Medical examination. - During the tenure of their employment, S & T personnel shall be given a compulsory free medical examination
once a year and immunization as the case may warrant. The medical examination shall include:
(1) Complete physical examination;
(2) Routine laboratory, Chest X-ray and ECG;
(3) Psychometric examination;
(4) Dental examination;
(5) Other indicated examination.
Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the
year following the enactment of R.A. No. 8439.
4

The DOST Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City released the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY
1998 despite the absence of specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA. Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State
Auditor Ramon E. Vargas on April 23, 1999, October 28, 1999, June 20, 2000, February 27, 2001, June 27, 2001, October 10, 2001 and October 17, 2001,
several NDs were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta benefits. The justifications for the disallowance were stated in the post-audit
report, as follows:
a) ND Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to 99-105-101 (98) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry Allowances and Hazard Pay for the months of
February-November 1998 The State Auditor claims that no funds were appropriated in the 1998 General Appropriations Act for the said
purpose notwithstanding the effectivity of the Magna Carta, providing for payment of allowances and benefits, among others, to Science
and Technology Personnel in the Government;
b) ND Nos. 2000-101-101 (99) to 2000-010-101 (99) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry Allowances and Hazard Pay for the months of
January-June 1999 The State Auditor claims that no Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC)
guidelines were issued by the said Departments on the payment thereof;
c) ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry Allowances, Hazard Pay and Health Care Program
for the month of October 1999 and January-September 2000 The State Auditor claims that there was no basis for the payment of the said
allowances because the President vetoed provisions of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) regarding the use of savings for the payment
of benefits;
d) ND Nos. 2001-014-101(00) to 2001-025-101 (00) Payment of Subsistence and Laundry Allowances, Hazard Pay and Medical Benefits for
the months of January-October 2001 The provision for the use of savings in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) was vetoed by the
President; hence, there was no basis for the payment of the aforesaid allowances or benefits according to the State Auditor.
5

The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to request the Office of the President (OP) through his
Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 (Request for Authority to Use Savings for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439) for
the authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.
6
The salient portions of the Memorandum of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.
explained the request in the following manner:
x x x. However, the amount necessary for its full implementation had not been provided in the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Since the Acts
effectivity, the Department had paid the 1998 MC benefits out of its current years savings as provided for in the Budget Issuances of the Department
of Budget and Management while the 1999 MC benefits were likewise sourced from the years savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA.
The 2000 GAA has no provision for the use of savings. The Department, therefore, cannot continue the payment of the Magna Carta benefits from its
2000 savings. x x x. The DOST personnel are looking forward to His Excellencys favorable consideration for the payment of said MC benefits, being
part of the administrations 10-point action program to quote "I will order immediate implementation of RA 8439 (the Magna Carta for Science and
Technology Personnel in Government)" as published in the Manila Bulletin dated May 20, 1998.
Through the Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved the
request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.,
7
viz:
With reference to your Memorandum dated April 03, 2000 requesting authority to use savings from the appropriations of that Department and its
agencies for the payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, please be informed that the said request is hereby approved.
On July 28, 2003, the petitioner, in her capacity as the DOST Regional Director in Region IX, lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director
Ellen Sescon, urging the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for the period covering CY 1998 to CY 2001 amounting to
P4,363,997.47. She anchored her appeal on the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora, and cited the provision in the GAA of
1998,
8
to wit:
Section 56. Priority in the Use of Savings. In the use of savings, priority shall be given to the augmentation of the amounts set aside for
compensation, bonus, retirement gratuity, terminal leave, old age pension of veterans and other personnel benefits authorized by law and those
expenditure items authorized in agency Special Provisions and in Sec. 16 and in other sections of the General Provisions of this Act.
9

In support of her appeal, the petitioner contended that the DOST Regional Office had "considered the subsistence and laundry allowance as falling
into the category other personnel benefits authorized by law, hence the payment of such allowances were charged to account 100-900 for Other
Benefits (Honoraria), which was declared to be the savings of our Office."
10
She argued that the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary
Zamora not only ratified the payment of the Magna Carta benefits out of the savings for CY 1998 and CY 1999 and allowed the use of the savings for
CY 2000, but also operated as a continuing endorsement of the use of savings to cover the Magna Carta benefits in succeeding calendar years.
The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication Director (RLAD), COA Regional Office IX in Zamboanga City, which denied the
appeal and affirmed the grounds stated in the NDs.
Not satisfied with the result, the petitioner elevated the matter to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office in Quezon City
On September 15, 2005, respondent Director Khem N. Inok of the COA Legal and Adjudication Office rendered a decision in LAO-N-2005-
308,
11
denying the petitioners appeal with the modification that only the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000 were to be set aside in
view of the authorization under the Memorandum of April 12, 2000 issued by Executive Secretary Zamora as the alter ego of the President. The
decision explained itself as follows:
In resolving the case, the following issues should first be resolved:
1. Whether or not the "approval" made by the Executive Secretary on April 12, 2000 on the request for authority to use savings of the agency
to pay the benefits, was valid; and
2. Whether or not the payments of the benefits made by the agency using its savings for the years 1998 and 1999 based on Section 56 of RA
8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998 [GAA]) were legal and valid.
Anent the first issue, the law in point is Article VI, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution, which aptly provides that:
"(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the PRESIDENT, x x x may by law, be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
Simply put, it means that only the President has the power to augment savings from one item to another in the budget of administrative agencies
under his control and supervision. This is the very reason why the President vetoed the Special Provisions in the 1998 GAA that would authorize the
department heads to use savings to augment other items of appropriations within the Executive Branch. Such power could well be extended to his
Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the "doctrine of qualified political agency" enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Binamira v.
Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, where it was pronounced that the official acts of a Department Secretary are deemed acts of the President unless
disapproved or reprobated by the latter. Thus, in the instant case, the authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter
egos of the President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agencys savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in
2001, the authority granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.
On the second issue, the payments of benefits made by the agency in 1998 and 1999 were admittedly premised on the provisions of the General
Appropriations Acts (GAA) for CY 1998 and 1999 regarding the use of savings which states that:
"In the use of savings, priority shall be given to the augmentation of the amount set aside for compensation, bonus, retirement gratuity, terminal
leave, old age pensions of veterans and other personal benefits x x x." (Underscoring ours.)
It can be noted, however, that augmentation was likewise a requisite to make payments for such benefits which means that Presidential approval was
necessary in accordance with the above-cited provision of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, the acts of the agency in using its savings to pay the said
benefits without the said presidential approval were illegal considering that during those years there was no appropriations provided in the GAA to
pay such benefits.
Further, COA Decision Nos. 2003-060 dated March 18, 2003 and 2002-022 dated January 11, 2002, where this Commission lifted the DOST
disallowance on the payments of similar benefits in 1992 to 1995, can not be applied in the instant case. The disallowances therein dealt more on the
classification of the agency as health related or not while the instant case deals mainly on the availability of appropriated funds for the benefits under
RA 8439 and the guidelines for their payments.
Likewise, the certification of the DOST Secretary declaring work areas of S and T personnel as hazardous for purposes of entitlement to hazard
allowance is not valid and may be considered as self-serving. Under RA 7305 and its Implementing Rules and Regulation[s] (Magna Carta of Public
Health Workers), the determination which agencies are considered health-related establishments is within the competence of the Secretary of Health
which was used by this Commission in COA Decision No. 2003-060, supra, to wit:
x x x x
"It bears emphasis to state herein that it is within the competence of the Secretary of Health as mandated by RA 7305 and its IRR to determine which
agencies are health-related establishments. Corollary thereto, the certifications dated October 10, 1994 issued by then DOH Secretary Juan M. Flavier
that certain DOST personnel identified by DOST Secretary Padolina in his letter dated September 29, 1994 to be engaged in health and health-related
work and that of Secretary Hilarion J. Ramiro dated December 12, 1996 confirming the staff and personnel of the DOST and its attached agencies to be
engaged in health-related work and further certified to be a health-related establishment were sufficient basis for reconsideration of the disallowance
on subsistence and laundry allowances paid for 1992, 1993 and 1995."
x x x x
Assuming that the situation in the DOST and its attached agencies did not change as to consider it health-related establishment for its entitlement to
magna carta benefits, still the payments of the benefits cannot be sustained in audit not only for lack of said certification from the Secretary of
Department of Health for the years 1998 and 1999 but more importantly, for lack of funding.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein Appeal is DENIED with modification. NDs Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-013-101 (00) issued for the
payments of benefits for CY 2000 are hereby SET ASIDE while NDs pertaining to benefits paid for CY 1998, 1999 and 2001 shall STAY.
On December 1, 2005, the petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration in the COA Legal and Adjudication Office-National in Quezon City.
By resolution dated May 12, 2006,
12
the COA Legal and Adjudication Office-National denied the motion for reconsideration.
Thence, the petitioner filed a petition for review in the COA Head Office, insisting that the payment of Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST
Regional Office No. IX officials and employees had been allowed under R.A. No. 8349.
On June 4, 2009, the COA rendered the assailed decision, further modifying the decision of respondent Director Inok by also lifting and setting aside
the NDs covering the Magna Carta benefits for CY 1998 and CY 1999 for the same reason applicable to the lifting of the NDs for CY 2000, but
maintaining the disallowance of the benefits for CY 2001 on the ground that they were not covered by the authorization granted by the Memorandum
of April 12, 2000 of Executive Secretary Zamora.
The pertinent portions of the decision are quoted below, to wit:
Hence, the appellant filed the instant petition for review with the main argument that the payment of Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST
Regional Office No. IX employees is allowed pursuant to RA No. 8439.
ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is valid and legal.
DISCUSSION
It is clear that the funds utilized for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits came from the savings of the agency. The approval by the Executive
Secretary of the request for authority to use the said savings for payments of the benefits was an affirmation that the payments were authorized. The
Memorandum dated April 3, 2000 of the DOST Secretary requested for the approval of the payment out of savings of the CY 2000 benefits. Likewise,
the same Memorandum mentioned the 1998 Magna Carta benefits which were paid out of its current years savings as provided for in the budget
issuances of the DBM and the 1999 Magna Carta benefits which were sourced from the years savings as authorized in the 1999 GAA. When such
memorandum request was approved by the Executive Secretary in a Memorandum dated April 12, 2000, it was clear that the approval covered the
periods stated in the request, which were the 1998, 1999 and 2000 Magna Carta benefits.
Thus, this Commission hereby affirms LAO-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 which lifted ND Nos. 2001-001-101 (00) to 2001-
013-101 (00) for the payments of Magna Carta benefits for CY 2000 and which sustained the NDs for payments in 2001. However, for the
disallowances covering payments in 1998 and 1999, this Commission is inclined to lift the same. This is in view of the approval made by the Executive
Secretary for the agency to use its savings to pay the benefits for the years covered. Thus, when the Executive Secretary granted the request of the
DOST Secretary for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to its qualified personnel, the said payments became lawful for the periods covered in
the request, that is, CYs 1998, 1999 and 2000. Since the Magna Carta benefits paid in 2001 were not covered by the approval, the same were correctly
disallowed in audit.
In a previous COA Decision-No. 2006-015 dated January 31, 2006, the payment of hazard, subsistence and laundry allowances given to personnel of
the DOST, Regional Office No. VI, Iloilo City, was granted. The same decision also stated that in (sic) no doubt the DOST personnel, who are
qualified, are entitled to receive the Magna Carta benefits. The 1999 GAA did not prohibit the grant of these benefits but merely emphasized the
discretion of the agency head, upon authority of the President, to use savings from the Departments appropriation, to implement the payment of
benefits pursuant to the DOST Charter.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal on the payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998 and 1999 which were disallowed in ND
Nos. 99-001-101 (98) to 99-015-101 (98) and 2000-001-101 (99) to 2000-010-101 (99), is hereby GRANTED. Likewise, the lifting of ND Nos. 2001-001-101
(00) to 2001-013-101 (00) as embodied in LAO-National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 is hereby CONFIRMED. While the
disallowances on the payment of said benefits for 2001 as covered by ND Nos. 2001-014-101 (01) to 2001-032-101 (01) are hereby AFFIRMED.
Issues
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari, with the petitioner insisting that the COA gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in affirming the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 despite the provisions of R.A. No. 8439, and in ruling that the
Memorandum of April 12, 2000 did not cover the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001.
Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing ND No. 2001-014-101(01) to ND No. 2001-032-101(01)?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari lacks merit.
R. A. No. 8439 was enacted as a manifestation of the States recognition of science and technology as an essential component for the attainment of
national development and progress. The law offers a program of human resources development in science and technology to help realize and
maintain a sufficient pool of talent and manpower that will sustain the initiative for total science and technology mastery. In furtherance of this
objective, the law not only ensures scholarship programs and improved science and engineering education, but also affords incentives for those
pursuing careers in science and technology. Moreover, the salary scale of science and technology personnel is differentiated by R. A. No. 8439 from
the salary scales of government employees under the existing law.
As earlier mentioned, Section 7 of R. A. No. 8439 confers the Magna Carta benefits consisting of additional allowances and benefits to DOST officers
and employees, such as honorarium, share in royalties, hazard, subsistence, laundry, and housing and quarter allowances, longevity pay, and medical
examination. But the Magna Carta benefits will remain merely paper benefits without the corresponding allocation of funds in the GAA.
The petitioner urges the Court to treat the authority granted in the April 12, 2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora as a continuing
authorization to use the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.
We cannot agree with the petitioner.
The April 12, 2000 Memorandum was not a blanket authority from the OP to pay the benefits out of the DOSTs savings. Although the Memorandum
was silent as to the period covered by the request for authority to use the DOSTs savings, it was clear just the same that the Memorandum
encompassed only CY 1998, CY 1999 and CY 2000. The limitation of its applicability to those calendar years was based on the tenor of the request of
Secretary Uriarte, Jr. to the effect that the DOST had previously used its savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits in CY 1998 and CY 1999; that the
2000 GAA did not provide for the use of savings; and that the DOST personnel were looking forward to the Presidents favorable consideration. The
Memorandum could only be read as an authority covering the limited period until and inclusive of CY 2000. The text of the Memorandum was also
bereft of any indication that the authorization was to be indefinitely extended to any calendar year beyond CY 2000.
As we see it, the COA correctly ruled on the matter at hand. Article VI Section 29 (1) of the 1987 Constitution firmly declares that: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." This constitutional edict requires that the GAA be purposeful,
deliberate, and precise in its provisions and stipulations. As such, the requirement under Section 20
13
of R.A. No. 8439 that the amounts needed to
fund the Magna Carta benefits were to be appropriated by the GAA only meant that such funding must be purposefully, deliberately, and precisely
included in the GAA. The funding for the Magna Carta benefits would not materialize as a matter of course simply by fiat of R.A. No. 8439, but must
initially be proposed by the officials of the DOST as the concerned agency for submission to and consideration by Congress. That process is what
complies with the constitutional edict. R.A. No. 8439 alone could not fund the payment of the benefits because the GAA did not mirror every
provision of law that referred to it as the source of funding. It is worthy to note that the DOST itself acknowledged the absolute need for the
appropriation in the GAA. Otherwise, Secretary Uriarte, Jr. would not have needed to request the OP for the express authority to use the savings to
pay the Magna Carta benefits.
In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations
bill is the extent Congress will determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception is found in Section 25
(5),
14
Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for
their respective offices from the savings in other items of their respective appropriations. The plain language of the constitutional restriction leaves no
room for the petitioners posture, which we should now dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to
transfer savings only to augment another item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive. As the Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections:
15

When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The
exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the
exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the
courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining
the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within
the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply
to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision
and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the
operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction.
The claim of the petitioner that the payment of the 2001 Magna Carta benefits was upon the authorization extended by the OP through the 12 April
2000 Memorandum of Executive Secretary Zamora was outrightly bereft of legal basis. In so saying, she inexplicably, but self-servingly, ignored the
important provisions in the 2000 GAA on the use of savings, to wit:
Sec. 54. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution, the Ombudsman and the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
Sec. 55. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free of any
obligation or encumbrance still available after the completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized, or arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay.
Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of an item, project, activity or purpose with an appropriation which upon implementation or
subsequent evaluation of needed resources is determined to be deficient. In no case, therefore, shall a non-existent item, project, activity, purpose or
object of expenditure be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations authorized otherwise in this Act. (Bold emphases
added)
Under these provisions, the authority granted to the President was subject to two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation from the
agencys savings would be validly effected. The first required that there must be savings from the authorized appropriation of the agency. The second
demanded that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be
transferred for augmentation purposes only.
At any rate, the proposition of the petitioner that savings could and should be presumed from the mere transfer of funds is plainly incompatible with
the doctrine laid down in Demetria v. Alba,
16
in which the petition challenged the constitutionality of paragraph 1 of Section 44
17
of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 (Budget Reform Decree of 1977) in view of the express prohibition contained in Section 16(5)
18
of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
against the transfer of appropriations except to augment out of savings,
19
with the Court declaring the questioned provision of Presidential Decree
No. 1177 "null and void for being unconstitutional" upon the following reasoning, to wit:
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the
heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer
may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16(5). It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project, or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
Clearly and indubitably, the prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is the general rule. Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta
benefits for CY 2001 without a specific item or provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the DOSTs savings in
other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution, and the re-enacted GAA for 2001.
The COA is endowed with sufficient latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow the irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purposes for which they
had been intended by law. The "Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts
pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property, including the exclusive authority to define the scope
of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations".
20

Thus, the COA is generally accorded complete discretion in the exercise of its constitutional duty and responsibility to examine and audit
expenditures of public funds, particularly those which are perceptibly beyond what is sanctioned by law. Verily, the Court has sustained the
decisions of administrative authorities like the COA as a matter of general policy, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also upon the recognition that such administrative authorities held the expertise as to the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
21
The Court has accorded
not only respect but also finality to their findings especially when their decisions are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to
grave abuse of discretion.
22

Only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may
the Court entertain and grant a petition for certiorari brought to assail its actions.
23
Section 1 of Rule 65,
24
Rules of Court, demands that the petitioner
must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding. Inasmuch as the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction
of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner should establish
that the COA gravely abused its discretion. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a
positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
25
Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
26

The petitioner dismally failed to discharge her burden.1wphi1 We conclude and declare, therefore, that the COAs assailed decision was issued in
steadfast compliance of its duty under the Constitution and in the judicious exercise of its general audit power conferred to it by the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who caused the payment of the Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees
acted in good faith in the honest belief that there was a firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits. Evincing their good faith even after receiving
the NDs from the COA was their taking the initiative of earnestly requesting the OP for the authorization to use the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna
Carta benefits. On their part, the DOST covered officials and employees received the benefits because they considered themselves rightfully deserving
of the benefits under the long-awaited law.
The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be reimbursed to the Government. This accords with
consistent pronouncements of the Court, like that issued in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,
27
to wit:
Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala
28
supports petitioners position on the refund of the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the
officials and employees of several government departments and agencies were paid incentive benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that
Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19 January 1993 prohibited payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained the COA on the disallowance, it
nevertheless declared that:
Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992,
which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The
officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and
the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
This ruling in Blaquera applies to the instant case. Petitioners here received the additional allowances and bonuses in good faith under the honest
belief that LWUA Board Resolution No. 313 authorized such payment. At the time pet1t10ners received the additional allowances and bonuses, the
Court had not yet decided Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit.
29
Petitioners had no knowledge that such payment was without legal
basis. Thus, being in good faith, petitioners need not refund the allowances and bonuses they received but disallowed by the COA.
Also, in Veloso v. Commission on Audit
30
the Court, relying on a slew of jurisprudence
31
ruled that the recipients of the disallowed retirement and
gratuity pay remuneration need not refund whatever they had received:
x x x because all the parties acted in good faith. In this case, the questioned disbursement was made pursuant to an ordinance enacted as early as
December 7, 2000 although deemed approved only on August 22, 2002. The city officials disbursed the retirement and gratuity pay remuneration in
the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve
such reward.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision issued on June 4, 2009 by the Commission
Proper of the Commission on Audit in COA Case No. 2009-045; and DECLARES that the covered officials and employees of the Department of
Science and Technology who received the Magna Carta benefits for calendar year 2001 are not required to refund the disallowed benefits received.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
DEMETRIA VS ALBA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO
L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P.,
ISIDORO E. REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR S. ZIGA,
M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of
Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing
their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may
be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for"
1
listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY
AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY
THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM
AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.
2

Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for the public respondents,
questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable
controversy fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5],
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin
the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating, among others, that as a result of the
change in the administration, there is a need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to
concretize their respective stands."
3

Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as
grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has
allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)
4
as basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22, 1986, We stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondents both of whom have gone their separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case. But
there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised.
The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone
wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes
to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant
the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then,
not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We take cognizance of this
petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino
people in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI.
And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is
authority in support of petitioners' locus standi. Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence
of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Although
there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as
follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers
have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question
the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open
discretion to entertain the same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily
perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the
Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the
heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer
may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the
funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater temptation for
misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the
rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence,
the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the
prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all
safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as
correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for
the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political
and personal expediency."
5
The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government against a coordinate branch to
enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the
exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the
control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is
not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three
departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative.
Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the
paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the
legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its
constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may
do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or decrees without
jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the
public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but
because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to
that of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ
v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with
the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this
Court has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The
general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but
without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed
dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in our
statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.
IN RE LAURETA AND MARAVILLA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."
R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:
Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court promulgated on March 12, 1987,
finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion
for Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.
Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life and due process of law and by reason
thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that the charge against him that it was he who had
circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having
distributed copies to the press is not stated positively; that the banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not
responsible for such "misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and
officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of the Complaint to the press in
envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories about the case in a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy
articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press
conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the
complaint before the Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which newspaper
also made him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment
in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to plead for the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben
Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that
he was called by a reporter of DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the
filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago; that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the
Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his professional services having been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's
case before this Court; that similarities in the language and phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the
Tanodbayan do not prove his authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the
discussions on the merits in the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales being competent
to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the
two highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders;
that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious
charges of Eva Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the reminder on
the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon his law students;" and finally, that "for
the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."
In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the alleged deprivation of her constitutional right to due
process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in
criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable, in this proceeding, and that she should be given every opportunity to present her
side. Additionally, she states that, with some sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division
was arrived at without any deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded mystery"
thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong in making public the manner of
voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical letters to Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Isagani Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member of the Supreme Court and a
Division Chairman, respectively, the resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own
hands or joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into how her case was decided, and brought
her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had committed injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."
We deny reconsideration in both instances.
The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process abhors is absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-
cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987, Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he
should not be subjected to dispose action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22) pages,
double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Court and/or
the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she prayed that the contempt proceeding against her be dismissed,
contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the
letters written by Ilustre, his being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said
body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those letters and the charges
levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their malicious and contemptuous character, but also the
lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton
disregard of the cardinal doctrine of independence of the Judiciary.Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity
to conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19, 1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty.
Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.
(1)
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause Resolution that his professional services
were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the
individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan.
Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty. Laureta as "counsel for the
complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its
dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.
Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after having failed to serve copy of the Per Curiam
Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F. Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been
informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two
copies of decision for her husband and for Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).
That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she filed, as of March 27, 1987, a
"Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre
acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client
relationship between her husband and Ilustre had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy
intended for Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the corespondents
is heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.
Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment on the Ilustre charges
before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the
truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary
courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.
The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for Reconsideration that he
"understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his
being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case
last year." The malice lurking in that statement is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.
Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more properly addressed to the
Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus
incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of
March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended dissertation in
the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and balances, pursuant to which it is this Court
"entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice."
Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by environmental facts and
circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the charges against the Justices concerned before the
Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum
of justice" was implemented to the fun. Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he
has been visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to destroy the
"authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justifiable
disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.
In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a modification, much less a reversal, of our finding that
he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an
attorney and officer of the Court.
(2)
Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification. She and her counsel have
refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in
so doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation" was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en
banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14,
1986 showed that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all
deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences should have been drawn from their
inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was
Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was
rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the
First Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.
Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around. Three of them failed to serve on her
personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo
C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo, Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that address to serve copy of
the Resolution but he reported:
4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said address could not be located;
5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila, and they informed that there is no
such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p. 672, Rollo, Vol. 11).
The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He reported:
2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished at; the notice of judgment (101 Felix
Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by an elderly woman who admitted to be the owner of the house but
vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me that she does not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further that she
always meets different persons looking for Miss Maravilla because the latter always gives the address of her house;
3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to serve a resolution to Miss Maravilla
which was returned unserved because she is not known in the place; ... (p. 674, Rollo, Vol. II).
And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at 101 Felix Manalo St.,
Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a resident of and that she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious
elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further standing before this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting aside of the order suspending him from the
practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre
shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10) days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine
within the stipulated period.
SO ORDERED.
METROBANK VS TOBIAS
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION


METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO.
(METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A.
SANTIAGO,
Petitioner,


-versus-



ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 177780

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
*
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 25, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal assails the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
1
that dismissed the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to nullify and
set aside the resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice on July 20, 2004
2
and November 18, 2005
3
directing the City Prosecutor of Malabon City to
withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 27020 entitled People v. Antonino O. Tobias III.

We affirm the CA in keeping with the principle of non-interference with the prerogative of the Secretary of Justice to review the resolutions of the
public prosecutor in the latters determination of the existence of probable cause, absent any showing that the Secretary of Justice thereby commits
grave abuse of his discretion.

Antecedents
In 1997, Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City, was
introduced to respondent Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client of METROBANK. Subsequently, Tobias
opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan
from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. METROBANK next
proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as collateral by asking him for a photocopy of the title and other related documents.
4
The property
consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area of 6,080 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. M-16751.
5
Based on the financial statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a credit line for P40,000,000.00. On August
15, 1997, Joselito Bermeo Moreno, Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon to cause the
annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-16751. The annotation was Entry No. 26897.
6


Thereafter, Tobias initially availed himself of P20,000,000, but took out the balance within six months.
7
He paid the interest on the loan for about a
year before defaulting. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was
foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder.
8
On June 11, 1999, the certificate of sale was issued in favor of
METROBANK.
9


When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751
was found in the registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register of Deeds of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and learned that
Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had been issued for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT No. 16751 (now TCT No.
390146) appeared to have been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a parcel of land located in Navotas.
10


Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate.
11
In its report dated May
29, 2000,
12
PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing
against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in relation to Articles
172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.
13


The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents through the following
information,
14
viz:

xxx
That on or about the 15
th
day of August, 1997 in the Municipality of Malabon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretense, fraudulent acts and misrepresentation executed
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud, represented to METROBANK, as represented by MS. ROSELLA S.
SANTIAGO, that he is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-16751 which he represented to be true and
genuine when he knew the Certificate of Title No. M-16751 is fake and spurious and executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
Metrobank and offered the same as collateral for a loan and Rosella S. Santiago relying on said misrepresentation gave to
accused, the amount of P20,000,000.00 and once in possession of the amount, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously failed to deliver the land covered by spurious title and misappropriate, misapply and converted the said amount
of P20,000,000.00 to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to return the amount to complainant METROBANK, and/or delivered the land covered in the spurious title in the
aforementioned amount of P20,000,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
15

Tobias filed a motion for re-investigation,
16
which was granted.
In his counter-affidavit submitted during the re-investigation,
17
Tobias averred that he had bought the property from one Leonardo Fajardo through
real estate brokers Augusto Munsuyac and Carmelito Pilapil; that Natalio Bartolome, his financial consultant from Carwin International, had
convinced him to purchase the property due to its being an ideal site for his meat processing plant and cold storage business; that the actual
inspection of the property as well as the verification made in the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City had ascertained the veracity of TCT No. 106083
under the name of Leonardo Fajardo; that he had applied for the loan from METROBANK to pay the purchase price by offering the property as
collateral; that in order for the final application to be processed and the loan proceeds to be released, METROBANK had advised him to have the title
first transferred to his name; that he had executed a deed of absolute sale with Fajardo covering the property, and that said instrument had been
properly registered in the Registry of Deeds; that the transfer of the title, being under the account of the seller, had been processed by seller Fajardo
and his brokers Munsuyac and Pilapil; that his title and the property had been inspected and verified by METROBANKs personnel; and that he did
not have any intention to defraud METROBANK.
Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being charged
with estafa through falsification of public document.
18

Tobias appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On July 20, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed
against Tobias,
19
to wit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Malabon City is
directed to cause the withdrawal of the Information in Crim. Case No. 27020 against respondent Antonino O. Tobias III, and
report the action taken thereon within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Acting Secretary of Justice Gutierrez opined that Tobias had sufficiently established his good faith in purchasing the property; that he had even used
part of the proceeds of the loan to pay the seller; that it was METROBANK that had caused the annotation of the mortgage on the TCT, thereby
creating an impression that the title had been existing in the Registry of Deeds at that time; that, accordingly, the presumption that the possessor of a
falsified document was the author of the falsification did not apply because it was always subject to the qualification or reference as to the
approximate time of the commission of the falsification.
METROBANK moved to reconsider,
20
arguing that Tobias had employed deceit or false pretense in offering the property as collateral by using a fake
title; and that the presumption that the possessor of the document was the author of the falsification applied because no other person could have
falsified the TCT and would have benefitted therefrom except Tobias himself.
On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANKs motion for reconsideration.
21

Ruling of the CA
METROBANK challenged the adverse resolutions through certiorari.
On December 29, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision,
22
dismissing METROBANKs petition for certiorari by holding that the presumption of
authorship might be disputed through a satisfactory explanation, viz:

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified
document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of
Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court
declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is
presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation
could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one.

It is in this score that We affirm the resolution of the Department of Justice finding no probable cause against private respondent
Tobias for estafa thru falsification of public document. The record speaks well of Tobias good faith and lack of criminal intention
and liability. Consider:

(a) Tobias has in his favor a similar presumption that good faith is always presumed. Therefore, he who claims
bad faith must prove it (Prinsipio vs. The Honorable Oscar Barrientos, G.R. 167025, December 19, 2005). No such
evidence of bad faith of Tobias appears on record;

(b) Tobias actuation in securing the loan belies any criminal intent on his part to deceive petitioner Bank. He
was not in a hurry to obtain the loan. He had to undergo the usual process of the investigative arm or machine of the
Bank not only on the location and the physical appearance of the property but likewise the veracity of its title. Out of
the approved P40,000,000.00 loan he only availed of P20,000,000.00, for his frozen meat business which upon
investigation of the Bank failed to give negative results;

(c) Tobias paid the necessary interests for one (1) year on the loan and two (2) installments on the restructured
loan; and

(d) More importantly, the loan was not released to him until after the mortgage was duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Malabon City and even paid the amount of P90,000.00 for the registration fees therefor.

These actuations, for sure, can only foretell that Tobias has the least intention to deceive the Bank in obtaining the loan. It may not
be surprising to find that Tobias could even be a victim himself by another person in purchasing the properties he offered as
security for the loan.
23

The CA stressed that the determination of probable cause was an executive function within the discretion of the public prosecutor and, ultimately, of
the Secretary of Justice, and the courts of law could not interfere with such determination;
24
that the private complainant in a criminal action was only
concerned with its civil aspect; that should the State choose not to file the criminal action, the private complainant might initiate a civil action based
on Article 35 of the Civil Code, to wit:
In the eventuality that the Secretary of Justice refuses to file the criminal complaint, the complainant, whose only interest is the civil aspect
of the case and not the criminal aspect thereof, is not left without a remedy. In Vda. De Jacob vs. Puno, 131 SCRA 144, 149 [1984], the
Supreme Court has this for an answer:

The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of Justice would not allow the filing of a criminal
complaint against an accused because it is his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain an information for
the complaint with which the respondents are charged of, is to file a civil action as indicated in Article 35 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for
which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace
finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney
refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages
against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon
the defendants motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in
case the complainant should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting
attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
25

METROBANK sought reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion for that purpose, emphasizing that the presumption that METROBANK firmly
relied upon was overcome by Tobias sufficiently establishing his good faith and lack of criminal intent. The CA relevantly held:

Petitioner should be minded that the subject presumption that the possessor and user of a forged or falsified document is
presumed to be the falsifier or forger is a mere disputable presumption and not a conclusive one. Under the law on evidence,
presumptions are divided into two (2) classes: conclusive and rebuttable. Conclusive or absolute presumptions are rules
determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support of any particular averment which is not permitted to be overcome
by any proof that the fact is otherwise, if the basis facts are established (1 Greenleaf, Ev 44; 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 164; 1 Jones on
Evidence 6 ed, page 132). Upon the other hand, a disputable presumption has been defined as species of evidence that may be
accepted and acted on when there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be
overcome by other evidence (31A C.J.S., p. 197; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, Feb. 9, 1994; Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol.
VI, 1999 Edition, pp. 40-41). In fact, Section 3 of Rule 131 provides that the disputable presumptions therein enumerated are
satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Thus, as declared in Our decision in this
case, private respondent had shown evidence of good faith and lack of criminal intention and liability that can overthrow the
controversial disputable presumption.
26

Issue
In this appeal, METROBANK raises the lone issue of

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THUS,
COMMITTED PATENT ERROR IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION DATED 29 DECEMBER 2006, DISMISSING
METROBANKS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED 20 JULY 2004 AND 18
NOVEMBER 2005 OF THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUDTICE AND IN DENYING METROBANKS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
METROBANK submits that the presumption of authorship was sufficient to establish probable cause to hold Tobias for trial; that the presumption
applies when a person is found in possession of the forged instrument, makes use of it, and benefits from it; that contrary to the ruling of the CA,
there is no requirement that the legal presumption shall only apply in the absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed,
used and benefited from the forged document; that the CA erred in declaring that Tobias was in good faith, because good faith was merely
evidentiary and best raised in the trial on the merits; and that Tobias was heavily involved in amodus operandi of using fake titles because he was also
being tried for a similar crime in the RTC, Branch 133, in Makati City.
METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the
preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.
On the other hand, Tobias posits that the core function of the Department of Justice is to prosecute the guilty in criminal cases, not to persecute; that
although the prosecutors are given latitude to determine the existence of probable cause, the review power of the Secretary of Justice prevents
overzealous prosecutors from persecuting the innocent; that in reversing the resolution of Malabon City Assistant Prosecutor Ojer Pacis, the Secretary
of Justice only acted within his authority; that, indeed, the Secretary of Justice was correct in finding that there was lack of evidence to prove that the
purported fake title was the very cause that had induced the petitioner to grant the loan; and that the Secretary likewise appropriately found that
Tobias dealt with the petitioner in good faith because of lack of proof that he had employed fraud and deceit in securing the loan.
Lastly, Tobias argues that the presumption of forgery could not be applied in his case because it was METROBANK, through a representative, who
had annotated the real estate mortgage with the Registry of Deeds; and that he had no access to and contact with the Registry of Deeds, and whatever
went wrong after the annotation was beyond his control.
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government,
27
or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,
28
represented in this case
by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose
of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
29
That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
30
For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu
City,
31
the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required hard facts and solid evidence in order to hold the
defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial.
32
At a
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
33
Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
34
There is no definitive standard by which probable cause is determined except to
consider the attendant conditions; the existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the examination,
who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
35

Tobias was charged with estafa through falsification of public document the elements of which are: (a) the accused uses a fictitious name, or falsely
pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or employs other similar deceits; (b)
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property
because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
36
It is required that
the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive that induced the complainant to part with the thing.
37

METROBANK urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the spurious
title to secure the loan; and posits that there is no requirement that the presumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid explanation
from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged document.
We cannot sustain METROBANKs urging.
Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State.
38
The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary.
39
As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual
trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the
presumption and demolish the prima facie case.
40
This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the
existence of a prima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court.
41

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for which it
stands.
42
It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during
preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the duty to
weigh the evidence submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have ample
discretion to determine the existence of probable cause,
43
a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and inferences
can properly warrant.
The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation.
44
Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting
explanation by Tobias showing how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of
discretion, least of all grave. We concur with the erudite exposition of the CA on the matter, to wit:

It would seem that under the above proposition of the petitioner, the moment a person has in his possession a falsified document
and has made use of it, probable cause or prima facie is already established and that no amount of satisfactory explanation will
prevent the filing of the case in court by the investigating officer, for any such good explanation or defense can only be threshed
out in the trial on the merit. We are not to be persuaded. To give meaning to such argumentation will surely defeat the very
purpose for which preliminary investigation is required in this jurisdiction.

A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution.
A preliminary investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed, and (b) whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof (De Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 [2006]). It is a means of
discovering the person or persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime (Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 478 SCRA 387, 410 [2005]). Prescindingly, under Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
respondent must be informed of the accusation against him and shall have the right to examine the evidence against him and
submit his counter-affidavit to disprove criminal liability. By far, respondent in a criminal preliminary investigation is legally
entitled to explain his side of the accusation.

We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified
document and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger (Serrano vs. Court of
Appeals, 404 SCRA 639, 651 [2003]), citing Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192 SCRA 533, 546-547 [1990]). Yet, the Supreme Court
declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is
presumed to be the forger (citing People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120, 141 [1978]). Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation
could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one.
45

We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the
existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty.
46
Its duty included the responsibility
of dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of investigating who was its
real owner.
47
Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the
realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than
others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.
48
Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.
49

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on December
29, 2006. The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

TANADA VS CUENCO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10520 February 28, 1957
LORENZO M. TAADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO
REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing officer,respondents.
Taada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the
General elections held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido,
Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually
assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta,
Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbian-who had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now
pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. .
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose
P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Taada, on
behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on
behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators
Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1)
Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private
secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing
Officer of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who
belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taada-belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in
assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely
without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the
powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as
technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case
No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada, both as a Senator
belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional
rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of
not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more
than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the
rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5)
Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".
Petitioners pray that:.
"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately
issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,
restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina
Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and
making the Preliminary injunction permanent, with costs against the respondents.".
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the election of
respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents,
likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or control the
action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no cause of action, because "petitioner Taada
has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel,
and because the present action is not the proper remedy. .
I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6) Senators as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional
convention gave to the respective political parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the
original Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum", but "to bring the matter
to the bar of public opinion.".
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46
Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the
latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that
the Senate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress nor of the Senate. (Angara
vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46 Off. Gaz., 462.).
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall form part of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on
judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other hand, to determine whether the
powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function, they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the,
government, since the determination of the validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to
ascertain upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine whether the Constitution has
been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244,
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court exercised its jurisdiction over said case
and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the personnel thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet, this does not detract from the
power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality
of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said
Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the so-called "judicial
supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the exercise of the powers of the former Electoral
Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible
with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity of an act of Congress
or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without
violating the fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual destruction. 4.
Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise, invoked by respondents, in point. In the
Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended
by said House should not be considered in determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution, sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a precedent, has been
weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court proceeded to determine the number essential to
constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body. The issue
before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to
which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2)
Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the
Committee on Rules for the Senate.
The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation in the Commission on
Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main
purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of
the members of which is to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the issue
depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of said reorganization and of the necessity
or advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question. We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or
similar question, it being conceded, impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate.
The issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either by the Nacionalista Party, or
by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.
x x x x x x x x x
The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that the proper remedy for
petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises
merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.
In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but, to use petitioner, Taada's own
words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This
allegation may give the impression that said petitioner had declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in
the petition is to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the organization of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Taada was asked what remedies he would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista
Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator Taada replied:.
"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is no
recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator Rodriguez,
our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has always
ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of separation of powers
will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the
Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the
theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the
Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).
This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of
said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Taada was made. At any rate,
the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this connection,
Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass judgment
upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in
which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence
and extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because in
very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of
course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or
by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given
status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such
questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to designate
all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413;
see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis
supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the
procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no
jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus
raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be
finally settled.
x x x x x x x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the people in
their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs.
Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature
may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial
control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution
delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and
acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but
because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act
according to law and subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or
the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of
determining the limitations which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and
America, is necessary, to the end that the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any
written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in
the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of
the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate,
and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It
is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by
statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such
statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S.,
439; emphasis supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties
herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and
three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis
supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the Nacionalista
Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Taada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session of the Senate held on
February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Taada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3)
members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those who, according to the
provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Taada objected
formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista
Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of votes in
the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the
Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Taada
to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two
or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Taada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would
nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim,
Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338,
339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Taada, but, also,
maintaining that "Senator Taada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the
minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be
nominated by its spokesman, Senator Taada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other Senators already
mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole
morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the
meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at
8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and
the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Taada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo
M. Taada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this
proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to complete the
membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not
because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional
nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of
votes to nominate three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my objection to the last
nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha por el
Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios
Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the
election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must
necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to
which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6)
of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of
three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Taada nominated
himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the
Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of their co-respondents,
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to the
effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of
said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of
the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although Senator Taada formed
part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator Taada "is the distinguished
president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate
Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.
"At present Senator Taada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing Senate, is
not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we should be allowed to
grant this authority to Senator Taada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Taada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to nominate," adding
that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party, and
that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Taada was included in the
Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I
maintain that when Senator Taada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a
Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its
personality as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by
Senator Taada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Taada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether we like it or
not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. I think
that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that
Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator Taada to
help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Taada the "privilege" to nominate, and
said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without any, objection
whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded
the Citizens Party, represented by Senator Taada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.
Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional provision
relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne
out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of the
question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule,
it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a
consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to
no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of
contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory
provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or
practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such construction is
erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72;
emphasis supplied.) 6b.
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so essential to give
thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section
11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said
provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .
The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as
regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for
their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought.
Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members
of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of section
11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for the adjudication of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said
Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political justice in this
determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election
contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection of partisanship in
the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no
means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines
inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp.
257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party in a position to
dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each House the
judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the
case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the
minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag,
when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he
was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the rare
exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the,
decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111,
p. 361; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of them
belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these members
may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr.
President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis
supplied.).
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I
heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election,
returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the
election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest
argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States under the
Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained.
But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the past."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the equal
representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme
Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in the
determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself.
Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:.
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority party,
there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the
many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required
that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no
tyranny on the part of the majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this intervention
of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental
disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should
wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations
of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before
the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will
be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act
impartially in these electoral questions.
`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests. Hence, the
best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as
for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of
the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in
the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of the party of the minority
and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I repeat
that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the
minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and experience. To be
sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it wise to
create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also
having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain
evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the approval of
the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much
the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid
of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the
Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the
Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres miembrosala
mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros
del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria
asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para
dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del
partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of
election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the
largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given
the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control
the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same
number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said Commission or
Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to
Senator Taada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As
Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent
the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the members
of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will
become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide
election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators
like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be
free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from the minority who will act
as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the guarantee
that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no partisan motives
to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions
of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be
wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my
understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
x x x x x x x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its
decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote
in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional
Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate questioned the
right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Taada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to
nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit
of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively making the nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest, number of votes in
each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent,
however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be
maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present Senate, said feature
reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional
Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intention
of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of
statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within
the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S.,
613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are
mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the
legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form
of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from construing it one
way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a
mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the
extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; ..
On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried
out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory
should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is
mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and
what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to
some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute
are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words
of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the
purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a
provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute,
which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to
the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be
performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases,
Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution,
reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is
founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of
said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of the Electoral
Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is
mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven (7),
instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the
solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party
having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one
member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The
same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two
Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the aforementioned
nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority
thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the
political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out,
and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the determination of election protests
pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of fact, when
Senator Taada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the
principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political
parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual
qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran
politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving
general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well
meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political
exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which it comes. As above stated,
this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the
necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal basis for the final
destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms
belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged
fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and
terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates
of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court
Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to reject an
interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could entrench itself in power
the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.
x x x x x x x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority against
members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the minority
party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion,
such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they
could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal.
x x x x x x x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates who were
adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Taada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive constitutional provisions
intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal
liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of
the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its
provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which Senator Taada did not have. Again, the alleged
waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the
Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular
thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec.
68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Taada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators
Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise,
specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the
truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation
that confronted Senator Taada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents,
is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the
nomination and election of Senator Taada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the nomination
and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not been
nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not
more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the
exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor
any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative
therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and
Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their
appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to
the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter falling within the
jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4)
respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly
elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from
exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No.
4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
TORRECAMPO VS MWSS
BARANGAY CAPTAIN BEDA
TORRECAMPO,
G.R. No. 188296
Petitioner, Present:


- versus -



CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
METROPOLITAN
WATERWORKS
AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM,
Diosdado Jose Allado,
Administrator,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS, Secretary
Hermogenes Ebdane,
Respondents.




Promulgated:

May 30, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 188296 is a petition for injunction
1
with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo (Torrecampo) of Barangay Matandang Balara, Quezon City, in his capacity as taxpayer and on behalf of
his barangay constituents and eight million Metro Manila residents, filed the present petition against respondents Manila Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) and Diosdado Jose M. Allado (Allado) in his official capacity as Administrator, and the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) and Hermogenes Ebdane (Ebdane) in his official capacity as Secretary.Torrecampo sought to enjoin respondents from implementing the
Circumferential Road 5 (C-5) Extension Project over Lot Nos. 42-B-2-A, 42-A-6 and 42-A-4 (subject lots),
2
all of which are owned by the MWSS. The C-
5 Road Extension Project will connect the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) to the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX).
The Facts
In his petition,
3
Torrecampo narrated that his constituents approached him on 30 June 2009 to report that personnel and heavy equipment from the
DPWH entered a portion of Barangay Matandang Balara to implement the C-5 Road Extension Project over Lot Nos. 42-A-4, 42-A-6 and 42-A-
4.
4
Torrecampo alleged that if the MWSS and the DPWH are allowed to continue and complete the C-5 Road Extension Project
within Barangay Matandang Balara, three aqueducts of the MWSS which supply water to eight million Metro Manila residents will be put at great
risk. Torrecampo insisted that the RIPADA area, consisting of Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris and PookDagohoy, located in Barangay University of the
Philippines (UP), Diliman, Quezon City, is a better alternative to subject lots.
Torrecampo filed the present petition on 1 July 2009, the very next day after the DPWHs entry. We considered the allegations and the issues in the
petition and required respondents to comment thereon. We also issued a status quo order, effective from 1 July 2009 and continuing until further
orders. We set the urgent application for ex-parte temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction for hearing on 6 July 2009.
5

Pertinent portions of the resolution which summarized the hearing read:

Atty. Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr. avers that the instant petition for injunction seeks to enjoin the implementation of the DPWH C-5 Road Extension Project
to connect the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX) to the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), alleging that the project would result to grave injustice and
irreparable injury to petitioner and the eight million residents of Metro Manila considering that the impending DPWH road project includes the
portion known as Tandang Sora Section located within petitioners barangay, underneath which are the aqueducts supplying water to eight million
residents of Metro Manila, which aqueducts might be damaged and thus imperil and disrupt water supply to all Metro Manila residents; that the
petition raises the fundamental right to health under Sec. 15, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution; and that this petition for injunction has to be filed
directly with the Supreme Court rather than with the lower court, pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. 8975 An Act to Ensure the Expeditious
Implementation and Completion of Government Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders,
Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations.

Assistant Solicitor General Eric Remegio Panga, lead counsel for respondent DPWH, asserts among others, that petitioners case does not fall within
the exception cited in R.A. 8975 and that under the principle of hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Said counsel likewise clarified that the proposed C-5 Road Expansion Project shall not be undertaken pending completion by the DPWH of studies
and tests on the safety concerns, including the determination of the existence and actual location of the aqueducts in the area.

Atty. Alberto C. Agra for respondent MWSS finds as premature the filing of the petition for injunction as there is yet no road expansion project to be
implemented; that the project as conceived has yet to pass prior review by the MWSS after submission by the DPWH of a detailed study as to actual
engineering design and actual tests for the conduct of any construction work; that the entry of DPWH in the area is to conduct study on the soil and
on the location of the aqueducts; and that under the premises, there is yet no justiciable controversy as alleged by petitioner.
6

After the respective counsels presented their arguments and answered queries from the members of the Court, we resolved to require all parties to
submit their memoranda within ten days from the hearing. We also deliberated on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, and resolved to lift
the status quo order of 1 July 2009 considering that no grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.
In their memorandum,
7
the MWSS and Allado, through the OGCC, explained the purpose of the MWSS and its participation in the C-5 Road
Extension Project. Under Republic Act No. 6234 (the MWSS Charter), the MWSS owns and has jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
waterworks and sewerage systems within the development path of the expanding Metro Manila area, Rizal province, and a portion of Cavite
province.
8
The MWSS installed three sub-terrain aqueducts that connect raw water from the La Mesa Dam to theBalara Filtration Plant located
in Barangay Matandang Balara, Diliman, Quezon City. Portions of these aqueducts are located underneath Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City,
and are buried in varying depths because of the uneven surface of Quezon Citys landscape.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1395 (PP 1395), issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 25 September 2007, declared and reserved
certain parcels of land of the RIPADA area for two purposes:

1. As an access highway for the new road alignment of the C-5 [Road] Extension Project that will connect the NLEX and SLEX with an area of THIRTY
SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY (37,820) SQUARE METERS, more or less.

2. As housing facilities for deserving and bonafide occupants, to include those active and retired UP employees presently residing in the said
communities with an area of FORTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE (46,563) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
9

The land reserved by PP 1395 has a total area of 84,383 square meters, and is bounded by University Valley Subdivision on the
North,Katipunan Avenue on the South, Tandang Sora Avenue on the East, and Dagohoy Street on the West. Lot 42-C-8-B has an area of 37,820 square
meters, while Lot 42-C-8-C has an area of 46,563 square meters. PP 1395 directed the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), under
the direct supervision of the Office of the President, to coordinate with DPWH for detailed engineering plans and designs for the access highway as
well as with the Land Registration Authority and Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for a
comprehensive development plan for housing facilities for the affected families in the areas.
10
At the time of issuance of PP 1395, MWSS did not have
any participation in the C-5 Extension Project.
On 3 December 2007, then MMDA Chairperson Bayani F. Fernando (Chairperson Fernando) wrote to then MWSS Administrator Lorenzo
H. Jamora and proposed the utilization of certain MWSS properties for constructing Medium Rise Buildings (MRBs) for the affected families who will
be displaced by the C-5 Road Extension Project.
11


The Board of Trustees of the MWSS, in a meeting held on 19 June 2008, resolved to uphold the position of the MWSS management that the MWSS
could not accede to Chairperson Fernandos request. Portions of Resolution No. 2008-120 read:

WHEREAS, Lot 42-B-2-A consisting of 9,018.20 square meters, more or less, is one of the operational facilities turned over to [Manila Water Company,
Inc.] MWCI. Three (3) main aqueducts [two-1575 mm. diameter Reinforced Concrete Pipes AQ1 and AQ2 (constructed in 1928 and 1955,
respectively), and one 2010 mm. Reinforced Concrete Pipe, Hexagonal] conveying raw water from La Mesa Dam toBalara Treatment Plants are
located underneath the subject area. The 60-meter wide ROW was designed to provide enough space for the rehabilitation, upgrading, and
maintenance of the aqueducts which have been in existence for more than 50 years, and maintenance thereof has to be undertaken to ensure
sustainability of water supply. The area should also be insulated from disruptions and disturbances such as increased traffic, construction activities,
and heavy loadings, as the subject areas were not technically designed to withstand such dynamic activities. Technically, the integrity of the pipes
underneath is compromised in cases of heavy loadings;

WHEREAS, Lot 42-A-6 consisting of an area of 2,026.50 square meters, more or less, is an extension of the above-mentioned property and for the same
reasons, the same should remain free from disruptions and disturbances;

WHEREAS, Lot 42-A-3 with an area of 15,647.60 square meters, more or less, located in front of MWSS complex is now developed as part of the C-5
road extension project;

WHEREAS, Lot 42-A-4 with an area of 47,655.70 square meters, more or less, is an extension of the C-5 road extension project;

WHEREAS, that parcel of land from the aggregate Lot 2 as shown in subdivision Plan PCS-8245 covered by TCT No. 80123 consisting of 8,414.71
square meters, more or less, is located within the MWSS Balara Complex and serves as a buffer zone of the chlorine house and other water facilities
comprising the Balara Treatment Plant No. 1.

x x x
WHEREFORE, on motion made by Trustee Reyes and duly seconded by Trustee Dumlao, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to UPHOLD the
position of Management that it cannot accede to the segregation of the aforementioned parcels of land of the MWSS inBarangay Balara, Quezon City
for the housing program of families affected by the C-5 Road Extension Project (NLEX-SLEX Connection). The aqueduct [Right-of-Way] ROW must
be retained/exclusively used for the proposed rehabilitation/upgrading works of the three (3) aqueducts by MWCI programmed from 2008 and
beyond given the fact that the ages or economic life of the same are nearly reached and/or future improvements considering the increase of
population of Metro Manila.
12

Between 3 December 2007 and 20 June 2008, there were correspondences between Atty. Rowena Turingan-Sanchez (Atty. Turingan-Sanchez),
Director IV of the Office of the President and Administrator Allado of the MWSS;
13
between MMDA Chairperson Fernando and Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita (Exec. Sec. Ermita);
14
between Leonor C. Cleofas, Deputy Administrator of the MWSS Operations Department, and Vicente Elefante,
Manager of the Property Management Department of the MWSS;
15
and between the Board of Directors of the MWSS and the Chairperson of the
MMDA on one hand, and Exec. Sec. Ermita on the other.
16
All these correspondences referred to the segregation of MWSS-owned lots for the
construction of MRBs for those affected by the C-5 Road Extension Project.
On 12 March 2009, MWSS issued Board Resolution No. 2009-052 and allowed DPWH to use the 60 Meter Right-of-Way for preliminary studies in the
implementation of the C-5 Road Extension Project. The Resolution reads:

Subject to the prior review by Management of the road construction design and the opinion of the OGCC approving the use of the right-of-way
(ROW), as recommended by Management and the joint Board Committees on Concession, Monitoring and Construction Management, RESOLVED,
as it is hereby resolved, to allow the use by the Department of Public Works and Highways of the MWSS Balara-La Mesa aqueduct ROW, including
the area of the Capitol Golf Course consisting of 93,941 square meters, for the implementation of theKatipunan/Tandang Sora Segment
Circumferential Road 5 Project.
17


DPWH entered the said properties of the MWSS on 30 June 2009 to conduct the necessary complete study and detailed design of the C-5 Road
Extension Project, including test pitting and geothermal profiling.
In their memorandum,
18
DPWH, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), stated that to execute the Magsaysay Avenue Congressional
Avenue segment of the C-5 Road Extension Project, the DPWH will follow the direction of the existing KatipunanAvenue Tandang Sora Avenue
road connection. A portion of Tandang Sora road, from Magsaysay Avenue to Damayan Road, will be widened to attain a 30-meter road width,
allowing three lanes per direction. The road-widening aspect of the above-mentioned portion of the project affects Lots 42-A-4 and 42-B-2-A of the
MWSS. A portion of Lot 42-B-2-A was occupied by the Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club until the early part of July 2009, when the MWSS allowed
DPWHs entry pursuant to Board Resolution No. 2009-052.
The Issues
Torrecampo raises only one issue: Whether respondents should be enjoined from commencing with and implementing the C-5 Road Extension Project
along Tandang Sora Road, affecting MWSS properties. Torrecampo argues that (1) he has the legal standing to file the present suit; (2) only the
Supreme Court may issue a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against government projects, according to the exception in
Section 3 of R.A. 8975; (3) the present suit is not premature; and (4) the implementation of the C-5 Road Extension Project violates and defeats the
purpose of R.A. 8975 unless it is enjoined.
The MWSS seeks the dismissal of Torrecampos petition on the following grounds: (1) the petition does not present a justiciable matter that requires
the Court to exercise its power of judicial review; (2) the petition failed to allege Torrecampos right that warrants the issuance of an injunction under
R.A. 8975; and (3) Torrecampo failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
The DPWH also limits the issue to Torrecampos entitlement to an injunctive writ. The DPWH argues that: (1) Torrecampo violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts; (2) MWSS did not object to DPWHs proposed project on the alleged ground that the project would destroy the aqueducts; (3)
there is no credible proof that the project is implemented in the RIPADA area; (4) the alignment in the RIPADA area is more difficult to undertake
compared to the DPWH alignment; (5) the petition cannot be a valid class suit becauseTorrecampo failed to show proof that he represents the interest
of eight million residents of Metro Manila; (6) the petition is not a valid taxpayers suit as there is yet no project to speak of; (7) the DPWHs
determination of the location of the project in accordance with its specialized skills and technical expertise should be accorded with finality and
respect; (8) Torrecampo is not entitled to the issuance of an injunctive writ; and (9) Torrecampo has no cause of action.
The Courts Ruling
The petition must fail. Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction. Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, a
matter outside this Courts jurisdiction. Torrecampo failed to show that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the
exercise of this Courts extraordinary certiorari power.
Judicial Review of a Question of Executive Policy
At the outset, we declare that Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of Executive policy, and quotes the Constitution as a thin veil for his
weak arguments.
Torrecampo asserts that [t]he right of the eight million residents of Metro Manila to clean and potable water is greatly put at risk x xx
19
and alleges
that the MWSS and the DPWH violate Section 16, Article II
20
and Section 6, Article XII
21
of the Constitution should they choose to proceed with the C-
5 Road Extension Project using MWSS properties instead of the RIPADA area. These issues, however, are dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.
22
Under the guise of the relative importance of the rights of a lesser number of motorists to a wider road vis-a-vis the rights
of some eight million residents of Metro Manila to clean and potable water, Torrecampo wants this Court to determine whether
the Tandang Sora area is a better alternative to the RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project.
Despite the definition of judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
23
an inquiry on issues raised by Torrecampowould delve into
matters that are exclusively within the wisdom of the Executive branch. The possibility of judicial interference, as well as the speculative nature of the
present petition, was clearly shown during the oral arguments:

JUSTICE CARPIO:
Ok, so, is it the province of this Court to tell the DPWH that [it] should construct the road not in the Ripada area but here in the Tandang Soraarea. Do
we have that jurisdiction?

Atty. Villamor
24
:
No, Your Honor. Maybe what your jurisdiction is to stop or enjoin the DPWH from constructing the DPWH and the Honorable Court need not direct
it, or not direct the DPWH to instead construct the Ripada area because it is already an ongoing concern Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Is that our duty or thats the duty of the President to tell the DPWH Secretary, dont waste our money, we have already the road on thisRipada side...
Atty. Villamor:
It can be the duty of the President Your Honor, but the petitioner here Your Honor...
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Did you go to the President and ask the President to tell the DPWH Secretary not to waste the taxpayers money?
Atty. Villamor:
No, the point Your Honor, the petitioner here is a lowly Barangay Captain...
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, but you can also go to the President if you think that there is a waste of funds by the DPWH Secretary?
Atty. Villamor:
We did not contemplate of [sic] that possibility Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
You should go to the superior first of the Department Secretary, ask the President. We are not the overseer of the President in terms of Executive
functions here.
Atty. Villamor:
Yes, but that is wanting. Maybe the Court is trying to say that we should have exhausted...
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Ok, do you know if the plan of DPWH includes fortifications of the aqueducts [so] that x x x the integrity will not suffer if there is a road over it?
Atty. Villamor:
We do not know, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
You do not know?
Atty. Villamor:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, it could be possible that they included that in their plans?
Atty. Villamor:
Well, Your Honors, as I have said Your Honor, apart from the fact that aqueducts will be put in danger, there is an ongoing Government project, Your
Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So, do you agree with me that it is possible x x x the DPWH did x x x make plans for remedial measures, so its possible that they in fact made
remedial measures?
Atty. Villamor:
Yes, thats possible, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Ok. You are coming here and you are alleging so many factual issues that hundreds of millions of pesos have already been disbursed?
Atty. Villamor:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO
What are your supporting papers on this?
Atty. Villamor:
The SARO that I have just shown, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, the SARO doesnt mean actual expenditure, there has to be a contract and the payments must have been made. There are so many SAROs
floating around and not a single centavo has been spent.
Atty. Villamor:
Im not saying by virtue of the SARO, Your Honor, moneys have been spent, what Im saying is that by virtue of that SARO the project is being
implemented and being pushed through by the MMDA, Your Honor.
25


The OGCC, in its presentation of the case for MWSS during the oral arguments, further explained the nature of DPWHs entry into MWSS premises:
Atty. Agra:
x x x
MWSS Board of Trustees, mindful of its mandate under its Charter, issued Resolution No. 2009-052 on March 12, 2009. The MWSS Board resolved to
allow the use by the Department of Public Works and Highways of the MWSS Balara, La Mesa aqueducts Right of Way for the implementation of
the Katipunan-Tandang Sora segment circumferential road [extension] project. However, as pointed out by counsel, the implementation of
the Resolution, is subject to two conditions precedent: (1) prior review by management of MWSS of the road construction design, and (2) opinion
from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel approving the use of the Right of Way. To date, the conditions have not been complied with,
simply because no road construction design has been prepared and submitted to the MWSS management for consideration. The objective, therefore,
of the entry into the MWSS property last week is two (2) fold. First, the purpose of the entry is to fence off, clear, segregate and secure the property in
order that DPWH can conduct the necessary complete study and detailed design of the proposed road extension project. The study includes test
pitting and geo-technical profiling. The results of the study will show the condition and location of the aqueducts, the condition and classification of
the soil, the requirements to protect the aqueducts, assuming that the detailed design is approved by the MWSS. Second reason, the entry is simply an
act of the ownership of the MWSS over its property along TandangSora. The lease contract with Capitol Golf expired in 2005. And therefore, with or
without the road extension project, the property should be fenced off. In sum, no approval of the road extension project has been made by the MWSS
since no study has been submitted to it.
MWSS recognizes the existence of two plans concerning the extension of the C-5. The other plan referred to in the petition as the better alternative is
being pursued by the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. The proposed road shall traverse Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris and Dagohoy, which
is referred to as the Ripada, within the University of the Philippines. An integral part of the project per Proclamation1395, is the proposed
construction of medium-rise buildings within the University of the Philippines. Therefore, Your Honors, under Proclamation 1395, MWSS has
no role, there is no aqueduct that would be affected by this proposed project under Proclamation No. 1395. However, in a proposed proclamation
which would effectively amend Proclamation No. 1395, the proposed relocation site of the bonafideresidents of the University of the Philippines shall
be within MWSS property along Tandang Sora. This is the subject of the petition. The letter of Administrator Diosdado Allado dated June 20, 2008,
which is attached to the petition as Annex B, was written in connection with the proposed proclamation not in connection with Proclamation No.
1395. The proposed proclamation again pertains to the proposed relocation of UP residents within the MWSS property, in connection with the
proposed C-5 project being carried out by MMDA. The first paragraph of the letter was conveniently omitted by petitioner in his discussion. Because
the first paragraph of the letter puts into context the objections of the MWSS. What petitioner projects is that the objections of the MWSS pertains to
the road extension project while in truth and in fact the letter referred, signed by Mr. Allado, the Administrator of the MWSS, refers to the objections
not on the the proposed road widening project, but on the proposed housing project. The objections of the MWSS of any disruption or any
disturbance on the aqueducts are confined to the proposed construction of medium-rise buildings that will be constructed on top of the aqueducts.
Thus, MWSS is not objecting to any proposed extension road project on top of the aqueducts. At this point MWSS cannot object or concur with any
road project since no comprehensive study has been made and has been submitted to the MWSS for its approval.

Further, it would be erroneous to automatically assume that any road above the aqueducts would necessarily impair or compromise the integrity of
the aqueducts. At present, as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, there are portions of the aqueducts which are under Commonwealth
Avenue, Luzon Avenue and Tandang Sora. The aqueducts to this day are intact and serve the water needs of the 8 million residents of Metro
Manila.
26

The determination of where, as between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is obviously not within the province of this Court. Such
determination belongs to the Executive branch. Moreover, in this case the DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to determine whether a road
can be safely constructed on land beneath which runs the aqueducts. Without such study, the MWSS, which owns the land, cannot decide whether to
allow the DPWH to construct the road. Absent such DPWH study and MWSS decision, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
can be alleged against or attributed to respondents warranting the exercise of this Courts extraordinary certiorari power.
27

Indeed, for the above reason alone, Torrecampos petition must fail. There is no need to further discuss the other issues raised by the parties.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition filed by Barangay Captain Beda Torrecampo. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.